Serious question: What is the ultimate goal of the LGBT movement?
Achieving equality and acceptance in mainstream life
Constantly viewing itself as a victim in need of protection
Both (1) and (2)
We live in a country where gays and trans have full equality under the law, and have for many years.
So called “marriage equality” was settled in Canada back in 2005. That’s right, 14 years ago. There are also provisions in every Provincial human rights code to protect sexual orientation. And hate crime provisions have existed for many years in the Criminal Code.
We also live in a country where being trans is protected, and employers and schools are required to make accommodations. Bill C-16 seems to be both poorly written and overkill.
You would think all is great, but not so. Despite the very limited scientific knowledge on gender dysphoria, we are prohibited from questioning it, even in young children. Even in our children. Questioning if changing gender is possible will now net a hefty fine. Bake-my-cake-or-I’ll-sue is no longer just a punchline, at least in Colorado. And SOGI has creeped into elementary schools.
Note: The issues and concerns with how gender dysphoria is treated will be a topic for another post. Likewise with having young children transition.
The problem with advocacy groups is that they eventually run out of grievances to protest. And the need to celebrate a movement becomes less and less important.
If misgendering people, or suing over wedding cakes is the worst we have going on, then what genuine causes are left?
Answer: No serious causes.
Since LGBT people enjoy full rights, and equality under the law, why does this need to be flaunted in public every Spring/Summer? Isn’t the ultimate goal to live freely and without stigmatization as your true self? This is what activists don’t seem to realize.
And while a small march or parade seems harmless enough, some larger Prides are downright raunchy (Toronto is a specific example). Nudity and lewd behaviour do often happen, at sites where children are present. For the sake of readers, I’ll spare the details. What this does to promote equality is beyond me.
If LGBT people want to just go about their lives, nothing stops them. Legally, nothing can stop them, and the vast majority of people don’t care. Prides (and other such events) detract from this by bringing the issue up again and again, throwing it in the public’s face.
Yes, people had their rights violated in the past, but that ended decades ago. It doesn’t help to bring it up with people who had absolutely no involvement. It also doesn’t help when municipalities fund (all or in part) of these movements.
As an aside, LGBT activists often get triggered at the idea (often trolling) of a “straight pride”. Well, identity cuts both ways, doesn’t it?
Having equality is an important part of this nation, but your orientation or identity isn’t. It doesn’t need to be forced on the public. Rather, Canada should focus more on what built the nation, and what holds it together.
The question at the start seemed rhetorical, but is not. Activists want option (3).
CLICK HERE, for the ruling, Oger v. Whatcott. CLICK HERE, for the BC Human Rights Code. CLICK HERE, for the Canadian Charter of Rights & Freedoms. CLICK HERE, for a prior review of Bill C-16. CLICK HERE, for a prior review of “Hate Map”. CLICK HERE, for a prior review on weaponizing human rights code.
Our favourite “serial-victim” Morgane Oger, is in the news again, this time for getting a $55,000 award ($35K for hurt feelings, and $20K in punitive damages). This was William Whatcott for calling Oger “a man”. (Oger is transgender).
A few interesting observations in reading the ruling:
(1) Morgane Oger seems perfectly content silencing William Whatcott’s free speech and right to religious expression in the name of gender identity.
(2) The BC Tribunal deliberately and repeatedly skirted the truthfulness of Whatcott’s claim that Oger is biologically male. Hormones, surgery and legal paperwork don’t change biology.
(3) The BC Tribunal awarded $35,000 in damages without any damages being proven. How exactly does one prove “hurt feelings and dignity”?
3. BC Human Rights Code
Discrimination and intent
Discrimination in contravention of this Code does not require an intention to contravene this Code.
Section 2 makes it very clear: absolutely no intent is required on the part of anyone in order to be found to violate someone’s human rights. For a “quasi-judicial” board, this is very disturbing. However, it seems to be the case with all provinces.
7 (1) A person must not publish, issue or display, or cause to be published, issued or displayed, any statement, publication, notice, sign, symbol, emblem or other representation that
(a) indicates discrimination or an intention to discriminate against a person or a group or class of persons, or
(b) is likely to expose a person or a group or class of persons to hatred or contempt because of the race, colour, ancestry, place of origin, religion, marital status, family status, physical or mental disability, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or age of that person or that group or class of persons.
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a private communication, a communication intended to be private or a communication related to an activity otherwise permitted by this Code.
Oger claims that the publications were contrary to Section 7(1)(a) and (b) of the code.
27.2 (1) A member or panel may receive and accept on oath, by affidavit or otherwise, evidence and information that the member or panel considers necessary and appropriate, whether or not the evidence or information would be admissible in a court of law.
(2) Nothing is admissible in evidence before a member or panel that is inadmissible in a court because of a privilege under the law of evidence.
(3) Despite section 4, subsection (1) of this section does not override an Act expressly limiting the extent to which or purposes for which evidence may be admitted or used in any proceeding.
(4) A member or panel may direct that all or part of the evidence of a witness be heard in private.
(4) flies in the face of an open inquiry, and doesn’t set any guidelines as to “when” it would be appropriate.
One of the problems Whatcott cited was the Commission refusing to hear all the evidence.
37 (1) If the member or panel designated to hear a complaint determines that the complaint is not justified, the member or panel must dismiss the complaint.
