Race & Crime Rates: What Liberals Won’t Admit (Gladue 2.0?)

1. Important Links

CLICK HERE, for the case R. v. Morris, [2018] O.J. No. 4631.
CLICK HERE, for the Canadian Criminal Code, robbery section.
CLICK HERE, for the Canadian Criminal Code, firearms section.
CLICK HERE, for a National Post article covering a case where an Ontario criminal court judge wants to expand “Gladue” to include blacks.
CLICK HERE, for a similar article.
CLICK HERE, for a University of Toronto research paper on race, crime and incarceration.

CLICK HERE, for FBI Uniform Crime Reporting, Table 21
CLICK HERE, for UK demographic crime data.

Background From Gladue
R. v. Gladue, 1997 CanLII 3015 (BC CA)
R. v. Gladue, [1999] 1 SCR 688, 1999 CanLII 679 (SCC)
R. v. Ipeelee, [2012] 1 SCR 433, 2012 SCC 13 (CanLII)

CLICK HERE, for race-based discounts in criminal court.
CLICK HERE, for child-killer Terri McClintic going to a “healing lodge”.
CLICK HERE, for incarceration rates among Aboriginals.

2. Quotes From Ruling

In a way this is not surprising at all. The 1997/1999 Gladue rulings created essentially a “discount” for Aboriginal offenders specifically on the basis of “historical oppression”.

Now, there is a case that is pending before the Ontario Court of Appeals, which could see the same provisions apply to blacks as well. This is a (potential) expansion of a horrible idea: race-based-discounts in the criminal justice system.

People should be outraged by this. Your crime, seriousness, and past (if any) criminal record should impact your sentence. Not your race, ethnicity, or skin colour. It is the anti-thesis of equality under the law.

[2] A jury found you guilty of a number of offences. I convicted you of possession of an unauthorized firearm, possession of a prohibited firearm with ammunition, and carrying a concealed weapon. The jury acquitted you of assaulting a peace officer with intent to resist arrest.
[3] The basic facts of your crime are straightforward. On December 13, 2014, the police received a call about a home invasion in Scarborough. As the police officers sent to investigate drove to the scene, they came upon four Black males walking in the parking lot. The officers were in plainclothes and drove unmarked police cars. One officer stopped the young men. You were one of them. You ran. As you ran, D.C. Moorcroft, who was not the officer who stopped you but was also driving into the lot, accelerated to stop you.

Police were responding to a home invasion. When they arrived, there just happened to be 4 black men in the area, and the defendant took off.

Of course, it is just a coincidence that he had a gun on him. Now it is apparently a charter violation that a police car was used to stop him.

[6] I must now sentence you for your offences. Let me go over what the Crown and your defence lawyers said should be the sentence. These positions were pretty far apart. The Crown asked for 4 to 4.5 years in jail. Your lawyers argued that the sentence should be 1 year before credit was given for the Charter breaches.

There is something here we are not being told. The Crown (supposedly) wants 4 to 4.5 years for gun possession for a first time offender? What else went on that is not included?

[9] Let me briefly explain to you what I did in Jackson. I began my judgment in that case by saying sentencing is a very individual process. The criminal law has recognized that there are cases where, in order to determine a fit and proportionate sentence, consideration must be given to an individual’s systemic and social circumstances. These circumstances may extend beyond a person who is being sentenced to include factors such a systemic discrimination and historical injustice. This has been recognized by the criminal courts, particularly in the case of Indigenous offenders. While the distinct history of colonial violence endured by Indigenous peoples cannot simply be analogized to Black Canadians, I found that the ability to consider social context in a sentencing decision is extended to all under section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code. This allowed me to consider the unique social history of Black Canadians in sentencing Mr. Jackson. Mr. Jackson was a Black male offender not too much older than you, who pleaded guilty to a charge of possession of a prohibited gun. His lawyers presented a great deal of evidence to me on systemic anti-Black racism and its role in Mr. Jackson’s life. I took note of this evidence. I also took judicial notice, independently of these materials, of the history of colonialism, slavery, policies and practices of segregation, intergenerational trauma, and both overt and systemic racism that continue to affect Black Canadians today. With an understanding of these social factors I was able to better appreciate the circumstances that led Mr. Jackson to come before me. I sentenced him accordingly.

Gladue was horrible for exactly this reason. Instead of holding people accountable to as similar a standard as possible, some get to play the “oppression card” and get much lighter sentences. It stands the idea of equality before the law completely on its head.

The ruling would then go on to quote some social worker at length about the struggles that blacks face, and how its circumstances must be considered.

[66] Giving your acts a contextual analysis in light of the wealth of evidence provided to me on this sentencing, I do not find this to be a weighty aggravating factor in your case. I appreciate that accused people should not flee from police. Especially carrying a loaded firearm. But it is understandable to me that you ran. It was not a coldly calculated act to escape but one based upon emotion and a state of mind that has been shaped both generally and specifically by the historical racism suffered by Blacks and by you. In other words, not every flight from the police should be treated the same. Here there is a connection in the evidence between your act of flight and the systemic factors. I find it would be wrong to punish you more severely for this. When I view how anti-Black racism and historical injustices have contributed to your actions, the needs of general deterrence and denunciation normally raised by this act of flight is tempered. Given that the choice you made to do so was affected by these factors, the moral blameworthiness of your actions is also lessened.
[67] In addition, in assessing the seriousness of the offences, when I look at potential aggravating factors that often exist in the case law, here, there is no evidence that your possession of the gun is connected with other crimes such as crimes of violence or drug trafficking.
[68] There are also some very traditional mitigating factors. You are a first offender. You were young when you committed these crimes. You were 22 years old. You have supportive family and friends. There is a side of you that speaks well to your rehabilitation. I have mentioned them before. Your warmth, kindness, and respectfulness.

Being a young, first time offender is a legitimate reason to cut someone a break. No argument on that point.

But that is where the agreement ends. All this nonsense about historical racism and systemic factors (repeated throughout the ruling), was nauseating to read.

[81] Sentencing must always be an individual process. In these cases judges gave sentences of 1 year, 15 months, 18 months, just under 2 years. Some of these sentences were permitted to be served in the community rather than in jail. The cases are: R. v. Ishmael, 2014 ONCJ 136; R. v. Garton, 2018 ONSC 544; R. v. Rutledge, 2015 ONSC 6625; R. v. Shunmuganathan, 2016 ONCJ 519;
R. v. Nuttley, 2013 ONCJ 727;
R. v. Kelsy, [2008] O.J. No. 3879;
R. v. Cadienhead, [2015] O.J. No. 3125;
R. v. Williams, [2011] O.J. No. 3352 (S.C.J.);
R. v. Brown, [2006] O.J. No. 4681 (S.C.J.);
R. v. Carranza, [2004] O.J. No. 6041 (S.C.J.)

Fair enough. The Judge was looking for a little consistency.

[82]82 Now I want to talk about that elephant in the room. I know you are in custody on other charges. What those charges are were not explained to me by either the Crown or your lawyers. However, I do know from some of the materials filed what the charges are said to be. Of course, there is a charge of breaching your bail. There are also some other offences. But they are not gun offences. Your surety surrendered your bail so you are in custody on the charges I am sentencing you for. To someone hearing this, I am sure they will say you have not behaved well while on bail. They may be right. But you are presumed innocent of these alleged new offences. I am sentencing you as a first offender. Someone without a criminal record. The new charges do not change that. The presumption of innocence is the foundation of our criminal justice system. While it may be hard for many to understand, I cannot let that foundation be eroded or chipped away by taking into account the new charges.

So, “first-timer” comes with a few caveats: Morris breached his bail, and is facing additional charges. However, the Judge has decided to ignore this in sentencing him as a first-timer.

It would be nice to know how exactly bail was breached, and what exactly the other charges are. But they are not mentioned.

[92] I also find that the anti-Black racism evidence presented on the sentencing is relevant in assessing the weight I should give this. Racism can operate very subtly. It can be there lurking in the background of people’s minds, unconsciously influencing their judgment and making them act in certain ways towards certain people.
[93] I want to be clear that I am not painting the police with the brush of overt racism in this case. I do not have the evidence to support that. But I am troubled. If I asked myself: If it was someone other than a young Black man running away from the police that night, would D.C. Moorcroft have driven in the aggressive way that he did? Would Mr. Morris and the car have collided? I am troubled because in all honesty, I cannot conclude it would have happened in the same way.

So, racism happens, but I have no evidence that there was any in this case. Therefore, I will still bring it up as a mitigating factor.

This Judge talks in circles about how there is all this systemic racism, and how it can be very subtle. Yet he notes that there is no proof that there was racism in this case. So what is the point then?

E. CONCLUSION
[97] After mitigation for the Charter violations, I have sentenced you to a jail sentence of 12 months. You have done a lot of dead time. The sentence will be based upon the credit you will receive for that dead time. I will credit you 1.5 to 1 for that pre-trial custody. The evidence shows that you received no real programming, had a difficult time in jail, and at times experienced physical discomfort in jail due to your medical conditions. You also did not receive consideration for parole or remission while in pre-trial custody. I find it right to give this enhanced credit. Therefore, 243 days of pre-trial custody will be used up. You will be sentenced to a further 1 day in jail on each charge concurrently. I also made a DNA order, s. 109 weapons prohibition, and the forfeiture order.

So not even a year. Just 8 months.

3. University of Toronto Article On Race & Crime

Although not specific to this case, this article by Akwasi Owusu-Bempah is an interesting read. If nothing else, it shows the extent that this academic will go to avoid the obvious conclusion:

SOME GROUPS JUST COMMIT MORE CRIME

Yes, that’s it. Groups are not equal when it comes to committing crime. That is the hard truth that lawyers, judges, politicians, academics and social workers refuse to address.

On the topic of “disparity”, it’s worth noting that males make up over 90% of prison inmates. However, there is no push claiming discrimination against them. Oh, the double standards.

Instead, he will talk in circles. Owusu-Bempah will blame mistrust, victimization in black and Aboriginal neighbourhoods, racial bias (without proving it), and Court discrimination (again, without proving it). Although the author touches the topic of crime rates, he avoids making any definitive statements. It’s like he is deliberately avoiding the obvious answer.

Abstract and Keywords
Canada effectively bans systematic collection and dissemination of racially disaggregated criminal justice statistics. A significant proportion of Canada’s racial minority populations perceive bias in the criminal justice system, especially on the part of police. Aboriginal and black Canadians are grossly overrepresented in Canada’s correctional institutions. Some evidence suggests that both Aboriginal and black populations are overrepresented with respect to violent offending and victimization. Social conditions in which Aboriginal and black Canadians live are at least partially to blame for their possibly elevated rates of violent offending. Evidence indicates that racial bias exists in the administration of Canadian criminal justice. At times, this discrimination has been supported by court decisions. Discrimination and disparity are at times acknowledged by government, but they are seldom wholeheartedly addressed. There is a lack of political will to address issues of racial minority overrepresentation in relation to manifestations of racial discrimination or to the societal conditions that lead to criminal offending.

Oh, the mental gymnastics of the author are blatant:

  • Minorities “perceive” bias against them
  • There is overrepresentation
  • Bias in administration
  • Government acknowledges disparity
  • No political will to address overrepresentation
  • Societal conditions lead to offending

However:

  • The author mentions overrepresentation regarding offending, but immediately lumps it in with “victimization”, as if to muddy the waters
  • Lack of available objective data, yet we are able to make conclusions based on much more subjective things, such as perceived bias
  • Right, not elevated rates, but “possibly” elevated rates

Connections among race, crime, and criminal justice are often portrayed in Canadian media images and are captured in the popular imagination. Yet, in comparison to the United States and Great Britain, these phenomena receive relatively little attention from Canadian academics and policy makers. A lack of readily available criminal justice data disaggregated by race makes it particularly difficult for researchers to examine the nature of these racial differences. Thus, we are unable to determine the extent to which higher rates of offending among certain racial groups and discrimination in the administration of criminal justice contribute to the apparent overrepresentation

There’s a lack of data, but this author will still make claims about bias and discrimination, without actually proving it. He will also tap-dance around the obvious: If a group commits crime at a much higher rate, doesn’t that justify higher incarceration rates?

Nonetheless, available evidence indicates that a significant proportion of Canada’s racial minority populations and a sizable proportion of the white population perceive bias in the criminal justice system. These public perceptions are supported by data that show that certain racial minority groups, particularly Aboriginal and black Canadians, are grossly overrepresented in Canada’s correctional institutions. Further evidence indicates that racial bias does exist in the administration of Canadian criminal justice, and, at times, this discrimination has been supported by court decisions. We cannot discount, however, the probability that increased rates of offending among certain racialized groups contributes to their overrepresentation in correctional statistics. As we show in this essay, research suggests that Aboriginal and black Canadians are overrepresented with respect to violent offending and victimization. The Canadian federal government itself has pointed out that the social conditions in which Aboriginals live is at least partially to blame for their rates of violent offending (Department of Justice 2009). We have previously made the same connection with respect to black Canadians (Wortley and Owusu-Bempah2011a).

Owusu-Bempah contradicts himself here. He claims there is “perceived” bias from many people. Not “actual” bias, but perceived bias. He then goes on to say that there is overrepresentation among certain groups.

He then offers a perfectly reasonable explanation for the higher incarceration rate: increased offending.

Just a thought. If a certain group commits crime at a higher rate, then it is not bias or discrimination that there would be more of them involved with the courts.

Unfortunately, there is an apparent lack of political will to address issues of racial minority overrepresentation in the Canadian criminal justice system. Ambivalence to address these issues relates both to the manifestations of racial discrimination in the system, as well as to the societal conditions that lead to criminal offending. Discrimination and disparity may be at times acknowledged, but they are seldom wholeheartedly addressed. When addressed, the means are seldom thoroughly evaluated for effectiveness, and, when evaluated, the results are rarely made public.

Difficult to believe, but this is just the next paragraph. Owusu-Bempah claims there is no political will to address racial minority overrepresentation. Yet, he previously commented that there was a higher rate of offending.

This seems like a solution in search of a problem.

Many have argued that relatively high rates of homicide and gun crime among African Canadians and Aboriginals in Canada are reflective of their overrepresentation in street gangs. Unfortunately, official police statistics on Canadian gangs are almost nonexistent

Yeah, good job.

Canada’s reluctance to acknowledge and document race is most evident in the operation of its criminal justice system and in its criminal justice policies. Unlike in the United States and the United Kingdom, where race-based criminal justice statistics are readily available to the public and researchers alike, the Canadian criminal justice system does not systematically collect or publish statistics on the race of individuals processed through the system. The debate over the collection of racial data from the criminal justice sector in Canada can be traced back as far as 1929 (Roberts 1992). Discussions about the collection, or more accurately, the public release of these data have emerged more recently in the context of broader debates about race, crime, and the administration of criminal justice—particularly related to the circumstances of Aboriginal and black Canadians (Hatt 1994; Johnston 1994; Gabor 1994; Roberts 1994; Wortley 1999; Owusu-Bempah and Millar 2010). On the one hand, allegations of racial discrimination have been leveled against the justice system to explain the overrepresentation of certain racial minority groups in the few available sources of police and correctional data. On the other hand, it has been suggested that racial minorities are disproportionately involved in criminal activity, which accounts for their disproportionate involvement with the criminal justice system as reflected in the data. Unfortunately, our ability to test either of these claims is limited by the absence of available data, despite numerous calls for its collection. Several major attempts have been made in Canada to collect racial and ethnic data, particularly in the policing sector (Fine 1990; Wortley and Marshall 2005; Leclair InfoCom 2009); these attempts, however, have not paved the way for systematic data collection

The author addresses crime rates, but gives a wishy washy answer. There’s not enough data to tell one way or another whether it is: (a) discrimination; or (b) actual crime, that results in the disparities. Yet, feelings about perceived bias and virtue signalling bureaucrats apologizing are apparently good evidence.

