Public Health Agency Of Canada Created As Branch Of WHO; Bill C-12 PHAC Act

This will sound controversial, but PHAC, the Public Health Agency of Canada, is essentially a branch of the World Health Organization. It’s therefore logical that Theresa Tam (or whoever that person is), would actually hold dual roles.

From 2004 to 2006, there were a few significant developments in Canadian politics. The effects of which would finally be felt in 2020, with this fake “pandemic”.

(1) Creation of Public Health Agency of Canada by Order In Council
(2) International Health Regulations, 3rd Edition, Take Effect
(3) Passing of Quarantine Act, based on WHO-IHR
(4) Passing of PHAC Act, giving the Agency real teeth

These events are connected. The 2005 Quarantine Act is domestic implementation of the International Health Regulations. The Provincial Health Acts are derivatives of that. PHAC is a branch of WHO that masquerades as part of the Canadian Government. It was created to fulfill obligations under WHO-IHR.

Far from being a rogue administration, this was advanced by successive Liberal and Conservative Governments. Maybe one of the reasons the Canadian media spent so much time on the Paul Martin/Stephen Harper drama was to divert attention from what was really going on. It may also explain why Erin O’Toole is so blase about martial law being imposed these days.

1. Timeline: PHAC Act/Quarantine Act/IHR 3rd Ed

  • Jan 23, 2004 – WHO decides to update IHR
  • 2004 to 2005 – WHO begins process of creating IHR 3rd Edition
  • Sept 23, 2004 – OIC 2004-1068, amend Financial Administration Act
  • Sept 23, 2004 – OIC 2004-1070, amend PS Staff Relations Act
  • Sept 23, 2004 – OIC 2004-1071, amend Public Service Employment Act
  • Sept 23, 2004 – OIC 2004-1072/1073, amend Privacy Act
  • Sept 23, 2004 – OIC 2004-1074/1075, amend Access To Info Act
  • Sept 23, 2004 – OIC 2004-1076, amend CSIS Act
  • Sept 23, 2004 – OIC 2004-1076, amend Auditor General Act
  • Oct 8, 2004 – 1st Reading of Quarantine Act
  • Oct 26, 2004 – 2nd Reading of Quarantine Act
  • Oct 28, 2004 – Parliamentary Hearing of Quarantine Act
  • Nov 4 2004 – Parliamentary Hearing of Quarantine Act
  • Nov 18, 2004 – Parliamentary Hearing of Quarantine Act
  • Nov 23, 2004 – Parliamentary Hearing of Quarantine Act
  • Nov 25, 2004 – Parliamentary Hearing of Quarantine Act
  • Dec 7, 2004 – Parliamentary Hearing of Quarantine Act
  • Dec 7, 2004 – Parliamentary Hearing of Quarantine Act
  • Dec 8, 2004 – Parliamentary Hearing of Quarantine Act
  • Feb 10, 2005 – 3rd Reading of Quarantine Act
  • Feb 10, 2005 – 1st Reading of Quarantine Act (Senate)
  • Mar 9, 2005 – 2nd Reading of Quarantine Act (Senate)
  • Apr 14, 2005 – 3rd Reading of Quarantine Act (Senate)
  • May 13, 2005 – Royal Assent of Quarantine Act
  • May 8, 2006 – 2nd Reading of PHAC Act Passed in HoC
  • May 11, 2006 – Parliamentary Hearing on PHAC Act
  • May 16, 2006 – Parliamentary Hearing on PHAC Act
  • June 20, 2006 – 3rd Reading of PHAC Act Passed in HoC
  • June 20, 2006 – 1st Reading of PHAC Act (Senate)
  • June 28, 2006 – 2nd Reading of PHAC Act (Senate)
  • Nov 3, 2006 – 3rd Reading of PHAC Act (Senate)
  • Dec 12, 2006 – Royal Assent of PHAC Act
  • Dec 15, 2006 – OIC 2006-1587, PHAC Act Active

2. PHAC Is Canada’s “Focal Point” For IHR

Article 4 Responsible authorities
1. Each State Party shall designate or establish a National IHR Focal Point and the authorities responsible within its respective jurisdiction for the implementation of health measures under these Regulations.
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2. National IHR Focal Points shall be accessible at all times for communications with the WHO IHR Contact Points provided for in paragraph 3 of this Article. The functions of National IHR Focal Points shall include:
(a) sending to WHO IHR Contact Points, on behalf of the State Party concerned, urgent communications concerning the implementation of these Regulations, in particular under Articles 6 to 12; and
(b) disseminating information to, and consolidating input from, relevant sectors of the administration of the State Party concerned, including those responsible for surveillance and reporting, points of entry, public health services, clinics and hospitals and other government departments.
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3. WHO shall designate IHR Contact Points, which shall be accessible at all times for communications with National IHR Focal Points. WHO IHR Contact Points shall send urgent communications concerning the implementation of these Regulations, in particular under Articles 6 to 12, to the National IHR Focal Point of the States Parties concerned. WHO IHR Contact Points may be designated by WHO at the headquarters or at the regional level of the Organization.
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4. States Parties shall provide WHO with contact details of their National IHR Focal Point and WHO shall provide States Parties with contact details of WHO IHR Contact Points. These contact details shall be continuously updated and annually confirmed. WHO shall make available to all States Parties the contact details of National IHR Focal Points it receives pursuant to this Article.

IHR 3rd Edition Full Text 2005 (See highlighted version)

The 2005 Edition of the International Health Regulations specifies that each State Party (which is each country) shall establish a “focal point”. These points shall be responsible for implementing the Regulations, and answer to WHO.

And who is that focal point? The Public Health Agency of Canada. It was created specifically for the purpose of implementing WHO’s directives on global public health.

Who better to head PHAC than Theresa Tam? This person acted in a 2010 film supporting martial law, and already works for WHO anyway.

3. Timeline Of PHAC/IHR Implemented

January 19 to 23, 2004, at the 113th Session of the Executive Board of the World Health Organization, it was decided that the International Health Regulations were to receive an updated edition. See here, here and the archive.

Mr AISTON (Canada) said that the International Health Regulations were a key component of Canada’s approach to the management and containment of communicable diseases, and also central to the role and function of WHO. The approach proposed was good: while a case could be made for accelerating the process, revision required careful consideration and the timetable put forward was therefore probably realistic. Having been a participant in the negotiations on the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, he suggested that the process should be concluded in one or two negotiating sessions at most. Canada was preparing a domestic approach to the revision of the International Health Regulations and would keep WHO informed of developments.

Page 41 starts to address proposed changes to the IHR, and states that it was widely supported by Member States. There seems to be no concern with just how much sovereignty is given up.

In fact, discussions for what changes to make to the International Health Regulations continued throughout 2004, and into 2005. That’s when things started to happen in Canada, although this was not discussed publicly.

In September 2004, a series of Orders In Council were signed to retroactively include the Public Health Agency of Canada into existing legislation. PHAC was also a recent creation that had not yet received any sort of legislative legitimacy. That would later change.