(2) If the member or panel determines that the complaint is justified, the member or panel
(a) must order the person that contravened this Code to cease the contravention and to refrain from committing the same or a similar contravention,
(b) may make a declaratory order that the conduct complained of, or similar conduct, is discrimination contrary to this Code,
(c) may order the person that contravened this Code to do one or both of the following:
(i) take steps, specified in the order, to ameliorate the effects of the discriminatory practice;
(ii) adopt and implement an employment equity program or other special program to ameliorate the conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups if the evidence at the hearing indicates the person has engaged in a pattern or practice that contravenes this Code, and
(d) if the person discriminated against is a party to the complaint, or is an identifiable member of a group or class on behalf of which a complaint is filed, may order the person that contravened this Code to do one or more of the following:
(i) make available to the person discriminated against the right, opportunity or privilege that, in the opinion of the member or panel, the person was denied contrary to this Code;
(ii) compensate the person discriminated against for all, or a part the member or panel determines, of any wages or salary lost, or expenses incurred, by the contravention;
(iii) pay to the person discriminated against an amount that the member or panel considers appropriate to compensate that person for injury to dignity, feelings and self respect or to any of them.
In short, the BC Human Rights Code can award money if it rules that your feelings were hurt, or your dignity or self respect was hurt. No need to prove “actual” damages.
4. Section 2(b) Of Charter
2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms:
(a) freedom of conscience and religion;
(b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication;
(c) freedom of peaceful assembly; and
(d) freedom of association
5. From HRT Ruling
William Whatcott identifies himself as a Christian activist. When he learned of Ms. Oger’s candidacy, he resolved to stop her being elected. He was not a member of her riding, nor did he research her platform or the policies which she sought to advance. The sole basis for his campaign against her was that she is a transgender woman and therefore, in his view, unsuitable to hold public office.
Very interesting choice of words. Whatcott “identifies” as a Christian activist, yet Oger “actually is” a woman.
Mr. Whatcott was not a resident in Ms. Oger’s riding. She came to his attention after he had decided there were no suitable political options within his own riding. He says that he had decided not to vote in the election at all, but then turned to prayer. He asked God how he could help in the election. He started researching the candidates across the province and, in this way, came across Ms. Oger. He learned that she had been active in lobbying for amendments to the Code to add the grounds of “gender identity and expression”, and in promoting education about sexual orientation and gender identity in schools. Most importantly, however, he was upset that the media and public at large were “pretending” that Ms. Oger was a woman. He fundamentally believes that gender is static and derived from the genitalia that a person has at birth. He believes that Ms. Oger is a man. He sees himself as the small boy in the fairy tale about the Emperor with no clothes the only one brave enough to speak the truth about Ms. Oger’s gender. He decided to focus his energies on her campaign. In doing so, he describes Ms. Oger herself as “incidental” and “small” within his larger fight for social order and freedom.
The first part gets glossed over. Oger is trying help enact 2 policies that Whatcott is bothered by:
(A) Bill C-16, to add “gender identity” to the Criminal Code and Human Rights Code.
(B) Bringing SOGI (sexual orientation & gender identity) into schools and have it taught to young children.
In all fairness, “both” of the above issues rub a lot of people the wrong way.
 To the extent that s. 7 is unique, it is because it expressly and exclusively targets speech. Mr. Whatcott argues that, in doing so, it violates his Charter‐guaranteed rights to freedom of religion and expression ss. 2(a) and (b). In his final reply, he added an argument that it violates his right to life, liberty and security of the person, guaranteed by s. 7 of the Charter.
This Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to apply the Charter: Administrative Tribunals Act, s . 45; Code, s. 32(i). I cannot find s. 7 of the Code unconstitutional, or that any of Mr. Whatcott’s Charter rights have been violated in the course of Ms. Oger’s human rights complaint against him.
There is no question, however, that this complaint engages Charter protections. In these circumstances, I must interpret and apply the Code in a manner that proportionately balances its purposes with those protections. The framework for this analysis has been set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in three cases: Doré v. Québec (Tribunal des Professions), 2012 SCC 12 [Doré]; Loyola High School v. Quebec (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 12 [Loyola]; and Trinity Western University v. Law Society of BC, 2018 SCC 32 [TWU].
While simultaneously claiming not to be able to apply the Charter, the Tribunal says it will balance the rights of the Charter v.s. the Code.
A. Factual context
1. Discrimination against transgender people
. This is a significant time for trans and gender diverse people. Their long fight for equality is bearing some fruit, as society begins to adjust its traditionally static and binary understanding of gender, and its tolerance for people to identify and express their gender authentically. One indicator of this progress is the 2016 amendment to the Code that added the grounds of gender identity and expression.
 However, as this hearing made clear, the journey is far from over. Unlike other groups protected by the Code, transgender people often find their very existence the subject of public debate and condemnation. What flows from this existential denial is, naturally, a view that transpeople are less worthy of dignity, respect, and rights. In the hearing room for this complaint, we were witness to repeated, deliberate, and flagrant attacks on Ms. Oger based on nothing more than a belief that her very existence is an affront.
(A) The Tribunal actually referred to this section as “factual context”, but then goes on to make a number of straw man arguments.
(B) It is not a fight for equality. That was never the issue.
(C)”Traditionally static and binary understanding of gender”? Actually, there has never been evidence that there are more than 2 genders. Simply passing a law does not erase science. A government could conceivably pass a law saying that dogs are cats, but it would not be based in reality.
(D) Gender identity and expression? Don’t these contradict reality? Merely expressing oneself or identifying oneself a certain way does not make it so.
(E) Questioning the reality of something not based on science is a hate crime now? Got it.
 And so, despite some gains, transgender people remain among the most marginalized in our society. Their lives are marked by “disadvantage, prejudice, stereotyping, and vulnerability”: F(C) v. Albert (Vital Statistics), 2014 ABQB 237 at para. 58; see also Rainbow Committee of Terrace v. City of Terrace, 2002 BCHRT 26 at paras. 47-51. They are stereotyped as “diseased, confused, monsters and freaks”: Nixon v. Vancouver Rape Relief Society, 2002.
