Category: Canadian Decisions

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Canada’s Criminal Code: Insults As Bad As Advocating Genocide

(MP Iqra Khalid, who opposes free speech)

DEFAMATORY LIBEL laws are still on the books!

1. Important Links

CLICK HERE, for a prior review of Bill C-71 (firearms)
CLICK HERE, for a prior review of Bill C-75 (terrorism)
CLICK HERE, for global efforts to ban criticism of Islam.
CLICK HERE, for “defamatory libel” in the Criminal Code.
CLICK HERE, for previous version.
CLICK HERE, for Canadian Charter of Rights & Freedoms.
CLICK HERE, for R. v. Stevens, 1993 CanLII 14706 (MB PC).
CLICK HERE, for cases linked to R. v. Stevens.
CLICK HERE, for R. v. Lucas, (1998)

2. From The Criminal Code

Defamatory Libel
Definition of newspaper
297 In sections 303, 304 and 308, newspaper means any paper, magazine or periodical containing public news, intelligence or reports of events, or any remarks or observations thereon, printed for sale and published periodically or in parts or numbers, at intervals not exceeding thirty-one days between the publication of any two such papers, parts or numbers, and any paper, magazine or periodical printed in order to be dispersed and made public, weekly or more often, or at intervals not exceeding thirty-one days, that contains advertisements, exclusively or principally.
R.S., c. C-34, s. 261.

Marginal note:
Definition
298 (1) A defamatory libel is matter published, without lawful justification or excuse, that is likely to injure the reputation of any person by exposing him to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or that is designed to insult the person of or concerning whom it is published.

Marginal note:
Mode of expression
(2) A defamatory libel may be expressed directly or by insinuation or irony
(a) in words legibly marked on any substance; or
(b) by any object signifying a defamatory libel otherwise than by words.
R.S., c. C-34, s. 262.

Marginal note:
Publishing
299 A person publishes a libel when he
(a) exhibits it in public;
(b) causes it to be read or seen; or
(c) shows or delivers it, or causes it to be shown or delivered, with intent that it should be read or seen by any person other than the person whom it defames.
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 299; 2018, c. 29, s. 31.
Previous Version

Marginal note:
Punishment of libel known to be false
300 Every one who publishes a defamatory libel that he knows is false is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years.
R.S., c. C-34, s. 264.

Marginal note:
Punishment for defamatory libel
301 Every one who publishes a defamatory libel is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.
R.S., c. C-34, s. 265.

Marginal note:
Extortion by libel
302 (1) Every one commits an offence who, with intent
(a) to extort money from any person, or
(b) to induce a person to confer on or procure for another person an appointment or office of profit or trust,
publishes or threatens to publish or offers to abstain from publishing or to prevent the publication of a defamatory libel.

Marginal note:
Idem
(2) Every one commits an offence who, as the result of the refusal of any person to permit money to be extorted or to confer or procure an appointment or office of profit or trust, publishes or threatens to publish a defamatory libel.

Marginal note:
Punishment
(3) Every one who commits an offence under this section is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years.
R.S., c. C-34, s. 266.

Marginal note:
Proprietor of newspaper presumed responsible
303 (1) The proprietor of a newspaper shall be deemed to publish defamatory matter that is inserted and published therein, unless he proves that the defamatory matter was inserted in the newspaper without his knowledge and without negligence on his part.

Marginal note:
General authority to manager when negligence
(2) Where the proprietor of a newspaper gives to a person general authority to manage or conduct the newspaper as editor or otherwise, the insertion by that person of defamatory matter in the newspaper shall, for the purposes of subsection (1), be deemed not to be negligence on the part of the proprietor unless it is proved that
(a) he intended the general authority to include authority to insert defamatory matter in the newspaper; or
(b) he continued to confer general authority after he knew that it had been exercised by the insertion of defamatory matter in the newspaper.

Marginal note:
Selling newspapers
(3) No person shall be deemed to publish a defamatory libel by reason only that he sells a number or part of a newspaper that contains a defamatory libel, unless he knows that the number or part contains defamatory matter or that defamatory matter is habitually contained in the newspaper.

Selling book containing defamatory libel
304 (1) No person shall be deemed to publish a defamatory libel by reason only that he sells a book, magazine, pamphlet or other thing, other than a newspaper that contains defamatory matter, if, at the time of the sale, he does not know that it contains the defamatory matter.

Marginal note:
Sale by servant
(2) Where a servant, in the course of his employment, sells a book, magazine, pamphlet or other thing, other than a newspaper, the employer shall be deemed not to publish any defamatory matter contained therein unless it is proved that the employer authorized the sale knowing that
(a) defamatory matter was contained therein; or
(b) defamatory matter was habitually contained therein, in the case of a periodical.
R.S., c. C-34, s. 268.

Some observations:

  1. Under 301 defamatory libel is punishable by up to 2 years. However, in Section 300 publishing defamatory libel is punishable by up to 5 years. What exactly is the difference?
  2. Bill C-75 (terrorism and other offences) included provisions to make terrorism eligible to be tried summarily (for lesser punishments). However, mean words is automatically indictable. Seriously?
  3. Obvious question: but in a free society, why would civil infractions be criminalized?
  4. Under Section 298(1) and (2), irony and satire seem to be included.
  5. Under Section 303, newspaper editors are “assumed” to be liable. So much for the presumption of innocence in our criminal “justice” system.
  6. However, when publishing a “book” (under Section 304), the publisher is assumed not to be have known.

3. Defenses To Defamatory Libel

Well, there are some defenses, which is good to know. For example, it’s not a crime if bad things are said in the context of divorce proceedings, or parliamentary or judicial proceedings.

Fair report of public meeting
308 No person shall be deemed to publish a defamatory libel by reason only that he publishes in good faith, in a newspaper, a fair report of the proceedings of any public meeting if
(a) the meeting is lawfully convened for a lawful purpose and is open to the public;
(b) the report is fair and accurate;
(c) the publication of the matter complained of is for the public benefit; and
(d) he does not refuse to publish in a conspicuous place in the newspaper a reasonable explanation or contradiction by the person defamed in respect of the defamatory matter.
R.S., c. C-34, s. 272.

