Max Boykoff’s Revenge On Science: Creative Climate Communications, Part II

1. Important Links

CLICK HERE, for earlier review of book.

CLICK HERE, for the Climate Change Scam Part I.
CLICK HERE, for Part II, the Paris Accord.
CLICK HERE, for Part III, Saskatchewan Appeals Court Reference.
CLICK HERE, for Part IV, Controlled Opposition to Carbon Tax.
CLICK HERE, for Part V, UN New Development Funding.
CLICK HERE, for Part VI, Disruptive Innovation Framework.
CLICK HERE, for Part VII, Blaming Arson On Climate Change.
CLICK HERE, for Part VIII, Review Of Green New Deal.
CLICK HERE, for Part VIII(II), Sunrise Movement & Green New Deal.
CLICK HERE, for Part IX, Propaganda Techniques, Max Boykoff.
CLICK HERE, for Part X, GG Pollution Pricing Act & Bill C-97.
CLICK HERE, for part XI, Dr. Shiva Ayyadurai Explains Paris Accord
CLICK HERE, for Part XII, Joel Wood and Carbon tax “option”.
CLICK HERE, for Part XIII, controlled opposition going to SCC.
CLICK HERE, for Part XIV, Mark Carney, UN Climate Finance Envoy.
CLICK HERE, for UN global taxation efforts.

2. Why Focus On This Book?

Most “scientists” involved in the climate change business at least claim that their focus is on the science itself. However, a subset has emerged which focuses on the science of persuasion.

That’s right, the goal isn’t using scientific research to PROVE that climate change is a serious and ongoing global threat. Rather, the goal is using social science methods to CONVINCE people that the threat is real. These are two very different things.

In layman’s terms, this book reads like a propaganda manual for tricks and techniques of persuasion. There never appears a moment of doubt in Boykoff’s mind that climate change is urgent. He seems to views the public’s disengagement simply as a communications issue. As such, this book focuses on emotionally manipulative tactics to get around that.

The idea is creepy enough. The fact that there is an entire segment of academia that focuses on this area is very troubling. Unfortunately, Boykoff is entirely serious about his work. Also, the many, many sources he cites are serious.

3. About The Author, Maxwell Boykoff

His professional biography is available here.

Max’s research and creative work has developed primarily in two arenas:
(1) cultural politics of science, climate change and environmental issues = this refers to ways that attitudes, intentions, beliefs and behaviors of individuals and groups shape (and are shaped by) the perceived spectrum of possible action in the context of science-policy, climate change and environmental issues.
.
(2) transformations of carbon-based economies and societies (with emphasis on the interface of science and practical action) = this refers to decarbonization politics, policies and decision-making, with particular interest in how these activities find meaning in people’s everyday lives, as well as how they, in turn, feed back into science-policy decision-making.

4. Specific Examples From CCC Book

(Page 18) Boykoff cites some research suggesting that racial and gender politics should be injected into the subject. Supposedly, racial minorities are going to be disproportionately impacted, and that needs to be discussed openly. Also, female researchers are more likely to have their work ridiculed and mocked. Obviously that is because of sexism and not poor research. That’s right, race and gender are now dimensions in the climate change debate.

(Page 21) A technique called “pre-bunking” is introduced. This is a form of inoculation, which climate change pushers will attempt to pre-empt criticism or questions ahead of time. They do it to sew seeds of doubts in people who would otherwise see obvious problems with the research.

(Page 23) One idea is go beyond simply telling the truth. The focus here is to go beyond simply stating facts and conclusions, and to introduce a “story-telling” element to it. By doing this, people are more accepting of the story, and are less likely to pick up on deficiencies in the arguments themselves.

(Page 26) This is the start of Chapter 2. This chapter gets shifting the discussion away from a scientific one, and appealing to a more emotional issue. By framing it as a social issue, there is more of a focus on people’s ability to act. One technique suggested is to keep it “upbeat” so that others will remain optimistic that their actions will have consequences. Boykoff’s sources also suggest moving away from the “DOOMSDAY APPROACH”. This should have the effect of keeping people more engaged if their aren’t told it is hopeless.

(Page 35) There is more detail about how to turn climate change into stories. Stories in general have: main characters, villains, plot, description, complexity, some ambiguity, and conflict resolution. Boykoff talks about telling the “facts” of climate change as if it were a story. This will do wonders to keep people engaged. Interestingly, the approach is to water down the hard facts, and to focus more on a compelling narrative.

(Page 45) The book heads towards cultural politics and interdisciplinary communication. What this means is that taking different approaches, or combining approaches, may work best depending on who the specific audience is. Page 47, Boykoff begins to detail the actual communication training that climate change pushers are being given in order to more effectively market this concept. Yes, there is now formal training in how to peddle this.

(Page 50) Boykoff talks about a “building bridges” approach, something he also refers to as a “common ground” approach. This involves making some effort to find out what other people are interested in, and building a relationship with them. Climate change information will gradually be introduced via this relationship. The other people will eventually be sold on the agenda, but without realizing that was your goal all along. The entire tactic is emotional manipulation, and the worse form of bonding that can take place.

(Page 58) Boykoff discusses some of the research that has been done across demographic groups and across political leanings. He also explains that the climate change agenda can still be pitched to almost everyone, but the message needs to be shifted depending on which group you are addressing.

(Page 96) We get into the idea of adding visualizations (images) to help sell the climate change agenda. The idea here is that if people can actually see what is happening, it should compel them more strongly to act. Now, it doesn’t really matter if what people see is what is truly happening. What’s important is that they see what they should.

(Page 132) Boykoff talks about the framing climate change in certain ways. One is as a sacrifice v.s. benefits approach. This is one where the experts will outline the sacrifices needed (such as your standard of life) and various benefits that will come. Always, there is the bit about making the world a better place for those in developing countries. After all, they had no hand in this. This is a combination of guilt tripping and a call to patriotism, and put together beautifully.

(Page 190) Boykoff explains more of this “silver buckshot approach”, as opposed to the silver bullet. In short, there have to be multiple forms and paths to spread the message of climate change at any given time. Since no one technique will work on everyone, we need many streams ready to convince people of the cause. And really, that is what this book is: listing and detailing these multiple paths.

In short, Boykoff suggests inserting climate change into the discussion wherever possible. Though he doesn’t explicitly add this, it’s implied that it should be done even when the above issue has nothing to do with it.

Make the connections. And make the other people see those connections. Sometimes best if done subtly, as you don’t want your agenda to be too obvious.

The examples above are by no means exhaustive, but should demonstrate how devious and cunning the author is. He outlines technique after technique to push the narrative. And these techniques are lifted directly from psychological and sociological research. Boykoff is applying those findings in his quest to do a better job of selling climate change to the public.

5. Boykoff Avoids Actual Research

You will likely notice that Max Boykoff never gets into the so-called climate change science. He mainly avoids any real detail on how climate change research is conducted. Why is that?

It’s because this entire book shies away from telling people the hard and fast truth (at least as he perceives it), and focuses on indirect and roundabout ways of getting people on board. In short, this book is still intended to push the climate change agenda, but just shows ways to be more sneaky and dishonest about it.

Was this a worthwhile read? Yes, in the context of knowing how your enemies are lying and manipulating you. Boykoff gives an in-depth, well researched book on exactly that. If nothing else, he if very thorough in detailing these underhanded methods.

TSCE #7(D): UN Research Into Smuggling and “Irregulars” (Cont’d)

(UN Office on Drugs and Crime)

(There is a connection between smuggling and “irregular migration”)

(UN abhors smuggling, but fake refugees get a pass)

(UN High Commission on Refugees)

(UN insists terrorists be allowed to return home)

This is a continuation to the last article, and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. While the basics were laid out before, there is so much more detail to be included. In fact, the UN has done a surprising amount of research on this topic.