BCHRT 1 at paras. 136137, overturned 2005 BCCA 601 (not on this point). Transpeople face barriers to employment and housing, inequitable access to health care and other vital public services, and heightened risks of targeted harassment and violence. The results include social isolation, as well as higher rates of substance use, poor mental health, suicide, and poverty: XY v. Ontario (Government and Consumer Services), 2012 HRTO 726 at paras. 164-166. For transgender children, antitrans bullying leads to higher rates of absenteeism and poorer educational outcomes, which then has ripple effects for their health and future prospects: Christophe Cornu (2016), “Preventing and addressing homophobic and transphobic bullying in education; A human-rights based approach using the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child”, Journal of LGBT Youth, 13:1‐2, 6‐17 at pp 7‐8.
(A) How are they marginalized? They have entire government bodies to fight specifically for their rights.
(B) Substance abuse, suicide, and mental health problems? Doesn’t that signify that there might be something seriously wrong with what they are doing?
(C) Children should not be transitioning. Period.
 Mr. Whatcott and the JCCF sought to rely on statistics about the poor health and social outcomes for transgender people as proof that – at best – the merits of being transgender was a matter for ongoing study and debate and – at worst –it was a bad lifestyle choice, whichought to be publicly discouraged. I agree with Ms. Oger that this is an illconceived attempt to “take the data about the consequences of being a victim of oppression, or the consequences of being marginalized, and turn that into the root cause of the issue”.
 The poor health, economic, and social outcomes for many transgender people are not a signal of their inherent worth but rather of the significant degree to which they continue to face marginalization, stigma, and discrimination. They illustrate how much work remains to be done to make the Code’s objective of an equal society into a reality.
(A) The Tribunal specifically states they will not consider statistical data. How very “scientific and reasoned” of them.
(B) Another straw-man argument. No one is saying these people are not worthy, but that there are very serious mental health issues that need to be addressed. Issues the tribunal has no interest in addressing.
 There is no dispute that a decision against Mr. Whatcott would limit his Charter right to freedom of religion. Ms. Oger concedes that Mr. Whatcott has a sincerely held religious belief that it is his duty to spread his views about transgender people: Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, 2004 SCC 47 at para. 65. This concession was appropriate. Mr. Whatcott identifies as Christian and describes himself as a “flawed Christian activist”. He says that his theology largely lines up with that of the Lutheran Church. The Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that Evangelical Christians, and I believe it is fair to count Mr. Whatcott as one, “carry their religious beliefs and values beyond their private lives and into their work, education, and politics”: TWU at para. 67. This is certainly true of Mr. Whatcott. For many years, he has manifested his religious beliefs through activism, beginning with antiabortion activism and then, in more recent years, in activism against the LGBTQ community. His beliefs about transgender people namely that they do not exist and are engaged in a falsehood stem from his interpretation of the Christian Bible. He believes it is God’s will that he spread the Christian gospel and his views about the “morality” of being transgender.
(A) Now we get to the heart of it. This would actually limit religious freedom.
(B) The Tribunal knows this, and will act against it anyway.
 There is similarly no dispute that a decision against Mr. Whatcott would limit his freedom to publicly express his views about transgender people generally, and Ms. Oger specifically. This engages his right to free expression. As I will discuss below, the scope of freedom of expression, and the significance of any possible infringement, varies according to the type of speech and the extent to which it furthers or detracts from the core values underlying the freedom. However, at this threshold stage, it is sufficient that the Flyer was a form of expression and that any decision restricting Mr. Whatcott’s right to distribute it publicly would limit his expressive rights to some extent.
 With respect to Mr. Whatcott’s s. 7 Charter rights, I agree with the Attorney General that it would not be fair to consider that argument, which was raised for the first time in Mr. Whatcott’s final reply, after the hearing of this complaint had concluded. Regardless, the argument has no merit. A decision by this Tribunal would not restrict Mr. Whatcott’s life, liberty, or security of the person. The remedial jurisdiction conferred by s. 37 of the Code is in no way equivalent to penal consequences. It does not threaten Mr. Whatcott’s life or liberty. While I accept that individuals found to violate the Code may encounter, as a consequence, a degree of stigma and social disapproval, such consequences do not rise to a level of “serious state imposed psychological stress
(A) No threat to his security? Try not paying the fine and see what happens.
(B) You also say the Commission “will” order the so-called bad behaviour to stop. And if it doesn’t, you’ll fine him again.
(C) Who cares if this is the first time the argument has been brought up?
Now a quote from the Supreme Court of Canada:
First and foremost, free expression is essential to the proper functioning of democratic governance. As Rand J. put it, “government by the free public opinion of an open society . . . demands the condition of a virtually unobstructed access to and diffusion of ideas”: Switzman, at p. 306.
. Second, the free exchange of ideas is an “essential precondition of the search for truth”: R. v. Keegstra,  3 S.C.R. 697, at p. 803, per McLachlin J. This rationale, sometimes known as the “marketplace of ideas”, extends beyond the political domain to any areaof debate where truth is sought through the exchange of information and ideas. Information is disseminated and propositions debated. In the course of debate, misconceptions and errors are exposed. What withstands testing emerges as truth.
Third, free expression has intrinsic value as an aspect of self‐realization for both speakers and listeners. As the majority observed in Irwin Toy, at p. 976, “the diversity in forms of individual selffulfillment and human flourishing ought to be cultivated in an essentially tolerant, indeed welcoming, environment not only for the sake of those who convey a meaning, uut also for the sake of those to whom it is conveyed”. Grant v. Torstar Corp., 2009 SCC 61 at paras. 4750; see also R v. Keegstra,  3 SCR 697 [Keegstra], at paras. 87‐89;
This is quite laughable, as the Tribunal has no interest in the factual basis of Whatcott’s claim (that Oger is male), nor in the statistical research and evidence regarding transgenders in general.
 I reject this proposition in the strongest possible terms. The question of whether transgender people exist and are entitled to dignity in this province is as valuable to ongoing public debate as whether one race is superior to another. This does not mean that all expression that criticizes or questions the existence of transgender people violates the Code. Here I distinguish between public debate about, for example, the scope of rights that different groups in society may be afforded, and commentary like that which is in the Flyer, which denies the very existence of transpeople. Understood in its proper context, it is simply not accurate to place this type of expression at the core of s. 2(b) values.