Marginal note:
Public benefit
309 No person shall be deemed to publish a defamatory libel by reason only that he publishes defamatory matter that, on reasonable grounds, he believes is true, and that is relevant to any subject of public interest, the public discussion of which is for the public benefit.
R.S., c. C-34, s. 273.

Marginal note:
Fair comment on public person or work of art
310 No person shall be deemed to publish a defamatory libel by reason only that he publishes fair comments
(a) on the public conduct of a person who takes part in public affairs; or
(b) on a published book or other literary production, or on any composition or work of art or performance publicly exhibited, or on any other communication made to the public on any subject, if the comments are confined to criticism thereof.
R.S., c. C-34, s. 274.

Marginal note:
When truth a defence
311 No person shall be deemed to publish a defamatory libel where he proves that the publication of the defamatory matter in the manner in which it was published was for the public benefit at the time when it was published and that the matter itself was true.
R.S., c. C-34, s. 275.

Marginal note:
Publication invited or necessary
312 No person shall be deemed to publish a defamatory libel by reason only that he publishes defamatory matter
(a) on the invitation or challenge of the person in respect of whom it is published, or
(b) that it is necessary to publish in order to refute defamatory matter published in respect of him by another person,
if he believes that the defamatory matter is true and it is relevant to the invitation, challenge or necessary refutation, as the case may be, and does not in any respect exceed what is reasonably sufficient in the circumstances.
R.S., c. C-34, s. 276.

Marginal note:
Answer to inquiries
313 No person shall be deemed to publish a defamatory libel by reason only that he publishes, in answer to inquiries made to him, defamatory matter relating to a subject-matter in respect of which the person by whom or on whose behalf the inquiries are made has an interest in knowing the truth or who, on reasonable grounds, the person who publishes the defamatory matter believes has such an interest, if
(a) the matter is published, in good faith, for the purpose of giving information in answer to the inquiries;
(b) the person who publishes the defamatory matter believes that it is true;
(c) the defamatory matter is relevant to the inquiries; and
(d) the defamatory matter does not in any respect exceed what is reasonably sufficient in the circumstances.

Good to know that truth is a valid defense. Also, “public benefit” considered to be a defense. But don’t we have something called the Charter of Rights and Freedoms? Aren’t there fundamental freedoms guaranteed to us? Let’s take a look.

But first, let’s look at a silly comparison: what are the punishments for advocating genocide?

4. Canadian Criminal Code

Advocating genocide
318 (1) Every one who advocates or promotes genocide is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years.
Marginal note:
Definition of genocide
(2) In this section, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy in whole or in part any identifiable group, namely,
(a) killing members of the group; or
(b) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction.
Marginal note:
Consent
(3) No proceeding for an offence under this section shall be instituted without the consent of the Attorney General

That’s right. Advocating genocide is an indictable offense, punishable by up to 5 years in prison.

Think that through. Insulting people publicly can be treated just as harshly as actually calling for people to be exterminated.

5. Fundamental Freedoms, Canadian Charter

2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms:
(a) freedom of conscience and religion;
(b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication;
(c) freedom of peaceful assembly; and
(d) freedom of association.

On the surface, yes, fee speech, belief, expression and opinion are guaranteed. Yet these “defamatory libel” laws are still on the books. So what happens when they collide?

6. Charter V.S. Criminal Code

From the case: R. v. Stevens (1993),

1. Is s. 300 of the Criminal Code of Canada an infringement of freedom of expression as guaranteed under s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms?
ANSWER: Yes
2. If s. 300 of the Criminal Code is an infringement of the Charter can it be upheld under s. 1 of the Charter as a reasonable limit prescribed by law and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society?
ANSWER: Yes
While I have struck down certain portions of ss. 298 and 299 for failing the proportionality test under s. 1, this result has no impact in the present case in view of the findings of fact previously made by this court.
Accordingly, I find Mr. Stevens guilty of the offence under s. 300
of the Criminal Code as charged.

This Judge rules that yes, it is a violation of the Charter, but a justifiable one under Section 1.

From the case: R. v. Lucas (1998),

[129] In his reasons for sentence ((1995), 1995 CanLII 4081 (SK QB), 132 Sask. R. 71), the trial judge stated “that John David Lucas was the instigator and Johanna Erna Lucas was his follower” (p. 74). This finding raises the possibility that Mrs. Lucas’s knowledge might have derived at least in part from what she was told by Mr. Lucas, and she may therefore have believed that the message was true even though in fact it was not.

[130] In the absence of findings of fact by the trial judge related to subjective knowledge, there is insufficient evidence before this Court to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mrs. Lucas knew that the messages on the placard she carried were false. Accordingly, her conviction must be set aside.

[131] Ordinarily, a new trial would be ordered. However, in light of the Crown’s statement that in the circumstances the Crown would not proceed with a new trial, I would direct an acquittal of Mrs. Lucas.

An acquittal here, but only because the person didn’t know the statements weren’t true.

7. Do We Really Have Free Speech?

To a point, yes. However, a free speech absolutist would argue that no, that isn’t free speech.

However, in the world of everyone criticizing everyone, this type of law seems to easy to be abused. One person’s satire and trolling is another person’s hate and defamatory libel.

There are several other cases to go through. But the point here remains:

DEFAMATORY LIBEL laws are still on the books!

There are plenty of “civil” cases for defamation even in recent years. However, “criminal” cases for defamation seem to be a thing of the past. Probably since there are far more important things for police and prosecutors to busy themselves with.

Still, good to know this….

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Abuse of Safe Third Country Agreement & Coming To Canada Under False Pretenses

CLICK HERE, for previous article on the Canada/US Safe 3rd Country Agreement (signed in 2002)

1. Interesting Cases

(1) CLICK HERE, for a marriage of convenience.
Liang v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, 2014 CanLII 90636 (CA IRB)

(2) CLICK HERE, for committing identity fraud in order to gain entry to Canada.
Shaikh v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2018 CanLII 89040 (CA IRB)

(3) CLICK HERE, for an actual terrorist wanting to stay in Canada.
Singh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1997 CanLII 5893 (FC)

(4) CLICK HERE, for a failed US asylum seeker, relying on falsified psychological documents.
X (Re), 2016 CanLII 152912 (CA IRB)

(5) CLICK HERE, for a failed US asylum seeker changing his story this time.
X (Re), 2013 CanLII 99499 (CA IRB)

(6) CLICK HERE, for an Indian man claiming to be from Tibet to gain asylum (Mariam Monself, take note).
X (Re), 2014 CanLII 100882 (CA IRB)

(7) CLICK HERE, for a “refugee” who lived illegally in the US for 14 years, then trying to claim asylum in Canada
X (Re), 2015 CanLII 44019 (CA IRB)

(8) CLICK HERE, for a wanted fugitive from China trying to get asylum in Canada.
X (Re), 2015 CanLII 107837 (CA IRB)

These 8 cases are just a small sample of the tidal wave of fraudulent “refugee” claims that have been made over the last several years. Although many get rejected, many still get through. This happens even when adjudicators admit that applicants have been deceptive.