This is not some conspiracy theory. In fact, PHAC itself writes “was created in 2004 in response to growing concerns about the capacity of Canada’s public health system to anticipate and respond effectively to public health threats”. This is posted on its own website. It’s under the section titled WHY WAS THE AGENCY CREATED?

PHAC’s creation was in part of the larger Federal Strategy. Part of that (Pillar 3) promoted the idea of a Pan-Canadian Public Health Network. “Pan-Canadian” seems to be a euphemism for global.

October 8, 2004, just 2 weeks later, Bill C-12 was introduced into the House of Commons. This was the Quarantine Act, and was to be based on the World Health Organization’s regulations. By the end of October, it had passed Second Reading and was before the HESA Committee.

The November 4 hearing, the second hearing, is quite an interesting one. Below are quotes from the transcript of that session.

The Quarantine Act is passed in 2005, and the 3rd Edition of IHR took effect that year. In 2006, “Conservative” Prime Minister Stephen Harper brings in the PHAC Act, to give some legislative legitimacy to PHAC.

4. Bill C-12, Quarantine Act, IHR Implementation

[Page 5]
Mr. Colin Carrie: I have a question about Canada’s quarantine laws. Are we in touch with the World Health Organization and other international organizations? If there’s an outbreak, can we have any influence on quarantining people in other areas, or vice versa, the sharing of information in that way?
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Dr. Paul Gully: During an outbreak we certainly would communicate with the countries involved. During SARS we had close collaboration with the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, for example, as required, to share intelligence. In terms of utilization of their legislation, such as quarantine acts, we feel that our relationship with WHO, which is closer, and also clarification of WHO’s powers under the international health regulations will, I think, further ensure there is consistency in terms of response from individual member states as a result of that. Does that answer your question?
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Mr. Colin Carrie: Yes.
Are you aware of international standards for quarantine?
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Dr. Paul Gully: The international health regulations would be the regulations that individual states would then use to design their quarantine acts. I don’t know of any other standards out there or best practices to look at quarantine acts, but the IHRs really have been used over the years as the starting point. Now, with the improvement of the international health regulations, maybe, as is the case in Canada, changes will occur to quarantine acts in other countries in order to better comply with the international health regulations.

[Page 6]
The Chair: Madam Demers.
[Translation]
Ms. Nicole Demers (Laval, BQ): Madam Chair, my colleague made a reference earlier to international agreements. This is also one of my concerns. You will recall that the fundamental principle established at the First International Sanitary Conference in 1951 was to ensure maximum protection combined with a minimum number of restrictions. This principle still holds sway today. I’m certainly concerned about our future course of action.

[Page 8]
Mrs. Carol Skelton: Why did Health Canada proceed with a separate Quarantine Act at this time?
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Dr. Paul Gully: Those of us who administered the Quarantine Act over the years always knew there were deficiencies in the old act, and because it was rarely used there wasn’t the inclination to update it. As a result of SARS and utilization of the act, which certainly put it under close scrutiny, and the requirement for the Government of
Canada to respond to the various reports on SARS, it was felt that updating the act sooner rather than later was appropriate. In addition, during discussions about the international health regulations of the World Health Organization, it was felt that it was appropriate to do it and to spend time and energy, which it obviously does require, to do it now, before other parts of legislative renewal, of which Mr. Simard is well aware, were further implemented or further discussion was carried out.

[Page 8]
Mrs. Carol Skelton: I would appreciate that, please. We talked at a previous committee meeting about the newly
created Public Health Agency of Canada. Bill C-12 gives authority to the Minister of Health, with no mention at all of the Chief Public Health Officer. Is there any connection between Bill C-12 and the Public Health Agency headed by our Chief Public Health Officer?
.
Dr. Paul Gully: The minister has the powers and can delegate those powers. The responsibility for the Quarantine Act is a responsibility of the Public Health Agency, which is headed by the Chief Public Health Officer. In effect, the Chief Public Health Officer has responsibility for the act under the minister, because there are certain powers, obviously, that the minister will delegate to the Chief Public Health Officer.

[Page 9]
Ms. Ruby Dhalla: I have one question. In terms of the Quarantine Act for our country, where are we at in terms of best practices models when we look at the international spectrum?
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Dr. Paul Gully: I don’t know the acts in other countries, but because we are updating our act right now and we’re taking into account the probable revisions to the international health regulations, I believe we would be well in the forefront in terms of having modern legislation.

From the November 4, 2004 Parliamentary Hearings. Bill C-12, the 2005 Quarantine Act, was written as to accommodate anticipated changes in the International Health Regulations. As is spelled out, compliance is mandatory.

It also becomes clear that the newly created Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC), will be responsible for carrying out actions in accordance with the Quarantine Act. Keep in mind, in 2004, PHAC had been created by Order In Council. There was no legislative basis for it yet.

5. Bill C-5: Public Health Agency Of Canada Act

WHEREAS the Government of Canada wishes to take public health measures, including measures relating to health protection and promotion, population health assessment, health surveillance, disease and injury prevention, and public health emergency preparedness and response;
WHEREAS the Government of Canada wishes to foster collaboration within the field of public health and to coordinate federal policies and programs in the area of public health;
WHEREAS the Government of Canada wishes to promote cooperation and consultation in the field of public health with provincial and territorial governments;
WHEREAS the Government of Canada also wishes to foster cooperation in that field with foreign governments and international organizations, as well as other interested persons or organizations;
AND WHEREAS the Government of Canada considers that the creation of a public health agency for Canada and the appointment of a Chief Public Health Officer will contribute to federal efforts to identify and reduce public health risk factors and to support national readiness for public health threats;

PUBLIC HEALTH AGENCY OF CANADA
Establishment
3. The Public Health Agency of Canada is established for the purpose of assisting the Minister in exercising or performing the Minister’s powers, duties and functions in relation to public health.

Qualifications required
(2) The Chief Public Health Officer shall be a health professional who has qualifications in the field of public health.
Lead health professional
7. (1) The Chief Public Health Officer is the lead health professional of the Government of Canada in relation to public health.
Communication with governments, public health authorities and organizations
(2) The Chief Public Health Officer may, with respect to public health issues, communicate with governments, public health author-ities or organizations in the public health field, within Canada or internationally.
Communication with the public, voluntary organizations and the private sector
(3) The Chief Public Health Officer may communicate with the public, voluntary organizations in the public health field or the private sector for the purpose of providing information, or seeking their views, about public health issues.

PHAC was created for the purpose of promoting public health, and it serves as a required “focal point” for Canada to fulfill its obligations under the International Health Regulations and the Quarantine Act.

Having Theresa Tam as both the Public Health Officer of Canada and working for the World Health Organization actually makes sense. PHAC effectively acts as a branch of WHO.

PHAC exists to serve a UN function.

6. Government Openly Admits PHAC Is WHO Outpost

How Canada meets its obligations under the IHR
As a signatory to the IHR, Canada is committed to help strengthen global health security. We build capacities to detect, assess, report and respond to public health events here at home and abroad.