(A) False equivalence. The reality of transitioning is not the same thing as racial supremacy.
(B) False equivalence. Questioning whether trans-people exist is not the same thing as saying a person should not have dignity.
(C) The flyer is inappropriate, but once again the Tribunal dodges the issue of “truth”.
 This argument confuses distinctions with discrimination. Efforts to increase the participation and representation of groups which have historically been excluded from political life serve the goals of achieving substantive equality and enriching Canada’s democracy. But to advocate against including those groups in politics is not the same thing as arguing for their deliberate inclusion. The law has long understood that identical treatment of groups is often the very source of serious inequality: Kapp at para. 27, citing Andrews. Put another way, “different treatment in the service of equity for disadvantaged groups is an expression of [substantive] equality, not an exception to it”: P. W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (5th ed. Supp. 2007), vol. 2, at p. 5553; cited with approval in Kapp at para. 37. It is simply not reasonable to equate efforts to increase the representation of disadvantaged groups in government with those which would seek to continue to exclude them. While I acknowledge that individual voters may choose to discriminate within the privacy of a ballot box, it does not further Canada’s democracy to suggest that a person’s connection with a historically disadvantaged group is a legitimate point on which to openly campaign against them.
To summarize this word salad: ACTUAL equal treatment of people can be wrong, since it doesn’t take “historical marginalization” into account. Hence the idea of 15(2) of the Charter (affirmative action). This is essentially different rules for different groups in order to “increase representation”.
The decision is long one (100 pages), but this covers the main points. The Tribunal also goes on at length about Whatcott refusing to refer to Oger as “she” despite being repeatedly told not to.
While Whatcott comes off as a bit of a jerk, it is hard to come up with much sympathy for Oger, who is essentially a professional victim. The proposed “hate map” is essentially a doxing tool for opinions that they don’t agree with.
It is also disturbing to see the Tribunal so uninterested in fact or truth. Legitimate concerns about whether a person can transition are deemed hate speech. Further, the tribunal doesn’t care for evidence presented regarding statistics of trans-people. If anything, it is deemed as more of a reason to grant special status.
Whatcott “identifies” as a Christian activist, yet Oger “really is” a woman. The Tribunal is inconsistent in their own standards.
And as seems to be the case in all provinces, the “human rights” code stipulates that no intent is necessary for a finding against a person or group.
Will there be an appeal (in the form of an application for judicial review)? We will find out. But this sets a very bad precedent.
(A concise, but accurate review of “Social Autopsy”)
CLICK HERE, for the Morgane Oger Foundation. CLICK HERE, for MFO information on hate crimes. CLICK HERE, for the GlobalNews article on MFO’s agenda CLICK HERE, for Federal Liberals contemplating censorship under the guise of “removing extremist content”. CLICK HERE, for Proud Boys lawsuit against SPLC. CLICK HERE, for SPLC’s so called “hate-map”
What is the Morgane Oger Foundation?
The Morgane Oger Foundation is a small volunteer-driven organization entirely run and funded by people who care about justice and inclusion, like you. We focus on opportunities to reduce prejudice-driven inequality in Canada a few projects at a time and pride ourselves with a 100% success rate to date. We are working on several initiatives where we feel we can best help change things for the better..
Sounds harmless and well meaning enough. Let’s see some details.
“An advocacy organization says it wants to map hatred and discrimination across Canada in a move that is prompting warnings of caution from one civil liberties group.
The Vancouver-based Morgane Oger Foundation has issued a call for volunteers to help build the Canadian Atlas of Populist Extremism, to be known as CAPE.
Founder Morgane Oger said the mapping tool would tie together extremist groups and people regularly associated with them, and also map incidents involving hate across Canada.
The idea is to shed light on how hatred is propagated, she said, while being mindful that allegations can’t be tossed out willy-nilly.
“We can’t say someone is a murderer unless they are in fact a murderer, but maybe it would be interesting to see it’s always the same dozen people who are doing anti-trans advocacy in the (B.C.) Interior or the white supremacy groups are working with each other,” said Oger, a former provincial NDP candidate and a member of the party’s executive.
1/ Okay, nice to know they won’t make false accusations of being a murderer unless the person actually is one. However, that is where the reasonableness seems to end.
2/ The examples cited are vague at best.
(a) So called trans activists seem to think “everything” is transphobia. Express any doubt about transgender children, or the never ending demands for accommodation, and you’re a bigot.
(b) Also what white supremacist groups? To left wing activists, anyone opposing open borders or forced multiculturalism is a white supremacist apparently.
3/Serious question: will create this “hate network” lead to innocent people being doxed for no other reason than you have different opinions? Seem very intolerant.
4/ A call for volunteers? What screening will be put in place to ensure that these people don’t have malintent and are actually capable of distinguishing what is hate?
Some Canadian Laws
264 (1) No person shall, without lawful authority and knowing that another person is harassed or recklessly as to whether the other person is harassed, engage in conduct referred to in subsection (2) that causes that other person reasonably, in all the circumstances, to fear for their safety or the safety of anyone known to them.
(2) The conduct mentioned in subsection (1) consists of
(a) repeatedly following from place to place the other person or anyone known to them;
(b) repeatedly communicating with, either directly or indirectly, the other person or anyone known to them;
(c) besetting or watching the dwelling-house, or place where the other person, or anyone known to them, resides, works, carries on business or happens to be; or
(d) engaging in threatening conduct directed at the other person or any member of their family.
298 (1) A defamatory libel is matter published, without lawful justification or excuse, that is likely to injure the reputation of any person by exposing him to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or that is designed to insult the person of or concerning whom it is published.
Mode of expression
(2) A defamatory libel may be expressed directly or by insinuation or irony
(a) in words legibly marked on any substance; or
(b) by any object signifying a defamatory libel otherwise than by words.