2. UN Promotes Abuse Of S3CA

CLICK HERE, for the UN link.

Exceptions to the Safe Third Country Agreement with Canada

The U.S. and Canada have an agreement preventing people who first enter one country from applying for asylum or refugee status in the other. This means that if you entered the U.S. first and then try to apply for asylum in Canada, you may not be able to. However, there are exceptions to the agreement that may allow you to apply for asylum in Canada, even if you came to the U.S. first. For one thing, this agreement only applies to you if you are planning on arriving at entry ports on the U.S.-Canada land border. It does not apply if you plan on arriving in Canada at air or marine ports.

The following questions will determine whether you meet any of the exceptions that will allow you to apply for asylum in Canada at a U.S.-Canada land border even if you arrived in the U.S. first.

EXCEPTION # 1 Land Border Entry Ports Only

Are you going to arrive in Canada from a land border?

NO ==> You qualify under this exception!

YES ==> You do not qualify under this exception. Check to see if you qualify under any other exception.

EXCEPTION # 2 Family Connections in Canada

Do you have any of the following family members in Canada?

  • A spouse
  • A common-law partner (a common law partner is person of the same or opposite sex with whom you are cohabiting in a conjugal relationship and have cohabited for at least a year.)
  • A legal guardian
  • A child
  • A father or mother
  • A brother or sister
  • A grandfather or grandmother
  • A grandchild
  • An uncle or aunt
  • A nephew or niece

NO ==> You do not qualify under this exception. Check to see if you qualify under any other exception.

YES ==> Is your family member any of the following?

  • A Canadian citizen
  • A permanent resident
  • A protected person (i.e. determined to be a refugee or a person in need of protection)
  • Accepted in principle on humanitarian and compassionate grounds (removal order stayed under Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations 233)
  • 18 years of age or over and is a refugee claimant (and the claim has not been rejected, withdrawn, found abandoned or ineligible)
  • 18 years of age or over and is in Canada on a work permit or study permit (but check the exceptions)

    • YES ==> You qualify under this exception!
    NO ==> You do not qualify under this exception. Check to see if you qualify under any other exception.

    EXCEPTION # 3 Unaccompanied Minor
    Are you under 18?
    NO ==> You do not qualify under the unaccompanied minor exception. Check to see if you qualify under any other exception.
    YES ==> Were you accompanied here by your father, mother, or legal guardian? Are you married? Is your father, mother, or legal guardian in Canada or the United States?

    If NO to all these questions ==> You qualify under this exception!
    If YES to any of these questions ==> You do not qualify under this exception. Check to see if you qualify under any other exception.

    EXCEPTION # 4 Countries to which Canada Does Not Remove

    Are you a national of any of the following countries?

    • Afghanistan
    • Burundi
    • Democratic Republic of Congo
    • Haiti
    • Iraq
    • Liberia
    • Rwanda
    • Zimbabwe

    NO ==> You do not qualify under this exception. Check to see if you qualify under any other exception.

    YES ==> Have you been convicted of any crimes?

    NO ==> You qualify under this exception!

    YES ==> You may not qualify under this exception. Canada does not admit people who have been convicted of certain crimes. Whether you qualify under this exception depends on the type of crime(s) you were convicted of.

    EXCEPTION # 5 Death Penalty

    Have you been charged or convicted of an offence punishable with the death penalty in the country?

    YES ==> You MAY qualify under this exception. Canada does not admit people who have been convicted of certain crimes. Whether you qualify under this exception depends on the type of crime(s) you were convicted of.

    NO ==> You do not qualify under this exception. Check to see if you qualify under any other exception.

    EXCEPTION # 6 Valid Visa Exception

    Do you have a valid visa to enter Canada, other than a transit visa?

    YES ==> You qualify under this exception!

    NO ==> You do not qualify under this exception. Check to see if you qualify under any other exception.

    EXCEPTION # 7 Visa Required in U.S. But Not in Canada

    Are you a national of any of the following countries?

    • Antigua and Barbuda
    • Barbados
    • Botswana
    • Cyprus
    • Greece
    • Malta
    • Mexico
    • Namibia
    • Papua New Guinea
    • Republic of (South) Korea
    • St. Kitts and Nevis
    • St. Lucia
    • St. Vincent
    • Solomon Islands
    • Swaziland
    • Western Samoa

    NO ==> You do not qualify under this exception. Check to see if you qualify under any other exception.

    YES ==> You qualify under this exception!

    From Canadian Website

    CLICK HERE, for Canadian Government website.

    Where the Agreement is in effect
    The Safe Third Country Agreement applies only to refugee claimants who are seeking entry to Canada from the U.S.:
    at Canada-U.S. land border crossings
    by train or
    at airports, only if the person seeking refugee protection in Canada has been refused refugee status in the U.S. and is in transit through Canada after being deported from the U.S.

    Exceptions to the Agreement
    Exceptions to the Agreement consider the importance of family unity, the best interests of children and the public interest.
    There are four types of exceptions:

    1. Family member exceptions
    2. Unaccompanied minors exception
    3. Document holder exceptions
    4. Public interest exceptions

    Even if they qualify for one of these exceptions, refugee claimants must still meet all other eligibility criteria of Canada’s immigration legislation. For example, if a person seeking refugee protection has been found inadmissible in Canada on the grounds of security, for violating human or international rights, or for serious criminality, that person will not be eligible to make a refugee claim.

