Bit Of History: Putting The Rights Of Terrorists Over Those Of Canadians
(From Canuck Politics. Although a political ad, this one is entirely truthful, and worth a mention.)
Rocco Galati and Justin Trudeau both believe it’s a human right for foreigners who obtain Canadian citizenship to retain that citizenship, even after being convicted of terrorism or treason offences. Although Galati lost that court challenge, Justin Trudeau would “correct” it anyway, by implementing Bill C-6.
Simply holding a Canadian passport doesn’t make you a Canadian, except in a civic sense. Terrorists and traitors, however, don’t even deserve that.
1. Islam, Terrorism, Religious Violence
Check this series for more information on the religion of peace. Tolerance of intolerance is being forced on the unwilling public. Included are efforts to crack down on free speech, under the guise of “religious tolerance”.
2. Galati Defending Terrorists’ “Rights”
CLICK HERE, for Galati claiming to have received threats. CLICK HERE, for $10.5 million payout to Khadr. CLICK HERE, for Galati defending citizenship for terrorists.
 In my view, the real issue is whether the designated judge in a s. 40.1 hearing has jurisdiction to grant the remedy sought. Section 40.1(4)(d) states that the designated judge shall “determine whether the certificate filed by the Minister and the Solicitor General is reasonable on the basis of the evidence and the information available to the Chief justice or the designated judge, as the case may be, and, if found not to be reasonable, quash the certificate”. In Re Baroud, Denault, J., found that the role of this court is neither to substitute its decision for that of the Minister and the Solicitor General, nor to find that they were correct in their assessment of the evidence. Rather, the designated judge must determine, based on the evidence presented to him or her, whether the Ministers’ decision to issue the certificate is reasonable.
 Does the assessment of reasonableness, pursuant to s. 40.1(4)(d), include as assessment of whether upholding the certificate would breach the applicant’s constitutional rights? I do not find that it does. In my view, reasonableness and constitutionality are distinct issues. Reasonableness involves an evaluation of the evidence to determine if it supports the Ministers’ decision; constitutionality is a more in-depth assessment of the applicant’s constitutional rights. In my view, a plain reading of s. 40.1(4)(d) gives the designated judge jurisdiction only to consider the reasonableness of the certificate. If Parliament had intended the designated judge to consider the validity of the certificate, including its constitutionality, the section could have been so drafted.
 My decision that the designated judge does not have jurisdiction to consider Charter matters is further supported by the fact that there is no appeal from the decision of the designated judge. Section 40.1(6) states:
“A determination under paragraph (4)(d) is not subject to appeal or review by any court”.
By expressly prohibiting further appeal or review, Parliament reinforced the notion that proceedings under s. 40.1 of the Immigration Act are intended only to consider whether the Ministers’ decision to issue the certificate is reasonable on the basis of the available evidence.
 Although I initially had doubts regarding Cullen J.’s conclusion, I am now satisfied that his conclusion is the correct one. I find support for Cullen J.’s conclusion in the Federal Court of Appeal’s decision in Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)(1998), 229 N.R. 240. The issue before the Court of Appeal was whether a judge designated under subsections 40.1(8) and (9) of the Act had jurisdiction to hear constitutional issues that arose from an order made by a judge pursuant to subsection 40.1(9) of the Act.
This appeal concerned the constitutionality of the security certificates issued by the government. The limit scope of the appeals was over whether the decisions handed down were reasonable or not.
4. Bringing Back The Khadrs (2002 to ….)
Galati, decided to stop representing terrorists in late 2003. It wasn’t because he saw the practice as wrong. Instead, it was due to alleged death threats. One of his clients was Abdurahman Khadr, brother of Omar Khadr.
Omar Khadr himself, would eventually receive $10.5 million from taxpayers, due to “alleged” abuses and human rights violations at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
As to the first part of the test, the reference to a period of 120 days in subsection 84(2) reflects Parliament’s intent that once a certificate has been determined to be reasonable, the person named in the certificate should be removed expeditiously. In the present case, Mahjoub has been detained for slightly over three years and it has been 21 months since the certificate was upheld. However, by requiring as one of the criteria for release that the Court consider whether removal will or will not take place within a reasonable time, Parliament has contemplated that in some circumstances, removal will not have occurred within 120 days, but the period of detention may still be a reasonable period. Otherwise, release after 120 days would be automatic, absent considerations of national security or the safety of persons. What in any particular case will be reasonable will depend upon the facts and circumstances of that case. Any uncertainty about when Mahjoub may be removed resulted from two significant circumstances: (i) Court proceedings which he has initiated or will initiate; and (ii) concerns as to whether Mahjoub faces a risk of torture or death if he is removed to Egypt. With respect to the first circumstance, while it was Mahjoub’s right to exhaust all avenues of legal recourse, the time required for those challenges could not be relied upon for the purpose of arguing that he will not be removed within a reasonable time. As to the second circumstance, the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed in Suresh that, absent extraordinary circumstances, deportation to torture will generally violate the principles of fundamental justice protected by section 7 of the Charter. Thus, generally, as a matter of law, the Minister should decline to deport Convention refugees where there is a substantial risk of torture.
