Parliament’s Guidelines On Euthanizing The Mentally Ill

Medical Assistance in Dying (MAiD), a.k.a. euthanasia or assisted suicide, had been touted as proponents as having an extremely limited scope. In other words, it would be available to people with terminal illnesses, who were otherwise living in extreme pain.

Bill C-14 was supposed to be limited to terminal cases. In the next session, Bill C-7 increased the eligibility options. Suddenly, even people with serious mental illnesses were able to obtain euthanasia, provided the mental problem wasn’t the sole reason.

And now, we reach the point where people whose SOLE problem is a mental illness can be put down with the help of so-called medical professionals. The people pushing the slippery slope argument have been proven correct once again.

An interim report was released in June 2022, and it’s widely expected that expanding the scope will become law very soon.

MAID PRACTICE STANDARDS

Recommendation 1: Development of MAiD practice standards
The federal, provincial and territorial governments should facilitate the collaboration of physician and nurse regulatory bodies in the development of Standards of Practice for physicians and nurse practitioners for the assessment of MAiD requests in situations that raise questions about incurability, irreversibility, capacity, suicidality, and the impact of structural vulnerabilities. These standards should elaborate upon the subject matter of recommendations 2–13.

INTERPRETING GRIEVOUS AND IRREMEDIABLE MEDICAL CONDITION

Recommendation 2: Establishing incurability
MAiD assessors should establish incurability with reference to treatment attempts made up to that point, outcomes of those treatments, and severity and duration of illness, disease or disability. It is not possible to provide fixed rules for how many treatment attempts, how many kinds of treatments, and over what period of time as this will vary according to the nature and severity of medical conditions the person has and their overall health status. This must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. The Panel is of the view that the requester and assessors must come to a shared understanding that the person has a serious and incurable illness, disease or disability. As with many chronic conditions, the incurability of a mental disorder cannot be established in the absence of multiple attempts at interventions with therapeutic aims.

Recommendation 3: Establishing irreversibility
MAiD assessors should establish irreversibility with reference to interventions tried that are designed to improve function, including: recognized rehabilitative and supportive measures that have been tried up to that point, outcomes of those interventions, and the duration of decline. It is not possible to provide fixed rules for how many attempts at interventions, how many types of interventions, and over how much time, as this will vary according to a requester’s baseline function as well as life goals. Therefore, this must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. The Panel is of the view that the requester and assessors must come to a shared understanding that the person is in an advanced state of irreversible decline in capability.

Recommendation 4: Understanding enduring and Intolerable suffering
MAiD assessors should come to an understanding with the requester that the illness, disease or disability or functional decline causes the requester enduring and intolerable physical or psychological suffering.

VULNERABILITIES

Recommendation 5: Comprehensive capacity assessments
MAiD assessors should undertake thorough and, where appropriate, serial assessments of a requester’s decision-making capacity in accordance with clinical standards and legal criteria. These assessments should be consistent with approaches laid out in standardized capacity evaluation tools.

Recommendation 6: Means available to relieve suffering
To ensure all requesters have access to the fullest possible range of social supports which could potentially contribute to reducing suffering, the Panel recommends that ’community services’ in Track 2 Safeguard 241.2(3.1)(g) should be interpreted as including housing and income supports as means available to relieve suffering and should be offered to MAiD requesters, where appropriate.

Recommendation 7: Interpretation of track 2 safeguard 241.2(3.1)(h) the person has given serious consideration to those means
Serious consideration should be interpreted to mean genuine openness to the means available to relieve suffering and how they could make a difference in the person’s life.

Recommendation 8: Consistency, durability, and well-considered nature of a maid request
Assessors should ensure that the requester’s wish for death is consistent with the person’s values and beliefs, unambiguous and rationally considered during a period of stability, not during a period of crisis.

Recommendation 9: Situations of involuntariness
Persons in situations of involuntariness for periods shorter than six months should be assessed following this period to minimize the potential contribution of the involuntariness on the request for MAiD. For those who are repeatedly or continuously in situations of involuntariness, (e.g., six months or longer, or repeated periods of less than six months), the institutions responsible for the person should ensure that assessments for MAiD are performed by assessors who do not work within or are associated with the institution.

ASSESSMENT PROCESS

Recommendation 10: Independent assessor with expertise
The requester should be assessed by at least one assessor with expertise in the condition(s). In cases involving MAiD MD-SUMC, the assessor with expertise in the condition should be a psychiatrist independent from the treating team/provider. Assessors with expertise in the person’s condition(s) should review the diagnosis, and ensure the requester is aware of all reasonable options for treatment and has given them serious consideration.

Recommendation 11: Involvement of other healthcare professionals
Assessors should involve medical subspecialists and other healthcare professionals for consultations and additional expertise where necessary.

Recommendation 12: Discussion with treating team and collateral information
• If the requester’s primary healthcare provider is not one of the assessors, assessors should obtain input from that person. When the requester’s clinical care is shared by members of a multidisciplinary healthcare team, assessors should solicit their input as well.
• With a requester’s consent, assessors and providers shall obtain collateral information relevant to eligibility and capacity assessment. This should include reviewing medical records, prior MAiD assessments, and discussions with family members or significant others. Care must be taken to determine that obtaining collateral information will not be harmful to the requester.

Recommendation 13: Challenging interpersonal dynamics
Assessors and providers should be self-reflective and examine their reactions to those they assess. If their reactions compromise their ability to carry out the assessment in accordance with professional norms, they should seek supervision from mentors and colleagues, and/or discontinue involvement in the assessment process. The practitioner should adhere to any local policies concerning withdrawal from a MAiD assessment and onward referral.

IMPLEMENTATION

Recommendation 14: Consultations with first nations, inuit and métis peoples
Consultation between health regulatory bodies in each province and territory with First Nations, Métis, and Inuit peoples must aim to create practice standards with respect to MAiD MD-SUMC, and MAiD more generally, that incorporate Indigenous perspectives and are relevant to their communities.

Recommendation 15: Training of assessors and providers in specialized topics
To support consistent application of the law and to ensure high quality and culturally sensitive care, assessors and providers should participate in training opportunities that address topics of particular salience to MAiD MD-SUMC. These include, but are not limited to: capacity assessment, trauma-informed care and cultural safety.

Recommendation 16: Prospective oversight
Given its concurrent jurisdiction in relation to MAiD, the federal government should play an active role in supporting the development of a model of prospective oversight for all or some Track 2 cases that could be adapted by provinces and territories.

Recommendation 17: Case-based quality assurance and education
The federal government should play an active role in supporting the development of provincial/territorial systems of MAiD case review for educational and quality improvement purposes.

