CLICK HERE, for abuse of Safe Third Country Agreement. CLICK HERE, for Prothonotary strikes out Statement of Claim. CLICK HERE, for Uppity Peasants on the moral arguments. CLICK HERE, for arguments to appeal S3CA dismissal. CLICK HERE, for reply submissions in S3CA appeal. CLICK HERE, for hypocrisy in Toronto/Vancouver cases.
2. Quotes From Ruling W/Feedback
Rule 221 is the rule which the original motion to strike was brought. However, the reason for citing the Toronto cases was another part of Rule 221, which prohibits inconsistent pleadings. More on that later
It’s interesting that these allegations are seen as bare assertions, when court protocol dictates that allegations be taken as fact at least in initial pleadings. Despite the abundance of evidence available about illegal crossings, they were considered “personal opinions” by the original Prothonotary.
This summary is actually pretty accurate here.
Okay, this isn’t too bad.
The Justice fails to mention that in the appeal motion there was an evidence affidavit submitted which contained plenty of evidence that the illegal crossings were going on.
Why was this not done initially? Because initial pleadings are not supposed to include evidence. And motions to strike are not allowed to contain evidence. So the appeal motion was the first opportunity to add proof.
And yes these are “discretionary”, meaning that Prothonotaries can essentially do what they like.
Yes, they should be read as generously as possible. This was not done here.
Some real mental gymnastics here. Wanting a secure border is cited, but apparently that doesn’t count for the purposes of asserting a personal interest. Nor is objecting unscreened/unvetted people into the country and posing a potential danger seen as asserting a personal interest.
Obviously, having a secure border benefits a person individually, as well as society as a whole. This is arguing for the sake of arguing.
Not sure what to make of this. The Appeal Justice asserts that providing security for the people is a legitimate state function, and that there is a real person interest in pursuing this.
However, despite having a real and recognized interest in the matter, it apparently doesn’t translate into having standing to bring such. I need to demonstrate how letting unvetted illegals into the country impacts me personally.
The million dollar question here: is protecting Canada’s borders a serious justifiable issue? Most people would probably agree that it is. As for (iii), where else could the matter be brought? If the politicians won’t fix it, then what remedies are available?
“If as the Plaintiff repeatedly asserts”…. Okay, is letting people simply bypass border controls because of the wording NOT a loophole?
Not a serious issue worth the court’s time, apparently.
Interesting how the court both claims:
(a) Material facts were not plead; and
(b) These are personal opinions are bare assertions
Yes, crossing the border illegally to get benefits one is not entitled to is unjust enrichment.
However, nice strawman. The “it’s not about money” line referred to stating this matter was not brought for personal enrichment. it was not that there was not money at stake paying for these fake refugees. This is being taken completely out of context.
This was addressed in a previous post. Currently, there are 3 cases in the Toronto Branch of Federal Court. These cases involve people trying to overturn the Safe 3rd Country Agreement altogether. It seems absurd that the Government can tell a Toronto Court that the S3CA is necessary, but tell a Vancouver Court that there is no need to close any loopholes.
There are the 3 cases.
They can be found online.
And yes, these files were cited in the appeal motion.
MOHAMMAD MAJD MAHER HOMSI ET AL v. MCI ET AL
Court File: #IMM-775-17
NEDIRA JEMAL MUSTEFA v. MIRC ET AL
Court File: #IMM-2229-17
THE CANADIAN COUNCIL FOR REFUGEES ET AL v. MIRC ET AL
Court File: #IMM-2977-17
Yet, Prothonotaries have broad discretion to rule things “opinion” even before evidence is allowed to be heard. The Court can simply “choose” to not hear certain matters, no matter how meritorious.
3. So, What Happens Now?
This ruling by Justice Crampton is nonsensical, and not something that can be ignored.
In 2003, the current Conservative Party of Canada did not exist. Instead, there was the Alliance Party, led by Stephen Harper, and the Progressive Conservative Party, undergoing a leadership race.
Two candidates in that race, David Orchard and Peter Mackay, struck a deal: Orchard would support MacKay’s leadership bid in return for a written pledge not to pursue a merger or deal with the Alliance. At that time, a merger had been seriously considered, as a way to form a united alternative to the Liberal Party. But MacKay promised — in writing — not to pursue this if he was supported for leader of the Progressive Conservative leadership.
The deal went ahead as planned (so it seemed), and MacKay became leader of the party. However, it appeared he had no intention of honouring his deal. Almost immediately, he pursued merger talks with the Alliance. The eventually merged, and the new party formed government from 2006 until 2015. MacKay’s deceptive and underhanded tactics had won in the long term.
Fast forward more than a decade from 2003, and another controversy. See section #9 for more on that.
3. Text Of McKay/Orchard Deal
May 31, 2003 Agreement between Peter MacKay and David Orchard
1) No merger, joint candidates w[ith] Alliance. Maintain 301.
2) Review of FTA/NAFTA – blue ribbon commission with D[avid] O[rchard] w[ith] choice of chair w[ith] P[eter] M[acKay’s] agreement. Rest of members to be jointly agreed upon.
3) Clean up of head office including change of national director in consultation (timing w[ithin] reasonable period in future, pre-election) and some of DO’s people working at head office.
4) Commitment to making environmental protection front and center incl[uding] sustainable agriculture, forestry, reducing pollution through rail.
[Signed by Peter MacKay and David Orchard]
Looks pretty straightforward.
No merger. Fix our party instead.
4. ON Court Challenge By Orchard, Others
Administrative law — Voluntary association — Political parties — Political parties registered under Canada Elections Act — Leaders of Progressive Conservative Party of Canada and Canadian Reform Conservative Alliance reaching agreement for merger of political parties — Common law principles regarding unregulated voluntary associations did not apply to political parties registered under Canada Elections Act — Canada Elections Act governing merger of registered political parties — Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c. 9.
On October 15, 2003, Peter MacKay, leader of the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada (“PC Party”), reached an agreement in principle with Steven [page278] Harper, leader of the Canadian Reform Conservative Alliance (“Alliance”), for the establishment of the “Conservative Party of Canada”. PC Party members who were opposed to the agreement applied to the court for several declarations. The premise of these declarations was that the PC Party could not be dissolved or merged with another political party except with the unanimous consent of all its members. The applicants also sought a permanent injunction to prevent anyone from dealing with the party’s assets.
 The applicants are PC Party members who are opposed to the merger of the party with the Alliance. They request that the court make a number of declarations, which are all premised on their view that the PC Party cannot be dissolved or merged with another political party, except with the unanimous consent of all of its members. They also seek a permanent injunction to prevent anyone from otherwise dealing with the party’s assets.
 I note that several items of the relief set out in the Notice of Application are not pursued before me. Paragraph 1(j) requested a declaration that Mr. MacKay is in breach of his written agreement, dated June 1, 2003, with Mr. Orchard, and sought consequential relief. The request for this relief was withdrawn on the consent of counsel prior to the date set for the hearing. Paragraph 1(e) sought a declaration that the procedures set by the Management Committee of the PC Party for the special meeting scheduled for December 6, 2003 are contrary to the Party’s Constitution and by-laws. Counsel for the applicants indicated they [page280] were not seeking such relief and informed the court the applicants were making no attack on the specific procedures adopted by the Party respecting the special meeting. Counsel also informed the court that the applicants were not requesting the court to deal with the relief sought in para. 1(g) which sought a declaration that the Constitution of the PC Party prohibited its leader from agreeing with the leader of another political party that the PC Party will not nominate candidates in every federal constituency in Canada.
 Traditionally, the courts have been reluctant to get involved in supervising the internal affairs of voluntary associations. However, courts do recognize that membership in a voluntary association can give individuals important social rights that are worthy of some protection. Members may request the courts to require that the organization carry out its affairs honestly, in good faith and in accordance with its governing rules.
 In this case we are dealing with a political party. The social interest of members in ensuring that the organization’s affairs are conducted in accordance with its governing Constitution is apparent. Citizens exercise important rights in participating in political activity through membership in political parties. However, the court must be careful not to intrude into the political realm. There were submissions and evidence in this case that I considered to be political rhetoric. I have disregarded all such evidence and submissions.
 I am satisfied that the situation is sufficiently developed to give rise to an actual dispute between the parties. Both sides have important interests at stake. The leadership of the PC Party has embarked on a path to merge the party. The applicants are opposed to the course of action being taken. Counsel for both sides indicated to the court that it would be of assistance to have a decision before the vote is taken tomorrow. Given their national significance, there is good reason to determine the questions raised by this actual dispute, and I am satisfied that the court’s decision will be of practical effect in resolving the dispute.
 I have concluded that this dispute does not fall within the ambit of the internal dispute resolution in Article 13 of the PC Party’s Constitution. I regard the internal process as intended to deal with questions about whether the ongoing affairs of the party are being conducted in compliance with its Constitution and by-laws. This dispute arises in extraordinary circumstances not contemplated by its Constitution, concerns its continued existence, and as will be seen, is in large measure about the proper interpretation and effect of a public statute. In deciding not to defer to the internal arbitration process, I paid no heed to the applicants’ arguments that that process was flawed by relationship and institutional bias. I regard the applicant’s apprehension of bias to be without merit.
 In expressing this view, I should not be taken to be declaring the law. In this proceeding I was asked to make declarations that the PC Party cannot merge, transfer its assets, or dissolve without the unanimous consent of every one of its individual members. I have decided, based on the view I take of the law, that it is not appropriate to make such declarations.
 A further comment must be made about para. 1(h) of the application. Paragraph 1(h) seeks “a declaration that the resolution [before the December 6 special meeting] does not constitute the resolution required pursuant to s. 400(2)(b) of the Canada Elections Act in order for the PC Party to merge with another registered party under the Act”. Whether the resolution being acted upon tomorrow, or any other resolution, satisfies the requirements of the Act must, in the first instance, be decided by the Chief Electoral Officer. I refuse the relief requested in para. 1(h) on that basis.
 The application is dismissed in its entirety. Counsel may make an appointment through my secretary to address costs.
In short the Court ruled that the matter should be decided internally. The parties have governing documents (such as constitutions) which set out terms for various issues, including mergers.
One way to look at this would be the “sort out your own business” line of reasoning prevailed. And while members of an organization should expect leaders to behave in a good faith manner, the Court apparently isn’t always the place to demand such a resolution.
While the Judge “could” have intervened, the decision was made not to.
See the next section for the Elections Act (400-403)
5. Canada Elections Act
 I set out the provisions in full, underlining the particular phrases that I find helpful in interpreting the provisions. I discuss some of the particular phrases below.
400(1) Two or more registered parties may, at any time other than during the period beginning 30 days before the issue of a writ for an election and ending on polling day, apply to the Chief Electoral Officer to become a single registered party resulting from their merger.
(2) An application to merge two or more registered parties must
(a) be certified by the leaders of the merging parties;
(b) be accompanied by a resolution from each of the merging parties approving the proposed merger; and
(c) contain the information required from a party to be registered, except for the information referred to in paragraph 366(2)(i).
401(1) The Chief Electoral Officer shall amend the registry of parties by replacing the names of the merging parties with the name of the merged party if
(a) the application for the merger was not made in the period referred to in subsection 400(1); and
(b) the Chief Electoral Officer is satisfied that
(i) the merged party is eligible for registration as a political party under this Act, and
(ii) the merging parties have discharged their obligations under this Act, including their obligations to report on their financial transactions and their election expenses and to maintain valid and up-to-date information concerning their registration.
(2) The Chief Electoral Officer shall notify the officers of the merging parties in writing whether the registry of parties is to be amended under subsection (1).
(3) If the Chief Electoral Officer amends the registry of parties, he or she shall cause to be published in the Canada Gazette a notice that the names of the merging parties have been replaced in the registry with the name of the merged party.
402(1) A merger of registered parties takes effect on the day on which the Chief Electoral Officer amends the registry of parties under subsection 401(1). (2) On the merger of two or more registered parties,
(a) the merged party is the successor of each merging party;
(b) the merged party becomes a registered party;
(c) the assets of each merging party belong to the merged party;
(d) the merged party is responsible for the liabilities of each merging party; [page287]
(e) the merged party is responsible for the obligations of each merging party to report on its financial transactions and election expenses for any period before the merger took effect;
(f) the merged party replaces a merging party in any proceedings, whether civil, penal or administrative, by or against the merging party; and
(g) any decision of a judicial or quasi-judicial nature involving a merging party may be enforced by or against the merged party.
403. Within six months after a merger
(a) each of the merging parties shall provide the Chief Electoral Officer with the documents referred to in subsection 424(1) for
(i) the portion of its current fiscal period that ends on the day before the day on which the merger takes effect, and
(ii) any earlier fiscal period for which those documents have not been provided; and
(b) the merged party shall provide the Chief Electoral Officer with
(i) a statement, prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, of its assets and liabilities, including any surplus or deficit, at the date of the merger,
(ii) an auditor’s report, submitted to the chief agent of the merged party, as to whether the statement presents fairly and in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles the information on which it was based, and
(iii) a declaration in the prescribed form by the chief agent of the merged party concerning the statement.
These sections of the Canada Elections Act are cited in both the Provincial and Federal Court rulings. As such, we should know what they actually say. In short, they quite clearly allow for party mergers. Broken promises and backroom deals don’t actually appear anywhere in the text.
6. ON Court Of Appeal (Orchard et al.)
 As a preliminary matter, the respondent moves to quash the appeal as now being moot. It argues that there is no longer a live issue affecting the rights of the parties because the merger has happened and the Conservative Party has been registered by the Chief Electoral Officer in place of the PC Party and the Alliance Party.
 In my view, the motion must be dismissed. There remains the same real legal issue between the parties that existed before December 6, 2003, namely, whether the PC Party can be dissolved or merged with another political party without the unanimous consent of all of its members. The only difference is that if [page134] they are successful, the appellants must now seek a remedial order undoing what has happened rather than an order to prevent it from occurring. The respondent has not shown that this would be impossible. The underlying legal issues still have an effect on the rights of the parties and hence mootness does not apply.