Just a few laws this group might want to know if they are serious about starting up this “database”.
Here are 2 prior examples of doxxing gone wrong
(1) Southern Poverty Law Center
The Southern Poverty Law Center in the United States has a “hate map,” which lists 1,020 groups. They include 51 Ku Klux Klan chapters, 49 anti-LGBT groups, 11 radical traditional Catholic groups and a combined 412 black and white nationalist groups.
The centre doesn’t list individuals, only organizations, and uses a similar definition to the FBI for them. The law centre defines a hate group as “an organization that – based on its official statements or principles, the statements of its leaders, or its activities – has beliefs or practices that attack or malign an entire class of people, typically for their immutable characteristics.”
(2) Candice Owens and “Social Autopsy”
Prior to getting a media makeover and coming out as a conservative, Candice Owens launched a website called “social autopsy”. This was billed as an anti-bullying database. But it relied on people making personal complaints and sending personal information on others. See above videos.
Does Morgane Oger Foundation Want To Be Like That?
The Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), and Social Autopsy are just 2 of the more well known examples of attempts to dox people they disagree with.
Bad ideas should be countered with good ideas. They shouldn’t be doxxed, threatened, or otherwise bullied.
Restriction on publication: Order sealing court records in effect. There is a
publication ban imposed by orders of this court restricting the publication, broadcast
or transmission of any information that could identify the names of the parties
referred to in these proceedings as A.B., C.D., E.F., G.H., I.J., K.L., M.N., O.P.,
Q.R., S.T., U.V. and W.X. This publication ban applies indefinitely unless otherwise ordered.
The story can be made public, but not the names.
3. Review Of Ruling, 2019
 Three applications are before the court.
 The first is by “A.B.” who was born on October 18, 2004. He is described as a transgender boy who was assigned female at birth.
He has commenced proceedings by Notice of Family Claim and now applies for various orders under the Family Law Act, SBC 2011, c 25, the most important one being that the court find it to be in his best interests to undergo medical treatment for gender dysphoria including hormone treatments.
 The second application is by C.D., who is A.B.’s father. He has filed a Petition now seeks an interlocutory injunction until April 5, 2019, when the Petition may be heard, by way of an order extending an injunction granted by the Provincial Court of B.C. that restrains gender transition treatments for A.B. until February 19, 2019. The order by the Provincial Court has been extended by this court until this decision is released.
 The third application is for an order anonymizing the names of some of the parties in these proceedings and counsel for A.B. and an order banning the publication of anything that could lead to the identification of the parties. A.B.’s mother is referred to in these reasons as “E.F.”
 These reasons reflect the brevity of the submissions made to the Court and the need for this decision to be released expeditiously.
Okay, three linked petitions:
A/ Child wanting to under hormone treatement
B/ Extending an injunction
C/ Privacy of the parties
Rule 10-9 — Urgent Applications
When Applications May Be Heard on Short Notice
Without limiting subrule (6), in case of urgency, a person wishing to bring an application (in this subrule and in subrules (2) to (5) called the “main application”) on less notice than would normally be required may make an application (in this subrule and in subrules (2) to (4) called the “short notice application”) for an order that the main application may be brought on short notice.
How to make a short notice application
A short notice application may be made by requisition in Form F17, without notice, and in a summary way.
Rule 10-11 — Final Orders in Defended Family Law Cases
Final orders in defended family law cases
To obtain a final order, other than at trial, in a defended family law case begun by the filing of a notice of family claim, a party must apply by way of summary trial in accordance with Rule 11-3.
Under BC Supreme Court Family Rules, 10-9 allows parties allows applications to be brought on short notice, but stipulates that a summary trial (abbreviated trial) is the method that must be used.
“ A.B. was born on October 18, 2004. Since age 11, A.B. has gender identified as a male. He informed his school counsellor of that when he was 12 years old and in Grade 7.
 He is presently enrolled in Grade 9 at high school under his chosen male name and is referred to by his teachers and peers as a boy and with male pronouns. He has transitioned socially to being a boy. To respect his gender identity, in this decision, the court will refer to A.B. using male pronouns.
 With his mother’s help, A.B. sought medical assistance to allow him to begin a physical transition to a boy. He was seen by Dr. Wallace Wong, a registered psychologist experienced in treating children with gender dysphoria, on a number of occasions.”
I have sympathy for anyone with this condition. However, making permanent changes can do untold destruction and harm to adolescents who are still developing.
Dr. Hursh expresses the view that the delay of hormone treatment is not a neutral option because A.B. is experiencing ongoing and unnecessary suffering and continued gender dysphoria. He opines that when youth are provided with affirming hormone therapy they may have an improvement of gender dysphoria and relief from other co-morbid mental issues. He says that they are also less likely to suffer from harassment and victimizations by others.
 Significantly, Dr. Hursh expresses his concern that continued delay in hormone treatment will place A.B. at risk of suicide.”
Except what will happen to the child if the dysphoria goes away? What if the child makes irreversible changes at 13 or 14, but then at 19 eventually “ages out” of it?
“ In her affidavits, A.B.’s mother states that she has serious concerns for A.B.’s well-being if he has to wait to begin treatment for his gender dysphoria. She says, “If his treatment is put on hold, I am terrified that A.B. will conclude there is no hope and will take his life.””
Again, I have sympathy for the child, but being suicidal if not allowed to modify a body in such an irreversible way?! There are bigger issues than just gender dysphoria.
 A.B. ’s father filed an affidavit with the court on February 11, 2019. He refers to a written agreement between him and A.B. ’s mother under the Family Law Act. Paragraph 1 of that agreement provides that each parent will exercise all parental responsibilities with respect to A.B. , “…subject to section 17 of the Infants Act, giving, refusing or withdrawing consent to medical dental and other health-related treatments for the child”
Here is section 17 of the Infants Act, which the Court is referencing. This relates to consent for medical treatment.