Recommendation 18: Modifications to data collection under the federal maid monitoring system
Data related to specific topics (eligibility, supported decision-making, means available to relieve suffering, refusal of means available, and residence and legal status) should be collected in the MAiD monitoring system in addition to data already collected under the 2018 Regulations. These data can be used to assess whether key areas of concern raised about MAiD MD-SUMC and complex Track 2 cases discussed in this report are being addressed by the clinical practices recommended.

Recommendation 19: Periodic, federally funded research
The federal government should fund both targeted and investigator-initiated periodic research on questions relating to the practice of MAiD (including but not only MAiD MD-SUMC).

If nothing else, Recommendation #8 points out that this should only be an option during a period of stability, and not during a crisis.

Keep in mind, this is only an interim report. There’s nothing to suggest this won’t be expanded on at some later point.

Since its inception, the rates of people receiving assistance in suicide has increased year over year. This will surely raise those numbers even more.

(1) https://www.ourcommons.ca/Committees/en/Work
(2) https://parl.ca/DocumentViewer/en/44-1/AMAD/report-1/
(3) https://parl.ca/Content/Committee/441/AMAD/Reports/RP11896958/amadrp01/amadrp01-e.pdf
(4) https://canucklaw.ca/canadas-bill-c-14-assisted-suicide/
(5) https://canucklaw.ca/euthanasia-3-bill-c-7-to-expand-scope-of-assisted-suicide/
(6) https://canucklaw.ca/recent-statistics-on-euthanasia-assisted-suicide-in-canada/

Replacement Migration In Canada: 1966 To 1979 Data

Here’s some data going back to the 1960s. These years feature quite differently than more recent reports. The United States and United Kingdom were consistently at the top of the source countries list. That has since been replaced by China, India and the Philippines. White genocide (a.k.a “replacement”) is a very real thing.

According to the United Nations, enacting policies designed to bring about the destruction of an ethnic, racial, or religious group (in all or in part), is considered genocide. Consequently, forced multiculturalism and population replacement should be viewed through that lens.

1. Mass LEGAL Immigration In Canada

Despite what many think, LEGAL immigration into Canada is actually a much larger threat than illegal aliens, given the true scale of the replacement that is happening. What was founded as a European (British) colony is becoming unrecognizable due to forced demographic changes. There are also social, economic, environmental and voting changes to consider. See this Canadian series, and the UN programs for more detail. Politicians, the media, and so-called “experts” have no interest in coming clean on this.

CLICK HERE, for UN Genocide Prevention/Punishment Convention.
CLICK HERE, for Barcelona Declaration & Kalergi Plan.
CLICK HERE, for UN Kalergi Plan (population replacement).
CLICK HERE, for UN replacement efforts since 1974.
CLICK HERE, for tracing steps of UN replacement agenda.

Note: If there are errors in calculating the totals, please speak up. Information is of no use to the public if it isn’t accurate.

2. Source Countries From 1966 To 1979

Let’s look at the “official” numbers from 1966 to 1979. The U.S. and U.K. are still featured prominently, something that will change in the coming years.