Canada has confirmed its ability to meet these public health core capacity requirements under the IHR through the following activities: (a) monitoring and evaluation (such as the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) process)
real-life events; (b) emergency preparedness and response exercises; and (c) Collaboration efforts between federal departments and with provincial and territorial partners improve and strengthen our country’s public health preparedness and response system.

Canada has also established a National IHR Focal Point (NFP), which is required under IHR Article 4 (Responsible authorities). The NFP supports IHR-related communications between Canadian public health authorities, WHO, its regional office in the Americas (care of the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO)) and other countries.

Implementing the IHR in Canada
In Canada, the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) is the lead organization for implementing the IHR. PHAC is also Canada’s designated National IHR Focal Point (NFP). As the NFP, PHAC coordinates the implementation of the IHR on behalf of the Government of Canada.

IHR activities are a shared responsibility. This means that Canada’s Health Portfolio, other federal departments and provincial/territorial governments support IHR implementation.

Canada implements the IHR under existing legislation, regulations, policies and agreements in place at both the federal and provincial/territorial levels.

The success of IHR implementation in Canada relies on ongoing collaboration by all partners to carry out surveillance, reporting, notification, verification, response and collaboration activities: (a) across the country and (b) at international points of entry (airports, ports and ground crossings)

Because legislation differs among federal and provincial/territorial governments, Canada has mechanisms, agreements and plans in place that enable national coordination. This is particularly important during public health emergencies that require federal involvement.

It’s hardly a conspiracy theory when Ottawa openly admits that PHAC serves as the “focal point” for WHO, and to implement the International Health Regulations.

PREVIOUS CANUCK LAW POSTS
(1) WHO International Health Regulations Legally Binding
(2) A Look At International Health Regulation Statements
(3) Quarantine Act Actually Written By WHO, IHR Changes
(4) Provincial Health Acts Domestic Implementation Of WHO-IHR
(5) Provincial Health Acts Domestic Implementation Of WHO-IHR, Part II
(6) World Health Treaty Proposed, Based On WHO-IHR

WHO/INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS
(1) 113th Session Of World Health Org Executive, January 2004
(2) 113th Session World Health Organization Jaunary 2004
(3) https://apps.who.int/gb/ghs/pdf/A_IHR_IGWG_1-en.pdf
(4) WHO September 2 2004 IHR Meeting
(5) https://apps.who.int/gb/ghs/e/e-igwg.html
(6) https://archive.is/kexzW
(7) https://www.canada.ca/en/public-health/corporate/mandate/about-agency/history.html
(8) https://www.canada.ca/en/public-health/corporate/mandate/about-agency/federal-strategy.html
(9) WHO 113th Session Revise The IHR
(10) WHO IHR 3rd Edition Full Text 2005 MARKED

PUBLIC HEALTH AGENCY OF CANADA ACT (BILL C-5)
(1) https://orders-in-council.canada.ca/
(2) https://openparliament.ca/bills/39-1/C-5/?page=2
(3) https://www.parl.ca/LegisInfo/BillDetails.aspx?Language=E&billId=2162144&View=5
(4) https://parl.ca/DocumentViewer/en/39-1/bill/C-5/first-reading
(5) HESA Committee Study On Bill C-5
(6) May 11 2006 HESA Transcript PHAC Act
(7) May 16 2006 HESA Transcript PHAC Act

QUARANTINE ACT (BILL C-12)
(1) https://www.parl.ca/LegisInfo/BillDetails.aspx?Language=E&billId=1395913
(2) https://www.ourcommons.ca/Committees/en/HESA/StudyActivity?studyActivityId=981075
(3) https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/38-1/HESA/report-2/
(4) Canada Quarantine Act Oct 28 Hearing
(5) Canada Quarantine Act Nov 4 Hearing
(6) Canada Quarantine Act Nov 18 Hearing
(7) Canada Quarantine Act Nov 23 Hearing
(8) Canada Quarantine Act Nov 25 Hearing
(9) Canada Quarantine Act Dec 7 First Hearing
(10) Canada Quarantine Act Dec 7 Second Hearing
(11) Canada Quarantine Act Dec 8 Hearing

The University Of Toronto, Ontario Science Table Monopoly On “Public Health” In Ontario

Ever get the impression that there is way too much group think in “public health” in Ontario? That could be because so many of them have ties to one institution: the University of Toronto.

About the Science Table
The Ontario COVID-19 Science Advisory Table is a group of scientific experts and health system leaders who evaluate and report on emerging evidence relevant to the COVID-19 pandemic, to inform Ontario’s response.
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The Science Table’s mandate is to provide weekly summaries of relevant scientific evidence for the COVID-19 Health Coordination Table of the Province of Ontario, integrating information from existing scientific tables, Ontario’s universities and agencies, and the best global evidence. The Science Table summarizes its findings for the Health Coordination Table and for the public in Science Briefs.
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The Science Table is an independent group, hosted by the Dalla Lana School of Public Health. There is no compensation for serving on the Science Table. However, the Scientific Director and the Secretariat are funded by the Dalla Lana School of Public Health and Public Health Ontario.

Interesting, the Ontario Science Table claims to be “independent”, yet it also has a mandate to provide health information for the Province of Ontario. How independent can they really be? And even if there isn’t direct compensation, are they expecting favours later? Political favours?

https://covid19-sciencetable.ca/about/
https://www.ontariosunshinelist.com/positions/twbpm

