Gladue 2.0: Blacks Also Get Race-Based Discount In Sentencing, What The Media Missed

1. Important Links

(1) https://canucklaw.ca/race-based-discounts-in-criminal-courts/
(2) https://canucklaw.ca/child-killer-gets-transfer-to-healing-lodge-because-of-her-race/
(3) https://canucklaw.ca/public-policy-7-abolish-gladue-fix-underlying-problems/
(4) https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/Const/page-15.html

Aboriginal Specific Cases
(A) R. v. Gladue, 1997 CanLII 3015 (BC CA)
http://archive.is/QKazg
(B) R. v. Gladue, 1999 CanLII 679 (SCC), [1999] 1 SCR 688
http://archive.is/vSWlo
(C) R. v. Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13 (CanLII), [2012] 1 SCR 433
http://archive.is/Ol7tw

2. Context For This Article

Much of the Canadian public knows about “Gladue Rights”, which is essentially a race-based discount given to Aboriginal defendants in criminal proceedings. In short, judges must consider systemic racism and other discrimination, and search for ways to reduce their sentences.

However, this does not extend only to Aboriginals. Blacks can also use many of the same excuses in pleading for reduced punishment for crimes they commit.

Everyone, regardless of their race, should be against this. The only way a society works is when everyone is treated the same way for their actions. One group should not benefit, or be hindered by unequal laws.

3. Court Cases For Blacks

Here are some recent court cases in which “racial discrimination” or “system racism” was taken into account by judges sentencing black felons. This is not the complete list.

(A) R. v. Borde, 2003 CanLII 4187 (ON CA)
http://archive.is/xfD1s
(B) R v Reid, 2016 ONSC 954 (CanLII)
http://archive.is/QgCtC
(C) R. v. Diabikulu, 2016 BCPC 390 (CanLII)
http://archive.is/PNiAG
(D) R. v. Deng, 2017 BCPC 225 (CanLII)
http://archive.is/MwPKY
(E) R. v. Jackson, 2018 ONSC 2527 (CanLII)
http://archive.is/GGEDy
(F) R. v. Shallow, 2019 ONSC 403 (CanLII)
http://archive.is/Koklf
(G) R. v. Faulkner, 2019 NSPC 36 (CanLII)
http://archive.is/fW8hj
(H) R. v. Kabanga-Muanza, 2019 ONSC 1161 (CanLII)
http://archive.is/m36ac

Again, this is not nearly all of them, but a snapshot into what the legal system (it’s not really a justice system) has become in Canada.

4. Looking At A Cultural Assessment

[17] Cultural Assessment – Completed by Mr. R. Wright, MSW, RSW. It is extensive, well-informed and well-researched.
The Nature of an Impact of Race and Culture Assessment
Though much has been written about the intersection of race and the criminal justice system, and in particular the experience of North Americans of African descent, until the development of IRCA’s (sic) there had been no recognized form for the presentation of such a report. That people of African descent have been overrepresented among incarcerated persons in Canada has been studied by academics, justice system leaders, and activist persons. The Office of the Correctional Investigator took special notice of the conditions of inmates of African descent in federal correctional institutions in its year end report in 2013. It concluded:

“Black inmates are one of the fastest growing sub-populations in federal corrections. Over the last 10 years, the number of federal incarcerated Black inmates has increased by 80% from 778 to 1,403. Black inmates now account for 9.5% of the total prison population (up from 6.3% in 2003/04) while representing just 2.9% of the general Canadian population.” (p.8)

Now, 4 years after the advent of these reports in the well publicized YCJA matter described as R v. X, IRCAs have been widely accepted in Nova Scotia courts and have also been conducted in Ontario. Though I fully respect that the experience of aboriginal Canadians is quite unique, and I have no wish to expropriate or exploit their struggle and leadership, I nevertheless need to acknowledge that my development of IRCAs has been influenced by my familiarity with Gladue reports. Like Gladue reports, the goal of IRCAs is to provide courts with more background information about an offender’s race and cultural background to assist the court at arriving at a just sentence: A sentence that considers the circumstances of the offender, alternatives to incarceration, and does not further contribute to the systemic problems of overrepresentation of persons within correctional populations. This principle is generally stated in the Criminal Code of Canada with particular attention given to Aboriginal offenders:

718.2 A court that imposes a sentence shall also taken into consideration the following principles:
(e) all available sanctions, other than imprisonment, that are reasonable in the circumstances and consistent with the harm done to victims or to the community should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders.

In keeping with these principles, it is a founding premise of IRCAs that a person’s race and cultural heritage should be considered as a significant factor in considering their sentence n a criminal matter. Not just because of cultural responses to normal stressors, but also because of the forces of racism that person experience and our growing understanding of how this affects outcomes when one encounters the justice and other government systems. In Nova Scotia we have significant reason to understand these effects. We are the province of the Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall, Jr., Prosecution (1989), which opening paragraph is very telling:

The criminal justice system failed Donald Marshall, Jr. at virtually every turn from his arrest and wrongful conviction for murder in 1971 up to, and even beyond, his acquittal by the Court of Appeal in 1983. The tragedy of the failure is compounded by evidence that this miscarriage of justice could – and should – have been prevented, or at least corrected quickly, if those involved in the system had carried out their duties in a professional and/or competent manner. That they did not is due, in part at least, to the fact that Donald Marshall, Jr. is a Native. (p.1)

We are also the province of the Black Learners Advisory Committee Report on Education: Redressing Inequity – Empowering Black Learners (1994). This report was produced as part of a comprehensive study of the education inequities that exist for African Nova Scotians (ANS). It produced 3 volumes of materials and 30 recommendations for education reform. That systemic racism exists in the Nova Scotia education system was well described by this report:

Black Nova Scotians, like other Black Canadians, are victimized by a racist ideology and a racist social structure. Racism permeates the entire social, economic, political and cultural environment of Nova Scotian and Canadian….

During the BLAC research, we encountered widespread condemnation of the education system as biased, insensitive and racist. Systemic racism was seen as manifested in student assessment and placement; in labelling of large numbers of Black students as slow learners or having behaviour problems; in steraming (sic); in low teacher expectation; in denigration by and exclusion of Blacks from the curriculum; and in the total lack of responsiveness to the needs of Black learners and concerns of the Black community.” (pp. 34, 35)

Similarly, the differential and disadvantageous experience of African Canadians in the federal corrections system has been documented by the Office of the Correctional Investigator in it year end report in 2013. Nova Scotia’s review of the Mental Health and Addictions system produced the Together We Can Strategy (2012) found that African Nova Scotians were among a number of diverse communities whose mental health and addictions treatment needs had not yet been served sufficiently. This Nova Scotian finding was identified earlier in a national study completed by a subcommittee of the Mental Health Commission of Canada. The document they produced: Improving Mental Health Services for Immigrant, Refugee, Ethno-Cultural and Racialized Groups: Issues and Options for Service Improvement (2009). It is interesting to note, that I served on the MHCC subcommittee and was a contributor to that report. Ms. Lana MacLean, my colleague and friend who is also a person who conducts IRCAs served on the committee that produced the Nova Scotia review document.

Knowing all of this, an IRCA then seeks to understand how an individual’s ANS heritage and interaction with formal and informal systems has affected their involvement in criminal behaviour, will be a factor in their treatment while incarcerated, and will be a factor in their rehabilitation and reintegration in the community. These issues are consistent with the expectations of the report described in Judge Curran’s order requesting: “preparation of a cultural assessment report regarding his African Nova Scotian background and any cultural factors and racial factors which are suggested to be systemic in nature, but may also have individual impacts on him,” Examination of “the role played by Derek Demitrius Faulkner’s cultural and racial background with respect to the criminal offence herein.”

Preparation of this Report
In preparing this report I have participated in the following activities:
• Interview in person of Mr. Faulkner at Northeast Nova Scotia Correctional Facility
• Review of JEIN report, Crown Brief and other Disclosure material
• Interview by phone of Mr. Michael Dull, counsel for Mr. Faulkner in the civil matter
• I attempted contact with other collaterals but were not able to reach them in time for the drafting of this report. I will continue to reach out to collaterals in the event that I am called to testify on this report.

According to the cultural report, Nova Scotians engage in system racism. This is the case of R. v. Faulkner, 2019 NSPC 36 (CanLII).

It had nothing to do with any of the AGGRAVATING FACTORS that were cited in Paragraph 5 of the sentencing report

II AGGRAVATING FACTORS
(1) Robbery is inherently violent and there were implied threats of violence to clerk #1 and specific to #2
(2) Lengthy record including two robberies, 2005/2009
(3) Accused released from custody; breached release
(4) Prolonged nature of the offence – accused was in store for over an hour
(5) Clerk asked member of public to call police

Nothing to do with committing a robbery and making threats.
Nothing to do with a robbery in 2005.
Nothing to do with a robbery in 2009.
Nothing to do with other criminal convictions.
Nothing to do with being in the store over an hour.
Nothing to do with breaching conditions of release.
The court needs to consider the “systemic racism” that blacks face.

Yeah, it’s all about those racist Nova Scotians. Turned him into a career criminal.

5. Section 15 Of Canadian Charter

Equality Rights
Marginal note:
Equality before and under law and equal protection and benefit of law
15. (1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.
Marginal note:
Affirmative action programs
(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.

Serious question: under the Canadian Charter, would this count as a law that ameliorates conditions of disadvantaged individuals? Guess we aren’t so equal after all.

6. Follow-up To Old Story

This topic was covered in a previous article in June last year. It was reported that this may become the law of the land. Admittedly I should have checked deeper into it at the time.

However, it seems that these cases have been going on for many years. The National Post just missed that detail. It just has not been codified into law — yet.

How exactly do we live in any sort of just society, when there are different rules and standards for people based on their skin colour? This completely flies in the face of equality under the law, which SHOULD apply to everyone.

7. 3 Levels Of Justice Now?

Under the Gladue ruling, judges are REQUIRED to take an Aboriginal person’s background into account when handing down sentencing. There is no discretion in the matter.

However, for blacks, judges MAY take race and circumstances into account, but this is not mandatory.

Everyone else, though, must take responsibility for their own actions. They don’t have the race card to play.

Bit Of History: Peter MacKay Shanks David Orchard In 2003 PC Leadership Race

(Peter Mackay pledges – in writing – no merger with Alliance if he wins)

(Peter MacKay sticking the knife in again?)

