Canada’s Bill C-75 (Watering Down Penalties for Terrorism, Rioting, Weapons)

(The Canadian Criminal Code, which typically gets amended every year)

Criminal offences in Canada are categorized like this

SUMMARY OFFENCE: more minor, lesser penalties (misdemeanor)
INDICTABLE OFFENCE: more serious, harsher penalties (felony)
HYBRID OFFENCE: Prosecutor has discretion as to proceed “summarily” or “by indictment”

For a good video on this subject, Julie Mora posted a video seen here. It had 2 parts: (a) an expanded gun registry, Bill C-71, and (b) changes to the Canadian Criminal Code, Bill C-75. Julie is a fine blogger, and her videos are well worth a watch by all Canadians. She claims in this video that the bill will “hybridize” many serious charges, meaning that they may now be tried summarily. And she is right. Below are the major points.

This is not trivial at all. Terrorism and rioting offence should be treated seriously. Yet, if this bill were actually to pass, the penalties for serious crimes may be gutted. True, for hybrid offences, Prosecutors could still choose to try the case by indictment. However, most people would agree that the option should not exist

Relevant links are below:
CLICK HERE for the Criminal Code as it currently exists.
CLICK HERE for the Liberal Bill C-75.


ORIGINAL

Marginal note:
Punishment of rioter
65 (1) Every one who takes part in a riot is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.
Marginal note:
Concealment of identity
(2) Every person who commits an offence under subsection (1) while wearing a mask or other disguise to conceal their identity without lawful excuse is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years.

REPLACEMENT

Punishment of rioter
65 (1) Every person who takes part in a riot is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than two years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.
Concealment of identity
(2) Every person who commits an offence under subsection (1) while wearing a mask or other disguise to conceal their identity without lawful excuse is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.


ORIGINAL

Neglect by peace officer
69 A peace officer who receives notice that there is a riot within his jurisdiction and, without reasonable excuse, fails to take all reasonable steps to suppress the riot is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.

REPLACEMENT

Neglect by peace officer
69 A peace officer who receives notice that there is a riot within their jurisdiction and, without reasonable excuse, fails to take all reasonable steps to suppress the riot is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than two years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.


ORIGINAL

Possession without lawful excuse
82 (1) Every person who, without lawful excuse, the proof of which lies on the person, makes or has in the possession or under the care or control of the person any explosive substance is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years.

REPLACEMENT

14 Subsection 82(1) of the Act is replaced by the following:

Possession of explosive
82 (1) Every person who, without lawful excuse, makes or has in their possession or under their care or control any explosive substance is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than five years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.


ORIGINAL

Financing of Terrorism
Marginal note:
Providing or collecting property for certain activities
83.02 Every one who, directly or indirectly, wilfully and without lawful justification or excuse, provides or collects property intending that it be used or knowing that it will be used, in whole or in part, in order to carry out
(a) an act or omission that constitutes an offence referred to in subparagraphs (a)(i) to (ix) of the definition of terrorist activity in subsection 83.01(1), or
(b) any other act or omission intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to a civilian or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, if the purpose of that act or omission, by its nature or context, is to intimidate the public, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or refrain from doing any act,
is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years.

REPLACEMENT

Providing or collecting property for certain activities
83.‍02 Every person is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years or is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction who, directly or indirectly, wilfully and without lawful justification or excuse, provides or collects property intending that it be used or knowing that it will be used, in whole or in part, in order to carry out
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than five years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.


ORIGINAL

Providing, making available, etc., property or services for terrorist purposes
83.03 Every one who, directly or indirectly, collects property, provides or invites a person to provide, or makes available property or financial or other related services
(a) intending that they be used, or knowing that they will be used, in whole or in part, for the purpose of facilitating or carrying out any terrorist activity, or for the purpose of benefiting any person who is facilitating or carrying out such an activity, or
(b) knowing that, in whole or part, they will be used by or will benefit a terrorist group,
is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years.

REPLACEMENT

Providing, making available, etc.‍, property or services for terrorist purposes
83.‍03 Every person is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years or is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction who, directly or indirectly, collects property, provides or invites a person to provide, or makes available property or financial or other related services
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than five years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.


ORIGINAL

Using or possessing property for terrorist purposes
83.04 Every one who
(a) uses property, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, for the purpose of facilitating or carrying out a terrorist activity, or
(b) possesses property intending that it be used or knowing that it will be used, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, for the purpose of facilitating or carrying out a terrorist activity,
is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years.