Yet they seem to have learned nothing from this research, or the results are being deliberately ignored.

To reiterate from last time: it is extremely hypocritical for the UN to claim that they are AGAINST smuggling and trafficking of people, yet SUPPORT mass illegal entries (which they minimize as “irregular”).

The connection between “irregulars” (or illegal aliens) and smuggling is straight forward. Human smugglers are the people who facilitate and coordinate these mass movements of people. They directly cause these “irregulars”, which the UN demands Western nations provide for. However, the UN, and other groups condemn the smuggling that is at the heart of it. The illegal aliens themselves are willing participants.

The difference between traffickers and smugglers is one of consent. Smugglers take people against their will. While victims of trafficking are not to blame for their situation, they are not legal immigrants either. And calling them “irregulars” deliberately blurs the line here.

A cynic may wonder if the UN is speaking out both sides of its mouth: demanding that Western nations take hoards of people from the 3rd World, all while pretending to reject the smuggling that at least facilitates this mass invasion.

Now let’s get right into the rest of this review.

1. Direct Connection Between Smuggling/Illegals

2.1 Smuggling of migrants and the concepts of irregular migration and trafficking in persons
2.1.1 Irregular migration
The relationship between irregular migration and smuggling of migrants has been discussed in the literature, with most authors acknowledging the crucial role of smuggling of migrants in facilitating irregular migration.

In looking at the relationship between the two concepts, Friedrich Heckmann stresses that smuggling of migrants plays a crucial role in facilitating irregular migration, as smugglers may provide a wide range of services, from physical transportation and illegal crossing of a border to the procurement of false documents.

Yes, this has been brought up before, but it is designed to hammer the point home. Smuggling of people across borders is directly connected to the “irregular migration” that occurs at the end. It is the end result of these actions which show no respect for national borders or sovereignty. The UN review is rather blunt on the subject.

2. Smuggling As A Business Model

2.2 Conceptualization of smuggling of migrants
2.2.1 Smuggling as an illegal migration business
The conceptualization of smuggling as a migration business was formally developed by Salt and Stein in 1997, even if one may find reference to this theory in earlier literature. This new interpretation of the smuggling phenomenon had a great influence on academic circles, and the concept was then borrowed by many academics. In a critical analysis of this concept, Herman stresses that the focus of expert discussions then revolved around the notion of a migration industry and its professionalization, in which migrants are seen as “products” and “people who aid migrants are called ‘smugglers’, and are portrayed as illegal ‘entrepreneurs’”

Salt and Stein suggested treating international migration as a global business that has both
legitimate and illegitimate sides
. The migration business is conceived as a system of institutionalized networks with complex profit and loss accounts, including a set of institutions, agents and individuals each of which stands to make a commercial gain.

The model conceives trafficking and smuggling as an intermediary part of the global migration business facilitating movement of people between origin and destination countries. The model is divided into three stages: the mobilization and recruitment of migrants; their movement en route; and their insertion and integration into labour markets and host societies in destination countries. Salt and Stein conclude their theory by citing the need to look at immigration controls in a new way, placing sharper focus on the institutions and vested interests involved rather than on the migrants themselves.

In some sense, this is quite obvious. Of course smuggling and trafficking are businesses, where the commodity being shipped is the people.

However, the solution seems almost designed to fail. Let’s focus on the institutions themselves and not the migrants?! If the migrants want what they view as a “better life” in Western nations, the demand will remain high. And as long as there is a demand, with customers willing to pay, then there will be people willing to take the risks.

The migration business theory seems still to be dominant in the literature analysing smuggling trends in North America, South-east Asia and the Pacific region, where smugglers are portrayed as “migration merchants”, while the smuggled migrants are considered clients paying for a service. However, it seems that academic views have evolved recently, with a greater number of authors, such as Zhang and Herman, looking at the role of family members and social networks in the smuggling process. While still endorsing the “migration business” theory, authors such as Doomernik and Kyle call for a more nuanced approach, as the empirical reality includes a mix of people with both altruistic and profit-making goals. empirical research led by Van liempt and Doomernik in the Netherlands in 2003 and 2004 looked at how smugglers of migrants may depict themselves as serving migrants rather than as profit-makers, despite the fees involved. equally, migrants may not use the word “smugglers” when they talk about the person who “helped” them. According to Aranowitz, the “mother of All Snakeheads”—a major Chinese smuggler is probably the symbol of the dual reality of smuggling of migrants, as she was a revered figure in New York’s Chinatown and considered a saint for “reuniting families”.

While this is interesting on some level, it does not change the basic reality. Helping to get people illegally into other countries is smuggling, regardless of whether it is driven by profit or humanitarian reasons.

3. Data From Interviews

3.2 Qualitative methodologies
3.2.1 Interviews with smuggled migrants
Methodological issues
Qualitative information can be extracted from various sources. For example, it can be the outcome of fact-finding missions carried out by researchers in source, transit and/or destination countries, involving interviews with actors in and witnesses of the smuggling process (migrants, migrants’ relatives and smugglers). The collection of direct information seems to be the most problematic, and research projects often require a combination of sources, such as interviews and police and court files.

Researchers may face difficulties in interviewing smuggled migrants and persons directly involved in the smuggling process. According to Düvell, Triandafyllidou and Vollmer, migrants are reluctant to participate, as they fear retaliation from smugglers and are also afraid that the information provided might be used against them and lead to deportation. Collyer, however, insists on the difficulties of getting a representative sample and of carrying out a proper interview, given the interviewees’ living conditions. Owing to these constraints, the interview technique varies greatly: while some researchers carry out observation in police stations or shelters, others conduct interviews on the basis of a standard questionnaire. Some academics use a mix of interviews and observations.

According to Heckmann, smuggled persons tend to cooperate in interviews when basic conditions are met, such as respect for anonymity, or when the interviewer is a person who comes from the same community as the smuggled person. Smuggled migrants may want to speak out of frustration with the smugglers or, after having achieved safe status, for political reasons. According to Bilecen, command of the migrant’s native language seems to be an imperative asset, together with being from the same community. Given the reluctance of smuggled migrants and smugglers, some authors have used tricks such as enrolling as social workers at the reception centre of Sangatte (France) or pretending to be irregular migrants.

Pretending to be a social worker or a fellow illegal is actually an interesting tactic. True, it is deception. But the entire presence and transport of these smuggled illegal aliens is based on deception, so it can be viewed as fighting fire with fire.

Of course getting direct information can be tricky. The entire point of these smuggling operations is …. wait for it …. to smuggle people. Giving direct and honest information can lead to their deportation, and to possible criminal charges as well.

Sure, speaking the same language can go a long way. Anyone familiar with police interrogations will tell you that having a connection with a suspect will help you get information.

3.2.2 Interviews with smugglers
There is a lack of research focusing on the smugglers’ perspectives that would allow insight into the subjective dimension of the phenomenon. According to Neske, this gap is understandable since smugglers are not interested in exposing themselves to publicity or law enforcement.

Yes, this is pretty obvious.

Now, let’s address some estimates about the size and scale of human smuggling and trafficking across borders.

4. Scope Of Int’l Smuggling

4. The scope of smuggling of migrants
Bearing in mind the methodological limitations on estimating the movement of smuggled migrants in the broader context of irregular migration, this chapter will outline quantitative information about the extent of smuggling of migrants with a focus on sub-regions and key countries. This information is scattered and/or imprecise for two reasons. Firstly, reports often mix up statistics on and refer interchangeably to irregular migration, trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants. Secondly, quantitative assessments are limited mainly to smuggling towards industrialized Western countries, while intraregional movements in the southern hemisphere are largely ignored.

