CV #9: A Look At Money Sunk Into Paying For Vaccines, Research

On August 1, 2020, the Canadian Government, or rather taxpayers, handed out over $240,000 to conduct research which included the study of the issues surrounding MANDATORY vaccines. Yes, that was apparently worth paying for a study. Now, let’s see what else the public’s money has been spent on.

1. Grants To Develop CV Vaccines In Canada

NAME DATE AMOUNT
Alberta Research Chemicals Inc. Jul. 1, 2020 $36,000
Archambault, Denis Jun. 1, 2020 $622,782
Barr, Stephen D Apr. 1, 2020 $998,840
Bell, John C Jun. 1, 2020 $1,936,150
Biodextris Inc. Sep. 24, 2020 $1,307,678
BioVectra Inc. Sep. 4, 2020 $5,412,045
Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Aug. 4, 2020 $40,000,000
Entos Pharmaceuticals Inc. May 1, 2020 $100,000
Entos Pharmaceuticals Inc. Sep. 1, 2020 $5,000,000
Falzarano, Darryl Feb. 1, 2020 $999,793
Falzarano, Darryl Jun. 1, 2020 $1,459,325
Grant, Michael D Sep. 1, 2020 $497,175
Halperin, Scott A Aug. 1, 2020 $240,731
Halperin, Scott A Sep. 1, 2020 $3,516,000
Houghton, Michael Apr. 1, 2020 $600,000
Immunovaccine Technologies Inc. Apr. 1, 2020 $378,239
Immunovaccine Technologies Inc. Apr. 1, 2020 $636,596
Immunovaccine Technologies Inc. Sep. 17, 2020 $1,000,000
Kobinger, Gary P Feb. 1, 2020 $999,356
Leclerc, Denis Feb. 1, 2020 $717,645
Les biotechnologies Ulysse inc Jun. 22, 2020 $30,000
Lewis, John D Jun. 1, 2020 $4,175,000
Liu, Jun Jun. 1, 2020 $416,483
McGill University (Academia) Nov. 6, 2020 $160,198
Medicago inc. Oct. 18, 2020 $173,000,000
Novocol Pharmaceutical of Canada Sep. 8, 2020 $500,000
PharmAchieve Corporation. Ltd. Apr. 1, 2020 $49,920
Pharma Glycovax Inc Aug. 31, 2020 $3,978,832
Precision NanoSystems Inc. Oct. 9, 2020 $18,203,000
Providence Therapeutics Holdings Sep. 1, 2020 $4,700,000
Resilience Biotechnologies Inc. Nov. 1, 2020 $2,103,150
Richardson, Christopher D Jun. 1, 2020 $138,097
Symvivo Corporation Sep. 4, 2020 $2,821,081
Watts, Tania H Jun. 1, 2020 $1,329,250
University of Saskatchewan Jul. 7, 2020 $23,000,000
Xing, Zhou Jun. 1, 2020 $1,920,985
Yao, Xiao-Jian Apr. 1, 2020 $326,578

This came from a quick search of Federal donations, “Vaccine + Covid”. A lot of money was spent already, for many different parties.

2. Other Grants Funding Vaccines/Research

NAME DATE AMOUNT
Adventist Development and Relief Agency Mar. 30, 2020 $3,500,000
Brockman, Mark A Dec. 1, 2011 $1,419,901
CARE Canada May 29, 2019 $2,000,000
Gavi, The Vaccine Alliance Mar. 28, 2014 $20,000,000
Gavi, The Vaccine Alliance Sep. 17, 2015 $500,000,000
IDRC Feb. 17, 2015 $3,000,000
Immuno Vaccine Technologies Sep. 15, 2011 $2,944,000
Immuno Vaccine Technologies Oct. 6, 2008 $3,000,000
Int’l Development Research Centre Sep. 29, 2015 $9,000,000
International Rescue Committee Jun. 12, 2019 $2,600,000
Kobinger, Gary P Apr. 1, 2017 $3,997,503
Loeb, Mark B Oct. 1, 2012 $2,864,660
Loeb, Mark B Jul. 1, 2016 $8,310,463
Medicago inc. May 13, 2015 $8,000,000
Medicago Inc. Jan. 1, 2019 $2,515,000
Novartis Animal Health Canada Inc. Nov. 1, 2006 $1,836,921
Novartis Animal Health Canada Inc. Nov. 7, 2008 $1,747,458
Ogilvie, Gina S Apr. 1, 2019 $10,090,731
Ostrowski, Mario A Dec. 1, 2011 $1,415,432
UNICEF Sep. 4, 2020 $2,500,000
University of Saskatchewan Feb. 16, 2018 $3,609,771
University of Saskatchewan Mar. 23, 2018 $15,609,771
University of Saskatchewan (VIDO) Oct. 2, 2007 $49,000,000
WHO – World Health Organization Mar. 31, 2015 $20,000,000
WHO – World Health Organization Nov. 13, 2019 $2,000,000
Xing, Zhou Jul. 1, 2017 $2,462,740

This is by no means all of them, but are some of the bigger grants flagged by searching “vaccines” on the Government of Canada website.

3. NSERC/CIHR/SSHRC Research Grants

NSERC, the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council, has also handed out hundreds of grants over the last year regarding “Covid research”. It’s available for all to see.

CIHR, the Canadian Institutes for Health Research, has also listed the grants they they will be handing out. As of August 8, 2020, it was listed at $111 million.

SSHRC, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, also has a website detailing information about its grants and spending.

4. Who Needs Science-Based Policy Anyway?

This is BC Provincial Health Officer, Bonnie Henry. Despite repeated admissions like this, the local media fawns over her, refusing to ask difficult questions. This is the unelected dictator of the Province, that all parties agreed to abdicate their responsibilities to. And this is what BC promotes as “safety“.

CV #30(E): Crestview Strategy, Danielle Peters, Lobbyists Behind $173 Million Grant To Medicago

Medicago received a grant of $173,000,000 to develop a CV-19 vaccine. Beyond that, a portion of the grant is to build a manufacturing facility, which presumably should be operational by 2040.

1. Other Articles On CV “Planned-emic”

The rest of the series is here. Many lies, lobbying, conflicts of interest, and various globalist agendas operating behind the scenes, obscuring the vile agenda called the GREAT RESET. The Gates Foundation finances: the WHO, the US CDC, GAVI, ID2020, John Hopkins University, Imperial College London, the Pirbright Institute, the BBC, and individual pharmaceutical companies. The International Health Regulations are legally binding. The Postmedia empire and the “independent” media are paid off, as are the fact-checkers. The virus was never isolated, PCR tests are a fraud, as are forced masks, social bubbles, and 2m distancing.

2. Danielle Peters, Major Pharma Lobbyist

  • February 4, 2019
  • February 4, 2019
  • February 5, 2019
  • November 27, 2019
  • January 22, 2020
  • March 3, 2020
  • March 5, 2020
  • May 25, 2020
  • June 8, 2020
  • June 8, 2020
  • June 29 2020
  • July 13, 2020
  • July 15, 2020
  • July 29, 2020
  • July 30, 2020
  • August 6, 2020
  • August 7, 2020
  • August 26, 2020
  • August 27, 2020
  • September 1, 2020
  • September 10, 2020
  • September 16, 2020
  • September 29, 2020
  • October 10, 2020
  • October 10 2020
  • January 13, 2021
  • January 28, 2021

The above list only includes searches for Medicago, which Danielle Peters is featured prominently. She has been registered as a Medicago lobbyist since 2013. Those dates are when she met on behalf of Medicago to lobby for vaccines. If you only search her name, Peters is involved in other pharma lobbying, such as with Merck, Kalgene Pharmaceuticals, Therapure Biopharma, and the Alliance for Safe Online Pharmacies

3. Danielle Peters, Magnet Strategy Group

Dani Peters is President of Magnet Strategy Group, a consulting firm that manages public affairs strategies in Canada and the United States.

Prior to founding Magnet Strategy Group, Dani held senior roles in public affairs firms in the U.S. and Canada, concentrating on fields that include innovation, health and life sciences. Over the past decade, Dani has worked with groups in the health sector to develop and manage government, public policy, funding, advocacy and stakeholder strategies.

Dani is co-founder of the Cross-Border Health Foundation, an organization that fosters dialogue between Canada and the United States around common health priorities. In addition to operating Magnet Strategy Group, Dani serves on the Industry Advisory Board for Bloom Burton & Co., a healthcare investment advisory firm in Toronto. She is also a Health Leader-in-Residence for the World Health Innovation Network (WIN), within the University of Windsor’s Odette School of Business.

What else is there to say? She is clearly a very connected person. Considering that Medicago landed a $173 million contract, due largely to her lobbying, Peters was financially a great investment. This deal wasn’t just to fund vaccine research, it was to build a facility as well.

4. Peters Lobbied While With Rothwell

It worth pointing out that Peters also lobbied on behalf of Medicago when she was employed by the firm, Rothwell Group. Seems that not much has changed.

5. Peters Part Of Adjuvant Partners As Well

Look familiar? It should. This profile is almost identical to the Magnet profile, down to using the same photograph. Among other things, Adjuvant lists “gene therapy” as one area it’s involved with. This appears to be another lobbying firm, as they don’t do medical research themselves.

6. Peters’ LinkedIn Page

The profile of one of the main players behind the $173 million spending. However, she has not acted alone in this.

7. Blake Oliver Jumps Ship To Government

On February 26, 2020, Blake Oliver lobbied the Federal Government on behalf of Medicago, while still employed at Crestview Strategy. Days later, he was working for the Government, in the Ministry of Transportation. He also helped volunteer for the Liberals in the 2019 election.

8. Patricia Sibal, Liberal Party Volunteer

Also connected to this is Patricia Sabil. She has lobbied for Medicago, while working for Crestview Strategy. She is also a volunteer with the Liberals in Ontario and Quebec.

9. Susie Heath, Liberal With Wynne/McGuinty

Susie Heath spent years with the Liberal Government of Dalton McGuinty and Kathleen Wynne. She has also lobbied on behalf of Medicago, while with Crestview Strategy

10. Jennifer Babcock, Ex-Crestview Lobbyist

Babcock spent several years in Parliament, working for various politicians. She also lobbied on behalf of both Medicago and GAVI. Honourable mentions go out to Lucas Malinowski, and Joanna Carey, who appear to have since left Crestview.

Jason Clark is still with Crestview, and has acted for Medicago and GAVI. He volunteered in the 2015 election for Liberals in the Ottawa region. Crestview itself was co-founded by Rob Silver, husband of Katie Telford, Trudeau’s Chief-of-Staff.

Currently, Ashton Arsenault is registered as a lobbyist for both Medicago and GAVI. For some variety, he is a strategist with the Conservative Party of Canada.

For some background information into Crestview and other lobbying, please check here, here, here and here.

This is what they mean when they say “we’re all in it together”.

11. Conflicts Of Interest Ignored In Media

Given the heavy subsidization of the media in Canada, it’s no surprise that none of this is being reported. When outlets are dependent on the Government to prop them up, they are unlikely to do real research. But about that $173 million grant, people should know who is really pulling the strings.