1. Important Links


CLICK HERE, for the Peter McKay/David Orchard alliance.
http://archive.is/DJ6M8
CLICK HERE, for CBC article on the broken deal.
http://archive.is/fAEgs
CLICK HERE, for ONSC denying Orchard’s application in full.
http://archive.is/niIKc
CLICK HERE, for an ONSC judge refusing costs for defamation.
http://archive.is/NgxG0
CLICK HERE, for Orchard’s ON Court of Appeal Factum.
http://archive.is/nsX0V/image
CLICK HERE, for ONCA dismissing appeal/cross appeal/motion.
http://archive.is/nBrOy
CLICK HERE, for Stevens v. CPC, Federal Court of Canada.
http://archive.is/iwCyI
CLICK HERE, for Stevens v. CPC, Federal Court of Appeal.
http://archive.is/6S6am

CLICK HERE, for a May 2019 article on replacing Scheer (before election).
http://archive.is/ZPFdF
CLICK HERE, for MacKay commenting on Scheer’s 2019 loss.
http://archive.is/SFvWr

2. Context For This Article


In 2003, the current Conservative Party of Canada did not exist. Instead, there was the Alliance Party, led by Stephen Harper, and the Progressive Conservative Party, undergoing a leadership race.

Two candidates in that race, David Orchard and Peter Mackay, struck a deal: Orchard would support MacKay’s leadership bid in return for a written pledge not to pursue a merger or deal with the Alliance. At that time, a merger had been seriously considered, as a way to form a united alternative to the Liberal Party. But MacKay promised — in writing — not to pursue this if he was supported for leader of the Progressive Conservative leadership.

The deal went ahead as planned (so it seemed), and MacKay became leader of the party. However, it appeared he had no intention of honouring his deal. Almost immediately, he pursued merger talks with the Alliance. The eventually merged, and the new party formed government from 2006 until 2015. MacKay’s deceptive and underhanded tactics had won in the long term.

Fast forward more than a decade from 2003, and another controversy. See section #9 for more on that.

3. Text Of McKay/Orchard Deal

May 31, 2003 Agreement between Peter MacKay and David Orchard
1) No merger, joint candidates w[ith] Alliance. Maintain 301.
2) Review of FTA/NAFTA – blue ribbon commission with D[avid] O[rchard] w[ith] choice of chair w[ith] P[eter] M[acKay’s] agreement. Rest of members to be jointly agreed upon.
3) Clean up of head office including change of national director in consultation (timing w[ithin] reasonable period in future, pre-election) and some of DO’s people working at head office.
4) Commitment to making environmental protection front and center incl[uding] sustainable agriculture, forestry, reducing pollution through rail.
[Signed by Peter MacKay and David Orchard]

Looks pretty straightforward.
No merger. Fix our party instead.

4. ON Court Challenge By Orchard, Others

Administrative law — Voluntary association — Political parties — Political parties registered under Canada Elections Act — Leaders of Progressive Conservative Party of Canada and Canadian Reform Conservative Alliance reaching agreement for merger of political parties — Common law principles regarding unregulated voluntary associations did not apply to political parties registered under Canada Elections Act — Canada Elections Act governing merger of registered political parties — Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c. 9.

On October 15, 2003, Peter MacKay, leader of the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada (“PC Party”), reached an agreement in principle with Steven [page278] Harper, leader of the Canadian Reform Conservative Alliance (“Alliance”), for the establishment of the “Conservative Party of Canada”. PC Party members who were opposed to the agreement applied to the court for several declarations. The premise of these declarations was that the PC Party could not be dissolved or merged with another political party except with the unanimous consent of all its members. The applicants also sought a permanent injunction to prevent anyone from dealing with the party’s assets.

[4] The applicants are PC Party members who are opposed to the merger of the party with the Alliance. They request that the court make a number of declarations, which are all premised on their view that the PC Party cannot be dissolved or merged with another political party, except with the unanimous consent of all of its members. They also seek a permanent injunction to prevent anyone from otherwise dealing with the party’s assets.

[5] I note that several items of the relief set out in the Notice of Application are not pursued before me. Paragraph 1(j) requested a declaration that Mr. MacKay is in breach of his written agreement, dated June 1, 2003, with Mr. Orchard, and sought consequential relief. The request for this relief was withdrawn on the consent of counsel prior to the date set for the hearing. Paragraph 1(e) sought a declaration that the procedures set by the Management Committee of the PC Party for the special meeting scheduled for December 6, 2003 are contrary to the Party’s Constitution and by-laws. Counsel for the applicants indicated they [page280] were not seeking such relief and informed the court the applicants were making no attack on the specific procedures adopted by the Party respecting the special meeting. Counsel also informed the court that the applicants were not requesting the court to deal with the relief sought in para. 1(g) which sought a declaration that the Constitution of the PC Party prohibited its leader from agreeing with the leader of another political party that the PC Party will not nominate candidates in every federal constituency in Canada.

[6] Traditionally, the courts have been reluctant to get involved in supervising the internal affairs of voluntary associations. However, courts do recognize that membership in a voluntary association can give individuals important social rights that are worthy of some protection. Members may request the courts to require that the organization carry out its affairs honestly, in good faith and in accordance with its governing rules.

[7] In this case we are dealing with a political party. The social interest of members in ensuring that the organization’s affairs are conducted in accordance with its governing Constitution is apparent. Citizens exercise important rights in participating in political activity through membership in political parties. However, the court must be careful not to intrude into the political realm. There were submissions and evidence in this case that I considered to be political rhetoric. I have disregarded all such evidence and submissions.

[13] I am satisfied that the situation is sufficiently developed to give rise to an actual dispute between the parties. Both sides have important interests at stake. The leadership of the PC Party has embarked on a path to merge the party. The applicants are opposed to the course of action being taken. Counsel for both sides indicated to the court that it would be of assistance to have a decision before the vote is taken tomorrow. Given their national significance, there is good reason to determine the questions raised by this actual dispute, and I am satisfied that the court’s decision will be of practical effect in resolving the dispute.

[14] I have concluded that this dispute does not fall within the ambit of the internal dispute resolution in Article 13 of the PC Party’s Constitution. I regard the internal process as intended to deal with questions about whether the ongoing affairs of the party are being conducted in compliance with its Constitution and by-laws. This dispute arises in extraordinary circumstances not contemplated by its Constitution, concerns its continued existence, and as will be seen, is in large measure about the proper interpretation and effect of a public statute. In deciding not to defer to the internal arbitration process, I paid no heed to the applicants’ arguments that that process was flawed by relationship and institutional bias. I regard the applicant’s apprehension of bias to be without merit.

[40] In expressing this view, I should not be taken to be declaring the law. In this proceeding I was asked to make declarations that the PC Party cannot merge, transfer its assets, or dissolve without the unanimous consent of every one of its individual members. I have decided, based on the view I take of the law, that it is not appropriate to make such declarations.

[41] A further comment must be made about para. 1(h) of the application. Paragraph 1(h) seeks “a declaration that the resolution [before the December 6 special meeting] does not constitute the resolution required pursuant to s. 400(2)(b) of the Canada Elections Act in order for the PC Party to merge with another registered party under the Act”. Whether the resolution being acted upon tomorrow, or any other resolution, satisfies the requirements of the Act must, in the first instance, be decided by the Chief Electoral Officer. I refuse the relief requested in para. 1(h) on that basis.

[42] The application is dismissed in its entirety. Counsel may make an appointment through my secretary to address costs.
Application dismissed.

In short the Court ruled that the matter should be decided internally. The parties have governing documents (such as constitutions) which set out terms for various issues, including mergers.

One way to look at this would be the “sort out your own business” line of reasoning prevailed. And while members of an organization should expect leaders to behave in a good faith manner, the Court apparently isn’t always the place to demand such a resolution.

While the Judge “could” have intervened, the decision was made not to.

See the next section for the Elections Act (400-403)

5. Canada Elections Act

[34] I set out the provisions in full, underlining the particular phrases that I find helpful in interpreting the provisions. I discuss some of the particular phrases below.

400(1) Two or more registered parties may, at any time other than during the period beginning 30 days before the issue of a writ for an election and ending on polling day, apply to the Chief Electoral Officer to become a single registered party resulting from their merger.
(2) An application to merge two or more registered parties must
(a) be certified by the leaders of the merging parties;
(b) be accompanied by a resolution from each of the merging parties approving the proposed merger; and
(c) contain the information required from a party to be registered, except for the information referred to in paragraph 366(2)(i).

401(1) The Chief Electoral Officer shall amend the registry of parties by replacing the names of the merging parties with the name of the merged party if
(a) the application for the merger was not made in the period referred to in subsection 400(1); and
(b) the Chief Electoral Officer is satisfied that
(i) the merged party is eligible for registration as a political party under this Act, and
(ii) the merging parties have discharged their obligations under this Act, including their obligations to report on their financial transactions and their election expenses and to maintain valid and up-to-date information concerning their registration.
(2) The Chief Electoral Officer shall notify the officers of the merging parties in writing whether the registry of parties is to be amended under subsection (1).
(3) If the Chief Electoral Officer amends the registry of parties, he or she shall cause to be published in the Canada Gazette a notice that the names of the merging parties have been replaced in the registry with the name of the merged party.

402(1) A merger of registered parties takes effect on the day on which the Chief Electoral Officer amends the registry of parties under subsection 401(1).
(2) On the merger of two or more registered parties,
(a) the merged party is the successor of each merging party;
(b) the merged party becomes a registered party;
(c) the assets of each merging party belong to the merged party;
(d) the merged party is responsible for the liabilities of each merging party; [page287]
(e) the merged party is responsible for the obligations of each merging party to report on its financial transactions and election expenses for any period before the merger took effect;

(f) the merged party replaces a merging party in any proceedings, whether civil, penal or administrative, by or against the merging party; and
(g) any decision of a judicial or quasi-judicial nature involving a merging party may be enforced by or against the merged party.