PERMANENT RESIDENTS IN YEAR 1966
SOURCE COUNTRY NUMBER PERCENTAGE RANK
United Kingdom 63,291 32.5 1
Italy 31,625 16.2 2
United States 17,514 9.0 3
Germany 9,263 4.8 4
Portugal 7,930 4.0 5
France 7,872 4.0 6
Greece 7,174 3.7 7
China 4,094 2.1 8
West Indies 3,935 2.0 9
Netherlands 3,794 1.9 10
TOTAL — TOP 10 156,492 80.4
TOTAL — OTHERS 38,251 19.6
GRAND TOTAL 194,743 100
PERMANENT RESIDENTS IN YEAR 1967
SOURCE COUNTRY NUMBER PERCENTAGE RANK
United Kingdom 62,420 28.0 1
Italy 30,055 13.4 2
United States 19,038 8.6 3
Germany 11,779 5.3 4
Greece 10,650 4.6 5
France 10,122 4.5 6
Portugal 9,500 4.2 7
West Indies 8,403 3.8 8
China 6,409 2.9 9
Australia 4,967 2.2 10
TOTAL — TOP 10 173,343 77.8
TOTAL — OTHERS 49,533 22.2
GRAND TOTAL 222,876 100
PERMANENT RESIDENTS IN YEAR 1968
SOURCE COUNTRY NUMBER PERCENTAGE RANK
United Kingdom 37,889 20.6 1
United States 20,422 11.1 2
Italy 19,774 10.8 3
Germany 8,966 4.8 4
China 8,382 4.6 5
France 8,184 4.4 6
Austria 8,125 4.4 7
Greece 7,739 4.2 8
Portugal 7,738 4.2 9
West Indies 7,563 4.1 10
TOTAL — TOP 10 104,782 57.0
TOTAL — OTHERS 79,192 43.0
GRAND TOTAL 183,974 100
PERMANENT RESIDENTS IN YEAR 1969
SOURCE COUNTRY NUMBER PERCENTAGE RANK
United Kingdom 31,977 19.8 1
United States 22,785 14.1 2
West Indies 13,093 8.1 3
Italy 10,383 6.4 4
China 8,272 5.1 5
Portugal 7,182 4.4 6
Greece 6,937 4.3 7
Germany 5,880 3.6 8
France 5,549 3.4 9
India 5,395 3.3 10
TOTAL — TOP 10 117,453 72.7
TOTAL — OTHERS 44,078 27.3
GRAND TOTAL 161,531 100
PERMANENT RESIDENTS IN YEAR 1970
SOURCE COUNTRY NUMBER PERCENTAGE RANK
United Kingdom 26,497 18.7 1
United States 24,424 16.5 2
West Indies 12,456 8.4 3
Italy 8,533 5.8 4
Portugal 7,902 5.4 5
Greece 6,327 4.3 6
Yugoslavia 5,672 3.8 7
India 5,670 3.8 8
China 5,377 3.6 9
France 4,410 2.9 10
TOTAL — TOP 10 101,596 68.8
TOTAL — OTHERS 46,118 31.2
GRAND TOTAL 147,714 100
PERMANENT RESIDENTS IN YEAR 1971
SOURCE COUNTRY NUMBER PERCENTAGE RANK
United States 24,366 20.0 1
United Kingdom 15,451 12.8 2
Portugal 9,157 7.5 3
Italy 5,790 4.8 4
India 5,313 4.4 5
China 5,009 4.1 6
Greece 4,769 3.9 7
Philippines 4,180 3.4 8
Yugoslavia 2,997 2.4 9
France 2,966 2.4 10
TOTAL — TOP 10 79,998 66.6
TOTAL — OTHERS 41,902 34.4
GRAND TOTAL 121,900 100
PERMANENT RESIDENTS IN YEAR 1972
SOURCE COUNTRY NUMBER PERCENTAGE RANK
United States 22,618 18.5 1
United Kingdom 18,197 14.9 2
Portugal 8,737 7.2 3
Hong Kong 6,297 5.2 4
India 5,049 4.1 5
Uganda 5,021 4.1 6
Italy 4,608 3.8 7
Greece 4,016 3.3 8
Philippines 3,946 3.2 9
France 2,742 2.2 10
TOTAL — TOP 10 81,231 66.6
TOTAL — OTHERS 40,775 33.4
GRAND TOTAL 122,006 100
PERMANENT RESIDENTS IN YEAR 1973
SOURCE COUNTRY NUMBER PERCENTAGE RANK
United Kingdom 26,973 14.6 1
United States 25,242 13.7 2
Hong Kong 14,662 8.0 3
Portugal 13,483 7.3 4
Jamaica 9,363 5.1 5
India 9,203 5.0 6
Philippines 6,757 3.7 7
Greece 5,833 3.2 8
Italy 5,468 3.0 9
Trinidad-Tobago 5,138 2.8 10
TOTAL — TOP 10 122,122 66.3
TOTAL — OTHERS 62,078 33.7
GRAND TOTAL 184,200 100
PERMANENT RESIDENTS IN YEAR 1974
SOURCE COUNTRY NUMBER PERCENTAGE RANK
United Kingdom 38,456 17.6 1
United States 26,541 12.1 2
Portugal 16,333 7.5 3
India 12,868 5.9 4
Hong Kong 12,704 5.8 5
Jamaica 11,286 5.2 6
Philippines 9,564 4.4 7
Greece 5,632 2.6 8
Italy 5,226 2.4 9
Haiti 4,857 2.2 10
TOTAL — TOP 10 143,467 65.7
TOTAL — OTHERS 74,998 34.3
GRAND TOTAL 218,465 100
PERMANENT RESIDENTS IN YEAR 1975
SOURCE COUNTRY NUMBER PERCENTAGE RANK
United Kingdom 34,978 18.6 1
United States 20,155 10.7 2
Hong Kong 11,132 5.9 3
India 10,144 5.4 4
Portugal 8,390 4.5 5
Jamaica 8,211 4.4 6
Philippines 7,364 3.9 7
Italy 5,078 2.7 8
Guyana 4,394 2.3 9
South Korea 4,314 2.3 10
TOTAL — TOP 10 114,163 60.8
TOTAL — OTHERS 73,718 39.2
GRAND TOTAL 187,881 100
PERMANENT RESIDENTS IN YEAR 1976
SOURCE COUNTRY NUMBER PERCENTAGE RANK
United Kingdom 21,548 14.4 1
United States 17,315 11.6 2
Hong Kong 10,725 7.2 3
Jamaica 7,282 4.9 4
Lebanon 7,161 4.8 5
India 6,733 4.5 6
Philippines 5,939 4.0 7
Portugal 5,344 3.6 8
Italy 4,530 3.0 9
Guyana 3,430 2.3 10
TOTAL — TOP 10 90,007 60.2
TOTAL — OTHERS 59,422 39.8
GRAND TOTAL 149,429 100
PERMANENT RESIDENTS IN YEAR 1977
SOURCE COUNTRY NUMBER PERCENTAGE RANK
United Kingdom 17,977 15.6 1
United States 12,888 11.2 3
Hong Kong 6,371 5.5 3
Philippines 6,232 5.4 4
India 5,555 4.8 5
Lebanon 3,847 3.3 6
Portugal 3,579 3.1 7
Italy 3,411 3.0 8
France 2,757 2.4 9
Guyana 2,472 2.4 10
TOTAL — TOP 10 65,089 56.7
TOTAL — OTHERS 49,825 43.3
GRAND TOTAL 114,914 100
PERMANENT RESIDENTS IN YEAR 1978
SOURCE COUNTRY NUMBER PERCENTAGE RANK
United Kingdom 11,801 13.7 1
United States 9,945 11.5 2
India 5,110 5.9 3
Hong Kong 4,740 5.5 4
Philippines 4,370 5.1 5
Portugal 3,086 3.6 6
Italy 2,976 .43 7
France 1,754 2.9 8
South Africa 1,653 1.9 9
Lebanon 1,454 1.7 10
TOTAL — TOP 10 46,880 54.3
TOTAL — OTHERS 39,424 45.7
GRAND TOTAL 86,313 100
PERMANENT RESIDENTS IN YEAR 1979
SOURCE COUNTRY NUMBER PERCENTAGE RANK
Vietnam 19,859 17.7 1
United Kingdom 12,853 11.5 2
United States 9,617 8.6 3
Hong Kong 5,966 5.3 4
India 4,517 4.0 5
Laos 3,903 3.5 6
Philippines 3,873 3.5 7
Jamaica 3,213 2.9 8
Guyana 2,473 2.2 9
China 2,058 2.1 10
TOTAL — TOP 10 68,332 61.0
TOTAL — OTHERS 43,764 39.0
GRAND TOTAL 112,096 100

Permanent Residents: U.S., Europe and Australia as a percentage of overall migration globally. The vast majority of people getting PR in recent years aren’t from those areas.

YEAR # U.S. % U.S. # Eur. % Eur. # Aust % Austr # Other % Other
1973 25,242 13.7 71,883 39.0 2,096 1.1 84,979 46.1
1974 26,541 12.1 88,694 40.6 2,022 0.1 102,208 46.3
1975 20,155 10.7 72,898 38.8 1,654 0.1 87,174 46.4
1976 17,315 11.5 49,908 33.3 1,387 0.1 80,819 54.1
1977 12,888 11.2 40,747 35.5 1,063 0.1 60,216 52.4
1978 9,945 11.5 30,075 34.8 1,233 1.4 45,060 52.2
1979 9,617 8.6 32,858 29.3 808 0.1 68,813 61.4

3. More Recent Statistics On Immigration Source Countries

The above may not seem too bad, but keep in mind that the trends are about to get a whole lot worse. Here are numbers from within the last decade. Of course, this doesn’t include the hordes of students and “temporary” workers who come and don’t leave.

(Page 16 of the 2015 Annual Report to Parliament)

(Page 10 of the 2016 Annual Report to Parliament)

(Page 14 of the 2017 Annual Report to Parliament)

(Page 28 of the 2018 Annual Report to Parliament)

(Page 36 of the 2019 Annual Report to Parliament)

Notice any major changes? The U.K. and U.S. are nowhere near as prominent as they once were, and the demographic replacement is accelerating.