REPLACEMENT

Using or possessing property for terrorist purposes

83.‍04 Every person is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years or is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction


ORIGINAL

Offences — freezing of property, disclosure or audit
83.12 (1) Every one who contravenes any of sections 83.08, 83.1 and 83.11 is guilty of an offence and liable
(a) on summary conviction, to a fine of not more than $100,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than one year, or to both; or
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years.

REPLACEMENT

Paragraphs 83.‍12(1)‍(a) and (b) of the Act are replaced by the following:

(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years; or
(b) on summary conviction, to a fine of not more than $100,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than two years less a day, or to both.


ORIGINAL

Participation in activity of terrorist group
83.18 (1) Every one who knowingly participates in or contributes to, directly or indirectly, any activity of a terrorist group for the purpose of enhancing the ability of any terrorist group to facilitate or carry out a terrorist activity is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years.

REPLACEMENT

Participation in activity of terrorist group
83.‍18 (1) Every person who knowingly participates in or contributes to, directly or indirectly, any activity of a terrorist group for the purpose of enhancing the ability of any terrorist group to facilitate or carry out a terrorist activity is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than10 years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.


ORIGINAL

Leaving Canada to participate in activity of terrorist group
83.181 Everyone who leaves or attempts to leave Canada, or goes or attempts to go on board a conveyance with the intent to leave Canada, for the purpose of committing an act or omission outside Canada that, if committed in Canada, would be an offence under subsection 83.18(1) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years

REPLACEMENT

21 Section 83.‍181 of the Act is replaced by the following:

Leaving Canada to participate in activity of terrorist group
83.‍181 Every person who leaves or attempts to leave Canada, or goes or attempts to go on board a conveyance with the intent to leave Canada, for the purpose of committing an act or omission outside Canada that, if committed in Canada, would be an offence under subsection 83.‍18(1) is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.


ORIGINAL

Advocating or promoting commission of terrorism offences
83.221 (1) Every person who, by communicating statements, knowingly advocates or promotes the commission of terrorism offences in general — other than an offence under this section — while knowing that any of those offences will be committed or being reckless as to whether any of those offences may be committed, as a result of such communication, is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than five years.

REPLACEMENT

22 Subsection 83.‍221(1) of the Act is replaced by the following:

Advocating or promoting commission of terrorism offences
83.‍221 (1) Every person who, by communicating statements, knowingly advocates or promotes the commission of terrorism offences in general — other than an offence under this section — while knowing that any of those offences will be committed or being reckless as to whether any of those offences may be committed, as a result of such communication, is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than five years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction


ORIGINAL

Concealing person who carried out terrorist activity
83.23 (1) Everyone who knowingly harbours or conceals any person whom they know to be a person who has carried out a terrorist activity, for the purpose of enabling the person to facilitate or carry out any terrorist activity, is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment
(a) for a term of not more than 14 years, if the person who is harboured or concealed carried out a terrorist activity that is a terrorism offence for which that person is liable to imprisonment for life; and
(b) for a term of not more than 10 years, if the person who is harboured or concealed carried out a terrorist activity that is a terrorism offence for which that person is liable to any other punishment.

REPLACEMENT

Concealing person who carried out terrorist activity
83.‍23 (1) Every person who knowingly harbours or conceals another person whom they know to be a person who has carried out a terrorist activity, for the purpose of enabling that other person to facilitate or carry out any terrorist activity, is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 14 years, if the person who is harboured or concealed carried out a terrorist activity that is a terrorism offence for which that person is liable to imprisonment for life; and
(b) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years or an offence punishable on summary conviction, if the person who is harboured or concealed carried out a terrorist activity that is a terrorism offence for which that person is liable to any other punishment.


ORIGINAL

Concealing person who is likely to carry out terrorist activity
(2) Everyone who knowingly harbours or conceals any person whom they know to be a person who is likely to carry out a terrorist activity, for the purpose of enabling the person to facilitate or carry out any terrorist activity, is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years.

REPLACEMENT

Concealing person who is likely to carry out terrorist activity
(2) Every person who knowingly harbours or conceals another person whom they know to be a person who is likely to carry out a terrorist activity, for the purpose of enabling that other person to facilitate or carry out any terrorist activity, is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction


ORIGINAL

Person to be brought before judge
(3) A peace officer who arrests a person in the execution of the warrant shall, without delay, bring the person, or cause them to be brought, before the judge who issued the warrant or another judge of the same court. The judge in question may, to ensure compliance with the order, order that the person be detained in custody or released on recognizance, with or without sureties.