403. Within six months after a merger
(a) each of the merging parties shall provide the Chief Electoral Officer with the documents referred to in subsection 424(1) for
(i) the portion of its current fiscal period that ends on the day before the day on which the merger takes effect, and
(ii) any earlier fiscal period for which those documents have not been provided; and
(b) the merged party shall provide the Chief Electoral Officer with
(i) a statement, prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, of its assets and liabilities, including any surplus or deficit, at the date of the merger,
(ii) an auditor’s report, submitted to the chief agent of the merged party, as to whether the statement presents fairly and in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles the information on which it was based, and
(iii) a declaration in the prescribed form by the chief agent of the merged party concerning the statement.

These sections of the Canada Elections Act are cited in both the Provincial and Federal Court rulings. As such, we should know what they actually say. In short, they quite clearly allow for party mergers. Broken promises and backroom deals don’t actually appear anywhere in the text.

6. ON Court Of Appeal (Orchard et al.)

[17] As a preliminary matter, the respondent moves to quash the appeal as now being moot. It argues that there is no longer a live issue affecting the rights of the parties because the merger has happened and the Conservative Party has been registered by the Chief Electoral Officer in place of the PC Party and the Alliance Party.

[18] In my view, the motion must be dismissed. There remains the same real legal issue between the parties that existed before December 6, 2003, namely, whether the PC Party can be dissolved or merged with another political party without the unanimous consent of all of its members. The only difference is that if [page134] they are successful, the appellants must now seek a remedial order undoing what has happened rather than an order to prevent it from occurring. The respondent has not shown that this would be impossible. The underlying legal issues still have an effect on the rights of the parties and hence mootness does not apply.

[19] On the appeal itself, the appellants’ fundamental contention is that the common law requires the PC Party to obtain the unanimous consent of all of its members to merge with the Alliance Party. In making this argument they place significant reliance on Astgen.

[45] By the terms of the constitution this decision is final and binding. Having had the opportunity to participate in that process the appellants are bound to accept it as final and binding, subject to judicial review which they have not sought. This is a corollary to the obligation of an organization like a trade union to give notice of an arbitration to a member whose rights will be affected because the decision of the arbitration board is final and binding. See, for example, Hoogendoorn v. Greening Metal Products and Screening Equipment Co. (1967), 1967 CanLII 20 (SCC), [1968] S.C.R. 30, 65 D.L.R. (2d) 641. It is not open to the appellants to seek a determination by the court that the resolution is of no legal effect because the PC Party failed to comply with the procedures required by its constitution. In this circumstance, that is a matter for the Arbitration Committee.

[46] In summary, therefore, the appellants’ arguments on appeal must be rejected.

[47] The respondent has cross-appealed from the decision of the application judge to award no costs because of the public importance of the issues raised. We did not call on the appellants to respond to the cross-appeal. In our view, it was an entirely appropriate exercise of discretion by the judge of first instance.

[48] As to the costs of the proceedings in this court, success has been divided. The appellants failed on the appeal. The respondent failed to establish mootness and failed on the cross-appeal. Together with the public importance of the questions raised, this makes it appropriate to order that there be no costs in this court. [page141]

[49] I would therefore dismiss the motion to quash and the appeal and the cross-appeal. No costs in this court.

Among other things, the Court of Appeals states that relief should have come in the form of an application for judicial review challenging the Elections Commission.

Beyond that, the Appeals Panel sidesteps the underhanded nature of MacKay’s duplicity. Instead, they point out that the Canada Elections Act explicitly allows for mergers except in very limited cases. Unanimity from all participants is not required.

To sum up, there is nothing new to add here, so appeal dismissed.

7. Stevens v. CPC (Federal Court)


This was not the only case that was launched. There was an Application for Judicial Review started in Federal Court to contest the ruling that allowed the merger.

[76] The Applicant argued that the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal confirmed the opinion of the application judge that section 401(1)(b)(ii) of the Act vests the CEO not the Court, with the mandate of determining if the merger application met the statutory requirements. However, he also submits that the Court of Appeal recognized that section 400(2)(b) of the Act implicitly requires that a merger resolution be passed in accordance with the constitution of a merging party.

[77] Accordingly, the Applicant argues that this holding supports his contention that the CEO erred in law by rejecting the constitution of the PC Party as being relevant to his decision. The Applicant repeats and relies upon his earlier submissions that the constitution of that party specifically prohibits the merger application that was made.

[78] Further, the Applicant says that the judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal does not address the argument that the common law rights of voluntary associations include the right to be heard when such association is a political party that is at risk of dissolution.

ii) The Respondent

[79] The Respondent disagrees with the Applicant’s interpretation of the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision and argues that the Court rejected the arguments that the merger of the PC Party and the Alliance Party attracted application of the common law rule that the unanimous consent of each party member was required for the merger of those parties. Further, the Respondent submits that the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the Act did not require unanimous consent for such merger.

[80] In conclusion, the Respondent relies on the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal as supporting its view that the decision of the CEO to amend the registry of parties on December 7, 2003, was correct.

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[114] A waiting period of sixty days applies when a political party initially applies for registration. In my view, it is reasonable that a waiting period, albeit a reduced one, will also apply when two registered parties apply for merger.

[115] It follows, then, that in my opinion, the CEO erred by amending the registry of parties on the same day that the merger application was made and without waiting for thirty days, to ensure that no election writ would be issued, thereby activating the commencement of the prohibited period.

[116] As noted earlier, the Applicant seeks an order quashing the decision of the CEO and reinstating the PC Party on the registry of parties. Alternatively, the Applicant seeks an order setting aside the decision of December 7, 2003 and referring the matter back to the CEO.

[117] In my opinion, the remedies sought by the Applicant should not be granted. Pursuant to section 18.1(3) of the Federal Courts Act, supra, the Court has discretion in the matter of granting relief upon an application for judicial review. On occasion, relief has been denied and in this regard, I refer to Mobil Oil Canada Ltd. v. Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board, 1994 CanLII 114 (SCC), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 202.

[118] In the present case, I take judicial notice of the fact that no writ for an election was issued in the thirty days following December 7, 2003. In the result, the CEO’s action in immediately amending the registry of parties, although contrary to my interpretation of the Act, had no material effect. In the exercise of my discretion, I decline to grant the relief sought.

[119] The application for judicial review is dismissed. However, the Applicant has raised a valid point and is entitled to his assessed costs under Column III.

                                         <center>  ORDER</center>

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:
.
The application for judicial review is dismissed, the Applicant to have his assessed costs under Column III

Much the same as with the Ontario Courts. The Court declines to intervene, and rules the merger allowed under the Canada Elections Act.

8. Stevens v. CPC (Federal Court of Appeal)

[49]I therefore find that the only interpretation that would give a concrete meaning to the texts in question is the one that requires the Chief Electoral Officer to let 30 days expire once the merger application is received before accepting it. If this was not Parliament’s intention, it is free to correct our vision with a more specific legislative text.

Exercising discretionary power for judicial review
[50]Justice Heneghan refused to grant the relief sought despite the fact that the Chief Electoral Officer, by not waiting 30 days before making his decision, violated the Canada Elections Act. Taking judicial notice of the fact that no writ ordering an election was issued in the 30 days following the merger application, she found, at paragraph 118 of her reasons:
In the result, the CEO’s action in immediately amending the registry of parties, although contrary to my interpretation of the Act, had no material effect. In the exercise of my discretion, I decline to grant the relief sought.

[51]Justice Heneghan, in my opinion, judiciously exercised the discretion inherent to the power for judicial review. The existence of this discretion is based both on the text of subsection 18.1(3) [as enacted by S.C. 1990, c. 8, s. 5; 2002, c. 8, s. 27] of the Federal Courts Act [R.S.C., 1985, c. F-7 , s. 1 (as am. by S.C. 2002, c. 8, s. 14)] under which the “Federal Court may” [emphasis added] quash the decision of a federal board, commission or tribunal, and on the principles associated with traditional prerogative writs. In this regard, it would be appropriate to return to this long excerpt from Justice Hugessen’s reasons in Schaaf v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, 1984 CanLII 3622 (FCA), [1984] 2 F.C. 334 (C.A.), at pages 342-344, which summarize the basis of this discretion best, with the adaptations required by the new, more explicit formulation of section 18 [as am. by S.C. 1990, c. 8, s. 4; 2002, c. 8, s. 26]:

In my view, nothing in the words used makes them other than attributive of jurisdiction. They create the power in the Court to set aside decisions which offend in one of the stated ways but do not impose a duty to do so in every case.

More of the same. The Federal Court can use discretion and choose not to intervene.

9. Current CPC Leadership Antics

This is the follow-up to Section #2. Andrew Scheer becomes leader of the Conservative Party of Canada in May 2017, is a surprise (and contested) 13th ballot over Maxime Bernier. However, it soon becomes clear that many people did not want this, and Scheer is undermined within his own party.

Bernier leaves in August 2018 to start his own party, the bizarrely named “People’s Party of Canada”. He claims that the CPC is no longer conservative, and that he will form an alternative. He also starts adopting populist rhetoric, something he previously hadn’t shown. Interestingly, Bernier spends more time attacking Scheer than the Liberal Party, which is currently in government.

Curiously, the People’s Party is missing a lot:
(a) Bernier has never called a leadership campaign
(b) No policies have ever been voted on
(c) There is no party constitution
(d) There are no by-laws, or other governing documents
(e) There is no national council, or senior board
(f) The platform was recycled from Bernier’s 2016/17 leadership run

Critics claim it is a “temporary” party meant to keep the Conservatives from winning, and to get Scheer ejected. Strangely enough, Peter MacKay’s name gets floated as a possible successor should Scheer not become Prime Minister.

Ultimately, Justin Trudeau did win again, but this time a minority. Despite winning the popular vote and increasing the seat total, Scheer was pressured to resign from the CPC leadership.

Could MacKay be at it again? Is this another scheme to undermine the will of conservative party members and select the party’s leader? Was the PPC just a psy-op to get rid of Scheer and install another leader instead?

10. Politics Is Rotten To The Core


This current fiasco has relevance to the 2003 one for a simple reason: some of the same people are involved in both. Now, could Peter MacKay be up to his old tricks of deceit and backstabbing? Choosing who becomes leader?

Actually governing people always seems to take a backseat to the infighting, pettiness, and selfishness of the politicians involved. Public servants appear to be anything but.

Giving your word, even in writing, seems to mean little. Alliances will always give way to self interest.