    Family member exceptions
    Refugee claimants may qualify under this category of exceptions if they have a family member who:

    • is a Canadian citizen
    • is a permanent resident of Canada
    • is a protected person under Canadian immigration legislation
    • has made a claim for refugee status in Canada that has been accepted by the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB)
    • has had his or her removal order stayed on humanitarian and compassionate grounds
    • holds a valid Canadian work permit
    • holds a valid Canadian study permit, or
    • is over 18 years old and has a claim for refugee protection that has been referred to the IRB for determination. (This claim must not have been withdrawn by the family member, declared abandoned or rejected by the IRB or found ineligible for referral to the IRB.)

    Unaccompanied minors exception
    Refugee claimants may qualify under this category of exceptions if they are minors (under the age of 18) who:
    are not accompanied by their mother, father or legal guardian
    have neither a spouse nor a common-law partner, and
    do not have a mother, a father or a legal guardian in Canada or the United States.

    Document holder exceptions
    Refugee claimants may qualify under this category of exceptions if they:
    hold a valid Canadian visa (other than a transit visa)
    hold a valid work permit
    hold a valid study permit
    hold a travel document (for permanent residents or refugees) or other valid admission document issued by Canada, or
    are not required (exempt) to get a temporary resident visa to enter Canada but require a U.S.–issued visa to enter the U.S.

    Public interest exceptions
    Refugee claimants may qualify under this category of exceptions if:
    they have been charged with or convicted of an offence that could subject them to the death penalty in the U.S. or in a third country. However, a refugee claimant is ineligible if he or she has been found inadmissible in Canada on the grounds of security, for violating human or international rights, or for serious criminality, or if the Minister finds the person to be a danger to the public.

    Making a refugee claim under the Safe Third Country Agreement
    For detailed information on making a refugee claim for protection in Canada at the Canada–U.S. border, please refer to the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA).

    There are so many exemptions in this agreement that it’s difficult to find someone who “doesn’t” qualify on one or more grounds.

    4. Canada Admits U.S. A Safe Country

    Factor 3: Human rights record of the United States
    The United States meets a high standard with respect to the protection of human rights. It is an open democracy with independent courts, separation of powers and constitutional guarantees of essential human rights and fundamental freedoms.

    Factor 4: Whether the United States is party to an agreement with Canada for the purpose of sharing responsibility with respect to claims for refugee protection

    The Safe Third Country Agreement between Canada and the United States was signed on December 5, 2002, came into force on December 29, 2004, and remains in force.

    The US is a safe country. That “should” end the discussion on fake refugees coming here.

    After all, simply being in the country illegally isn’t a defense.

    Posted on

    Mandatory Minimum Sentences: Good, Bad, Or It Depends?

    Suggested Offences With Mandatory Minimums
    CC 46-48 (Treason)
    CC 83.01-83.3 (Terrorism)
    CC 151-154 (child Sex Offences)
    CC 229-239 (Murder, 1st degree)

    The case AGAINST Mandatory Minimums
    -Judges are better able to look at a case and decide what is fair
    -Judges are better able to decide what would be best for the public
    -Judges are not subject to the whims of the population, given their jobs are secure
    -In the event of very poor rulings, they can be appealed
    -Mandatory minimums are very costly to the public
    -Mandatory minimums result in “social costs” to the public
    -There is no general deterrence
    -Politicians in general cannot be trusted to pass good laws
    -Politicians take so much power anyway, a separate judiciary is necessary
    -Government should stay out of people’s lives as much as possible
    -Given fraud and corruption within gov’t it is hypocritical for them to be passing such laws
    -Judges are best able to “make that exception” when needed
    -Mandatory minimums make it hard, if not impossible to make punishment fit the crime. It always must.

    Articles Cited:
    Research At A Glance
    Mandator Minimum Penalties
    Mandatory Minimums Unfair and Expensive
    PBS Special on Mandatory Minimums

    The Case IN FAVOUR OF Mandatory Minimums
    -Politicians can (theoretically) be thrown out, judges cannot
    -Although far from perfect, public input can help draft laws
    -While judges are well intended, different perspectives can lead to widely differing sentences on cases of similar facts
    -Consistency is necessary in applying sentencing principles
    -If bad rulings occur and are not struck down, they can create ”precedent” for future bad rulings. Having set standards eliminates that possibility
    -If not mandatory minimums, then guidelines (as is also the case in US/UK)
    -Some offences are so bad they “require” prison time (as mentioned, it covered offences like murder, terrorism, child sex offences)
    -Of course, this is not to imply that all, or even most offences should carry mandatory minimums
    -The crimes being proposed for mandatory minimums are committed so rarely, that there would be ”no dragnet” of people.
    -For certain offences, the well being of society needs to trump individual rights
    -The Principles of Sentencing (see below) to see a need to balance both individual rights and society’s (the group’s rights)
    -Items (a), (b), (c) put societal interest first, while (d), (e), (f) put individual interest first

    What Does The Law Say?

    Note: the information here is not necessary to prove that mandatory minimums are necessary, but rather to explain when the rationale behind sentencing.

    Also the Bill C-42 was introduced to remove so-called ”conditional sentencing” for certain offences. The rationale being, if house arrest is inadequate, the probation would be even more so. In effect, it would ”create” mandatory jail sentences (though the length not specified).

    Purpose and Principles of Sentencing
    Marginal note:
    Purpose
    718 The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives:

    (a) to denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community that is caused by unlawful conduct;

    (b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences;

    (c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary;

    (d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders;

    (e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and

    (f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims or to the community.

    Objectives — offences against children
    718.01 When a court imposes a sentence for an offence that involved the abuse of a person under the age of eighteen years, it shall give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence of such conduct.

    Objectives — offence against peace officer or other justice system participant
    718.02 When a court imposes a sentence for an offence under subsection 270(1), section 270.01 or 270.02 or paragraph 423.1(1)(b), the court shall give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence of the conduct that forms the basis of the offence.

    Objectives — offence against certain animals
    718.03 When a court imposes a sentence for an offence under subsection 445.01(1), the court shall give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence of the conduct that forms the basis of the offence.

    Fundamental principle
    718.1 A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.