Of course, this doesn’t address the levels of student visas and “temporary” workers, which would increase drastically in the coming years.

4. Documents Provided By Canadian Government

(A.0) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/index.html
(A.1) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1966.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1966
(A.2) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1967.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1967
(A.3) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1968.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1968
(A.4) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1969.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1969
(A.5) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1970.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1970
(A.6) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1971.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1971
(A.7) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1972.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1972
(A.8) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1973.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1973
(A.9) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1974.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1974
(A.10) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1975.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1975
(A.11) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1976.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1976
(A.12) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1977.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1977
(A.13) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1978.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1978
(A.14) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1979.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1979
(A.15) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1980.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1980
(A.16) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1981.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1981
(A.17) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1982.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1982
(A.18) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1983.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1983
(A.19) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1984.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1984
(A.20) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1985.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1985
(A.21) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1986.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1986
(A.22) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1987.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1987
(A.23) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1988.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1988
(A.24) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1989.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1989
(A.25) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1990.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1990
(A.26) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1991.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1991
(A.27) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1992.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1992
(A.28) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1993.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1993
(A.29) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1994.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1994
(A.30) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1995.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1995
(A.31) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1996.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1996

2004.annual.immigration.report.to.parliament
2005.annual.immigration.report.to.parliament
2006.annual.immigration.report.to.parliament
2007.annual.immigration.report.to.parliament
2008.annual.immigration.report.to.parliament
2009.annual.immigration.report.to.parliament
2010.annual.immigration.report.to.parliament
2011.annual.immigration.report.to.parliament
2012.annual.immigration.report.to.parliament
2013.annual.immigration.report.to.parliament
2014.annual.immigration.report.to.parliament
2015.annual.immigration.report.to.parliament
2016.annual.immigration.report.to.parliament
2017.annual.immigration.report.to.parliament
2018.annual.immigration.report.to.parliament
2019.annual.immigration.report.to.parliament
2020.annual.immigration.report.to.parliament

Gov’t Recommends More Pathways For Hong Kong Residents To Come

The Canadian Government has posted its take on the report by the Immigration Committee in Parliament. This concerns the topic: “Safe Haven in Canada: Special Immigration and Refugee Measures are Urgently Needed for the People of Hong Kong”.

The responses are not encouraging. Overall, Ottawa seems to favour more people coming to Canada, and less accountability overall. While most of the recommendations are specific to Hong Kong, there’s little interest in legitimate security concerns related to China.

1. Mass LEGAL Immigration In Canada

Despite what many think, LEGAL immigration into Canada is actually a much larger threat than illegal aliens, given the true scale of the replacement that is happening. What was founded as a European (British) colony is becoming unrecognizable due to forced demographic changes. There are also social, economic, environmental and voting changes to consider. See this Canadian series, and the UN programs for more detail. Politicians, the media, and so-called “experts” have no interest in coming clean on this.

CLICK HERE, for UN Genocide Prevention/Punishment Convention.
CLICK HERE, for Barcelona Declaration & Kalergi Plan.
CLICK HERE, for UN Kalergi Plan (population replacement).
CLICK HERE, for UN replacement efforts since 1974.
CLICK HERE, for tracing steps of UN replacement agenda.

Note: If there are errors in calculating the totals, please speak up. Information is of no use to the public if it isn’t accurate.

2. Recommendations From June 2022 Report

Recommendation 1
That Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada issue study permits to Hong Kong applicants who have been accepted in a study program at an institution with a COVID-19 readiness plan, regardless of their age.

Recommendation 2
That Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada undertake to extend the young professionals Working Holiday work permit for Hong Kong residents to two years and to include persons up to 35 years of age.

Recommendation 3
That Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada extend the criteria for eligibility for the three-year open work permit to include all persons with a minimum of 60 credits or its equivalent of post-secondary education regardless of when this education was completed.

Disagreed with, if only because there are already of pathways available. This is a response that will come up over and over again.

Recommendations 4 and 5
#4 That Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada adopt an inclusive approach and develop a pathway to permanent residence for former Hong Kong residents based on a broad range of work experience, and requiring minimal language and education levels.
#5 That Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada quickly develop and implement a pathway to permanent residence for Hong Kong residents who complete their post-secondary studies in Canada, ensuring that this pathway remains available to all Hong Kong residents studying at designated learning institutions.

Recommendations 6 and 7
#6 That Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada create a temporary public policy to grant refugee status to pro-democracy activists within Hong Kong and within third countries, which will enable their resettlement to Canada.
#7 That Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada implement a temporary public policy to bring Hong Kong residents at risk to Canada on temporary resident visas regardless of their age.

Recommendation 8
That Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada partner with designated non-governmental organizations to identify Hong Kong pro-democracy activists in need of safe haven in Canada on a temporary resident visa, to certify Hong Kong refugees, and to facilitate both classes of Hong Kong residents at risk to travel from Hong Kong to third countries and to Canada, and redevelop a refugee stream similar to the former source country program.

Recommendation 9
That Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada acknowledge the urgency of the situation and that, given the exit ban will take effect on 1 August 2021, the Minister immediately respond with an expansion of humanitarian measures to the current immigration and refugee measures to support the people of Hong Kong.

Recommendation 10
That Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada issue travel documents to residents of Hong Kong at risk of persecution and exempt them from non-essential pandemic travel restrictions, following all public health guidelines.

Recommendation 11
That Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada implement a temporary public policy to create an expedited pathway to permanent residence for Hong Kong residents in Canada or abroad before the exit ban comes into effect on 1 August 2021.

Recommendation 12
That Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada promote its family reunification stream to family members of Hong Kong residents looking to come to Canada and create a temporary public policy to also include extended family members of Canadian citizens and of pro-democracy activists living in Canada.

Recommendation 13
That Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada develop a temporary public policy to allow former Canadian citizens to return to Canada as permanent residents.

Recommendation 14
That Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, in partnership with Public Services and Procurement Canada, and, as needed, other departments and agencies, investigate Canada’s Visa Application Centres in China, especially in regard to personal data leaks due to employee coercion, and that it tables its findings with the Committee.

Recommendation 15
That Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada terminate its contract with VFS Global in China and bring the services back in-house at Canadian diplomatic missions in China.

The Government disagrees with recommendations #14 and #15, which is interesting. There seems to be little urgency to investigate, or replace a private agency (despite concerns) that is processing the visas for Chinese nationals.