Canada’s Bill C-14, Assisted Suicide

1. Important Links

(1) https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/medical-assistance-dying.html
(2) https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/14637/index.do
(3) https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1993/1993canlii75/1993canlii75.html
(4) https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/Const/page-15.html
(5) https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-46/page-53.html#h-119931
(6) http://www.parl.ca/DocumentViewer/en/42-1/bill/C-14/royal-assent#EH3

C-14 British Columbia Humanist Association
C-14 Christian Legal Fellowship
C-14 Communication Disabilities Access Canada
C-14 Dying with Dignity Canada Nova Scotia Chapter
C-14 Euthanasia Prevention Coalition
C-14 Justice For Children And Youth
C-14 Life Canada
C-14 Protection Of Conscience Project
C-14 Quebec Association for the Right to Die with Dignity
C-14 Saskatchewan Pro-Life Association Inc
C-14 St. Catharines Right To Life Association</a

2. Law Against Assisted Suicide

Suicide
Marginal note:
Counselling or aiding suicide
241 (1) Everyone is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 14 years who, whether suicide ensues or not,
(a) counsels a person to die by suicide or abets a person in dying by suicide; or
(b) aids a person to die by suicide.

Now there is more to be considered. See section 6.

3. Canadian Charter, Section 7

Guarantee of Rights and Freedoms
Marginal note:
Rights and freedoms in Canada
1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.

Life, liberty and security of person
7. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.

The 2015 decision ruled that the blanket ban violated the Section 7 Charter rights, and that there was no “saving” of it under Section 1.

4. SCC Orders Parliament To Fix Law

XIII. Conclusion
[147] The appeal is allowed. We would issue the following declaration, which is suspended for 12 months:
Section 241 (b) and s. 14 of the Criminal Code unjustifiably infringe s. 7 of the Charter and are of no force or effect to the extent that they prohibit physician-assisted death for a competent adult person who (1) clearly consents to the termination of life and (2) has a grievous and irremediable medical condition (including an illness, disease or disability) that causes enduring suffering that is intolerable to the individual in the circumstances of his or her condition.

The Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the prohibition against assisted suicide violated Section 7 of the Charter, which addresses security of the person.

The ruling is very long, and addressed the issue from a number of legal questions. It also addressed whether the Lower Courts should be bound by a 1993 ruling on much the same issues. It’s too lengthy to go through in an article, but is worth a read.

5. Bill C-14, Assisted Dying

SUMMARY
.
This enactment amends the Criminal Code to, among other things,
(a) create exemptions from the offences of culpable homicide, of aiding suicide and of administering a noxious thing, in order to permit medical practitioners and nurse practitioners to provide medical assistance in dying and to permit pharmacists and other persons to assist in the process;
(b) specify the eligibility criteria and the safeguards that must be respected before medical assistance in dying may be provided to a person;
(c) require that medical practitioners and nurse practitioners who receive requests for, and pharmacists who dispense substances in connection with the provision of, medical assist­ance in dying provide information for the purpose of permitting the monitoring of medical assistance in dying, and authorize the Minister of Health to make regulations respecting that information; and
(d) create new offences for failing to comply with the safeguards, for forging or destroying documents related to medical assistance in dying, for failing to provide the required information and for contravening the regulations.

Following the Supreme Court ruling, the Federal Government was ordered to remedy the situation. Bill C-14 was introduced in 2016 to set out the guidelines for medically assisted death.

6. Medical Assistance Exemption

Eligibility for medical assistance in dying
241.2 (1) A person may receive medical assistance in dying only if they meet all of the following criteria:
(a) they are eligible — or, but for any applicable minimum period of residence or waiting period, would be eligible — for health services funded by a government in Canada;
(b) they are at least 18 years of age and capable of making decisions with respect to their health;
(c) they have a grievous and irremediable medical condition;
(d) they have made a voluntary request for medical assistance in dying that, in particular, was not made as a result of external pressure; and
(e) they give informed consent to receive medical assistance in dying after having been informed of the means that are available to relieve their suffering, including palliative care.

Grievous and irremediable medical condition
(2) A person has a grievous and irremediable medical condition only if they meet all of the following criteria:
(a) they have a serious and incurable illness, disease or disability;
(b) they are in an advanced state of irreversible decline in capability;
(c) that illness, disease or disability or that state of decline causes them enduring physical or psychological suffering that is intolerable to them and that cannot be relieved under conditions that they consider acceptable; and
(d) their natural death has become reasonably foreseeable, taking into account all of their medical circumstances, without a prognosis necessarily having been made as to the specific length of time that they have remaining.

To be fair, there are considerable safeguards written into the law to ensure that the person suffering is actually the one making the decision, and that it is voluntary and informed.

7. Where Does It Go From Here?

Currently, the law applies only to adults. But what happens when children decide that they want to make decisions over their own “health care”? Will minors be allowed to get it themselves? This is currently being considered.

The law allows for assisted suicide in the case of serious conditions which cause pain and is irreversible, and to get worse. How much will that get watered down over time? Perhaps this is just a foot-in-the-door technique to be able to end lives over more minor things.

What will happen to medical staff who refuse to participate in this? Will they become subject to sanctions for discrimination, or failing to fulfill a duty?

In fairness to Trudeau (it feels weird defending him), introducing this, or similar legislation, was forced by the 2015 Supreme Court ruling. Some bill had to be introduced at some point, so he doesn’t own this one.

Personally, this is conflicting. People should have control over their own lives, yes, but trending down a slope where lives are valued less and less is very troubling. How we treat and care for people reflects the society we live in, and this is the wrong direction to head in.

Race & Crime Rates: What Liberals Won’t Admit (Gladue 2.0?)

1. Important Links

CLICK HERE, for the case R. v. Morris, [2018] O.J. No. 4631.
CLICK HERE, for the Canadian Criminal Code, robbery section.
CLICK HERE, for the Canadian Criminal Code, firearms section.
CLICK HERE, for a National Post article covering a case where an Ontario criminal court judge wants to expand “Gladue” to include blacks.
CLICK HERE, for a similar article.
CLICK HERE, for a University of Toronto research paper on race, crime and incarceration.

CLICK HERE, for FBI Uniform Crime Reporting, Table 21
CLICK HERE, for UK demographic crime data.

Background From Gladue
R. v. Gladue, 1997 CanLII 3015 (BC CA)
R. v. Gladue, [1999] 1 SCR 688, 1999 CanLII 679 (SCC)
R. v. Ipeelee, [2012] 1 SCR 433, 2012 SCC 13 (CanLII)

CLICK HERE, for race-based discounts in criminal court.
CLICK HERE, for child-killer Terri McClintic going to a “healing lodge”.
CLICK HERE, for incarceration rates among Aboriginals.

2. Quotes From Ruling

In a way this is not surprising at all. The 1997/1999 Gladue rulings created essentially a “discount” for Aboriginal offenders specifically on the basis of “historical oppression”.

Now, there is a case that is pending before the Ontario Court of Appeals, which could see the same provisions apply to blacks as well. This is a (potential) expansion of a horrible idea: race-based-discounts in the criminal justice system.

People should be outraged by this. Your crime, seriousness, and past (if any) criminal record should impact your sentence. Not your race, ethnicity, or skin colour. It is the anti-thesis of equality under the law.

[2] A jury found you guilty of a number of offences. I convicted you of possession of an unauthorized firearm, possession of a prohibited firearm with ammunition, and carrying a concealed weapon. The jury acquitted you of assaulting a peace officer with intent to resist arrest.
[3] The basic facts of your crime are straightforward. On December 13, 2014, the police received a call about a home invasion in Scarborough. As the police officers sent to investigate drove to the scene, they came upon four Black males walking in the parking lot. The officers were in plainclothes and drove unmarked police cars. One officer stopped the young men. You were one of them. You ran. As you ran, D.C. Moorcroft, who was not the officer who stopped you but was also driving into the lot, accelerated to stop you.

Police were responding to a home invasion. When they arrived, there just happened to be 4 black men in the area, and the defendant took off.

Of course, it is just a coincidence that he had a gun on him. Now it is apparently a charter violation that a police car was used to stop him.

[6] I must now sentence you for your offences. Let me go over what the Crown and your defence lawyers said should be the sentence. These positions were pretty far apart. The Crown asked for 4 to 4.5 years in jail. Your lawyers argued that the sentence should be 1 year before credit was given for the Charter breaches.

There is something here we are not being told. The Crown (supposedly) wants 4 to 4.5 years for gun possession for a first time offender? What else went on that is not included?

[9] Let me briefly explain to you what I did in Jackson. I began my judgment in that case by saying sentencing is a very individual process. The criminal law has recognized that there are cases where, in order to determine a fit and proportionate sentence, consideration must be given to an individual’s systemic and social circumstances. These circumstances may extend beyond a person who is being sentenced to include factors such a systemic discrimination and historical injustice. This has been recognized by the criminal courts, particularly in the case of Indigenous offenders. While the distinct history of colonial violence endured by Indigenous peoples cannot simply be analogized to Black Canadians, I found that the ability to consider social context in a sentencing decision is extended to all under section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code. This allowed me to consider the unique social history of Black Canadians in sentencing Mr. Jackson. Mr. Jackson was a Black male offender not too much older than you, who pleaded guilty to a charge of possession of a prohibited gun. His lawyers presented a great deal of evidence to me on systemic anti-Black racism and its role in Mr. Jackson’s life. I took note of this evidence. I also took judicial notice, independently of these materials, of the history of colonialism, slavery, policies and practices of segregation, intergenerational trauma, and both overt and systemic racism that continue to affect Black Canadians today. With an understanding of these social factors I was able to better appreciate the circumstances that led Mr. Jackson to come before me. I sentenced him accordingly.

Gladue was horrible for exactly this reason. Instead of holding people accountable to as similar a standard as possible, some get to play the “oppression card” and get much lighter sentences. It stands the idea of equality before the law completely on its head.

The ruling would then go on to quote some social worker at length about the struggles that blacks face, and how its circumstances must be considered.