Consent of infant to medical treatment
17 (1) In this section:
“health care” means anything that is done for a therapeutic, preventive, palliative, diagnostic, cosmetic or other health related purpose, and includes a course of health care;
“health care provider” includes a person licensed, certified or registered in British Columbia to provide health care.
(2) Subject to subsection (3), an infant may consent to health care whether or not that health care would, in the absence of consent, constitute a trespass to the infant’s person, and if an infant provides that consent, the consent is effective and it is not necessary to obtain a consent to the health care from the infant’s parent or guardian.
(3) A request for or consent, agreement or acquiescence to health care by an infant does not constitute consent to the health care for the purposes of subsection (2) unless the health care provider providing the health care
(a) has explained to the infant and has been satisfied that the infant understands the nature and consequences and the reasonably foreseeable benefits and risks of the health care, and
(b) has made reasonable efforts to determine and has concluded that the health care is in the infant’s best interests.
The Judge also takes a shot at the Father, who opposes the medical treatment.
 There is some evidence that indicates the A.B. ’s father is somewhat disingenuous in seeking to present more scientific evidence relating to gender transition treatment. Rather, some evidence suggests that he has been delaying proceedings as a way of preventing his son from obtaining the gender transition treatment that he seeks.
The science is far from definitive. But even if it is true, the Father’s motivations are good, wanting the child to hold off longer, to see what develops. Remember, this is a child!
 Having said that, it still remains to consider whether further delay to allow the
father time to obtain more opinions is in the best interests of A.B.
 In my view it is not.
 The totality of the evidence regarding A.B.’s medical needs including the opinions of Dr. Wong, Dr. Hursh, Dr. Metzger, and Dr. Chapman, leads me to conclude that his hormone treatment should not be delayed further.
 The risks to A.B. of further delay have also been clearly identified by Dr. Metzger and A.B.’s mother both of whom are concerned that having previously attempted suicide, further delay may result in him attempting it again.”
The Judge doesn’t seem to realize that if the child is truly suicidal, other options should be explored at this point, rather than making body altering changes that will be irreversible.
Now, the Judge applies the case cited above: RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General),  1 SCR 311, 1994 CanLII 117 (SCC), for some guidelines in applying the test.
 In view of the established law regarding the right of a mature minor to consent to medical treatment and the assessments of a number of physicians that A.B. has capacity to consent as well as the evidence of his health care providers that the proposed treatment is in A.B.’s best interests, there is no serious question to be tried.
 At the second stage of the RJR test, the inquiry is whether the litigant who seeks the interlocutory injunction would, unless the injunction is granted, suffer irreparable harm. A.B.’s father has not demonstrated that a refusal to grant the injunction would adversely affect or irreparably harm him.
 As to the third stage, I accept Dr. Hursh’s evidence that delaying hormone therapy for A.B. is not a neutral option as he is experiencing ongoing and unnecessary suffering from gender dysphoria. In my view the balance of convenience clearly favours
While certainly meaning well, the BC Supreme Court Judge fails to actually protect the child. Virtue signalling seems to win over child well being.
I have nothing against adults who are trans. But allowing children at this young age to do it amounts to child abuse.
It will be interesting to see if it is appealed.
UPDATE: It was.
4. BC Court of Appeals Ruling
CD appeals three orders of the Supreme Court. The first found his child AB to have validly consented to medical treatment for gender dysphoria and made declarations respecting AB’s best interests and family violence. The second was a protection order against CD, and the third dismissed a second proceeding commenced by CD. At issue is whether the orders were procedurally unfair, authorized by the legislative scheme, or violated CD’s Charter rights. Held: Appeal allowed in part. The bald declarations under s. 37 of the Family Law Act pertaining to AB’s best interests and family violence were not permitted by the statutory scheme, and the protection order was consequently without foundation. Substituted for some of these orders are a declaration that AB’s consent to the medical treatment was validly made under s. 17 of the Infants Act and conduct orders under s. 227(c) of the Family Law Act.
The BCCA ruling is far too long to go through entirely, so let’s look at some parts of it.
1. Protection orders and family violence
 Protection orders, which fall under Part 9 of the FLA entitled “Protection from Family Violence”, are powerful tools to address family violence.
 “Family violence” is defined in s. 1 of the FLA as:
(a) physical abuse of a family member, including forced confinement or deprivation of the necessities of life, but not including the use of reasonable force to protect oneself or others from harm,
(b) sexual abuse of a family member,
(c) attempts to physically or sexually abuse a family member,
(d) psychological or emotional abuse of a family member, including
(i) intimidation, harassment, coercion or threats, including threats respecting other persons, pets or property,
(ii) unreasonable restrictions on, or prevention of, a family member’s financial or personal autonomy,
(iii) stalking or following of the family member, and
(iv) intentional damage to property, and
(e) in the case of a child, direct or indirect exposure to family violence;
 In this case, Marzari J. assumed that the conduct identified in para. 2(c) of the Bowden Order—attempting to persuade AB to abandon the treatment, addressing him by his birth name and referring to him as a girl or with female pronouns—constituted family violence as defined in the FLA. She made additional findings that CD’s conduct in speaking publicly about AB’s personal issues was harmful to AB.
 While the judge did not explicitly conclude that this conduct constituted “family violence”, her finding that it was harmful to AB appears to ground her conclusion that CD was likely to continue to engage in “conduct that constitutes family violence against AB”. We take this from para. 46 of her reasons, where she found that CD’s conduct “both before and after the determinations made by this Court” indicated that he was likely to continue to engage in conduct that constitutes family violence against AB, “through conduct already determined to be family violence by this court, and the publication and sharing of deeply private information that is harmful to AB”.