There is an interesting point to be taken from this: if there was concrete data on race and crime rates, then the debate could be put to bed once and for all.

The article keeps repeating the same idea and muddying the waters: we don’t have data, so we can’t be sure what causes discrepancies in the representation.

If the author wanted a reference point, why not check the data from the US and UK? After all, he knows it is there.

4. Crime Data From Britain

CLICK HERE, for UK demographic crime data.

There were 698,737 arrests in 2017/18, a fall of 8% on the previous year – both years’ figures exclude Lancashire Police (see ‘Things you need to know’)
-Black people were over 3 times as likely to be arrested as White people – there were 35 arrests for every 1,000 —Black people, and 11 arrests for every 1,000 White people
-overall, men were over 5 times as likely to be arrested as women – there were 22 arrests for every 1,000 men, and -4 arrests for every 1,000 women
-Black women were more than twice as likely to be arrested as White women – there were 7 arrests for every 1,000 —Black women, and 3 arrests for every 1,000 White women

And a few pages later,

there were 698,737 arrests in England and Wales in 2017/18 (excluding the Lancashire police force area), at a rate of 13 arrests per 1,000 people
there were 62,501 fewer arrests in 2017/18 compared with the previous year, a fall of 8% (excluding Lancashire Police from both years)
Black people were over 3 times as likely to be arrested as White people – there were 35 arrests for every 1,000 Black people, and 11 arrests for every 1,000 White people
people with Mixed ethnicity were over twice as likely to be arrested as White people – there were 25 arrests for every 1,000 people with Mixed ethnicity, and 11 arrests for every 1,000 White people

So the UK Government is willing to be quite open and blunt about the disparities in race and offending. And what about the US.

5. Crime Data From US FBI

CLICK HERE, for FBI Uniform Crime Reporting, Table 21. This is compiled from 2016, though the stats over the years don’t change much.

Looking at Table 21C (people aged 18 or over)
Worth noting the US black population is about 13% commits:

  • 52% of homicides
  • 28% of rapes
  • 51% of robberies
  • 32% of aggravated assault
  • 36% of violent crime
  • 41% of weapons carrying
  • 30% buying stolen property

…. and so on.

Are blacks greatly overrepresented in US prisons? Absolutely. And for a very good reason — disproportionate amount of violent and serious crime.

Are US sentences in general too harsh? A fair point, but a topic for another day. This post concerns treating people equally.

6. Gladue 2.0 Addresses Wrong Problem

With this proposed change, the scope of Gladue will be broadened. This means that it will not be restricted to Aboriginals.

The claim is that this will reduce overrepresentation in the courts and prison system. Problem is: it focuses on making prisons look like a random sample of society, rather than a reflection of who is actually committing the most serious crime.

It’s what liberals do not want to acknowledge:

SOME GROUPS JUST COMMIT MORE CRIME

It is not necessarily due to “oppression” or “systemic bias”, or any other such nonsense. It is caused by these groups, on average, behaving differently. While it is obviously desirable for society to reduce crime and their prison populations, this is a backwards approach.

Should the Ontario Court of Appeals (and possibly the Supreme Court of Canada) confirm this nonsense, racial equality dies. Your skin colour will determine your punishment, not your crime. Though arguably that was the case with Gladue.

Keep in mind, it is the Supreme Court of Canada that upheld Gladue in the first place (appealed from BC). There is nothing to indicated they wouldn’t extend their ruling to this.

Public Policy #7: Abolish Gladue, Fix Underlying Problems

1. Important Links

CLICK HERE, for race- based discounts in sentencing.
CLICK HERE, for Terri McClintic, child killer, in a healing lodge.
CLICK HERE, for 2016/2017 StatsCan data on incarceration rates.
CLICK HERE, for Table 5, incarceration by race and gender.
CLICK HERE, for Table 6.
CLICK HERE, for archived findings form Correctional Service of Canada form 1999.
CLICK HERE, for a Larry Elder video on single parent households.
CLICK HERE, for a documentary on drug use on reserves.
CLICK HERE, for a video on lack of drinking water on reserves.

CLICK HERE, for Gladue, 1997.
CLICK HERE, for Gladue, 1999.
CLICK HERE, for Ipeelee, 2012.
CLICK HERE, for R.v. Proulx (conditional sentencing guidelines).

2. Disproportionate Incarceration Rates

This is a proposal to scrap so-called “Gladue Rights” which specifically are designed to give Aboriginal offenders special consideration when it comes to sentencing in the criminal justice system.

Please don’t interpret this as an indication not to give anyone a break if the circumstances permit. Rather, rights and options should be available to everyone. They should not be given to one specific group, or denied to one specific group.

Disclaimer: I am not a criminologist, or a sociologist. Just a researcher.

Now, how great are the discrepancies?

From the StatsCan 2016/2017 findings:

The Criminal Code mandates that all sanctions other than imprisonment are to be considered with particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders. In 2016/2017, Aboriginal adults accounted for 28% of admissions to provincial/territorial correctional services and 27% for federal correctional services, while representing 4.1% of the Canadian adult population (Table 5). In comparison to 2006/2007, the proportion of admissions of Aboriginal peoples to correctional services was 21% for provincial and territorial correctional services and 19% for federal correctional services.

Aboriginal adults accounted for 30% of admissions to custody and 25% of admissions to community supervision among the provinces and territories in 2016/2017. Aboriginal adults accounted for 27% of admissions to custody and 26% of admissions to community supervision in federal correctional services (Table 5).

The proportion of Aboriginal admissions to adult custody has been trending upwards for over 10 years. It has increased steadily from 2006/2007 when it was 21% for provincial and territorial correctional services and 20% for federal correctional services.

Among the provinces, Aboriginal adults made up the greatest proportion of admissions to custody in Manitoba (74%) and Saskatchewan (76%). These two provinces also have the highest proportion of Aboriginal adults among their provincial populations at 15% for Manitoba, and 14% for Saskatchewan.

Aboriginal males accounted for 28% of admissions to custody in the province and territories, whereas non-Aboriginal males accounted for 72%, in 2016/2017. Aboriginal females made up a greater proportion of custody admissions than their male counterparts, accounting for 43% of admissions, while non-Aboriginal females accounted for 57% (Table 6).

Here is the data in a more visual form.

Category Abor. Total Pop’n Abor. Group Pop’n Non-Abor. Total Pop’n Non-Abor. Group Pop’n Ratio
Incar 4.1% 28% 95.9% 72% 9.1:1

Note: Here is how to calculate the rates. Assume there is a population of 100,000 people, and 1,000 of them are locked up and then break in down as percentages of the population.

category totals Non-Abor Abor
People 100,000 95,900 4,100
Locked Up 1,000 720 280
Rates Percentage 0.0075 0.068

Now that we can make an apples-to-apples comparison, 0.068/0.0075 =~9.1
So on a per-capita basis, Aboriginals are about 9 times as likely as non-Aboriginals to be locked up

Next, covering Aboriginal women and incarceration rate. For this. Assume that the overall percentages are about same: 95.9% non-Aboriginal, and 4.1% Aboriginal. Here instead of making up 28% overall in Provincial jails, it is 57%, approximately double.

Category Abor. Total Pop’n Abor. Group Pop’n Non-Abor. Total Pop’n Non-Abor. Group Pop’n Ratio
Incar 4.1% 57% 95.9% 43% 30.88:1

And once more we need to convert to rates of respective populations.

category totals Non-Abor Abor
People 100,000 95,900 4,100
Locked Up 1,000 430 570
Rates Percentage 0.0045 0.1390

When women inmates are looked at specifically, the ratio goes to 0.1390/0.0045 ~= 30.88

That’s right, looking at women, there are (per capita) 30 times as many Aboriginal women locked up as non-Aboriginal women.

3. Evidence Of Discrimination Or Bias?

By itself, no. Having groups with different rates of something is not evidence that there has been discrimination. Either these differences are caused by something that justifies it (such as higher crime rate), or there may be some external factor. Let’s start with the Criminal Code.

718.2(e) all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders.

It is written right into the Canadian Criminal Code, to give offenders (where reasonable), an alternative to custody, with special consideration to Aboriginals. And this is codified in 3 cases.
R. v. Gladue, 1997 CanLII 3015 (BC CA)
R. v. Gladue, [1999] 1 SCR 688, 1999 CanLII 679 (SCC)
R. v. Ipeelee, [2012] 1 SCR 433, 2012 SCC 13 (CanLII)

Looking at the Criminal Code, and recent decisions, there doesn’t seem to be any legalized discrimination. So let’s look elsewhere.

4. R. v. Proulx (Conditional Sentencing Guidelines)

12 Since it came into force on September 3, 1996, the conditional sentence has generated considerable debate. With the advent of s. 742.1, Parliament has clearly mandated that certain offenders who used to go to prison should now serve their sentences in the community. Section 742.1 makes a conditional sentence available to a subclass of non-dangerous offenders who, prior to the introduction of this new regime, would have been sentenced to a term of incarceration of less than two years for offences with no minimum term of imprisonment.

13 In my view, to address meaningfully the complex interpretive issues raised by this appeal, it is important to situate this new sentencing tool in the broader context of the comprehensive sentencing reforms enacted by Parliament in Bill C-41. I will also consider the nature of the conditional sentence, contrasting it with probationary measures and incarceration. Next, I will address particular interpretive issues posed by s. 742.1. I will first discuss the statutory prerequisites to the imposition of a conditional sentence. Thereafter, I will consider how courts should determine whether a conditional sentence is appropriate, assuming the prerequisites are satisfied. I conclude with some general comments on the deference to which trial judges are entitled in matters of sentencing and dispose of the case at hand in conformity with the principles outlined in these reasons.

16 Bill C-41 is in large part a response to the problem of overincarceration in Canada. It was noted in Gladue, at para. 52, that Canada’s incarceration rate of approximately 130 inmates per 100,000 population places it second or third highest among industrialized democracies. In their reasons, Cory and Iacobucci JJ. reviewed numerous studies that uniformly concluded that incarceration is costly, frequently unduly harsh and “ineffective, not only in relation to its purported rehabilitative goals, but also in relation to its broader public goals” (para. 54). See also Report of the Canadian Committee on Corrections, Toward Unity: Criminal Justice and Corrections (1969); Canadian Sentencing Commission, Sentencing Reform: A Canadian Approach (1987), at pp. xxiii‑xxiv; Standing Committee on Justice and Solicitor General, Taking Responsibility (1988), at p. 75. Prison has been characterized by some as a finishing school for criminals and as ill-preparing them for reintegration into society: see generally Canadian Committee on Corrections, supra, at p. 314; Correctional Service of Canada, A Summary of Analysis of Some Major Inquiries on Corrections – 1938 to 1977 (1982), at p. iv. In Gladue, at para. 57, Cory and Iacobucci JJ. held:

Without rehashing the entire ruling, Proulx, which was based on Bill C-41, set the benchmark for giving out “conditional sentences”, aka “house arrest”. The ruling noted the destructive long term effect prison can have.

While conditional sentencing is completely inappropriate for certain offences, it can have its benefits.

In areas with high crime rates, poverty, or high drug use, a person has to reasonably ask what will be the best solution overall. Does the community benefit from locking up large amounts of its people?

One caveat, breaks in sentencing, and alternatives to prison should be equally available to all Canadians. One group shouldn’t receive a greater aid, or detriment.

See the next section for the CSC report on Aboriginal circumstances.

5. Information Worth Looking At

This comes from the 1998 Corrections Service of Canada Paper (linked above). It also has an impressive bibliography, worth at least a peek.

1.3 Aboriginal Population
Approximately, one-third of all Aboriginal children under the age of 15 in Census families lived in a lone-parent family, twice the rate within the general population. The rate was even higher in urban areas. About 46% of Aboriginal children under 15 in Census families who lived in a census metropolitan area were in a lone-parent family. One-quarter of the Aboriginal population reported that they had an Aboriginal language as mother tongue. Cree was the largest Aboriginal mother tongue. The number of people who could speak an Aboriginal language was about 10% higher than the number who reported an Aboriginal mother tongue, indicating that a significant number of persons learned such a language later in life. (Department of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 1998).

This mentions a very interesting issue. Conservative commentator Larry Elder frequently talks about this. Single parent households (mostly missing fathers), is a very good indicator of crime and education. And it cuts across race.

1.4 Demographic and Socio-Economic Data
Increasing evidence points to a strong correlation between socio-economic disadvantage and involvement with the criminal justice system. A large proportion of the Aboriginal population in Canada suffers socio-economic disadvantage in comparison to non-Aboriginal Canadians. The social and economic conditions outlined in the section below illustrates a correlation between these factors and Aboriginal involvement with the criminal justice system. Poverty, inadequate educational opportunities, unemployment, poor living conditions, alcohol abuse and domestic violence all contribute to Aboriginal people coming into conflict with the law. The challenges to which the criminal justice system must respond are rooted in addressing these disadvantaged conditions.

These problems are prevalent, in particularly on remote reserves. To be fair, it isn’t restricted to reserves. It is heartbreaking to hear the problems and 3rd world conditions.

1.8 Suicide
Suicide is approximately three times more common among Aboriginal people than non-Aboriginal people. It is also five to six times more prevalent among Aboriginal youth than non-Aboriginal youth. In First Nations communities, suicide is more prevalent among the young and usually results from feelings of hopelessness and despair.

Wow. Just wow.

2.4 Urban vs. Rural Aboriginal Offenders
A recent study (Johnston, 1997) of Aboriginal inmates incarcerated in Canadian federal penitentiaries found that one-quarter (24%) of the group had originally came from reserve or remote areas; 44% originally came from rural areas, and 30% from urban areas. The interviewers did not ask about where the offenders had been living at the time of the offence. In addition, the study also found that a majority of the group had left their home community after their youth. Eighteen percent had lived in their home community all their life apart from periods spent incarcerated. Furthermore, the study found that 66% of the Aboriginal inmates incarcerated in federal penitentiaries were considered high-need. Forty-seven per cent were rated as both high-need and high-risk. A majority were rated by case management officers and other penitentiary staff who knew them, as having needs in the following areas:
-substance abuse needs (88%),
-personal/emotional needs (82%),
-employment needs (63%), and
-education needs (54%).

A large proportion were also rated as having needs in relation to:
-pro-criminal attitudes (49%),
-marital and family issues (42%),
-community functioning (36%),
-criminal associates (33%), and
-sexual offending (31%).

This is shocking. Almost 9 in 10 with substance abuse, 4 in 5 with personal needs, 2/3 with employment needs, and half lacking in education.

Canada is supposed to be a 1st world country, but standard of living for those away from any urban area are falling far short of what should be acceptable.