[66] Giving your acts a contextual analysis in light of the wealth of evidence provided to me on this sentencing, I do not find this to be a weighty aggravating factor in your case. I appreciate that accused people should not flee from police. Especially carrying a loaded firearm. But it is understandable to me that you ran. It was not a coldly calculated act to escape but one based upon emotion and a state of mind that has been shaped both generally and specifically by the historical racism suffered by Blacks and by you. In other words, not every flight from the police should be treated the same. Here there is a connection in the evidence between your act of flight and the systemic factors. I find it would be wrong to punish you more severely for this. When I view how anti-Black racism and historical injustices have contributed to your actions, the needs of general deterrence and denunciation normally raised by this act of flight is tempered. Given that the choice you made to do so was affected by these factors, the moral blameworthiness of your actions is also lessened.
[67] In addition, in assessing the seriousness of the offences, when I look at potential aggravating factors that often exist in the case law, here, there is no evidence that your possession of the gun is connected with other crimes such as crimes of violence or drug trafficking.
[68] There are also some very traditional mitigating factors. You are a first offender. You were young when you committed these crimes. You were 22 years old. You have supportive family and friends. There is a side of you that speaks well to your rehabilitation. I have mentioned them before. Your warmth, kindness, and respectfulness.

Being a young, first time offender is a legitimate reason to cut someone a break. No argument on that point.

But that is where the agreement ends. All this nonsense about historical racism and systemic factors (repeated throughout the ruling), was nauseating to read.

[81] Sentencing must always be an individual process. In these cases judges gave sentences of 1 year, 15 months, 18 months, just under 2 years. Some of these sentences were permitted to be served in the community rather than in jail. The cases are: R. v. Ishmael, 2014 ONCJ 136; R. v. Garton, 2018 ONSC 544; R. v. Rutledge, 2015 ONSC 6625; R. v. Shunmuganathan, 2016 ONCJ 519;
R. v. Nuttley, 2013 ONCJ 727;
R. v. Kelsy, [2008] O.J. No. 3879;
R. v. Cadienhead, [2015] O.J. No. 3125;
R. v. Williams, [2011] O.J. No. 3352 (S.C.J.);
R. v. Brown, [2006] O.J. No. 4681 (S.C.J.);
R. v. Carranza, [2004] O.J. No. 6041 (S.C.J.)

Fair enough. The Judge was looking for a little consistency.

[82]82 Now I want to talk about that elephant in the room. I know you are in custody on other charges. What those charges are were not explained to me by either the Crown or your lawyers. However, I do know from some of the materials filed what the charges are said to be. Of course, there is a charge of breaching your bail. There are also some other offences. But they are not gun offences. Your surety surrendered your bail so you are in custody on the charges I am sentencing you for. To someone hearing this, I am sure they will say you have not behaved well while on bail. They may be right. But you are presumed innocent of these alleged new offences. I am sentencing you as a first offender. Someone without a criminal record. The new charges do not change that. The presumption of innocence is the foundation of our criminal justice system. While it may be hard for many to understand, I cannot let that foundation be eroded or chipped away by taking into account the new charges.

So, “first-timer” comes with a few caveats: Morris breached his bail, and is facing additional charges. However, the Judge has decided to ignore this in sentencing him as a first-timer.

It would be nice to know how exactly bail was breached, and what exactly the other charges are. But they are not mentioned.

[92] I also find that the anti-Black racism evidence presented on the sentencing is relevant in assessing the weight I should give this. Racism can operate very subtly. It can be there lurking in the background of people’s minds, unconsciously influencing their judgment and making them act in certain ways towards certain people.
[93] I want to be clear that I am not painting the police with the brush of overt racism in this case. I do not have the evidence to support that. But I am troubled. If I asked myself: If it was someone other than a young Black man running away from the police that night, would D.C. Moorcroft have driven in the aggressive way that he did? Would Mr. Morris and the car have collided? I am troubled because in all honesty, I cannot conclude it would have happened in the same way.

So, racism happens, but I have no evidence that there was any in this case. Therefore, I will still bring it up as a mitigating factor.

This Judge talks in circles about how there is all this systemic racism, and how it can be very subtle. Yet he notes that there is no proof that there was racism in this case. So what is the point then?

E. CONCLUSION
[97] After mitigation for the Charter violations, I have sentenced you to a jail sentence of 12 months. You have done a lot of dead time. The sentence will be based upon the credit you will receive for that dead time. I will credit you 1.5 to 1 for that pre-trial custody. The evidence shows that you received no real programming, had a difficult time in jail, and at times experienced physical discomfort in jail due to your medical conditions. You also did not receive consideration for parole or remission while in pre-trial custody. I find it right to give this enhanced credit. Therefore, 243 days of pre-trial custody will be used up. You will be sentenced to a further 1 day in jail on each charge concurrently. I also made a DNA order, s. 109 weapons prohibition, and the forfeiture order.

So not even a year. Just 8 months.

3. University of Toronto Article On Race & Crime

Although not specific to this case, this article by Akwasi Owusu-Bempah is an interesting read. If nothing else, it shows the extent that this academic will go to avoid the obvious conclusion:

SOME GROUPS JUST COMMIT MORE CRIME

Yes, that’s it. Groups are not equal when it comes to committing crime. That is the hard truth that lawyers, judges, politicians, academics and social workers refuse to address.

On the topic of “disparity”, it’s worth noting that males make up over 90% of prison inmates. However, there is no push claiming discrimination against them. Oh, the double standards.

Instead, he will talk in circles. Owusu-Bempah will blame mistrust, victimization in black and Aboriginal neighbourhoods, racial bias (without proving it), and Court discrimination (again, without proving it). Although the author touches the topic of crime rates, he avoids making any definitive statements. It’s like he is deliberately avoiding the obvious answer.

Abstract and Keywords
Canada effectively bans systematic collection and dissemination of racially disaggregated criminal justice statistics. A significant proportion of Canada’s racial minority populations perceive bias in the criminal justice system, especially on the part of police. Aboriginal and black Canadians are grossly overrepresented in Canada’s correctional institutions. Some evidence suggests that both Aboriginal and black populations are overrepresented with respect to violent offending and victimization. Social conditions in which Aboriginal and black Canadians live are at least partially to blame for their possibly elevated rates of violent offending. Evidence indicates that racial bias exists in the administration of Canadian criminal justice. At times, this discrimination has been supported by court decisions. Discrimination and disparity are at times acknowledged by government, but they are seldom wholeheartedly addressed. There is a lack of political will to address issues of racial minority overrepresentation in relation to manifestations of racial discrimination or to the societal conditions that lead to criminal offending.

Oh, the mental gymnastics of the author are blatant:

  • Minorities “perceive” bias against them
  • There is overrepresentation
  • Bias in administration
  • Government acknowledges disparity
  • No political will to address overrepresentation
  • Societal conditions lead to offending

However:

  • The author mentions overrepresentation regarding offending, but immediately lumps it in with “victimization”, as if to muddy the waters
  • Lack of available objective data, yet we are able to make conclusions based on much more subjective things, such as perceived bias
  • Right, not elevated rates, but “possibly” elevated rates

Connections among race, crime, and criminal justice are often portrayed in Canadian media images and are captured in the popular imagination. Yet, in comparison to the United States and Great Britain, these phenomena receive relatively little attention from Canadian academics and policy makers. A lack of readily available criminal justice data disaggregated by race makes it particularly difficult for researchers to examine the nature of these racial differences. Thus, we are unable to determine the extent to which higher rates of offending among certain racial groups and discrimination in the administration of criminal justice contribute to the apparent overrepresentation

There’s a lack of data, but this author will still make claims about bias and discrimination, without actually proving it. He will also tap-dance around the obvious: If a group commits crime at a much higher rate, doesn’t that justify higher incarceration rates?

Nonetheless, available evidence indicates that a significant proportion of Canada’s racial minority populations and a sizable proportion of the white population perceive bias in the criminal justice system. These public perceptions are supported by data that show that certain racial minority groups, particularly Aboriginal and black Canadians, are grossly overrepresented in Canada’s correctional institutions. Further evidence indicates that racial bias does exist in the administration of Canadian criminal justice, and, at times, this discrimination has been supported by court decisions. We cannot discount, however, the probability that increased rates of offending among certain racialized groups contributes to their overrepresentation in correctional statistics. As we show in this essay, research suggests that Aboriginal and black Canadians are overrepresented with respect to violent offending and victimization. The Canadian federal government itself has pointed out that the social conditions in which Aboriginals live is at least partially to blame for their rates of violent offending (Department of Justice 2009). We have previously made the same connection with respect to black Canadians (Wortley and Owusu-Bempah2011a).

Owusu-Bempah contradicts himself here. He claims there is “perceived” bias from many people. Not “actual” bias, but perceived bias. He then goes on to say that there is overrepresentation among certain groups.

He then offers a perfectly reasonable explanation for the higher incarceration rate: increased offending.

Just a thought. If a certain group commits crime at a higher rate, then it is not bias or discrimination that there would be more of them involved with the courts.

Unfortunately, there is an apparent lack of political will to address issues of racial minority overrepresentation in the Canadian criminal justice system. Ambivalence to address these issues relates both to the manifestations of racial discrimination in the system, as well as to the societal conditions that lead to criminal offending. Discrimination and disparity may be at times acknowledged, but they are seldom wholeheartedly addressed. When addressed, the means are seldom thoroughly evaluated for effectiveness, and, when evaluated, the results are rarely made public.

Difficult to believe, but this is just the next paragraph. Owusu-Bempah claims there is no political will to address racial minority overrepresentation. Yet, he previously commented that there was a higher rate of offending.

This seems like a solution in search of a problem.

Many have argued that relatively high rates of homicide and gun crime among African Canadians and Aboriginals in Canada are reflective of their overrepresentation in street gangs. Unfortunately, official police statistics on Canadian gangs are almost nonexistent

Yeah, good job.