This chapter then looks at the current state of knowledge regarding smuggling routes. The literature reviewed reveals a dual perspective. On the one hand, the “traditional” view holds that all smuggling trends are converging towards the industrialized Western States. This perspective is dominant in the literature published in the early 1990s. On the other hand, more recent research shows that smuggling routes are far more diverse and that Western-centric views may not accurately represent the complex dynamics of smuggling of migrants. In any case, the routes outlined below provide only an overview of smuggling routes as described in the literature. Further details about the organization of sea, air and land movements are provided in chapter 9.

The report says that “irregular migrants” (who are really illegal aliens) get mixed up with people who are smuggled and trafficked. It seems that the authors are the ones contributing to this problem. They repeatedly try to make a distinction where none exists.

Part of the assumption that illegals head to Western nations is the fact that they have the best social programs. They also have lawyers and others who work hard to circumvent national laws. Heading to the West offers the best rate of return in most cases.

It will be interesting to read onward and see where these additional routes are. True, there is the belief that smuggling and trafficking heads mostly here.

The report spends some time giving estimates of the number of illegals in various regions. However, it is clear that these are estimates (often conflicting estimates) and that they have few real answers.

5. Profile Of Smuggled Migrants

5.1 General profile of smuggled migrants
5.1.1 Social and educational background
According to figures in the IOM World Migration Report 2008, the vast majority of migrants around the world are young people, including a great proportion of underage persons. many developing countries have very young populations: in most African countries and many in Asia, about half of the population is under the age of 14. As stressed by Doomernik and Kyle, such countries encourage their young people to emigrate since they are facing severe underemployment and unemployment. Some authors have considered the role of State authorities—in particular in the Philippines and Spain—in migrant-exporting schemes. Although there are no consolidated global figures on the age pyramid of smuggled migrants, the figures shown by regional research tend to confirm that smuggled migrants are usually recruited from the young population.

There are diverging views about the social and educational backgrounds of smuggled migrants. According to authors such as Aronowitz, smuggled persons are usually the most disadvantaged in their own countries, with poor job skills or little chance of successful employment at home. They are often women and children, as shown by the smuggling and trafficking patterns in countries in eastern and Central Europe and West Africa. According to IOM, research on the profile of persons using the service of smugglers in Central Asia would present similar characteristics.

We are getting some honesty here, and it undermines a major narrative of the asylum pushers. A large amount of people claiming to be refugees fleeing persecution are actually economic migrants seeking a better life. While it is understandable that people want to make better lives for themselves, it does not translate into a “right” to migrate.

6. Profile Of Smugglers Themselves

6. Profiles of smugglers of migrants
The main objective of this chapter is to look at the social background of smugglers of migrants and their motivations. It will highlight the similarities and differences in the profiles of smugglers in different parts of the world. Because of the lack of information and the diversity of situations, the present review refrains from drawing general conclusions about the social and educational background of the persons involved in migrant-smuggling activities. Regional profiles of smugglers will be established according to analyses of law enforcement activities or information gathered directly from smugglers. Complementary information is provided in chapter 9.

6.3 Conclusions
There is a striking lack of information regarding the profile of smugglers. Scholars’ views can be divided into a criminological and a sociological perspective. The information about the smugglers is based mainly on police and court records and, to a lesser extent, on interviews with migrants. Some recent research includes a psychological perspective, including interviews with the smugglers about their motivations and background. Research based on interviews with smugglers should be further developed, as it provides subjective insight into the migrant-smuggling phenomenon

There are a lot of generalities in this. But a few conclusions from the chapter:

(a) Smugglers never give the full truth about their operations, as it would lead to the authorities easily disrupting them.
(b) Greatest trust happens when smuggler and their “migrants” come from the same communities and speak the same language.
(c) Some do it purely for money, and others are driven — at least partly — by altruistic reasons. It seems to act as a self-rationalization.

7. Organizational Details Of Smuggling

8. Organizational structures of smuggling networks
This chapter considers typologies of organizational structures and actors involved in
migrant-smuggling activities and highlight similarities and differences in the organizational
structures of smuggling networks in different parts of the world
. It then looks into details of how smugglers are organized in different parts of the world and reviews information about factors that influence the way smugglers are organized and elements that guide their evolution. Finally, it reviews information available to determine whether migrant-smuggling markets are increasingly dominated by transnational organizations.

8.1 General analysis of organizational structures of smuggling networks
8.1.1 Typology of structures
From a general standpoint, the literature has taken a great interest in the organizational structure of smuggling networks. Intergovernmental organizations and national administrations have published or sponsored research on this issue in order to increase the capacity to investigate and prosecute smuggling-related offences. The literature reviewed shows that smuggling of migrants can take many organizational forms, as indicated by the great diversity of concepts used to describe it. According to Heckmann, the methodology presented in the literature on smuggling of migrants is rather weak and often uses vague and ad hoc concepts, such as “the smuggling industry”, “migrant merchants”, “mom and pop smugglers” and “organized crime”.

8.3 Conclusions
Sources reviewed reveal a great disparity in the quantity and the quality of information about the organization of smuggling networks. Few regions have been researched, and there is often a critical lack of comprehensive and up-to-date research available. Specific research has not been carried out in North and West African countries; and investigative and judicial data from european sources have been used. Further research should be developed in order to get a more comprehensive understanding of the organization of smuggling networks around the world.

Some useful information is contained in the chapter.

While there are areas that are under researched, it may be that the methods used are similar to those that are more documented in other nations. After all, how many techniques can there be that are totally novel?

8. Human & Social Costs

10.1 Human costs
The literature reviewed is highly critical of the law enforcement strategy currently deployed at the maritime borders of EU, which is deemed to be both inefficient in preventing irregular migration and inhumane towards the migrants. According to Spijkerboer, increased border controls have led to the loss of more lives, and further tightening of external EU borders will intensify this trend. Heckmann stresses that improved border control measures have contributed to establishing a low-cost segment of the market, in which smugglers endanger the health and lives of the smuggled migrants. This opinion is shared by authors such as Carling, monzini, eylemer and Şemşit, to name but a few.

10.2 Social costs The literature reviewed provides little information on the social costs of smuggling of migrants, except in respect of Africa. The high failure rate of internal journeys in Africa seems to indicate that, in many situations, migration can drain local resources and leave the country of origin and the communities of co-nationals abroad even more impoverished than before. most migrants depart with the savings of their family and loans from friends, making their migration a long-term investment. If they find themselves in difficulty during the trip, they ask for more money and often have it transferred in order to pay for later stages of the journey. The sums, for the country of origin, are often very high and dry up the family economy for years. Therefore, according to Beneduce, in recent decades the geography of migration has changed, and the geography of humanitarian problems recently associated with irregular migration (poverty, exploitation, segregation and abuse) is changing as well. many of the migrants or asylum-seekers caught between the economic demands of the smugglers and a permanent fear of being arrested and deported by the authorities, are impoverished and become “stranded”.

This is one of the main arguments against immigration in general. What happens to those other nations when the wealthy and able people leave? What happens when their family wealth is drained?

As for the costs, one piece of the puzzle is left out: what about those 1st world nations who are now forced to cope with large numbers of “refugees” or “irregular migrants” who have been smuggled in? The nations never invited them, and the people never gave any democratic mandate.