The position of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), as stated in the summary, is that it believes that Mr. Mahjoub is a high-ranking member of an Egyptian Islamic terrorist organization, the Vanguards of Conquest, a radical wing of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad or Al Jihad. According to CSIS, Al Jihad is one of the groups which split from Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood in the 1970’s to form a more extremist and militant organization. Al Jihad, according to CSIS, advocates the use of violence as a means of establishing an Islamic state in Egypt.
The summary provided to Mr. Mahjoub set out, to the extent consistent with national security and the safety of persons, CSIS’s grounds for believing that Mr. Mahjoub will, while in Canada, engage in or instigate the subversion by force of the Gov ernment of Egypt, and that he is a member of an organization that there are reasonable grounds to believe was and is engaged in terrorism, and which will engage in subversion by force against the Government of Egypt. The summary also set out the Service’s grounds to believe that Mr. Mahjoub had engaged in terrorism.
An open hearing was held before Mr. Justice Nadon from February 26, 2001 to March 8, 2001 for the purpose of providing to Mr. Mahjoub a reasonable opportunity to be heard with respect to the certificate. Submissions were made by counsel to Mr. Justice Nadon on May 8, 2001. On October 5, 2001 [2001 FCT 1095 (CanLII),  4 F.C. 644 (T.D.)], Mr. Justice Nadon determined that, on the basis of the evidence and information available to him, the certificate filed by the Ministers is reasonable.
On March 25, 2002 [ I.Adj.D.D. No. 5 (QL)], the Adjudication Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board found Mr. Mahjoub to be inadmissible, based on the security certificate. A deportation order was therefore issued.
With respect to membership in the Vanguards of Conquest and/or Al Jihad, Mr. Justice Nadon found that:
1. Mr. Mahjoub perjured himself when he denied knowing Mr. Marzouk.
2. Mr. Mahjoub was not truthful with respect to his connection with Mr. Al Duri.
3. Mr. Mahjoub was not truthful with respect to the use of his alias “Mahmoud Shaker” to CSIS agents.
4. Mr. Mahjoub was not truthful regarding his true activities while he worked in the Sudan for Osama bin Laden.
5. Mr. Mahjoub was initially untruthful when he was interviewed by CSIS and he denied knowing Mr. Ahmad Said Khadr.
In addition to lying in his earlier application, a defense was raised that human rights had been violated, since the deportation order hadn’t taken place within 120 days (4 months). However, that falls flat when it’s pointed out that the Applicant tried other legal means to stay in Canada.
 The applicants submit that s. 83.01 offences are “akin, of the same class and indistinguishable from offences included in s. 469 of the Criminal Code, and therefore within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Superior Court of Justice. They argue that on the allegations as disclosed to date, “some of the allegations cited constitute, or may constitute, treason and/or intimidating Parliament or attempts thereunder”. Further, the applicants submit the nature and content of terrorism charges are “either subsets or specific instances of s. 469 offences or indistinguishably akin to them”.
 The fact that some of the offences under s. 83.01 involve elements of other offences does not assist the applicants. For example, another count of the information charges two accused with importing a firearm and prohibited ammunition contrary to s. 103 of the Criminal Code for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a terrorist group, thereby committing an offence contrary to s. 83.2 of the Criminal Code. Doing so does not turn those offences into s. 469 offences. Section 103 is not covered by s. 469.
 The applicants further submit that their s. 15 Charter rights are impacted by this constitutional omission. Mr. Galati argues that having these offences “against the Canadian state tried by provincially appointed “lower magistrates” infringes sections 7 and 15 of the Charter, as well as infringing the pre-amble to the Constitution Act, 1982 in placing offences against the Canadian state before provincially appointed “lower magistrates and justices”. Finally, they submit that s. 469 “offers certain procedural and judicial benefits and protections for the accused” which mitigates in favour of having “the highest judicial scrutiny, and review by exclusive jurisdiction at first instance”. In regard to the contention that the cases are being “tried” in the Ontario Court of Justice, the issue on this application is the forum of the bail hearings.