    Restrictions on Conditional Sentencting, Bill C-42

    R v. Proulx (2003) for conditional sentencing

    “The requirement in s. 742.1 (b) that the judge be satisfied that the safety of the community would not be endangered by the offender serving his or her sentence in the community is a condition precedent to the imposition of a conditional sentence, and not the primary consideration in determining whether a conditional sentence is appropriate. In making this determination, the judge should consider the risk posed by the specific offender, not the broader risk of whether the imposition of a conditional sentence would endanger the safety of the community by providing insufficient general deterrence or undermining general respect for the law. Two factors should be taken into account: (1) the risk of the offender re-offending; and (2) the gravity of the damage that could ensue in the event of re-offence. A consideration of the risk posed by the offender should include the risk of any criminal activity, and not be limited solely to the risk of physical or psychological harm to individuals.

    Once the prerequisites of s. 742.1 are satisfied, the judge should give serious consideration to the possibility of a conditional sentence in all cases by examining whether a conditional sentence is consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing set out in ss. 718 to 718.2. This follows from Parliament’s clear message to the judiciary to reduce the use of incarceration as a sanction.

    A conditional sentence can provide significant denunciation and deterrence. As a general matter, the more serious the offence, the longer and more onerous the conditional sentence should be. There may be some circumstances, however, where the need for denunciation or deterrence is so pressing that incarceration will be the only suitable way in which to express society’s condemnation of the offender’s conduct or to deter similar conduct in the future.

    Generally, a conditional sentence will be better than incarceration at achieving the restorative objectives of rehabilitation, reparations to the victim and the community, and promotion of a sense of responsibility in the offender and acknowledgment of the harm done to the victim and the community.

    Where a combination of both punitive and restorative objectives may be achieved, a conditional sentence will likely be more appropriate than incarceration. Where objectives such as denunciation and deterrence are particularly pressing, incarceration will generally be the preferable sanction. This may be so notwithstanding the fact that restorative goals might be achieved. However, a conditional sentence may provide sufficient denunciation and deterrence, even in cases in which restorative objectives are of lesser importance, depending on the nature of the conditions imposed, the duration of the sentence, and the circumstances of both the offender and the community in which the conditional sentence is to be served. A conditional sentence may be imposed even where there are aggravating circumstances, although the need for denunciation and deterrence will increase in these circumstances.

    No party is under a burden of proof to establish that a conditional sentence is either appropriate or inappropriate in the circumstances. The judge should consider all relevant evidence, no matter by whom it is adduced. However, it would be in the offender’s best interests to establish elements militating in favour of a conditional sentence.

    Sentencing judges have a wide discretion in the choice of the appropriate sentence. They are entitled to considerable deference from appellate courts. Absent an error in principle, failure to consider a relevant factor, or an overemphasis of the appropriate factors, a court of appeal should only intervene to vary a sentence imposed at trial if the sentence is demonstrably unfit.”

    R v Proulx makes a pretty compelling case in favour of “conditional sentencing” a.k.a. “house arrest”. This case is recognized and relied on when handing down sentences. Many defense lawyers argue that conditional sentencing would better serve everyone (in most cases) than physical prison.

    The restrictions that came from Bill C-42, however, means that certain offences are no longer eligible for conditional sentencing. This means that Judges will have to choose jail sentences, since probation would be considered unfit.

    Overall, a very interesting topic to cover.

    Posted on

    Senator Mike Duffy Can’t Sue Senate Over Suspension

    (“P.E.I” Senator Mike Duffy, textbook case of “pig at the trough”)

    (Pamela Wallin, Patrick Brazeau, Mike Duffy, all temporarily suspended from the Canadian Senate)

    An Ontario Judge has ruled that Mike Duffy cannot sue the Senate for a decision that caused him to be suspended without pay for almost 2 years.

    CLICK HERE, for the actual ruling from Justice Sally Gomery. (Quotes in bold/italics. Commentary in regular font).

    CLICK HERE, for the original verdict, acquitting Duffy.

    [1] Senator Michael Duffy is suing the Senate of Canada for over $7 million in damages.

    [2] On November 5, 2013, the Senate voted to suspend Senator Duffy based on a report from its standing committee on Internal Economy, Budgets and Administration (the “CIBA”). This CIBA report concluded that he had violated rules on living and travel expenses. Senator Duffy was later criminally charged with breach of trust, fraud and accepting a bribe. On April 21, 2016, after a trial that lasted more than a year, he was acquitted of all charges. Justice Vaillancourt, the judge who heard the criminal trial, concluded that the Prime Minister’s Office (“PMO”) directed one or more senators to interfere with an audit of Senator Duffy’s expenses. 2018 ONSC 7523 (CanLII) He also concluded that, in making living expense claims, Senator Duffy “committed no prohibited act, violated no Senate rules”, and neither engaged in criminal fraud nor intended to do so.

    [3] In his lawsuit, Senator Duffy claims that the CIBA report and the Senate’s decision to suspend him were politically motivated, unconstitutional, procedurally unfair and contrary to his rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms1. Given the judge’s findings when he was acquitted of criminal charges, Senator Duffy argues that actions by various senators and the Senate as a whole were clearly wrong and unlawfully deprived him of salary, allowances and pension contributions. He also says that, since he was acquitted and the suspension was lifted, the Senate has once again unfairly denied him reimbursement for further legitimate expenses. He seeks compensation for the amounts he says he is entitled to as well as compensatory and punitive damages.

    [4] This matter is before me now because the Senate says that Senator Duffy’s action should be dismissed. The Senate contends that the lawsuit cannot proceed because the actions that Senator Duffy seeks to challenge fall squarely within the scope of parliamentary privilege. Determining the questions that arise in Senator Duffy’s lawsuit would accordingly require a court to do exactly what parliamentary privilege is designed to prevent.

    An interesting approach. While Duffy was ultimately acquitted on the criminal charges, the Trial Judge didn’t exactly exonerate him completely. More on that later. And this deflection and projection does not change the fact that there was considerable grounds for the suspension. This reads like an attempt to cash in.

    [7] For the purpose of a motion like this one, I must assume that all of the factual allegations in Senator Duffy’s statement of claim are true. He makes many allegations about the improper motivations of various senators and the denial of any due process. But the core allegation, what he says entitles him to damages, is that the decisions by the CIBA and the Senate to suspend him and to deny his claims for compensation were unlawful and unfair. I must determine whether these decisions are protected by parliamentary privilege and therefore shielded from any review by this court.

    This is an important distinction to make here: the Judge is saying that it must be “assumed” for the purposes of the motion that the factual allegations are true. This is not to claim that they actually are.