9. Final Thoughts On Report

Let’s start with the obvious question: for all the research that has been done, why doesn’t the UN do more to prevent illegal crossings? Instead, they do all they can to facilitate mass, illegal invasions and force host nations to cope.

Another thing to address: prosecuting or punishing smugglers is to be expected, but why should these migrants get a pass? If they are willingly participating, then they are accomplices. It is selfish to effectively reward such a system.

Why does the UN keep repeating the “refugee” lie, when its own research concludes that it is mainly economic migrants looking for better opportunity? The UN appears to be willingly complicit in this industry.

How would agreements like the UN Global Migration Compact impact this issue? Is the UN oblivious, or this a deliberate attempt to make human smuggling easier? Remember what is in it:

(Objective 4) Ensure migrants have identity papers
(Objective 5) Enhance pathways for migration
(Objective 11) Manage borders in “integrated” manner
(Objective 13) Detention only as a last resort
(Objective 15) Provide basic services for all migrants
(Objective 17) Educating media, censorship
(Objective 20) Make remittances easier/cheaper to send
(Objective 22) Forced to pay out pensions, social benefits

This UN treaty only makes it easier to smuggle people into countries like Canada. After all, if we are required to provide social benefits, can’t lock them up, and can’t even criticize it, then what will discourage it?

(1) https://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/Migrant-Smuggling/Smuggling_of_Migrants_A_Global_Review.pdf
(2) Smuggling_of_Migrants_A_Global_Review
(3) UN guide in circumventing the Canada/U.S. Safe 3rd Country Agreement
(4) https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/5952a3c54.pdf
(5) https://www.cbc.ca/radio/asithappens/as-it-happens-tuesday-edition-1.4884043/canada-has-a-legal-obligation-to-repatriate-citizens-who-left-to-fight-for-isis-says-un-rapporteur-1.4884562
(6) https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/11/1024882
(7) Full Text Of UN Global Migration Compact

TSCE #7(C): UN Blurs The Line Between Smuggling & “Irregular” Migrants

(UN Office on Drugs and Crime)

(There is a connection between smuggling and “irregular migration”)

The United Nations has done a surprising amount of research on people being smuggled illegally across international borders. But there seems to be little interest in curbing the problem.

1. UN Review On Smuggling Migrants

(Page 11)
1. Introduction
The purpose of this thematic review is to survey existing sources and research papers on smuggling of migrants and to provide a gap analysis of existing knowledge from a global perspective. Indeed, despite the fact that smuggling of migrants has attracted great media and political attention over the last two decades, there has not been any comprehensive analysis of the state of expert knowledge. Great confusion still prevails about what smuggling of migrants is within the global context of irregular migration.

To be honest, I wonder that myself. “Irregular migrants”, which are really illegal aliens, are being who have entered a country illegally, or who entered legally, but remained when their status changed. This could simply be trying to make a distinction where none exists.

Article 6 of the Smuggling of migrants Protocol, requires States to criminalize both smuggling of migrants and enabling a person to remain in a country illegally in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, as well as to establish as aggravating circumstances acts that endanger the lives or safety or entail inhuman or degrading treatment of migrants. By virtue of article 5, migrants are not liable to criminal prosecution for the fact of having been smuggled. It is therefore understood that the Protocol aims to target smugglers, not the people being smuggled

So, are we to give a pass to the people being smuggled and only focus on the smugglers? What happens if the people being smuggled are a willing part of it?

From a sociological perspective, smuggling of migrants may then include every act on a continuum between altruism and organized crime. Doomernik defines smuggling of migrants as “every act whereby an immigrant is assisted in crossing international borders whereby this crossing is not endorsed by the government of the receiving state, neither implicitly nor explicitly”.

(Page 12)
To the extent that the literature available allows a distinction to be made, the issues of irregular migration and trafficking in persons are deliberately not covered per se by this thematic review, despite the fact that these phenomena are closely connected with smuggling of migrants in practice.

They are not immigrants, but aliens.

Again, it seems to be searching for a difference where none exists. Illegal aliens (or “irregular migrants” in UN duck-speak) are people who enter other countries illegally. People who knowingly aid these illegal aliens are people smugglers. The UN engages in this mangling of the language in order to attempt to separate the two.

(Page 15)
2.1.1 Irregular migration
The relationship between irregular migration and smuggling of migrants has been discussed in the literature, with most authors acknowledging the crucial role of smuggling of migrants in facilitating irregular migration.

The legal definition of smuggling of migrants finds wide acceptance among the academic community, which usually refers to articles 3 and 6 of the Smuggling of migrants Protocol. Contrary to the concept of smuggling, the notion of irregular migration does not have a universally accepted definition; however, most academics and experts refer to the definition provided by IOM, which highlights that the most common forms of irregular migration are illegal entry, overstaying and unauthorized work.

In looking at the relationship between the two concepts, Friedrich Heckmann stresses that smuggling of migrants plays a crucial role in facilitating irregular migration, as smugglers may provide a wide range of services, from physical transportation and illegal crossing of a border to the procurement of false documents

Finally, we are getting some real honesty. Smuggling helps to facilitate so called “irregular migrants”, who are really illegal aliens. Smugglers transport these aliens, and often obtain false documents for them.

Why doesn’t irregular migration have a universally accepted definition? Is it done deliberately to obscure what is going on?

(Page 15)
2.1.2 Trafficking in persons
Smuggling of migrants must also be differentiated from the concept of trafficking in persons, defined under article 3 of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Trafficking in Persons Protocol) as: The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs

This is actually true. There is a difference between voluntarily arranging to come to another nation illegally, and being forced or coerced into doing so. This is a valid distinction.

(Page 18)
2.2 Conceptualization of smuggling of migrants
2.2.1 Smuggling as an illegal migration business
The conceptualization of smuggling as a migration business was formally developed by Salt and Stein in 1997, even if one may find reference to this theory in earlier literature. This new interpretation of the smuggling phenomenon had a great influence on academic circles, and the concept was then borrowed by many academics. In a critical analysis of this concept, Herman stresses that the focus of expert discussions then revolved around the notion of a migration industry and its professionalization, in which migrants are seen as “products” and “people who aid migrants are called ‘smugglers’, and are portrayed as illegal ‘entrepreneurs’

Salt and Stein suggested treating international migration as a global business that has both
legitimate and illegitimate sides
. The migration business is conceived as a system of institutionalized networks with complex profit and loss accounts, including a set of institutions, agents and individuals each of which stands to make a commercial gain.

The model conceives trafficking and smuggling as an intermediary part of the global migration business facilitating movement of people between origin and destination countries. The model is divided into three stages: the mobilization and recruitment of migrants; their movement en route; and their insertion and integration into labour markets and host societies in destination countries. Salt and Stein conclude their theory by citing the need to look at immigration controls in a new way, placing sharper focus on the institutions and vested interests involved rather than on the migrants themselves.

Aranowitz puts forward a similar view and claims that smuggling could not have grown to such proportions if it were not supported by powerful market forces. Furthermore, Aranowitz argues that smugglers exhibit entrepreneur-like behaviour and circumvent legal requirements through corruption, deceit and threats. They specialize either in smuggling or in trafficking services, and the profit generated varies accordingly.

This is surprisingly well written. Smuggling and trafficking are businesses, and the people are the commodity. That being said, if the people are consenting to being smuggled, they are accomplices and not victims.

(Page 21)
The network theory also departs from the migration business theory by looking at the migrant as an actor in the migration process and not merely as an object, as in the organized crime theory. Van liempt and Doomernik have questioned the assumption that smuggled migrants are recruited by criminals and have little to say within the migration process. In their view, the relationship between the smugglers and the smuggled is more complex.