CV #62(E): The Other Provincial Health Acts Written By WHO-IHR

Welcome to the second part of the Provincial Health Acts of Canada. As you will see, elements of the 2005 Quarantine Act are written into them.

1. Other Articles On CV “Planned-emic”

The rest of the series is here. Many lies, lobbying, conflicts of interest, and various globalist agendas operating behind the scenes, obscuring the vile agenda called the GREAT RESET. The Gates Foundation finances: the WHO, the US CDC, GAVI, ID2020, John Hopkins University, Imperial College London, the Pirbright Institute, the BBC, and individual pharmaceutical companies. The International Health Regulations are legally binding. The Postmedia empire and the “independent” media are paid off, as are the fact-checkers. The virus was never isolated, PCR tests are a fraud, as are forced masks, social bubbles, and 2m distancing.

2. Important Links

https://www.ourcommons.ca/Committees/en/HESA/StudyActivity?studyActivityId=981075
https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/38-1/HESA/report-2/

(AB) https://www.qp.alberta.ca/documents/Acts/P37.pdf
(SK) https://www.canlii.org/en/sk/laws/stat/ss-1994-c-p-37.1/11022/ss-1994-c-p-37.1.html
(MB) https://web2.gov.mb.ca/laws/statutes/ccsm/p210e.php
(ON) https://healthunit.org/wp-content/uploads/Health_Protection_and_Promotion_Act.pdf
CLICK HERE, for earlier piece on Provincial Health Acts

(QC) http://legisquebec.gouv.qc.ca/en/ShowDoc/cs/S-2.2
(NB) http://laws.gnb.ca/en/showfulldoc/cs/P-22.4//20210220
(NS) https://nslegislature.ca/sites/default/files/legc/statutes/health%20protection.pdf
(NL) https://www.assembly.nl.ca/Legislation/sr/statutes/p37-3.htm
(PEI) Prince Edward Island Public Health Act
(YK) https://legislation.yukon.ca/acts/puhesa.pdf

3. Quebec Public Health Act

5. Public health actions must be directed at protecting, maintaining or enhancing the health status and well-being of the general population and shall not focus on individuals except insofar as such actions are taken for the benefit of the community as a whole or a group of individuals.
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6. This Act is binding on the Government, on government departments and on bodies that are mandataries of the State.

CHAPTER IX
COMPULSORY TREATMENT AND PROPHYLACTIC MEASURES FOR CERTAIN CONTAGIOUS DISEASES OR INFECTIONS
DIVISION I
CONTAGIOUS DISEASES OR INFECTIONS AND COMPULSORY TREATMENT

83. The Minister may, by regulation, draw up a list of the contagious diseases or infections for which any person affected is obligated to submit to the medical treatments required to prevent contagion.
.
The list may include only contagious diseases or infections that are medically recognized as capable of constituting a serious threat to the health of a population and for which an effective treatment that would put an end to the contagion is available.
2001, c. 60, s. 83.

84. Any health professional with the authority to make a medical diagnosis or to assess a person’s state of health who observes that a person is likely suffering from a disease or infection to which this division applies must take, without delay, the required measures to ensure that the person receives the care required by his or her condition, or direct the person to a health and social services institution able to provide such treatments.
2001, c. 60, s. 84; 2020, c. 6, s. 25.

85. In the case of certain diseases or infections identified in the regulation, any health or social services institution having the necessary resources must admit as an emergency patient any person suffering or likely to be suffering from one of those diseases or infections. If the institution does not have the necessary resources, it must direct the person to an institution able to provide the required services.
2001, c. 60, s. 85.

86. Any health professional with the authority to make a medical diagnosis or to assess a person’s state of health who becomes aware that a person who is likely suffering from a disease or infection to which this division applies is refusing or neglecting to submit to an examination must notify the appropriate public health director as soon as possible.
.
Such a notice must also be given by any such professional who observes that a person is refusing or neglecting to submit to the required medical treatment or has discontinued a treatment that must be completed to prevent contagion or a recurrence of contagion.
2001, c. 60, s. 86; 2020, c. 6, s. 26.

87. Any public health director who receives a notice under section 86 must make an inquiry and, if the person refuses to be examined or to submit to the appropriate treatment, the public health director may apply to the Court for an order enjoining the person to submit to such examination or treatment.
2001, c. 60, s. 87.

88. A judge of the Court of Québec or of the municipal courts of the cities of Montréal, Laval or Québec having jurisdiction in the locality where the person is to be found may, if the judge believes on reasonable grounds that the protection of the health of the population so warrants, order the person to submit to an examination and receive the required medical treatment.
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In addition, the judge may, if the judge believes on serious grounds that the person will refuse to submit to the examination or to receive the treatment, order that the person be taken to an institution maintained by a health or social services institution for examination and treatment. The provisions of section 108 apply to that situation, with the necessary modifications.
2001, c. 60, s. 88.

DIVISION II
COMPULSORY PROPHYLACTIC MEASURES
.
89. The Minister may, for certain contagious diseases or infections medically recognized as capable of constituting a serious threat to the health of a population, make a regulation setting out prophylactic measures to be complied with by a person suffering or likely to be suffering from such a disease or infection, as well as by any person having been in contact with that person.
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Isolation, for a maximum period of 30 days, may form part of the prophylactic measures prescribed in the regulation of the Minister.
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The regulation shall prescribe the circumstances and conditions in which specific prophylactic measures are to be complied with to prevent contagion. It may also require certain health or social services institutions to admit as an emergency patient any person suffering or likely to be suffering from one of the contagious diseases or infections to which this section applies, as well as any person who has been in contact with that person.
2001, c. 60, s. 89.

90. Any health professional who observes that a person is omitting, neglecting or refusing to comply with the prophylactic measures prescribed in the regulation made under section 89 must notify the appropriate public health director as soon as possible.
.
The director must make an inquiry and, if the person refuses to comply with the necessary prophylactic measures, the director may apply to the Court for an order enjoining the person to do so.
The provisions of section 88 apply to that situation, with the necessary modifications.
The director may also, in the case of an emergency, use the powers conferred by section 103, and sections 108 and 109 apply to such a situation.
2001, c. 60, s. 90.

91. Despite any decision of the Court ordering the isolation of a person, isolation must cease as soon as the attending physician, after consulting the appropriate public health director, issues a certificate to the effect that the risk of contagion no longer exists.

Good old Quebec, where doctors can have you forcibly detained and “treated” based on the vague suspicion that you may have a communicable illness. And of course, the Court can have you locked up and isolated for 30 days at a time based on these suspicions.

4. New Brunswick Public Health Act

Duty to report contacts
2002, c.23, s.10; 2017, c.42, s.35
31A medical practitioner, nurse practitioner, midwife or nurse shall, in accordance with the regulations, report the person’s contacts related to a notifiable disease or notifiable event prescribed by regulation to a medical officer of health or person designated by the Minister, if the medical practitioner, nurse practitioner, midwife or nurse
(a) provides professional services to a person who has a notifiable disease prescribed by regulation or has suffered a notifiable event prescribed by regulation, or
(b) provided professional services to a deceased person before that person’s death and that person had a notifiable disease prescribed by regulation or had suffered a notifiable event prescribed by regulation.
2002, c.23, s.10; 2007, c.63, s.10; 2011, c.26, s.4; 2017, c.42, s.36

Duty to report refusal or neglect of treatment
2017, c.42, s.37
32A medical practitioner or nurse practitioner shall report to a medical officer of health, in accordance with the regulations, if a person who is under the care and treatment of the medical practitioner or the nurse practitioner in respect of a Group I notifiable disease refuses or neglects to continue the treatment in a manner and to a degree satisfactory to the medical practitioner or the nurse practitioner, as the case may be.
2017, c.42, s.38

Order respecting notifiable disease
2017, c.42, s.39
33(1)Subject to subsection (2), a medical officer of health by a written order may require a person to take or refrain from taking any action that is specified in the order in respect of a notifiable disease.
.
33(2)A medical officer of health may make an order under this section if he or she believes on reasonable grounds,
(a) that a notifiable disease exists or may exist in a health region,
(b) that the notifiable disease presents a risk to the health of persons in the health region, and
(c) that the requirements specified in the order are necessary to prevent, decrease or eliminate the risk to health presented by the notifiable disease.

33(3)In an order under this section, a medical officer of health may specify the time or times when or the period or periods of time within which the person to whom the order is directed must comply with the order.

33(4)An order under this section may include, but is not limited to,
(a) requiring any person that the order states has or may have a notifiable disease or is or may be infected with an agent of a notifiable disease to isolate himself or herself and remain in isolation from other persons,
.
(b) requiring the person to whom the order is directed to submit to an examination by a medical practitioner or a nurse practitioner and to deliver to the medical officer of health a report by the medical practitioner or nurse practitioner as to whether or not the person has a notifiable disease or is infected with an agent of a notifiable disease,
(c) requiring the person to whom the order is directed in respect of a disease that is a notifiable disease to place himself or herself under the care and treatment of a medical practitioner or nurse practitioner without delay, and
.
(d) requiring the person to whom the order is directed to conduct himself or herself in such a manner as not to expose another person to infection.

This is the Public Health Act of New Brunswick.

5. Nova Scotia Health Protection Act

COMMUNICABLE DISEASES
Powers respecting communicable diseases
32 (1) Where a medical officer is of the opinion, upon reasonable and probable grounds, that
(a) a communicable disease exists or may exist or that there is an immediate risk of an outbreak of a communicable disease;
(b) the communicable disease presents a risk to the public health; and
(c) the requirements specified in the order are necessary in order to decrease or eliminate the risk to the public health presented by the communicable disease, the medical officer may by written order require a person to take or to refrain from taking any action that is specified in the order in respect of a communicable disease

32 (3) Without limiting the generality of subsection (1), an order
made under this Section may
(a) require the owner or occupier of premises to close the premises or a part of the premises or to restrict access to the premises;
(b) require the displaying of signage on premises to give notice of an order requiring the closing of the premises;
(c) require any person that the order states has been exposed or may have been exposed to a communicable disease to quarantine himself or herself from other persons;
(d) require any person who has a communicable disease or is infected with an agent of a communicable disease to isolate himself or herself from other persons;
(e) require the cleaning or disinfecting, or both, of the premises or any thing specified in the order;
(f) require the destruction of any matter or thing specified in the order;
(g) require the person to whom the order is directed to submit to an examination by a physician who is acceptable to a medical officer and to deliver to the medical officer a report by the physician as to whether or not the person has a communicable disease or is or is not infected with an agent of a communicable disease;
(h) require the person to whom the order is directed in respect of a communicable disease to place himself or herself forthwith under the care and treatment of a physician who is acceptable to a medical officer;
(i) require the person to whom the order is directed to conduct himself or herself in such a manner as not to expose another person to infection.