  • Adalsteinn Brown, Co-Chair, Dean, Dalla Lana School of Public Health, University of Toronto Senior Fellow, Massey College
  • Brian Schwartz, Co-Chair, Vice-President, Public Health Ontario, Associate Professor, Department of Family and Community Medicine and Dalla Lana School of Public Health, University of Toronto
  • Peter Jüni, Scientific Director, Professor of Medicine and Epidemiology, Department of Medicine and Institute of Health Policy, Management and Evaluation, University of Toronto, Director, Applied Health Research Centre, Li Ka Shing Knowledge Institute, St. Michael’s Hospital
  • Upton Allen, Professor of Paediatrics, University of Toronto
  • Vanessa Allen, Assistant Professor, Department of Laboratory Medicine and Pathobiology, University of Toronto, Chief, Microbiology and Laboratory Science, Public Health Ontario, Medical Director, Provincial COVID-19 Diagnostic Network, Ontario Health, Clinical Consultant, Infectious Diseases, Sunnybrook Health Sciences Centre
  • Laura Desveaux, Scientific Lead, Institute for Better Health; Learning Health System Program Lead, Trillium Health Partners; Innovation Fellow, Institute for Health System Solutions and Virtual Care, Women’s College Hospital; Assistant Professor, Institute of Health Policy, Management and Evaluation, University of Toronto; Executive Director, Women Who Lead
  • David Fisman, Professor of Epidemiology, Dalla Lana School of Public Health, University of Toronto
  • Jennifer Gibson, Director, Joint Centre for Bioethics, University of Toronto, Sun Life Financial Chair in Bioethics, Associate Professor, Institute of Health Policy, Management and Evaluation, Dalla Lana School of Public Health University of Toronto
  • Anna Greenberg, Vice President, Health System Performance, Health Quality Ontario Adjunct Lecturer, Institute of Health Policy Management and Evaluation, University of Toronto
  • Michael Hillmer, Assistant Deputy Minister, Capacity Planning and Analytics Division, Ministries of Health and Long-Term Care, Assistant Professor, Institute for Health Policy, Management, and Evaluation, University of Toronto
  • Jessica Hopkins, Deputy Chief, Health Protection, Public Health Ontario, Assistant Professor (part-time), Department of Health Research Methods, Evidence, and Impact, McMaster University, Adjunct Lecturer, Dalla Lana School of Public Health, University of Toronto
  • Audrey Laporte, Professor and Director, Institute of Health Policy, Management and Evaluation, University of Toronto, Director, Canadian Centre for Health Economics
  • Linda Mah, Associate Professor of Psychiatry, Division of Geriatric Psychiatry, Faculty of Medicine, University of Toronto, Associate Member, Institute of Medical Science, Faculty of Medicine, University of Toronto
  • Allison McGeer, Microbiologist and Infectious Disease Consultant, Mount Sinai Hospital, Professor, Department of Laboratory Medicine and Pathobiology, Dalla Lana School of Public Health, University of Toronto
  • David McKeown, Associate Chief Medical Officer of Health, Ontario Ministry of Health, Adjunct Professor, Clinical Public Health Division, University of Toronto
  • Andrew Morris, Professor, Infectious Diseases, University of Toronto; Director, Antimicrobial Stewardship Program, Sinai Health and University Health Network
  • Laveena Munshi, Assistant Professor, Clinician Investigator, Interdepartmental Division of Critical Care Medicine, Sinai Health System/University Health Network, University of Toronto
  • Kumar Murty, Director, Fields Institute for Research in Mathematical Sciences, Professor of Mathematics, University of Toronto
  • Samir Patel, Deputy Chief, Microbiology, Public Health Ontario, Clinical Microbiologist, Public Health Ontario
    Associate Professor, Department of Laboratory Medicine and Pathobiology, University of Toronto
  • Fahad Razak, Internist and Assistant Professor, St. Michael’s Hospital, University of Toronto, Assistant Professor, Institute of Health Policy, Management and Evaluation, University of Toronto, Research Scientist, Li Ka Shing Knowledge Institute, Provincial Lead, Quality Improvement in General Internal Medicine, Ontario Health
  • Robert Reid, Chief Scientist, Trillium Health Partners, Professor (status), Institute for Health Policy, Management & Evaluation, University of Toronto, Professor (part-time), Health Research Methods, Evidence and Impact, McMaster University, Affiliate Associate Professor, Health Services, University of Washington
  • Paula Rochon, Senior Scientist and Geriatrician Women’s College Hospital; Professor, Division of Geriatric Medicine, Faculty of Medicine and Dalla Lana School of Public Health, University of Toronto; RTOERO Chair in Geriatric Medicine, University of Toronto.
  • Beate Sander, Canada Research Chair in Economics of Infectious Diseases, Scientist and Director, Population Health Economics Research, University Health Network, Director, Health Modeling and Health Economics, Toronto Health Economics and Technology Assessment collaborative, Associate Professor and Faculty Co-Lead Health Technology Assessment program, Institute of Health Policy, Management and Evaluation, University of Toronto
  • Michael Schull, CEO and Senior Core Scientist, ICES Professor and Clinician-Scientist, Department of Medicine, University of Toronto, Senior Scientist, Evaluative Clinical Sciences, Sunnybrook Research Institute, Professor, Institute of Health Policy, Management and Evaluation, University of Toronto
  • Arjumand Siddiqi, Associate Professor and Division Head of Epidemiology, University of Toronto Canada Research Chair in Population Health Equity
  • Arthur Slutsky, Scientist, St. Michael’s Hospital, Unity Health Toronto, Professor of Medicine, Surgery and Biomedical Engineering, University of Toronto
  • Janet Smylie, Professor, Dalla Lana School of Public Health and Department of Family and Community Medicine, Faculty of Medicine, University of Toronto
  • Tania Watts, Professor of Immunology, University of Toronto
  • Nathan Stall, Eliot Phillipson Clinician-Scientist Training Program and the Division of Geriatric Medicine, Department of Medicine, University of Toronto
  • Robert Steiner, Management and Evaluation Director, Dalla Lana Fellowship in Global Journalism, Dalla Lana School of Public Health, University of Toronto
  • Antonina Maltsev, MPH Epidemiology Student, Dalla Lana School of Public Health, University of Toronto
  • Karen Born, Senior Research Associate, Assistant Professor, University of Toronto
  • Gerald Lebovic, Assistant Professor, Institute of Health Policy Management and Evaluation, University of Toronto
  • Justin Morgenstern, Senior Research Associate, Assistant Professor, Department of Family and Community Medicine, University of Toronto
  • Ayodele Odutayo, Senior Research Associate, Resident Physician, University of Toronto
  • Pavlos Bobos, Pavlos Bobos is a professionally trained clinician (physiotherapy) and a clinical epidemiologist.
    His graduate studies were conducted at the Bone and Joint Institute at Western University and the Dalla Lana School of Public Health at University of Toronto.
  • Yoojin Choi, Research Associate, PhD Candidate, Department of Immunology, University of Toronto Course Instructor, Institute of Medical Science, University of Toronto
  • Roisin McElroy, Research Associate, Emergency Medicine Physician, St. Joseph’s Health Centre, Unity Health Toronto, Lecturer, Department of Family and Community Medicine, University of Toronto
  • Ashini Weerasinghe, an epidemiologist within the Health Promotion, Chronic Disease and Injury Prevention Program at Public Health Ontario. She holds a master’s degree in epidemiology from the Dalla Lana School of Public Health at the University of Toronto
  • Diana Yan, Research Associate, HBSc Data Science & Pharmacology Student, University of Toronto

That is the “Science Table” Covid-19 Advisory For Ontario. The above list isn’t everyone, but a lot of them. They all have ties to the same institution. But what about these “medical experts” demanding lockdowns? Surely, they have some more variety to them.

Barbara Yaffe – Ontario Deputy Medical Officer
Eileen De Villa – Toronto Chief Medical Officer
Vinita Dubey – Toronto Associate Medical Officer of Health
Lisa Berger – Toronto Associate Medical Officer of Health
Christine Navarro – Toronto Associate Medical Officer of Health
Avis Lynn Noseworthy – Medical Officer of Health for the Haliburton, Kawartha, Pine Ridge
Vera Etches – Ottawa Deputy Medical Officer of Health
Brent Moloughney – Ottawa Associate Medical Officer
Lawrence C. Loh – Peel Medical Officer of Health
Hamidah Meghani – Halton Region Medical Health Officer
Nicola Mercer – Wellington-Dufferin-Guelph Medical Officer (UofT Medical School)
Mustafa Hirji – Niagara Acting Medical Officer of Health (U of T graduate)
Elizabeth Richardson – Hamilton Medical Officer of Health (U of T graduate)

Seeing any pattern here? A lot of them have connections to the same place. It can’t all be a giant coincidence. For more background information on Barbara Yaffe, check this earlier piece.