REPLACEMENT

25 Subsection 83.‍29(3) of the Act is replaced by the following:

Person to be brought before judge
(3) A peace officer who arrests a person in the execution of a warrant shall, without delay, bring the person, or cause the person to be brought, before the judge who issued the warrant or another judge of the same court. The judge in question may, to ensure compliance with the order, order that the person be detained in custody or make a release order, the form of which may be adapted to suit the circumstances

[Note: the new wording is such that is seems intended to make it easier to release suspected terrorists]


ORIGINAL

Possession of prohibited or restricted firearm with ammunition

Punishment
(2) Every person who commits an offence under subsection (1)
(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of
(i) in the case of a first offence, three years, and
(ii) in the case of a second or subsequent offence, five years; or
(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year.

REPLACEMENT

27 Paragraph 95(2)‍(b) of the Act is replaced by the following:

(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.


ORIGINAL

Possession of weapon obtained by commission of offence

96 (1) Subject to subsection (3), every person commits an offence who possesses a firearm, a prohibited weapon, a restricted weapon, a prohibited device or any prohibited ammunition that the person knows was obtained by the commission in Canada of an offence or by an act or omission anywhere that, if it had occurred in Canada, would have constituted an offence.
Marginal note:
Punishment
(2) Every person who commits an offence under subsection (1)
(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of one year; or
(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year.

REPLACEMENT

28 Paragraph 96(2)‍(b) of the Act is replaced by the following:

(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.


As absurd as it sounds, here is the “SUMMARY” of Bill C-75.

SUMMARY

This enactment amends the Criminal Code to, among other things,
(a) modernize and clarify interim release provisions to simplify the forms of release that may be imposed on an accused, incorporate a principle of restraint and require that particular attention be given to the circumstances of Aboriginal accused and accused from vulnerable populations when making interim release decisions, and provide more onerous interim release requirements for offences involving violence against an intimate partner;
(b) provide for a judicial referral hearing to deal with administration of justice offences involving a failure to comply with conditions of release or failure to appear as required;
(c) abolish peremptory challenges of jurors, modify the process of challenging a juror for cause so that a judge makes the determination of whether a ground of challenge is true, and allow a judge to direct that a juror stand by for reasons of maintaining public confidence in the administration of justice;
(d) increase the maximum term of imprisonment for repeat offences involving intimate partner violence and provide that abuse of an intimate partner is an aggravating factor on sentencing;
(e) restrict the availability of a preliminary inquiry to offences punishable by imprisonment for life and strengthen the justice’s powers to limit the issues explored and witnesses to be heard at the inquiry;
(f) hybridize most indictable offences punishable by a maximum penalty of 10 years or less, increase the default maximum penalty to two years less a day of imprisonment for summary conviction offences and extend the limitation period for summary conviction offences to 12 months;
(g) remove the requirement for judicial endorsement for the execution of certain out-of-province warrants and authorizations, expand judicial case management powers, allow receiving routine police evidence in writing, consolidate provisions relating to the powers of the Attorney General and allow increased use of technology to facilitate remote attendance by any person in a proceeding;
(h) allow the court to exempt an offender from the requirement to pay a victim surcharge if the offender satisfies the court that the payment would cause the offender undue hardship, provide the court with guidance as to what constitutes undue hardship, provide that a victim surcharge is to be paid for each offence, with an exception for certain administration of justice offences if the total amount of surcharges imposed on an offender for those types of offences would be disproportionate in the circumstances, require courts to provide reasons for granting any exception for certain administration of justice offences or any exemption from the requirement to pay a victim surcharge and clarify that the amendments described in this paragraph apply to any offender who is sentenced after the day on which they come into force, regardless of whether or not the offence was committed before that day; and
(i) remove passages and repeal provisions that have been ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Canada, repeal section 159 of the Act and provide that no person shall be convicted of any historical offence of a sexual nature unless the act that constitutes the offence would constitute an offence under the Criminal Code if it were committed on the day on which the charge was laid.