 On the appeal itself, the appellants’ fundamental contention is that the common law requires the PC Party to obtain the unanimous consent of all of its members to merge with the Alliance Party. In making this argument they place significant reliance on Astgen.
 By the terms of the constitution this decision is final and binding. Having had the opportunity to participate in that process the appellants are bound to accept it as final and binding, subject to judicial review which they have not sought. This is a corollary to the obligation of an organization like a trade union to give notice of an arbitration to a member whose rights will be affected because the decision of the arbitration board is final and binding. See, for example, Hoogendoorn v. Greening Metal Products and Screening Equipment Co. (1967), 1967 CanLII 20 (SCC),  S.C.R. 30, 65 D.L.R. (2d) 641. It is not open to the appellants to seek a determination by the court that the resolution is of no legal effect because the PC Party failed to comply with the procedures required by its constitution. In this circumstance, that is a matter for the Arbitration Committee.
 In summary, therefore, the appellants’ arguments on appeal must be rejected.
 The respondent has cross-appealed from the decision of the application judge to award no costs because of the public importance of the issues raised. We did not call on the appellants to respond to the cross-appeal. In our view, it was an entirely appropriate exercise of discretion by the judge of first instance.
 As to the costs of the proceedings in this court, success has been divided. The appellants failed on the appeal. The respondent failed to establish mootness and failed on the cross-appeal. Together with the public importance of the questions raised, this makes it appropriate to order that there be no costs in this court. [page141]
 I would therefore dismiss the motion to quash and the appeal and the cross-appeal. No costs in this court.
Among other things, the Court of Appeals states that relief should have come in the form of an application for judicial review challenging the Elections Commission.
Beyond that, the Appeals Panel sidesteps the underhanded nature of MacKay’s duplicity. Instead, they point out that the Canada Elections Act explicitly allows for mergers except in very limited cases. Unanimity from all participants is not required.
To sum up, there is nothing new to add here, so appeal dismissed.
7. Stevens v. CPC (Federal Court)
This was not the only case that was launched. There was an Application for Judicial Review started in Federal Court to contest the ruling that allowed the merger.
 The Applicant argued that the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal confirmed the opinion of the application judge that section 401(1)(b)(ii) of the Act vests the CEO not the Court, with the mandate of determining if the merger application met the statutory requirements. However, he also submits that the Court of Appeal recognized that section 400(2)(b) of the Act implicitly requires that a merger resolution be passed in accordance with the constitution of a merging party.
 Accordingly, the Applicant argues that this holding supports his contention that the CEO erred in law by rejecting the constitution of the PC Party as being relevant to his decision. The Applicant repeats and relies upon his earlier submissions that the constitution of that party specifically prohibits the merger application that was made.
 Further, the Applicant says that the judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal does not address the argument that the common law rights of voluntary associations include the right to be heard when such association is a political party that is at risk of dissolution.
ii) The Respondent
 The Respondent disagrees with the Applicant’s interpretation of the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision and argues that the Court rejected the arguments that the merger of the PC Party and the Alliance Party attracted application of the common law rule that the unanimous consent of each party member was required for the merger of those parties. Further, the Respondent submits that the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the Act did not require unanimous consent for such merger.
 In conclusion, the Respondent relies on the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal as supporting its view that the decision of the CEO to amend the registry of parties on December 7, 2003, was correct.
 A waiting period of sixty days applies when a political party initially applies for registration. In my view, it is reasonable that a waiting period, albeit a reduced one, will also apply when two registered parties apply for merger.
 It follows, then, that in my opinion, the CEO erred by amending the registry of parties on the same day that the merger application was made and without waiting for thirty days, to ensure that no election writ would be issued, thereby activating the commencement of the prohibited period.
 As noted earlier, the Applicant seeks an order quashing the decision of the CEO and reinstating the PC Party on the registry of parties. Alternatively, the Applicant seeks an order setting aside the decision of December 7, 2003 and referring the matter back to the CEO.
 In my opinion, the remedies sought by the Applicant should not be granted. Pursuant to section 18.1(3) of the Federal Courts Act, supra, the Court has discretion in the matter of granting relief upon an application for judicial review. On occasion, relief has been denied and in this regard, I refer to Mobil Oil Canada Ltd. v. Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board, 1994 CanLII 114 (SCC),  1 S.C.R. 202.
 In the present case, I take judicial notice of the fact that no writ for an election was issued in the thirty days following December 7, 2003. In the result, the CEO’s action in immediately amending the registry of parties, although contrary to my interpretation of the Act, had no material effect. In the exercise of my discretion, I decline to grant the relief sought.
 The application for judicial review is dismissed. However, the Applicant has raised a valid point and is entitled to his assessed costs under Column III.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:
The application for judicial review is dismissed, the Applicant to have his assessed costs under Column III
Much the same as with the Ontario Courts. The Court declines to intervene, and rules the merger allowed under the Canada Elections Act.
8. Stevens v. CPC (Federal Court of Appeal)
I therefore find that the only interpretation that would give a concrete meaning to the texts in question is the one that requires the Chief Electoral Officer to let 30 days expire once the merger application is received before accepting it. If this was not Parliament’s intention, it is free to correct our vision with a more specific legislative text.
Exercising discretionary power for judicial review
Justice Heneghan refused to grant the relief sought despite the fact that the Chief Electoral Officer, by not waiting 30 days before making his decision, violated the Canada Elections Act. Taking judicial notice of the fact that no writ ordering an election was issued in the 30 days following the merger application, she found, at paragraph 118 of her reasons:
In the result, the CEO’s action in immediately amending the registry of parties, although contrary to my interpretation of the Act, had no material effect. In the exercise of my discretion, I decline to grant the relief sought.
Justice Heneghan, in my opinion, judiciously exercised the discretion inherent to the power for judicial review. The existence of this discretion is based both on the text of subsection 18.1(3) [as enacted by S.C. 1990, c. 8, s. 5; 2002, c. 8, s. 27] of the Federal Courts Act [R.S.C., 1985, c. F-7 , s. 1 (as am. by S.C. 2002, c. 8, s. 14)] under which the “Federal Court may” [emphasis added] quash the decision of a federal board, commission or tribunal, and on the principles associated with traditional prerogative writs. In this regard, it would be appropriate to return to this long excerpt from Justice Hugessen’s reasons in Schaaf v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, 1984 CanLII 3622 (FCA),  2 F.C. 334 (C.A.), at pages 342-344, which summarize the basis of this discretion best, with the adaptations required by the new, more explicit formulation of section 18 [as am. by S.C. 1990, c. 8, s. 4; 2002, c. 8, s. 26]:
In my view, nothing in the words used makes them other than attributive of jurisdiction. They create the power in the Court to set aside decisions which offend in one of the stated ways but do not impose a duty to do so in every case.
More of the same. The Federal Court can use discretion and choose not to intervene.
9. Current CPC Leadership Antics
This is the follow-up to Section #2. Andrew Scheer becomes leader of the Conservative Party of Canada in May 2017, is a surprise (and contested) 13th ballot over Maxime Bernier. However, it soon becomes clear that many people did not want this, and Scheer is undermined within his own party.
Bernier leaves in August 2018 to start his own party, the bizarrely named “People’s Party of Canada”. He claims that the CPC is no longer conservative, and that he will form an alternative. He also starts adopting populist rhetoric, something he previously hadn’t shown. Interestingly, Bernier spends more time attacking Scheer than the Liberal Party, which is currently in government.
Curiously, the People’s Party is missing a lot:
(a) Bernier has never called a leadership campaign
(b) No policies have ever been voted on
(c) There is no party constitution
(d) There are no by-laws, or other governing documents
(e) There is no national council, or senior board
(f) The platform was recycled from Bernier’s 2016/17 leadership run
Critics claim it is a “temporary” party meant to keep the Conservatives from winning, and to get Scheer ejected. Strangely enough, Peter MacKay’s name gets floated as a possible successor should Scheer not become Prime Minister.
Ultimately, Justin Trudeau did win again, but this time a minority. Despite winning the popular vote and increasing the seat total, Scheer was pressured to resign from the CPC leadership.
Could MacKay be at it again? Is this another scheme to undermine the will of conservative party members and select the party’s leader? Was the PPC just a psy-op to get rid of Scheer and install another leader instead?
10. Politics Is Rotten To The Core
This current fiasco has relevance to the 2003 one for a simple reason: some of the same people are involved in both. Now, could Peter MacKay be up to his old tricks of deceit and backstabbing? Choosing who becomes leader?
Actually governing people always seems to take a backseat to the infighting, pettiness, and selfishness of the politicians involved. Public servants appear to be anything but.
Giving your word, even in writing, seems to mean little. Alliances will always give way to self interest.
CLICK HERE, for Gov’t of Canada website on assisted dying. CLICK HERE, for 2015 Supreme Court ruling. CLICK HERE, for 1993 ruling prohibiting assisted suicide. CLICK HERE, for the CDN Charter of Rights & Freedoms. CLICK HERE, for the Canadian Criminal Code. CLICK HERE, for Bill C-14, assisted suicide.
2. Law Against Assisted Suicide
Counselling or aiding suicide
241 (1) Everyone is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 14 years who, whether suicide ensues or not,
(a) counsels a person to die by suicide or abets a person in dying by suicide; or (b) aids a person to die by suicide.
Now there is more to be considered. See section 6.
3. Canadian Charter, Section 7
Guarantee of Rights and Freedoms
Rights and freedoms in Canada
1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.
Life, liberty and security of person
7. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.
The 2015 decision ruled that the blanket ban violated the Section 7 Charter rights, and that there was no “saving” of it under Section 1.
4. SCC Orders Parliament To Fix Law
 The appeal is allowed. We would issue the following declaration, which is suspended for 12 months: Section 241 (b) and s. 14 of the Criminal Code unjustifiably infringe s. 7 of the Charter and are of no force or effect to the extent that they prohibit physician-assisted death for a competent adult person who (1) clearly consents to the termination of life and (2) has a grievous and irremediable medical condition (including an illness, disease or disability) that causes enduring suffering that is intolerable to the individual in the circumstances of his or her condition.
The Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the prohibition against assisted suicide violated Section 7 of the Charter, which addresses security of the person.
The ruling is very long, and addressed the issue from a number of legal questions. It also addressed whether the Lower Courts should be bound by a 1993 ruling on much the same issues. It’s too lengthy to go through in an article, but is worth a read.
5. Bill C-14, Assisted Dying
This enactment amends the Criminal Code to, among other things,
(a) create exemptions from the offences of culpable homicide, of aiding suicide and of administering a noxious thing, in order to permit medical practitioners and nurse practitioners to provide medical assistance in dying and to permit pharmacists and other persons to assist in the process;
(b) specify the eligibility criteria and the safeguards that must be respected before medical assistance in dying may be provided to a person;
(c) require that medical practitioners and nurse practitioners who receive requests for, and pharmacists who dispense substances in connection with the provision of, medical assistance in dying provide information for the purpose of permitting the monitoring of medical assistance in dying, and authorize the Minister of Health to make regulations respecting that information; and
(d) create new offences for failing to comply with the safeguards, for forging or destroying documents related to medical assistance in dying, for failing to provide the required information and for contravening the regulations.
Following the Supreme Court ruling, the Federal Government was ordered to remedy the situation. Bill C-14 was introduced in 2016 to set out the guidelines for medically assisted death.
6. Medical Assistance Exemption
Eligibility for medical assistance in dying
241.2 (1) A person may receive medical assistance in dying only if they meet all of the following criteria:
(a) they are eligible — or, but for any applicable minimum period of residence or waiting period, would be eligible — for health services funded by a government in Canada;
(b) they are at least 18 years of age and capable of making decisions with respect to their health;
(c) they have a grievous and irremediable medical condition;
(d) they have made a voluntary request for medical assistance in dying that, in particular, was not made as a result of external pressure; and
(e) they give informed consent to receive medical assistance in dying after having been informed of the means that are available to relieve their suffering, including palliative care.
Grievous and irremediable medical condition
(2) A person has a grievous and irremediable medical condition only if they meet all of the following criteria:
(a) they have a serious and incurable illness, disease or disability;
(b) they are in an advanced state of irreversible decline in capability;
(c) that illness, disease or disability or that state of decline causes them enduring physical or psychological suffering that is intolerable to them and that cannot be relieved under conditions that they consider acceptable; and
(d) their natural death has become reasonably foreseeable, taking into account all of their medical circumstances, without a prognosis necessarily having been made as to the specific length of time that they have remaining.
To be fair, there are considerable safeguards written into the law to ensure that the person suffering is actually the one making the decision, and that it is voluntary and informed.
7. Where Does It Go From Here?
Currently, the law applies only to adults. But what happens when children decide that they want to make decisions over their own “health care”? Will minors be allowed to get it themselves? This is currently being considered.
The law allows for assisted suicide in the case of serious conditions which cause pain and is irreversible, and to get worse. How much will that get watered down over time? Perhaps this is just a foot-in-the-door technique to be able to end lives over more minor things.
What will happen to medical staff who refuse to participate in this? Will they become subject to sanctions for discrimination, or failing to fulfill a duty?
In fairness to Trudeau (it feels weird defending him), introducing this, or similar legislation, was forced by the 2015 Supreme Court ruling. Some bill had to be introduced at some point, so he doesn’t own this one.
Personally, this is conflicting. People should have control over their own lives, yes, but trending down a slope where lives are valued less and less is very troubling. How we treat and care for people reflects the society we live in, and this is the wrong direction to head in.
CLICK HERE, for the case R. v. Morris,  O.J. No. 4631. CLICK HERE, for the Canadian Criminal Code, robbery section. CLICK HERE, for the Canadian Criminal Code, firearms section. CLICK HERE, for a National Post article covering a case where an Ontario criminal court judge wants to expand “Gladue” to include blacks. CLICK HERE, for a similar article. CLICK HERE, for a University of Toronto research paper on race, crime and incarceration.