 The declaration in para. 2(c) of the Bowden Order may have formed the basis for AB’s decision to take the matter further and seek a protection order. It did form the initial basis for Marzari J.’s consideration of “family violence”. This is indeed unfortunate, as it is our view that raising the issue of family violence in the context of this case caused the parties to become increasingly polarized in their positions, thus exacerbating the conflict and raising the stakes in the litigation. We see none of this to be in AB’s best interests.
 Moreover, given our opinion that para. 2(c) of the Bowden Order should be set aside, and perhaps more importantly the fact that Bowden J. made no findings on the issue of family violence in this context, para. 1 of the Marzari Order should also be set aside.
 There is evidence that CD’s refusal to acknowledge AB’s gender is clearly hurtful to AB, but there is insufficient evidence in the record before both Bowden J. and Marzari J. that CD’s conduct was grounded by an intent to hurt AB or that his refusal to agree with AB’s decision about the treatment was ultimately unresponsive to AB when AB wished to disengage.
Yes, we are at a point where a parent using a child’s name and pronouns are seriously being considered as “family violence” by the BC courts. It seems to attach malice to a parent’s words.
 In bringing his concerns to public forums like the Federalist and Culture Guard, CD apparently took no account of the extent to which AB would be negatively affected. Not only did CD continue to disrespect AB’s decisions, he also appeared to be oblivious to the effect of his conduct on AB as well as the very derogatory public comments related to AB posted on the Federalist website. Marzari J.’s finding that CD had made AB “an unwilling poster child (albeit anonymously)” was well founded (at para. 69).
 As concerning as CD’s conduct was, however, it does not necessarily follow that such conduct equates to the kind of psychological or emotional abuse that would constitute “family violence” under the FLA. As we have observed, the evidence does not suggest that CD deliberately intended to harm AB; rather the evidence suggests that CD cares deeply for AB but, as Marzari J. found, he has been irresponsible in the way in which he has dealt with his disagreement with AB about what is in AB’s best interests. We agree that his conduct in this regard has been seriously misguided but in the unique circumstances of this case, we do not agree that it should be characterized as “family violence” justifying the issuance of a protection order.
 It is apparent to us that Marzari J. was heavily influenced in her approach to family violence by “conduct already determined to be family violence by this court” (at para. 46). In the absence of the declaration in the Bowden Order, it is questionable whether she would have proceeded further down that path, particularly in light of her acknowledgement that restraining CD from publishing and sharing information about the issues in this case would restrict his freedom of expression not only within his own family but more broadly (at para. 47). This is not to suggest that CD’s right to expressive freedom precludes any restrictions, a subject which we discuss below in respect of Charter values.
 It is our view, therefore, that para. 2 of the Marzari Order should be set aside. As paras. 3, 4, and 5 were also made under s. 183, they should also be set aside.
The panel was not happy that the father had made media appearances, even if it was done without the names being disclosed. They thought it would still have a harmful effect.
 CD submits that orders that require him to acknowledge AB as male violated his right to freedom of conscience and belief under s. 2(a) of the Charter because they require him to adopt views that are not his own. He also submits that both the Bowden and Marzari Orders infringe his s. 2(b) rights in three ways: (1) they censor him from using AB’s proper name and female pronouns in speaking with AB or referring to AB as his daughter in communications with third parties; (2) they compel him to refer to AB as a boy, to use male pronouns and to use the male name AB has chosen when speaking to AB or when speaking about AB to third parties; and (3) they censor him from discussing the case with anybody except his lawyers, who are also censored from talking about the case. CD says that referring to AB as his “daughter” lies at the core of the purpose of s. 2(b)—protecting truth-seeking.
 CD further submits that the orders that restrain him from discussing the medical treatment with AB prevent him from playing an important parental role in discussing an important medical decision with AB, thus violating his liberty right under s. 7 of the Charter to make decisions for his child in fundamental matters such as medical care.
 CD’s position is supported by ARPA and JCCF.
 ARPA submits that a parent’s freedom to hold certain beliefs, which include beliefs about gender, is protected by s. 2(b). It says that parents also have the right and the duty to give guidance to their children in accordance with those beliefs, and the state cannot prohibit parents from sharing their beliefs and opinions with their children. While ARPA’s submissions focus on the interpretation of s. 183 of the FLA, the essence of its position is that such provisions—which we assume would include provisions for orders under the FLA other than protection orders—should be interpreted in light of their text and their context within the FLA as a whole, as well as consistently with the Charter.
 JCCF supports CD’s position that the kind of orders made here violate CD’s rights under ss. 2(b) and 7 of the Charter.
An interesting argument. Forcing someone to use language (and that the person considers untrue) might be a violation of their free speech and security of the person.
 The law is clear that the Charter does not apply to judicial orders made in private disputes: RWDSU v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., 1986 CanLII 5 (SCC),  2 S.C.R. 573. In Young v. Young, 1993 CanLII 34 (SCC),  4 S.C.R. 3 and P.(D.) v. S.(C.), 1993 CanLII 35 (SCC),  4 S.C.R. 141, L’Heureux-Dubé J. applied this principle to court orders made in private family law disputes, but held that underlying Charter values are not to be ignored by courts when making such decisions.
 The Attorney General points out recent judicial and academic commentary that has been critical of the consideration of Charter values in making decisions and interpreting legislation: see Ojeikere v. Ojeikere, 2018 ONCA 372, Miller J.A.; E.T. v. Hamilton-Wentworth District School Board, 2017 ONCA 893; Gehl v. Canada (Attorney General), 2017 ONCA 319, Lauwers and Miller JJ.A. While each of these cases involve different circumstances, the primary concern expressed is that reasoning based on Charter values lacks the doctrinal rigour of a traditional Charter analysis, which must also consider the competing principles in s. 1. The Attorney General also points to Wilson v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles), 2015 SCC 47, where the Court held that Charter values had no role to play in interpreting legislation in the absence of an ambiguity. This court applied the same principle in the family law context in J.E.S.D. v. Y.E.P., 2018 BCCA 286.