Doesn’t seem like there is much interest in protecting Canadian borders or sovereignty.

3. Important Links

(1) https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/44-1/CIMM/report-1/
(2) https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/44-1/CIMM/report-1/response-8512-441-10
(3) https://www.ourcommons.ca/content/Committee/441/CIMM/GovResponse/RP11842881/441_CIMM_Rpt01_GR/DepartmentOfCitizenshipAndImmigration-e.pdf
(4) Department Of Citizenship And Immigration Hong Kong

U.N. Death Cult: 73 Million Abortions Annually Worldwide

The World Health Organization openly posts and discusses some pretty disturbing and messed up data on abortion worldwide. (See archive).

This expands on a recent Canuck Law article, which estimates that there have been over 4.2 million abortions just in Canada since 1970. This averages out to approximately 20% of pregnancies being willfully terminated. Few are aware of just how big this problem is.

Here are some claims W.H.O. promotes:

  • Abortion is a common health intervention. It is safe when carried out using a method recommended by WHO, appropriate to the pregnancy duration and by someone with the necessary skills.
  • Six out of 10 of all unintended pregnancies end in an induced abortion.
  • Around 45% of all abortions are unsafe, of which 97% take place in developing countries.
  • Unsafe abortion is a leading – but preventable – cause of maternal deaths and morbidities. It can lead to physical and mental health complications and social and financial burdens for women, communities and health systems.
  • Lack of access to safe, timely, affordable and respectful abortion care is a critical public health and human rights issue.

And this one is a doozy:

Around 73 million induced abortions take place worldwide each year. Six out of 10 (61%) of all unintended pregnancies, and 3 out of 10 (29%) of all pregnancies, end in induced abortion

This claim is based on work from Bearak J, Popinchalk A, Ganatra B, Moller A-B, Tunçalp Ö, Beavin C et al, which covered estimates from the years 1990 through 2019. They used a “Bayesian framework”, meaning dta on pregnancy intentions and abortion were compiled from country-based surveys, official statistics, and published studies found through a literature search. So, it’s not just a straight compilation, but estimates as well.

Of course, if this figure of 73 million, per year, is even remotely accurate, it would be somewhere between 2 and 5 billion children have been aborted since the 1970s, when the movement really took off.

Restrictive abortion regulation can cause distress and stigma, and risk constituting a violation of human rights of women and girls, including the right to privacy and the right to non-discrimination and equality, while also imposing financial burdens on women and girls. Regulations that force women to travel to attain legal care, or require mandatory counselling or waiting periods, lead to loss of income and other financial costs, and can make abortion inaccessible to women with low resources.

Estimates from 2006 show that complications of unsafe abortions cost health systems in developing countries US$ 553 million per year for post-abortion treatments. In addition, households experienced US$ 922 million in loss of income due to long-term disability related to unsafe abortion. Countries and health systems could make substantial monetary savings by providing greater access to modern contraception and quality induced abortion.

A set of scoping reviews from 2021 indicate that abortion regulations – by being linked to fertility – affect women’s education, participation on the labour market and positive contribution to GDP growth. The legal status of abortion can also affect children’s educational outcomes, and their earnings on the labour market later in life. For example, legalization of abortion – by reducing the number of unwanted pregnancies and thus increasing the likelihood that children are born wanted – can be linked to greater parental investments in children, including in girls’ schooling.

Does W.H.O. condemn the hundreds of millions — if not billions — of lives that are lost through this? Not exactly. The rights of the unborn never seem to factor into the equation.

W.H.O. attempts to make several economic arguments as to why abortion should be legal and as accessible as possible. Of course, they don’t seem to bother with addressing the long term physical and psychological impacts of women who do abort their children.

The World Health Organization also has its own division on Sexual and Reproductive Health and Research (SRH). (See archive). It’s funded both by various governments and private companies, including the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. (See archive). They always seem to be around whenever there are population reduction programs involved.

5.6 Ensure universal access to sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights as agreed in accordance with the Programme of Action of the International Conference on population and Development and the Beijing Platform for Action and the outcome documents of their review conferences

Enshrining abortion is also written right into Agenda 2030, which was signed by “Conservative” Stephen Harper in 2015. (See archive). It’s item #5.6 on the Treaty.

One might think it strange that population control groups are interested in keeping abortion legal and readily available. Then again, once one realizes the scale of this mass infanticide, things start to make a whole lot more sense.

Furthermore, the W.H.O. and U.N. link to the U.N. Population Fund, their 2014 Programme of Action, and to the Beijing Declaration And Platform For Action. (See archive). In a sick twist, abortion is promoted as women’s rights, and pregnancy an often unwanted evil.

Of course, 50% or so of the babies who are killed would have grown up to become women. This is something that many women’s rights groups don’t get, or at least pretend they don’t.

It’s interesting that groups like the United Nations claim to be against child exploitation and human trafficking. That said, they support encourage practices that ensure the deaths of countless unborn, while their remains can be sold off for a variety of purposes.

It’s even more disturbing that the U.N. keeps detailed and up-to-date records of abortion regulations across countries. Guess it’s one way of tracking where the most victims are likely to come from.

Has abortion been stopped, or slowed over the last 2 1/2 years during this so-called pandemic? Not at all. In fact, it’s one of the few things that were still available in Canada the entire time. Sure, weddings, churches, and funerals were “non-essential”. However, abortion, weed and liquor were still accessible.

SOURCE MATERIAL
(1) https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/abortion
(2) https://canucklaw.ca/eugenics-in-canada-20-of-babies-aborted-in-pro-choice-movement/
(3) https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/32710833/
(4) https://www.who.int/teams/sexual-and-reproductive-health-and-research-(srh)/human-reproduction-programme
(5) https://archive.ph/uyd8J
(6) https://www.who.int/teams/sexual-and-reproductive-health-and-research-(srh)/human-reproduction-programme/donors
(7) https://archive.ph/7tb5Q
(8) https://www.un.org/ohrlls/sites/www.un.org.ohrlls/files/2030_agenda_for_sustainable_development_web.pdf
(9) 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development web
(10) https://www.unfpa.org/publications/international-conference-population-and-development-programme-action
(11) https://www.unwomen.org/sites/default/files/Headquarters/Attachments/Sections/CSW/PFA_E_Final_WEB.pdf
(12) https://canucklaw.ca/wp-content/uploads/UN-Beijing-Declaration-And-Platform-For-Action.pdf
(13) https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/related-health-issues
(14) https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/331561/WHO-2019-nCoV-essential_health_services-2020.1-eng.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
(15) WHO-2019-nCoV Essential Health Services 2020 March 2020
(16) WHO-2019-nCoV-essential_health_services June 2020
(17) https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/policy/AbortionPoliciesReproductiveHealth.pdf

International Mobility Programme Data: 1994-2013

Below is some significant data on temporary foreign workers (TFW) from 1994 to 2013. (See archive). In fairness, the totals differ somewhat from the Annual Immigration Reports to Parliament. Perhaps, the methods of calculation weren’t the same.