CLICK HERE, for race-based discounts in criminal court. CLICK HERE, for child-killer Terri McClintic going to a “healing lodge”. CLICK HERE, for incarceration rates among Aboriginals.
2. Quotes From Ruling
In a way this is not surprising at all. The 1997/1999 Gladue rulings created essentially a “discount” for Aboriginal offenders specifically on the basis of “historical oppression”.
Now, there is a case that is pending before the Ontario Court of Appeals, which could see the same provisions apply to blacks as well. This is a (potential) expansion of a horrible idea: race-based-discounts in the criminal justice system.
People should be outraged by this. Your crime, seriousness, and past (if any) criminal record should impact your sentence. Not your race, ethnicity, or skin colour. It is the anti-thesis of equality under the law.
 A jury found you guilty of a number of offences. I convicted you of possession of an unauthorized firearm, possession of a prohibited firearm with ammunition, and carrying a concealed weapon. The jury acquitted you of assaulting a peace officer with intent to resist arrest.
 The basic facts of your crime are straightforward. On December 13, 2014, the police received a call about a home invasion in Scarborough. As the police officers sent to investigate drove to the scene, they came upon four Black males walking in the parking lot. The officers were in plainclothes and drove unmarked police cars. One officer stopped the young men. You were one of them. You ran. As you ran, D.C. Moorcroft, who was not the officer who stopped you but was also driving into the lot, accelerated to stop you.
Police were responding to a home invasion. When they arrived, there just happened to be 4 black men in the area, and the defendant took off.
Of course, it is just a coincidence that he had a gun on him. Now it is apparently a charter violation that a police car was used to stop him.
 I must now sentence you for your offences. Let me go over what the Crown and your defence lawyers said should be the sentence. These positions were pretty far apart. The Crown asked for 4 to 4.5 years in jail. Your lawyers argued that the sentence should be 1 year before credit was given for the Charter breaches.
There is something here we are not being told. The Crown (supposedly) wants 4 to 4.5 years for gun possession for a first time offender? What else went on that is not included?
 Let me briefly explain to you what I did in Jackson. I began my judgment in that case by saying sentencing is a very individual process. The criminal law has recognized that there are cases where, in order to determine a fit and proportionate sentence, consideration must be given to an individual’s systemic and social circumstances. These circumstances may extend beyond a person who is being sentenced to include factors such a systemic discrimination and historical injustice. This has been recognized by the criminal courts, particularly in the case of Indigenous offenders. While the distinct history of colonial violence endured by Indigenous peoples cannot simply be analogized to Black Canadians, I found that the ability to consider social context in a sentencing decision is extended to all under section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code. This allowed me to consider the unique social history of Black Canadians in sentencing Mr. Jackson. Mr. Jackson was a Black male offender not too much older than you, who pleaded guilty to a charge of possession of a prohibited gun. His lawyers presented a great deal of evidence to me on systemic anti-Black racism and its role in Mr. Jackson’s life. I took note of this evidence. I also took judicial notice, independently of these materials, of the history of colonialism, slavery, policies and practices of segregation, intergenerational trauma, and both overt and systemic racism that continue to affect Black Canadians today. With an understanding of these social factors I was able to better appreciate the circumstances that led Mr. Jackson to come before me. I sentenced him accordingly.
Gladue was horrible for exactly this reason. Instead of holding people accountable to as similar a standard as possible, some get to play the “oppression card” and get much lighter sentences. It stands the idea of equality before the law completely on its head.
The ruling would then go on to quote some social worker at length about the struggles that blacks face, and how its circumstances must be considered.
 Giving your acts a contextual analysis in light of the wealth of evidence provided to me on this sentencing, I do not find this to be a weighty aggravating factor in your case. I appreciate that accused people should not flee from police. Especially carrying a loaded firearm. But it is understandable to me that you ran. It was not a coldly calculated act to escape but one based upon emotion and a state of mind that has been shaped both generally and specifically by the historical racism suffered by Blacks and by you. In other words, not every flight from the police should be treated the same. Here there is a connection in the evidence between your act of flight and the systemic factors. I find it would be wrong to punish you more severely for this. When I view how anti-Black racism and historical injustices have contributed to your actions, the needs of general deterrence and denunciation normally raised by this act of flight is tempered. Given that the choice you made to do so was affected by these factors, the moral blameworthiness of your actions is also lessened.
 In addition, in assessing the seriousness of the offences, when I look at potential aggravating factors that often exist in the case law, here, there is no evidence that your possession of the gun is connected with other crimes such as crimes of violence or drug trafficking.
 There are also some very traditional mitigating factors. You are a first offender. You were young when you committed these crimes. You were 22 years old. You have supportive family and friends. There is a side of you that speaks well to your rehabilitation. I have mentioned them before. Your warmth, kindness, and respectfulness.
Being a young, first time offender is a legitimate reason to cut someone a break. No argument on that point.
But that is where the agreement ends. All this nonsense about historical racism and systemic factors (repeated throughout the ruling), was nauseating to read.
 Sentencing must always be an individual process. In these cases judges gave sentences of 1 year, 15 months, 18 months, just under 2 years. Some of these sentences were permitted to be served in the community rather than in jail. The cases are: R. v. Ishmael, 2014 ONCJ 136; R. v. Garton, 2018 ONSC 544; R. v. Rutledge, 2015 ONSC 6625; R. v. Shunmuganathan, 2016 ONCJ 519;
R. v. Nuttley, 2013 ONCJ 727;
R. v. Kelsy,  O.J. No. 3879;
R. v. Cadienhead,  O.J. No. 3125;
R. v. Williams,  O.J. No. 3352 (S.C.J.);
R. v. Brown,  O.J. No. 4681 (S.C.J.);
R. v. Carranza,  O.J. No. 6041 (S.C.J.)
Fair enough. The Judge was looking for a little consistency.
82 Now I want to talk about that elephant in the room. I know you are in custody on other charges. What those charges are were not explained to me by either the Crown or your lawyers. However, I do know from some of the materials filed what the charges are said to be. Of course, there is a charge of breaching your bail. There are also some other offences. But they are not gun offences. Your surety surrendered your bail so you are in custody on the charges I am sentencing you for. To someone hearing this, I am sure they will say you have not behaved well while on bail. They may be right. But you are presumed innocent of these alleged new offences. I am sentencing you as a first offender. Someone without a criminal record. The new charges do not change that. The presumption of innocence is the foundation of our criminal justice system. While it may be hard for many to understand, I cannot let that foundation be eroded or chipped away by taking into account the new charges.
So, “first-timer” comes with a few caveats: Morris breached his bail, and is facing additional charges. However, the Judge has decided to ignore this in sentencing him as a first-timer.
It would be nice to know how exactly bail was breached, and what exactly the other charges are. But they are not mentioned.
 I also find that the anti-Black racism evidence presented on the sentencing is relevant in assessing the weight I should give this. Racism can operate very subtly. It can be there lurking in the background of people’s minds, unconsciously influencing their judgment and making them act in certain ways towards certain people.
 I want to be clear that I am not painting the police with the brush of overt racism in this case. I do not have the evidence to support that. But I am troubled. If I asked myself: If it was someone other than a young Black man running away from the police that night, would D.C. Moorcroft have driven in the aggressive way that he did? Would Mr. Morris and the car have collided? I am troubled because in all honesty, I cannot conclude it would have happened in the same way.
So, racism happens, but I have no evidence that there was any in this case. Therefore, I will still bring it up as a mitigating factor.
This Judge talks in circles about how there is all this systemic racism, and how it can be very subtle. Yet he notes that there is no proof that there was racism in this case. So what is the point then?
 After mitigation for the Charter violations, I have sentenced you to a jail sentence of 12 months. You have done a lot of dead time. The sentence will be based upon the credit you will receive for that dead time. I will credit you 1.5 to 1 for that pre-trial custody. The evidence shows that you received no real programming, had a difficult time in jail, and at times experienced physical discomfort in jail due to your medical conditions. You also did not receive consideration for parole or remission while in pre-trial custody. I find it right to give this enhanced credit. Therefore, 243 days of pre-trial custody will be used up. You will be sentenced to a further 1 day in jail on each charge concurrently. I also made a DNA order, s. 109 weapons prohibition, and the forfeiture order.
So not even a year. Just 8 months.
3. University of Toronto Article On Race & Crime
Although not specific to this case, this article by Akwasi Owusu-Bempah is an interesting read. If nothing else, it shows the extent that this academic will go to avoid the obvious conclusion:
SOME GROUPS JUST COMMIT MORE CRIME
Yes, that’s it. Groups are not equal when it comes to committing crime. That is the hard truth that lawyers, judges, politicians, academics and social workers refuse to address.
On the topic of “disparity”, it’s worth noting that males make up over 90% of prison inmates. However, there is no push claiming discrimination against them. Oh, the double standards.
Instead, he will talk in circles. Owusu-Bempah will blame mistrust, victimization in black and Aboriginal neighbourhoods, racial bias (without proving it), and Court discrimination (again, without proving it). Although the author touches the topic of crime rates, he avoids making any definitive statements. It’s like he is deliberately avoiding the obvious answer.
Abstract and Keywords Canada effectively bans systematic collection and dissemination of racially disaggregated criminal justice statistics. A significant proportion of Canada’s racial minority populations perceive bias in the criminal justice system, especially on the part of police. Aboriginal and black Canadians are grossly overrepresented in Canada’s correctional institutions. Some evidence suggests that both Aboriginal and black populations are overrepresented with respect to violent offending and victimization. Social conditions in which Aboriginal and black Canadians live are at least partially to blame for their possibly elevated rates of violent offending. Evidence indicates that racial bias exists in the administration of Canadian criminal justice. At times, this discrimination has been supported by court decisions. Discrimination and disparity are at times acknowledged by government, but they are seldom wholeheartedly addressed. There is a lack of political will to address issues of racial minority overrepresentation in relation to manifestations of racial discrimination or to the societal conditions that lead to criminal offending.
Oh, the mental gymnastics of the author are blatant:
Minorities “perceive” bias against them
There is overrepresentation
Bias in administration
Government acknowledges disparity
No political will to address overrepresentation
Societal conditions lead to offending
The author mentions overrepresentation regarding offending, but immediately lumps it in with “victimization”, as if to muddy the waters
Lack of available objective data, yet we are able to make conclusions based on much more subjective things, such as perceived bias
Right, not elevated rates, but “possibly” elevated rates
Connections among race, crime, and criminal justice are often portrayed in Canadian media images and are captured in the popular imagination. Yet, in comparison to the United States and Great Britain, these phenomena receive relatively little attention from Canadian academics and policy makers. A lack of readily available criminal justice data disaggregated by race makes it particularly difficult for researchers to examine the nature of these racial differences. Thus, we are unable to determine the extent to which higher rates of offending among certain racial groups and discrimination in the administration of criminal justice contribute to the apparent overrepresentation
There’s a lack of data, but this author will still make claims about bias and discrimination, without actually proving it. He will also tap-dance around the obvious: If a group commits crime at a much higher rate, doesn’t that justify higher incarceration rates?
Nonetheless, available evidence indicates that a significant proportion of Canada’s racial minority populations and a sizable proportion of the white population perceive bias in the criminal justice system. These public perceptions are supported by data that show that certain racial minority groups, particularly Aboriginal and black Canadians, are grossly overrepresented in Canada’s correctional institutions. Further evidence indicates that racial bias does exist in the administration of Canadian criminal justice, and, at times, this discrimination has been supported by court decisions. We cannot discount, however, the probability that increased rates of offending among certain racialized groups contributes to their overrepresentation in correctional statistics. As we show in this essay, research suggests that Aboriginal and black Canadians are overrepresented with respect to violent offending and victimization. The Canadian federal government itself has pointed out that the social conditions in which Aboriginals live is at least partially to blame for their rates of violent offending (Department of Justice 2009). We have previously made the same connection with respect to black Canadians (Wortley and Owusu-Bempah2011a).
Owusu-Bempah contradicts himself here. He claims there is “perceived” bias from many people. Not “actual” bias, but perceived bias. He then goes on to say that there is overrepresentation among certain groups.
He then offers a perfectly reasonable explanation for the higher incarceration rate: increased offending.
Just a thought. If a certain group commits crime at a higher rate, then it is not bias or discrimination that there would be more of them involved with the courts.
Unfortunately, there is an apparent lack of political will to address issues of racial minority overrepresentation in the Canadian criminal justice system. Ambivalence to address these issues relates both to the manifestations of racial discrimination in the system, as well as to the societal conditions that lead to criminal offending. Discrimination and disparity may be at times acknowledged, but they are seldom wholeheartedly addressed. When addressed, the means are seldom thoroughly evaluated for effectiveness, and, when evaluated, the results are rarely made public.
Difficult to believe, but this is just the next paragraph. Owusu-Bempah claims there is no political will to address racial minority overrepresentation. Yet, he previously commented that there was a higher rate of offending.
This seems like a solution in search of a problem.
Many have argued that relatively high rates of homicide and gun crime among African Canadians and Aboriginals in Canada are reflective of their overrepresentation in street gangs. Unfortunately, official police statistics on Canadian gangs are almost nonexistent
Yeah, good job.