In short, Galati wanted his client (who was charged with Section 83 — terrorism — offences), to have the court view them in the same manner as Section 469 offences. This would make it mandatory that bail hearings be held by the Superior Court of Justice in Ontario. Thus it would remove the discretion for the Lower Court to conduct it. Galati admits that the reason behind it is that he figures it will be easier for his client to get bail.
(8) The portion of subsection 3(3) of the Act before paragraph (b) is replaced by the following:
(3) Paragraphs (1)(b), (f) to (j), (q) and (r) do not apply to a person born outside Canada
(a) if, at the time of his or her birth, only one of the person’s parents was a citizen and that parent was a citizen under paragraph (1)(b), (c.1), (e), (g), (h), (o), (p), (q) or (r) or both of the person’s parents were citizens under any of those paragraphs;
(a.1) if the person was born before January 1, 1947 and, on that day, only one of the person’s parents was a citizen and that parent was a citizen under paragraph (1)(o) or (q), or both of the person’s parents were citizens under either of those paragraphs; (a.2) if the person was born before April 1, 1949 and, on that day, only one of the person’s parents was a citizen and that parent was a citizen under paragraph (1)(p) or (r), or both of the person’s parents were citizens under either of those paragraphs; or
This provision would allow for Canada to strip away the Canadian citizenship of a foreign-born person convicted of terrorism or treason, if citizenship elsewhere was an option.
 The applicants seek to set aside the decision of His Excellency The Right Honourable David Johnston Governor General of Canada on June 19, 2014 to grant royal assent to Bill C-24, the Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act, SC 2014, c 22 (Strengthening Citizenship Act).
 Section 8 of the Strengthening Citizenship Act amends the Citizenship Act, RSC 1985, c C-29 (Citizenship Act). The amendments allow the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration to revoke the citizenship of natural-born and naturalized Canadian citizens where a citizen has a conviction relating to national security or terrorism. These convictions include treason under section 47 of the Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46 (subsection 10(2)(a) of the Citizenship Act); a terrorism offence as defined in section 2 of the Criminal Code (subsection 10(2)(b) of the Citizenship Act) and certain offences under the National Defence Act, RSC 1985, c N-5 and the Security of Information Act, RSC 1985, c O-5. Where the citizen holds, or could have a right to dual nationality, the Strengthening Citizenship Act provides for the revocation of citizenship and designation of that individual as a foreign national, which may lead to deportation from Canada.
 Given these principles, it is clear that Parliament must enjoy exclusive and unqualified legislative competence over citizenship, subject only to constraints of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
 The application for judicial review is dismissed. The matter in respect of which judicial review is sought, the decision to grant royal assent, is a legislative act and not justiciable. The respondents are not federal boards exercising a power or jurisdiction conferred under an act of Parliament. In any event, the substantive argument with respect to constitutionality of the Strengthening Citizenship Act fails. Section 8 of the Strengthening Citizenship Act is within the legislative competence of Parliament.
THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that the application is dismissed, with costs. If parties cannot agree on the amount of costs, submissions of no more than five pages in length may be made within 10 days from the date of this decision.
Although this application was thrown out, Trudeau would soon be elected, making this all a non-issue. Still, it’s absurd beyond belief that foreigners who come to Canada only to engage in these crimes should have people fighting for their rights.
9. Trudeau Liberals Introduce Bill C-6 (2016)
In early 2016, the Trudeau Government introduced Bill C-6, to remove the requirement that foreign born dual nationals be deported if convicted of terrorism or treason. In short, Trudeau did in the legislature what Rocco Galati failed to accomplish in Federal Court.
10. Rights Of Canadians Don’t Matter
Lawyers have a well deserved reputation for being scum, and these are just a few examples of it. Societal norms and protections are undermined under the pretense of “rights” for people who enter Canada with the intention of doing harm.
Just as bad are the lobbyists, politicians, NGOs, and others who undermine our laws to let these people in. Islam is not compatible with a Western Society, and we should not make any effort to accommodate it.
Foreign NGOs should not be allowed to influence laws and policies in Canada. For that matter, foreigners shouldn’t be allowed to hold public office — because their loyalty will always be divided.