Court may ensure compliance
38 (1) Where, upon application by a medical officer, a judge of the provincial court is satisfied that
(a) a person has failed to comply with an order by a medical officer made under to Section 32 that
(i) the person quarantine himself or herself from other persons,
(ii) the person isolate himself or herself from other persons,
(iii) the person submit to an examination by a physician who is acceptable to the medical officer,
(iv) the person place himself or herself under the care and treatment of a physician who is acceptable to the
medical officer, or
(v) the person conduct himself or herself in such a manner as not to expose another person to infection,
the judge may order that the person who has failed to comply with the order of the medical officer
(b) be taken into custody and be admitted to and detained in a quarantine facility named in the order;
(c) be taken into custody and be admitted to, detained and treated in an isolation facility named in the order;
(d) be examined by a physician who is acceptable to the medical officer to ascertain whether or not the person is infected with an agent of a communicable disease; or
(e) where found on examination to be infected with an agent of a communicable disease, be treated for the disease.
(2) Where an order made by a judge pursuant to subsection (1) is to be carried out by a physician or other health professional, the failure of the person subject to such an order to consent does not constitute an assault or battery against that person by the physician or other health professional should the order be carried out.
(3) A physician or other health professional carrying out an order pursuant to subsection (1) may obtain such assistance from a peace officer or other person as the physician or health professional reasonably believes is necessary.
(4) A judge shall not name an isolation facility or quarantine facility in an order under this Section unless the judge is satisfied that the isolation facility or quarantine facility is able to provide detention, care and treatment as required for the person who is the subject of the order. 2004, c. 4, s. 38.

Authority to apprehend and isolate or quarantine
39 (1) An order made under Section 38 is authority for any person to
(a) locate and apprehend the person who is the subject of the order; and
(b) deliver the person who is the subject of the order to the isolation facility or quarantine facility named in the order or to a physician for examination.
(2) An order made under Section 38 may be directed to a police force that has jurisdiction in the area where the person who is the subject of the order may be located, and the police force shall do all things reasonably able to be done to locate, apprehend and deliver the person to an isolation or quarantine facility in the jurisdiction where the person was apprehended or to an isolation or quarantine facility specified in the order.
(3) A person who apprehends a person who is the subject of an order pursuant to subsection (2) shall promptly
(a) inform the person of the reasons for the apprehension and of the person’s right to retain and instruct counsel without delay; and
(b) tell the person where the person is being taken.
(4) An order made under clause 38(1)(c) is authority to detain the person who is the subject of the order in the isolation facility named in the order and to care for and examine the person and to treat the person for the communicable disease in accordance with generally accepted medical practice for a period of not more than four months from and including the day that the order was issued.
(5) An order made under clause 38(1)(b) is authority to detain the person who is the subject of the order in the quarantine facility named in the order and to care for and examine the person for the incubation period of the communicable disease as determined by the judge.

Nova Scotia, like the others, can force a person to submit to a “medical examination” and do whatever is demanded of the health care provider

6. Newfoundland Public Health

Communicable disease orders
32. (1) A regional medical officer of health may make a communicable disease order under this section where he or she has reasonable grounds to believe that
(a) a communicable disease exists or may exist or that there is an immediate risk of an outbreak of a communicable disease;
(b) the communicable disease presents a risk to the health of the population; and
(c) the order is necessary to prevent, eliminate, remedy, or mitigate the risk to the health of the population.
(2) A regional medical officer of health may make a communicable disease order in respect of a person who has or may have a communicable disease or is infected with an infectious agent and the order may do one or more of the following:
(a) require the person to submit to an examination by a specified health care professional at a specified health facility on or before a particular date or according to a schedule;
(b) require the person to isolate himself or herself from other persons, including in a specified health facility;
(c) require the person to conduct himself or herself in a manner that will not expose other persons to infection or to take other precautions to prevent or limit the direct or indirect transmission of the communicable disease or infectious agent to those who are susceptible to the communicable disease or infectious agent or who may spread the communicable disease or infectious agent to others;
(d) prohibit or restrict the person from attending a school, a place of employment or other public premises or from using a public conveyance;
(e) prohibit or restrict the person from engaging in his or her occupation or another specified occupation or type of occupation;
(f) prohibit or restrict the person from leaving or entering a specified premises;
(g) require the person to avoid physical contact with, or being near, a person, animal or thing;
(h) require the person to be under the supervision or care of a specified person;
(i) require a person to provide information, records or other documents relevant to the person’s possible infection to a specified person;
(j) require a person to provide samples of the person’s clothing or possessions to a specified person;
(k) require a person to destroy contaminated clothing or possessions;
(l) require a person to provide specimens previously collected from the person to a specified person;
(m) where a regional medical officer of health has reasonable grounds to believe that the person has a communicable disease or is infected with an infectious agent, require the person to undergo treatment specified in the order or by a specified health care professional, including attending a specified health facility, where there is no other reasonable method available to mitigate the risks of the infection;
(n) require a person to disclose the identity and location of the persons with whom the person may have had contact or whom the person may have exposed to the communicable disease or infectious agent; or
(o) require the person to take, or prohibit the person from taking, an action prescribed in the regulations.

Apprehension orders and treatment orders generally
.
37. (1) A regional medical officer of health or a person subject to an apprehension order or treatment order may apply to the Supreme Court to vary, terminate or suspend the order.
(2) Where the application is made by a regional medical officer of health, the variation, termination or suspension of an apprehension order or treatment order may be issued on an application made under subsection (1) without notice and in the absence of the person subject to the order.
(3) Where the application is made by the person subject to the order, the apprehension order or treatment order shall not be varied, terminated or suspended unless the regional medical officer of health has been served with the application made under subsection (1).
(4) An apprehension order and a treatment order shall specify the health facility where the person subject to the order shall be detained, isolated, quarantined, examined and treated.
(5) Notwithstanding another provision of this Act, a judge shall not specify a health facility in an apprehension order or treatment order unless he or she is satisfied that the health facility is able to provide for the detainment, isolation, quarantine, examination or treatment as required in the order.
(6) Where an apprehension order or treatment order has been made, the person in charge of the health facility specified in the order shall ensure that
(a) the person subject to an apprehension order is detained, isolated or quarantined in accordance with the order; and
(b) the person subject to a treatment order is examined and treated in accordance with the order.
(7) The person in charge of the health facility specified in an apprehension order or treatment order shall immediately report to the regional medical officer of health regarding
(a) the results of the examination and treatment of the person subject to the order;
(b) the health status of the person subject to the order; and
(c) any change in the diagnosis or health status of the person subject to the order.
(8) A regional medical officer of health shall monitor the treatment and condition of a person subject to an apprehension order or treatment order and shall issue a certificate authorizing the release and discharge of the person immediately where he or she is of the opinion that
(a) the person is no longer infectious with a communicable disease; and
(b) discharging the person would not present a serious risk to the health of the population.
(9) A regional medical officer of health shall file a certificate issued under subsection (8) with the court that issued the apprehension order or treatment order.
(10) Notwithstanding any term or condition of an apprehension order or treatment order, the order is terminated immediately upon the issuance of a certificate under subsection (8) or the termination of the order under subsection 46(5).

Newfoundland & Labrador, like the other Provinces, allows for “medical officers” to order people detained and subjected to treatment, based on suspicions. The text is almost identical to the others.

7. Prince Edward Island Public Health

42. Order of court to detain, examine or treat a person
(1) The Chief Public Health Officer may make an application to the court for an order under this section where a person has failed to comply with an order issued by the Chief Public Health Officer in respect of a communicable disease specified in the regulations that
(a) the person isolate himself or herself and remain in isolation from other persons;
(b) the person submit to an examination by a medical practitioner;
(c) the person place himself or herself under the care and treatment of a medical practitioner;
(d) the person conduct himself or herself in such a manner as not to expose another person to infection; and
Public Health Act
.
PART II — PUBLIC HEALTH PROTECTION
Section 42
ct Updated June 12, 2018 Page 25
(e) the person provide information respecting the person’s contacts related to the communicable disease to the Chief Public Health Officer.
Court order
(2) Where the court is satisfied that a person has failed to comply with an order issued by the Chief Public Health Officer under section 39 or 40, the court may order, with respect to the person named in the order, any or all of the following:
(a) that the person be taken into custody and admitted to and detained in a health facility named in the order;
(b) that the person be examined by a medical practitioner to ascertain whether or not a person is infected with an agent of a communicable disease specified in the regulations;
(c) that the person, if found on examination to be infected with an agent of a communicable disease specified in the regulations, be treated for the disease;
(d) that the person, if found on examination to be infected with an agent of a communicable disease specified in the regulations, provide information respecting the person’s contacts related to the communicable disease to the Chief Public Health
Officer.
Ex parte application
(3) An application under subsection (1) may be made ex parte and where so made the court may
make an interim order under subsection (2).

43. Designation of medical practitioner to have responsibility for detained person
The administrator or person in charge of a health facility shall designate a medical practitioner to have responsibility for a person named in an order issued under section 42 who is delivered to a health facility. 2012(2nd),c.20,s.43.
.
44. Medical practitioner to report respecting detained person The medical practitioner responsible for a person named in an order made under section 42 shall report in respect of the treatment and the condition of the person to the Chief Public Health Officer in the manner, at the times and with the information specified by the Chief
Public Health Officer. 2012(2nd),c.20,s.44.
.
45. Extension of period of detention
Where upon application of the Chief Public Health Officer the court is satisfied
(a) that the person continues to be infected with an agent of a communicable disease specified in the regulations; and
(b) that the discharge of the person from the health facility would present a significant risk to the health of the public, the court may by order extend the period of detention for not more than three months, and upon further applications by the Chief Public Health Officer, the court may extend the period of detention and treatment for further periods, each of which shall not be for more than three months. 2012(2nd),c.20,s.45.

Prince Edward Island allows Courts to detain people for up to 3 months at a time, and all under the guise of public health. Not that it will ever be abused for political reasons.

8. Medical Tyranny As “Public Health”

The content of these carious Provincial Health Acts overlaps considerably. These unelected medical officers are able to detain people, close businesses, and suspend basic liberties, all under the pretense of public safety.

In any other context, this would be considered dictatorial. But this gets a pass from the mainstream media. Wonder why they don’t address it.

Many Other Periodicals Receiving Government Subsidies
Other Subsidies Propping Up Canadian Media
Taxpayer Subsidies To Combat CV “Misinformation”
Aberdeen Publishing Sells Out, Takes Subsidies
Postmedia Periodicals Getting Covid Subsidies

Canadian Media Subsidized By Taxpayers, Biased
Media Subsidies To Combat Online Misinformation

CV #62(D): Provincial Health Acts Are Really Just WHO-IHR Domestically Implemented

Bill C-12 is the 2005 Quarantine Act, passed by Canada’s Parliament. It was heavily based on presumed changes to the International Health Regulations that the World Health Organization imposed. However, the problem has filtered down to the Provinces as well.

Strangely, it was only the Bloc Quebecois who voted against this. All other parties supported this Bill.

1. Other Articles On CV “Planned-emic”

The rest of the series is here. Many lies, lobbying, conflicts of interest, and various globalist agendas operating behind the scenes, obscuring the vile agenda called the GREAT RESET. The Gates Foundation finances: the WHO, the US CDC, GAVI, ID2020, John Hopkins University, Imperial College London, the Pirbright Institute, the BBC, and individual pharmaceutical companies. The International Health Regulations are legally binding. The Postmedia empire and the “independent” media are paid off, as are the fact-checkers. The virus was never isolated, PCR tests are a fraud, as are forced masks, social bubbles, and 2m distancing.