Looking at migrants as actors in the migration process, de Haas also insists on the need to depart from prejudiced views against smuggled migrants. According to him, rather than a desperate response to destitution, migration is generally a conscious choice made by relatively well-off individuals to enhance their livelihoods. Detailed discussions of migrants’ profiles and relationships with their smugglers are in chapters 5 and 7.

2.3 Conclusions
Sources reviewed reveal a strong interest among the academic community in analysing the phenomenon of smuggling of migrants from a conceptual perspective. In particular, experts have debated the link between smuggling of migrants and other forms of transnational movement of persons—in particular irregular migration and trafficking in persons. Recent literature has also attempted to improve concrete understanding of smuggling of migrants through the conceptualization of the phenomenon as a migration business, a security threat or a family (network) business.

Some useful points:

Smuggling is not usually that of desperate people, but rather well-off individuals looking for a better life. The refugee system is being gamed.

Also, there is a clear link between these illegals (no they are not “irregular”) and the smuggling that facilitates this. To suggest otherwise is to blur reality.

The book is some 148 pages, and is far too long to go through in a single article, but do have a read.

2. UN Hypocrisy On People Smuggling

This cannot be overstated. It is extremely hypocritical for the UN to condemn human smuggling, while promoting and excusing so-called “irregular migration”. It is well known that many of these illegals come to the West by means of smuggling.

If smuggling itself is to be rejected by society as a whole, then why is it okay for the accomplices of these smugglers to reap the rewards that come from it?

The UN also insists that nations have an obligation to allow terrorists to return home. Needless to say this endangers the public greatly. You can’t simultaneously expect this, and for nations to have safe borders.

This same behaviour also happens on the U.S./Mexico border. In 2018, the UN facilitated large “caravans” of economic migrants with the intention of bringing them up through Central America and overwhelming the U.S. border. How does this respect national sovereignty in any way at all?

3. Organizing “Irregulars” is Smuggling

As much as the UN would like to blur the line, arranging for migrants to enter other nations without permission is smuggling.

The UN insists that all migrants (even if in these countries illegally) are entitled to basic services. As such, the UN advocates for smuggling. The only reasonable conclusion is that having all these amenities will lead to more people trying to enter illegally.

As much as they try to engage in mental gymnastics, the UN is directly involved in people smuggling. They promote policies that only ensure the smuggling (and trafficking) will continue indefinitely.

The UN document claimed that migration is a huge industry. They were absolutely right about that.

(1) https://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/Migrant-Smuggling/Smuggling_of_Migrants_A_Global_Review.pdf
(2) UN Guide Circumventing the Canada/U.S. Safe 3rd Country Agreement.
(3) ttps://www.unhcr.org/en-us/5952a3c54.pdf
(4) https://www.cbc.ca/radio/asithappens/as-it-happens-tuesday-edition-1.4884043/canada-has-a-legal-obligation-to-repatriate-citizens-who-left-to-fight-for-isis-says-un-rapporteur-1.4884562
(5) https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/11/1024882

Creative (Climate) Communications — Effectively Marketing Psuedo-Science

No joke. There actually is a book out on how to “effectively communicate” on climate change. Loads of logical fallacies and emotional manipulation.

1. Important Links


(Other articles on climate change scam)
https://canucklaw.ca/the-climate-change-scam-part-1/

CLICK HERE, for the article in the ironically named “Scientific American” journal, authored by Max Boykoff, to promote his book.

CLICK HERE, for link to book sale.

2. Site Promoting Book

Conversations about climate change at the science-policy interface and in our lives have been stuck for some time. This handbook integrates lessons from the social sciences and humanities to more effectively make connections through issues, people, and things that everyday citizens care about. Readers will come away with an enhanced understanding that there is no ‘silver bullet’ to communications about climate change; instead, a ‘silver buckshot’ approach is needed, where strategies effectively reach different audiences in different contexts. This tactic can then significantly improve efforts that seek meaningful, substantive, and sustained responses to contemporary climate challenges. It can also help to effectively recapture a common or middle ground on climate change in the public arena. Readers will come away with ideas on how to harness creativity to better understand what kinds of communications work where, when, why, and under what conditions in the twenty-first century.

Includes strategies that help people have productive conversations about climate change that involve listening and adapting rather than just trying to win an argument
-Bridges sectors and audiences, bringing together important material for undergraduate and graduate courses
-Shows the importance of being creative in communications about climate change in the twenty-first century – many businesses, institutions, and collectives can benefit from this, not just students and academics

Reading through this, you will notice that the topic of additional reading and research never comes up. There is no push to understand other perspectives or review scientific findings.

Instead, the focus is on using sociological and psychological techniques to convert normies to your position, without actually providing evidence. This is all about language and emotional manipulation.

Ironically, there is science involved here. But instead of science relating to researching “climate change”, the research focuses on how to change people’s minds. Seems that the priorities are all backwards.

Item #1: Strategies that help people have productive conversations. Presumably this is ways to insert climate change topics into otherwise normal talks.

Item #2: Cram more of the propaganda into university classes.

Item #3: Be innovative about #1 and #2.

3. The Scientific American Article

From synthesizing this work, I distill these lessons into some important “rules of the road.”
-Be authentic.
-Be aware.
-Be accurate.
-Be imaginative.
-Be bold.
From there, additional features on the road map help to navigate toward resonant and effective communications.
-Find common ground on climate change.
Emphasize how climate change affects us here and now, in our everyday lives.
-strong>Focus on benefits of climate change engagement.
Creatively empower people to take meaningful and purposeful action.
“Smarten up” communications about climate change to match the demands of a 21st-century communications environment.

The first items on this list would only make sense if truth was actually a goal. Be aware and be accurate are good principles.

However, climate change advocates tend to be extremely dismissive of different ideas, opinions, facts and research. A commitment to being accurate would undermine the sense of superiority that many possess.

Find common ground and emphasizing the effects are attempts to emotionally manipulate people by inserting the topic in places where it really doesn’t belong. Indeed, the goal seems to be to make “everything” about climate change. Make it an omnipresent issue.

Lately, climate change has imposed itself on the public sphere. Through extreme events linked to changes in the climate, new scientific reports and studies, and rejuvenated youth movements (along with many other political, economic, scientific, ecological, meteorological and cultural events and issues) climate change has been increasingly difficult to ignore.
.
But you wouldn’t really have picked up on that in the first round of the U.S. Democratic party primary debates that took place in Miami, Florida. As 20 candidates made their case to the American people, it was striking how minimally and shallowly they discussed climate change.

To be fair, in a debate (10 people each over 2 days), there isn’t much chance to give long answers.

However, the author, Max Boykoff, makes the point — and will repeatedly make this point — that everything is connected to climate change. He takes the Anita Sarkessian approach, though not with gender.

Sadly, this illustrates a contradiction we have been living with for some time. That is this: amid extensive research into the causes and consequences of climate change, climate communications—and thus, conversations about climate change in our lives—have remained stuck.

There are many reasons. Among them:
-Climate change is still regularly treated as a single issue. This was clearly on display in the debates, and even during the paltry time devoted to surface-level discussions of climate change.
-There has continued to be inadequate funding provided to support sustained and coordinated social science and humanities research into what constitutes more effective climate communications.
-We have all been short on creativity, and we generally have stuck to ineffective climate communications approaches (e.g. merely scientific ways of knowing) as we muddle along.

Interesting take on the problem. Max Boykoff goes on about how the science is sound, but that we just aren’t making any headway in communicating the solutions.