The Charter is not intended to apply to private disputes.
 CD’s refusal to respect AB’s decisions regarding his gender identity is troublesome. The evidence shows that his rejection of AB’s identity has caused AB significant pain and has resulted in a rupture of what both parties refer to as an otherwise loving parent-child relationship. This rupture is not in AB’s best interests. He clearly wants and needs acceptance and support from his father.
 While of course CD is fully entitled to his opinions and beliefs, he cannot forget that AB, now a mature 15-year-old, with the support of his mother and his medical advisors, has chosen a course of action that includes not only hormone treatment, but a legal change of his name and gender identity.
 It is our view that in these circumstances, a limited conduct order, made with the objective of protecting the best interests of AB, is consistent with the Charter values underlying ss. 2(a), 2(b), and 7. CD has the right to his opinion and belief about AB’s gender identity and choice of medical treatment. His right to hold a contrary opinion would not be unduly affronted by an order that CD respect AB’s choices by acknowledging them in his communications with AB and publicly with third parties, both generally and in respect of these proceedings. His right to express his opinion publicly and to share AB’s private information to third parties may properly be subject to constraints aimed at preventing harm to AB. However, we would not restrict CD’s right to express his opinion in his private communications with family, close friends and close advisors, provided none of these individuals is part of or connected with the media or any public forum, and provided CD obtain assurances from those with whom he shares information or views that they will not share that information with others.
What is unsettling in all of this is that the courts either don’t know — or just don’t care — that there is an incredibly high rate of regret and eventual detransitioning that happens. Sure, the child is 15 now, and certain. But what about at age 20? Age 25? Age 30?
While some minor amendments were made to existing orders, the bulk of it remained intact. The dad is viewed as having lost the appeal.
Jack Philips, the owner of the Masterpiece Cakeshop in Lakewood Colorado is the owner of the infamous “Gay Cake” refusal.
Quite simply, he refused to create a wedding cake for 2 men, David Mullins and Charlie Craig, about to marry. He reasoned that he would have to act against his religious beliefs.
Craig and Mullins filed a complaint with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission (similar to Privincial human rights commissions, in Canada). It ruled against Philips, claiming religion was just an excuse to justify bigotry.
So, Philips took his case to the Colorado Court of Appeals. The C.C.A. ruled that no religion had to be endorsed, but that service couldn’t be refused on protected grounds, such sexual orientation.
Finally, the case went to the U.S. Supreme Court, which eventually ruled in the baker’s favour. However, critics complain that the ruling was on overly narrow grounds and did not actually make much of a precident. It wouldn’t address questions for florists, photographers, caterers, or others with a similar dilemma. The Supreme Court did however find the Civil Rights Commission was overly hostile to Philips.
The ruling sparked mixed opinions. Philips claims he has since had people calling to make ridiculous cakes, such as Satan cakes and cakes in the form of sex objects.
But now, Jack Philips is back in the news, and for basically the same reason: refusing to bake a cake for a transgender person named Autumn Scardina, celebrating the 7th anniversary of a gender change.
However, there is more than just a whiff of a conflict of interest here. Scardina is a lawyer whose firm does cases of employment disputes.
The Colorado Civil Rights Commission has ruled that in principle this appears to be a discrimination case. So it would seem that matters will be heading down the same road as before.
However, Philips has decided to take a new approach here: suing governor Jerry Hickenlooper and other government officials, claiming religious persecution seen .
It will be interesting to see how things play out.
Author’s Views: To disclose outright, I believe that the baker should be able to refuse or accept any deal they want, and to accept or reject any business they want. It would be different if it were a government agency, or a monopoly. Several questions I must ask.
(1) As for the gay couple, why not simply find another baker? While it may be annoying to you, why not take your money and business to someone else?
(2) If you wanted others to know about this baker, why would it be necessary to sue him or go to the Civil Rights Commission? Was the purpose to harm his business?
(3) Part of the backlash against letting gay couples marry in 2015 was the claim (derided as paranoia) that it would lead to religious freedom being stepped on. Does this not prove that claim right?
(4) Regarding Autumn Scardina and the transgender cake: why go to this “specific” baker, when you knew about the case?
(5) Was it an attempt to get money from him and/or to further harm his business? Or to use your law firm to make a political point?
(6) As for both the gay cake and the trans cake: do you really want the cake for your “big day” to be made by somebody you filed a civil rights claim against? It’s not like he cares about keeping your business.
Car insurance rates in Canada can be very expensive, especially for men. Provinces such as Alberta and Ontario charge men much higher rates than women, especially at a younger age. The rationale is that statistically speaking, men get into more serious car accidents than women.
But one person (can I call her a man, or him a woman?) has come up with an interesting way to get around that. This is the story: Here and here.
The person, known as ”David”, got his Alberta birth certificate changed from ”M” to ”F”, then got insurance as a ”woman”. It cost about $1100 less a year doing this.
Alberta had made it easier to change the gender on documents in an effort to make the process easier for transgender individuals. Clearly, this was not the intent of these legal reforms.
However, the LGBTQ Community has objected, claiming that this is making a mockery of the laws meant to protect them. Some in the government have claimed that this is in fact perjury and fraud.
Curiously enough, many Canadians have been left with a sour taste given all of the SJW policies, including what is seen as excessive trans accomodation and the blurring of actual biological differences between the sexes.
Author’s Views: I have no issue with people living as the people they wish to be or feel that they are. As long as it doesn’t infringe on myself or others, people are free to be who they are. However, the fake outrage that is so often on the news is very offputting.
My own leanings are somewhat conservative/libertarian, and my beliefs are that people should be treated equally and fairly. No prejudice, no special treatment. And different rates for men and women is discrimination.
I do think it is an amusing way to combat the prejudicial practice of charging men higher rates for insurance. A sense of 2 wrongs making a right.