2. Important Links

https://www.ourcommons.ca/Committees/en/HESA/StudyActivity?studyActivityId=981075
https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/38-1/HESA/report-2/

(AB) https://www.qp.alberta.ca/documents/Acts/P37.pdf
(SK) https://www.canlii.org/en/sk/laws/stat/ss-1994-c-p-37.1/11022/ss-1994-c-p-37.1.html
(MB) https://web2.gov.mb.ca/laws/statutes/ccsm/p210e.php
(ON) https://healthunit.org/wp-content/uploads/Health_Protection_and_Promotion_Act.pdf

3. Canada’s Quarantine Act Written By WHO

As mentioned earlier, the International Health Regulations (IHR), that the WHO issues are legally binding on all Member States. Countries are expected to follow the directives that are sent, even if they are very much against national self interest.

In declaring this “pandemic”, Trudeau activated the 2005 Quarantine Act, a piece of legislation that violates many basic rights in the name of “public health”. However, Bill C-12 was actually written by the World Health Organization. What this means is that the Bill was drafted in anticipation of changes to the 3rd Edition of the IHR, which remain legally binding today.

But what about the Provinces? What is the situation with their Public Health Acts? Turns out that many of the clauses from the Quarantine Act are included, almost word for word?

4. British Columbia Public Health Act

Preventive measure
16 (1) Preventive measures include the following:
(a) being treated or vaccinated;
(b) taking preventive medication;
(c) washing with, applying or ingesting a substance, or having a substance injected or inserted;
(d) undergoing disinfection and decontamination measures;
(e) wearing a type of clothing or other personal protective equipment, or changing, removing or altering clothing or personal protective equipment;
(f) using a type of equipment or implementing a process, or removing or altering equipment or processes.
.
(2) A person subject to a regulation requiring preventive measures must not be in a place or do a thing that is prohibited by the regulation until the person has
(a)taken preventive measures as set out in the regulation, or
(b)if permitted by the regulation, made an objection under subsection (4).

General emergency powers
Division 2 — Order of the Minister
Minister may order temporary quarantine facility
.
26 (1)The minister may by order designate a place as a quarantine facility if the minister reasonably believes that the temporary use of the place for the purposes of isolating or detaining infected persons is necessary to protect public health.
.
(2) A person who has control of a place designated as a quarantine facility must provide the place to the minister or a medical health officer.

Division 3 — Orders Respecting Infectious Agents and Hazardous Agents
When orders respecting infectious agents and hazardous agents may be made
27 (1) A medical health officer may issue an order under this Division only if the medical health officer reasonably believes that
(a) a person
(i) is an infected person, or
(ii) has custody or control of an infected person or an infected thing, and
(b) the order is necessary to protect public health.
.
(2) An order may be issued based on clinical findings or a person’s or thing’s circumstances or medical history, even if the person or thing has been examined and the examination did not reveal the presence of an infectious agent or a hazardous agent.

General powers respecting infectious agents and hazardous agents
.
28 (1) If the circumstances described in section 27 [when orders respecting infectious agents and hazardous agents may be made] apply, a medical health officer may order a person to do anything that the medical health officer reasonably believes is necessary for either or both of the following purposes:
(a) to determine whether an infectious agent or a hazardous agent exists, or likely exists;
(b) to prevent the transmission of an infectious agent or a hazardous agent.

(2 ) A medical health officer may, in respect of an infected thing,
(a) make any order, with any necessary modifications, that can be made under this Division as if the infected thing were an infected person, and
(b) direct the order to any person having custody or control of the infected thing.

Specific powers respecting infectious agents and hazardous agents
.
29 (1) An order may be made under this section only
(a) if the circumstances described in section 27 [when orders respecting infectious agents and hazardous agents may be made] apply, and
(b) for the purposes set out in section 28 (1) [general powers respecting infectious agents and hazardous agents].
.
(2) Without limiting section 28, a medical health officer may order a person to do one or more of the following:
.
(a) remain in a specified place, or not enter a place;
(b) avoid physical contact with, or being near, a person or thing;
(c) be under the supervision or care of a specified person;
(d) provide to the medical health officer or a specified person information, records, samples or other matters relevant to the person’s possible infection with an infectious agent or contamination with a hazardous agent, including information respecting persons who may have been exposed to an infectious agent or a hazardous agent by the person;
(e) be examined by a specified person, including
(i) going to a specified facility for examination, and
(ii) being examined before a particular date or according to a schedule;
(f) submit to diagnostic examination, including going to a specified facility or providing the results to a specified person;
(g) take preventive measures, including
(i) going to a specified facility for preventive measures,
(ii) complying with preventive measures set out in the order, specified by a medical practitioner or nurse practitioner, or both, and
(iii) beginning preventive measures before a particular date, and continuing until a particular date or event;
(h) provide evidence of complying with the order, including
(i) getting a certificate of compliance from a medical practitioner, nurse practitioner or specified person, and
(ii) providing to a medical health officer any relevant record;

(I ) take a prescribed action.
.
(3) For greater certainty, this section applies even if the person subject to the order is complying with all terms and conditions of a licence, a permit, an approval or another authorization issued under this or any other enactment.

54 (1) A health officer may, in an emergency, do one or more of the following:
(a) act in a shorter or longer time period than is otherwise required;
(b) not provide a notice that is otherwise required;
(c) do orally what must otherwise be done in writing;
(d) in respect of a licence or permit over which the health officer has authority under section 55 [acting outside designated terms during emergencies] or the regulations, suspend or vary the licence or permit without providing an opportunity to dispute the action;
(e) specify in an order a facility, place, person or procedure other than as required under section 63 [power to establish directives and standards], unless an order under that section specifies that the order applies in an emergency;
(f) omit from an order things that are otherwise required;
(g) serve an order in any manner;
(h) not reconsider an order under section 43 [reconsideration of orders], not review an order under section 44 [review of orders] or not reassess an order under section 45 [mandatory reassessment of orders];
(i) exempt an examiner from providing examination results to an examined person;
(j) conduct an inspection at any time, with or without a warrant, including of a private dwelling;
(k) collect, use or disclose information, including personal information,
(i) that could not otherwise be collected, used or disclosed, or
(ii) in a form or manner other than the form or manner required.

Under Section 54 the B.C. Public Health Act, during emergencies (or self-identified emergencies), Health Officers can have any place inspected at any time. A person can be examined, and the results of that exam withheld from him/her. Business can be shut down, without any recourse to challenge it. Health Officers can do things with oral only notice, or with no notice at all, and these privileges can be extended longer than need be.

Under Section 16 of the Act, a person can be ordered to be: vaccinated; medicated; ingest or insert something, and other invasive procedures. Section 26 of the Act allows the Health Minister to take any property and convert it into a quarantine facility. Sections 27 through 29 allows a Medical Health Officer – in this case, Bonnie Henry – virtual dictatorial powers over other people’s lives and livelihoods.

Worth clarifying, these “Health Officers” or “Medical Officers” are not elected by the public in any capacity. They cannot be voted out of their positions, regardless of the sentiments of the general population.
The Act of course is much, much longer than this. However, it is truly stunning just how much power unelected Health Officers are given over other people’s lives. And in B.C., all parties are apparently okay with handing over their duties.

Sure, the B.C. Public Health Act gives bureaucrats that power, but who wrote the Act in the first place? Who was responsible for handing over that power to begin with? This Act was written and voted on by MLAs (Members of Legislative Assembly), who are, in theory, accountable to voters.

A cynic might wonder if MLAs made this law in order to avoid making themselves accountable for decisions they make. Here at least, they can claim it’s not them, and that they are simply following the advice of health professionals.

It’s interesting that the B.C Health Act was assented to (made law) in 2008. The 3rd Edition of WHO’s International Health Regulations came into effect in 2005, and Canada’s 2005 Quarantine Act was heavily based on those IHR. The B.C. Act contains much of the same information and powers as the WHO/Federal documents, and it’s fair to assume that the content was derived from them.

Of course, this is hardly limited to B.C. Other Provinces have their own version of a Provincial Health Act, and they carry many of the same powers. This includes: Alberta , Saskatchewan , Manitoba , among others. What these Acts all have in common is they give broad, sweeping powers to bureaucrats who are not elected by the public, and who cannot be voted out. Looking at Alberta:

5. Alberta Public Health Act

Powers of Chief Medical Officer
.
14(1) The Chief Medical Officer
.
(a) shall, on behalf of the Minister, monitor the health of Albertans and make recommendations to the Minister and regional health authorities on measures to protect and promote the health of the public and to prevent disease and injury,
.
(b) shall act as a liaison between the Government and regional health authorities, medical officers of health and executive officers in the administration of this Act,
.
(c) shall monitor activities of regional health authorities, medical officers of health and executive officers in the administration of this Act, and
.
(d) may give directions to regional health authorities, medical officers of health and executive officers in the exercise of their powers and the carrying out of their responsibilities under this Act.

(2) Where the Chief Medical Officer is of the opinion that a medical officer of health or executive officer is not properly exercising powers or carrying out duties under this Act in respect of a matter, the Chief Medical Officer may assume the powers and duties of the medical officer of health or executive officer in respect of the matter and act in that person’s place.

Isolation, Quarantine and Special Measures
.
Isolation and quarantine
.
29(1) A medical officer of health who knows of or has reason to suspect the existence of a communicable disease or a public health emergency within the boundaries of the health region in which the medical officer of health has jurisdiction may initiate an investigation to determine whether any action is necessary to protect the public health.
(2) Where the investigation confirms the presence of a communicable disease, the medical officer of health
(a) shall carry out the measures that the medical officer of health is required by this Act and the regulations to carry out, and
(b) may do any or all of the following:
(i) take whatever steps the medical officer of health considers necessary
(A) to suppress the disease in those who may already have been infected with it,
(B) to protect those who have not already been exposed to the disease,
(C) to break the chain of transmission and prevent spread of the disease, and
(D) to remove the source of infection;
(ii) by order
(A) prohibit a person from attending a school,
(B) prohibit a person from engaging in the person’s occupation, or
(C) prohibit a person from having contact with other persons or any class of persons for any period and subject to any conditions that the medical officer of health considers appropriate, where the medical officer of health determines that the person’s engaging in that activity could transmit an infectious agent;
.
(iii) issue written orders for the decontamination or destruction of any bedding, clothing or other articles that
have been contaminated or that the medical officer of health reasonably suspects have been contaminated.
(2.1) Where the investigation confirms the existence of a public health emergency, the medical officer of health
(a) has all the same powers and duties in respect of the public health emergency as he or she has under subsection (2) in the case of a communicable disease, and
(b) may take whatever other steps are, in the medical officer of health’s opinion, necessary in order to lessen the impact of the public health emergency.

Sections 13 to 15 of Alberta’s Public Health Act outline how a Medical Health Officer is appointed, and the vast powers available to that person. In Alberta, that is currently Deena Hinshaw. Like Bonnie Henry, she is not elected, and cannot be held directly liable to the public for anything that she does.

Pages 25 through 31 of the most recent version of that Act relate to quarantine measures, epidemics, and how the average person’s rights can be suspended almost indefinitely under the pretense of “public safety”. It reads like the Provincial counterpart to the Quarantine Act, which of course, was dictated by the WHO.