    [8] I conclude that they are. The Senate enjoys certain categories of privilege by virtue of the Constitution Act, 1867. 6 Four types of privilege prevent a court from reviewing the actions by the Senate at issue in this case.

    [9] First, parliamentary privilege extends to decisions by the Senate to discipline its own members. The privilege clearly applies to decisions about whether a senator should be suspended or expelled. In some cases, a court may review disciplinary decisions with respect to employees of a legislative body, if the management of such employees does not fall within the scope of what is necessary to protect the independent functioning of that body. There is however no question that the privilege prevents judicial review of discipline or suspension of a member of the legislature itself.

    [10] Second, parliamentary privilege applies to the Senate’s management of its internal affairs, including the allocation and use of parliamentary resources. This privilege extends to decisions on the approval of expenses claimed by senators. I find that the privilege applies to decisions by an internal committee of senators, such as the CIBA, with respect to the allocation or withholding of parliamentary resources to a senator.

    [11] Third, Parliament has exclusive control over, and privilege with respect to, its own debates and proceedings.

    [12] Finally, parliamentary privilege protects freedom of speech in the Senate. Allegations in a statement of claim about what was said in parliament must be struck, because statements in parliament cannot be reviewed by a court. Neither a senator nor a third party can be compelled to testify in court about anything they said or did in the course of Senate proceedings. Transcripts of proceedings, and reports produced by or commissioned for the Senate, can likewise not be produced in court proceedings. The Senate’s failure to object to disclosure of some evidence that might have been subject to privilege during Senator Duffy’s criminal trial does not mean that it has relinquished its right to invoke privilege in this case.

    The Judge is setting out the reasons here: The Senate is allowed under the law to discipline its own members. The ruling will go on to cite many examples and circumstances, but this will suffice for now.

    [13] Senator Duffy contends that the application of parliamentary privilege in this case leaves him without any meaningful remedy. He says that he cannot hope to get justice from the very body that has treated him so badly in the past, and that the courts should not allow Charter violations to go unchecked, particularly in circumstances where those violations arise from interference by one branch of government (the PMO) with another (the Senate).

    [14] I am however obliged to respect constitutional imperatives. Allowing a court to revisit the Senate’s decisions at issue here would interfere with the Senate’s ability to function as an independent legislative body, equal to other branches of government. These decisions, as well as the Senate record relevant to them, are protected by parliamentary privilege and are accordingly immune from judicial review or reconsideration. Since the actions at issue fall within those actions protected by parliamentary privilege, I cannot give any consideration to whether they were wrong or unfair or even contrary to Senator Duffy’s Charter rights. All of these are determinations that the Senate, and the Senate alone, can make. The Senate’s motion to dismiss Senator Duffy’s action against it is therefore granted.

    Interesting, that Duffy has been in the Senate since 2009, but seems to know so little about how it works.

    From the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, 21 and 25.11:


    21.01 (1) A party may move before a judge,
    (a) for the determination, before trial, of a question of law raised by a pleading in an action where the determination of the question may dispose of all or part of the action, substantially shorten the trial or result in a substantial saving of costs; or
    (b) to strike out a pleading on the ground that it discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence,
    and the judge may make an order or grant judgment accordingly. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 21.01 (1).

    STRIKING OUT A PLEADING OR OTHER DOCUMENT
    25.11 The court may strike out or expunge all or part of a pleading or other document, with or without leave to amend, on the ground that the pleading or other document,
    (a) may prejudice or delay the fair trial of the action;
    (b) is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious; or
    (c) is an abuse of the process of the court. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 25.11.

    The Senate invokes 2 sections of the Ontario rules, claiming that since Parliamentary privilege applies that the Senate should not be a defendant in the case.

    [25] Over time, the concept of parliamentary privilege was expanded to protect not only speech and procedures, but any action within parliament over which it must necessarily have exclusive control, as an independent and coequal branch of government. Parliamentary privilege is accordingly:
    the necessary immunity that the law provides for Members of Parliament … in order for these legislators to do their legislative work. It is also the necessary immunity that the law provides for anyone while taking part in a proceeding in Parliament … Finally, it is the authority and power of each House of Parliament … to enforce that immunity.

    Section 18 of the 1867 Constitution Act states:


    Privileges, etc., of Houses
    18. The privileges, immunities, and powers to be held, enjoyed, and exercised by the Senate and by the House of Commons, and by the members thereof respectively, shall be such as are from time to time defined by Act of the Parliament of Canada, but so that any Act of the Parliament of Canada defining such privileges, immunities, and powers shall not confer any privileges, immunities, or powers exceeding those at the passing of such Act held, enjoyed, and exercised by the Commons House of Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and by the members thereof

    In one context, it is nice that the Court here does apply and uphold some separation between branches of government.

    However, from a taxpayer who likes accountability from public officials, there is another viewpoint. Many would like to see the truth of the matter fleshed out, something that hasn’t really happened. However, this seems to be a case of “procedure over facts”.

    It will be interesting to see what happens with the RCMP, as they will be all too happy to throw Duffy under the bus to show they acted properly.

    Backstory Events Leading Up to Lawsuit Against RCMP and Senate
    In November 2013, Conservative Senators: 1/ Patrick Brazeau; 2/ Pamela Wallin’ and 3/ Mike Duffy were all suspended from the Canadian Senate for 2 years without pay, over illegal spending.

    Mike Duffy faced 31 criminal charges, including: 15 counts of fraud, 15 counts of breach of trust, and 1 count of bribery, (for allegedly receiving $90,000 gift to pay back expenses).

    Brazeau and Liberal Senator Mac Harb were charged with breach of trust and fraud, (sections 122 and 380 of the criminal code)


    Bribery of judicial officers, etc.
    119 (1) Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years who
    (a) being the holder of a judicial office, or being a member of Parliament or of the legislature of a province, directly or indirectly, corruptly accepts, obtains, agrees to accept or attempts to obtain, for themselves or another person, any money, valuable consideration, office, place or employment in respect of anything done or omitted or to be done or omitted by them in their official capacity, or
    (b) directly or indirectly, corruptly gives or offers to a person mentioned in paragraph (a), or to anyone for the benefit of that person, any money, valuable consideration, office, place or employment in respect of anything done or omitted or to be done or omitted by that person in their official capacity.