6. So Why Abolish Gladue?

Quite simply, it is a band-aid solution that ignores the real problems. “Rigging” the rules to let Aboriginal offenders off easier (or let them out earlier) turns a blind eye to the problems cited in the previous section. Lack of drinking water being one in the news lately.

Are Aboriginals disproportionately represented in criminal courts and jails? Yes, absolutely. The data and evidence for that is overwhelming.

But it is also plain and obvious that there are many problems with the more remote areas that should not be happening. Setting up different sentencing guidelines does nothing to address any of that.

It could easily be argued that problems with poverty, remote living, drugs, alcohol and domestic violence contribute to crime. These are the causes and crime is the effect. But Gladue gets it entirely backwards. It impacts the EFFECT, hoping to impact the CAUSES.

Hopefully this doesn’t come off as heartless. However, I view the “Gladue Rights” idea as completely missing the point, and ignoring genuine concerns.

7. Actually, There Is Discrimination

Instead of our Prime Minister blowing our money on virtue signalling foreign adventures, perhaps fixing the problems within our borders is a better approach.

  • Safe drinking water
  • Education/Work opportunities
  • Access to social services
  • Seriously evaluate if reserve system is sustainable

We certainly have money to blow on every UN adventure.

While the criminal justice system itself isn’t set up to discriminate, our government does. Entire sections of Canada’s population is left to die while we show the outside world how generous we are.

Gladue is the quick-fix that covers up the real problem.

Central Banking, Part 2: The COMER Case

(Specific to the litigation in question)

(COMER – Committee On Monetary & Economic Reform)

1. Important Links


CLICK HERE, for the last piece, a call to restore the 1934 Bank of Canada Act.
CLICK HERE, for www.comer.org.
CLICK HERE, for a failed Court bid to reform the banking process in Canada.
CLICK HERE, for COMER’s 2011 press release.
CLICK HERE, for 2012 Proceedings.
CLICK HERE, for the ruling to strike our the claim, without leave to amend.
CLICK HERE, for April 24, 2014 ruling, which overturned the portion of the striking out, instead, allowing an amended statement to be filed.
CLICK HERE, for press release on April 24, 2014 decision, overturning a Pronothary’s dismissal.
CLICK HERE, for the 2015 Federal Court of Appeal ruling.
CLICK HERE, for the 2015 Federal Court of Appeal

2. From COMER’s 2011 Press Release

The action also constitutionally challenges the government’s fallacious accounting methods in its tabling of the budget by not calculating nor revealing the true and total revenues of the nation before transferring back “tax credits” to corporations and other taxpayers.

The Plaintiffs state that since 1974 there has been a gradual but sure slide into the reality that the Bank of Canada and Canada’s monetary and financial policy are dictated by private foreign banks and financial interests contrary to the Bank of Canada Act.

The Plaintiffs state that the Bank of International Settlements (BIS), the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were all created with the cognizant intent of keeping poorer nations in their place which has now expanded to all nations in that these financial institutions largely succeed in over-riding governments and constitutional orders in countries such as Canada over which they exert financial control.

The Plaintiffs state that the meetings of the BIS and Financial Stability Board (FSB) (successor of FSF), their minutes, their discussions and deliberations are secret and not available nor accountable to Parliament, the executive, nor the Canadian public notwithstanding that the Bank of Canada policies directly emanate from these meetings. These organizations are essentially private, foreign entities controlling Canada’s banking system and socio-economic policies.

The gist of the press release, and of the Claim overall, is that Canada’s banking system has been hijacked and usurped. As such, it is controlled by foreign entities such as the Bank of International Settlements and the International Monetary Fund.

As was outlined in the last article, Canada’s banking “was” effectively turned over. The result is that Canada, instead of loaning money to itself, is now borrowing from private banks. As such, it is being bled dry.

In fact, COMER’s claims can be easily validated by online research. The question for the Court to decide: is this actually legal?

3. Ruling Striking Out Statement of Claim

[5] The core elements of COMER’s Claim can be reduced to three parts:
1. The Bank of Canada (Bank) and Crown refuse to provide interest-free loans for capital expenditures.
2. The Crown uses flawed accounting methods in describing public finances, which provides the rationale for refusing to grant such loans.
3. These and other harms are caused by the Bank being controlled by private foreign interests.

The Pronothary summarizing the main issues the Plaintiffs raise

Discussion
[41] Against these competing positions, it must be remembered that the test for striking an action is a high one. The action must be bereft of any chance of success and as noted above just because it is a novel cause of action it does not automatically fail.[26]

[42] The Supreme Court of Canada has recently summarized the principles to be applied on a motion to strike. In R. v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd.,[27] the Chief Justice, writing for the Court made the following observations regarding a motion to strike:

17. The parties agree on the test applicable on a motion to strike for not disclosing a reasonable cause of action under r. 19(24)(a) of the B.C. Supreme Court Rules. This Court has reiterated the test on many occasions. A claim will only be struck if it is plain and obvious, assuming the facts pleaded to be true, that the pleading discloses no reasonable cause of action: Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse, 2003 SCC 69 (CanLII), [2003] 3 S.C.R. 263, at para. 15; Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc., 1990 CanLII 90 (SCC), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 959, at p. 980. Another way of putting the test is that the claim has no reasonable prospect of [page 67] success. Where a reasonable prospect of success exists, the matter should be allowed to proceed to trial: see, generally, Syl Apps Secure Treatment Centre v. B.D., 2007 SCC 38 (CanLII), [2007] 3 S.C.R. 83; Odhavji Estate; Hunt; Attorney General of Canada v. Inuit Tapirisat of Canada, 1980 CanLII 21 (SCC), [1980] 2 S.C.R. 735.

. . .

21. Valuable as it is, the motion to strike is a tool that must be used with care. The law is not static and unchanging. Actions that yesterday were deemed hopeless may tomorrow succeed. Before Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562 (H.L.) introduced a general duty of care to one’s neighbour premised [page68] on foreseeability, few would have predicted that, absent a contractual relationship, a bottling company could be held liable for physical injury and emotional trauma resulting from a snail in a bottle of ginger beer. Before Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners, Ltd., [1963] 2 All E.R. 575 (H.L.), a tort action for negligent misstatement would have been regarded as incapable of success. The history of our law reveals that often new developments in the law first surface on motions to strike or similar preliminary motions, like the one at issue in Donoghue v. Stevenson. Therefore, on a motion to strike, it is not determinative that the law has not yet recognized the particular claim. The court must rather ask whether, assuming the facts pleaded are true, there is a reasonable prospect that the claim will succeed. The approach must be generous and err on the side of permitting a novel but arguable claim to proceed to trial.

What we can gain from this is that striking out a Statement of Claim is something that must be done cautiously, and only when it is plain and obvious that there is no chance to succeed.

Some of what may be “struck out” now, may in fact later be the basis for new laws, so the Courts should exercise caution and not jump to conclusions.

[30] The Crown further contends that COMER’s claim is outside this Court’s jurisdiction as it fails to meet the three-part test set out in ITO-International Terminal Operators Ltd v. Miida Electronics Inc.[21] In ITO, the Supreme Court considered the jurisdiction of the Federal Court in the context of an admiralty action. The Supreme Court determined that jurisdiction in the Federal Court depends on three factors:
1. There must be a statutory grant of jurisdiction by the Federal Parliament.
2. There must be an existing of body of federal law which is essential to the disposition of the case and which nourishes the statutory grant of jurisdiction.
3. The law on which the case is based must be a “law of Canada” as the phrase is used in s. 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867 [page 766]

[57] The jurisdictional issue raised by the Crown engages the three part test set out in ITO as discussed above. The Crown argues that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain tort claims against Federal authorities.

[58] However, pursuant to sections 2, 17 and 18 of the Federal Courts Act, the wording is sufficiently wide to capture these types of claims against federal actors and Crown servants. It is therefore not plain and obvious that this Court is without jurisdiction to entertain claims seeking declaratory relief as here.

One of the major contentions is that the Government alleged that the Federal Court had no jurisdiction to even hear the case. The Pronothary took a different view. However, there were other problems which ended with this.

[71] There is ample authority in this Court and in the jurisprudence generally that where a claim has some kernel of a legitimate claim it should not be tossed aside but permitted to be amended to determine if the clam in law can be cured.[45]

[72] Given that the Claim, in my view, is not justiciable, leave to amend will not cure the defects. Leave to amend is therefore not granted.

The case was thrown out on a motion to strike. However, that will not be the end of it. The Plaintiffs would appeal to a Justice of the Federal Court.

4. COMER Appeals Dismissal


(See here.)

The striking out (without permission to amend) was appealed to a Justice of the Federal Court. This was a partial victory, as the dismissal “was” upheld, but it allowed the Plaintiff’s to file an amended Claim. This would be another “chance” to get it right.

5. COMER Tries To File Again


(See here.)
After the Justice of the Federal Court upheld the dismissal (but giving leave to amend the Statement of Claim), COMER appealed to the Federal Court of Appeal, and the Government cross-appealed.

In short, the Plaintiffs were trying to get the dismissal overturned entirely, while the Government tried to remove the clause to allow COMER to file an amended Statement of Claim.

The Federal Appeals Court panel (3 Justices) threw out both the appeal and cross-appeal.

6. COMER’s Amended Statement Thrown Out


(See here.)

[66] In terms of the general principles that ought to be applied on a motion to strike, the Plaintiffs assert that the facts pleaded by the Plaintiffs must be taken as proven: Canada (Attorney General) v Inuit Tapirasat of Canada, 1980 CanLII 21 (SCC), [1980] 2 SCR 735; Nelles v Ontario (1989), DLR (4th) 609 (SCC) [Nelles]; Operation Dismantle, above; Hunt v Carey Canada Inc 1990 CanLII 90 (SCC), [1990] 2 SCR 959 [Hunt]; Dumont v Canada (Attorney General), 1990 CanLII 131 (SCC), [1990] 1 SCR 279 [Dumont]; Nash v Ontario (1995), 1995 CanLII 2934 (ON CA), 27 OR (3d) 1 (Ont CA) [Nash]; Canada v Arsenault, 2009 FCA 242 (CanLII) [Arsenault].

[67] The Plaintiffs echo the test referenced by the Defendants, asserting that a claim can be struck only in plain and obvious cases where the pleading is bad beyond argument: Nelles, above, at para 3. The Court has provided further guidance in Dumont, above, that an outcome should be “plain and obvious” or “beyond doubt” before striking can be invoked (at para 2). Striking cannot be justified by a claim that raises an “arguable, difficult or important point of law”: Hunt, above, at para 55.

[68] The novelty of the Amended Claim is not reason in and of itself to strike it: Nash, above, at para 11; Hanson v Bank of Nova Scotia (1994), 1994 CanLII 573 (ON CA), 19 OR (3d) 142 (CA); Adams-Smith v Christian Horizons (1997), 3 OR (3d) 640 (Ont Gen Div). Additionally, matters that are not fully settled by the jurisprudence should not be disposed of on a motion to strike: RD Belanger & Associates Ltd v Stadium Corp of Ontario Ltd (1991), 1991 CanLII 2731 (ON CA), 5 OR (3d) 778 (CA). In order for the Defendants to succeed, the Plaintiffs state that a case from the same jurisdiction that squarely deals with, and rejects, the very same issue must be presented: Dalex Co v Schwartz Levitsky Feldman (1994), 19 OR (3d) 215 (CA). The Court should be generous when interpreting the drafting of the pleadings, and allow for amendments prior to striking: Grant v Cormier – Grant et al (2001), 2001 CanLII 3041 (ON CA), 56 OR (3d) 215 (CA).

[69] The Plaintiffs also remind the Court that the line between fact and evidence is not always clear (Liebmann v Canada, 1993 CanLII 3006 (FC), [1994] 2 FC 3 at para 20) and that the Amended Claim must be taken as pleaded by the Plaintiffs, not as reconfigured by the Defendants: Arsenault, above, at para 10.

Plaintiffs arguing that the Defendant has not actually met the burden to strike out a Statement of Claim. However, the Justice decides differently.

[137] In the present case, the Plaintiffs have not, in their Amended Claim, pleaded facts to demonstrate a “real” issue concerning the relative interests of each party, and the nexus of that real issue to the Plaintiffs and their claim for relief. Although as I pointed out in my Order of April 24, 2014, the Plaintiffs do distinguish between legal issues and policy issues, the legal issues remain theoretical with no real nexus to some interest of the Plaintiffs, other than an interest in having the Court endorse their opinion on the Bank Act issues raised.

[138] The Plaintiffs have not addressed the jurisdictional problems I referred to in paras 85 to 91 of my Order of April 24, 2014 and/or what might generally be referred to as the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain, or its willingness to grant, free-standing requests for declaration.

The Justice Rules that the original problems are left unfixed. As such, the case is thrown out. This time, there is no leave to amend, so if this is to continue, it must go back to the Federal Court of Appeals.

7. Return to Federal Court of Appeals


(See here.)

[9] The essence of the Federal Court judge’s reasoning for striking the amended statement of claim is summed up at paragraph 144 of his reasons: It seems to me, then, that the latest Amended Claim discloses no reasonable cause of action and has no prospect of success at trial. It also seems to me that the Plaintiffs are still asking the Court for an advisory opinion in the form of declarations that their view of the way the Bank Act and the Constitution should be read is correct. It also seems to me that they have failed to show a statutory grant of jurisdiction by Parliament that this Court can entertain and rule on their claim as presently constituted, or that they have any specific rights under the legislation which they invoke, or a legal framework for any such rights. As the Supreme Court of Canada pointed out in Operation Dismantle, above, the preventive function of a declaratory judgment must be more than hypothetical and requires “a cognizable threat to a legal interest before the Court will entertain the use of its process as a preventative measure” (para 33). The Court is not here to declare the law generally or to give an advisory opinion. The Court is here to decide and declare contested legal rights.

[10] The appellants assert that the opinion so expressed is wrong in law. In support of this proposition, they essentially reiterate the arguments which they urged upon the Federal Court judge and ask that we come to a different conclusion. Counsel for the appellants focused his argument during the hearing on the issue of standing and the right to seek declarations of constitutionality. It remains however that, as the Federal Court judge found, the right to a remedy is conditional on the existence of a justiciable issue.

The Federal Appeals Court believes that COMER is still asking for an advisory opinion. Furthermore, the FCA still believes that no justiciable issue has been raised.

8. Supreme Court of Canada Declines To Hear Case


(See here.)

The Supreme Court refuses to hear the case, which means it is legally over. It would have been nice to have some actual reasons included. However, due to the volume of cases it receives, rejected applications generally don’t receive them.

9. Issues Still Remain Unaddressed


Despite repeated rejection by the Courts, the questions about the changes in banking policy were never really addressed. Does giving control of our central bank to foreign powers break the law?

This is supposedly a “political” issue, but no politicians are willing to talk about it.

As of now, Canada is still borrowing money from private banks, as opposed to ourselves. We are racking up huge levels of debt that we shouldn’t be.

Public Policy #5: Restoring The 1934 Bank Of Canada Act

1. Important Links


CLICK HERE, for StatsCan data on National debt.

CLICK HERE, for the Bank for International Settlements.
CLICK HERE, for BIS mainpage.
CLICK HERE, for the 60 banks which own BIS.
CLICK HERE, for the Basil Committee.