Pages 39 through 51 cover Section 52 of the Alberta Public Health Act. It gives sweeping powers to unelected bureaucrats in the name of safety. The content of that Section reads almost beat for beat identical to that of the Quarantine Act. Moving on to Saskatchewan, we get this piece of legislation:

6. Saskatchewan Public Health Act

CONTROL OF EPIDEMICS Orders
.
45(1) The minister may make an order described in subsection (2) if the minister believes, on reasonable grounds, that:
.
(a) a serious public health threat exists in Saskatchewan; and (b) the requirements set out in the order are necessary to decrease or eliminate the serious public health threat. (2) An order pursuant to this section may: (a) direct the closing of a public place;
.
(b) restrict travel to or from a specified area of Saskatchewan;
.
(c) prohibit public gatherings in a specified area of Saskatchewan;
.
(d) in the case of a serious public health threat that is a communicable disease, require any person who is not known to be protected against the communicable disease:
(i) to be immunized or given prophylaxis where the disease is one for which immunization or prophylaxis is available; or
(ii) to be excluded from school until the danger of infection is past where the person is a pupil;
.
(e) establish temporary hospitals;
.
(f) require a local authority, a medical health officer or a public health officer to investigate matters relating to the serious public health threat and report to the minister the results of the investigation;
.
(g) require any person who, in the opinion of the minister or medical health officer, is likely to have information that is necessary to decrease or eliminate the serious public health threat to disclose that information to the minister or a medical health officer;
.
(h) authorize public health officers, peace officers or prescribed persons to confiscate substances or other materials found in any place, premises or vehicle, if those substances or materials are suspected by the public health officer, peace officer or prescribed person of causing or contributing to a serious public health threat or packages, containers or devices containing or suspected of containing any of those substances or materials;
.
(i) in the case of a serious public health threat that is a communicable disease, require any person to be isolated from other persons until a medical health officer is satisfied that isolation is no longer necessary to decrease or eliminate the transmission of a communicable disease.

Preventive detention order
45.1(1) If a person fails to comply with an order pursuant to clause 45(2)(i) and a medical health officer believes on reasonable grounds that the person is endangering the lives, safety or health of the public because the person is or probably is infected with, or has been or might have been exposed to, a communicable disease, the medical health officer may detain the person for a period not exceeding the prescribed period of transmissibility of the disease.

(2) A person detained by a medical health officer pursuant to subsection (1) may request a review of his or her detention by application to the Court of Queen’s Bench served on the minister, and the court may make any order with respect to the detention or the release of the person that the court considers appropriate, having regard to the danger to the lives, safety or health of the public.

In similar fashion, Saskatchewan has their own Public Health Act, which has undergone several revisions since the 1990s. It allows for freedoms and liberties to be suspended on even the vaguest suspicion that a person may have an infectious disease. It also allows for property to be seized, and people to be detained.

Things like public gatherings, and freedom of citizens to travel can also be suspended indefinitely under the guise of safety.

Note: as with all of these cases, it’s not the politicians doing the dirty work. It’s the various “experts” who call themselves Chief Medical Officers (or similar titles). This provides cover to elected officials, who want to stamp out civil rights, but don’t want to get their own hands dirty in the process. Now, about Manitoba:

7. Manitoba Public Health Act

PART 6
PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY
Public health emergency
67(1) The chief public health officer may take one or more of the special measures described in subsection (2) if he or she reasonably believes that
(a) a serious and immediate threat to public health exists because of an epidemic or threatened epidemic of a communicable disease; and
(b) the threat to public health cannot be prevented, reduced or eliminated without taking special measures.

Special measures
67(2) The chief public health officer may take the following special measures in the circumstances set out in subsection (1):
(a) issue directions, for the purpose of managing the threat, to a regional health authority, health corporation, health care organization, operator of a laboratory, operator of a licensed emergency medical response system, health professional or health care provider, including directions about
(i) identifying and managing cases,
(ii) controlling infection,
(iii) managing hospitals and other health care facilities and emergency medical response services, and
(iv) managing and distributing equipment and supplies;
(a.1) issue an order prohibiting or restricting persons from travelling to, from or within a specified area, or requiring persons who are doing so to take specified actions;
(b) order the owner, occupant or person who appears to be in charge of any place or premises to deliver up possession of it to the minister for use as a temporary isolation or quarantine facility;
(c) order a public place or premises to be closed;
(d) order persons not to assemble in a public gathering in a specified area;
(d.1) order persons to take specified measures to prevent the spread of a communicable disease, including persons who arrive in Manitoba from another province, territory or country;
(e) order a person who the chief public health officer reasonably believes is not protected against a communicable disease to do one or both of the following:
(i) be immunized, or take any other preventive measures,
(ii) refrain from any activity or employment that poses a significant risk of infection, until the chief public health officer considers the risk of infection no longer exists;
(f) order an employer to exclude from a place of employment any person subject to an order under subclause (e)(ii).

Manitoba’s Public Health Act allows the Chief Medical Officer, and the operatives, to effectively suspend basic civil rights indefinitely. Of course this is “for your safety”, the ever present excuse. Basic liberties such as free association, freedom to peacefully assemble, and freedom to earn a livelihood can be stopped.

Note: the Act was assented to on June 13, 2006, a year after the Federal Quarantine Act, and the 3rd Edition of the International Health Regulations were implemented. The obvious implication is that this Act is just Manitoba enacting its own version.

Section 10 of the Act mandates that a Chief Medical Officer be named. Currently, that is Brent Roussin. In November, he caused a scandal when he openly admitted that public health orders don’t apply to public officials. Not leading by example.

8. Ontario Health Protection & Promotion Act

PART VI.1 PROVINCIAL PUBLIC HEALTH POWERS
.
Chief Medical Officer of Health may act where risk to health
.
77.1 (1) If the Chief Medical Officer of Health is of the opinion that a situation exists anywhere in Ontario that constitutes or may constitute a risk to the health of any persons, he or she may investigate the situation and take such action as he or she considers appropriate to prevent, eliminate or decrease the risk. 2007, c. 10, Sched. F, s. 15.
.
Same (2) For the purpose of subsection
.
(1), the Chief Medical Officer of Health,
.
(a) may exercise anywhere in Ontario,
(i) any of the powers of a board of health, including the power to appoint a medical officer of health or an associate medical officer of health, and (ii) any of the powers of a medical officer of health; and
.
(b) may direct a person whose services are engaged by a board of health to do, anywhere in Ontario, whether within or outside the health unit served by the board of health, any act,
(i) that the person has power to do under this Act, or
(ii) that the medical officer of health for the health unit served by the board of health has authority to direct the person to do within the health unit. 2007, c. 10, Sched. F, s. 15.
.
Authority and duty of person directed to act
(3) If the Chief Medical Officer of Health gives a direction under clause (2) (b) to a person whose services are engaged by a board of health, (a) the person has authority to act, anywhere in Ontario, whether within or outside the health unit served by the board of health, to the same extent as if the direction had been given by the medical officer of health of the board of health and the act had been done in the health unit; and (b) the person shall carry out the direction as soon as practicable. 2007, c. 10, Sched. F, s. 15. Section 22 powers
.
(4) For the purpose of the exercise by the Chief Medical Officer of Health under subsection (2) of the powers of a medical officer of health, a reference in section 22 to a communicable disease shall be deemed to be a reference to an infectious disease. 2007, c. 10, Sched. F, s. 15. Application to judge where risk to health 77.2 (1) If the Chief Medical Officer of Health is of the opinion that a situation exists anywhere in Ontario that constitutes or may constitute a risk to the health of any persons, he or she may apply to a judge of the Superior Court of Justice for an order under subsection (2). 2007, c. 10, Sched. F, s. 15.

Possession of premises for temporary isolation facility
.
77.4 (1) The Minister, in the circumstances mentioned in subsection (3), by order may require the occupier of any premises to deliver possession of all or any specified part of the premises to the Minister to be used as a temporary isolation facility or as part of a temporary isolation facility. 2007, c. 10, Sched. F, s. 15.
.
Extension
(2) An order under subsection (1) shall set out an expiry date for the order that is not more than 12 months after the day of its making and the Minister may extend the order for a further period of not more than 12 months. 2007, c. 10, Sched. F, s. 15.
.
Grounds for order
(3) The Minister may make an order under subsection (1) where the Chief Medical Officer of Health certifies in writing to the Minister that, (a) there exists or there is an immediate risk of an outbreak of a communicable disease anywhere in Ontario; and (b) the premises are needed for use as a temporary isolation facility or as part of a temporary isolation facility in respect of the communicable disease. 2007, c. 10, Sched. F, s. 15.

Ontario has the 2007 Health Protection and Promotion Act. The wording and powers are very similar to other Provinces, and to the Federal Quarantine Act. The timing is also suspicious, given that this was implemented soon after the 2005 International Health Regulations and the Federal legislation.

In Ontario, the Chief Medical Officer is David Williams, and the Deputy Medical Officer is Barbara Yaffe. As with the other so-called experts, these people are not elected, and have no real accountability to the public. Both have made very interesting statements about how dangerous this “pandemic” really is. More on them later.

9. These Acts Strip Away Basic Rights

At no time is there a requirement for there to be PROOF of a public health emergency to act on these powers. These Chief Medical Officers can simply claim that they “reasonably believe”, and that is sufficient.

Provincially and Federally, politicians write laws that allow unelected bureaucrats almost free reign to impose whatever measures they want. Of course, they don’t write content of the laws, but follow the instructions of a supra-national body that is accountable to no one.

This only covers 5 Provinces, however, they all have similar laws. If there is time, a Part II will be published to cover the others.

CV #26(D): Provinces Can’t Get Their Stories Straight On “Covid Deaths” & Test Accuracy

At the behest of the World Organization, Governments (including Canada and the Provinces), are playing along with the psy-op that is Covid-19. Now, to anyone who doubts that we are governed by a supra-national body, consider the content below.

1. Other Articles On CV “Planned-emic”

The rest of the series is here. Many lies, lobbying, conflicts of interest, and various globalist agendas operating behind the scenes, obscuring the vile agenda called the GREAT RESET. The Gates Foundation finances: the WHO, the US CDC, GAVI, ID2020, John Hopkins University, Imperial College London, the Pirbright Institute, the BBC, and individual pharmaceutical companies. The International Health Regulations are legally binding. The media is paid off. The virus was never isolated, PCR tests are a fraud, as are forced masks, social bubbles, and 2m distancing.