1. Mass LEGAL Immigration In Canada

Despite what many think, LEGAL immigration into Canada is actually a much larger threat than illegal aliens, given the true scale of the replacement that is happening. What was founded as a European (British) colony is becoming unrecognizable due to forced demographic changes. There are also social, economic, environmental and voting changes to consider. See this Canadian series, and the UN programs for more detail. Politicians, the media, and so-called “experts” have no interest in coming clean on this.

CLICK HERE, for UN Genocide Prevention/Punishment Convention.
CLICK HERE, for Barcelona Declaration & Kalergi Plan.
CLICK HERE, for UN Kalergi Plan (population replacement).
CLICK HERE, for UN replacement efforts since 1974.
CLICK HERE, for tracing steps of UN replacement agenda.

Note: If there are errors in calculating the totals, please speak up. Information is of no use to the public if it isn’t accurate.

There’s also the issue that “temporary” workers and students often don’t leave when their visas expire. Canada offers many pathways to extend their stays, and there is little in the way of enforcement.

Aside from all the official totals, there are 3 “temporary” programs that are worth mentioning. These lead to hundreds of thousands of foreigners entering Canada each year, and most with some option to extend. There are also pathways to permanent residence. These are:

  • Temporary Foreign Worker Program (TFWP)
  • International Mobility Programme (IMP)
  • International Students

Let’s look at a decade worth of data, and see where the bulk of these people are coming from. Of course, this should be pretty obvious. This is from page 27 and 36, and focuses on the International Mobility Programme. In fairness, it’s likely that a lot of these people leave afterwards. That said, having the rates would be nice.

2. International Mobility Programme: Permit Holders 1994-2013

For reference: the International Mobility Visas (also known as “Working Holiday Visas”) are typically valid for 1-2 years. The charts below refer to the total at any given year.

YEAR
NEW IMP PERMITS ISSUED
1994 64,020
1995 60,358
1996 59,293
1997 61,339
1998 64,405
1999 67,584
2000 71,186
2001 72,525
2002 66,984
2003 58,619
2004 66,757
2005 72,689
2006 81,312
2007 88,217
2008 102,659
2009 106,737
2010 121,642
2011 138,533
2012 148,070
2013 161,541

This is from page 27 of this report. Overall data is from 1994 to 2013. Also, the number of permits has nearly tripled from 1994 (64,000) through to 2013 (161,000).

3. Source Countries For International Mobility: 2004 To 2013

INT’L MOBILITY PROGRAMME, PERMITS HOLDERS IN 2004
SOURCE COUNTRY NUMBER PERCENTAGE RANK
United States 18,567 27.8 1
Australia 7,271 10.9 2
France 7,028 10.5 3
United Kingdom, Colonies 6,476 9.7 4
Japan 5,916 8.9 5
Germany 2,467 3.7 6
China 1,801 2.8 7
Ireland 1,615 2.4 8
South Korea 1,558 1.8 9
New Zealand 1,484 2.2 10
TOTAL — TOP 10 53,517 80.2
TOTAL — OTHERS 13,240 19.8
GRAND TOTAL 66,757 100
INT’L MOBILITY PROGRAMME, PERMITS HOLDERS IN 2005
SOURCE COUNTRY NUMBER PERCENTAGE RANK
United States 19,453 26.8 1
France 8,636 11.9 2
United Kingdom, Colonies 6,701 9.2 3
Japan 6,244 9.2 4
Germany 2,751 3.8 5
South Korea 1,998 2.7 6
China 1,959 2.7 7
New Zealand 1,702 2.3 8
India 1,688 2.3 9
Ireland 1,572 2.2 10
TOTAL — TOP 10 52,704 72.5
TOTAL — OTHERS 19,985 27.5
GRAND TOTAL 72,689 100
INT’L MOBILITY PROGRAMME, PERMITS HOLDERS IN 2006
SOURCE COUNTRY NUMBER PERCENTAGE RANK
United States 21,469 26.4 1
France 9,767 12.0 2
Australia 7,975 9.8 3
United Kingdom, Colonies 6,894 8.5 4
Japan 5,953 7.3 5
Germany 4,211 5.2 6
India 2,295 2.8 7
China 2,242 2.8 8
South Korea 2,009 2.5 9
Ireland 1,998 2.5 10
TOTAL — TOP 10 64,813 79.7
TOTAL — OTHERS 16,499 20.3
GRAND TOTAL 81,312 100
INT’L MOBILITY PROGRAMME, PERMITS HOLDERS IN 2007
SOURCE COUNTRY NUMBER PERCENTAGE RANK
United States 22,168 25.1 1
France 10,358 11.7 2
Australia 8,220 9.3 3
United Kingdom, Colonies 7,397 8.4 4
Japan 5,683 6.4 5
Germany 4,809 5.5 6
China 2,822 3.2 7
South Korea 2,363 2.7 8
Ireland 2,259 2.6 9
New Zealand 2,058 2.3 10
TOTAL — TOP 10 68,137 77.3
TOTAL — OTHERS 20,080 22.7
GRAND TOTAL 88,217 100
INT’L MOBILITY PROGRAMME, PERMITS HOLDERS IN 2008
SOURCE COUNTRY NUMBER PERCENTAGE RANK
United States 24,169 23.5 1
Australia 11,879 11.6 2
France 11,505 11.2 3
United Kingdom, Colonies 7,813 7.6 4
Japan 6,715 6.5 5
Germany 5,336 5.2 6
India 3,776 3.7 7
South Korea 3,318 3.2 8
China 3,098 3.0 9
New Zealand 2,436 2.4 10
TOTAL — TOP 10 80,045 78.0
TOTAL — OTHERS 22,614 22.0
GRAND TOTAL 102,659 100
INT’L MOBILITY PROGRAMME, PERMITS HOLDERS IN 2009
SOURCE COUNTRY NUMBER PERCENTAGE RANK
United States 23,446 22.0 1
France 14,233 13.3 2
Australia 10,053 9.4 3
United Kingdom 7,983 7.5 4
Germany 6,092 5.7 5
Japan 5,954 5.6 6
India 4,166 3.9 7
South Korea 4,041 3.8 8
China 2,920 2.7 9
Ireland 2,812 2.6 10
TOTAL — TOP 10 81,700 76.5
TOTAL — OTHERS 25,037 23.5
GRAND TOTAL 106,737 100
INT’L MOBILITY PROGRAMME, PERMITS HOLDERS IN 2010
SOURCE COUNTRY NUMBER PERCENTAGE RANK
United States 27,398 22.5 1
France 16,107 13.2 2
Australia 10,375 8.5 3
United Kingdom, Colonies 8,161 6.7 4
Germany 6,812 5.6 5
India 6,603 5.4 6
South Korea 5,508 4.5 7
Japan 5,059 4.2 8
Ireland 3,649 3.0 9
Philippines 3,440 2.8 10
TOTAL — TOP 10 93,112 76.5
TOTAL — OTHERS 28,530 23.5
GRAND TOTAL 121,642 100
INT’L MOBILITY PROGRAMME, PERMITS HOLDERS IN 2011
SOURCE COUNTRY NUMBER PERCENTAGE RANK
United States 27,979 20.2 1
France 17,509 12.6 2
India 9,961 7.2 3
United Kingdom, Colonies 9,386 6.8 4
Australia 9,160 6.6 5
Germany 6,854 4.9 6
Japan 6,284 4.5 7
South Korea 6,014 4.3 8
Philippines 5,514 4.0 9
Ireland 5,247 3.8 10
TOTAL — TOP 10 103,908 75.0
TOTAL — OTHERS 34,625 25.0
GRAND TOTAL 138,533 100
INT’L MOBILITY PROGRAMME, PERMITS HOLDERS IN 2012
SOURCE COUNTRY NUMBER PERCENTAGE RANK
United States 29,833 20.1 1
France 17,951 12.1 2
India 11,368 7.7 3
United Kingdom, Colonies 9,771 6.6 4
Australia 9,135 6.2 5
Germany 6,932 4.7 6
Japan 6,436 4.3 7
Ireland 6,231 4.2 8
South Korea 6,144 4.1 9
Philippines 5,387 3.6 10
TOTAL — TOP 10 109,188 73.7
TOTAL — OTHERS 38,882 26.3
GRAND TOTAL 148,070 100
INT’L MOBILITY PROGRAMME, PERMITS HOLDERS IN 2013
SOURCE COUNTRY NUMBER PERCENTAGE RANK
United States 30,399 18.8 1
France 19,971 12.4 2
India 14,251 8.8 3
United Kingdom, Colonies 10,189 6.3 4
Australia 9,840 6.1 5
Ireland 7,076 4.4 6
Japan 6,723 4.1 7
Philippines 6,703 4.1 8
Germany 6,386 4.0 9
South Korea 5,885 3.6 10
TOTAL — TOP 10 117,423 72.7
TOTAL — OTHERS 44,118 27.3
GRAND TOTAL 161,541 100