The enactment also amends the Youth Criminal Justice Act in order to reduce delays within the youth criminal justice system and enhance the effectiveness of that system with respect to administration of justice offences. For those purposes, the enactment amends that Act to, among other things,
(a) set out principles intended to encourage the use of extrajudicial measures and judicial reviews as alternatives to the laying of charges for administration of justice offences;
(b) set out requirements for imposing conditions on a young person’s release order or as part of a sentence;
(c) limit the circumstances in which a custodial sentence may be imposed for an administration of justice offence;
(d) remove the requirement for the Attorney General to determine whether to seek an adult sentence in certain circumstances; and
(e) remove the power of a youth justice court to make an order to lift the ban on publication in the case of a young person who receives a youth sentence for a violent offence, as well as the requirement to determine whether to make such an order.

Finally, the enactment amends among other Acts An Act to amend the Criminal Code (exploitation and trafficking in persons) so that certain sections of that Act can come into force on different days and also makes consequential amendments to other Acts.
Bill C-75 is too long to possibly cover entirely in one article, though this is the most serious of it.


Having much smaller bills introduced would certainly be preferable. Far too often, governments ram through much unrelated material into a bill, called “omnibus bills”, such that proper debate never actually happens.

A more thorough debate could be had if this were broken up into 6-8 separate bills

And just reiterate, terrorism and other major crimes should always be tried by indictment.

European Union Censorship

(Provocative, but you get the point)

September 12, 2018 — the European Union passed this law, the “Copyright Directive”, in a 438-226 vote.

Other media on the subject can be found: here, here, here, and here.

The “Copyright Directive” was originally stopped in July of this year, primarily over concerns over Articles 11 and 13. And to a degree, the concerns were over the same thing. Responding to, or critiquing another’s work is very common, and makes way for advancement of discussion of ideas. As long as there is some educational, critical or reporting use (and not blatant copyright), then using portions of a person or institution’s work is fine. In fact, this very website, Chimeratsk.com, cites Canadian “Fair Dealing“, and American “Fair Use” provisions.

Article 11, a.k.a. the “link tax”, concerned ways for original content creators to get paid via taxes or royalties. In practice though, how would one know who the original content creator was? Perhaps the royalties would be going to someone who is at least in part responding to another person’s work.

Article 13 had to do with platforms such as Facebook and YouTube being blocked from sharing protected content. Apparently there is to be a huge database on protected material, which by itself sounds creepy. To be fair though, the law says that encyclopedia-type platforms like Wikipedia will be exempt. However, as many images, text and music can sound similar, how would the original creator be identified?

Further, copyrighted material does not last forever. For example, the book “1984”, written by George Orwell (a.k.a. Eric Arthur Blair was written in 1949, so after 1999, a Canuck should be free to use it freely. Under Canadian Copyright Law, 50 years after death, copyright protection would disappear. Yes, ironic to use the Orwewll book here. However, would this EU driven database(s) know when copyright on each image, unique, phrase, text, etc… lapse?

On a semi-related note: there is an academic database — turnitin.com which college and university students would upload digitial copies of essays and other papers. This is an anti-plagiarism site which was to ensure that students were handing in original work. The site would compare and contrast the student paper against millions of others and look for regions of overlap. Sounds great, except for problems those arose in this.

At its core, the Copyright Directive seems to nullify what may be considered Fair Dealing/Fair Use exemptions (by listing the original content creator as the copyright owner of any and all of its content, and responses. CLICK HERE, for an article on the proposed revisions of Article 11 and 13.

Some accidental incidents of censorship occurred here, here, and here.

While the E.U. has passed this Copyright Directive, there are reasons to be cautiously optimistic:

First, even if nothing is done, this seems absurd on its face to implement. (See the earlier criticism on logistical issues). Yes, content is still getting blocked, even the most innocuous stuff. While this is done under the guise of “protecting” creators, the complications that will arise will cause more and more headaches. Oddly, creators will “lose” money if research and ad revenue plummet.

Second, the law will undoubtedly face legal challenges and be tied up in the courts for years.

Third, each memberstate will implement their own version of this law, and that will likely not happen for a year or 2. Harder to enforce when the rules aren’t uniform. And on a related note: what about the UK, who is leaving the E.U.? What about any other member who may leave? What happens if governments change and their successors don’t agree with what they see? And won’t any inconsistencies in member laws make it easier to challenge the law?

Fourth, what if any E.U. members decide to just ignore the directive altogether? The EU has shown itself to be rather toothless in enforcing its own rules and orders.

Fifth, how will this be enforced when using material from, or creating new content in countries that do not have these laws, or subscribe to this version of them?

Online creators decry this EU directive, and they do have reason to be worried. However, there are many options available to fight it, and many hurdles it will face.