Canada’s reluctance to acknowledge and document race is most evident in the operation of its criminal justice system and in its criminal justice policies. Unlike in the United States and the United Kingdom, where race-based criminal justice statistics are readily available to the public and researchers alike, the Canadian criminal justice system does not systematically collect or publish statistics on the race of individuals processed through the system. The debate over the collection of racial data from the criminal justice sector in Canada can be traced back as far as 1929 (Roberts 1992). Discussions about the collection, or more accurately, the public release of these data have emerged more recently in the context of broader debates about race, crime, and the administration of criminal justice—particularly related to the circumstances of Aboriginal and black Canadians (Hatt 1994; Johnston 1994; Gabor 1994; Roberts 1994; Wortley 1999; Owusu-Bempah and Millar 2010). On the one hand, allegations of racial discrimination have been leveled against the justice system to explain the overrepresentation of certain racial minority groups in the few available sources of police and correctional data. On the other hand, it has been suggested that racial minorities are disproportionately involved in criminal activity, which accounts for their disproportionate involvement with the criminal justice system as reflected in the data. Unfortunately, our ability to test either of these claims is limited by the absence of available data, despite numerous calls for its collection. Several major attempts have been made in Canada to collect racial and ethnic data, particularly in the policing sector (Fine 1990; Wortley and Marshall 2005; Leclair InfoCom 2009); these attempts, however, have not paved the way for systematic data collection

The author addresses crime rates, but gives a wishy washy answer. There’s not enough data to tell one way or another whether it is: (a) discrimination; or (b) actual crime, that results in the disparities. Yet, feelings about perceived bias and virtue signalling bureaucrats apologizing are apparently good evidence.

There is an interesting point to be taken from this: if there was concrete data on race and crime rates, then the debate could be put to bed once and for all.

The article keeps repeating the same idea and muddying the waters: we don’t have data, so we can’t be sure what causes discrepancies in the representation.

If the author wanted a reference point, why not check the data from the US and UK? After all, he knows it is there.

4. Crime Data From Britain

CLICK HERE, for UK demographic crime data.

There were 698,737 arrests in 2017/18, a fall of 8% on the previous year – both years’ figures exclude Lancashire Police (see ‘Things you need to know’)
-Black people were over 3 times as likely to be arrested as White people – there were 35 arrests for every 1,000 —Black people, and 11 arrests for every 1,000 White people
-overall, men were over 5 times as likely to be arrested as women – there were 22 arrests for every 1,000 men, and -4 arrests for every 1,000 women
-Black women were more than twice as likely to be arrested as White women – there were 7 arrests for every 1,000 —Black women, and 3 arrests for every 1,000 White women

And a few pages later,

there were 698,737 arrests in England and Wales in 2017/18 (excluding the Lancashire police force area), at a rate of 13 arrests per 1,000 people
there were 62,501 fewer arrests in 2017/18 compared with the previous year, a fall of 8% (excluding Lancashire Police from both years)
Black people were over 3 times as likely to be arrested as White people – there were 35 arrests for every 1,000 Black people, and 11 arrests for every 1,000 White people
people with Mixed ethnicity were over twice as likely to be arrested as White people – there were 25 arrests for every 1,000 people with Mixed ethnicity, and 11 arrests for every 1,000 White people

So the UK Government is willing to be quite open and blunt about the disparities in race and offending. And what about the US.

5. Crime Data From US FBI

CLICK HERE, for FBI Uniform Crime Reporting, Table 21. This is compiled from 2016, though the stats over the years don’t change much.

Looking at Table 21C (people aged 18 or over)
Worth noting the US black population is about 13% commits:

  • 52% of homicides
  • 28% of rapes
  • 51% of robberies
  • 32% of aggravated assault
  • 36% of violent crime
  • 41% of weapons carrying
  • 30% buying stolen property

…. and so on.

Are blacks greatly overrepresented in US prisons? Absolutely. And for a very good reason — disproportionate amount of violent and serious crime.

Are US sentences in general too harsh? A fair point, but a topic for another day. This post concerns treating people equally.

6. Gladue 2.0 Addresses Wrong Problem

With this proposed change, the scope of Gladue will be broadened. This means that it will not be restricted to Aboriginals.

The claim is that this will reduce overrepresentation in the courts and prison system. Problem is: it focuses on making prisons look like a random sample of society, rather than a reflection of who is actually committing the most serious crime.

It’s what liberals do not want to acknowledge:

SOME GROUPS JUST COMMIT MORE CRIME

It is not necessarily due to “oppression” or “systemic bias”, or any other such nonsense. It is caused by these groups, on average, behaving differently. While it is obviously desirable for society to reduce crime and their prison populations, this is a backwards approach.

Should the Ontario Court of Appeals (and possibly the Supreme Court of Canada) confirm this nonsense, racial equality dies. Your skin colour will determine your punishment, not your crime. Though arguably that was the case with Gladue.

Keep in mind, it is the Supreme Court of Canada that upheld Gladue in the first place (appealed from BC). There is nothing to indicated they wouldn’t extend their ruling to this.

Abolish Gladue, Fix Underlying Problems

1. Previous Solutions Offered

A response that frequently comes up is for people to ask what to do about it. Instead of just constantly pointing out what is wrong, some constructive suggestions should be offered. This section contains a list of proposals that, if implemented, would benefit society. While the details may be difficult to implement, at least they are a starting point.

2. Important Links

CLICK HERE, for race- based discounts in sentencing.
CLICK HERE, for Terri McClintic, child killer, in a healing lodge.
CLICK HERE, for 2016/2017 StatsCan data on incarceration rates.
CLICK HERE, for Table 5, incarceration by race and gender.
CLICK HERE, for Table 6.
CLICK HERE, for archived findings form Correctional Service of Canada form 1999.
CLICK HERE, for a Larry Elder video on single parent households.
CLICK HERE, for a documentary on drug use on reserves.
CLICK HERE, for a video on lack of drinking water on reserves.

CLICK HERE, for Gladue, 1997.
CLICK HERE, for Gladue, 1999.
CLICK HERE, for Ipeelee, 2012.
CLICK HERE, for R.v. Proulx (conditional sentencing guidelines).

3. Disproportionate Incarceration Rates

This is a proposal to scrap so-called “Gladue Rights” which specifically are designed to give Aboriginal offenders special consideration when it comes to sentencing in the criminal justice system.

Please don’t interpret this as an indication not to give anyone a break if the circumstances permit. Rather, rights and options should be available to everyone. They should not be given to one specific group, or denied to one specific group.

Disclaimer: I am not a criminologist, or a sociologist. Just a researcher.

Now, how great are the discrepancies?

From the StatsCan 2016/2017 findings:

The Criminal Code mandates that all sanctions other than imprisonment are to be considered with particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders. In 2016/2017, Aboriginal adults accounted for 28% of admissions to provincial/territorial correctional services and 27% for federal correctional services, while representing 4.1% of the Canadian adult population (Table 5). In comparison to 2006/2007, the proportion of admissions of Aboriginal peoples to correctional services was 21% for provincial and territorial correctional services and 19% for federal correctional services.

Aboriginal adults accounted for 30% of admissions to custody and 25% of admissions to community supervision among the provinces and territories in 2016/2017. Aboriginal adults accounted for 27% of admissions to custody and 26% of admissions to community supervision in federal correctional services (Table 5).

The proportion of Aboriginal admissions to adult custody has been trending upwards for over 10 years. It has increased steadily from 2006/2007 when it was 21% for provincial and territorial correctional services and 20% for federal correctional services.

Among the provinces, Aboriginal adults made up the greatest proportion of admissions to custody in Manitoba (74%) and Saskatchewan (76%). These two provinces also have the highest proportion of Aboriginal adults among their provincial populations at 15% for Manitoba, and 14% for Saskatchewan.

Aboriginal males accounted for 28% of admissions to custody in the province and territories, whereas non-Aboriginal males accounted for 72%, in 2016/2017. Aboriginal females made up a greater proportion of custody admissions than their male counterparts, accounting for 43% of admissions, while non-Aboriginal females accounted for 57% (Table 6).

Here is the data in a more visual form.

Category Abor. Total Pop’n Abor. Group Pop’n Non-Abor. Total Pop’n Non-Abor. Group Pop’n Ratio
Incar 4.1% 28% 95.9% 72% 9.1:1

Note: Here is how to calculate the rates. Assume there is a population of 100,000 people, and 1,000 of them are locked up and then break in down as percentages of the population.

category totals Non-Abor Abor
People 100,000 95,900 4,100
Locked Up 1,000 720 280
Rates Percentage 0.0075 0.068

Now that we can make an apples-to-apples comparison, 0.068/0.0075 =~9.1
So on a per-capita basis, Aboriginals are about 9 times as likely as non-Aboriginals to be locked up

Next, covering Aboriginal women and incarceration rate. For this. Assume that the overall percentages are about same: 95.9% non-Aboriginal, and 4.1% Aboriginal. Here instead of making up 28% overall in Provincial jails, it is 57%, approximately double.

Category Abor. Total Pop’n Abor. Group Pop’n Non-Abor. Total Pop’n Non-Abor. Group Pop’n Ratio
Incar 4.1% 57% 95.9% 43% 30.88:1

And once more we need to convert to rates of respective populations.

category totals Non-Abor Abor
People 100,000 95,900 4,100
Locked Up 1,000 430 570
Rates Percentage 0.0045 0.1390

When women inmates are looked at specifically, the ratio goes to 0.1390/0.0045 ~= 30.88

That’s right, looking at women, there are (per capita) 30 times as many Aboriginal women locked up as non-Aboriginal women.

4. Evidence Of Discrimination Or Bias?

By itself, no. Having groups with different rates of something is not evidence that there has been discrimination. Either these differences are caused by something that justifies it (such as higher crime rate), or there may be some external factor. Let’s start with the Criminal Code.

718.2(e) all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders.

It is written right into the Canadian Criminal Code, to give offenders (where reasonable), an alternative to custody, with special consideration to Aboriginals. And this is codified in 3 cases.
R. v. Gladue, 1997 CanLII 3015 (BC CA)
R. v. Gladue, [1999] 1 SCR 688, 1999 CanLII 679 (SCC)
R. v. Ipeelee, [2012] 1 SCR 433, 2012 SCC 13 (CanLII)

Looking at the Criminal Code, and recent decisions, there doesn’t seem to be any legalized discrimination. So let’s look elsewhere.

5. R. v. Proulx (Conditional Sentencing Guidelines)

12 Since it came into force on September 3, 1996, the conditional sentence has generated considerable debate. With the advent of s. 742.1, Parliament has clearly mandated that certain offenders who used to go to prison should now serve their sentences in the community. Section 742.1 makes a conditional sentence available to a subclass of non-dangerous offenders who, prior to the introduction of this new regime, would have been sentenced to a term of incarceration of less than two years for offences with no minimum term of imprisonment.