2. Important Documents

https://www.who.int/classifications/icd/Guidelines_Cause_of_Death_COVID-19.pdf
WHO Guidelines Classification Of Death

https://www.cpsbc.ca/for-physicians/college-connector/2020-V08-02/04
http://www.bccdc.ca/health-professionals/clinical-resources/covid-19-care/covid-19-testing/viral-testing
http://www.bccdc.ca/Health-Professionals-Site/Documents/COVID19_InterpretingTesting_Results_NAT_PCR.pdf

http://www.cpsa.ca/physicians-notes-basic-principles-on-medical-death-certification/?highlight=covid%20death%20certification
https://www.albertahealthservices.ca/assets/info/ppih/if-ppih-covid-19-sag-comparison-of-testing-sites-rapid-review.pdf
Alberta Test Comparisons Review

Saskatchewan Death Certificate
Saskatchwan Covid Death Certificate
https://www.saskhealthauthority.ca/news/service-alerts-emergency-events/covid-19/testing-screening-treatment-medical-directives/
Saskatchewan PROV-51-POCT-COVID-Panbio-Antigen-Testing

https://www.gov.mb.ca/health/publichealth/surveillance/covid-19/resources/Notes.html
https://manitoba.ca/asset_library/en/coronavirus/interim_guidance.pdf
Manitoba Interim Guidance

Ontario Public Health Testing FAQ
Ontario Health Covid Lab Testing
http://www.health.gov.on.ca/en/pro/programs/publichealth/coronavirus/docs/2019_case_definition.pdf
Ontario Covid 2019_case_definition

3. Guidelines Handed Down By WHO

1. PURPOSE OF THE DOCUMENT
This document describes certification and classification (coding) of deaths related to COVID-19. The primary goal is to identify all deaths due to COVID-19.
.
A simplified section specifically addresses the persons that fill in the medical certificate of cause of death. It should be distributed to certifiers separate from the coding instructions.

2. DEFINITION FOR DEATHS DUE TO COVID-19
A death due to COVID-19 is defined for surveillance purposes as a death resulting from a clinically compatible illness, in a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, unless there is a clear alternative cause of death that cannot be related to COVID disease (e.g. trauma). There should be no period of complete recovery from COVID-19 between illness and death.
.
A death due to COVID-19 may not be attributed to another disease (e.g. cancer) and should be counted independently of preexisting conditions that are suspected of triggering a severe course of COVID-19.

In fairness this may just be extremely poor wording. However, it appears that the default position is to count deaths in confirmed OR PROBABLE cases if the death is from an illness COMPATIBLE WITH Covid-19 symptoms, and we should downplay PREEXISTING CONDITIONS that may have contributed.

As with the diagnosing of cases, there is no requirement to have a positive test. Speaks volumes about how shady this method is.

Now there is the disclaimer that it should not be counted if there is a clear alternative, but this appears to be just an afterthought.

C- CHAIN OF EVENTS
Specification of the causal sequence leading to death in Part 1 of the certificate is important. For example, in cases when COVID-19 causes pneumonia and fatal respiratory distress, both pneumonia and respiratory distress should be included, along with COVID-19, in Part 1. Certifiers should include as much detail as possible based on their knowledge of the case, as from medical records, or about laboratory testing.

D- COMORBIDITIES
There is increasing evidence that people with existing chronic conditions or compromised immune systems due to disability are at higher risk of death due to COVID-19. Chronic conditions may be non-communicable diseases such as coronary artery disease, chronic obstructive pulmonary diseas (COPD), and diabetes or disabilities. If the decedent had existing chronic conditions, such as these, they should be reported in Part 2 of the medical certificate of cause of death.

This guidebook from the World Health Organization is dated April 16, 2020. It defines Covid deaths as “a death resulting from a clinically compatible illness, in a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case”. In other words, it doesn’t have to have CAUSED the death, just be compatible with. Also, a deceased person can be a probable case, meaning no verification is needed that they actually have it.

Now, under WHO’s International Health Regulations, rules handed down are required to be followed by Member States. Let’s see just how well that’s happening.

4. BC College Of Physicians & Surgeons

1. Recording COVID-19 on the medical certificate of cause of death
.
COVID-19 should be recorded on the medical certificate of cause of death for all decedents where the disease caused, or is assumed to have caused, or contributed to death.

2. Terminology
.
The use of official terminology, as recommended by the World Health Organization (i.e. COVID-19) should be used for all certification of this cause of death.
.
As there are many types of coronaviruses it is recommended not to use “coronavirus” in place of COVID-19. This will help to reduce uncertainty for coding and monitoring these deaths which may lead to underreporting.

3. Chain of events
.
Due to the public health importance of COVID-19, when it is thought to have caused or contributed to death it should be recorded in Part I of the medical certificate of cause of death.
Specification of the causal sequence leading to death in Part I of the certificate is also important. For example, in cases when COVID-19 causes pneumonia and fatal respiratory distress, both pneumonia and respiratory distress should be included along with COVID-19 in Part I. Certifiers should include as much detail as possible based on their knowledge of the case, medical records, laboratory testing, etc.

4. Co-morbidities
.
There is increasing evidence that people with existing chronic conditions or compromised immune systems due to disability are at greater risk of death due to COVID-19. Chronic conditions may be non-communicable diseases such as coronary artery disease, COPD, and diabetes or disabilities. If the decedent had existing chronic conditions, such as those listed above, these should be listed in Part II of the medical certificate of cause of death.

Does this look familiar? It is almost word for word identical to that of the World Health Organization, and even explicitly states WHO is used as a reference point.

4. BC Lying About Cases/Testing Errors

Strange question: why would the BC Centre for Disease Control recommend LOWERING the testing threshold for certain people, depending on other factors? Don’t these tests work as advertised? Or is it to confirm a bias when something is suspected?

1. How does the test work?
The NAT works by detecting RNA specific to the SARS-CoV-2 virus that causes COVID-19 infection, after RNA has been extracted from the specimen and then amplified in the laboratory. NATs are typically performed on nasopharyngeal swabs, but the test can also be done on other sample types such as throat swabs, saliva, sputum, tracheal aspirates, and broncho-alveolar lavage (BAL) specimens.
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The NAT has a high analytical sensitivity (i.e., it works well at detecting the virus when the virus is present). The NAT can potentially detect as few as 10-100 copies of viral RNA per mL in a respiratory sample. Note that this is not the same as clinical sensitivity of NAT for detection of COVID-19 infection, which is unknown at this time (see #5 below).

2. What do the test results mean?
 Positive: Viral RNA is detected by NAT and this means that the patient is confirmed to have COVID-19 infection.
A positive NAT does not necessarily mean that a patient is infectious, as viral RNA can be shed in the respiratorytract for weeks but cultivatable (live) virus is typically not detected beyond 8 to 10 days after symptom onset.
 Negative: Viral RNA is not detected in the sample. However, a negative test result does not totally rule out COVID-19 infection as there may be reasons beyond test performance that can result in a lack of RNA detectionin patients with COVID-19 infection (false negatives; see below).
 Indeterminate: The NAT result is outside the validated range of the test (i.e., RNA concentration is below the limit of detection, or a non-specific reaction), or this might occur when the sample collected is of poor quality (i.e., does not contain a sufficient amount of human cells). Indeterminate results do not rule in or rule out infection.

Overall, clinical judgement remains important in determining the implications of NAT test results, and whether a repeat test is indicated for negative or indeterminate results (for example, if the patient’s recent exposures or clinical presentation suggest COVID-19 infection is likely, diagnostic tests for other respiratory pathogens remain negative, or there is worsening of symptoms). For clinical guidance including testing and specimen collection, please refer to COVID-19 testing guidelines for British Columbia.

5. What is the clinical sensitivity of the NAT test?
A statistic commonly quoted is that there is a 30% chance of a false negative result for a NAT test in a patient with COVID-19 infection (i.e., a 70% sensitivity). These and other similar estimates are based on a small number studies that compared the correlation between CT scan findings suggestive of COVID-19 infection to NAT on upper respiratory tract specimens. In these studies, 20-30% of people with a positive CT scan result had negative NAT results – and as discussed above a number of factors can contribute to false negative results. CT scan is not a gold standard for diagnosis of COVID-19 infection, and CT scan cannot differentiate amongst the many microbiological causes of pneumonia.
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Ultimately, for COVID-19 testing, there is currently no gold standard, and the overall clinical sensitivity and specificity of NAT in patients with COVID-19 infection is unknown (i.e., how well NAT results correlate with clinical infection, “true positivity” or “true negativity” rate).

  • Can spot 10-100 copies, but that does not equate to infection
  • False positives are common
  • False negatives are common
  • Tests are entirely “open to interpretation”
  • 30% false negatives is just a commonly quoted statistic
  • CT scan not a gold standard
  • CT scan cannot differentiate microbiological causes of pneumonia

Even from the BC CDC’s own document, these tests are worthless, as they cannot be reliably used to detect infection, and are entirely open to interpretation.

5. Alberta Lying About Cases/Testing Errors

After the World Health Organization (WHO) declared COVID-19 a pandemic with increasing mortality, the importance of correctly certifying COVID-19-related deaths is crucial. In view of the public health importance of this infection, when it is thought to have caused death, or is assumed to have caused or contributed to death, it should be recorded in Part I of the medical cause of death. A specification of the causal sequence leading to death (e.g., acute respiratory distress syndrome, or pneumonia) is also important.

The use of official terminology, as recommended by the WHO (i.e., COVID-19), should be used for all certification of this cause of death.

As there are many types of coronaviruses it is recommended not to use “coronavirus” in place of COVID-19. This will help to reduce uncertainty for coding and monitoring these deaths which may lead to underreporting.

If a definite diagnosis cannot be made, but the circumstances are compelling within a reasonable degree of certainty, it is acceptable to report COVID-19 on a death certificate as “presumed” or “probable.

Alberta also instructs its doctors to list Covid-19 as a cause of death if it’s believed to have caused or contributed to it. There is no requirement to be sure, or even to verify that the person has the virus.

Key Messages from the Evidence Summary
 The analytical validity of the lab-developed test used in Alberta is not in question, as confirmatory testing by the Canadian National Microbiology Lab (NML) showed that the Alberta test was 100% accurate, and analytical specificity of PCR testing has been reported to be 100% given the methodology – at least when done during active infection phase.
 However, problems with swab collection have been noted, and it is unknown how the anatomical site of sampling and the timing of the sample relative to the disease progression affects the likelihood of RNA detection in a person who is infected with SARS-CoV-2.
 There is very limited data regarding the negative predictive values and clinical sensitivity and specificity of commercially developed molecular tests for SARS-CoV-2. What data that exists publicly is a different assay from what is used in Alberta and comparisons should be made with caution.
 Studies comparing RNA detection from different sites used samples collected from any of the following sites: nasopharynx, nose, throat, sputum, or bronchoalveolar lavage (BAL) fluid. The evidence was mixed with respect to the superiority (or inferiority) of nasal swabs compared to throat swabs. A small study (n=30) that is ongoing in Alberta indicates that NP and throat swabs may be equivalent while nasal swabs may have lower sensitivity. It is suspected that this is related to a lack of familiarity with deep nasal swab collection and poor collection technique, though this is based on anecdotal evidence.

Recommendations
1. Based on the evidence, false negative samples are infrequent but do occur and would appear to result from insufficient sample collection, emphasizing the importance of proper collection of samples.
2. A program should be devised to identify false negative test results and correlate to clinical cases of COVID-19. To calculate the clinical sensitivity of the test, a consistent case definition and a standard for confirming positive cases will be required. The current lack of a gold standard for confirming positive cases is a significant challenge.