Yes, climate change is still treated as a single issue (that part is true). The author’s goal is to make it an issue of everything. Again, the Anita Sarkeesian technique.

All the money that we pay in various carbon tax schemes apparently aren’t needed for climate change research. Rather, they are needed to SHARE THE RESULTS of the climate change research.

Boykoff seems to believe that it is the “strictly scientific” approach to sharing research that keeps people from seeing what is before their eyes. Seems condescending.

<

p style=”padding:2px 6px 4px 6px; color: #555555; background-color: #eeeeee; border: #dddddd 2px solid”>Yet climate change is a collective action problem that intersects with just about every other area of life. It traverses critical issues such as public health, jobs, education, inequality, poverty, violence, trade, infrastructure, energy, foreign policy and geopolitics. While everyday people clearly have the capacity to care, they reasonably often focus on immediate concerns, such as issues of job security, local school quality, crime and the economy. In recent years, however, it has become more and more clear that these issues are interlinked with climate change.

So, in making these connections, we can more effectively get to the heart of how we live, work, play, find happiness and relax in modern life, shaping our everyday lives, lifestyles, relationships and livelihoods.

Apparently we are too naïve to see the forest for the trees. Ordinary people have lives to live. We don’t spend every waking moment trying to connect aspects of our lives with climate change.

Again the author assumes, with no evidence, that every major aspect of your life is connected to climate change. It must all be pointed out.

Of course, Boykoff will never get into the conflict-if-interest that plagues climate change research. Most of it is funded with a certain outcome expected. Remember, if you aren’t concluding that climate change is a threat to humanity, then you likely won’t be funded anymore. Why keep financing climate research if it isn’t an emergency?

There has been an urgent need to improve communications about climate change at the intersections of science, policy and society. With that in mind, I wrote Creative (Climate) Communications. It is essentially a handbook that bridges sectors and audiences to meet people where they are on this critical 21st-century challenge. In the book I integrate research from the social sciences and humanities that has provided insights into better understanding what communications work, where, when, why and under what conditions.

I also examine how to harness creativity for more effective engagement. I integrate these lessons by assembling what I call features on a “road map” along with “rules of the road.” The guide is then meant to help as researchers and practitioners proceed with both ambition and caution into struggles to effectively address the many issues associated with climate change.

Although Boykoff doesn’t come right out an say it, book is about marketing techniques. What tactics are most persuasive and under what circumstances? People can’t straight up accept “facts and truth”, it needs to be pointed out again and again.

In short, most people are too stupid to see the big picture. Boykoff implies it, but doesn’t not actually state it.

Through this guidance, I seek to help maximize effectiveness and opportunities and minimize mistakes and dead ends in a resource-, energy- and time-constrained environment. In putting this together, I also emphasize that successful and creative climate communications strategies must be tailored to perceived and intended audiences and can be most effective when pursued through relations of trust. And I underscore that context is critical; cultural, political, social, environmental, economic, ideological and psychological conditions matter.

Move away from hard data and facts. Use “soft techniques” to sell it. To once more point out the obvious, everything is connected to climate change.

I also argue that an expanded approach involves processes of listening and adapting rather than winning and argument or talking people into something. Authentically considering other points of view fosters meaningful exchanges and enhances possibilities for finding common ground. Facts established through scientific ways of knowing about climate change are important, but they are not enough. We therefore need to enlarge considerations of how knowledge influences actions, through experiential, emotional, visceral, tactile, tangible, affective and aesthetic ways of learning and knowing about climate change.

Facts aren’t enough. Tell people again and again, that climate change impacts everything. Look for more subtle ways to get your message across.

4. Reflection On This Article


To address the elephant in the room: it is darkly amusing to post in “Scientific American” about scientific methods to convince people to accept pseudo-science about climate change.

Boykoff mentions several times about considering other peoples’ perspectives. But this is hypocritical considering the amount of times “skeptics” or “deniers” are ridiculed or scorned for trying to find out the truth.

Boykoff also neglects any mention or idea that any of the “climate change” findings might be exaggerated or flat out wrong.

It seems the climate-change industry has given up on science, and instead focuses its efforts on trying to market their agenda.

Might be worth buying the book just to do a thorough debunking of it. Understand your enemy after all.

Kirsten Jenkins: Humanizing Sociotechnical Transitions Through Energy Justice

1. Go Check Out Uppity Peasants Site


This is a fairly new site, however, it has some interesting content on it. Well researched, it will give some alternative views on how we are really being controlled. It you haven’t been there, what are you waiting for?

2. About The Authors


CLICK HERE, for the profile of Kirsten Jenkins. Side note: no shocker she has cited Frank Geels.

CLICK HERE, for Benjamin Sovacool.

He is a Lead Author of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s Sixth Assessment Report (AR6), due to be published in 2022, and an Advisor on Energy to the European Commission’s Directorate General for Research and Innovation in Brussels, Belgium.

He has played a leadership role in winning and managing collaborative research grants worth more than $19.6 million, including those from the U.S. Department of Energy, U.S. National Science Foundation, MacArthur Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation, Energy Technology Development and Demonstration Program of Denmark, the Danish Council for Independent Research, and the European Commission. In the United Kingdom, he has served as a Principal Investigator on projects funded by the Economic and Social Research Council, Natural Environment Research Council, and the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council.

CLICK HERE, for Darren McCauley.

3. The Paper Itself

Humanizing sociotechnical transitions through energy justice: An ethical framework for global transformative change
Kirsten Jenkins, Benjamin K. Sovacool, Darren McCauley

Not even kidding. That is the title of the paper.

ABSTRACT
Poverty, climate change and energy security demand awareness about the interlinkages between energy systems and social justice. Amidst these challenges, energy justice has emerged to conceptualize a world where all individuals, across all areas, have safe, affordable and sustainable energy that is, essentially, socially just. Simultaneously, new social and technological solutions to energy problems continually evolve, and interest in the concept of sociotechnical transitions has grown. However, an element often missing from such transitions frameworks is explicit engagement with energy justice frameworks. Despite the development of an embryonic set of literature around these themes, an obvious research gap has emerged: can energy justice and transitions frameworks be combined? This paper argues that they can. It does so through an exploration of the multi-level perspective on sociotechnical systems and an integration of energy justice at the model’s niche, regime and landscape level. It presents the argument that it is within the overarching process of sociotechnical change that issues of energy justice emerge. Here, inattention to social justice issues can cause injustices, whereas attention to them can provide a means to examine and potential resolve them

This article is the first time I have encountered the term “energy justice”. Rather than simply dealing with a problem in a scientific and factual way, the authors add some social-justice element to it. The abstract doesn’t really explain how this works. Hopefully the body will.

Thus, it calls for greater engagement with the three-tenet energy justice approach (distributional justice, procedural justice and justice as recognition) when planning for more sustainable transitions.

Energy justice apparently consists of:

  • Distributional justice
  • Procedural justice
  • Justice as recognition

Okay, but that doesn’t really explain what it is.

Amidst serious sustainability challenges, transitions frameworks have evolved to either conceptualize or facilitate decarbonised energy systems that provide both security of supply and universal access to energy; a process that it is widely acknowledged will require new ways of producing, living and working with energy (Bridge et al., 2013; Heffron and McCauley, 2018; IEA, 2008; Mernier, 2007). In aiming to implement sociotechnical solutions, governments are increasingly utilising the language of transitions, and the concept has begun to feature in the energy policies of countries including Denmark, Switzerland and the United Kingdom (UK)

Some points that should be addressed:

  • They are quite blunt (and proud it seems) that their language is filtering into government activity.
  • Provide universal supply of energy? Is this meant to be some sort of socialist or communist idea?
  • Has it sunk in that if you remove all Carbon forms of energy that it will reduce supply, and make your universal supply harder to obtain?
  • When you say a “new way of living”, does this mean reducing the standard of living in the West to ensure that everyone has access to the same amount of energy?