Who Is Ontario Deputy Medical Officer Barbara Yaffe?

The now infamous clip of Barbara Yaffe telling Ontario that these testing methods can result in 50% false positives. Amazingly, she has never faced real scrutiny from this.

It’s interesting how little information is available on Yaffe, considering she has been in a position of power for years. In some ways, this looks like another Theresa Tam.

https://www.linkedin.com/in/barbara-yaffe-b5395111/
https://archive.is/eaKt7
https://doctors.cpso.on.ca/DoctorDetails/Barbara-Ann-Yaffe/0026394-31217
https://opengovca.com/ontario-employee/Yaffe,_Barbara
https://mds.servicerating.ca/office/p-a-rostas-medicine-professional-corporation
https://academic.oup.com/pch/article/5/6/319/2655770?login=true
Canadian Journal Of Public Health
https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMoa032111
https://academic.oup.com/cid/article/62/2/139/2462731?login=true
https://www.dlsph.utoronto.ca/faculty-profile/yaffe-barbara/
https://www.dlsph.utoronto.ca/faculty-profile/de-villa-eileen/
https://www.dlsph.utoronto.ca/faculty-profile/moloughney-brent/
CIHR Grants To Conduct Modelling, Other Research (2020)
Ottawa Announcing Grants For CV-19 Research
UofT “Modellers” Getting More Taxpayer Money (2021)
April 17, 2020 Memo To Ontario Doctors
National Collaborating Centre For Infectious Diseases
U of Toronto, McMaster Claim To Have Isolated Covid-19
Fluoride Free Peel On UofT Virus Isolation

Barbara Yaffe is more than just on the “Sunshine List” for Ontario. She’s taking in over $250,000 per year, plus a generous benefits program, courtesy of taxpayers. That’s in addition to the money she gets moonlighting as a Professor for the University of Toronto. For that kind of money, one would hope that the Province is getting a skilled professional. However, her work history isn’t all that impressive.

Yaffe is also part of the NCCID, which aims on implementing aspects of public health into all areas of life. She is a Member, and on the Advisory Board. However, it’s unclear what, if anything, she actually does.

Yaffe is still 1 of 2 registered shareholders of P.A. Rostas Medicine Professional Corporation, which “appears” to be a medical practice set up in 2008, but no information is available about it.

Not only is Yaffe paid quite well, it appears that the entire upper echelon of Ontario Health is making great salaries. Seems none of them have lost jobs, or been forced onto EI or CERB.

Keep in mind, Yaffe blurted out last December that she “only says what they write down for [her]”. This suggests she is little more than a puppet for the political masters. As for her education, she’s a lifer at U of T.

1974 – University of Toronto, General Science
1978 – University of Toronto, Medical Degree
1981 – University of Toronto, Masters of Public Health
1983 – University of Minnesota, Epidemiology (online?)
1984 – University of Toronto, Fellowship in Public Health and Preventative Medicine

That’s from the LinkedIn page. The CPSO profile simply lists medical school in 1978, and a specialty in “Community Medicine” in 1984. Is the LinkedIn page fake? Or is the professional CPSO profile missing information? Anyhow, the “ABOUT” section on LinkedIn states:

I am a public health physician with over 30 years of experience working in local public health in Toronto, Ontario, both as a Medical Officer of Health and as an Associate MOH. My current position is Director of Communicable Disease Control and Associate MOH with Toronto Public Health. My areas of interest include the prevention and control of infectious diseases and emergency preparedness and response, but also much broader areas of public health. My work has increasingly focused on identifying and helping to address the unique needs of our diverse populations and communities – new immigrants/refugees, the homeless, drug users etc. My work involves collaboration with multiple stakeholders (local, provincial and national), advocacy, policy development and program implementation. I am interested in contributing to public health at a national and international level as possible.

If this is to be taken at face value, Yaffe has been a political operative in Ontario for over 30 years. This means she hasn’t actually practiced medicine much, if at all. Yaffe’s talent seems to be in helping write papers on the topic of population control measures. More can be found on Google Scholar. Here are a few of them.

In September 2000, Yaffe co-authored a paper for Oxford Academic that outlined measures should a terrorist attack happen in Canada. If it wasn’t predictive programming, it’s quite the coincidence.

In 2004, Sheela V. Basrur, Barbara Yaffe and Bonnie Henry wrote for the Canadian Journal of Public Health outlining the quarantine, contact tracing and restrictions of movement around SARS.

In 2004, Yaffe co-authored (along with Bonnie Henry) a piece in the New England Journal of Medicine called: Public Health Measures to Control the Spread of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome during the Outbreak in Toronto.

From the last 2004 SARS paper:

METHODS
We analyzed SARS case, quarantine, and hotline records in relation to control measures. The two phases of the outbreak were compared.
.
CONCLUSIONS
The transmission of SARS in Toronto was limited primarily to hospitals and to households that had had contact with patients. For every case of SARS, health authorities should expect to quarantine up to 100 contacts of the patients and to investigate 8 possible cases. During an outbreak, active in-hospital surveillance for SARS-like illnesses and heightened infection-control measures are essential.
.
QUARANTINE AND CALLS TO THE HOTLINE
During the outbreak, 23,103 contacts were identified as requiring quarantine (Figure 2). Of those in quarantine, 27 (0.1 percent) were issued a legally enforceable quarantine order owing to initial noncompliance. A breakdown of 316,615 calls to the Toronto Public Health SARS hotline is given in Table 1. The most common reason for calling was to discuss potential exposures.

Even back in 2003/2004, these public health officials were discussing and research details and methods related to quarantine and contact tracing. Not that it will ever be abused some day.

Yaffe is also an Associate Professor at the Dalla Lana School of Public Health at the University of Toronto. So is Eileen De Villa, Toronto Medical Health Officer. De Villa has her own backstory, as explained by Stormhaven and Diverge Media. Brent Moloughney is the Associate Medical Officer for Ottawa, and also a Dalla Lana Professor. Notice a trend?

In 2020, at least 9 people at the University of Toronto got grants from the CIHR, Canadian Institutes for Health Research, for Covid-19, some of it to conduct modelling.