Canada’s reluctance to acknowledge and document race is most evident in the operation of its criminal justice system and in its criminal justice policies. Unlike in the United States and the United Kingdom, where race-based criminal justice statistics are readily available to the public and researchers alike, the Canadian criminal justice system does not systematically collect or publish statistics on the race of individuals processed through the system. The debate over the collection of racial data from the criminal justice sector in Canada can be traced back as far as 1929 (Roberts 1992). Discussions about the collection, or more accurately, the public release of these data have emerged more recently in the context of broader debates about race, crime, and the administration of criminal justice—particularly related to the circumstances of Aboriginal and black Canadians (Hatt 1994; Johnston 1994; Gabor 1994; Roberts 1994; Wortley 1999; Owusu-Bempah and Millar 2010). On the one hand, allegations of racial discrimination have been leveled against the justice system to explain the overrepresentation of certain racial minority groups in the few available sources of police and correctional data. On the other hand, it has been suggested that racial minorities are disproportionately involved in criminal activity, which accounts for their disproportionate involvement with the criminal justice system as reflected in the data. Unfortunately, our ability to test either of these claims is limited by the absence of available data, despite numerous calls for its collection. Several major attempts have been made in Canada to collect racial and ethnic data, particularly in the policing sector (Fine 1990; Wortley and Marshall 2005; Leclair InfoCom 2009); these attempts, however, have not paved the way for systematic data collection
The author addresses crime rates, but gives a wishy washy answer. There’s not enough data to tell one way or another whether it is: (a) discrimination; or (b) actual crime, that results in the disparities. Yet, feelings about perceived bias and virtue signalling bureaucrats apologizing are apparently good evidence.
There is an interesting point to be taken from this: if there was concrete data on race and crime rates, then the debate could be put to bed once and for all.
The article keeps repeating the same idea and muddying the waters: we don’t have data, so we can’t be sure what causes discrepancies in the representation.
If the author wanted a reference point, why not check the data from the US and UK? After all, he knows it is there.
There were 698,737 arrests in 2017/18, a fall of 8% on the previous year – both years’ figures exclude Lancashire Police (see ‘Things you need to know’)
-Black people were over 3 times as likely to be arrested as White people – there were 35 arrests for every 1,000 —Black people, and 11 arrests for every 1,000 White people
-overall, men were over 5 times as likely to be arrested as women – there were 22 arrests for every 1,000 men, and -4 arrests for every 1,000 women
-Black women were more than twice as likely to be arrested as White women – there were 7 arrests for every 1,000 —Black women, and 3 arrests for every 1,000 White women
And a few pages later,
there were 698,737 arrests in England and Wales in 2017/18 (excluding the Lancashire police force area), at a rate of 13 arrests per 1,000 people
there were 62,501 fewer arrests in 2017/18 compared with the previous year, a fall of 8% (excluding Lancashire Police from both years)
Black people were over 3 times as likely to be arrested as White people – there were 35 arrests for every 1,000 Black people, and 11 arrests for every 1,000 White people
people with Mixed ethnicity were over twice as likely to be arrested as White people – there were 25 arrests for every 1,000 people with Mixed ethnicity, and 11 arrests for every 1,000 White people
So the UK Government is willing to be quite open and blunt about the disparities in race and offending. And what about the US.
5. Crime Data From US FBI
CLICK HERE, for FBI Uniform Crime Reporting, Table 21. This is compiled from 2016, though the stats over the years don’t change much.
Looking at Table 21C (people aged 18 or over)
Worth noting the US black population is about 13% commits:
52% of homicides
28% of rapes
51% of robberies
32% of aggravated assault
36% of violent crime
41% of weapons carrying
30% buying stolen property
…. and so on.
Are blacks greatly overrepresented in US prisons? Absolutely. And for a very good reason — disproportionate amount of violent and serious crime.
Are US sentences in general too harsh? A fair point, but a topic for another day. This post concerns treating people equally.
6. Gladue 2.0 Addresses Wrong Problem
With this proposed change, the scope of Gladue will be broadened. This means that it will not be restricted to Aboriginals.
The claim is that this will reduce overrepresentation in the courts and prison system. Problem is: it focuses on making prisons look like a random sample of society, rather than a reflection of who is actually committing the most serious crime.
It’s what liberals do not want to acknowledge:
SOME GROUPS JUST COMMIT MORE CRIME
It is not necessarily due to “oppression” or “systemic bias”, or any other such nonsense. It is caused by these groups, on average, behaving differently. While it is obviously desirable for society to reduce crime and their prison populations, this is a backwards approach.
Should the Ontario Court of Appeals (and possibly the Supreme Court of Canada) confirm this nonsense, racial equality dies. Your skin colour will determine your punishment, not your crime. Though arguably that was the case with Gladue.
Keep in mind, it is the Supreme Court of Canada that upheld Gladue in the first place (appealed from BC). There is nothing to indicated they wouldn’t extend their ruling to this.
CLICK HERE, for race- based discounts in sentencing. CLICK HERE, for Terri McClintic, child killer, in a healing lodge. CLICK HERE, for 2016/2017 StatsCan data on incarceration rates. CLICK HERE, for Table 5, incarceration by race and gender. CLICK HERE, for Table 6. CLICK HERE, for archived findings form Correctional Service of Canada form 1999. CLICK HERE, for a Larry Elder video on single parent households. CLICK HERE, for a documentary on drug use on reserves. CLICK HERE, for a video on lack of drinking water on reserves.
This is a proposal to scrap so-called “Gladue Rights” which specifically are designed to give Aboriginal offenders special consideration when it comes to sentencing in the criminal justice system.
Please don’t interpret this as an indication not to give anyone a break if the circumstances permit. Rather, rights and options should be available to everyone. They should not be given to one specific group, or denied to one specific group.
Disclaimer: I am not a criminologist, or a sociologist. Just a researcher.
Now, how great are the discrepancies?
From the StatsCan 2016/2017 findings:
The Criminal Code mandates that all sanctions other than imprisonment are to be considered with particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders. In 2016/2017, Aboriginal adults accounted for 28% of admissions to provincial/territorial correctional services and 27% for federal correctional services, while representing 4.1% of the Canadian adult population (Table 5). In comparison to 2006/2007, the proportion of admissions of Aboriginal peoples to correctional services was 21% for provincial and territorial correctional services and 19% for federal correctional services.
Aboriginal adults accounted for 30% of admissions to custody and 25% of admissions to community supervision among the provinces and territories in 2016/2017. Aboriginal adults accounted for 27% of admissions to custody and 26% of admissions to community supervision in federal correctional services (Table 5).
The proportion of Aboriginal admissions to adult custody has been trending upwards for over 10 years. It has increased steadily from 2006/2007 when it was 21% for provincial and territorial correctional services and 20% for federal correctional services.
Among the provinces, Aboriginal adults made up the greatest proportion of admissions to custody in Manitoba (74%) and Saskatchewan (76%). These two provinces also have the highest proportion of Aboriginal adults among their provincial populations at 15% for Manitoba, and 14% for Saskatchewan.
Aboriginal males accounted for 28% of admissions to custody in the province and territories, whereas non-Aboriginal males accounted for 72%, in 2016/2017. Aboriginal females made up a greater proportion of custody admissions than their male counterparts, accounting for 43% of admissions, while non-Aboriginal females accounted for 57% (Table 6).
Here is the data in a more visual form.
Abor. Total Pop’n
Abor. Group Pop’n
Non-Abor. Total Pop’n
Non-Abor. Group Pop’n
Note: Here is how to calculate the rates. Assume there is a population of 100,000 people, and 1,000 of them are locked up and then break in down as percentages of the population.
Now that we can make an apples-to-apples comparison, 0.068/0.0075 =~9.1
So on a per-capita basis, Aboriginals are about 9 times as likely as non-Aboriginals to be locked up
Next, covering Aboriginal women and incarceration rate. For this. Assume that the overall percentages are about same: 95.9% non-Aboriginal, and 4.1% Aboriginal. Here instead of making up 28% overall in Provincial jails, it is 57%, approximately double.
Abor. Total Pop’n
Abor. Group Pop’n
Non-Abor. Total Pop’n
Non-Abor. Group Pop’n
And once more we need to convert to rates of respective populations.
When women inmates are looked at specifically, the ratio goes to 0.1390/0.0045 ~= 30.88
That’s right, looking at women, there are (per capita) 30 times as many Aboriginal women locked up as non-Aboriginal women.
3. Evidence Of Discrimination Or Bias?
By itself, no. Having groups with different rates of something is not evidence that there has been discrimination. Either these differences are caused by something that justifies it (such as higher crime rate), or there may be some external factor. Let’s start with the Criminal Code.
718.2(e) all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders.
It is written right into the Canadian Criminal Code, to give offenders (where reasonable), an alternative to custody, with special consideration to Aboriginals. And this is codified in 3 cases.
R. v. Gladue, 1997 CanLII 3015 (BC CA)
R. v. Gladue,  1 SCR 688, 1999 CanLII 679 (SCC)
R. v. Ipeelee,  1 SCR 433, 2012 SCC 13 (CanLII)
Looking at the Criminal Code, and recent decisions, there doesn’t seem to be any legalized discrimination. So let’s look elsewhere.
4. R. v. Proulx (Conditional Sentencing Guidelines)
12 Since it came into force on September 3, 1996, the conditional sentence has generated considerable debate. With the advent of s. 742.1, Parliament has clearly mandated that certain offenders who used to go to prison should now serve their sentences in the community. Section 742.1 makes a conditional sentence available to a subclass of non-dangerous offenders who, prior to the introduction of this new regime, would have been sentenced to a term of incarceration of less than two years for offences with no minimum term of imprisonment.
13 In my view, to address meaningfully the complex interpretive issues raised by this appeal, it is important to situate this new sentencing tool in the broader context of the comprehensive sentencing reforms enacted by Parliament in Bill C-41. I will also consider the nature of the conditional sentence, contrasting it with probationary measures and incarceration. Next, I will address particular interpretive issues posed by s. 742.1. I will first discuss the statutory prerequisites to the imposition of a conditional sentence. Thereafter, I will consider how courts should determine whether a conditional sentence is appropriate, assuming the prerequisites are satisfied. I conclude with some general comments on the deference to which trial judges are entitled in matters of sentencing and dispose of the case at hand in conformity with the principles outlined in these reasons.
16 Bill C-41 is in large part a response to the problem of overincarceration in Canada. It was noted in Gladue, at para. 52, that Canada’s incarceration rate of approximately 130 inmates per 100,000 population places it second or third highest among industrialized democracies. In their reasons, Cory and Iacobucci JJ. reviewed numerous studies that uniformly concluded that incarceration is costly, frequently unduly harsh and “ineffective, not only in relation to its purported rehabilitative goals, but also in relation to its broader public goals” (para. 54). See also Report of the Canadian Committee on Corrections, Toward Unity: Criminal Justice and Corrections (1969); Canadian Sentencing Commission, Sentencing Reform: A Canadian Approach (1987), at pp. xxiii‑xxiv; Standing Committee on Justice and Solicitor General, Taking Responsibility (1988), at p. 75. Prison has been characterized by some as a finishing school for criminals and as ill-preparing them for reintegration into society: see generally Canadian Committee on Corrections, supra, at p. 314; Correctional Service of Canada, A Summary of Analysis of Some Major Inquiries on Corrections – 1938 to 1977 (1982), at p. iv. In Gladue, at para. 57, Cory and Iacobucci JJ. held:
Without rehashing the entire ruling, Proulx, which was based on Bill C-41, set the benchmark for giving out “conditional sentences”, aka “house arrest”. The ruling noted the destructive long term effect prison can have.
While conditional sentencing is completely inappropriate for certain offences, it can have its benefits.
In areas with high crime rates, poverty, or high drug use, a person has to reasonably ask what will be the best solution overall. Does the community benefit from locking up large amounts of its people?
One caveat, breaks in sentencing, and alternatives to prison should be equally available to all Canadians. One group shouldn’t receive a greater aid, or detriment.
See the next section for the CSC report on Aboriginal circumstances.
5. Information Worth Looking At
This comes from the 1998 Corrections Service of Canada Paper (linked above). It also has an impressive bibliography, worth at least a peek.
1.3 Aboriginal Population
Approximately, one-third of all Aboriginal children under the age of 15 in Census families lived in a lone-parent family, twice the rate within the general population. The rate was even higher in urban areas. About 46% of Aboriginal children under 15 in Census families who lived in a census metropolitan area were in a lone-parent family. One-quarter of the Aboriginal population reported that they had an Aboriginal language as mother tongue. Cree was the largest Aboriginal mother tongue. The number of people who could speak an Aboriginal language was about 10% higher than the number who reported an Aboriginal mother tongue, indicating that a significant number of persons learned such a language later in life. (Department of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 1998).
This mentions a very interesting issue. Conservative commentator Larry Elder frequently talks about this. Single parent households (mostly missing fathers), is a very good indicator of crime and education. And it cuts across race.
1.4 Demographic and Socio-Economic Data
Increasing evidence points to a strong correlation between socio-economic disadvantage and involvement with the criminal justice system. A large proportion of the Aboriginal population in Canada suffers socio-economic disadvantage in comparison to non-Aboriginal Canadians. The social and economic conditions outlined in the section below illustrates a correlation between these factors and Aboriginal involvement with the criminal justice system. Poverty, inadequate educational opportunities, unemployment, poor living conditions, alcohol abuse and domestic violence all contribute to Aboriginal people coming into conflict with the law. The challenges to which the criminal justice system must respond are rooted in addressing these disadvantaged conditions.
These problems are prevalent, in particularly on remote reserves. To be fair, it isn’t restricted to reserves. It is heartbreaking to hear the problems and 3rd world conditions.
Suicide is approximately three times more common among Aboriginal people than non-Aboriginal people. It is also five to six times more prevalent among Aboriginal youth than non-Aboriginal youth. In First Nations communities, suicide is more prevalent among the young and usually results from feelings of hopelessness and despair.
Wow. Just wow.
2.4 Urban vs. Rural Aboriginal Offenders
A recent study (Johnston, 1997) of Aboriginal inmates incarcerated in Canadian federal penitentiaries found that one-quarter (24%) of the group had originally came from reserve or remote areas; 44% originally came from rural areas, and 30% from urban areas. The interviewers did not ask about where the offenders had been living at the time of the offence. In addition, the study also found that a majority of the group had left their home community after their youth. Eighteen percent had lived in their home community all their life apart from periods spent incarcerated. Furthermore, the study found that 66% of the Aboriginal inmates incarcerated in federal penitentiaries were considered high-need. Forty-seven per cent were rated as both high-need and high-risk. A majority were rated by case management officers and other penitentiary staff who knew them, as having needs in the following areas:
-substance abuse needs (88%),
-personal/emotional needs (82%),
-employment needs (63%), and
-education needs (54%).