Yet despite ongoing debates about ethics or justice across many fields of literature (including extended discussions between antagonist camps that have gone on across the history of political philosophy), one social element missing from transitions frameworks is explicit, practice oriented engagement with the energy justice concept and related approaches to justice concerns. Eames and Hunt (2013) draw attention to the fact that considerations of equity and justice are underrepresented within the sociotechnical transitions literature and the wider energy transitions debate, despite the fact that the concept of sustainable development, the target of many transition plans, is inherently rooted in these core notions (Hopwood et al., 2005). Transitions literatures can also fail to give due consideration to issues of landscape, health and existing property values too (Jefferson, 2017).

More points to be looked at:

  • This seems a shameless attempt to turn what is supposed to be an environmental issue into a “social justice”, and hence blur the lines.
  • “Equity and justice” and terms that need to be rammed into discussions.
  • It appears that including “social justice” would be a way to better market their ideas. They don’t seem to make an actual connection though.
  • If a platform needs to latch on to overused buzzwords to sell itself, then it’s probably not a very good platform.

Failure to adequately engage with questions of justice throughout the transition process is dangerous. It may lead to aggravated poverty, entrenched gender bias and non-participation as outcomes or by-products of ‘blinkered’ decision-making. Indeed, without a focus on justice, transitions may fail to acknowledge the burdens of having too much energy, such as waste, over-consumption and pollution, or from not having enough, where some individuals lack access, are challenged by under-consumption and poverty, and may face health burdens and shortened lives as a consequence of restricted energy choices (Sovacool et al.,2016a). This paper therefore utilizes the energy justice concept as a way of engaging with these ethical dilemmas within pre-existing transitions frameworks.

More nonsense which requires a response:

  • There is an obsession with redefining terms to suit an agenda.
  • This is energy we are talking about, not poverty, gender bias, or non-participation. That’s right, they really played the “gender” card here.
  • Burden of having too much? Can I assume the solution is to force sharing? Or rather, to force “rich” nations to hand over energy supplies?
  • Engaging with these ethical dilemmas? You haven’t demonstrated any sort of cause and effect yet.

The origins of the energy justice literature is largely reported as coming from activist accounts of energy issues using the environmental justice frame – a precursor to the energy justice concept which shares overlapping philosophical groundings

That’s right. A bunch of activists made this up.

Specifically, as environmental justice is commonly defined as the distribution of environmental hazards and access to all natural resources; it includes equal protection from burdens, meaningful involvement in decisions, and fair treatment in access to benefits……….. This approach forms the basis of the energy justice approach and framework. However, mentions of its core notions also appear elsewhere, including in the guise of the “three A’s” of availability, accessibility and affordability

It reads like the sort of nonsense one would get in a gender studies class. Only thing is that “energy” is being substituted for here.

note in this regard, that even ‘a “low-carbon” transition has the potential to distribute its costs and benefits just as unequally [as historical fossil-based transitions] without governance mindful of distributional justice’ or, as an extension, without attention to the issues of justice as recognition and due process–energy justice tenets we explore below. We argue that the energy justice concept provides one way of filling this gap.

Here, we get into some straight up Communism. Is it true that costs and benefits don’t impact everyone equally? Yes. However, there is no practical way to do this. Either you would have to forcefully arrange differences in benefits and costs to “make things right”, or you would have to alter everyone’s standard of living so that they were equal.

Guess the road to Hell could use a re-paving.

Throughout, we present three main claims, each coinciding with a level in the MLP model; the niche, regime, and landscape:

(1) That the energy justice concept can expose exclusionary and/or inclusionary technological and social niches before they develop, leading to potentially new and socially just innovation;

(2) That in addition to using the MLP to describe regimes, the energy justice framework provides a way for these actors to normatively judge them, potentially destabilising existing regimes using moral criteria;

(3) That framing energy justice as a matter of priority at the landscape level could exert pressure on the regime below, leading to the widespread reappraisal of our energy choices, and integration of moral criteria.

(1) Sounds like a way to vilify or outcast technology that is scientifically sound, because it doesn’t meet their criteria.
(2) Appears to be a method of using peer pressure and social pressure as a way of destabilizing systems.
(3) Comes across as more overt propaganda.

This governance focus means that the socio-technical literature increasingly acknowledges the political dynamics related to the process through which innovations scale, diffuse or entrench. We focus here on the most prominent socio-technical transitions framework, the multi-level perspective (MLP). The MLP takes the form of a series of nested levels, the niche, regime, and landscape

Nothing scientific. Purely political manoeuvering.

Analysis through the energy justice lens reveals that although electric vehicles (EVs) do have laudable environmental (and social) attributes, they can be exclusionary in the sense that they can perpetuate already widening gaps between the wealthy and poor, as well as potentially raising new forms and geographies of injustice – distributional and justice as recognition concerns.

I thought the point was protecting the environment. But here, they talk about how electric cars will not impact everyone equally, even if they do have considerable environmental benefits. Again, is this an argument in favour of socialism or communism?

Equal opportunity v.s. equal outcome.

In addition to applications in niches, the energy justice framework can support the current role of the MLP to describe regimes by providing a means for policy actors to normatively judge them—exposing unjust practices and resultantly, increasing regime ‘humanisation’. We illustrate this first through the exploration of nuclear power and hydroelectric power production, regimes in which there is some consensus that technological development and lock-in raises issues of justice, or injustice. We identify that the metrics, frameworks, or checklists presented above – as well as the three-tenet framework of energy justice more generally – provide a means of normatively judging both planned and current energy and future sociotechnical regimes, leading to potential re-evaluation of our energy selection criteria. These approaches also recognise the need to politicise the actualisation of energy justice itself.

Finally some honesty. This is a political agenda.

And working to “humanize” a movement? What happened to simply relying on scientific consensus?

4. Conclusions From The Paper

Energy decisions are all too frequently made in a moral vacuum, culminating in a strong normative case for combining the literature on sociotechnical transitions with concepts arising from energy justice. Moreover, we illustrate that energy justice can play a role at each level of one of the more expansive sociotechnical transitions frameworks, the MLP. Within this latter contribution, (1) the energy justice concept could expose exclusionary niches, (2) provide a means for actors to normatively judge regimes, and (3) through the framing of energy justice at the landscape level foster the reappraisal of our energy choices and integration of moral principles. Across all stages of this argument, we present a case for not only mitigating environmental impacts of energy production via sociotechnical change, but doing so in an ethically defensible, socially just way.

To repeat, this is not about environmental protection. It is about blending a social justice causes and lingo into an unrelated topic.

Our caveats come as recognition of the intricacies of politics and political processes around energy transitions and energy justice. For as Meadowcroft (2009) highlights, long-term change is likely to be even messier and more contested than the transitions literature discusses. Indeed, there are likely to be political aspects that approaches such as the MLP are ill equipped to negotiate, and trade-offs that a tenet approach to energy justice cannot entirely resolve.

This may be the most honest thing they say. Politically, this is a very tough sell. They also admit that there “energy justice” approach will not answer the hard questions.

Nonetheless, they still cover those facts in academic jargon.

5. My Own Thoughts

The authors keep repeating that they are just “framing the issue”. In reality, they are publishing propaganda.

There is nothing scientific that the paper adds. There is no building on previous work, or fact checking of previous research. It is entirely about manipulating people to their cause by pretending it is a “social justice” issue. This is blatant activism, masquerading as science.