CLICK HERE, for an interesting article from Canadian Dimension.
CLICK HERE, for an article from www.globalresearch.ca.
CLICK HERE, for a failed Court bid to reform the banking process in Canada
CLICK HERE, for amended Statement of Claim.
CLICK HERE, for the Bank of Canada Act, 1985 version.

2. Some Background


The Bank of Canada Act was passed in 1934. It allowed the Canadian Government to borrow from its own central bank, in a sense, to “borrow from itself”. However, things drastically changed in 1974. Pierre Trudeau changed it so that Canada would now be borrowing from “private banks”, and racking up debt and interest charges in the meantime.

From the Global Research article:

Between 1939 and 1974, the government actually did borrow from its own central bank. That made its debt effectively interest-free, since the government owned the bank and got the benefit of the interest. According to figures supplied by Jack Biddell, a former government accountant, the federal debt remained very low, relatively flat, and quite sustainable during those years. (See his chart below.) The government successfully funded major public projects simply on the credit of the nation, including the production of aircraft during and after World War II, education benefits for returning soldiers, family allowances, old age pensions, the Trans-Canada Highway, the St. Lawrence Seaway project, and universal health care for all Canadians.

This is the main takeaway here: Borrowing from your own central bank effectively makes the loans interest free, since you are borrowing from yourself as opposing to borrowing from someone else.

From the Canadian Dimension article:

The critical point is that between 1939 and 1974 the federal government borrowed extensively from its own central bank. That made its debt effectively interest-free, since the government owned the bank and got the benefit of any interest. As such Canada emerged from World War II and from all the extensive infrastructure and other expenditures with very little debt. But following 1974 came a dramatic change.

Reiterating the point, that Canada was borrowing from itself until 1974.

3. How Much Debt?


Dollars (millions)
Net federal government financial debt
1930 $2,178
1931 $2,262
1932 $2,376
1933 $2,596
1934 $2,730
1935 $2,846
1936 $3,006
1937 $3,084
1938 $3,102
1939 $3,153
1940 $3,271
1941 $3,649
1942 $4,045
1943 $6,183
1944 $8,740
1945 $11,298
1946 $13,421
1947 $13,048
1948 $12,372
1949 $11,776
1950 $11,626
1951 $11,427
1952 $11,163
1953 $11,151
1954 $11,092
1955 $11,229
1956 $11,241
1957 $10,967
1958 $11,015
1959 $11,627
1960 $12,047
1961 $12,394
1962 $13,378
1963 $14,079
1964 $15,262
1965 $15,748
1966 $15,381
1967 $15,866
1968 $16,713
1969 $17,396
1970 $18,095
1971 $18,581
1972 $19,328
1973 $20,123
1974 $21,580
1975 $24,769
1976 $28,573
1977 $32,629
1978 $45,846
1979 $59,040
1980 $72,555
1981 $86,280
1982 $99,600
1983 $128,302
1984 $164,532
1985 $209,891
1986 $245,151
1987 $276,735
1988 $305,438
1989 $333,519
1990 $362,920
1991 $395,075
1992 $428,682
1993 $471,061
1994 $513,219
1995 $550,685
1996 $578,718
1997 $588,402
1998 $581,581
1999 $574,468
2000 $561,733
2001 $545,300
2002 $534,690
2003 $526,492
2004 $523,648
2005 $523,344
2006 $514,099
2007 $508,122
2008 $490,412

See the source.

In 1930, Canada’s national debt was about $2 billion. In $1974, it was about $20 billion. A decade after changes to the Act, the debt was about $160, or 8 times higher.

Worth noting, that Brian Mulroney, who was PM from 1984 until 1993 added over $300 billion to the national debt.

4. Fighting Back: Committee on Monetary & Economic Reform

Supreme Court of Canada Dismisses Constitutional Bank of Canada Case, Claiming It Is a Political Matter

We believe that the case has ample legal merit, and should have proceeded to trial. It is not uncommon for the Supreme Court to refuse leave on a given issue multiple times, finally to grant leave, hear the appeal and the case then succeeds. The Supreme Court controls its own agenda, both in its timing and on the merits of issues it will or will not hear. (Annually, fewer than 8–10% of all cases filed are granted permission and heard at the Supreme Court of Canada.)

It should be noted that throughout this arduous and expensive legal process, the substance of this lawsuit initiated in the public interest has not been addressed. The matters raised by the lawsuit are summarized in the original news release (pdf) issued on December 19, 2011.)

See the source

A 5 1/2 year legal fight to restore the original central banking. Even more frustrating is that the Courts have never really addressed the issues which led to the challenge in the first place.

The Supreme Court says it is a “political matter”, but no politicians in Canada have the willpower to address it, never mind fix it. Even “socialist” and “populist” politicians seem unwilling to take it on.

5. Who Are These People?

About BIS – overview

Our mission is to serve central banks in their pursuit of monetary and financial stability, to foster international cooperation in those areas and to act as a bank for central banks.

Established in 1930, the BIS is owned by 60 central banks, representing countries from around the world that together account for about 95% of world GDP. Its head office is in Basel, Switzerland and it has two representative offices: in Hong Kong SAR and in Mexico City.

We pursue our mission by:

  • fostering discussion and facilitating collaboration among central banks
  • supporting dialogue with other authorities that are responsible for promoting financial stability
  • carrying out research and policy analysis on issues of relevance for monetary and financial stability
  • acting as a prime counterparty for central banks in their financial transactions
  • serving as an agent or trustee in connection with international financial operations

As part of our work in the area of monetary and financial stability, we regularly publish related analyses and international banking and financial statistics that underpin policymaking, academic research and public debate.

With regard to our banking activities, our customers are central banks and international organisations. We do not accept deposits from, or provide financial services to, private individuals or corporate entities.

Supposedly, the Bank for International Settlements is “owned” by 60 central banks. It then facilitates discussions between those 60 banks. In short, it is a global collusion to fix monetary policies.

Interesting that the “central banks” are supposed to be owned by their respective nations, yet, BIS recommends borrowing from “private” bankers. Almost as if it wasn’t acting in the nations’ self interests.

6. Not in Canada’s Interests


This should be obvious, but borrowing from private banks is not in Canada’s best interests, nor any nations. This is bankrupting our nation, to enrich global bankers.

Restore the 1934 Bank of Canada Act, and let us take back control over our own finances.

Curious, even when national and provincial debts are in the news so much, no one asks the obvious question. Why are we jacking up our debt by borrowing from private banks?

Infanticide #5: Ontario COA Rules Doctors Must Provide Abortions/Euthanasia, or Provide Referal

(article from Christian Legal Fellowship)

(Lifesite news also covered this)

(Ontario Divisional Court ruling)

(Divisional Court ruling appeal to Ontario Court of Appeals)

1. Important Links


CLICK HERE, for Ontario Court of Appeals ruling, May 15, 2019.
CLICK HERE, for the Ontario Divisional Court ruling, January 31, 2018.
CLICK HERE, for R.v. Oakes (balancing test)
CLICK HERE, for Carter v. Canada (struck down assisted suicide laws).
CLICK HERE, for Ontario Human Rights Code.
CLICK HERE, for the Canadian Charter.
CLICK HERE, for some Charter cases.
CLICK HERE, for Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 (standard for review)

In This Series
CLICK HERE, for Part 1, New York and Virginia.
CLICK HERE, for Part 2, Kill The Survivors.
CLICK HERE, for Part 3, UN Endorses Abortion As Human Right.
CLICK HERE, for Part 4, Fallout and Pushback.

Miscellaneous Articles
CLICK HERE, for woman who tries to drown newborn gets only 1 year.
CLICK HERE, for a Maclean’s article on “assault on women’s rights”.
CLICK HERE, for Roe (as in Roe v Wade), becomes anti-abortion activist.

2. Brief Introduction


The case above is one of Ontario doctors refusing to provide certain “reproductive health services” (a.k.a. abortion), and “medical assistance in dying” MAiD (a.k.a. euthanasia). Not only did they refuse to provide these services, they refused to help with the referrals procedures to others who would.

The Appellants refused on religious grounds. They claimed that requiring them to participate in these “medical services” violated their consciences and religious convictions. To be fair, we are talking about killing unborn children, eldery, and terminal patients. The other extreme would be more disturbing.

Their regulatory body, the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, says if they won’t perform such “health care services”, then they must help the patients get referred to doctors who will.

The Ontario Divisional Court agreed that this was the case. And now the Ontario Court of Appeals has upheld that ruling. Will this go to the Supreme Court of Canada? We will see.

3. Court of Appeal Exerps

E. Issues
[57] The appeal raises the following issues:
(1) What is the applicable standard of review and is the Doré/Loyola framework or the Oakes framework applicable to this case?
(2) Do the effective referral requirements of the Policies infringe the appellants’ s. 2(a) freedom of conscience and religion?
(3) Do the effective referral requirements of the Policies infringe the appellants’ s. 15(1) equality rights?
(4) If there is an infringement of the appellants’ Charter rights and/or freedoms, is it justified under s. 1 of the Charter?

Standard Of Review

[59] The normal rules of appellate review of lower court decisions, articulated in Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33 (CanLII), [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235, apply on this appeal. Questions of law are reviewed on a correctness standard, and questions of fact and mixed fact and law are reviewed on a standard of palpable and overriding error: Housen, at paras. 8, 10, 36-37. The Divisional Court’s selection and application of the correctness standard to the Policies is a question of law and is accordingly reviewed by this court on a correctness standard.

If it is a question of fact, the standard is “overriding palpable error”. In essence, Appeals Courts tend to “give deference” to the Trial Judge since he/she is in a much better position to actually judge the case.

In questions of law, the standard is the correctness of the law itself.

In questions of mixed law and fact are viewed more towards “overriding palpable error”.

Religious Freedom

[62] In Law Society of British Columbia v. Trinity Western University, 2018 SCC 32 (CanLII), [2018] 2 S.C.R. 293, at para. 62, the Supreme Court adopted the definition of religious freedom expressed in R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., 1985 CanLII 69 (SCC), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at p. 336:

[T]he right to entertain such religious beliefs as a person chooses, the right to declare religious beliefs openly and without fear of hindrance or reprisal, and the right to manifest religious belief by worship and practice or by teaching and dissemination.

[63] At para. 63, the court set out the requirements of the test:
[F]irst, that he or she sincerely believes in a practice or belief that has a nexus with religion; and second, that the impugned state conduct interferes, in a manner that is more than trivial or insubstantial, with his or her ability to act in accordance with that practice or belief.
This was the test applied by the Divisional Court, referring to Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, 2004 SCC 47 (CanLII), [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551, at para. 56. See also Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37 (CanLII), [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567, at para. 32.

[64] The sincerity of belief and interference are conceded. But the College contends that the interference is trivial and insubstantial and does not contravene s. 2(a).

[65] I disagree. To explain my reasons, it is necessary to examine the appellants’ beliefs and their objections to performing or referring patients for the procedures at issue.

All parties agree the beliefs are sincere. The College says it is trivial, while the Panel disagrees.

Section 15 and Equality

[87] The Divisional Court referred to the two-part test for establishing a breach of s. 15(1) articulated in Taypotat, at paras. 19-20: (1) whether, on its face or in its impact, a law creates a distinction on the basis of an enumerated or analogous ground; and (2) whether the impugned law fails to respond to the actual capacities and needs of the members of the group and instead imposes burdens or denies benefits in a manner that has the effect of reinforcing, perpetuating or exacerbating their disadvantage.

[88] The focus of the inquiry is “whether a distinction has the effect of perpetuating arbitrary disadvantage on the claimant because of his or her membership in an enumerated or analogous group” such that it is a “discriminatory distinction”: Taypotat, at paras. 16, 18; and Quebec (Attorney General) v. A., 2013 SCC 5 (CanLII), [2013] 1 S.C.R. 61, at para. 331

[89] Applying this test, the Divisional Court dismissed the appellants’ claim that the Policies infringe their equality rights under s. 15(1) of the Charter. Without deciding whether the Policies create a distinction on the basis of religion, the Divisional Court held that the Policies do not have the effect of reinforcing, perpetuating or exacerbating a disadvantage or promoting prejudice against religious physicians. Nor do they restrict access to a fundamental social institution or impede full membership in Canadian society.

To put it mildly, the Courts have decided that not all “equality rights” are treated equally. In other words, it is okay to discriminate on the basis of “protected grounds” as long as it falls within certain guidelines.

Allowed Under Section 1?

[97] The onus at this stage is on the College to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that the infringement of the appellants’ freedom of religion is a reasonable limit, demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society: Multani, at para. 43.
[98] In Oakes, at pp. 135 and 138-39, Dickson C.J. articulated a framework for the s. 1 analysis, which can be summarized as follows:
(a) the Charter-infringing measure must be “prescribed by law”;
(b) the objective of the impugned measure must be of sufficient importance to warrant overriding a constitutionally protected right or freedom;
(c) the means chosen must be reasonable and demonstrably justified – this is a “form of proportionality test” which will vary in the circumstances, but requires a balancing of the interests of society with the interests of individuals and groups and has three components:
(i) the measure must be rationally connected to the objective – i.e., carefully designed to achieve the objective and not arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational considerations;
(ii) the means chosen should impair the Charter right or freedom as little as possible; and
(iii)there must be proportionality between the salutary and deleterious effects of the measure.

This is a fairly lengthy section, but this lays out the groundwork for determining whether Charter violations can otherwise be “saved”. Are there justifiable public interests in the breaches that are affirmed? Ultimately, the Court of Appeals said yes. These violations were justified on other grounds.

[186] The Fact Sheet identifies options that are clearly acceptable to many objecting physicians. Those who do not find them acceptable may be able to find other practice structures that will insulate them from participation in actions to which they object. If they cannot do so, they will have to seek out other ways in which to use their skills, training and commitment to patient care. I do not underestimate the individual sacrifices this may require. The Divisional Court correctly found, however, that the burden of these sacrifices did not outweigh the harm to vulnerable patients that would be caused by any reasonable alternative. That conclusion is not undermined by the fresh evidence before this court. Even taking the burden imposed on physicians at its most onerous, as framed by the appellants, the salutary effects of the Policies still outweigh the deleterious effects.

[187] As the Divisional Court observed, the appellants have no common law, proprietary or constitutional right to practice medicine. As members of a regulated and publicly-funded profession, they are subject to requirements that focus on the public interest, rather than their interests. In fact, the fiduciary nature of the physician-patient relationship requires physicians to act at all times in their patients’ best interests, and to avoid conflicts between their own interests and their patients’ interests:

4. Closing Thoughts


This is the heart of the conclusion:
(A) Doctors have other options
(B) Doctors can alter their practice
(C) Public interest comes first
(D) Medicine is a publicly regulated profession.

One thing needs to be pointed out though: just because something is LEGAL, doesn’t make it MORAL. Abortion and euthanasia are killing. Period.

Although both abortion and assisted suicide have no criminal penalties against them, there are still huge scientific and moral arguments against both. This will be a topic for a coming piece.

If a person believes that carrying out just “health care services” amounts to murder, that is okay. But wouldn’t referrals of such procedures make a doctor an accessory to murder? Although one degree removed, the moral objection would be the same.

Bottom line: provide the service, or refer to someone else who will. You’re here to serve the public.