  • Roy Gillis of the department of applied psychology and human development at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education: Responding to the stigma, fear, discrimination and misinformation related to the COVID-19 disease outbreak – a novel analyses and intervention for a novel coronavirus
  • Shaf Keshavjee of the department of surgery in the Faculty of Medicine and the University Health Network: Reducing the health-care resource burden from COVID-19 (SARS-CoV-2) –Rapid diagnostics to risk-stratify for severity of illness
  • Robert Maunder of the department of psychiatry in the Faculty of Medicine and Sinai Health System: Peer champion support for hospital health-care workers during and after a novel coronavirus outbreak: It’s a marathon, not a sprint
  • Vijaya Kumar Murty of the department of mathematics in the Faculty of Arts & Science and the Fields Institute for Research in Mathematical Sciences: Agent-based and multi-scale mathematical modelling of COVID-19 for assessments of sustained transmission risk and effectiveness of countermeasures
  • James Rini of the departments of biochemistry and molecular genetics in the Faculty of Medicine: Neutralizing antibodies as SARS-CoV-2 therapeutics
  • Simron Singh of the Dalla Lana School of Public Health and the department of medicine in the Faculty of Medicine and Sunnybrook Health Sciences Centre: Assessment of cancer patient and caregiver perspective on the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) and the impact on delivery of cancer care at an institution with a confirmed case of COVID-19
  • Darrell Tan of the Institute of Health Policy, Management and Evaluation at the Dalla Lana School of Public Health and department of medicine in the Faculty of Medicine and St. Michael’s Hospital: COVID-19 ring-based prevention trial for undermining spread (CORPUS)
  • Xiaolin Wei of the Institute of Health Policy, Management and Evaluation at the Dalla Lana School of Public Health: Developing integrated guidelines for health-care workers in hospital and primary health-care facilities in response to Covid-19 pandemic in low- and mddle-Income countries (LMICs)
  • Xiao-Yan Wen of the department of physiology in the Faculty of Medicine and St. Michael’s Hospital: Therapeutic development for COVID-19 coronavirus-induced sepsis and ARDS targeting vascular leakage

Even going back to March 2020, Ottawa was handing out money everywhere to conducting research on Covid-19. Overnight, it became a growth industry for researchers looking for work. The grants have continued into 2021.

This is nowhere near exhaustive, and a deeper dive will surely uncover far more grants being doled out.

Even as groups like the CIHR are shelling out money to conduct modelling and “response plans”, they are also funding efforts to convince people that vaccines are safe. A significant conflict of interest.

With lives at stake, and large amounts of taxpayer money, one would think that oversight and review mechanisms would be tighter.

Some of the research went to (at least allegedly) for isolating and purifying Covid-19. In fact, the University of Toronto proudly broadcast that achievement as a marvel of modern science. On March 13, 2020, a prominent article was posted on the University website.

While that sounds great, it doesn’t seem to withstand scrutiny. An organization called Fluoride Free Peel has been looking for proof isolation from all over the world. When presented with a freedom of information request, there were “no records available”. What happened? Was this contracted out to some 3rd party, or was there never any isolation to begin with?

The University of Toronto is receiving large amounts of money in the name of pandemic research. Barbara Yaffe (and Eileen De Villa), are both Faculty Members at U of T. At the same time, both are Medical Officers, with De Villa in Toronto, and Yaffe Provincially. They are able (at least in theory) to use their positions of power to prolong the narrative and keep and “pandemic bucks” going.

Last Spring, Health Minister Christine Elliott openly admitted that death “with the virus” are being conflated with deaths “from the virus”. The counting system is at best dysfunctional, and at worse, fruadulent. Moreover, Toronto Public Health made a similar admission and nothing came of it.

It really does go past the point of being absent minded. These medical experts have to be deliberately ignoring what is in front of their faces. More likely, they are fully complicit in perpetuating a hoax.

Yaffe seems to offer nothing productive about this “pandemic”, and only pushes continued medical tyranny. She’s never practiced as a doctor (unless it’s well hidden) and just writes papers and lectures at University of Toronto. Nor has she shown any interest in the myriad of legitimate concerns related to human rights violations. She simply acts to give Ford’s Government a cloak of legitimacy.

After all, she just says whatever they write down for her.

Ontario Health Care Consent Act Of 1996: FYI For Vaccines Or Tests

A disclaimer: this article is merely information about what laws exist. It does not constitute advice. Read, research, research further, and come to your own conclusions.

That being said, a request in Ontario had been made asking about was on the books regarding forced (or coerced) tests. This is course refers to the nasal rape sticks that are being passed off as coronavirus tests. Here is what some digging uncovered. Again, take this as information, and then decide for yourself.

On the issue of masks as a human rights issue, recent Clown Rights Tribunals have found that these demands from stores can be enforced in most cases. Simply having breathing issues is not sufficient. How it would be enforced in a health care setting is a bit more complicated. That said, let’s take a look at the poking stuff.

https://www.cpso.on.ca/About/Legislation-By-Laws
https://www.ontario.ca/laws/regulation/930856
https://www.cpso.on.ca/Physicians/Policies-Guidance/Policies/Consent-to-Treatment/Advice-to-the-Profession-Consent-to-Treatment
https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/stat/so-1996-c-2-sch-a/latest/so-1996-c-2-sch-a.html
https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-46/page-51.html#docCont
https://www.laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/F-27/page-8.html#h-234517
Interim Order From Patty Hajdu

  • Know What Is Actually Considered Malpractice
  • Understand What Consent Really Is
  • Applicable Legislation: Health Care Consent Act, 1996
  • Canada Criminal Code
  • Approved v.s. Interim Authorized Treatments

1. How College Of Physicians Views Malpractice

Medicine Act, 1991
Loi de 1991 sur les médecins
ONTARIO REGULATION 856/93
PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT
Consolidation Period: From December 3, 2010 to the e-Laws currency date.
Last amendment: 450/10.
This Regulation is made in English only.
.
1. (1) The following are acts of professional misconduct for the purposes of clause 51 (1) (c) of the Health Professions Procedural Code
.
2. Failing to maintain the standard of practice of the profession.
.
3. Abusing a patient verbally or physically.
.
7. Discontinuing professional services that are needed unless,
i. the patient requests the discontinuation,
ii. alternative services are arranged, or
iii. the patient is given a reasonable opportunity to arrange alternative services.
.
8. Failing to fulfil the terms of an agreement for professional services.
.
9. Performing a professional service for which consent is required by law without consent.
.
12. Failing to reveal the exact nature of a secret remedy or treatment used by the member following a proper request to do so.
.
13. Making a misrepresentation respecting a remedy, treatment or device.
.
14. Making a claim respecting the utility of a remedy, treatment, device or procedure other than a claim which can be supported as reasonable professional opinion.

On the College of Physicians and Surgeons for Ontario website, they have a link to a very extensive list of what is considered to be malpractice. On the surface, forcing “Covid tests” would certainly seem to qualify as misconduct on several counts. If a person cannot access health care in a normal fashion without having this pushed on them, it would appear to count as misconduct, at least in Ontario.

Also, #12 makes it very clear that the exact nature of whatever medical procedure must be explained. That includes the process, and the risks. This cannot be shrugged off. Obviously, they will be at a loss to explain how these “Covid tests” or these “vaccines” actually work.

2. CPSO Describes Consent For Treatment

Source of Obligations
What is the source of my consent obligations?
.
Physicians have both legal and professional obligations to obtain consent prior to providing treatment. Although the policy does not contain an exhaustive catalogue, it does highlight many of the legal obligations set out in the Health Care Consent Act, 1996 (HCCA). It also sets out certain obligations that are not codified in the HCCA, but are professional expectations of physicians set by the College.