Evidence from grey literature
Instructions for the RT-PCR novel coronavirus diagnostic panel developed by the United States Centers for Disease Control (CDC) highlight the limitations of their assay, specifying that their panel was validated only for respiratory tract specimens and that due to many factors in the sample collection chain, a negative test result should not be used to rule out disease (CDC, 2020a). This document also notes that the predictive values of diagnostic tests are highly dependent on the prevalence and risk of disease (CDC, 2020a). Specifically, false negative test results are more likely when prevalence is high and false positives are more likely when the prevalence is moderate or low (CDC, 2020a), although false positives are rare for RT-PCR based testing when primers and probes are designed appropriately.

This is an extremely important detail that got slipped in. The test is 100% effective — if the person is actually infectious. If they are not, then false positives are quite easy to occur. And this is interesting: they say that false negatives are pretty rare, but B.C. said they could be 30%. Which is it? Moreover, the clinical sensitivity of the test cannot be determined since there is no consistent standard. No “gold standard” anyway.

It speaks volumes about the quality of the test when it’s explained that low prevalence results in more false positives, and vice versa.

So which is it? The quality of the test is not in question, or there are no defined standards to base results on?

6. Sask. Death Certificates, Antigen Tests

3. RECORDING COVID-19 ON THE MCOD – CAUSE OF DEATH SECTION
COVID-19 should be recorded on the MCOD – Cause of Death section for ALL decedents where the disease caused, or is assumed to have caused, or contributed to death.
4. TERMINOLOGY
 The use of official terminology, as recommended by the WHO (i.e. COVID-19) should be used for all certification of this cause of death.
 Do not use “coronavirus” in place of COVID-19, as there are many types of coronaviruses. This will help to reduce uncertainty for coding and monitoring these deaths which may lead to underreporting.
5. CHAIN OF EVENTS
 When COVID-19 is thought to have caused or contributed to death, it should be recorded in Part 1 of the MCOD – Cause of Death section.
 Specification of the causal sequence leading to death in Part 1 of the certificate is also important. For example, in cases when COVID-19 causes pneumonia and fatal respiratory distress, both pneumonia and respiratory distress should be included along with COVID-19 in Part 1. Certifiers should include as much detail as possible based on their knowledge of the case, medical records, laboratory testing, etc.
 Here, on a generic model form, is an example of how to certify this chain of events in Part 1:
6. CO-MORBIDITIES
 If the decedent had existing chronic conditions, such as those listed below, these should be listed in Part 2 of the MCOD – Cause of Death section.
 Chronic conditions may be non-communicable diseases such as coronary artery disease, COPD, and diabetes or disabilities.
 There is increasing evidence that people with existing chronic conditions or compromised immune systems due to disability are at greater risk of death due to COVID-19.

Looking at Page 2 of the death certificate, we get this. Looks like it was taken straight from WHO’s guidelines on declaring Covid deaths.

Detects viral proteins/antigens
• Used at the point of specimen collection
• Has lower sensitivity when compared with laboratory-based PCR testing
• The use of a lower sensitivity test carries risks to clinical and public health decision making. However, these risks can be mitigated by implementing it in limited situations combined with careful and appropriate interpretation.
• Provides preliminary test results:
Negative: Does NOT rule out COVID-19 infection. Does NOT change any infection control precautions or isolation requirements.
Positive: Should be acted on immediately. Considered a “Presumptive Case” until confirmed by an in-lab PCR test.

According to the Saskatchewan Health Authority, this antigen test is basically useless. A patient would have to follow up with a PCR test regardless of the outcome.

7. Manitoba Deaths, Cases, PCR “Gold Standard”

Surveillance Case Definition
Cases include both confirmed and probable cases. Surveillance case definitions are provided for the purpose of standardizing case classification and reporting. They are based on evidence, public health response goals, and are subject to change as new information becomes available. Please visit https://manitoba.ca/asset_library/en/coronavirus/interim_guidance.pdf for the most current case definition.

Confirmed case – A person with a laboratory confirmation of infection with the virus that causes COVID-19 performed at a community, hospital or reference laboratory (NML or a provincial public health laboratory) running a validated assay. This consists of detection of at least one specific gene target by a NAAT assay (e.g. real-time PCR or nucleic acid sequencing).

Death due to COVID-19
Source: Adapted from WHO International Guidelines for Certification and Classification (coding) of COVID-19 as a cause of death
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A death resulting from a clinically compatible illness, unless there is a clear alternative cause of death that cannot be related to COVID disease (e.g. trauma). There should be no period of complete recovery* from COVID-19 between illness and death.

Underlying Illness
Validated algorithms developed by the Canadian Chronic Disease Surveillance System (CCDSS) are used to define the common chronic conditions of COVID-19 cases using administrative health records maintained by Manitoba Health, Seniors and Active Living. (MHSAL)

Under WHO’s rules, even probable cases are considered cases for the purposes of surveillance and reporting. Note: they aren’t even testing for a virus, but for a single gene.

[Page 6]
Laboratory Testing
 At present, a validated reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) test on a clinically appropriate sample collected by a trained health care provider is the gold standard for the diagnosis of SARS-CoV-2 infection.

[Page 14/15]
Testing Individuals After Death
In the interest of identifying all deaths related to COVID-19 and to better understand the burden of disease in Manitoba, collection of a post-mortem nasopharyngeal (NP) swab for COVID-19 testing should be considered if the following are true:
.
Part A: Prior testing
1) The deceased did not have a NP swab positive for COVID-19 prior to death
OR
2) The deceased did not have two or more NP swabs negative for COVID-19 in the past week
AND
Part B: Symptoms or cause of death
1) Death was preceded by influenza-like illness (ILI), upper or lower respiratory tract infection, or any symptoms compatible with COVID-19, even if very mild
OR
2) Cause of death is unclear
If a previous swab was positive, no further testing is required

It’s a little strange that B.C. claims there is no gold standard for testing, yet Manitoba claims that RT-PCR tests are. Did they not get their stories straight? And this post-death testing comes across as a way to artificially drive up the numbers.

8. Ontario Testing Sensitivity, False Positives

Testing Results and Performance
1. Q. What is the test performance of the PCR assay in use at PHO Laboratory?
A. PHO Laboratory validated the PCR assay currently in use in close collaboration with the National Microbiology Laboratory (NML), Canada’s reference microbiology laboratory. We have excellent concordance with NML from the parallel testing done with them at set up, which included a large number (over 100) and positives (over 20). The sensitivity and specificity of the assay, comparing to NML as the gold standard, is close to 100%.

However, there are many commercial and laboratory developed assays being released and used in Canada, and it is not possible to compare assay performance with every one of them. It is expected there will be some variance in performance if multiple assays are compared to each other, especially around the limit of detection of the individual assays. Parallel testing with the commercial kits in use so far shows similar performance with the assay in use at PHO Laboratory. More information on the testing done at PHO Laboratory from our COVID-19 Test Information Sheet:
https://www.publichealthontario.ca/en/laboratory-services/test-information-index/wuhan-novelcoronavirus

2. Q. What is the positive predictive value of COVID-19 PCR assays?
A. In general, the positive predictive value of COVID-19 PCR assays is excellent, and approaches 100%. At PHO Laboratory, we know this, as we are able to generate viral sequence from samples that are positive provided the viral copy number is not near the limit of detection of the assay.

4. Q. What is the sensitivity, and how often is the COVID-19 test false negative?
COVID-19 Laboratory Testing Q&A 4
A. It is hard to answer this question objectively on how many false negatives there are, as the only way to know is to retest patients who are initially negative, or retest a large number of the same samples with a different assay. Several studies with small sample sizes have been published, and have estimated that the first test done has a sensitivity of 70% to 90% for detecting SARS-CoV-2.

Some interesting questions show up in the Ontario publication. The paper repeatedly claims that the accuracy is close to 100%, but later states that other studies give a sensitivity of 70% to 90%. This would mean a 10% to 30% error. Doesn’t bode well.

9. What Does All This Mean?

The Provinces appear to be following WHO’s directive on deaths, which allows for a “clinically compatible illness” to be the basis for writing Covid-19 on the death certificate. It specifically allows for these certificates to be made based on the flimsiest evidence.

Despite the claims to the contrary, there are some real issues with the PCR and antigen tests. Even taking their words at face value, they are pretty much useless. Rather than them being any sort of “gold standard”, they are open to wide interpretation, and multiple samples may be needed. Keep in mind, they are not testing for an isolated virus, but rather, for a single genetic marker.

Let’s not forget people like Ontario Deputy Medical Officer Barbara Yaffe and Alberta Premier Jason Kenney, who admit potential 50% and 90% errors, respectively. Ontario Health Minister Christine Elliott admitted to fudgind the data when it comes to deaths.

These examples cited are by no means exhaustive. There are surely more documents that contradict the public health narratives on this “pandemic”.

If things really were as bad as advertised, there would be no need to constantly pour out the fear. There’d be no need to “reevaluate” or double check so frequently.

CV #37(D): WHO Distortions On Positive Cases, Causes Of Death, Surveillance

Let’s take a look into how the World Health Organization defines cases, and causes of death.

1. Other Articles On CV “Planned-emic”

The rest of the series is here. Many lies, lobbying, conflicts of interest, and various globalist agendas operating behind the scenes, obscuring the vile agenda called the “Great Reset“. The Gates Foundation finances: the WHO, the US CDC, GAVI, ID2020, John Hopkins University, Imperial College London, the Pirbright Institute, the BBC, and individual pharmaceutical companies. Also: there is little to no science behind what our officials are doing; they promote degenerate behaviour; the Australian Department of Health admits the PCR tests don’t work; the US CDC admits testing is heavily flawed; and The International Health Regulations are legally binding. See here, here, and here. The media is paid off, and our democracy compromised, shown: here, here, here, and here.

2. Important Links

January 17, 2020 Testing Guidelines For WHO
March 19, 2020 Testing Guidelines For WHO
September 11, 2020 Testing Guidelines For WHO
September 11, 2020 WHO-2019-nCoV-Antigen_Detection
WHO: January, March, September 2020 Guidelines
WHO’s January 13, 2021 Posting On Test Guidelines

January 31 Global Surveillance For Human Infection
March 20 Global Surveillance For Human Infection
May 10 Global Surveillance For Human Infection
August 7 Global Surveillance For Human Infection
December 16 Global Surveillance For Human Infection

https://www.who.int/classifications/icd/Guidelines_Cause_of_Death_COVID-19.pdf
WHO Guidelines Classification Of Death

WHO Case Definition Guidelines

BCCDC: No Idea Actual Error Rate Of PCR Tests
BC COVID19_SerologyTestingGuidelines (1)
BC COVID19_InterpretingTesting_Results_NAT_PCR

Tricity: Bonnie Henry – False Positives Overwhelming Hospitals
CBC: Bonnie Henry Warning About False Negatives

WHO’s Definition Of “Herd Immunity”
WHO Posting On Herd Immunity Definition
WHO’s Other Definition Of Herd Immunity

3. Case Definitions Are Quite Subjective

Given the way that the “probable” cases are defined, it’s entirely possible to classify many thousands of people without doing a single test to confirm. Perhaps this is why it’s so vague, in order to generate false positives when needed.

4. Guidelines For Listing Causes Of Death

1. PURPOSE OF THE DOCUMENT
This document describes certification and classification (coding) of deaths related to COVID-19. The primary goal is to identify all deaths due to COVID-19.
.
A simplified section specifically addresses the persons that fill in the medical certificate of cause of death. It should be distributed to certifiers separate from the coding instructions.