Review of the Book ”An Advocacy Primer”

(3rd edition of the book by Lee Stuesser)

This book was released in 2005 by Lee Stuesser, a law professor at the University of Manitoba. It is basically a reference book for how to litigate different types of cases.

The book itself was written for law students in how to work for clients. However, the information provided is very straightforward, and many self-represented persons could get a leg up simply by reading through and following along. Self representation, as discussed here, is possible by many people, on the more simplistic cases.

”An Advocacy Primer” details: (a) how to go about the many steps in litigation; (b) gives many tips on how to prepare documents; (c) organize arguments; and (d) common pitfalls to avoid.

A brief outline of the book:

Chapter 1: Developing a Trial Plan
Chapter 2: Draft of the Pleadings
Chapter 3: Civil Case — Disclosure
Chapter 4: Criminal Case — Discovery
Chapter 5: Making Submissions
Chapter 6: A Trial Notebook
Chapter 7: Running a Civil Trial
Chapter 8: Running a Criminal Trial
Chapter 9: Opening Arguments
Chapter 10: Closing Arguments
Chapter 11: Your Case — Direct Examination
Chapter 12: Using Exhibits
Chapter 13: Principles of Cross Examination
Chapter 14: Impeachment
Chapter 15: Objections at trial
Chapter 16: Special Witnesses
Chapter 17: Appellate Advocacy
Chapter 18: Ethics of Advocacy

Stuesser’s work can be used in one of two ways. First, it can be read straight through as a non-fiction book. Second, it can be used in pieces, as needed for a representative in a legal matter. This 475 page book also gives many templates of legal forms, and exact wordings to include.

The second option is obviously far more practical. The first is possible, although it would be a very tedious read to do in one sitting.

Overall, the book is great source of information, both for self-reps and other legal enthusiasts.

E.U. Punishes Memberstates for Daring to Exercise Soverignty

Hungarian Parliament Building

(September 12, 2018), The European Union has triggered Article 7 of the Lisbon Treaty.

Many reasons were given, but it is widely believed that the main one has to do with immigration. Hungary has blatantly refused to accept forced migration quotas, and has run on a “Hungary for Hungarians” platform. While Victor Orban’s policy is extremely popular, and helped his re-election in April, the E.U. is angered at the open defiance.

Nationalism is alive and well in Europe. Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic are 4 central European nations known as the “Visegrad 4”. They are against open borders. Sebastian Kurz in Austria and Matteo Salvini in Italy recently won on populist platforms. Hungary is hardly alone.

While the E.U. professes outrage, Orban is actually running on the agenda he specifically set out to do. He sealed Hungary’s borders and stopped 99% of the illegal immigration. He has also stopped all funding for illegal migrants, and banned NGOs from aiding and abetting. While claiming these to be “human rights abuses”, it seems there is little the E.U. can do about it.

To give some perspective, there are many more legal hurdles to clear before anything actually happens. Poland, for example, had Article 7 triggered against it in December 2017, almost a year ago, see here, and also see here. Yet nothing has actually happened.

But ultimately, Hungary could lose its voting rights within the E.U. (as could Poland). Should this happen, they would be subjected to laws which they have no say in enacting or repealing.

Critics have loudly advised Hungary and Poland should just leave the European Union altogether. In 2016, the UK invoked Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty in order to begin to leave the EU. Nigel Farage of the UK, and Marine Le Pen of France openly mock the E.U. as violating the will of sovereign European nations.

More insight to the European Union and their laws will be given on a future article.

    Author’s Views

: From my perspective as a Canadian tourist, an integrated Europe and common currency does make travel, movement, and purchasing easier. However, it is disappointing to see how much sovereignty is eroded in the name of “unity”. A nation should be able to control its own borders, currency, language, culture, economy and way of life. While this union may have at one time been useful, it is undermining the autonomy and independence of the host countries.

Measured Discussion on Multiculturalism is Apparently Off-Limits

Andrew Scheer (left) and Maxime Bernier (Right)

August 13, 2018 — Maxime Bernier, a Member of Federal Parliament in Canada (and a senior member of the Conservative Party), caused a stir when he sent off 6 tweets.  He questioned to what limits the push for diversity and multiculturalism should  go in Canada.

To disclose bias right away: political correctness gets us nowhere.  Truth and open discussion are valued over censorship anytime.  And Bernier was tweeting what many people believe, specifically that there has to be some limit to the push for ”endless diversity”.