My patient is refusing to consent to a treatment that I think they should have. Does this mean they are incapable?
.
Not necessarily. Patients and SDMs have the legal right to refuse or withhold consent. Consent can also be withdrawn at any time, by the patient if they are capable with respect to the treatment at the time of the withdrawal, or by the patient’s SDM if the patient is incapable.
.
Patients or SDMs may sometimes make decisions that are contrary to the physician’s treatment advice. You cannot automatically assume that because the patient is making a decision you do not agree with, that they are incapable of making that decision.
.
It is possible, however, that a patient’s decision may cause you to question whether the patient has the capacity to make the decision (e.g., that the patient may not truly understand the consequences of not proceeding with the treatment). Where this is the case, you may want to consider doing a more thorough investigation of the patient’s capacity to ensure the patient’s decision is informed and valid.
.
It is important to remember that it is inappropriate for a physician to end the physician-patient relationship in situations where the patient chooses not to follow the physician’s treatment advice (for more information, see the College’s Ending the Physician-Patient Relationship policy).

The CPSO makes it clear that consent is MANDATORY in order to do anything to the patient. Moreover, it is explicitly stated that it’s considered inappropriate to terminate the patient-physician relationship just because the doctor doesn’t personally agree with the patient’s decision(s).

3. Ontario Health Care Consent Act, 1996

Purposes
.
1 The purposes of this Act are,
(a) to provide rules with respect to consent to treatment that apply consistently in all settings;
(b) to facilitate treatment, admission to care facilities, and personal assistance services, for persons lacking the capacity to make decisions about such matters;
(c) to enhance the autonomy of persons for whom treatment is proposed, persons for whom admission to a care facility is proposed and persons who are to receive personal assistance services by,
(i) allowing those who have been found to be incapable to apply to a tribunal for a review of the finding,
(ii) allowing incapable persons to request that a representative of their choice be appointed by the tribunal for the purpose of making decisions on their behalf concerning treatment, admission to a care facility or personal assistance services, and
(iii) requiring that wishes with respect to treatment, admission to a care facility or personal assistance services, expressed by persons while capable and after attaining 16 years of age, be adhered to;

No treatment without consent
.
10 (1) A health practitioner who proposes a treatment for a person shall not administer the treatment, and shall take reasonable steps to ensure that it is not administered, unless,
(a) he or she is of the opinion that the person is capable with respect to the treatment, and the person has given consent; or
(b) he or she is of the opinion that the person is incapable with respect to the treatment, and the person’s substitute decision-maker has given consent on the person’s behalf in accordance with this Act.

Elements of consent
.
11 (1) The following are the elements required for consent to treatment:
1. The consent must relate to the treatment.
2. The consent must be informed.
3. The consent must be given voluntarily.
4. The consent must not be obtained through misrepresentation or fraud.
.
Informed consent
(2) A consent to treatment is informed if, before giving it,
(a) the person received the information about the matters set out in subsection (3) that a reasonable person in the same circumstances would require in order to make a decision about the treatment; and
(b) the person received responses to his or her requests for additional information about those matters
.
Same
(3) The matters referred to in subsection (2) are:
1. The nature of the treatment.
2. The expected benefits of the treatment.
3. The material risks of the treatment.
4. The material side effects of the treatment.
5. Alternative courses of action.
6. The likely consequences of not having the treatment.

The 1996 Health Care Consent Act makes it clear that consent to any medical treatment must be voluntary, informed, and the risks spelled out. These are not things that can just be ignored under the guise of an “emergency”.

For the nasal rape sticks: ask probing questions. Ask what are the effects of putting cotton almost to the brain barrier? Ask if they have verified themselves the sticks are not contaminated in any way. Ask how the PCR test works, and get specific information.

For the gene replacement “vaccines”: ask about the lack of testing on certain groups. Ask about the ongoing testing, and how they can be sure they are safe. Ask if they know and understand what is even in them. This shouldn’t be controversial.

Offences Against the Person and Reputation (continued)
Duties Tending to Preservation of Life (continued)
Marginal note:Duty of persons undertaking acts dangerous to life

4. Canada Criminal Code Provisions

Duty of persons undertaking acts dangerous to life
.
216 Every one who undertakes to administer surgical or medical treatment to another person or to do any other lawful act that may endanger the life of another person is, except in cases of necessity, under a legal duty to have and to use reasonable knowledge, skill and care in so doing.

Duty of persons undertaking acts dangerous to life
Marginal note: Duty of persons undertaking acts
.
217 Every one who undertakes to do an act is under a legal duty to do it if an omission to do the act is or may be dangerous to life.

Duty of persons undertaking acts dangerous to life
Marginal note: Duty of persons directing work
.
217.1 Every one who undertakes, or has the authority, to direct how another person does work or performs a task is under a legal duty to take reasonable steps to prevent bodily harm to that person, or any other person, arising from that work or task.

Criminal negligence
.
219 (1) Every one is criminally negligent who
(a) in doing anything, or
(b) in omitting to do anything that it is his duty to do,
shows wanton or reckless disregard for the lives or safety of other persons.
.
Definition of duty
(2) For the purposes of this section, duty means a duty imposed by law.

Assault
.
265 (1) A person commits an assault when
(a) without the consent of another person, he applies force intentionally to that other person, directly or indirectly;
(b) he attempts or threatens, by an act or a gesture, to apply force to another person, if he has, or causes that other person to believe on reasonable grounds that he has, present ability to effect his purpose; or
(c) while openly wearing or carrying a weapon or an imitation thereof, he accosts or impedes another person or begs.
.
Marginal note: Application
.
(2) This section applies to all forms of assault, including sexual assault, sexual assault with a weapon, threats to a third party or causing bodily harm and aggravated sexual assault.
.
Marginal note: Consent
.
(3) For the purposes of this section, no consent is obtained where the complainant submits or does not resist by reason of
(a) the application of force to the complainant or to a person other than the complainant;
(b) threats or fear of the application of force to the complainant or to a person other than the complainant;
(c) fraud; or
(d) the exercise of authority.

Just a take on this, but could pressuring people to take needles into their arms, or sticks up their nose, be seen as breaching the Criminal Code of Canada? Serious crimes can’t be masked simply by classifying them as medical care.

5. Interim Authorization V.S. Approval

To make this point, consider these categories:

(a) Approved: Health Canada has fully reviewed all the testing, and steps have been done, with the final determination that it can be used for the general population
(b) Interim Authorization: deemed to be “worth the risk” under the circumstances, doesn’t have to be fully tested. Allowed under Section 30.1 of the Canada Food & Drug Act, if an Interim Order is signed. Commonly referred to as an emergency use authorization.

https://covid-vaccine.canada.ca/info/pdf/astrazeneca-covid-19-vaccine-pm-en.pdf
https://covid-vaccine.canada.ca/info/pdf/janssen-covid-19-vaccine-pm-en.pdf
https://covid-vaccine.canada.ca/info/pdf/covid-19-vaccine-moderna-pm-en.pdf
https://covid-vaccine.canada.ca/info/pdf/pfizer-biontech-covid-19-vaccine-pm1-en.pdf

Here’s a question that even small children should be able to understand: Looking at the product monographs, does it say these “vaccines were approved? Or does it say they were authorized under section 5 of an Interim Order? If the person doesn’t know, (and most won’t), pushing for vaccination would probably be malpractice.