    Breach of trust by public officer
    122 Every official who, in connection with the duties of his office, commits fraud or a breach of trust is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, whether or not the fraud or breach of trust would be an offence if it were committed in relation to a private person.
    R.S., c. C-34, s. 111.

    Fraud
    380 (1) Every one who, by deceit, falsehood or other fraudulent means, whether or not it is a false pretence within the meaning of this Act, defrauds the public or any person, whether ascertained or not, of any property, money or valuable security or any service,
    (a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to a term of imprisonment not exceeding fourteen years, where the subject-matter of the offence is a testamentary instrument or the value of the subject-matter of the offence exceeds five thousand dollars; or
    (b) is guilty
    (i) of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, or
    (ii) of an offence punishable on summary conviction,
    where the value of the subject-matter of the offence does not exceed five thousand dollars.

    Pamela Wallin was never actually charged, but forced to pay back for her actions, despite over $100,000 in illegal expenses. In a bizarre twist, it cost $127,000 to audit Wallin’s spending.

    Duffy was acquitted in a very bizarre ruling in 2016. More on that later.

    This most likely influenced the decision to drop the charges against Harb in May 2016, and later Brazeau in July 2016.

    Although Duffy was eventually acquitted of criminal wrongdoing, him returning to the Senate has left a bad taste in many people’s mouths.

    Nonsensical Acquittal by Vaillancourt At Trial

    CLICK HERE, for the text of the ruling.

    That is actually its own article, CLICK HERE. It is too long to do properly here.

    Posted on

    Supreme Court Will Hear Woman Arrested for Not Holding Handrail

    (Bela Kosoian, taking legal action to S.C.C.)

    ***********************************************************************
    The full text for UN Global Migration Compact is RIGHT HERE.

    Please sign this: PETITION E-1906 CLICK HERE
    ***********************************************************************

    The Supreme Court of Canada has agreed to hear Bela Kosoian, a woman detained in Laval, Quebec, for refusing to hold a hand rail.

    (1) Backstory of the Case
    This is a a bizarre story, starting in 2009, of a woman in a Laval, QC, subway station, refused instructions from transit officers to hold a handrail while on an escalator.

    When transit officers attempted to write her a ticket for the refusal to obey, she refused to identify herself. Identity is rather important in enforcing tickets. This led to her being detained for about a half hour, after which point she did reveal her name.

    Kosoian was issued 2 tickets from that incident, one for $100, and one for $320. She contested both, and they were eventually thrown out.

    Since then, she has taken legal action against the city, the STM, and a staff member. After a series of legal twists, it will now be heard by the Supreme Court of Canada.

    (2) Quebec Court of Justice — Trial Court
    Kosoian took legal action against: (a) the City of Laval; (b) Fabio Camacho — one of the officers; and (c) the Transportation Company of Montreal — aka the STM. She sought $24,000 for moral damages, pain, suffering, inconvenience and exemplary damages, and another $45,000 for moral and punitive damages for the fault committed by its agent.

    Kosoian submitted a VERY LENGTHY list and description of physical and psychological trauma suffered as a resukt of being detained for about half an hour. On the surface, it seems like malingering.

    Section 49 of the Canadian Charter was invoked, which states:

    CHAPTER V
    SPECIAL AND INTERPRETATIVE PROVISIONS

    49. Any unlawful interference with any right or freedom recognized by this Charter entitles the victim to obtain the cessation of such interference and compensation for the moral or material prejudice resulting therefrom.
    In case of unlawful and intentional interference, the tribunal may, in addition, condemn the person guilty of it to punitive damages.

    For it’s part, the STM Referenced By-Law R-036

    ” BY-LAW R-036

    “REGULATIONS RESPECTING THE SAFETY AND BEHAVIOR STANDARDS OF PERSONS IN ROAD EQUIPMENT AND BUILDINGS OPERATED BY OR FOR THE MONTREAL TRANSPORTATION CORPORATION”

    […]

    SECTION III – GENERAL PROVISIONS

    3. Subject to the law and regulations, any person has the right to use the public transportation system of the Company in comfort and safety.

    Subsection I – Citizenship

    4. In or on a building or rolling stock, no person shall

    (a) impede or hinder the free movement of persons, including standing still, lurking, strolling, laying down or carrying a bag, container or other object;

    (b) endanger the safety of persons or rolling stock, in particular by depositing or carrying a bag, container or other object;

    […]

    e) to disobey a directive or pictogram posted by the Society;

    […]

    h) to delay or interfere with the work of a servant of the Corporation; “

    But according to the STM staff, it is not the potential safety infraction that led to Bela Kosoian being arrested. Rather, it was her refusal to identity herself when being written a ticket.

    In August 2015, a Quebec Court rejected the claim. It stated that the officers acted reasonably, and that the situation was largely self-inflicted

    (3) Motion for Leave, Quebec Court of Appeal
    Kosoian sought leave to go to the Quebec Court of Appeal.

    On December 2015, in an extremely brief ruling, the Quebec Court of Appeal allowed the appeal to proceed, dismissing a motion from the Respondents.

    (4) Appeal, Quebec Court of Appeal
    In a 2-1 split decision, Kosoian lost her appeal at the Quebec Court of Appeals. 2 Justices ruled that the STM and its staff had acted reasonably. In dissent, the other Justice says he would have set aside the Trial ruling, and ordered $15,000 in damages.

    [ 1 ] The appellant appeals against a judgment rendered on August 11, 2015, by the Court of Quebec, District of Laval (the Honorable Denis Le Reste), dismissing the appellant’s motion to institute damages for damages .
    [ 2 ] For the reasons of Dutil and Vauclair JJ., THE COURT :
    [ 3 ] REJECTS the appeal with court costs.
    [ 4 ] For other reasons, Schrager JA would have allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment at trial, granted the motion to institute proceedings, ordered the respondents, jointly and severally, to pay the appellant the sum of 15,000 $ with interest and the additional indemnity since the summons at first instance, as well as legal costs at first instance and on appeal, and stated that between the respondents, the Montreal Transit Corporation will have to assume the entire conviction.

    (5) Supreme Court of Canada
    This leads things to where they are today. Once again, the Supreme Court granting leave to appeal just now.