A large proportion were also rated as having needs in relation to:
-pro-criminal attitudes (49%),
-marital and family issues (42%),
-community functioning (36%),
-criminal associates (33%), and
-sexual offending (31%).
This is shocking. Almost 9 in 10 with substance abuse, 4 in 5 with personal needs, 2/3 with employment needs, and half lacking in education.
Canada is supposed to be a 1st world country, but standard of living for those away from any urban area are falling far short of what should be acceptable.
6. So Why Abolish Gladue?
Quite simply, it is a band-aid solution that ignores the real problems. “Rigging” the rules to let Aboriginal offenders off easier (or let them out earlier) turns a blind eye to the problems cited in the previous section. Lack of drinking water being one in the news lately.
Are Aboriginals disproportionately represented in criminal courts and jails? Yes, absolutely. The data and evidence for that is overwhelming.
But it is also plain and obvious that there are many problems with the more remote areas that should not be happening. Setting up different sentencing guidelines does nothing to address any of that.
It could easily be argued that problems with poverty, remote living, drugs, alcohol and domestic violence contribute to crime. These are the causes and crime is the effect. But Gladue gets it entirely backwards. It impacts the EFFECT, hoping to impact the CAUSES.
Hopefully this doesn’t come off as heartless. However, I view the “Gladue Rights” idea as completely missing the point, and ignoring genuine concerns.
7. Actually, There Is Discrimination
Instead of our Prime Minister blowing our money on virtue signalling foreign adventures, perhaps fixing the problems within our borders is a better approach.
Safe drinking water
Access to social services
Seriously evaluate if reserve system is sustainable
We certainly have money to blow on every UN adventure.
While the criminal justice system itself isn’t set up to discriminate, our government does. Entire sections of Canada’s population is left to die while we show the outside world how generous we are.
Gladue is the quick-fix that covers up the real problem.
CLICK HERE, for the last piece, a call to restore the 1934 Bank of Canada Act. CLICK HERE, for www.comer.org. CLICK HERE, for a failed Court bid to reform the banking process in Canada. CLICK HERE, for COMER’s 2011 press release. CLICK HERE, for 2012 Proceedings. CLICK HERE, for the ruling to strike our the claim, without leave to amend. CLICK HERE, for April 24, 2014 ruling, which overturned the portion of the striking out, instead, allowing an amended statement to be filed. CLICK HERE, for press release on April 24, 2014 decision, overturning a Pronothary’s dismissal. CLICK HERE, for the 2015 Federal Court of Appeal ruling. CLICK HERE, for the 2015 Federal Court of Appeal
2. From COMER’s 2011 Press Release
The action also constitutionally challenges the government’s fallacious accounting methods in its tabling of the budget by not calculating nor revealing the true and total revenues of the nation before transferring back “tax credits” to corporations and other taxpayers.
The Plaintiffs state that since 1974 there has been a gradual but sure slide into the reality that the Bank of Canada and Canada’s monetary and financial policy are dictated by private foreign banks and financial interests contrary to the Bank of Canada Act.
The Plaintiffs state that the Bank of International Settlements (BIS), the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were all created with the cognizant intent of keeping poorer nations in their place which has now expanded to all nations in that these financial institutions largely succeed in over-riding governments and constitutional orders in countries such as Canada over which they exert financial control.
The Plaintiffs state that the meetings of the BIS and Financial Stability Board (FSB) (successor of FSF), their minutes, their discussions and deliberations are secret and not available nor accountable to Parliament, the executive, nor the Canadian public notwithstanding that the Bank of Canada policies directly emanate from these meetings. These organizations are essentially private, foreign entities controlling Canada’s banking system and socio-economic policies.
The gist of the press release, and of the Claim overall, is that Canada’s banking system has been hijacked and usurped. As such, it is controlled by foreign entities such as the Bank of International Settlements and the International Monetary Fund.
As was outlined in the last article, Canada’s banking “was” effectively turned over. The result is that Canada, instead of loaning money to itself, is now borrowing from private banks. As such, it is being bled dry.
In fact, COMER’s claims can be easily validated by online research. The question for the Court to decide: is this actually legal?
3. Ruling Striking Out Statement of Claim
 The core elements of COMER’s Claim can be reduced to three parts:
1. The Bank of Canada (Bank) and Crown refuse to provide interest-free loans for capital expenditures.
2. The Crown uses flawed accounting methods in describing public finances, which provides the rationale for refusing to grant such loans.
3. These and other harms are caused by the Bank being controlled by private foreign interests.
The Pronothary summarizing the main issues the Plaintiffs raise
 Against these competing positions, it must be remembered that the test for striking an action is a high one. The action must be bereft of any chance of success and as noted above just because it is a novel cause of action it does not automatically fail.
 The Supreme Court of Canada has recently summarized the principles to be applied on a motion to strike. In R. v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., the Chief Justice, writing for the Court made the following observations regarding a motion to strike:
17. The parties agree on the test applicable on a motion to strike for not disclosing a reasonable cause of action under r. 19(24)(a) of the B.C. Supreme Court Rules. This Court has reiterated the test on many occasions. A claim will only be struck if it is plain and obvious, assuming the facts pleaded to be true, that the pleading discloses no reasonable cause of action: Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse, 2003 SCC 69 (CanLII),  3 S.C.R. 263, at para. 15; Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc., 1990 CanLII 90 (SCC),  2 S.C.R. 959, at p. 980. Another way of putting the test is that the claim has no reasonable prospect of [page 67] success. Where a reasonable prospect of success exists, the matter should be allowed to proceed to trial: see, generally, Syl Apps Secure Treatment Centre v. B.D., 2007 SCC 38 (CanLII),  3 S.C.R. 83; Odhavji Estate; Hunt; Attorney General of Canada v. Inuit Tapirisat of Canada, 1980 CanLII 21 (SCC),  2 S.C.R. 735.
. . .
21. Valuable as it is, the motion to strike is a tool that must be used with care. The law is not static and unchanging. Actions that yesterday were deemed hopeless may tomorrow succeed. Before Donoghue v. Stevenson,  A.C. 562 (H.L.) introduced a general duty of care to one’s neighbour premised [page68] on foreseeability, few would have predicted that, absent a contractual relationship, a bottling company could be held liable for physical injury and emotional trauma resulting from a snail in a bottle of ginger beer. Before Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners, Ltd.,  2 All E.R. 575 (H.L.), a tort action for negligent misstatement would have been regarded as incapable of success. The history of our law reveals that often new developments in the law first surface on motions to strike or similar preliminary motions, like the one at issue in Donoghue v. Stevenson. Therefore, on a motion to strike, it is not determinative that the law has not yet recognized the particular claim. The court must rather ask whether, assuming the facts pleaded are true, there is a reasonable prospect that the claim will succeed. The approach must be generous and err on the side of permitting a novel but arguable claim to proceed to trial.
What we can gain from this is that striking out a Statement of Claim is something that must be done cautiously, and only when it is plain and obvious that there is no chance to succeed.
Some of what may be “struck out” now, may in fact later be the basis for new laws, so the Courts should exercise caution and not jump to conclusions.
 The Crown further contends that COMER’s claim is outside this Court’s jurisdiction as it fails to meet the three-part test set out in ITO-International Terminal Operators Ltd v. Miida Electronics Inc. In ITO, the Supreme Court considered the jurisdiction of the Federal Court in the context of an admiralty action. The Supreme Court determined that jurisdiction in the Federal Court depends on three factors:
1. There must be a statutory grant of jurisdiction by the Federal Parliament.
2. There must be an existing of body of federal law which is essential to the disposition of the case and which nourishes the statutory grant of jurisdiction.
3. The law on which the case is based must be a “law of Canada” as the phrase is used in s. 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867 [page 766]
 The jurisdictional issue raised by the Crown engages the three part test set out in ITO as discussed above. The Crown argues that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain tort claims against Federal authorities.
 However, pursuant to sections 2, 17 and 18 of the Federal Courts Act, the wording is sufficiently wide to capture these types of claims against federal actors and Crown servants. It is therefore not plain and obvious that this Court is without jurisdiction to entertain claims seeking declaratory relief as here.
One of the major contentions is that the Government alleged that the Federal Court had no jurisdiction to even hear the case. The Pronothary took a different view. However, there were other problems which ended with this.
 There is ample authority in this Court and in the jurisprudence generally that where a claim has some kernel of a legitimate claim it should not be tossed aside but permitted to be amended to determine if the clam in law can be cured.
 Given that the Claim, in my view, is not justiciable, leave to amend will not cure the defects. Leave to amend is therefore not granted.
The case was thrown out on a motion to strike. However, that will not be the end of it. The Plaintiffs would appeal to a Justice of the Federal Court.
The striking out (without permission to amend) was appealed to a Justice of the Federal Court. This was a partial victory, as the dismissal “was” upheld, but it allowed the Plaintiff’s to file an amended Claim. This would be another “chance” to get it right.
5. COMER Tries To File Again
After the Justice of the Federal Court upheld the dismissal (but giving leave to amend the Statement of Claim), COMER appealed to the Federal Court of Appeal, and the Government cross-appealed.
In short, the Plaintiffs were trying to get the dismissal overturned entirely, while the Government tried to remove the clause to allow COMER to file an amended Statement of Claim.
The Federal Appeals Court panel (3 Justices) threw out both the appeal and cross-appeal.
 In terms of the general principles that ought to be applied on a motion to strike, the Plaintiffs assert that the facts pleaded by the Plaintiffs must be taken as proven: Canada (Attorney General) v Inuit Tapirasat of Canada, 1980 CanLII 21 (SCC),  2 SCR 735; Nelles v Ontario (1989), DLR (4th) 609 (SCC) [Nelles]; Operation Dismantle, above; Hunt v Carey Canada Inc 1990 CanLII 90 (SCC),  2 SCR 959 [Hunt]; Dumont v Canada (Attorney General), 1990 CanLII 131 (SCC),  1 SCR 279 [Dumont]; Nash v Ontario (1995), 1995 CanLII 2934 (ON CA), 27 OR (3d) 1 (Ont CA) [Nash]; Canada v Arsenault, 2009 FCA 242 (CanLII) [Arsenault].
 The Plaintiffs echo the test referenced by the Defendants, asserting that a claim can be struck only in plain and obvious cases where the pleading is bad beyond argument: Nelles, above, at para 3. The Court has provided further guidance in Dumont, above, that an outcome should be “plain and obvious” or “beyond doubt” before striking can be invoked (at para 2). Striking cannot be justified by a claim that raises an “arguable, difficult or important point of law”: Hunt, above, at para 55.
 The novelty of the Amended Claim is not reason in and of itself to strike it: Nash, above, at para 11; Hanson v Bank of Nova Scotia (1994), 1994 CanLII 573 (ON CA), 19 OR (3d) 142 (CA); Adams-Smith v Christian Horizons (1997), 3 OR (3d) 640 (Ont Gen Div). Additionally, matters that are not fully settled by the jurisprudence should not be disposed of on a motion to strike: RD Belanger & Associates Ltd v Stadium Corp of Ontario Ltd (1991), 1991 CanLII 2731 (ON CA), 5 OR (3d) 778 (CA). In order for the Defendants to succeed, the Plaintiffs state that a case from the same jurisdiction that squarely deals with, and rejects, the very same issue must be presented: Dalex Co v Schwartz Levitsky Feldman (1994), 19 OR (3d) 215 (CA). The Court should be generous when interpreting the drafting of the pleadings, and allow for amendments prior to striking: Grant v Cormier – Grant et al (2001), 2001 CanLII 3041 (ON CA), 56 OR (3d) 215 (CA).
 The Plaintiffs also remind the Court that the line between fact and evidence is not always clear (Liebmann v Canada, 1993 CanLII 3006 (FC),  2 FC 3 at para 20) and that the Amended Claim must be taken as pleaded by the Plaintiffs, not as reconfigured by the Defendants: Arsenault, above, at para 10.
Plaintiffs arguing that the Defendant has not actually met the burden to strike out a Statement of Claim. However, the Justice decides differently.
 In the present case, the Plaintiffs have not, in their Amended Claim, pleaded facts to demonstrate a “real” issue concerning the relative interests of each party, and the nexus of that real issue to the Plaintiffs and their claim for relief. Although as I pointed out in my Order of April 24, 2014, the Plaintiffs do distinguish between legal issues and policy issues, the legal issues remain theoretical with no real nexus to some interest of the Plaintiffs, other than an interest in having the Court endorse their opinion on the Bank Act issues raised.
 The Plaintiffs have not addressed the jurisdictional problems I referred to in paras 85 to 91 of my Order of April 24, 2014 and/or what might generally be referred to as the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain, or its willingness to grant, free-standing requests for declaration.
The Justice Rules that the original problems are left unfixed. As such, the case is thrown out. This time, there is no leave to amend, so if this is to continue, it must go back to the Federal Court of Appeals.
 The essence of the Federal Court judge’s reasoning for striking the amended statement of claim is summed up at paragraph 144 of his reasons: It seems to me, then, that the latest Amended Claim discloses no reasonable cause of action and has no prospect of success at trial. It also seems to me that the Plaintiffs are still asking the Court for an advisory opinion in the form of declarations that their view of the way the Bank Act and the Constitution should be read is correct. It also seems to me that they have failed to show a statutory grant of jurisdiction by Parliament that this Court can entertain and rule on their claim as presently constituted, or that they have any specific rights under the legislation which they invoke, or a legal framework for any such rights. As the Supreme Court of Canada pointed out in Operation Dismantle, above, the preventive function of a declaratory judgment must be more than hypothetical and requires “a cognizable threat to a legal interest before the Court will entertain the use of its process as a preventative measure” (para 33). The Court is not here to declare the law generally or to give an advisory opinion. The Court is here to decide and declare contested legal rights.