It can’t really be informed consent if the people pushing it have no information about the product in question.

6. No Science Behind Any Of This

Too long to detail here, but there is no real science behind any of this so called “pandemic”. As an example, these “gold-standard” PCR tests are unable to distinguish between dead genetic material and an active infection. Using them at all is fraudulent. Feel free to argue any of this.

Now, just because these protections are in place, it doesn’t mean that health care workers actually know about them. It also doesn’t mean that they will care if push comes to shove.

That being said: at least know what you are talking about when you try to assert your rights. Perhaps bring a recording device if possible. That should make it easier for the patient.

To reiterate from before: all of this content is for informational purposes, and should not be considered professional advice. Please, do your own homework.

CV #66(E): Ontario Inserts, Then Removes Protection Against “No Jab, No Job” By Employers

Worker rights are always important, especially if employers want to mandate they take experimental, unapproved gene replacement therapy. But what does the Ontario Government have to say?

https://www.ontario.ca/laws/regulation/r20228
https://archive.is/pZoao (May 29, 2020)
https://files.ontario.ca/books/ontariogazette_153-24.pdf
Ontario Gazette June 13 Page 59 ESA Protections
https://archive.is/A03GF (March 2, 2021)
https://www.ontario.ca/laws/regulation/r20228 (as of today)
https://archive.is/6atpm (as of today)

Section 30.1, Canada Food & Drug Act
Interim (Emergency) Order Signed By Patty Hajdu
https://covid-vaccine.canada.ca/info/pdf/astrazeneca-covid-19-vaccine-pm-en.pdf
https://covid-vaccine.canada.ca/info/pdf/janssen-covid-19-vaccine-pm-en.pdf
https://covid-vaccine.canada.ca/info/pdf/covid-19-vaccine-moderna-pm-en.pdf
https://covid-vaccine.canada.ca/info/pdf/pfizer-biontech-covid-19-vaccine-pm1-en.pdf

The Infectious Disease Emergency Leave Provisions of the Employment Standards Act came into effect in May 2020. They were written up to be retroactive to January 2020. Sounds reasonable enough.

Now, this portion of the Ontario Employment Standards Act has undergone revision, several times. That being said, there is one particularly interesting provision. Specifically: protections were put in, then removed, for workers who don’t want to receive the “vaccine”.

Reasons an employee may take infectious disease emergency leave
.
Employees can take infectious disease emergency leave if they will not be performing the duties of their position because of any of the following reasons:
.
(4) The employee is under a direction given by their employer in response to the employer’s concern that the employee might expose other individuals in the workplace to a designated infectious disease. The ESA does not require employers to pay employees during that time.
Examples include where the employer:
(a) is concerned that employees who have not received the COVID-19 vaccine may expose others in the workplace to COVID-19 and tells them not to come to work until they have been vaccinated
(b) directed an employee to stay at home for a period of time if the employee has recently travelled internationally and the employer is concerned the employee may expose others in the workplace to a designated infectious disease

Reasons an employee may take infectious disease emergency leave
.
(4) The employee is under a direction given by their employer in response to the employer’s concern that the employee might expose other individuals in the workplace to a designated infectious disease. The ESA does not require employers to pay employees during that time.
.
Examples include where the employer directed an employee to stay at home for a period of time if the employee has recently travelled internationally and the employer is concerned the employee may expose others in the workplace to a designated infectious disease

The top quote is how the March 2, 2021, and the lower quote is how the law currently reads. The April 2021 update keeps the provision for international travel, but removes the protection for workers who don’t want to be vaccinated.

Now, it could be argued that this removal isn’t conclusive, and that the Government still could enforce such protections anyway. In that case, why was it removed then? The people drafting it saw a need to specifically include protections against forced vaccination. There was a concern they were addressing. Then they specifically wrote it out.

To further make this point, consider these categories:

(a) Approved: Health Canada has fully reviewed all the testing, and steps have been done, with the final determination that it can be used for the general population
(b) Interim Authorization: deemed to be “worth the risk” under the circumstances, doesn’t have to be fully tested. Allowed under Section 30.1 of the Canada Food & Drug Act. Commonly referred to as an emergency use authorization.

These “vaccines” fall under the second category. They were authorized under a temporary order, because politicians declared that it was worth the risk. They are not, and have never been, approved.

And Doug Ford’s Government removed protections for workers that would have provided cover from bosses who make this demand. Once again, these were never approved, and simply given temporary authorization. So much for his slogan: “For The People”.

TSCE #9(I): “Mr. Girl”, Pedo Defending Cuties Film Gets YouTube Channel Restored

Free speech and open discourse are generally extremely beneficial to society. However, the selective censoring of that on platforms like YouTube raise some serious questions. Here, YouTube and Twitter don’t seem to have an issue with disturbing content.

1. “Mr. Girl”, Max Karson, Defends Cuties

The first video is Max Karson (a.k.a. “Mr. Girl”) appearing on the Kill Stream with Ethan Ralph. Ralph frequently hosts discussion on topics like pornography, so this isn’t just a one-off. Karson then made his “Cuties” video the next day. While scrubbed from YouTube, it’s still on his site. Several people made great reviews of it, including Adonis Paul and Brittany Venti.

2. Most Likely Sincere, Not Trolling

The suggestion had been made several times that Karson was trolling, that this whole thing was an act either for attention, or to generate views. While that is possible, the tone and overall content comes across as someone who is serious about this content. While satire and comedy (even raunchy stuff) should be protected as free speech, this doesn’t look like that at all.

3. Karson’s YouTube Channel Gets Restored

Even though the Cuties video was taken from the YouTube channel, it is still available — in full — on the website, https://maxkarson.com/. There’s also a disgusting “apology” video posted. Additionally, Karson is still able to receive donations via Square Space and Patreon.

There wouldn’t be as much of an issue if there were uniform standards, either for or against free speech absolutism. However, there seem to be double standards, depending on the subject.

Again, if this was some strange version of satire or parody, what exactly is the punch line? How does this result in humour or comedy?

YouTube has no problems with removing content that contradicts the Covid-19 narrative. Guess we have to draw the line somewhere. Canuck Law is just one of many accounts who have been threatened with the loss of their channel over that.

Worth pointing out: Twitter is currently being sued for (allegedly) not removing illegal material involving minors on its website. That is still ongoing in Court.

4. Trafficking, Smuggling, Child Exploitation

Serious issues like smuggling or trafficking are routinely avoided in public discourse. Also important are the links between open borders and human smuggling; between ideology and exploitation; between tolerance and exploitation; between abortion and organ trafficking; or between censorship and complicity. Mainstream media will also never get into the organizations who are pushing these agendas, nor the complicit politicians. These topics don’t exist in isolation, and are interconnected.