Meet the Controlled “Opposition” To Carbon Tax (Climate Change Scam #4)

(Originally featured in Maclean’s as “The Resistance”)

(Garnett Genuis, CPC MP, justifies Paris Accord)

(“Conservative” AB Premier Jason Kenney endorses Carbon tax)

(“Conservative” AB Prem Jason Kenney supports Bill C-69)

(Ontario Court of Appeals, website, contains many great links and references)

(Maxime Bernier, in 2016, against tax)

1. Important Links


CLICK HERE, for the Climate Change Scam Part I.
CLICK HERE, for Part II, the Paris Accord.
CLICK HERE, for Part III, Saskatchewan Appeals Court Reference.

CLICK HERE, for Reference at Ontario Court of Appeals.
CLICK HERE, for Saskatchewan COA ruling.
CLICK HERE, for Ontario COA Factum (arguments).
CLICK HERE, for BC Factum (Intervenor in Ontario).
CLICK HERE, for NB Factum (Intervenor in Ontario).
CLICK HERE, for Manitoba’s position on “climate change”.
CLICK HERE, for Jason Kenney (AB).
CLICK HERE, for Jason Kenney Supporting Bill C-69.
CLICK HERE, for Jason Kenney Wanting a Provincial Carbon Tax.
CLICK HERE, for Maxime Bernier (PPC).
CLICK HERE, for Bernier again.

CLICK HERE, for factum of Intergenerational Climate Committee.
CLICK HERE, for the Factum of Canadian Taxpayers Federation.
CLICK HERE, for United Conservative Association.

2. Quotes From Sask COA Ruling

[4] The factual record presented to the Court confirms that climate change caused by anthropogenic greenhouse gas [GHG] emissions is one of the great existential issues of our time. The pressing importance of limiting such emissions is accepted by all of the participants in these proceedings.

[5] The Act seeks to ensure there is a minimum national price on GHG emissions in order to encourage their mitigation. Part 1 of the Act imposes a charge on GHG-producing fuels and combustible waste. Part 2 puts in place an output-based performance system for large industrial facilities. Such facilities are obliged to pay compensation if their GHG emissions exceed applicable limits. Significantly, the Act operates as no more than a backstop. It applies only those provinces or areas where the Governor in Council concludes GHG emissions are not priced at an appropriate level.

[6] The sole issue before the Court is whether Parliament has the constitutional authority to enact the Act. The issue is not whether GHG pricing should or should not be adopted or whether the Act is effective or fair. Those are questions to be answered by Parliament and by provincial legislatures, not by courts.

As was mentioned in the last segment, Saskatchewan “admits” that climate change is a real thing, and that emissions must be reduced drastically, in order to save the planet.

In other words, “Conservative” Premier Scott Moe fully endorsed the climate change scam. Rather, his sole argument against was that Ottawa should not intervene, and that Provinces should be left to their own devices. Specifically, Ottawa shouldn’t impose a carbon tax.

Moe is hardly alone in this. Indeed, the other “Resistance Members”

3. Quotes From Ontario Factum

>6. Ontario agrees with Canada that climate change is real and that human activities are a major cause. Ontario also acknowledges that climate change is already having a disruptive effect across Canada, and that, left unchecked, its potential impact will be even more severe. Ontario agrees that proactive action to address climate change is required. That is why Ontario has put forward for consultation a made-in-Ontario plan to protect the environment, reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and fight climate change.

11. Ontario released its climate change plan, as part of its overall environment plan, for a 60-day period of public consultation on November 29, 2018. The plan will be finalized following consideration of input from that consultation. Ontario’s plan will tackle climate change in a balanced and responsible way, without placing additional burdens on Ontario families and businesses

12. “[Greenhouse gas] emissions come from virtually all aspects of Ontario’s society and economy.” There are seven primary sectors in Ontario that produce greenhouse gas emissions: transportation; industry; buildings; land use, land use change and forestry; electricity; waste; and agriculture. All but the last (which is an area of concurrent federal/provincial jurisdiction) will be discussed in turn.

13. Canada itself has publicly acknowledged the wide range of activities that can generate greenhouse gas emissions – activities as varied as homes and buildings, transport, industry, forestry, agriculture, waste, and electricity.

(Source is here.) Ontario, like Saskatchewan, does not bother questioning any of the findings. Both “Conservative” governments have no interest in getting to the truth of the scam, nor the many failed model predictions. Again, this only concerns whether Ottawa can mandate Carbon taxes on other provinces.

4.Quotes From New Brunswick Factum

1. The Intervenor, Attorney General of New Brunswick (“New Brunswick”) agrees with the factum of the Attorney General of Ontario (“Ontario”) regarding the nature of this reference and agrees with Ontario’s conclusions in every respect. New Brunswick also agrees with the climate data submitted by the Attorney General of Canada (“Canada”). This reference should not be a forum for those who deny climate change; nor should it be a showcase about the risks posed by greenhouse gas emissions (“GHG emissions”). The supporting data is relevant only to the extent that it is meaningfully connected to the constitutional question at issue.

2. The foundational climate change data provided by Canada, generally intended to portray the anticipated impacts of climate change in Canada, as well as the many references to international accord and commitments, leave an unquestionable impression of Canada’s a deep resolve to see the nation’s environmental footprint diminished. New Brunswick does not take issue with Canada’s commitment or with the importance of the overall subject matter.

3. What New Brunswick disputes is the way in which the federal Parliament has apportioned its resolve to diminish GHG emissions by imposing “backstop legislation”.

New Brunswick very explicitly states that the reference is not for anyone who denies “climate change, or global warming (or whatever it identifies as). Instead, the only issue is whether the tax imposed by the Federal Government is constitutional.

5. Quotes From BC Factum

1. Greenhouse gases might pose the most difficult collective action problem the world has ever faced. The benefits of emissions are local, but the costs are global. When people burn fossil fuels in the production or consumption of goods and services, each jurisdiction – national or subnational – exports its greenhouse gases to every other. And they all import the consequences: for all practical purposes, without regard to the extent of their own part in creating the problem.

2. The prospect of uncontrolled climate change requires that we treat the capacity of the atmosphere to hold greenhouse gases like the scarce, valuable resource it is. If total temperature increases are to be kept to 1.5˚C or 2˚C above pre-industrial averages — or indeed to any target at all — the world must ultimately reduce net emissions to zero. The global stock of greenhouse gases that can permissibly be added in the meantime is finite and must somehow be allocated. Those allocations have an economic value that individuals, industries, sub-national jurisdictions and nation states can be expected to quarrel over.

3. Under Canada’s Constitution, provinces have legislative authority to regulate or price emissions by individuals and businesses within their borders. In 2008, British Columbia enacted one of the first carbon pricing schemes. In the intervening decade, emissions were reduced compared to what they would have been, while the province enjoyed the highest economic growth in the country. But because greenhouse gases do not respect borders — while provincial legislation must — British Columbia’s actions will only counteract the negative effects of climate change on the property and civil rights of its residents if other jurisdictions follow suit

BC actually has a socialist government, which in this case is indistinguishable from self-identified “Conservative” governments.

6. Quotes From Manitoba

The Manitoba government will go to court over Ottawa’s imposition of a carbon tax.

Premier Brian Pallister revealed Wednesday his government will launch a legal challenge against the federal government, which imposed its new levy as promised on Manitoba, along with three other provinces, Monday.

“We’re going to court, sadly, to challenge the Ottawa carbon tax because Ottawa cannot impose a carbon tax on a province that has a credible greenhouse gas-reduction plan of its own, and we do,” he told reporters.

Manitoba’s Premier Pallister, who also self-identifies as a “Conservative”, doesn’t challenge the history of valid predictions or climate models. Instead, his position (like the others), is solely that Ottawa doesn’t have the authority to impose a Carbon tax on the Provinces.

7. Quotes From Alberta

The fall federal election will be “an opportunity for Canadians to say that they don’t want busy-body politicians telling them how to live their lives and taking more money out of their pockets,” said Kenney, who was sworn in as Alberta’s premier on Tuesday.

Alberta is not currently subject to the federal carbon tax because it has its own pricing scheme set up by the former NDP government. Kenney has vowed to repeal that legislation and implement his own emissions reduction plan.

Again, no mention about the scam that is climate change. No mention of how wrong all these “experts” have been. Nothing about how Carbon Dioxide is used in photosynthesis.

And Jason (Bilderberg) Kenney will very shortly go about screwing over Alberta, first with a “made in Alberta” Carbon tax, then supporting Bill C-69, despite the damage it will do to Alberta’s economy. See here, and see here.

8. From Canadian Taxpayer Federation

1. The Canadian Taxpayers Federation [the CTF] is a federally incorporated, not-for-profit citizen’s group dedicated to advocating for lower taxes, less waste, and more accountable government. The CTF is participating in this reference based on its concern that the federal carbon tax is unlikely to achieve its stated objective and will, instead, just be a ‘tax’ on the taxpayers of Ontario, despite being imposed on the taxpayers of Ontario in a manner that is contrary to section 53 of the Constitution Act, 1867. Constitution Act, 1867, at s. 53.

2. The CTF intends to use its participation in this reference to advance the following two points. First, the federal carbon tax also meets the legal criteria for being designated as a ‘tax’. Second, the federal carbon tax does not comply with the constitutionally-enshrined principle of “no taxation without representation” and, thus, the federal carbon tax is unconstitutional, at least in its application in Ontario.

For a non-profit worried about wasted taxpayer money, the CTF misses the most important part: the climate change movement is a scam based on junk science. However, no where that (or any similar arguments), be made on its behalf.

9. From United Conservative Association

1. This Reference is a case about the division of powers between the federal and provincial governments and the proper balance of federalism in Canada. The United Conservative Association (“UCA”) agrees with the positions advanced by Ontario and submits that the Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act (the ”GGPPA”) is unconstitutional.

2. By attempting to justify the enactment of the GGPPA using the national concern branch of the peace, order, and good governance (“FOGG”) clause, Canada seeks to expand the federal government’s constitutional powers at the expense of the provinces.

3. Put simply, Canada is attempting to claim a new, exclusive power to regulate greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions throughout Canada.

Again, no mention of the junk science behind the climate change scam. The only issue is whether Ottawa has Constitutional power to impose such a tax.

10. The “Populist” Position

A second reason is that provinces are already experimenting with various ways to reduce emissions. Some have a carbon tax, others have a cap-and-trade regime, still, others are focusing on carbon capture or direct regulation. Several also have programs to subsidize electric cars or renewable energy that only seem to waste money and drive up costs to businesses and consumers.

We’ll see over time what model is most effective in reducing emissions and least detrimental to the economy. But there is no reason for Ottawa to impose another layer of government intervention on an already complex and costly series of measures whose effectiveness has yet to be demonstrated.

A third reason is that the transition to other sources of energy is already taking place, as companies respond to consumer demand for more environment-friendly products. The federal government should help it along by reducing taxes, barriers to innovation and competition, and ineffective and costly regulation. This is a real market-based policy that Conservatives should support.

See SOURCE:

“Populist” Maxime Bernier refuses to call out the scam, and instead just calls Carbon pricing ineffective. Granted, this article is from August 2016. However, Bernier will not call a spade a spade. Just like in this 2016 tweet.

But since leaving the Conservative Party, Bernier is now willing to call out climate change propaganda.

Though, to be fair, Bernier is now openly saying that Carbon Dioxide is just plant food.

FINAL WORDS
Despite the shoddy pseudo-science behind “climate change” policies, none of the parties either in the Saskatchewan case, nor the upcoming Ontario case question it. Rather, these parties SOLELY object to the Carbon tax on the grounds that Provinces should be able to set their prices.

Controlled opposition, the whole lot.

Saskatchewan COA, in 3-2 Ruling Allows Carbon Tax (Climate Change Scam #3)

(Court reference regarding Carbon tax in Saskatchewan)

(Saskatchewan Premier Scott Moe)

(Environment Minister Catherine McKenna)

IMPORTANT LINKS


CLICK HERE, for the Saskatchewan COA Reference.
CLICK HERE, for Saskatchewan Premier, Scott Moe.
CLICK HERE, for Environment Minister Catherine McKenna.
CLICK HERE, for the Climate Change Scam Part I.
CLICK HERE, for Part II, the Paris Accord.
CLICK HERE, for the Paris Accord itself.

CLICK HERE, for Bjorn Lomborg, Copenhagen Consensus Center. (0.05 degrees)
CLICK HERE, for fact-checking Paris Accord. (0.20 degrees)
CLICK HERE, for limited temperature raises form 2 degrees to 1.5 (0.50).
CLICK HERE, for some skepticism.
CLICK HERE, for the Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report Summary for Policymakers [Climate Change 2014], used by Sask COA.
CLICK HERE, for the UN Conference on Climate Change (2015).

QUOTES FROM MAJORITY RULING

[4] The factual record presented to the Court confirms that climate change caused by anthropogenic greenhouse gas [GHG] emissions is one of the great existential issues of our time. The pressing importance of limiting such emissions is accepted by all of the participants in these proceedings.

Okay, to start this off, Saskatchewan Premier Scott Moe doesn’t actually “challenge” any of the climate change alarmist claims that society depends on it. He doesn’t challenge any of the pseudo-science or the history of failed climate models. His only argument is that a Carbon tax is ineffective.

If you were expecting Premier Moe to examine or look into any of the “scientific” claims, he is not the man to do it.

[5] The Act seeks to ensure there is a minimum national price on GHG emissions in order to encourage their mitigation. Part 1 of the Act imposes a charge on GHG-producing fuels and combustible waste. Part 2 puts in place an output-based performance system for large industrial facilities. Such facilities are obliged to pay compensation if their GHG emissions exceed applicable limits. Significantly, the Act operates as no more than a backstop. It applies only those provinces or areas where the Governor in Council concludes GHG emissions are not priced at an appropriate level.

[6] The sole issue before the Court is whether Parliament has the constitutional authority to enact the Act. The issue is not whether GHG pricing should or should not be adopted or whether the Act is effective or fair. Those are questions to be answered by Parliament and by provincial legislatures, not by courts.

So not only does the Saskatchewan Government accept that climate change is a threat to our existence, it doesn’t even ask the Court to consider if such a measure is fair or effective.

[16] ….(a) “Human influence on the climate system is clear, and recent anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases are the highest in history. Recent climate changes have had widespread impacts on human and natural systems” (at 2).

(b) “Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, and since the 1950s, many of the observed changes are unprecedented over decades to millennia. The atmosphere and ocean have warmed, the amounts of snow and ice have diminished, and sea level has risen” (at 2).

(c) “Anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions have increased since the pre-industrial era, driven largely by economic and population growth, and are now higher than ever. This has led to atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide that are unprecedented in at least the last 800,000 years. Their effects, together with those of other anthropogenic drivers, have been detected throughout the climate system and are extremely likely to have been the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century” (emphasis in original, at 4).

(d) “Changes in many extreme weather and climate events have been observed since about 1950. Some of these changes have been linked to human influences, including a decrease in cold temperature extremes, an increase in warm temperature extremes, an increase in extreme high sea levels and an increase in the number of heavy precipitation events in a number of regions” (at 7).

(e) “Continued emission of greenhouse gases will cause further warming and long lasting changes in all components of the climate system, increasing the likelihood of severe, pervasive and irreversible impacts for people and ecosystems. Limiting climate change would require substantial and sustained reductions in greenhouse gas emissions which, together with adaptation, can limit climate change risks” (at 8).