13 In my view, to address meaningfully the complex interpretive issues raised by this appeal, it is important to situate this new sentencing tool in the broader context of the comprehensive sentencing reforms enacted by Parliament in Bill C-41. I will also consider the nature of the conditional sentence, contrasting it with probationary measures and incarceration. Next, I will address particular interpretive issues posed by s. 742.1. I will first discuss the statutory prerequisites to the imposition of a conditional sentence. Thereafter, I will consider how courts should determine whether a conditional sentence is appropriate, assuming the prerequisites are satisfied. I conclude with some general comments on the deference to which trial judges are entitled in matters of sentencing and dispose of the case at hand in conformity with the principles outlined in these reasons.

16 Bill C-41 is in large part a response to the problem of overincarceration in Canada. It was noted in Gladue, at para. 52, that Canada’s incarceration rate of approximately 130 inmates per 100,000 population places it second or third highest among industrialized democracies. In their reasons, Cory and Iacobucci JJ. reviewed numerous studies that uniformly concluded that incarceration is costly, frequently unduly harsh and “ineffective, not only in relation to its purported rehabilitative goals, but also in relation to its broader public goals” (para. 54). See also Report of the Canadian Committee on Corrections, Toward Unity: Criminal Justice and Corrections (1969); Canadian Sentencing Commission, Sentencing Reform: A Canadian Approach (1987), at pp. xxiii‑xxiv; Standing Committee on Justice and Solicitor General, Taking Responsibility (1988), at p. 75. Prison has been characterized by some as a finishing school for criminals and as ill-preparing them for reintegration into society: see generally Canadian Committee on Corrections, supra, at p. 314; Correctional Service of Canada, A Summary of Analysis of Some Major Inquiries on Corrections – 1938 to 1977 (1982), at p. iv. In Gladue, at para. 57, Cory and Iacobucci JJ. held:

Without rehashing the entire ruling, Proulx, which was based on Bill C-41, set the benchmark for giving out “conditional sentences”, aka “house arrest”. The ruling noted the destructive long term effect prison can have.

While conditional sentencing is completely inappropriate for certain offences, it can have its benefits.

In areas with high crime rates, poverty, or high drug use, a person has to reasonably ask what will be the best solution overall. Does the community benefit from locking up large amounts of its people?

One caveat, breaks in sentencing, and alternatives to prison should be equally available to all Canadians. One group shouldn’t receive a greater aid, or detriment.

See the next section for the CSC report on Aboriginal circumstances.

6. Information Worth Looking At

This comes from the 1998 Corrections Service of Canada Paper (linked above). It also has an impressive bibliography, worth at least a peek.

1.3 Aboriginal Population
Approximately, one-third of all Aboriginal children under the age of 15 in Census families lived in a lone-parent family, twice the rate within the general population. The rate was even higher in urban areas. About 46% of Aboriginal children under 15 in Census families who lived in a census metropolitan area were in a lone-parent family. One-quarter of the Aboriginal population reported that they had an Aboriginal language as mother tongue. Cree was the largest Aboriginal mother tongue. The number of people who could speak an Aboriginal language was about 10% higher than the number who reported an Aboriginal mother tongue, indicating that a significant number of persons learned such a language later in life. (Department of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 1998).

This mentions a very interesting issue. Conservative commentator Larry Elder frequently talks about this. Single parent households (mostly missing fathers), is a very good indicator of crime and education. And it cuts across race.

1.4 Demographic and Socio-Economic Data
Increasing evidence points to a strong correlation between socio-economic disadvantage and involvement with the criminal justice system. A large proportion of the Aboriginal population in Canada suffers socio-economic disadvantage in comparison to non-Aboriginal Canadians. The social and economic conditions outlined in the section below illustrates a correlation between these factors and Aboriginal involvement with the criminal justice system. Poverty, inadequate educational opportunities, unemployment, poor living conditions, alcohol abuse and domestic violence all contribute to Aboriginal people coming into conflict with the law. The challenges to which the criminal justice system must respond are rooted in addressing these disadvantaged conditions.

These problems are prevalent, in particularly on remote reserves. To be fair, it isn’t restricted to reserves. It is heartbreaking to hear the problems and 3rd world conditions.

1.8 Suicide
Suicide is approximately three times more common among Aboriginal people than non-Aboriginal people. It is also five to six times more prevalent among Aboriginal youth than non-Aboriginal youth. In First Nations communities, suicide is more prevalent among the young and usually results from feelings of hopelessness and despair.

Wow. Just wow.

2.4 Urban vs. Rural Aboriginal Offenders
A recent study (Johnston, 1997) of Aboriginal inmates incarcerated in Canadian federal penitentiaries found that one-quarter (24%) of the group had originally came from reserve or remote areas; 44% originally came from rural areas, and 30% from urban areas. The interviewers did not ask about where the offenders had been living at the time of the offence. In addition, the study also found that a majority of the group had left their home community after their youth. Eighteen percent had lived in their home community all their life apart from periods spent incarcerated. Furthermore, the study found that 66% of the Aboriginal inmates incarcerated in federal penitentiaries were considered high-need. Forty-seven per cent were rated as both high-need and high-risk. A majority were rated by case management officers and other penitentiary staff who knew them, as having needs in the following areas:
-substance abuse needs (88%),
-personal/emotional needs (82%),
-employment needs (63%), and
-education needs (54%).

A large proportion were also rated as having needs in relation to:
-pro-criminal attitudes (49%),
-marital and family issues (42%),
-community functioning (36%),
-criminal associates (33%), and
-sexual offending (31%).

This is shocking. Almost 9 in 10 with substance abuse, 4 in 5 with personal needs, 2/3 with employment needs, and half lacking in education.

Canada is supposed to be a 1st world country, but standard of living for those away from any urban area are falling far short of what should be acceptable.

7. So Why Abolish Gladue?

Quite simply, it is a band-aid solution that ignores the real problems. “Rigging” the rules to let Aboriginal offenders off easier (or let them out earlier) turns a blind eye to the problems cited in the previous section. Lack of drinking water being one in the news lately.

Are Aboriginals disproportionately represented in criminal courts and jails? Yes, absolutely. The data and evidence for that is overwhelming.

But it is also plain and obvious that there are many problems with the more remote areas that should not be happening. Setting up different sentencing guidelines does nothing to address any of that.

It could easily be argued that problems with poverty, remote living, drugs, alcohol and domestic violence contribute to crime. These are the causes and crime is the effect. But Gladue gets it entirely backwards. It impacts the EFFECT, hoping to impact the CAUSES.

Hopefully this doesn’t come off as heartless. However, I view the “Gladue Rights” idea as completely missing the point, and ignoring genuine concerns.

8. Actually, There Is Discrimination

Instead of our Prime Minister blowing our money on virtue signalling foreign adventures, perhaps fixing the problems within our borders is a better approach.

  • Safe drinking water
  • Education/Work opportunities
  • Access to social services
  • Seriously evaluate if reserve system is sustainable

We certainly have money to blow on every UN adventure.

While the criminal justice system itself isn’t set up to discriminate, our government does. Entire sections of Canada’s population is left to die while we show the outside world how generous we are.

Gladue is the quick-fix that covers up the real problem.

Committee for Monetary and Economic Reform (COMER) Case, Bank Of Canada

An update on this is coming soon.
It’s time to go through this again.

1. From COMER’s 2011 Press Release

The action also constitutionally challenges the government’s fallacious accounting methods in its tabling of the budget by not calculating nor revealing the true and total revenues of the nation before transferring back “tax credits” to corporations and other taxpayers.

The Plaintiffs state that since 1974 there has been a gradual but sure slide into the reality that the Bank of Canada and Canada’s monetary and financial policy are dictated by private foreign banks and financial interests contrary to the Bank of Canada Act.

The Plaintiffs state that the Bank of International Settlements (BIS), the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were all created with the cognizant intent of keeping poorer nations in their place which has now expanded to all nations in that these financial institutions largely succeed in over-riding governments and constitutional orders in countries such as Canada over which they exert financial control.

The Plaintiffs state that the meetings of the BIS and Financial Stability Board (FSB) (successor of FSF), their minutes, their discussions and deliberations are secret and not available nor accountable to Parliament, the executive, nor the Canadian public notwithstanding that the Bank of Canada policies directly emanate from these meetings. These organizations are essentially private, foreign entities controlling Canada’s banking system and socio-economic policies.

The gist of the press release, and of the Claim overall, is that Canada’s banking system has been hijacked and usurped. As such, it is controlled by foreign entities such as the Bank of International Settlements and the International Monetary Fund.

As was outlined in the last article, Canada’s banking “was” effectively turned over. The result is that Canada, instead of loaning money to itself, is now borrowing from private banks. As such, it is being bled dry.

In fact, COMER’s claims can be easily validated by online research. The question for the Court to decide: is this actually legal?

2. Ruling Striking Out Statement of Claim

[5] The core elements of COMER’s Claim can be reduced to three parts:
1. The Bank of Canada (Bank) and Crown refuse to provide interest-free loans for capital expenditures.
2. The Crown uses flawed accounting methods in describing public finances, which provides the rationale for refusing to grant such loans.
3. These and other harms are caused by the Bank being controlled by private foreign interests.

The Pronothary summarizing the main issues the Plaintiffs raise

Discussion
[41] Against these competing positions, it must be remembered that the test for striking an action is a high one. The action must be bereft of any chance of success and as noted above just because it is a novel cause of action it does not automatically fail.[26]

[42] The Supreme Court of Canada has recently summarized the principles to be applied on a motion to strike. In R. v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd.,[27] the Chief Justice, writing for the Court made the following observations regarding a motion to strike:

17. The parties agree on the test applicable on a motion to strike for not disclosing a reasonable cause of action under r. 19(24)(a) of the B.C. Supreme Court Rules. This Court has reiterated the test on many occasions. A claim will only be struck if it is plain and obvious, assuming the facts pleaded to be true, that the pleading discloses no reasonable cause of action: Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse, 2003 SCC 69 (CanLII), [2003] 3 S.C.R. 263, at para. 15; Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc., 1990 CanLII 90 (SCC), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 959, at p. 980. Another way of putting the test is that the claim has no reasonable prospect of [page 67] success. Where a reasonable prospect of success exists, the matter should be allowed to proceed to trial: see, generally, Syl Apps Secure Treatment Centre v. B.D., 2007 SCC 38 (CanLII), [2007] 3 S.C.R. 83; Odhavji Estate; Hunt; Attorney General of Canada v. Inuit Tapirisat of Canada, 1980 CanLII 21 (SCC), [1980] 2 S.C.R. 735.