Recent ”diversity” moves include: (a) gender quotas for filling cabinet positions; (b) letting terrorists with dual citizenship keep their Canadian citizenship; (c) marching in gay pride parades while endorsing religions who want to slaughter gays; (d) calling it offensive to label honour killings as ”barbaric”; (e) Motion M-103, the anti-blasphemy legislation; (f) publicly saying that Canada has and should have no core identity; (g) altering the national anthem to make it ”gender neutral”; (h) making it mandatory for MPs to support abortion, but taking no position on sex-selective abortions, which target female babies; (i) comparing ISIS fighter to Italian, Polish and Chinese immigrants; (j) refusing to denounce religious and cultural practices which are incompatible with a free and equal society,  and so on…..

In all fairness to Bernier, he never called for anyone to be prohibited from entering the country, to be mistreated, or suggested that people are not equal.  He did question: (1) dividing Canadians into ever smaller groups and ”Balkanizing” the country; (2) accepting ideologies which are truly incompatible with Western societies; and (3) obsession with identity politics does nothing to unify a country.  All of these things seem very reasonable.

Left leaning Liberals and the NDP had a field day, calling Bernier a bigot and calling for his ouster from the parties.  That is no surprise.  Virtue signalling is how the left operates these days.

The more right leaning Canadian Nationalist Party enjoyed it as well, albeit for different reasons.  Members took it as proof that the Conservatives are too weak to stand up for a strong unified Canada. Here is an article from the Nationalist Party of Canada.

The real surprise (at least to me), was how reluctant fellow Conservatives were to support him.  They claim to be against political correctness and the silencing of open discussion, but showed true hypocracy here. The media condemned Bernier here, here, here, and here.

Outside Parliament and the mainstream media however, there has been large public support for Bernier and his having the courage to at least address a difficult topic.

It seems unlikely that Maxime will be kicked out of the party, if for no other reason than it will destroy any claim that Conservatives value free speech.  However, the damage seems to be already done.

And another observation: go to almost any ”multi-culture” city and you will find it segregated along cultural and ethnic lines.  This is not the government’s doing, but rather people doing it voluntarily.

Final Thoughts: Most don’t have a problem with people of other races, and (for to a degree) cultures living in Canada.  Where the line should be drawn is: (i) when the goal seems to actually be to break the country down; (ii) the cultures are truly incompatible; (iii) when asking valid questions becomes hate speech.

People are equal.  Ideas are not.  Ideas should be openly discussed, including ones that involve the direction the country is going.

Here is Maxime Bernier’s Twitter account, and specifically, here are the INFAMOUS 6, which caused the stir.

Update to the Story
Maxime Bernier left the Conservative Party on August 23. Bernier talked about many policy differences, while Scheer cited some personal differences. Bernier founded the (Communist sounding) People’s Party.

Supreme Court of Canada Affirms Protections for Self Represented People

April 23, 2017 — The Supreme Court of Canada has affirmed the protection for self represented persons and accused people

Based on the 2006 Statement of principles from the Canadian Judicial Council, the SCC has enshrined these principles into law. See here, here, here, and here.

STATEMENT:
Judges, the courts and other participants in the justice system have a responsibility to promote
access to the justice system for all persons on an equal basis, regardless of representation.

PRINCIPLES:
1. Judges and court administrators should do whatever is possible to provide a fair and impartial process and prevent an unfair disadvantage to self-represented persons.

  1. Self-represented persons should not be denied relief on the basis of a minor or easily rectified deficiency in their case.

  2. Where appropriate, a judge should consider engaging in such case management activities as are required to protect the rights and interests of self-represented persons. Such case management should begin as early in the court process as possible.

  3. When one or both parties are proceeding without representation, non-prejudicial and engaged case and courtroom management may be needed to protect the litigants’ equal right to be heard. Depending on the circumstances and nature of the case, the presiding judge may:

(a) explain the process;
(b) inquire whether both parties understand the process and the procedure;
(c) make referrals to agencies able to assist the litigant in the preparation of the case;
(d) provide information about the law and evidentiary requirements;
(e) modify the traditional order of taking evidence; and
(f) question witnesses.

This is great news, as Justices/Judges/Masters/JP are now obligated to go the extra mile in assuring fair process for those accused and self representing.

Self representing is an intimidating process, but levelling the field should go a long way to ensure better access to justice.  It should not be only for those who can spend lots of money on a lawyer, or who are able to spend huge amounts of time learning the law.