(f) “Surface temperature is projected to rise over the 21st century under all assessed emission scenarios. It is very likely that heat waves will occur more often and last longer, and that extreme precipitation events will become more intense and frequent in many regions. The ocean will continue to warm and acidify, and global mean sea level to rise” (emphasis in original, at 10).

(g) “Climate change will amplify existing risks and create new risks for natural and human systems. Risks are unevenly distributed and are generally greater for disadvantaged people and communities in countries at all levels of development”

(h) “Without additional mitigation efforts beyond those in place today, and even with adaptation, warming by the end of the 21st century will lead to high to very high risk of severe, widespread and irreversible impacts globally (high confidence). …” (emphasis in original, at 17).

None of these conclusions were challenged or put in issue by the participants in this Reference

Source for claims. Read through it. Despite all of the dire warnings inside, there is little to actually justify any of it.

To repeat: NONE of these “facts” are disputed by the Saskatchewan Government or Premier Moe. The Government doesn’t dispute that the IPCC claims to know what happened 800,000 years ago. It doesn’t challenge any of the predictions (and computer models are just predictions). Instead, the case will boil down to technical arguments as to whether the Feds have the jurisdiction to impose the Carbon tax.

Saskatchewan concedes all of the “factual” arguments around climate change, and instead tries to make narrow legal arguments against it being imposed.

In fact, watching Premier Moe’s speech after the ruling, it is clear he believes that the climate change scam is legitimate. Rather, he argues that the Federally mandated Carbon tax is just an ineffective means of dealing with it.

While on a technical level, Saskatchewan does make interesting arguments about jurisdiction. However, it’s difficult to justify not jumping onboard when you have agreed that climate change threatens humanity

[7] The Constitution Act, 1867 distributes legislative authority between Parliament and the provincial legislatures. Broadly speaking, a statute is valid if its essential character falls within a subject matter allocated to the legislative body that put the statute in place. Neither level of government has exclusive authority over the environment. As a result, Parliament can legislate in relation to issues such as GHGs so long as it stays within the four corners of its prescribed subject matters and the provinces can do the same so long as they stay within their prescribed areas of authority.

[8] The Attorney General of Saskatchewan [Saskatchewan] challenges the Act by submitting it imposes taxes in the constitutional sense of the term. This would normally be legally unobjectionable because Parliament enjoys a broad taxing authority. However, Saskatchewan contends the Act is invalid because the Governor in Council determines the provinces where it operates. This is said to offend the principle of federalism in that the application of the Act depends on whether a province has exercised its own jurisdiction in relation to pricing GHG emissions to a standard considered appropriate by the Governor in Council. Saskatchewan also says the Act runs afoul of s. 53 of the Constitution Act, 1867. Section 53 requires, in effect, that taxes be authorized by legislative bodies themselves, not by executive government or otherwise.

[9] Saskatchewan’s arguments on this front cannot be accepted. The principle of federalism is not a free-standing concept that can override an otherwise validly enacted law. Rather, it is a value to be taken into account when interpreting the Constitution. The s. 53 argument cannot be sustained either because, in constitutional terms, the levies imposed by the Act are regulatory charges, not taxes. In any event, even if they were taxes, the Act does not offend s. 53. Parliament has clearly and expressly authorized the Governor in Council to decide where the Act will apply.

The layman’s explanation is not that the science is sound (it isn’t) nor that such a tax is fair or appropriate. Again, the Court is only considering whether Ottawa stepped over its bounds by encroaching on a Provincial matter. The majority (a 3-2 decision), says no it does not.

[29] The federal government released a document entitled Pan-Canadian Approach to Pricing Carbon Pollution on October 3, 2016. The approach outlined in the document was grounded both on the proposition that economy-wide carbon pricing was the most efficient way to reduce GHG emissions and a recognition that several jurisdictions including British Columbia, Ontario and Québec had already introduced carbon pricing regimes. The approach proposed by the government involved a pan-Canadian “benchmark” for carbon pricing. The benchmark involved a requirement that pricing regimes apply to essentially the same emission sources as British Columbia’s carbon tax. The required stringency of the benchmark, for an explicit price-based system, was that carbon pricing should start at a minimum of $10 per tonne in 2018 and rise by $10 per year to $50 per tonne in 2022. The provinces with cap-and-trade systems would have to ensure that emission reduction targets were in line with Canada’s overall reduction target. As well, the federal government’s approach was stated to involve a “backstop”. This was the idea that the federal government would introduce an explicit price-based carbon pricing system in jurisdictions that did not meet the benchmark.

Again, the Provinces are all on board with the global warming scam, but Ottawa decided to enact a pricing scheme on Provinces that would not enact their own.

And from Saskatchewan’s own submissions:
[33]We wholeheartedly support efforts to reduce greenhouse gases. But those efforts must be effective and they must not disadvantage one region of Canada more than another. A federal carbon tax is ineffective and will impair Saskatchewan’s ability to respond to climate change.

Our opposition to the federal government’s carbon tax should not be seen as reluctance to act. Rather, it is a recognition that we must act, and act decisively, with all our economic strength. For Saskatchewan, mitigation is not enough. Our agriculture and resource-rich province must also focus on climate adaptation and resilience in order to be effective.

This reads like a dog-and-pony show. The Saskatchewan Government at every turn admitting that “climate change” is a dire threat to the world. The complaint seems to be wanting to implement its own solution.

Is Scott Moe just going through the motions?

[51] Saskatchewan advances two main lines of argument in seeking to have the Act found unconstitutional. The first is that the principle of federalism prevents Parliament from enacting a statute applicable in only some provinces because of how those provinces have chosen to exercise their legislative authority. Saskatchewan’s second argument is that the Act imposes a tax and, because it allows the Governor in Council to decide where it applies, the Act offends the requirement in s. 53 of the Constitution Act, 1867 that bills imposing taxes must originate in the House of Commons. Saskatchewan goes on to deny that, as contended by Canada, the Act can be sustained under Parliament’s authority under the national concern branch of POGG. It also denies, as suggested by some intervenors, that the Act, or features of it, can be supported under Parliament’s authority in relation to trade and commerce, emergencies, criminal law or treaties.

Argument 1: can’t treat the Provinces differently.
Argument 2: Tax bills must come from House of Commons.

Let’s address those both.

[60] It is useful to begin by underlining that, as Saskatchewan concedes, there is no recognized constitutional requirement that laws enacted by Parliament must apply uniformly from coast to coast to coast. To the contrary, a number of decisions have upheld federal laws with uneven geographic application.

[68] Saskatchewan has referred to no judicial authority which in any way directly supports the idea that the principle of federalism can or should independently render unconstitutional an otherwise valid law. Its argument on this front cannot succeed.

Several cases are then cited, in fact beating down Saskatchewan’s argument #1. That was one of 2 legal arguments, and Saskatchewan goes into Court without a single case to back up its claims. Now to get to argument #2.

[100] Saskatchewan does not challenge Parliament’s legislative authority to enact the Act under its s. 91(3) taxation power. Indeed, it takes the initiative in arguing that the levies imposed by the Act fall under s. 91(3). Saskatchewan’s real point lays one step down the road from this characterization of the Act. It takes issue with the authority of the Governor in Council to determine the provinces and areas to which the Act will apply. This authority is said to make the Act non-compliant with s. 53.

Saskatchewan admits the Federal Government has the power to impose taxes. Rather it takes issue with the Governor in Council determining where it will apply. But in all fairness, Ottawa “did” give all Provinces the chance to come up with their own taxation policies.

Argument #1: Claiming non-uniform treatment, yet admitting there is no requirement for uniform treatment. Also, not a single case to rely in.

Argument #2: Admitting Ottawa has constitutional power to impose taxes, but arguing over how it should apply.

Some pretty weak arguments.

Now, had Saskatchewan challenged the factual basis for the climate change scam, instead of relying on narrow, legal arguments, this may have ended quite differently.

Saskatchewan did also raise this issue of “Peace, Order and Good Governance”, but that was shot down as well

[210] The advisory opinion offered in response to the question posed by the Lieutenant Governor in Council is as follows: “The Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act is not unconstitutional either in whole or in part”.

QUOTES FROM MINORITY DISSENTING

[236] GHGs are gases that absorb and re-emit infrared radiation, the most prevalent of which is carbon dioxide [CO2]. GHGs are a significant contributor to climate change. For this reason, the parties and intervenors all agree that the governments of Canada and the Provinces must take steps to mitigate the anthropogenic emission of GHGs. Because none of the Attorneys General dispute the causative effect anthropogenic GHGs have on climate change or the attendant and existential necessity of mitigating anthropogenic GHG emissions, the proof or truth of these facts is not at issue. That is, they are proven and true.

[237] In policy terms, the Act is the product of the federal government’s efforts to meet Canada’s commitments under the Paris Agreement (AG-Can Record, Moffet Affidavit vol 2, Tab I). This is apparent from the terms of the March 3, 2016, Vancouver Declaration on Clean Growth and Climate Change (AG-SK Record, Tab 1 [Vancouver Declaration]), where First Ministers of Canada recognised the necessity of reducing anthropogenic GHG emissions and committed their respective governments to “[i]mplement GHG mitigation policies in support of meeting or exceeding Canada’s 2030 target of a 30% reduction below 2005 levels of emissions, including specific provincial and territorial targets and objectives”.

Even the dissenting Justices acknowledged that Saskatchewan admits the “climate change” issue is real.

[459] The Attorney General of Canada concedes the Act will cause prices of agricultural inputs to rise. Even though farmers are exempt from the fuel charge, the producers, manufacturers and retailers of farm inputs are not. Further, transportation companies that haul grain, livestock and inputs for farmers are not exempt from the fuel levy. In this way, the effect of the Act is to regulate local industries, businesses and consumer activity in a specific way chosen by the federal government, but the practical effect on a Province of the imposition of federal GHG emissions policy under the Act is a profound intrusion into the exclusive spheres of Provincial jurisdiction. As set forth earlier, the Government of Saskatchewan has indicated in the Saskatchewan Strategy that it believes the fuel levy imposed under the Act will actually impair its ability to react to and to address climate change.

[460] The Act is highly intrusive into provincial jurisdiction. Although less direct, it is only slightly less intrusive than the legislation considered in Anti-Inflation, where the federal government had sought to pervasively control wages and prices in the Provinces. Although the Supreme Court sustained that legislation under the emergency branch of POGG, it could not have sustained the legislation under the national concern branch.

[461] The Act is highly intrusive in another way. The benchmark, which determines its application in the Provinces, effectively establishes federal oversight of GHG emissions regulation by the Provinces within their spheres of exclusive jurisdiction. It is regulation of the regulator. To permit Parliament to exercise a law-making power of this nature in respect of GHGs would be to open up the use of POGG to allow regulatory oversight by the federal government over all manner of Provincial matters as it might unilaterally deem to have become matters of national concern.

[462] Of particular concern to us on the question of its impact are the provisions of the Act that make it possible for the executive branch of federal government to substantially alter the original form and effect of the Act. The provisions that permit statutory transmogrification are ss. 26, 166 to 168 and 197(1)(a). Furthermore, the pervasive use of the word prescribed in the Act confers further metamorphic power on the executive branch to alter the appearance, character and functionality of the Act. These provisions have been referred to earlier but are worth reviewing in this context. In that regard, s. 26, dealing with the fuel levy, allows the federal cabinet by prescribing certain things, to change to whom the fuel levy applies, under what conditions it applies, the manner of payment and the time of payment.

Some interesting points:
(a) Act effectively regulates local businesses.
(b) Act is highly intrusive into Provincial matters.
(c) Allows Federal regulation of Provincial matters.
(d) Feds can amend this unilaterally.

[468] In our view, the position taken by the Attorney General of Canada mirrors the scenario described above. The Act has broad effects and the potential to have even broader effect than its current terms, but these facts are ignored in the expediency of characterising the matter, whether in terms of cumulativeness or stringency, narrowly enough to qualify it as a matter of national concern. However, a court cannot ignore the fact that, by its very terms, the Act can be expanded in any way the federal cabinet determines is necessary or expedient.

[476] Before summarising our opinion, we would reiterate two points. First, we agree that all levels of government in Canada must take action to address climate change. The anthropogenic emission of GHGs is an issue of pressing concern to all Canadians and to the world. Second, Parliament has a number of constitutional powers, legislative means and administrative mechanisms at its disposal to achieve its objectives in this regard. This reference arises because Parliament chose not to avail itself of its established constitutional powers or to do so validly. Notwithstanding the existential threat of climate change, federalism in Canada means that all governments of Canada must bring all law-making power to bear on the issue of climate change, but in a way that respects the division of powers under the Constitution Act, 1867

Though some interesting legal arguments were raised, Saskatchewan plays along with the propaganda that climate change is an existential threat to humanity.

IV. OPINION
[477] Section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 states that the Constitution is the supreme law of Canada and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect. We advise the Lieutenant Governor in Council that, for the foregoing reasons, in our opinion:

(a) Part 1 of the Act is invalid, being an unconstitutional delegation of Parliament’s law-making power under s. 91(3) of the Constitution Act, 1867 and being contrary to s. 53 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

(b) The Act cannot be sustained as a valid exercise of Parliament’s other enumerated law-making powers under s. 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867 nor can it be sustained under POGG

So, by a 3-2 margin, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeals rules that the Carbon tax can be legally imposed on Provinces.

ACTUAL CLIMATE CHANGE RESEARCH

Table 1. Impact of climate policies, optimistic and pessimistic,

for RCP8.5, using MAGICC, summary of finds described through-out the text
Change in temperature

°C year 2100 Pessimistic Optimistic
US INDC 0.008 0.031
US CPP 0.004 0.013
EU INDC 0.017 0.053
EU 2020 0.007 0.026
China INDC 0.014 0.048
RoW INDC 0.009 0.036
Global INDCs 0.048 0.170

See page 9 (Page 117 in index) for above table.
Source is here.

That’s right. Even the most optimistic climate models, would be a reduction of 0.170 degrees Celcius. Most pessimistic case would be 0.048 degrees Celcius. 0.048 to 0.170 degrees over the next century. Rather than getting nitpicky over jurisdiction, perhaps Scott Moe SHOULD have challenged the facts and evidence.

Mogane Oger Further Weaponizes Human Rights Codes, $55K Ruling

(BC “Human Rights” Commission Ruling)

(Morgane Oger Foundation)

(Proposed “Hate Map” Across Canada)

IMPORTANT LINKS


CLICK HERE, for the ruling, Oger v. Whatcott.
CLICK HERE, for the BC Human Rights Code.
CLICK HERE, for the Canadian Charter of Rights & Freedoms.
CLICK HERE, for a prior review of Bill C-16.
CLICK HERE, for a prior review of “Hate Map”.
CLICK HERE, for a prior review on weaponizing human rights code.

Our favourite “serial-victim” Morgane Oger, is in the news again, this time for getting a $55,000 award ($35K for hurt feelings, and $20K in punitive damages). This was William Whatcott for calling Oger “a man”. (Oger is transgender).

A few interesting observations in reading the ruling:

(1) Morgane Oger seems perfectly content silencing William Whatcott’s free speech and right to religious expression in the name of gender identity.

(2) The BC Tribunal deliberately and repeatedly skirted the truthfulness of Whatcott’s claim that Oger is biologically male. Hormones, surgery and legal paperwork don’t change biology.