2. DEFINITION FOR DEATHS DUE TO COVID-19
A death due to COVID-19 is defined for surveillance purposes as a death resulting from a clinically compatible illness, in a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, unless there is a clear alternative cause of death that cannot be related to COVID disease (e.g. trauma). There should be no period of complete recovery from COVID-19 between illness and death.
.
A death due to COVID-19 may not be attributed to another disease (e.g. cancer) and should be counted independently of preexisting conditions that are suspected of triggering a severe course of COVID-19.

In fairness this may just be extremely poor wording. However, it appears that the default position is to count deaths in confirmed OR PROBABLE cases if the death is from an illness COMPATIBLE WITH Covid-19 symptoms, and we should downplay PREEXISTING CONDITIONS that may have contributed.

As with the diagnosing of cases, there is no requirement to have a positive test. Speaks volumes about how shady this method is.

Now there is the disclaimer that it should not be counted if there is a clear alternative, but this appears to be just an afterthought.

C- CHAIN OF EVENTS
Specification of the causal sequence leading to death in Part 1 of the certificate is important. For example, in cases when COVID-19 causes pneumonia and fatal respiratory distress, both pneumonia and respiratory distress should be included, along with COVID-19, in Part 1. Certifiers should include as much detail as possible based on their knowledge of the case, as from medical records, or about laboratory testing.

D- COMORBIDITIES
There is increasing evidence that people with existing chronic conditions or compromised immune systems due to disability are at higher risk of death due to COVID-19. Chronic conditions may be non-communicable diseases such as coronary artery disease, chronic obstructive pulmonary diseas (COPD), and diabetes or disabilities. If the decedent had existing chronic conditions, such as these, they should be reported in Part 2 of the medical certificate of cause of death.

WHO openly admits that people with underlying health problems are at a greater risk of death. This isn’t exactly revolutionary. It does make one ask why it’s necessary to drive up fear like this.

5. Global Surveillance For Infection January 2020

Recommendations for laboratory testing
Any suspected case should be tested. However, depending on the intensity of the transmission, the number of cases and the laboratory capacity, only a randomly selected sample of the suspect cases may be tested.
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If resources allow, testing may be done more broadly (for instance through sentinel surveillance) to better assess the full extent of the circulation of the virus.
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Based on clinical judgment, clinicians may opt to order a test in a patient not strictly meeting the case definition, such as for a cluster of acute respiratory illness among healthcare workers.

This of course raises an interesting question: how many of these samples are actually tested? How many are collected and just sit on a shelf somewhere?

If initial testing is negative in a patient who is strongly suspected to have novel coronavirus infection, the patient should be resampled and specimens collected from multiple
respiratory tract sites
(nose, sputum, endotracheal aspirate). Additional specimen may be collected such as blood, urine, and stool, to monitor the presence of virus of and shedding of virus from different body compartments.

Doesn’t speak too highly of the test, if the recommendation of a negative result is to retest, based on suspicions. Of course, “strongly suspected” is entirely subjective.

Detecting the presence of a virus being shed? Isn’t that consistent with the claim that viruses are really exosomes, excreted from the body?

6. Global Surveillance For Infection March 2020

Case definitions for surveillance
Case and contact definitions are based on the current available information and are regularly revised as new information accumulates. Countries may need to adapt case definitions depending on their local epidemiological situation and other factors. All countries are encouraged to publish definitions used online and in regular situation reports, and to document periodic updates to definitions which may affect the interpretation of surveillance data.

Probable case
A. A suspect case for whom testing for the COVID-19 virus is inconclusive.
OR
B. A suspect case for whom testing could not be performed for any reason.

The World Health Organization actually suggests that countries can make up their own definitions of what a case is. So much for consistency. Also, inconclusive tests, or cases where tests aren’t performed can be written up as “probable” cases.

7. Global Surveillance For Infection May 2020

Purpose of the document
This document provides an overview of surveillance strategies that Member States should consider as part of
comprehensive national surveillance for COVID-19. This document emphasises the need to adapt and reinforce existing national systems where appropriate and to scale-up surveillance capacities as needed.

Most countries will need to significantly strengthen surveillance capacities to rapidly identify cases of COVID‑19, follow-up their contacts, and to monitor disease trends over time. Comprehensive national surveillance for COVID-19 will require the adaptation and reinforcement of existing national systems where appropriate and the scale-up of additional surveillance capacities as needed. Digital technologies for rapid reporting, data management, and analysis will be helpful. Robust comprehensive surveillance once in place, should be maintained even in areas where there are few or no cases; it is critical that new cases and clusters of COVID-19 are detected rapidly and before widespread disease transmission occurs. Ongoing surveillance for COVID-19 is also important to understand longer-term trends in the disease and the evolution of the virus.

Individuals in the community
Individuals in the community can play an important role in the surveillance of COVID-19. Where possible, individuals who have signs and symptoms of COVID-19 should be able to access testing at the primary care level. Where testing at the primary level is not possible, community-based surveillance, whereby the community participates monitors and reports health events to local authorities, may be helpful for identifying clusters of COVID-19.

Participation in contact tracing and cluster investigations are other important ways in which individuals and communities contribute to the surveillance of COVID-19. Contact tracing is the identification of all persons who may have had contact with an individual with COVID-19. By following such contacts daily for up to 14 days since they had contact with the source case, it is possible to identify individuals who are at high risk of being infectious and/or ill and to isolate them before they transmit the infection to others. Contact tracing can be combined with door-to-door case-finding or systematic testing in closed settings, such as residential facilities, or with routine testing for occupational groups. See Contact tracing guidelines for COVID-19.

This document gives plenty of advice on how to go about doing contact tracing, and these procedures are being used. But it has to be said that the means that they classify cases and deaths throws everything into doubt. A cynic may just wonder if this is just to set up a surveillance apparatus.

8. Global Surveillance For Infection August 2020

[Page 2]
Probable COVID-19 case:
A. A patient who meets clinical criteria above AND is a contact of a probable or confirmed case, or epidemiologically linked to a cluster of cases which has had at least one confirmed case identified within that cluster.
B. A suspected case (described above) with chest imaging showing findings suggestive of COVID-19 disease*
* Typical chest imaging findings suggestive of COVID-19 include the following (Manna 2020):
• chest radiography: hazy opacities, often rounded in morphology, with peripheral and lower lung distribution
• chest CT: multiple bilateral ground glass opacities, often rounded in morphology, with peripheral and lower lung
distribution
• lung ultrasound: thickened pleural lines, B lines (multifocal, discrete, or confluent), consolidative patterns with or without air bronchograms.
C. A person with recent onset of anosmia (loss of smell) or ageusia (loss of taste) in the absence of any other identified cause.
D. Death, not otherwise explained, in an adult with respiratory distress preceding death AND who was a contact of a probable or confirmed case or epidemiologically linked to a cluster which has had at least one confirmed case identified within that cluster.

[Page 3]
3. Definition of death due to COVID-19
A COVID-19 death is defined for surveillance purposes as a death resulting from a clinically compatible illness in a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, unless there is a clear alternative cause of death that cannot be related to COVID-19 disease (e.g. trauma). There should be no period of complete recovery between the illness and death.

4. Recommendations for laboratory testing
Suspected and probable cases should be investigated for the presence of SARS-CoV-2 virus according to WHO guidance on Diagnostic testing for SARS-CoV-2. While recommended response activities are largely the same for probable and confirmed cases, testing of probable cases, where resources allow, is still useful since it can exclude cases and reduce the burden required for isolation and contact tracing.
.
Depending on the intensity of the transmission in a specific location, the number of cases and the laboratory capacity, a subset of suspected or probable cases can be prioritized for testing. WHO has provided recommendations on how to prioritize persons to be tested during community transmission in Laboratory testing strategy recommendations for COVID-19.

So, no tests actually have to be performed in order to consider a person a “probable case”. And if a person who had contact with a “probable case” dies, that person can also be considered one, if there was some respiratory issue.

Death has to be “clinically compatible” with how they believe this illness works. As long as there are no obvious signs (like bullet wounds), a case can be written up as a Covid-19 death. Such a system seems ripe for abuse, especially considering the political agenda being played out here.

9. Global Surveillance For Infection Dec. 2020

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Probable COVID-19 case:
A. A patient who meets clinical criteria above AND is a contact of a probable or confirmed case, or epidemiologically linked to a cluster of cases which has had at least one confirmed case identified within that cluster.
B. A suspected case (described above) with chest imaging showing findings suggestive of COVID-19 disease*
* Typical chest imaging findings suggestive of COVID-19 include the following (Manna 2020):
• chest radiography: hazy opacities, often rounded in morphology, with peripheral and lower lung distribution
• chest CT: multiple bilateral ground glass opacities, often rounded in morphology, with peripheral and lower lung
distribution
• lung ultrasound: thickened pleural lines, B lines (multifocal, discrete, or confluent), consolidative patterns with or without air bronchograms.
C. A person with recent onset of anosmia (loss of smell) or ageusia (loss of taste) in the absence of any other identified cause.
D. Death, not otherwise explained, in an adult with respiratory distress preceding death AND who was a contact of a probable or confirmed case or epidemiologically linked to a cluster which has had at least one confirmed case identified within that cluster.

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3. Definition of death due to COVID-19
A COVID-19 death is defined for surveillance purposes as a death resulting from a clinically compatible illness in a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, unless there is a clear alternative cause of death that cannot be related to COVID-19 disease (e.g. trauma). There should be no period of complete recovery between the illness and death.

4. Recommendations for laboratory testing
Suspected and probable cases should be investigated for the presence of SARS-CoV-2 virus according to WHO guidance on Diagnostic testing for SARS-CoV-2. While recommended response activities are largely the same for probable and confirmed cases, testing of probable cases, where resources allow, is still useful since it can exclude cases and reduce the burden required for isolation and contact tracing.
.
Depending on the intensity of the transmission in a specific location, the number of cases and the laboratory capacity, a subset of suspected or probable cases can be prioritized for testing. WHO has provided recommendations on how to prioritize persons to be tested during community transmission in Laboratory testing strategy recommendations for COVID-19.

The definition of a “Death due to Covid-19” is still the same, and can include people where no test was performed, as long the illness is compatible with what is expected.

It’s interesting that despite all these samples being taken, it seems that the bulk aren’t being tested. By contrast, it seems to be random samples, unless a problem is detected.

10. Is This About Establishing Police State?

What is really going on here? Is all of this contact tracing just an underhanded method of establishing the structure of a surveillance state across the globe? This disease clearly can’t be as deadly as it’s made out to be, if Governments have to artificially inflate the numbers.

Virus likely has never been isolated
Modelling compromised: Imperial College London
Modelling compromised: London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine
Modelling compromised: Vaccine Impact Modelling Consortium
No basis for the PCR tests that are used
No evidence that masks actually work as advertised
No evidence, still that masks do anything
No basis for 2 meter “social distancing”
Lobbying behind “non-essential” business determination
No science to what Bonnie Henry does

Politicians and media talking heads are always harping on about “following the science”. Guess what? There isn’t any pushing this so-called pandemic.