 The appellants assert that the opinion so expressed is wrong in law. In support of this proposition, they essentially reiterate the arguments which they urged upon the Federal Court judge and ask that we come to a different conclusion. Counsel for the appellants focused his argument during the hearing on the issue of standing and the right to seek declarations of constitutionality. It remains however that, as the Federal Court judge found, the right to a remedy is conditional on the existence of a justiciable issue.
The Federal Appeals Court believes that COMER is still asking for an advisory opinion. Furthermore, the FCA still believes that no justiciable issue has been raised.
The Supreme Court refuses to hear the case, which means it is legally over. It would have been nice to have some actual reasons included. However, due to the volume of cases it receives, rejected applications generally don’t receive them.
9. Issues Still Remain Unaddressed
Despite repeated rejection by the Courts, the questions about the changes in banking policy were never really addressed. Does giving control of our central bank to foreign powers break the law?
This is supposedly a “political” issue, but no politicians are willing to talk about it.
As of now, Canada is still borrowing money from private banks, as opposed to ourselves. We are racking up huge levels of debt that we shouldn’t be.
(Other articles on central banking) CLICK HERE, for Part II, the COMER Case. CLICK HERE, for Part III, US Federal Reserve (End The Fed) CLICK HERE, for Part IV, Debt Reports & Email From Ministry. CLICK HERE, for Part V, Globalist Approved Talking Points. CLICK HERE, for Part VI, answers from Bank of Canada email. CLICK HERE, for Part VII, Mark Carney as new UN Envoy.
CLICK HERE, for an interesting article from Canadian Dimension. CLICK HERE, for an article from www.globalresearch.ca. CLICK HERE, for a failed Court bid to reform the banking process in Canada CLICK HERE, for amended Statement of Claim. CLICK HERE, for the Bank of Canada Act, 1985 version.
2. Some Background
The Bank of Canada Act was passed in 1934. It allowed the Canadian Government to borrow from its own central bank, in a sense, to “borrow from itself”. However, things drastically changed in 1974. Pierre Trudeau changed it so that Canada would now be borrowing from “private banks”, and racking up debt and interest charges in the meantime.
From the Global Research article:
Between 1939 and 1974, the government actually did borrow from its own central bank. That made its debt effectively interest-free, since the government owned the bank and got the benefit of the interest. According to figures supplied by Jack Biddell, a former government accountant, the federal debt remained very low, relatively flat, and quite sustainable during those years. (See his chart below.) The government successfully funded major public projects simply on the credit of the nation, including the production of aircraft during and after World War II, education benefits for returning soldiers, family allowances, old age pensions, the Trans-Canada Highway, the St. Lawrence Seaway project, and universal health care for all Canadians.
This is the main takeaway here: Borrowing from your own central bank effectively makes the loans interest free, since you are borrowing from yourself as opposing to borrowing from someone else.
From the Canadian Dimension article:
The critical point is that between 1939 and 1974 the federal government borrowed extensively from its own central bank. That made its debt effectively interest-free, since the government owned the bank and got the benefit of any interest. As such Canada emerged from World War II and from all the extensive infrastructure and other expenditures with very little debt. But following 1974 came a dramatic change.
Reiterating the point, that Canada was borrowing from itself until 1974.
In 1930, Canada’s national debt was about $2 billion. In $1974, it was about $20 billion. A decade after changes to the Act, the debt was about $160, or 8 times higher.
Worth noting, that Brian Mulroney, who was PM from 1984 until 1993 added over $300 billion to the national debt.
4. Fighting Back: Committee on Monetary & Economic Reform
Supreme Court of Canada Dismisses Constitutional Bank of Canada Case, Claiming It Is a Political Matter
We believe that the case has ample legal merit, and should have proceeded to trial. It is not uncommon for the Supreme Court to refuse leave on a given issue multiple times, finally to grant leave, hear the appeal and the case then succeeds. The Supreme Court controls its own agenda, both in its timing and on the merits of issues it will or will not hear. (Annually, fewer than 8–10% of all cases filed are granted permission and heard at the Supreme Court of Canada.)
It should be noted that throughout this arduous and expensive legal process, the substance of this lawsuit initiated in the public interest has not been addressed. The matters raised by the lawsuit are summarized in the original news release (pdf) issued on December 19, 2011.)
A 5 1/2 year legal fight to restore the original central banking. Even more frustrating is that the Courts have never really addressed the issues which led to the challenge in the first place.
The Supreme Court says it is a “political matter”, but no politicians in Canada have the willpower to address it, never mind fix it. Even “socialist” and “populist” politicians seem unwilling to take it on.
5. Who Are These People?
About BIS – overview
Our mission is to serve central banks in their pursuit of monetary and financial stability, to foster international cooperation in those areas and to act as a bank for central banks.
Established in 1930, the BIS is owned by 60 central banks, representing countries from around the world that together account for about 95% of world GDP. Its head office is in Basel, Switzerland and it has two representative offices: in Hong Kong SAR and in Mexico City.
We pursue our mission by:
fostering discussion and facilitating collaboration among central banks
supporting dialogue with other authorities that are responsible for promoting financial stability
carrying out research and policy analysis on issues of relevance for monetary and financial stability
acting as a prime counterparty for central banks in their financial transactions
serving as an agent or trustee in connection with international financial operations
As part of our work in the area of monetary and financial stability, we regularly publish related analyses and international banking and financial statistics that underpin policymaking, academic research and public debate.
With regard to our banking activities, our customers are central banks and international organisations. We do not accept deposits from, or provide financial services to, private individuals or corporate entities.
Supposedly, the Bank for International Settlements is “owned” by 60 central banks. It then facilitates discussions between those 60 banks. In short, it is a global collusion to fix monetary policies.
Interesting that the “central banks” are supposed to be owned by their respective nations, yet, BIS recommends borrowing from “private” bankers. Almost as if it wasn’t acting in the nations’ self interests.
6. Not in Canada’s Interests
This should be obvious, but borrowing from private banks is not in Canada’s best interests, nor any nations. This is bankrupting our nation, to enrich global bankers.
Restore the 1934 Bank of Canada Act, and let us take back control over our own finances.
Curious, even when national and provincial debts are in the news so much, no one asks the obvious question. Why are we jacking up our debt by borrowing from private banks?
CLICK HERE, for Ontario Court of Appeals ruling, May 15, 2019. CLICK HERE, for the Ontario Divisional Court ruling, January 31, 2018. CLICK HERE, for R.v. Oakes (balancing test) CLICK HERE, for Carter v. Canada (struck down assisted suicide laws). CLICK HERE, for Ontario Human Rights Code. CLICK HERE, for the Canadian Charter. CLICK HERE, for some Charter cases. CLICK HERE, for Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 (standard for review)
Miscellaneous Articles CLICK HERE, for woman who tries to drown newborn gets only 1 year. CLICK HERE, for a Maclean’s article on “assault on women’s rights”. CLICK HERE, for Roe (as in Roe v Wade), becomes anti-abortion activist.
2. Brief Introduction
The case above is one of Ontario doctors refusing to provide certain “reproductive health services” (a.k.a. abortion), and “medical assistance in dying” MAiD (a.k.a. euthanasia). Not only did they refuse to provide these services, they refused to help with the referrals procedures to others who would.
The Appellants refused on religious grounds. They claimed that requiring them to participate in these “medical services” violated their consciences and religious convictions. To be fair, we are talking about killing unborn children, eldery, and terminal patients. The other extreme would be more disturbing.
Their regulatory body, the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, says if they won’t perform such “health care services”, then they must help the patients get referred to doctors who will.
The Ontario Divisional Court agreed that this was the case. And now the Ontario Court of Appeals has upheld that ruling. Will this go to the Supreme Court of Canada? We will see.
3. Court of Appeal Exerps
 The appeal raises the following issues:
(1) What is the applicable standard of review and is the Doré/Loyola framework or the Oakes framework applicable to this case?
(2) Do the effective referral requirements of the Policies infringe the appellants’ s. 2(a) freedom of conscience and religion?
(3) Do the effective referral requirements of the Policies infringe the appellants’ s. 15(1) equality rights?
(4) If there is an infringement of the appellants’ Charter rights and/or freedoms, is it justified under s. 1 of the Charter?
Standard Of Review
 The normal rules of appellate review of lower court decisions, articulated in Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33 (CanLII),  2 S.C.R. 235, apply on this appeal. Questions of law are reviewed on a correctness standard, and questions of fact and mixed fact and law are reviewed on a standard of palpable and overriding error: Housen, at paras. 8, 10, 36-37. The Divisional Court’s selection and application of the correctness standard to the Policies is a question of law and is accordingly reviewed by this court on a correctness standard.
If it is a question of fact, the standard is “overriding palpable error”. In essence, Appeals Courts tend to “give deference” to the Trial Judge since he/she is in a much better position to actually judge the case.
In questions of law, the standard is the correctness of the law itself.
In questions of mixed law and fact are viewed more towards “overriding palpable error”.
 In Law Society of British Columbia v. Trinity Western University, 2018 SCC 32 (CanLII),  2 S.C.R. 293, at para. 62, the Supreme Court adopted the definition of religious freedom expressed in R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., 1985 CanLII 69 (SCC),  1 S.C.R. 295, at p. 336:
[T]he right to entertain such religious beliefs as a person chooses, the right to declare religious beliefs openly and without fear of hindrance or reprisal, and the right to manifest religious belief by worship and practice or by teaching and dissemination.
 At para. 63, the court set out the requirements of the test:
[F]irst, that he or she sincerely believes in a practice or belief that has a nexus with religion; and second, that the impugned state conduct interferes, in a manner that is more than trivial or insubstantial, with his or her ability to act in accordance with that practice or belief.
This was the test applied by the Divisional Court, referring to Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, 2004 SCC 47 (CanLII),  2 S.C.R. 551, at para. 56. See also Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37 (CanLII),  2 S.C.R. 567, at para. 32.
 The sincerity of belief and interference are conceded. But the College contends that the interference is trivial and insubstantial and does not contravene s. 2(a).
 I disagree. To explain my reasons, it is necessary to examine the appellants’ beliefs and their objections to performing or referring patients for the procedures at issue.
All parties agree the beliefs are sincere. The College says it is trivial, while the Panel disagrees.
Section 15 and Equality
 The Divisional Court referred to the two-part test for establishing a breach of s. 15(1) articulated in Taypotat, at paras. 19-20: (1) whether, on its face or in its impact, a law creates a distinction on the basis of an enumerated or analogous ground; and (2) whether the impugned law fails to respond to the actual capacities and needs of the members of the group and instead imposes burdens or denies benefits in a manner that has the effect of reinforcing, perpetuating or exacerbating their disadvantage.
 The focus of the inquiry is “whether a distinction has the effect of perpetuating arbitrary disadvantage on the claimant because of his or her membership in an enumerated or analogous group” such that it is a “discriminatory distinction”: Taypotat, at paras. 16, 18; and Quebec (Attorney General) v. A., 2013 SCC 5 (CanLII),  1 S.C.R. 61, at para. 331
 Applying this test, the Divisional Court dismissed the appellants’ claim that the Policies infringe their equality rights under s. 15(1) of the Charter. Without deciding whether the Policies create a distinction on the basis of religion, the Divisional Court held that the Policies do not have the effect of reinforcing, perpetuating or exacerbating a disadvantage or promoting prejudice against religious physicians. Nor do they restrict access to a fundamental social institution or impede full membership in Canadian society.
To put it mildly, the Courts have decided that not all “equality rights” are treated equally. In other words, it is okay to discriminate on the basis of “protected grounds” as long as it falls within certain guidelines.
Allowed Under Section 1?
 The onus at this stage is on the College to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that the infringement of the appellants’ freedom of religion is a reasonable limit, demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society: Multani, at para. 43.
 In Oakes, at pp. 135 and 138-39, Dickson C.J. articulated a framework for the s. 1 analysis, which can be summarized as follows:
(a) the Charter-infringing measure must be “prescribed by law”;
(b) the objective of the impugned measure must be of sufficient importance to warrant overriding a constitutionally protected right or freedom;
(c) the means chosen must be reasonable and demonstrably justified – this is a “form of proportionality test” which will vary in the circumstances, but requires a balancing of the interests of society with the interests of individuals and groups and has three components:
(i) the measure must be rationally connected to the objective – i.e., carefully designed to achieve the objective and not arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational considerations;
(ii) the means chosen should impair the Charter right or freedom as little as possible; and
(iii)there must be proportionality between the salutary and deleterious effects of the measure.
This is a fairly lengthy section, but this lays out the groundwork for determining whether Charter violations can otherwise be “saved”. Are there justifiable public interests in the breaches that are affirmed? Ultimately, the Court of Appeals said yes. These violations were justified on other grounds.
 The Fact Sheet identifies options that are clearly acceptable to many objecting physicians. Those who do not find them acceptable may be able to find other practice structures that will insulate them from participation in actions to which they object. If they cannot do so, they will have to seek out other ways in which to use their skills, training and commitment to patient care. I do not underestimate the individual sacrifices this may require. The Divisional Court correctly found, however, that the burden of these sacrifices did not outweigh the harm to vulnerable patients that would be caused by any reasonable alternative. That conclusion is not undermined by the fresh evidence before this court. Even taking the burden imposed on physicians at its most onerous, as framed by the appellants, the salutary effects of the Policies still outweigh the deleterious effects.
 As the Divisional Court observed, the appellants have no common law, proprietary or constitutional right to practice medicine. As members of a regulated and publicly-funded profession, they are subject to requirements that focus on the public interest, rather than their interests. In fact, the fiduciary nature of the physician-patient relationship requires physicians to act at all times in their patients’ best interests, and to avoid conflicts between their own interests and their patients’ interests:
4. Closing Thoughts
This is the heart of the conclusion:
(A) Doctors have other options
(B) Doctors can alter their practice
(C) Public interest comes first
(D) Medicine is a publicly regulated profession.