(3) The BC Tribunal awarded $35,000 in damages without any damages being proven. How exactly does one prove “hurt feelings and dignity”?

PORTIONS OF BC HUMAN RIGHTS CODE

Discrimination and intent
2
Discrimination in contravention of this Code does not require an intention to contravene this Code.

Section 2 makes it very clear: absolutely no intent is required on the part of anyone in order to be found to violate someone’s human rights. For a “quasi-judicial” board, this is very disturbing. However, it seems to be the case with all provinces.

Discriminatory publication
7 (1) A person must not publish, issue or display, or cause to be published, issued or displayed, any statement, publication, notice, sign, symbol, emblem or other representation that
(a) indicates discrimination or an intention to discriminate against a person or a group or class of persons, or
(b) is likely to expose a person or a group or class of persons to hatred or contempt because of the race, colour, ancestry, place of origin, religion, marital status, family status, physical or mental disability, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or age of that person or that group or class of persons.
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a private communication, a communication intended to be private or a communication related to an activity otherwise permitted by this Code.

Oger claims that the publications were contrary to Section 7(1)(a) and (b) of the code.

Evidence
27.2 (1) A member or panel may receive and accept on oath, by affidavit or otherwise, evidence and information that the member or panel considers necessary and appropriate, whether or not the evidence or information would be admissible in a court of law.
(2) Nothing is admissible in evidence before a member or panel that is inadmissible in a court because of a privilege under the law of evidence.
(3) Despite section 4, subsection (1) of this section does not override an Act expressly limiting the extent to which or purposes for which evidence may be admitted or used in any proceeding.
(4) A member or panel may direct that all or part of the evidence of a witness be heard in private.

(4) flies in the face of an open inquiry, and doesn’t set any guidelines as to “when” it would be appropriate.
One of the problems Whatcott cited was the Commission refusing to hear all the evidence.

Remedies
37 (1) If the member or panel designated to hear a complaint determines that the complaint is not justified, the member or panel must dismiss the complaint.
(2) If the member or panel determines that the complaint is justified, the member or panel
(a) must order the person that contravened this Code to cease the contravention and to refrain from committing the same or a similar contravention,
(b) may make a declaratory order that the conduct complained of, or similar conduct, is discrimination contrary to this Code,
(c) may order the person that contravened this Code to do one or both of the following:
(i) take steps, specified in the order, to ameliorate the effects of the discriminatory practice;
(ii) adopt and implement an employment equity program or other special program to ameliorate the conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups if the evidence at the hearing indicates the person has engaged in a pattern or practice that contravenes this Code, and
(d) if the person discriminated against is a party to the complaint, or is an identifiable member of a group or class on behalf of which a complaint is filed, may order the person that contravened this Code to do one or more of the following:
(i) make available to the person discriminated against the right, opportunity or privilege that, in the opinion of the member or panel, the person was denied contrary to this Code;
(ii) compensate the person discriminated against for all, or a part the member or panel determines, of any wages or salary lost, or expenses incurred, by the contravention;
(iii) pay to the person discriminated against an amount that the member or panel considers appropriate to compensate that person for injury to dignity, feelings and self respect or to any of them.

In short, the BC Human Rights Code can award money if it rules that your feelings were hurt, or your dignity or self respect was hurt. No need to prove “actual” damages.

IMPORTANT LINKS

Fundamental freedoms
2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms:
(a) freedom of conscience and religion;
(b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication;
(c) freedom of peaceful assembly; and
(d) freedom of association

IMPORTANT LINKS

William Whatcott identifies himself as a Christian activist. When he learned of Ms. Oger’s candidacy, he resolved to stop her being elected. He was not a member of her riding, nor did he research her platform or the policies which she sought to advance. The sole basis for his campaign against her was that she is a transgender woman and therefore, in his view, unsuitable to hold public office. 

Very interesting choice of words. Whatcott “identifies” as a Christian activist, yet Oger “actually is” a woman.

Mr. Whatcott was not a resident in Ms. Oger’s riding. She came to his attention after he had decided there were no suitable political options within his own riding. He says that he had decided not to vote in the election at all, but then turned to prayer. He asked God how he could help in the election. He started researching the candidates across the province and, in this way, came across Ms. Oger. He learned that she had been active in lobbying for amendments to the Code to add the grounds of “gender identity and expression”, and in promoting education about sexual orientation and gender identity in schools. Most importantly, however, he was upset that the media and public at large were “pretending” that Ms. Oger was a woman. He fundamentally believes that gender is static and derived from the genitalia that a person has at birth. He believes that Ms. Oger is a man. He sees himself as the small boy in the fairy tale about the Emperor with no clothes the only one brave enough to speak the truth about Ms. Oger’s gender. He decided to focus his energies on her campaign. In doing so, he describes Ms. Oger herself as “incidental” and “small” within his larger fight for social order and freedom. 

The first part gets glossed over. Oger is trying help enact 2 policies that Whatcott is bothered by:
(A) Bill C-16, to add “gender identity” to the Criminal Code and Human Rights Code.
(B) Bringing SOGI (sexual orientation & gender identity) into schools and have it taught to young children.

In all fairness, “both” of the above issues rub a lot of people the wrong way.

[53] To the extent that s. 7 is unique, it is because it expressly and exclusively targets speech. Mr. Whatcott argues that, in doing so, it violates his Charter‐guaranteed rights to freedom of religion and expression ss. 2(a) and (b). In his final reply, he added an argument that it violates his right to life, liberty and security of the person, guaranteed by s. 7 of the Charter.  

[54] This Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to apply the Charter: Administrative Tribunals Act, s. 45; Code, s. 32(i). I cannot find s. 7 of the Code unconstitutional, or that any of Mr. Whatcott’s Charter rights have been violated in the course of Ms. Oger’s human rights  complaint against him. 

[55] There is no question, however, that this complaint engages Charter protections. In these circumstances, I must interpret and apply the Code in a manner that proportionately balances its purposes with those protections. The framework for this analysis has been set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in three cases: Doré v. Québec (Tribunal des Professions), 2012 SCC 12 [Doré]; Loyola High School v. Quebec (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 12 [Loyola]; and Trinity  Western University v. Law Society of BC, 2018 SCC 32 [TWU]. 

While simultaneously claiming not to be able to apply the Charter, the Tribunal says it will balance the rights of the Charter v.s. the Code.

A. Factual context 
1. Discrimination against transgender people 
This is a significant time for trans and gender diverse people. Their long fight for equality is bearing some fruit, as society begins to adjust its traditionally static and binary understanding of gender, and its tolerance for people to identify and express their gender authentically. One indicator of this progress is the 2016 amendment to the Code that added the grounds of gender identity and expression. 
[61] However, as this hearing made clear, the journey is far from over. Unlike other groups protected by the Code, transgender people often find their very existence the subject of public debate and condemnation. What flows from this existential denial is, naturally, a view that transpeople are less worthy of dignity, respect, and rights. In the hearing room for this complaint, we were witness to repeated, deliberate, and flagrant attacks on Ms. Oger based on nothing more than a belief that her very existence is an affront

(A) The Tribunal actually referred to this section as “factual context”, but then goes on to make a number of straw man arguments.
(B) It is not a fight for equality. That was never the issue.
(C)”Traditionally static and binary understanding of gender”? Actually, there has never been evidence that there are more than 2 genders. Simply passing a law does not erase science. A government could conceivably pass a law saying that dogs are cats, but it would not be based in reality.
(D) Gender identity and expression? Don’t these contradict reality? Merely expressing oneself or identifying oneself a certain way does not make it so.
(E) Questioning the reality of something not based on science is a hate crime now? Got it.

[62] And so, despite some gains, transgender people remain among the most marginalized in our society. Their lives are marked by “disadvantage, prejudice, stereotyping, and vulnerability”: F(C) v. Albert (Vital Statistics), 2014 ABQB 237 at para. 58; see also Rainbow  Committee of Terrace v. City of Terrace, 2002 BCHRT 26 at paras. 47-51. They are stereotyped as “diseased, confused, monsters and freaks”: Nixon v. Vancouver Rape Relief Society, 2002  BCHRT 1 at paras. 136137, overturned 2005 BCCA 601 (not on this point). Transpeople face barriers to employment and housing, inequitable access to health care and other vital public services, and heightened risks of targeted harassment and violence. The results include social isolation, as well as higher rates of substance use, poor mental health, suicide, and poverty: XY  v. Ontario (Government and Consumer Services), 2012 HRTO 726 at paras. 164‐166. For  transgender children, anti‐trans bullying leads to higher rates of absenteeism and poorer educational outcomes, which then has ripple effects for their health and future prospects:  Christophe Cornu (2016), “Preventing and addressing homophobic and transphobic bullying in  education; A human-rights based approach using the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child”, Journal of LGBT Youth, 13:1‐2, 6‐17 at pp 7‐8. 

(A) How are they marginalized? They have entire government bodies to fight specifically for their rights.
(B) Substance abuse, suicide, and mental health problems? Doesn’t that signify that there might be something seriously wrong with what they are doing?
(C) Children should not be transitioning. Period.

[64] Mr. Whatcott and the JCCF sought to rely on statistics about the poor health and social outcomes for transgender people as proof that – at best – the merits of being transgender was a matter for ongoing study and debate and – at worst –it was a bad lifestyle choice, whichought to be publicly discouraged. I agree with Ms. Oger that this is an illconceived attempt to “take the data about the consequences of being a victim of oppression, or the consequences of being marginalized, and turn that into the root cause of the issue”.  

[65] The poor health, economic, and social outcomes for many transgender people are not a signal of their inherent worth but rather of the significant degree to which they continue to face marginalization, stigma, and discrimination. They illustrate how much work remains to be done to make the Code’s objective of an equal society into a reality. 

(A) The Tribunal specifically states they will not consider statistical data. How very “scientific and reasoned” of them.
(B) Another straw-man argument. No one is saying these people are not worthy, but that there are very serious mental health issues that need to be addressed. Issues the tribunal has no interest in addressing.

[75] There is no dispute that a decision against Mr. Whatcott would limit his Charter right to freedom of religion. Ms. Oger concedes that Mr. Whatcott has a sincerely held religious belief that it is his duty to spread his views about transgender people: Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, 2004 SCC 47 at para. 65. This concession was appropriate. Mr. Whatcott identifies as Christian and describes himself as a “flawed Christian activist”. He says that his theology largely lines up with that of the Lutheran Church. The Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that Evangelical Christians, and I believe it is fair to count Mr. Whatcott as one, “carry their religious beliefs and values beyond their private lives and into their work, education, and politics”: TWU at para. 67. This is certainly true of Mr. Whatcott. For many years, he has manifested his religious beliefs through activism, beginning with antiabortion activism and then, in more recent years, in activism against the LGBTQ community. His beliefs about transgender people namely that they do not exist and are engaged in a falsehood  stem from his interpretation of the Christian Bible. He believes it is God’s will that he spread the Christian gospel and his views about the “morality” of being transgender. 

(A) Now we get to the heart of it. This would actually limit religious freedom.
(B) The Tribunal knows this, and will act against it anyway.

[77] There is similarly no dispute that a decision against Mr. Whatcott would limit his freedom to publicly express his views about transgender people generally, and Ms. Oger specifically. This engages his right to free expression. As I will discuss below, the scope of freedom of expression, and the significance of any possible infringement, varies according to the type of speech and the extent to which it furthers or detracts from the core values underlying the freedom. However, at this threshold stage, it is sufficient that the Flyer was a form of expression and that any decision restricting Mr. Whatcott’s right to distribute it publicly would limit his expressive rights to some extent. 

[78] With respect to Mr. Whatcott’s s. 7 Charter rights, I agree with the Attorney General that it would not be fair to consider that argument, which was raised for the first time in Mr. Whatcott’s final reply, after the hearing of this complaint had concluded. Regardless, the argument has no merit. A decision by this Tribunal would not restrict Mr. Whatcott’s life, liberty, or security of the person. The remedial jurisdiction conferred by s. 37 of the Code is in no way equivalent to penal consequences. It does not threaten Mr. Whatcott’s life or liberty. While I accept that individuals found to violate the Code may encounter, as a consequence, a degree of stigma and social disapproval, such consequences do not rise to a level of “serious  state imposed psychological stress

(A) No threat to his security? Try not paying the fine and see what happens.
(B) You also say the Commission “will” order the so-called bad behaviour to stop. And if it doesn’t, you’ll fine him again.
(C) Who cares if this is the first time the argument has been brought up?

Now a quote from the Supreme Court of Canada:

First and foremost, free expression is essential to the proper functioning of democratic governance. As Rand J. put it, “government by the free public opinion of an open society . . . demands the condition of a virtually unobstructed access to and diffusion of ideas”: Switzman, at p. 306. 

  Second, the free exchange of ideas is an “essential precondition of the  search for truth”: R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, at p. 803, per  McLachlin J. This rationale, sometimes known as the “marketplace of ideas”, extends beyond the political domain to any areaof debate where truth is sought through the exchange of information and ideas. Information is disseminated and propositions debated. In the course of debate, misconceptions and errors are exposed. What withstands testing  emerges as truth. 

  Third, free expression has intrinsic value as an aspect of self‐realization for both speakers and listeners. As the majority observed in Irwin Toy, at p. 976, “the diversity in forms of individual selffulfillment and human flourishing ought to be cultivated in an essentially tolerant, indeed welcoming, environment not only for the sake of those who convey a meaning, uut also for the sake of those to whom it is conveyed”.  Grant v. Torstar Corp., 2009 SCC 61 at paras. 4750; see also R v. Keegstra,  [1990] 3 SCR 697 [Keegstra], at paras. 87‐89; 

This is quite laughable, as the Tribunal has no interest in the factual basis of Whatcott’s claim (that Oger is male), nor in the statistical research and evidence regarding transgenders in general.

[119] I reject this proposition in the strongest possible terms. The question of whether transgender people exist and are entitled to dignity in this province is as valuable to ongoing public debate as whether one race is superior to another. This does not mean that all expression that criticizes or questions the existence of transgender people violates the Code. Here I distinguish between public debate about, for example, the scope of rights that different groups in society may be afforded, and commentary like that which is in the Flyer, which denies the very existence of transpeople. Understood in its proper context, it is simply not accurate to place this type of expression at the core of s. 2(b) values. 

(A) False equivalence. The reality of transitioning is not the same thing as racial supremacy.
(B) False equivalence. Questioning whether trans-people exist is not the same thing as saying a person should not have dignity.
(C) The flyer is inappropriate, but once again the Tribunal dodges the issue of “truth”.

[125] This argument confuses distinctions with discrimination. Efforts to increase the participation and representation of groups which have historically been excluded from political life serve the goals of achieving substantive equality and enriching Canada’s democracy. But to advocate against including those groups in politics is not the same thing as arguing for their deliberate inclusion. The law has long understood that identical treatment of groups is often the very source of serious inequality: Kapp at para. 27, citing Andrews. Put another way, “different treatment in the service of equity for disadvantaged groups is an expression of [substantive] equality, not an exception to it”: P. W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (5th ed. Supp. 2007), vol. 2, at p. 5553; cited with approval in Kapp at para. 37. It is simply not reasonable to equate efforts to increase the representation of disadvantaged groups in government with those which would seek to continue to exclude them. While I acknowledge that individual voters may choose to discriminate within the privacy of a ballot box, it does not further Canada’s democracy to suggest that a person’s connection with a historically disadvantaged group is a legitimate point on which to openly campaign against them. 