    The motion for an extension of time and the application for leave to appeal is granted. The application for leave to appeal to the judgment of theCourt of Appeal of Quebec (Montreal), Number 500-09-025644-154, 2017 QCCA 1919 (CanLII) , date December 5, 2017, is awarded with costs in the case. The schedule for serving and filing materials will be set by the Registrar .

    An interesting split so far in the courts. In Kosoian’s favour:
    -Supreme Court of Canada, leave to appeal
    -Quebec Court of appeal, dissenting opinion
    -Quebec Court of Appeal, motion for leave

    And against Kosoian:
    -Quebec Court of Appeal, majority opinion
    -Quebec Trial Court
    -Laval ruling which dismissed the original tickets.

    Personally, I see blame on both sides here. While ticketing her for refusing to hold a handrail does seem excessive, the escalation of the problems resulted from Kosoian herself. She did refuse to identify herself when being ticketed, which for the STM was a legitimate demand. Also, her claims of emotional and psychological damages seem grossly exaggerated, and manipulated to seek a huge damages amount.

    The Supreme Court Appeal Panel will now decide the case.

    Posted on

    Weaponizing the Human Rights Codes and Refugee Boards

    (This is criminal, not civil, but enjoy anyway)

    ***********************************************************************
    The full text for UN Global Migration Compact is RIGHT HERE.

    Please sign this: PETITION E-1906 CLICK HERE
    ***********************************************************************

    Need some extra cash? Don’t feel like working hard? Well, here at CanuckLaw, we have the solution for you.

    Simply make some vague claim about: (a) being offended; (b) having hurt feelings; (c) loss of self confidence, and you will be well on your way to making your next year’s salary virtually overnight.

    Need that new sports car? Or have a girlfriend with really expensive taste? Now you don’t have to feel like a cheapskate. Just file a human rights complaint, and that cash is as good as yours. Just appear before the tribunal and cry up a storm.

    In court, you will be forced to ”prove damages” and likely ”hire a lawyer”. Not the case here. Just say you are offended, and the Province will pick up your tab. The slimy accused will still have to pay his bill though.

    And if you want to come to Canada, but don’t qualify, then just claim to be oppressed and fearful of persecution. And since it’s all in your head, no proof necessary.

    All joking aside, the Provincial Human Rights Tribunals are in fact a very lucrative way to cash in. We will explain here.

    One interesting case, is Sanford v. Koop, 2005 HRTO 53 (CanLII) at paras. 34-38. CLICK HERE for a link to it. It sets out a disturbingly vague, yet extensive list which people can get extra money under. Although this is Ontario, other provinces have very similar guidelines. From paragraph 35:

    [35] The Commission provided a number of cases which set out the criteria to be used in assessing the appropriate quantum of general damages. These factors include:

    • Humiliation experienced by the complainant
    • Hurt feelings experienced by the complainant
    • A complainant’s loss of self-respect
    • A complainant’s loss of dignity
    • A complainant’s loss of self-esteem
    • A complainant’s loss of confidence
    • The experience of victimization
    • Vulnerability of the complainant
    • The seriousness, frequency and duration of the offensive treatment

    See: Baylis-Flannery v. DeWilde (No.2) (2003), 48 C.H.R.R. D/197 (total general damages of $35,000); Arias v. Desai, (No.2) (2003) 45 C.H.H.R. D/308 (HRTO) (total general damages of $25,000); Curling v. Torimiro (No.4) (2000), 38 C.H.R.R. D/216 (Ont. Bd. Inq.) (total general damages of $21,000); Ketola v. Value Propane Inc. (No. 2), (2002), 44 C.H.H.R.R. D/37 (Ont. Bd. Inq.) (total award of $20,000 for general damages and mental anguish); deSouza v. Gauthier (2002), 43 C.H.R.R. D/128 (Ont. Bd. Inq.) (total award of $25,000 for general damages and mental anguish)

    [36] The Tribunal accepts the submissions of the Commission. Considering the evidence in this matter, and the similarity of the facts in this case with the facts in the cases cited by the Commission, the Tribunal awards $25,000 in general damages.
    Damages for Mental Anguish for the Reckless and Wilful Infringement of the Complainant’s Rights

    [37] Pursuant to Section 41(1)(b) of the Code the Tribunal may award damages of up to $10,000 for mental anguish, injury to dignity, feelings and pride, where such infringement has been engaged in wilfully or recklessly.

    [38] The Commission identified the factors used to assess mental anguish damages pursuant to Section 41(1)(b):

    Yes, you are reading that correctly: having hurt feelings can get you lots of money, according to the Ontario Human Rights Tribunal. In fact, they even give a price range.

    Prospective Canadians: now, if waiting years, spending money, and doing paperwork are not your thing, don’t worry. Just hop a place to the U.S. with a tourist visa,seen here, walk across the Canadian border, and get yourself detained. Free housing, food and medical care while you wait for your claim.

    Immigration and Refugee Boards (IRB) and Human Rights Tribunals (HRT) are clogged with bogus cases. In fact, a quick search reveals thousands, and those are just the ones that are published. Here are some cases pulled at random.

    (1) CLICK HERE for an attempt to silence speech critical of Islam.

    (2) CLICK HERE for getting a job in a restaurant, then refusing to do it later based on religious grounds.

    (3) CLICK HERE for a funny one, taking action against each other for discrimination.

    (4) CLICK HERE for a member of the Islamic Salvation Front wanting refugee status.

    (5) CLICK HERE for a claim that asking a prospective tenant for a 12 month lease is discrimination.

    (6) CLICK HERE for a member of Hamas (a terrorist group), wanting to be declared a refugee.

    (7) CLICK HERE for an unsubstantiated claim of fear of safety.

    (8) CLICK HERE for a member of the Students Islamic Movement of India, with at least 6 arrests, wanting asylum based on persecution.

    (9) CLICK HERE for a woman seeking asylum due to an interfaith marriage gone wrong (Islam and Hindu)

    (10) CLICK HERE for a blind man being denied to bring his guide dog due to cab driver’s religion.

    (11) CLICK HERE for a judicial review (and a well cited case) of an asylum decision.

    (12) CLICK HERE for taking Rebel Media to he cleaners for offering commentary deemed offensive.

    (13) CLICK HERE for a claim about saying mean words to someone.

    http://canlii.org is a free site, available to anyone. You can do actual legal research from here, and research decisions from all over the country. Thing is, no lawyer is necessary.