. . .

21. Valuable as it is, the motion to strike is a tool that must be used with care. The law is not static and unchanging. Actions that yesterday were deemed hopeless may tomorrow succeed. Before Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562 (H.L.) introduced a general duty of care to one’s neighbour premised [page68] on foreseeability, few would have predicted that, absent a contractual relationship, a bottling company could be held liable for physical injury and emotional trauma resulting from a snail in a bottle of ginger beer. Before Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners, Ltd., [1963] 2 All E.R. 575 (H.L.), a tort action for negligent misstatement would have been regarded as incapable of success. The history of our law reveals that often new developments in the law first surface on motions to strike or similar preliminary motions, like the one at issue in Donoghue v. Stevenson. Therefore, on a motion to strike, it is not determinative that the law has not yet recognized the particular claim. The court must rather ask whether, assuming the facts pleaded are true, there is a reasonable prospect that the claim will succeed. The approach must be generous and err on the side of permitting a novel but arguable claim to proceed to trial.

What we can gain from this is that striking out a Statement of Claim is something that must be done cautiously, and only when it is plain and obvious that there is no chance to succeed.

Some of what may be “struck out” now, may in fact later be the basis for new laws, so the Courts should exercise caution and not jump to conclusions.

[30] The Crown further contends that COMER’s claim is outside this Court’s jurisdiction as it fails to meet the three-part test set out in ITO-International Terminal Operators Ltd v. Miida Electronics Inc.[21] In ITO, the Supreme Court considered the jurisdiction of the Federal Court in the context of an admiralty action. The Supreme Court determined that jurisdiction in the Federal Court depends on three factors:
1. There must be a statutory grant of jurisdiction by the Federal Parliament.
2. There must be an existing of body of federal law which is essential to the disposition of the case and which nourishes the statutory grant of jurisdiction.
3. The law on which the case is based must be a “law of Canada” as the phrase is used in s. 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867 [page 766]

[57] The jurisdictional issue raised by the Crown engages the three part test set out in ITO as discussed above. The Crown argues that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain tort claims against Federal authorities.

[58] However, pursuant to sections 2, 17 and 18 of the Federal Courts Act, the wording is sufficiently wide to capture these types of claims against federal actors and Crown servants. It is therefore not plain and obvious that this Court is without jurisdiction to entertain claims seeking declaratory relief as here.

One of the major contentions is that the Government alleged that the Federal Court had no jurisdiction to even hear the case. The Pronothary took a different view. However, there were other problems which ended with this.

[71] There is ample authority in this Court and in the jurisprudence generally that where a claim has some kernel of a legitimate claim it should not be tossed aside but permitted to be amended to determine if the clam in law can be cured.[45]

[72] Given that the Claim, in my view, is not justiciable, leave to amend will not cure the defects. Leave to amend is therefore not granted.

The case was thrown out on a motion to strike. However, that will not be the end of it. The Plaintiffs would appeal to a Justice of the Federal Court.

3. COMER Appeals Dismissal


(See here.)

The striking out (without permission to amend) was appealed to a Justice of the Federal Court. This was a partial victory, as the dismissal “was” upheld, but it allowed the Plaintiff’s to file an amended Claim. This would be another “chance” to get it right.

4. COMER Tries To File Again


(See here.)
After the Justice of the Federal Court upheld the dismissal (but giving leave to amend the Statement of Claim), COMER appealed to the Federal Court of Appeal, and the Government cross-appealed.

In short, the Plaintiffs were trying to get the dismissal overturned entirely, while the Government tried to remove the clause to allow COMER to file an amended Statement of Claim.

The Federal Appeals Court panel (3 Justices) threw out both the appeal and cross-appeal.

5. COMER’s Amended Statement Thrown Out


(See here.)

[66] In terms of the general principles that ought to be applied on a motion to strike, the Plaintiffs assert that the facts pleaded by the Plaintiffs must be taken as proven: Canada (Attorney General) v Inuit Tapirasat of Canada, 1980 CanLII 21 (SCC), [1980] 2 SCR 735; Nelles v Ontario (1989), DLR (4th) 609 (SCC) [Nelles]; Operation Dismantle, above; Hunt v Carey Canada Inc 1990 CanLII 90 (SCC), [1990] 2 SCR 959 [Hunt]; Dumont v Canada (Attorney General), 1990 CanLII 131 (SCC), [1990] 1 SCR 279 [Dumont]; Nash v Ontario (1995), 1995 CanLII 2934 (ON CA), 27 OR (3d) 1 (Ont CA) [Nash]; Canada v Arsenault, 2009 FCA 242 (CanLII) [Arsenault].

[67] The Plaintiffs echo the test referenced by the Defendants, asserting that a claim can be struck only in plain and obvious cases where the pleading is bad beyond argument: Nelles, above, at para 3. The Court has provided further guidance in Dumont, above, that an outcome should be “plain and obvious” or “beyond doubt” before striking can be invoked (at para 2). Striking cannot be justified by a claim that raises an “arguable, difficult or important point of law”: Hunt, above, at para 55.

[68] The novelty of the Amended Claim is not reason in and of itself to strike it: Nash, above, at para 11; Hanson v Bank of Nova Scotia (1994), 1994 CanLII 573 (ON CA), 19 OR (3d) 142 (CA); Adams-Smith v Christian Horizons (1997), 3 OR (3d) 640 (Ont Gen Div). Additionally, matters that are not fully settled by the jurisprudence should not be disposed of on a motion to strike: RD Belanger & Associates Ltd v Stadium Corp of Ontario Ltd (1991), 1991 CanLII 2731 (ON CA), 5 OR (3d) 778 (CA). In order for the Defendants to succeed, the Plaintiffs state that a case from the same jurisdiction that squarely deals with, and rejects, the very same issue must be presented: Dalex Co v Schwartz Levitsky Feldman (1994), 19 OR (3d) 215 (CA). The Court should be generous when interpreting the drafting of the pleadings, and allow for amendments prior to striking: Grant v Cormier – Grant et al (2001), 2001 CanLII 3041 (ON CA), 56 OR (3d) 215 (CA).

[69] The Plaintiffs also remind the Court that the line between fact and evidence is not always clear (Liebmann v Canada, 1993 CanLII 3006 (FC), [1994] 2 FC 3 at para 20) and that the Amended Claim must be taken as pleaded by the Plaintiffs, not as reconfigured by the Defendants: Arsenault, above, at para 10.

Plaintiffs arguing that the Defendant has not actually met the burden to strike out a Statement of Claim. However, the Justice decides differently.

[137] In the present case, the Plaintiffs have not, in their Amended Claim, pleaded facts to demonstrate a “real” issue concerning the relative interests of each party, and the nexus of that real issue to the Plaintiffs and their claim for relief. Although as I pointed out in my Order of April 24, 2014, the Plaintiffs do distinguish between legal issues and policy issues, the legal issues remain theoretical with no real nexus to some interest of the Plaintiffs, other than an interest in having the Court endorse their opinion on the Bank Act issues raised.

[138] The Plaintiffs have not addressed the jurisdictional problems I referred to in paras 85 to 91 of my Order of April 24, 2014 and/or what might generally be referred to as the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain, or its willingness to grant, free-standing requests for declaration.

The Justice Rules that the original problems are left unfixed. As such, the case is thrown out. This time, there is no leave to amend, so if this is to continue, it must go back to the Federal Court of Appeals.

6. Return to Federal Court of Appeals


(See here.)

[9] The essence of the Federal Court judge’s reasoning for striking the amended statement of claim is summed up at paragraph 144 of his reasons: It seems to me, then, that the latest Amended Claim discloses no reasonable cause of action and has no prospect of success at trial. It also seems to me that the Plaintiffs are still asking the Court for an advisory opinion in the form of declarations that their view of the way the Bank Act and the Constitution should be read is correct. It also seems to me that they have failed to show a statutory grant of jurisdiction by Parliament that this Court can entertain and rule on their claim as presently constituted, or that they have any specific rights under the legislation which they invoke, or a legal framework for any such rights. As the Supreme Court of Canada pointed out in Operation Dismantle, above, the preventive function of a declaratory judgment must be more than hypothetical and requires “a cognizable threat to a legal interest before the Court will entertain the use of its process as a preventative measure” (para 33). The Court is not here to declare the law generally or to give an advisory opinion. The Court is here to decide and declare contested legal rights.

[10] The appellants assert that the opinion so expressed is wrong in law. In support of this proposition, they essentially reiterate the arguments which they urged upon the Federal Court judge and ask that we come to a different conclusion. Counsel for the appellants focused his argument during the hearing on the issue of standing and the right to seek declarations of constitutionality. It remains however that, as the Federal Court judge found, the right to a remedy is conditional on the existence of a justiciable issue.

The Federal Appeals Court believes that COMER is still asking for an advisory opinion. Furthermore, the FCA still believes that no justiciable issue has been raised.

7. Supreme Court of Canada Declines To Hear Case


(See here.)

The Supreme Court refuses to hear the case, which means it is legally over. It would have been nice to have some actual reasons included. However, due to the volume of cases it receives, rejected applications generally don’t receive them.

Despite repeated rejection by the Courts, the questions about the changes in banking policy were never really addressed. Does giving control of our central bank to foreign powers break the law?

This is supposedly a “political” issue, but no politicians are willing to talk about it.

As of now, Canada is still borrowing money from private banks, as opposed to ourselves. We are racking up huge levels of debt that we shouldn’t be.

(1) http://www.comer.org ARCHIVE
(2) http://www.comer.org/content/SupremeCourtDecision_4May17.htm
(3) http://www.comer.org/content/COMER_CourtCasePressRelease.pdf
(4) http://comer.org/content/COMER_CourtProceedings5Dec2012.pdf
(5) https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fct/doc/2013/2013fc855/2013fc855.html
(6) http://comer.org/content/COMER_Appeal24April2014.pdf
(7) http://comer.org/content/COMER_FederalCourtDecisionApr2014.pdf
(8) https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fca/doc/2015/2015fca20/2015fca20.html
(9) https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fca/doc/2016/2016fca312/2016fca312.html