To summarize this word salad: ACTUAL equal treatment of people can be wrong, since it doesn’t take “historical marginalization” into account. Hence the idea of 15(2) of the Charter (affirmative action). This is essentially different rules for different groups in order to “increase representation”.

The decision is long one (100 pages), but this covers the main points. The Tribunal also goes on at length about Whatcott refusing to refer to Oger as “she” despite being repeatedly told not to.

While Whatcott comes off as a bit of a jerk, it is hard to come up with much sympathy for Oger, who is essentially a professional victim. The proposed “hate map” is essentially a doxing tool for opinions that they don’t agree with.

It is also disturbing to see the Tribunal so uninterested in fact or truth. Legitimate concerns about whether a person can transition are deemed hate speech. Further, the tribunal doesn’t care for evidence presented regarding statistics of trans-people. If anything, it is deemed as more of a reason to grant special status.

Whatcott “identifies” as a Christian activist, yet Oger “really is” a woman. The Tribunal is inconsistent in their own standards.

And as seems to be the case in all provinces, the “human rights” code stipulates that no intent is necessary for a finding against a person or group.

Will there be an appeal (in the form of an application for judicial review)? We will find out. But this sets a very bad precedent.

Abuse of S3CA & Coming To Canada Under False Pretenses


Check toolbar on right for globalism links (under counter). Also view the MASTERLIST.

PETITION E-1906 (UN Global Migration Compact): CLICK HERE
PETITION E-2012 (UN Global Parliament) CLICK HERE

All personal court appearances are under “BLOG
Fed Court cases are addressed on right under “Canadian Media”.


CLICK HERE, for previous article on the Canada/US Safe 3rd Country Agreement (signed in 2002)

OTHER CASES WORTH SEEING


(1) CLICK HERE, for a marriage of convenience.
Liang v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, 2014 CanLII 90636 (CA IRB)

(2) CLICK HERE, for committing identity fraud in order to gain entry to Canada.
Shaikh v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2018 CanLII 89040 (CA IRB)

(3) CLICK HERE, for an actual terrorist wanting to stay in Canada.
Singh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1997 CanLII 5893 (FC)

(4) CLICK HERE, for a failed US asylum seeker, relying on falsified psychological documents.
X (Re), 2016 CanLII 152912 (CA IRB)

(5) CLICK HERE, for a failed US asylum seeker changing his story this time.
X (Re), 2013 CanLII 99499 (CA IRB)

(6) CLICK HERE, for an Indian man claiming to be from Tibet to gain asylum (Mariam Monself, take note).
X (Re), 2014 CanLII 100882 (CA IRB)

(7) CLICK HERE, for a “refugee” who lived illegally in the US for 14 years, then trying to claim asylum in Canada
X (Re), 2015 CanLII 44019 (CA IRB)

(8) CLICK HERE, for a wanted fugitive from China trying to get asylum in Canada.
X (Re), 2015 CanLII 107837 (CA IRB)

These 8 cases are just a small sample of the tidal wave of fraudulent “refugee” claims that have been made over the last several years. Although many get rejected, many still get through. This happens even when adjudicators admit that applicants have been deceptive.

UN PROMOTES ABUSE OF S3CA


CLICK HERE, for the UN link.

Exceptions to the Safe Third Country Agreement with Canada

The U.S. and Canada have an agreement preventing people who first enter one country from applying for asylum or refugee status in the other. This means that if you entered the U.S. first and then try to apply for asylum in Canada, you may not be able to. However, there are exceptions to the agreement that may allow you to apply for asylum in Canada, even if you came to the U.S. first. For one thing, this agreement only applies to you if you are planning on arriving at entry ports on the U.S.-Canada land border. It does not apply if you plan on arriving in Canada at air or marine ports.

The following questions will determine whether you meet any of the exceptions that will allow you to apply for asylum in Canada at a U.S.-Canada land border even if you arrived in the U.S. first.

EXCEPTION # 1 Land Border Entry Ports Only

Are you going to arrive in Canada from a land border?

NO ==> You qualify under this exception!

YES ==> You do not qualify under this exception. Check to see if you qualify under any other exception.

EXCEPTION # 2 Family Connections in Canada

Do you have any of the following family members in Canada?

  • A spouse
  • A common-law partner (a common law partner is person of the same or opposite sex with whom you are cohabiting in a conjugal relationship and have cohabited for at least a year.)
  • A legal guardian
  • A child
  • A father or mother
  • A brother or sister
  • A grandfather or grandmother
  • A grandchild
  • An uncle or aunt
  • A nephew or niece

NO ==> You do not qualify under this exception. Check to see if you qualify under any other exception.

YES ==> Is your family member any of the following?

  • A Canadian citizen
  • A permanent resident
  • A protected person (i.e. determined to be a refugee or a person in need of protection)
  • Accepted in principle on humanitarian and compassionate grounds (removal order stayed under Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations 233)
  • 18 years of age or over and is a refugee claimant (and the claim has not been rejected, withdrawn, found abandoned or ineligible)
  • 18 years of age or over and is in Canada on a work permit or study permit (but check the exceptions)
  • YES ==> You qualify under this exception!
    NO ==> You do not qualify under this exception. Check to see if you qualify under any other exception.

    EXCEPTION # 3 Unaccompanied Minor
    Are you under 18?
    NO ==> You do not qualify under the unaccompanied minor exception. Check to see if you qualify under any other exception.
    YES ==> Were you accompanied here by your father, mother, or legal guardian? Are you married? Is your father, mother, or legal guardian in Canada or the United States?

    If NO to all these questions ==> You qualify under this exception!
    If YES to any of these questions ==> You do not qualify under this exception. Check to see if you qualify under any other exception.

    EXCEPTION # 4 Countries to which Canada Does Not Remove

    Are you a national of any of the following countries?

    • Afghanistan
    • Burundi
    • Democratic Republic of Congo
    • Haiti
    • Iraq
    • Liberia
    • Rwanda
    • Zimbabwe

    NO ==> You do not qualify under this exception. Check to see if you qualify under any other exception.

    YES ==> Have you been convicted of any crimes?

    NO ==> You qualify under this exception!

    YES ==> You may not qualify under this exception. Canada does not admit people who have been convicted of certain crimes. Whether you qualify under this exception depends on the type of crime(s) you were convicted of.

    EXCEPTION # 5 Death Penalty

    Have you been charged or convicted of an offence punishable with the death penalty in the country?

    YES ==> You MAY qualify under this exception. Canada does not admit people who have been convicted of certain crimes. Whether you qualify under this exception depends on the type of crime(s) you were convicted of.

    NO ==> You do not qualify under this exception. Check to see if you qualify under any other exception.

    EXCEPTION # 6 Valid Visa Exception

    Do you have a valid visa to enter Canada, other than a transit visa?

    YES ==> You qualify under this exception!

    NO ==> You do not qualify under this exception. Check to see if you qualify under any other exception.

    EXCEPTION # 7 Visa Required in U.S. But Not in Canada

    Are you a national of any of the following countries?

    • Antigua and Barbuda
    • Barbados
    • Botswana
    • Cyprus
    • Greece
    • Malta
    • Mexico
    • Namibia
    • Papua New Guinea
    • Republic of (South) Korea
    • St. Kitts and Nevis
    • St. Lucia
    • St. Vincent
    • Solomon Islands
    • Swaziland
    • Western Samoa

    NO ==> You do not qualify under this exception. Check to see if you qualify under any other exception.

    YES ==> You qualify under this exception!

    FROM CANADIAN WEBSITE


    CLICK HERE, for Canadian Government website.

    Where the Agreement is in effect
    The Safe Third Country Agreement applies only to refugee claimants who are seeking entry to Canada from the U.S.:
    at Canada-U.S. land border crossings
    by train or
    at airports, only if the person seeking refugee protection in Canada has been refused refugee status in the U.S. and is in transit through Canada after being deported from the U.S.

    Exceptions to the Agreement
    Exceptions to the Agreement consider the importance of family unity, the best interests of children and the public interest.
    There are four types of exceptions:

    1. Family member exceptions
    2. Unaccompanied minors exception
    3. Document holder exceptions
    4. Public interest exceptions

    Even if they qualify for one of these exceptions, refugee claimants must still meet all other eligibility criteria of Canada’s immigration legislation. For example, if a person seeking refugee protection has been found inadmissible in Canada on the grounds of security, for violating human or international rights, or for serious criminality, that person will not be eligible to make a refugee claim.

    Family member exceptions
    Refugee claimants may qualify under this category of exceptions if they have a family member who:

    • is a Canadian citizen
    • is a permanent resident of Canada
    • is a protected person under Canadian immigration legislation
    • has made a claim for refugee status in Canada that has been accepted by the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB)
    • has had his or her removal order stayed on humanitarian and compassionate grounds
    • holds a valid Canadian work permit
    • holds a valid Canadian study permit, or
    • is over 18 years old and has a claim for refugee protection that has been referred to the IRB for determination. (This claim must not have been withdrawn by the family member, declared abandoned or rejected by the IRB or found ineligible for referral to the IRB.)

    Unaccompanied minors exception
    Refugee claimants may qualify under this category of exceptions if they are minors (under the age of 18) who:
    are not accompanied by their mother, father or legal guardian
    have neither a spouse nor a common-law partner, and
    do not have a mother, a father or a legal guardian in Canada or the United States.

    Document holder exceptions
    Refugee claimants may qualify under this category of exceptions if they:
    hold a valid Canadian visa (other than a transit visa)
    hold a valid work permit
    hold a valid study permit
    hold a travel document (for permanent residents or refugees) or other valid admission document issued by Canada, or
    are not required (exempt) to get a temporary resident visa to enter Canada but require a U.S.–issued visa to enter the U.S.

    Public interest exceptions
    Refugee claimants may qualify under this category of exceptions if:
    they have been charged with or convicted of an offence that could subject them to the death penalty in the U.S. or in a third country. However, a refugee claimant is ineligible if he or she has been found inadmissible in Canada on the grounds of security, for violating human or international rights, or for serious criminality, or if the Minister finds the person to be a danger to the public.

    Making a refugee claim under the Safe Third Country Agreement
    For detailed information on making a refugee claim for protection in Canada at the Canada–U.S. border, please refer to the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA).

    There are so many exemptions in this agreement that it’s difficult to find someone who “doesn’t” qualify on one or more grounds.

    CANADA ADMITS US IS A SAFE COUNTRY

    Factor 3: Human rights record of the United States
    The United States meets a high standard with respect to the protection of human rights. It is an open democracy with independent courts, separation of powers and constitutional guarantees of essential human rights and fundamental freedoms.

    Factor 4: Whether the United States is party to an agreement with Canada for the purpose of sharing responsibility with respect to claims for refugee protection

    The Safe Third Country Agreement between Canada and the United States was signed on December 5, 2002, came into force on December 29, 2004, and remains in force.

    The US is a safe country. That “should” end the discussion on fake refugees coming here.

    After all, simply being in the country illegally isn’t a defense.

    Calgary Fed Court Decision on UN Global Migration Compact


    Check toolbar on right for globalism links (under counter).

    Please sign this: PETITION E-1906 CLICK HERE

    All personal court appearances are under “BLOG
    Challenge to UN Global Migration Compact dismissed in Calgary, however
    Court rules that it is non intended as legally binding contract


    Court Case
    A v. Her Majesty, the Queen
    Court File No: T-2089-18
    Calgary Branch, Federal Court
    300-635 8th Ave SW, Calgary
    Filed: November 6, 2018
    Ruled: February 12, 2019

    The Claim was filed in Calgary Federal Court on December 6, 2018. It asked (among other things), for an injunction against signing the UN Global Migration Compact.

    The Defense filed a motion to strike, claiming that under Federal Courts Act, it should have been an “Application for Judicial Review”, not a claim. However, that doesn’t seem to be the only problem.

    After some back and forth, the Statement of Claim was struck out (without permission to amend), and a $500 cost award was issued against me.

    Here are some quotes from the ruling. The most interesting is possibly the one where the Judge confirms that the UN Global Migration Compact is not intended as a legally-binding agreement.

    So, who won? The goal of the claim was to prevent Canada from joining the UN Compact, and the Judge says that it has no legal weight anyway.

    [2] (Plaintiff) pleads, in the alternative, that if Canada has already signed the UN Compact when the Court rules on her claim, the Court should void the signature and any legal consequences

    In this case, the issue of whether it should have been a 1/ Statement of Claim, or 2/ Application for Judicial Review, is sort of mute, since this alternative “does” fall within the scope of a Claim.

    Court is also correct that seeking to nullify any legal consequences “is” primary function of this action. However, the Judge will go on to say that the UN Global Migration Compact “doesn’t” carry legal weight.

    [8] However, this does not exempt a plaintiff from pleading material facts supporting the claim. Rule 174 states that a Statement of Claim “shall contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the party relies.

    Court finds that the facts plead were not specific enough to be suitable for an action.

    [15] The Supreme Court has substantive content of each Charter right in the case law, and a Plaintiff who relies on the Charter must plead material facts to satisfy the criteria applicable to the provision in question. Charter cases can not be decided in a factual vacuum.

    Interesting to know. General pleading are not enough in this case, and more definitive and substantive arguments must be made.

    [26] As it is plain and obvious that (her) claims based on the Charter and other statutory provisions cannot succeed, the thrust of her claim is simply that Canada should be enjoined from joining the UN Compact, a non-legally binding, cooperative framework agreement because she is of the opinion that it attempts to normalise mass migration to any country, and that the public should have been consulted on this agreement.

    Again, the Judge re-iterates that it is “non-legally binding”. Having rejected the specific constitutional arguments earlier, apparently the only argument left is that the public should have been consulted.

    [27] It is well-established that the conduct of foreign affairs, and international relations, including the decision to conclude or withdraw from a treaty, is part of the Crown’s prerogative powers and falls exclusively under the executive branch of government. In the absence of a Charter challenge, a decision pertaining to such matters is not justifiable.

    There “were” several Charter challenges listed, but the Calgary Court found them too broad to be acceptable.

    [25] Based on my review of the Statement of Claim, it is plain and obvious that the Contract Claim discloses no cause of action and must be struck out. The Statement of Claim quotes lengthy exerps from the UN Compact, including the following statement at Paragraph 54 of the claim, which indicates the UN Compact is not intended as a legally binding contract:

    44(7) “This Global Compact presents a non-legally binding, co-operate framework that builds on the commitments agreed upon by Member States in the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants. It fosters cooperation among all the relevant actors on migration, acknowledging that no one State can address migration alone, and upholds the sovereignty of States and their obligations under international law.”

    This is possibly the most interesting part of the entire ruling. The Judge states that the UN Global Migration Compact is not intended as a legally binding contract.

    We now have a Federal Court Judge ruling that the UN Compact is “not intended as a legally-binding contract”. This is huge, as this may thwart any attempt by open-borders advocates to use the UN Compact as a “reference point” at a later date.

    Even though the Court threw the case out, the reasons given may be what we need to prevent it from becoming “soft law”.

    You’re welcome, Canada
    $900 — costs of travel, court fees, other fees
    $500 — costs award issued by Calgary Court
    PRICELESS — protecting Canada’s sovereignty