One thing needs to be pointed out though: just because something is LEGAL, doesn’t make it MORAL. Abortion and euthanasia are killing. Period.
Although both abortion and assisted suicide have no criminal penalties against them, there are still huge scientific and moral arguments against both. This will be a topic for a coming piece.
If a person believes that carrying out just “health care services” amounts to murder, that is okay. But wouldn’t referrals of such procedures make a doctor an accessory to murder? Although one degree removed, the moral objection would be the same.
Bottom line: provide the service, or refer to someone else who will. You’re here to serve the public.
CLICK HERE, for factum of Intergenerational Climate Committee. CLICK HERE, for the Factum of Canadian Taxpayers Federation. CLICK HERE, for United Conservative Association.
2. Quotes From Sask COA Ruling
 The factual record presented to the Court confirms that climate change caused by anthropogenic greenhouse gas [GHG] emissions is one of the great existential issues of our time. The pressing importance of limiting such emissions is accepted by all of the participants in these proceedings.
 The Act seeks to ensure there is a minimum national price on GHG emissions in order to encourage their mitigation. Part 1 of the Act imposes a charge on GHG-producing fuels and combustible waste. Part 2 puts in place an output-based performance system for large industrial facilities. Such facilities are obliged to pay compensation if their GHG emissions exceed applicable limits. Significantly, the Act operates as no more than a backstop. It applies only those provinces or areas where the Governor in Council concludes GHG emissions are not priced at an appropriate level.
 The sole issue before the Court is whether Parliament has the constitutional authority to enact the Act. The issue is not whether GHG pricing should or should not be adopted or whether the Act is effective or fair. Those are questions to be answered by Parliament and by provincial legislatures, not by courts.
As was mentioned in the last segment, Saskatchewan “admits” that climate change is a real thing, and that emissions must be reduced drastically, in order to save the planet.
In other words, “Conservative” Premier Scott Moe fully endorsed the climate change scam. Rather, his sole argument against was that Ottawa should not intervene, and that Provinces should be left to their own devices. Specifically, Ottawa shouldn’t impose a carbon tax.
Moe is hardly alone in this. Indeed, the other “Resistance Members”
3. Quotes From Ontario Factum
>6. Ontario agrees with Canada that climate change is real and that human activities are a major cause. Ontario also acknowledges that climate change is already having a disruptive effect across Canada, and that, left unchecked, its potential impact will be even more severe. Ontario agrees that proactive action to address climate change is required. That is why Ontario has put forward for consultation a made-in-Ontario plan to protect the environment, reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and fight climate change.
11. Ontario released its climate change plan, as part of its overall environment plan, for a 60-day period of public consultation on November 29, 2018. The plan will be finalized following consideration of input from that consultation. Ontario’s plan will tackle climate change in a balanced and responsible way, without placing additional burdens on Ontario families and businesses
12. “[Greenhouse gas] emissions come from virtually all aspects of Ontario’s society and economy.” There are seven primary sectors in Ontario that produce greenhouse gas emissions: transportation; industry; buildings; land use, land use change and forestry; electricity; waste; and agriculture. All but the last (which is an area of concurrent federal/provincial jurisdiction) will be discussed in turn.
13. Canada itself has publicly acknowledged the wide range of activities that can generate greenhouse gas emissions – activities as varied as homes and buildings, transport, industry, forestry, agriculture, waste, and electricity.
(Source is here.) Ontario, like Saskatchewan, does not bother questioning any of the findings. Both “Conservative” governments have no interest in getting to the truth of the scam, nor the many failed model predictions. Again, this only concerns whether Ottawa can mandate Carbon taxes on other provinces.
4.Quotes From New Brunswick Factum
1. The Intervenor, Attorney General of New Brunswick (“New Brunswick”) agrees with the factum of the Attorney General of Ontario (“Ontario”) regarding the nature of this reference and agrees with Ontario’s conclusions in every respect. New Brunswick also agrees with the climate data submitted by the Attorney General of Canada (“Canada”). This reference should not be a forum for those who deny climate change; nor should it be a showcase about the risks posed by greenhouse gas emissions (“GHG emissions”). The supporting data is relevant only to the extent that it is meaningfully connected to the constitutional question at issue.
2. The foundational climate change data provided by Canada, generally intended to portray the anticipated impacts of climate change in Canada, as well as the many references to international accord and commitments, leave an unquestionable impression of Canada’s a deep resolve to see the nation’s environmental footprint diminished. New Brunswick does not take issue with Canada’s commitment or with the importance of the overall subject matter.
3. What New Brunswick disputes is the way in which the federal Parliament has apportioned its resolve to diminish GHG emissions by imposing “backstop legislation”.
New Brunswick very explicitly states that the reference is not for anyone who denies “climate change, or global warming (or whatever it identifies as). Instead, the only issue is whether the tax imposed by the Federal Government is constitutional.
5. Quotes From BC Factum
1. Greenhouse gases might pose the most difficult collective action problem the world has ever faced. The benefits of emissions are local, but the costs are global. When people burn fossil fuels in the production or consumption of goods and services, each jurisdiction – national or subnational – exports its greenhouse gases to every other. And they all import the consequences: for all practical purposes, without regard to the extent of their own part in creating the problem.
2. The prospect of uncontrolled climate change requires that we treat the capacity of the atmosphere to hold greenhouse gases like the scarce, valuable resource it is. If total temperature increases are to be kept to 1.5˚C or 2˚C above pre-industrial averages — or indeed to any target at all — the world must ultimately reduce net emissions to zero. The global stock of greenhouse gases that can permissibly be added in the meantime is finite and must somehow be allocated. Those allocations have an economic value that individuals, industries, sub-national jurisdictions and nation states can be expected to quarrel over.
3. Under Canada’s Constitution, provinces have legislative authority to regulate or price emissions by individuals and businesses within their borders. In 2008, British Columbia enacted one of the first carbon pricing schemes. In the intervening decade, emissions were reduced compared to what they would have been, while the province enjoyed the highest economic growth in the country. But because greenhouse gases do not respect borders — while provincial legislation must — British Columbia’s actions will only counteract the negative effects of climate change on the property and civil rights of its residents if other jurisdictions follow suit
BC actually has a socialist government, which in this case is indistinguishable from self-identified “Conservative” governments.
6. Quotes From Manitoba
The Manitoba government will go to court over Ottawa’s imposition of a carbon tax.
Premier Brian Pallister revealed Wednesday his government will launch a legal challenge against the federal government, which imposed its new levy as promised on Manitoba, along with three other provinces, Monday.
“We’re going to court, sadly, to challenge the Ottawa carbon tax because Ottawa cannot impose a carbon tax on a province that has a credible greenhouse gas-reduction plan of its own, and we do,” he told reporters.
Manitoba’s Premier Pallister, who also self-identifies as a “Conservative”, doesn’t challenge the history of valid predictions or climate models. Instead, his position (like the others), is solely that Ottawa doesn’t have the authority to impose a Carbon tax on the Provinces.
7. Quotes From Alberta
The fall federal election will be “an opportunity for Canadians to say that they don’t want busy-body politicians telling them how to live their lives and taking more money out of their pockets,” said Kenney, who was sworn in as Alberta’s premier on Tuesday.
Alberta is not currently subject to the federal carbon tax because it has its own pricing scheme set up by the former NDP government. Kenney has vowed to repeal that legislation and implement his own emissions reduction plan.
Again, no mention about the scam that is climate change. No mention of how wrong all these “experts” have been. Nothing about how Carbon Dioxide is used in photosynthesis.
And Jason (Bilderberg) Kenney will very shortly go about screwing over Alberta, first with a “made in Alberta” Carbon tax, then supporting Bill C-69, despite the damage it will do to Alberta’s economy. See here, and see here.
8. From Canadian Taxpayer Federation
1. The Canadian Taxpayers Federation [the CTF] is a federally incorporated, not-for-profit citizen’s group dedicated to advocating for lower taxes, less waste, and more accountable government. The CTF is participating in this reference based on its concern that the federal carbon tax is unlikely to achieve its stated objective and will, instead, just be a ‘tax’ on the taxpayers of Ontario, despite being imposed on the taxpayers of Ontario in a manner that is contrary to section 53 of the Constitution Act, 1867. Constitution Act, 1867, at s. 53.
2. The CTF intends to use its participation in this reference to advance the following two points. First, the federal carbon tax also meets the legal criteria for being designated as a ‘tax’. Second, the federal carbon tax does not comply with the constitutionally-enshrined principle of “no taxation without representation” and, thus, the federal carbon tax is unconstitutional, at least in its application in Ontario.
For a non-profit worried about wasted taxpayer money, the CTF misses the most important part: the climate change movement is a scam based on junk science. However, no where that (or any similar arguments), be made on its behalf.
9. From United Conservative Association
1. This Reference is a case about the division of powers between the federal and provincial governments and the proper balance of federalism in Canada. The United Conservative Association (“UCA”) agrees with the positions advanced by Ontario and submits that the Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act (the ”GGPPA”) is unconstitutional.
2. By attempting to justify the enactment of the GGPPA using the national concern branch of the peace, order, and good governance (“FOGG”) clause, Canada seeks to expand the federal government’s constitutional powers at the expense of the provinces.
3. Put simply, Canada is attempting to claim a new, exclusive power to regulate greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions throughout Canada.
Again, no mention of the junk science behind the climate change scam. The only issue is whether Ottawa has Constitutional power to impose such a tax.
10. The “Populist” Position
A second reason is that provinces are already experimenting with various ways to reduce emissions. Some have a carbon tax, others have a cap-and-trade regime, still, others are focusing on carbon capture or direct regulation. Several also have programs to subsidize electric cars or renewable energy that only seem to waste money and drive up costs to businesses and consumers.
We’ll see over time what model is most effective in reducing emissions and least detrimental to the economy. But there is no reason for Ottawa to impose another layer of government intervention on an already complex and costly series of measures whose effectiveness has yet to be demonstrated.
A third reason is that the transition to other sources of energy is already taking place, as companies respond to consumer demand for more environment-friendly products. The federal government should help it along by reducing taxes, barriers to innovation and competition, and ineffective and costly regulation. This is a real market-based policy that Conservatives should support.
“Populist” Maxime Bernier refuses to call out the scam, and instead just calls Carbon pricing ineffective. Granted, this article is from August 2016. However, Bernier will not call a spade a spade. Just like in this 2016 tweet.
Though, to be fair, Bernier is now openly saying that Carbon Dioxide is just plant food.
Despite the shoddy pseudo-science behind “climate change” policies, none of the parties either in the Saskatchewan case, nor the upcoming Ontario case question it. Rather, these parties SOLELY object to the Carbon tax on the grounds that Provinces should be able to set their prices.
CLICK HERE, for Bjorn Lomborg, Copenhagen Consensus Center. (0.05 degrees) CLICK HERE, for fact-checking Paris Accord. (0.20 degrees) CLICK HERE, for limited temperature raises form 2 degrees to 1.5 (0.50). CLICK HERE, for some skepticism. CLICK HERE, for the Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report Summary for Policymakers [Climate Change 2014], used by Sask COA. CLICK HERE, for the UN Conference on Climate Change (2015).
QUOTES FROM MAJORITY RULING
 The factual record presented to the Court confirms that climate change caused by anthropogenic greenhouse gas [GHG] emissions is one of the great existential issues of our time. The pressing importance of limiting such emissions is accepted by all of the participants in these proceedings.
Okay, to start this off, Saskatchewan Premier Scott Moe doesn’t actually “challenge” any of the climate change alarmist claims that society depends on it. He doesn’t challenge any of the pseudo-science or the history of failed climate models. His only argument is that a Carbon tax is ineffective.
If you were expecting Premier Moe to examine or look into any of the “scientific” claims, he is not the man to do it.
 The Act seeks to ensure there is a minimum national price on GHG emissions in order to encourage their mitigation. Part 1 of the Act imposes a charge on GHG-producing fuels and combustible waste. Part 2 puts in place an output-based performance system for large industrial facilities. Such facilities are obliged to pay compensation if their GHG emissions exceed applicable limits. Significantly, the Act operates as no more than a backstop. It applies only those provinces or areas where the Governor in Council concludes GHG emissions are not priced at an appropriate level.
 The sole issue before the Court is whether Parliament has the constitutional authority to enact the Act. The issue is not whether GHG pricing should or should not be adopted or whether the Act is effective or fair. Those are questions to be answered by Parliament and by provincial legislatures, not by courts.
So not only does the Saskatchewan Government accept that climate change is a threat to our existence, it doesn’t even ask the Court to consider if such a measure is fair or effective.
 ….(a) “Human influence on the climate system is clear, and recent anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases are the highest in history. Recent climate changes have had widespread impacts on human and natural systems” (at 2).
(b) “Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, and since the 1950s, many of the observed changes are unprecedented over decades to millennia. The atmosphere and ocean have warmed, the amounts of snow and ice have diminished, and sea level has risen” (at 2).
(c) “Anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions have increased since the pre-industrial era, driven largely by economic and population growth, and are now higher than ever. This has led to atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide that are unprecedented in at least the last 800,000 years. Their effects, together with those of other anthropogenic drivers, have been detected throughout the climate system and are extremely likely to have been the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century” (emphasis in original, at 4).
(d) “Changes in many extreme weather and climate events have been observed since about 1950. Some of these changes have been linked to human influences, including a decrease in cold temperature extremes, an increase in warm temperature extremes, an increase in extreme high sea levels and an increase in the number of heavy precipitation events in a number of regions” (at 7).
(e) “Continued emission of greenhouse gases will cause further warming and long lasting changes in all components of the climate system, increasing the likelihood of severe, pervasive and irreversible impacts for people and ecosystems. Limiting climate change would require substantial and sustained reductions in greenhouse gas emissions which, together with adaptation, can limit climate change risks” (at 8).