It should also be mentioned: it’s likely that a lot more of people from this program will actually leave afterwards, as opposed to international students, and the TFWP.

A little self promotion: Borderless Canada is still available online. Learn about what’s been going on in this country. Virtually all major issues can be directly tied to immigration and border security, and it’s not racist or bigoted to discuss these hard truths.

4. Documents Provided By Canadian Government

(A.0) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/index.html
(A.1) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1966.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1966
(A.2) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1967.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1967
(A.3) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1968.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1968
(A.4) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1969.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1969
(A.5) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1970.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1970
(A.6) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1971.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1971
(A.7) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1972.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1972
(A.8) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1973.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1973
(A.9) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1974.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1974
(A.10) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1975.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1975
(A.11) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1976.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1976
(A.12) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1977.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1977
(A.13) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1978.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1978
(A.14) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1979.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1979
(A.15) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1980.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1980
(A.16) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1981.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1981
(A.17) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1982.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1982
(A.18) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1983.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1983
(A.19) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1984.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1984
(A.20) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1985.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1985
(A.21) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1986.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1986
(A.22) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1987.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1987
(A.23) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1988.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1988
(A.24) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1989.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1989
(A.25) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1990.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1990
(A.26) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1991.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1991
(A.27) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1992.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1992
(A.28) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1993.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1993
(A.29) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1994.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1994
(A.30) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1995.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1995
(A.31) https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/mp22-1_1996.pdf
Canada Immigration Statistics 1996

(B.0) https://publications.gc.ca/site/eng/9.505817/publication.html
https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/corporate/reports-statistics/statistics-open-data.html
(B.1) https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2010/cic/MP43-333-1999-eng.pdf
Canada Immigration Facts And Figures 1998
(B.2) https://publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/MP43-333-2000E.pdf
(B.3) https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2015/cic/Ci1-8-10-2013-eng.pdf
Temporary Migration In Canada 2004-2013

(C.0) Parliament Report Index
http://archive.is/vwM6G
(C.1) 2004 Report to Canadian Parliament
2004.annual.immigration.report.to.parliament
(C.2) 2005 Report to Canadian Parliament
2005.annual.immigration.report.to.parliament
(C.3) 2006 Report to Canadian Parliament
2006.annual.immigration.report.to.parliament
(C.4) 2007 Report to Canadian Parliament
2007.annual.immigration.report.to.parliament
(C.5) 2008 Report to Canadian Parliament
2008.annual.immigration.report.to.parliament
(C.6) 2009 report to Canadian Parliament
2009.annual.immigration.report.to.parliament
(C.7) 2010 Report to Canadian Parliament
2010.annual.immigration.report.to.parliament
(C.8) 2011 Report to Canadian Parliament
2011.annual.immigration.report.to.parliament
(C.9) 2012 Report to Canadian Parliament
2012.annual.immigration.report.to.parliament
(C.10) 2013 Report to Canadian Parliament
2013.annual.immigration.report.to.parliament
(C.11) 2014 Report to Canadian Parliament
2014.annual.immigration.report.to.parliament
(C.12) 2015 Report to Canadian Parliament
2015.annual.immigration.report.to.parliament
(C.13) 2016 Report to Canadian Parliament
2016.annual.immigration.report.to.parliament
(C.14) 2017 Report to Canadian Parliament
2017.annual.immigration.report.to.parliament
(C.15) 2018 Report to CDN Parliament
2018.annual.immigration.report.to.parliament
(C.15.2) 2019-2021 Supplemental Report
http://archive.is/onyev
(C.16) 2019 Report to Canadian Parliament
2019.annual.immigration.report.to.parliament
(C.17) 2020 Report to Canadian Parliament
2020.annual.immigration.report.to.parliament
(C.18) 2021 Report to Canadian Parliament
2021.annual.immigration.report.to.parliament

U.S. Customs And Border Protection: Some Statistics On The Invasion

This piece focuses on the problem that is the United States border, particularly the side with Mexico. There have been many interests vested in not securing it. Consequently, people flood in illegally, since there’s little reason not to.

Why should Canadians care about this?

The answer is simple: it’s not just an American problem. Open borders threatens the sovereignty of nations in general. Not only that, many of those illegal aliens will surely be working their way to Canada, given the generous welfare benefits available.

Unfortunately, far too few Canadians, including many “conservatives”, fail to realize that open borders changes everything. The makeup of the country impacts everything: voting patterns; finance; culture; crime; and future immigration policies. And the mantra “just come legally” misses the bigger picture.

For an earlier piece on the estimated real scale of illegals in the U.S., north of 22 million. There was also this gem in 2018, suing for the right to illegally enter the U.S.

Now, let’s get into some of the data from the USCBP, or the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol. The numbers are quite shocking indeed.

A note about “fiscal year”: Fiscal Year 2022 runs October 01, 2021 – September 30, 2022. All of the years seem to be done in this format.

“Recidivism” in the context of CBP refers to the percentage of people who are detained multiple times within the same fiscal year. It’s been approximately 25% the last few years, meaning 1/4 of people caught and forced to leave are caught again. There doesn’t seem to be much of a deterrent. As for drugs being brought in:

Month Marijuana Cocaine Heroin Meth Fentanyl Other
October 2021 376 220 0 290 73 3
November 2021 191 73 0 581 84 3
December 2021 127 102 66 559 26 4
January 2022 360 39 0 457 65 56
February 2022 785 90 2 268 12 27
March 2022 58 50 2 224 13 4
April 2022 259 186 14 479 174 19

Data from the 2022 fiscal year (thus far). The C.B.P. also provides recent statistics on the drug busts that have occurred from people trying to bring narcotics into the country. While it’s nice to have these seizures, it’s likely just a drop in the bucket as to what really goes on.

AGENCY INVOLVED FY17 FY18 FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22TD
Office of Field Operations Encounters 216,370 281,881 288,523 241,786 294,352 259,057
U.S. Border Patrol Total Encounters 310,531 404,142 859,501 405,036 1,662,167 1,219,920
Total Enforcement Actions 526,901 683,178 1,148,024 646,822 1,956,519 1,478,977

For “enforcement actions”, this refers to: individuals encountered at ports of entry who are seeking lawful admission into the United States but are determined to be inadmissible, individuals presenting themselves to seek humanitarian protection under our laws, and individuals who withdraw an application for admission and return to their countries of origin within a short timeframe. This is according to the CBP’s own definition.

In other words, it’s the number of people who show up LEGALLY to border ports of entry and then are turned away. It doesn’t cover the vast numbers who enter illegally between border ports.

CATEGORY FY17 FY18 FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22TD
Office Of Field Operations
Criminal Non-Citizens 10,596 11,623 12,705 7,009 6,567 9,101
NCIC Arrests 7,656 5,929 8,546 7,108 8,979 5,580
U.S. Border Patrol
Criminal Noncitizens Encountered 8,531 6,698 4,269 2,438 10,763 5,985
Criminal Noncitizens With Warrants 2,675 1,550 4,153 2,054 1,904 525

There have also been considerable amounts of arrests for people who either had criminal records, and/or outstanding warrants. This doesn’t include people who entered without being detected.

GANG ARRESTS FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22TD
18th Street 84 47 61 145 168 36 28 66
MS-13 335 253 228 413 464 72 113 149
Paisas 73 119 53 62 90 93 79 80
Other 352 283 194 188 254 162 128 98
Total 844 702 536 808 976 363 348 393

There have also been gang-related arrests of people attempting to enter the United States. Of course, not all are included, just a few which represent the larger numbers of arrests.

Concerning arrests of suspected terrorists (all nationalities), CBP provides some data of people detained at both the Southern and Northern borders.

TERRORISTS AT BORDER FY17 FY18 FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22TD
Southern Border 116 155 280 72 103 42
Northern Border 217 196 258 124 54 115
Total 333 351 538 196 157 157

How many encounters does the U.S. Government have overall? Thankfully, they do provide more data, and a lot of it is mind blowing.

Nationwide Encounters
.
Encounter data includes U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) Title 8 Apprehensions, Office of Field Operations (OFO) Title 8 Inadmissibles, and Title 42 Expulsions for fiscal years (FY) 2020, 2021, and 2022. Data is available for the Northern Land Border, Southwest Land Border, and Nationwide (i.e., air, land, and sea modes of transportation) encounters.

FISCAL YEAR 2019 2020 2021 2022
October 60,781 45,139 71,929 164,849
November 62,469 42,643 72,113 174,849
December 70,694 40,565 73,994 179,254
January 58,317 36,585 78,414 154,816
February 76,545 36,687 101,099 165,900
March 103,731 34,460 173,277 221,144
April 109,415 17,106 178,795 234,088
May 114,116 23,237 180,597
June 104,311 33,049 189,034
July 81,777 40,929 213,593
August 62,707 50,014 209,840
TOTAL 904,863 400,414 1,542,685 1,141,054 (so far)

Once more, how many people are simply sneaking in undetected?

The data can further be broken down by the type of person/people coming:

  • Accompanied Minors (AM)
  • Individuals in a Family Unit (FMUA)
  • Single Adults
  • Unaccompanied Children (UC)

While there are clearly a lot of people who get stopped by the various departments, an awful lot don’t. They are let in through some pathway, or just sneak in.

It also doesn’t help that there are countless Sanctuary Cities and States, which do an end run around border security. If people know they can get social services without the risk of being deported, many more will come.

Again, this is not just an American issue. Many of the hordes flooding into the U.S. will eventually make their way North. Canadians should absolutely be worried about this.

A little self promotion: Borderless Canada is still available online. Learn about what’s been going on in this country. Virtually all major issues can be directly tied to immigration and border security, and it’s not racist or bigoted to discuss these hard truths.

Don’t worry, there will be much more included on this subject in the near future. This can’t be done justice by a single piece.

(1) https://www.cbp.gov/
(2) https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/cbp-enforcement-statistics
(3) https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/nationwide-encounters
(4) https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/southwest-land-border-encounters
(5) https://canucklaw.ca/true-scale-of-illegals-in-us-22-million-more-amnesty-coming/
(6) https://canucklaw.ca/tsce-2-migrant-caravan-lawyers-sue-for-right-to-legally-invade-u-s/
(7) https://canucklaw.ca/tsce-10b-sanctuary-cities-an-end-run-around-having-borders/

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