(f) “Surface temperature is projected to rise over the 21st century under all assessed emission scenarios. It is very likely that heat waves will occur more often and last longer, and that extreme precipitation events will become more intense and frequent in many regions. The ocean will continue to warm and acidify, and global mean sea level to rise” (emphasis in original, at 10).
(g) “Climate change will amplify existing risks and create new risks for natural and human systems. Risks are unevenly distributed and are generally greater for disadvantaged people and communities in countries at all levels of development”
(h) “Without additional mitigation efforts beyond those in place today, and even with adaptation, warming by the end of the 21st century will lead to high to very high risk of severe, widespread and irreversible impacts globally (high confidence). …” (emphasis in original, at 17).
None of these conclusions were challenged or put in issue by the participants in this Reference
Source for claims. Read through it. Despite all of the dire warnings inside, there is little to actually justify any of it.
To repeat: NONE of these “facts” are disputed by the Saskatchewan Government or Premier Moe. The Government doesn’t dispute that the IPCC claims to know what happened 800,000 years ago. It doesn’t challenge any of the predictions (and computer models are just predictions). Instead, the case will boil down to technical arguments as to whether the Feds have the jurisdiction to impose the Carbon tax.
Saskatchewan concedes all of the “factual” arguments around climate change, and instead tries to make narrow legal arguments against it being imposed.
In fact, watching Premier Moe’s speech after the ruling, it is clear he believes that the climate change scam is legitimate. Rather, he argues that the Federally mandated Carbon tax is just an ineffective means of dealing with it.
While on a technical level, Saskatchewan does make interesting arguments about jurisdiction. However, it’s difficult to justify not jumping onboard when you have agreed that climate change threatens humanity
 The Constitution Act, 1867 distributes legislative authority between Parliament and the provincial legislatures. Broadly speaking, a statute is valid if its essential character falls within a subject matter allocated to the legislative body that put the statute in place. Neither level of government has exclusive authority over the environment. As a result, Parliament can legislate in relation to issues such as GHGs so long as it stays within the four corners of its prescribed subject matters and the provinces can do the same so long as they stay within their prescribed areas of authority.
 The Attorney General of Saskatchewan [Saskatchewan] challenges the Act by submitting it imposes taxes in the constitutional sense of the term. This would normally be legally unobjectionable because Parliament enjoys a broad taxing authority. However, Saskatchewan contends the Act is invalid because the Governor in Council determines the provinces where it operates. This is said to offend the principle of federalism in that the application of the Act depends on whether a province has exercised its own jurisdiction in relation to pricing GHG emissions to a standard considered appropriate by the Governor in Council. Saskatchewan also says the Act runs afoul of s. 53 of the Constitution Act, 1867. Section 53 requires, in effect, that taxes be authorized by legislative bodies themselves, not by executive government or otherwise.
 Saskatchewan’s arguments on this front cannot be accepted. The principle of federalism is not a free-standing concept that can override an otherwise validly enacted law. Rather, it is a value to be taken into account when interpreting the Constitution. The s. 53 argument cannot be sustained either because, in constitutional terms, the levies imposed by the Act are regulatory charges, not taxes. In any event, even if they were taxes, the Act does not offend s. 53. Parliament has clearly and expressly authorized the Governor in Council to decide where the Act will apply.
The layman’s explanation is not that the science is sound (it isn’t) nor that such a tax is fair or appropriate. Again, the Court is only considering whether Ottawa stepped over its bounds by encroaching on a Provincial matter. The majority (a 3-2 decision), says no it does not.
 The federal government released a document entitled Pan-Canadian Approach to Pricing Carbon Pollution on October 3, 2016. The approach outlined in the document was grounded both on the proposition that economy-wide carbon pricing was the most efficient way to reduce GHG emissions and a recognition that several jurisdictions including British Columbia, Ontario and Québec had already introduced carbon pricing regimes. The approach proposed by the government involved a pan-Canadian “benchmark” for carbon pricing. The benchmark involved a requirement that pricing regimes apply to essentially the same emission sources as British Columbia’s carbon tax. The required stringency of the benchmark, for an explicit price-based system, was that carbon pricing should start at a minimum of $10 per tonne in 2018 and rise by $10 per year to $50 per tonne in 2022. The provinces with cap-and-trade systems would have to ensure that emission reduction targets were in line with Canada’s overall reduction target. As well, the federal government’s approach was stated to involve a “backstop”. This was the idea that the federal government would introduce an explicit price-based carbon pricing system in jurisdictions that did not meet the benchmark.
Again, the Provinces are all on board with the global warming scam, but Ottawa decided to enact a pricing scheme on Provinces that would not enact their own.
And from Saskatchewan’s own submissions:
We wholeheartedly support efforts to reduce greenhouse gases. But those efforts must be effective and they must not disadvantage one region of Canada more than another. A federal carbon tax is ineffective and will impair Saskatchewan’s ability to respond to climate change.
Our opposition to the federal government’s carbon tax should not be seen as reluctance to act. Rather, it is a recognition that we must act, and act decisively, with all our economic strength. For Saskatchewan, mitigation is not enough. Our agriculture and resource-rich province must also focus on climate adaptation and resilience in order to be effective.
This reads like a dog-and-pony show. The Saskatchewan Government at every turn admitting that “climate change” is a dire threat to the world. The complaint seems to be wanting to implement its own solution.
Is Scott Moe just going through the motions?
 Saskatchewan advances two main lines of argument in seeking to have the Act found unconstitutional. The first is that the principle of federalism prevents Parliament from enacting a statute applicable in only some provinces because of how those provinces have chosen to exercise their legislative authority. Saskatchewan’s second argument is that the Act imposes a tax and, because it allows the Governor in Council to decide where it applies, the Act offends the requirement in s. 53 of the Constitution Act, 1867 that bills imposing taxes must originate in the House of Commons. Saskatchewan goes on to deny that, as contended by Canada, the Act can be sustained under Parliament’s authority under the national concern branch of POGG. It also denies, as suggested by some intervenors, that the Act, or features of it, can be supported under Parliament’s authority in relation to trade and commerce, emergencies, criminal law or treaties.
Argument 1: can’t treat the Provinces differently.
Argument 2: Tax bills must come from House of Commons.
Let’s address those both.
 It is useful to begin by underlining that, as Saskatchewan concedes, there is no recognized constitutional requirement that laws enacted by Parliament must apply uniformly from coast to coast to coast. To the contrary, a number of decisions have upheld federal laws with uneven geographic application.
 Saskatchewan has referred to no judicial authority which in any way directly supports the idea that the principle of federalism can or should independently render unconstitutional an otherwise valid law. Its argument on this front cannot succeed.
Several cases are then cited, in fact beating down Saskatchewan’s argument #1. That was one of 2 legal arguments, and Saskatchewan goes into Court without a single case to back up its claims. Now to get to argument #2.
 Saskatchewan does not challenge Parliament’s legislative authority to enact the Act under its s. 91(3) taxation power. Indeed, it takes the initiative in arguing that the levies imposed by the Act fall under s. 91(3). Saskatchewan’s real point lays one step down the road from this characterization of the Act. It takes issue with the authority of the Governor in Council to determine the provinces and areas to which the Act will apply. This authority is said to make the Act non-compliant with s. 53.
Saskatchewan admits the Federal Government has the power to impose taxes. Rather it takes issue with the Governor in Council determining where it will apply. But in all fairness, Ottawa “did” give all Provinces the chance to come up with their own taxation policies.
Argument #1: Claiming non-uniform treatment, yet admitting there is no requirement for uniform treatment. Also, not a single case to rely in.
Argument #2: Admitting Ottawa has constitutional power to impose taxes, but arguing over how it should apply.
Some pretty weak arguments.
Now, had Saskatchewan challenged the factual basis for the climate change scam, instead of relying on narrow, legal arguments, this may have ended quite differently.
Saskatchewan did also raise this issue of “Peace, Order and Good Governance”, but that was shot down as well
 The advisory opinion offered in response to the question posed by the Lieutenant Governor in Council is as follows: “The Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act is not unconstitutional either in whole or in part”.
QUOTES FROM MINORITY DISSENTING
 GHGs are gases that absorb and re-emit infrared radiation, the most prevalent of which is carbon dioxide [CO2]. GHGs are a significant contributor to climate change. For this reason, the parties and intervenors all agree that the governments of Canada and the Provinces must take steps to mitigate the anthropogenic emission of GHGs. Because none of the Attorneys General dispute the causative effect anthropogenic GHGs have on climate change or the attendant and existential necessity of mitigating anthropogenic GHG emissions, the proof or truth of these facts is not at issue. That is, they are proven and true.
 In policy terms, the Act is the product of the federal government’s efforts to meet Canada’s commitments under the Paris Agreement (AG-Can Record, Moffet Affidavit vol 2, Tab I). This is apparent from the terms of the March 3, 2016, Vancouver Declaration on Clean Growth and Climate Change (AG-SK Record, Tab 1 [Vancouver Declaration]), where First Ministers of Canada recognised the necessity of reducing anthropogenic GHG emissions and committed their respective governments to “[i]mplement GHG mitigation policies in support of meeting or exceeding Canada’s 2030 target of a 30% reduction below 2005 levels of emissions, including specific provincial and territorial targets and objectives”.
Even the dissenting Justices acknowledged that Saskatchewan admits the “climate change” issue is real.
 The Attorney General of Canada concedes the Act will cause prices of agricultural inputs to rise. Even though farmers are exempt from the fuel charge, the producers, manufacturers and retailers of farm inputs are not. Further, transportation companies that haul grain, livestock and inputs for farmers are not exempt from the fuel levy. In this way, the effect of the Act is to regulate local industries, businesses and consumer activity in a specific way chosen by the federal government, but the practical effect on a Province of the imposition of federal GHG emissions policy under the Act is a profound intrusion into the exclusive spheres of Provincial jurisdiction. As set forth earlier, the Government of Saskatchewan has indicated in the Saskatchewan Strategy that it believes the fuel levy imposed under the Act will actually impair its ability to react to and to address climate change.
 The Act is highly intrusive into provincial jurisdiction. Although less direct, it is only slightly less intrusive than the legislation considered in Anti-Inflation, where the federal government had sought to pervasively control wages and prices in the Provinces. Although the Supreme Court sustained that legislation under the emergency branch of POGG, it could not have sustained the legislation under the national concern branch.
 The Act is highly intrusive in another way. The benchmark, which determines its application in the Provinces, effectively establishes federal oversight of GHG emissions regulation by the Provinces within their spheres of exclusive jurisdiction. It is regulation of the regulator. To permit Parliament to exercise a law-making power of this nature in respect of GHGs would be to open up the use of POGG to allow regulatory oversight by the federal government over all manner of Provincial matters as it might unilaterally deem to have become matters of national concern.
 Of particular concern to us on the question of its impact are the provisions of the Act that make it possible for the executive branch of federal government to substantially alter the original form and effect of the Act. The provisions that permit statutory transmogrification are ss. 26, 166 to 168 and 197(1)(a). Furthermore, the pervasive use of the word prescribed in the Act confers further metamorphic power on the executive branch to alter the appearance, character and functionality of the Act. These provisions have been referred to earlier but are worth reviewing in this context. In that regard, s. 26, dealing with the fuel levy, allows the federal cabinet by prescribing certain things, to change to whom the fuel levy applies, under what conditions it applies, the manner of payment and the time of payment.
Some interesting points:
(a) Act effectively regulates local businesses.
(b) Act is highly intrusive into Provincial matters.
(c) Allows Federal regulation of Provincial matters.
(d) Feds can amend this unilaterally.
 In our view, the position taken by the Attorney General of Canada mirrors the scenario described above. The Act has broad effects and the potential to have even broader effect than its current terms, but these facts are ignored in the expediency of characterising the matter, whether in terms of cumulativeness or stringency, narrowly enough to qualify it as a matter of national concern. However, a court cannot ignore the fact that, by its very terms, the Act can be expanded in any way the federal cabinet determines is necessary or expedient.
 Before summarising our opinion, we would reiterate two points. First, we agree that all levels of government in Canada must take action to address climate change. The anthropogenic emission of GHGs is an issue of pressing concern to all Canadians and to the world. Second, Parliament has a number of constitutional powers, legislative means and administrative mechanisms at its disposal to achieve its objectives in this regard. This reference arises because Parliament chose not to avail itself of its established constitutional powers or to do so validly. Notwithstanding the existential threat of climate change, federalism in Canada means that all governments of Canada must bring all law-making power to bear on the issue of climate change, but in a way that respects the division of powers under the Constitution Act, 1867
Though some interesting legal arguments were raised, Saskatchewan plays along with the propaganda that climate change is an existential threat to humanity.
 Section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 states that the Constitution is the supreme law of Canada and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect. We advise the Lieutenant Governor in Council that, for the foregoing reasons, in our opinion:
(a) Part 1 of the Act is invalid, being an unconstitutional delegation of Parliament’s law-making power under s. 91(3) of the Constitution Act, 1867 and being contrary to s. 53 of the Constitution Act, 1867.
(b) The Act cannot be sustained as a valid exercise of Parliament’s other enumerated law-making powers under s. 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867 nor can it be sustained under POGG
So, by a 3-2 margin, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeals rules that the Carbon tax can be legally imposed on Provinces.
ACTUAL CLIMATE CHANGE RESEARCH
Table 1. Impact of climate policies, optimistic and pessimistic,
for RCP8.5, using MAGICC, summary of ﬁnds described through-out the text
Change in temperature
That’s right. Even the most optimistic climate models, would be a reduction of 0.170 degrees Celcius. Most pessimistic case would be 0.048 degrees Celcius. 0.048 to 0.170 degrees over the next century. Rather than getting nitpicky over jurisdiction, perhaps Scott Moe SHOULD have challenged the facts and evidence.