I also noticed a lot of overlap with the Frank W. Geels article. Do they merely cite each other, or do they just republish the same articles over and over again?

This environmental movement seems to have a lot of self-inflicted problems. For example, this obsession with “energy justice” and other non-issues actually stonewalls progress that they could have made.

Frank Geels & Disruptive Innovation Framework

(From actual academic writing: Frank W. Geels)

(More academia: Sustainable Consumption Institute, Manchester University)

(Clayton Christiansen and “Disruptive Innovation” video)

(From the Uppity Peasants site)

1. Go Check Out Uppity Peasants Site


This is a fairly new site, however, it has some interesting content on it. Well researched, it will give some alternative views on how we are really being controlled.
Go check out “Uppity Peasants“.

2. Important Links


CLICK HERE, for the Sustainable Consumption Institute & Manchester Institute of Innovation Research, The University of Manchester, Denmark Road Building, M13 9PL, Manchester, United Kingdom.
CLICK HERE, for Clayton Christiansen and “Disruptive Innovation”.
CLICK HERE, for SCI Collective Action & Social Movements.
CLICK HERE, for SCI Social Inequality.
CLICK HERE, for Multi-Level Perspective on Sustainability.
CLICK HERE, for a Wiki explanation of disruptive innovation.
CLICK HERE, for removing the innovator’s dilemma.

CLICK HERE, for the Climate Change Scam Part I.
CLICK HERE, for Part II, the Paris Accord.
CLICK HERE, for Part III, Saskatchewan Appeals Court Reference.
CLICK HERE, for Part IV, Controlled Opposition to Carbon Tax.
CLICK HERE, for Part V, UN New Development Funding.

3. Quotes From The Geels Article

Disruption and low-carbon system transformation: Progress and new challenges in socio-technical transitions research and the Multi-Level Perspective

This will be elaborated on, but is about subverted the status quo, or “disruption”. Worth pointing out, that although these types of articles are published and marketed as “science”, they are anything but.

As this title would suggest, the article is extremely political. The concern is not about science itself, but how to “sell” the science. And the agenda here is searching for political methods of implementing the transition to a Carbon free

ABSTRACT
This paper firstly assesses the usefulness of Christensen’s disruptive innovation framework for low-carbon system change, identifying three conceptual limitations with regard to the unit of analysis (products rather than systems), limited multi-dimensionality, and a simplistic (‘point source’) conception of change. Secondly, it shows that the Multi-Level Perspective (MLP) offers a more comprehensive framework on all three dimensions. Thirdly, it reviews progress in socio-technical transition research and the MLP on these three dimensions and identifies new challenges, including ‘whole system’ reconfiguration, multi-dimensional struggles, bi-directional niche-regime interactions, and an alignment conception of change. To address these challenges, transition research should further deepen and broaden its engagement with the social scienceseconomy.

The usefulness of Christiansen’s disruptive innovation framework? While used in a business sense, it appears to be a way for entrepreneurs to get into a market or business. However, in this context it is used as disrupting an environmental policy.

It is mildly (or downright) creepy that the author, Frank Geels, openly suggests that research should broaden its engagement with social sciences. In plain English, this means merging, where scientific research is viewed through a “social” lens.

Christiansen’s “Disruptive Innovation Framework” is explained in the above video. Also see “disruption in financial services“.

Christensen [4] made important contributions to the long-standing debate in innovation management about new entrants, incumbents and industry structures. He argued that disruptive innovations enable new entrants to ‘attack from below’ and overthrow incumbent firms. Christensen thus has a particular understanding of disruption, focused mainly on the competitive effects of innovations on existing firms and industry structures. His framework was not developed to address systemic effects or broader transformations, so my comments below are not about the intrinsic merits of the framework, but about their usefulness for low-carbon transitions.

Christensen’s disruptive innovation framework offers several useful insights for low-carbon transitions (although similar ideas can also be found elsewhere). First, it suggests that incumbent firms tend to focus their innovation efforts on sustaining technologies (which improve performance along established criteria), while new entrants tend to develop disruptive technologies (which offer different value propositions). Second, it proposes that disruptive technologies emerge in small peripheral niches, where early adopters are attracted by the technology’s new functionalities. Third, incumbent firms may initially overlook or under-estimate disruptive technologies (because of established beliefs) or are not interested in them, because the limited return on-investments associated with small markets do not fit with existing business models. Fourth, price/performance improvements may enable disruptive technologies to enter larger markets, out-compete existing technologies and overthrow incumbent firms

Worth pointing out right away, Geels has no interest in the “intrinsic merits” of the disruptive innovation framework that Christiansen talks about. Rather, he focuses on applying that technique to reducing/eliminating Carbon emissions from society.

Christiansen’s idea could be applied fairly practically to business, where new players want to establish themselves. However, Geels “weaponizes” this idea and wants to apply it with the climate-change agenda.

Geels also makes it obvious that overthrowing incumbents is a priority. Again, Christiansen’s writings were meant with the business approach, and trying to start your own, but Geels “repurposes” it.

While Christensen’s framework focuses on technical and business dimensions, the MLP also accommodates consumption, cultural, and socio-political dimensions. Although co-evolution has always been a core concept in the MLP, this is even more important for low-carbon transitions, which are goal-oriented or ‘purposive’ in the sense of addressing the problem of climate change. This makes them different from historical transitions which were largely ‘emergent’, with entrepreneurs exploiting the commercial opportunities offered by new technology

[27]. Because climate protection is a public good, private actors (e.g. firms, consumers) have limited incentives to address it owing to free rider problems and prisoner’s dilemmas. This means that public policy must play a central role in supporting the emergence and deployment of low-carbon innovations and changing the economic frame conditions (via taxes, subsidies, regulations, standards) that incentivize firms, consumers and other actors. However, substantial policy changes involve political struggles and public debate because: “[w]hatever can be done through the State will depend upon generating widespread political support from citizens within the context of democratic rights and freedoms” ([28]: 91).

Again, Geels hijacking a legitimate business concept, but using it for his enviro agenda.

How to implement this? Taxes, subsidies, regulations, standards for businesses and consumers. Use these to regulate and influence behaviour.

Geels rightly says that widespread political support will be needed. But he frames the climate change scam as a way to protect rights and freedoms. Nice bait-and-switch.

Conceptually, this means that we should analyse socio-technical transitions as multi-dimensional struggles between niche-innovations and existing regimes. These struggles include: economic competition between old and new technologies; business struggles between new entrants and incumbents; political struggles over adjustments in regulations, standards, subsidies and taxes; discursive struggles over problem framings and social acceptance; and struggles between new user practices and mainstream ones.

Despite Geels’ article being published in the Journal, “ENERGY RESEARCH AND SOCIAL SCIENCE”, this anything but scientific. If anything, it seems analogous to the “lawfare” that Islamic groups perpetuate on democratic societies.

While Geels promotes economic competition, this is anything but a fair competition. He also calls for:

  • Political struggles over regulations
  • New standards
  • Subsidies
  • Taxes
  • Discursive struggles over problem framings & social acceptance
  • Struggles between new and mainstream user practices

There is nothing scientific here. This is a call for using “political” manoeuvering for achieving social goals.

The importance of public engagement, social acceptance and political feasibility is often overlooked in technocratic government strategies and model-based scenarios, which focus on techno-economic dimensions to identify least-cost pathways [32]. In the UK, which is characterized by closed policy networks and top-down policy style, this neglect has led to many problems, which are undermining the low carbon transition.

• Onshore wind experienced local protests and permit problems, leading to negative public discourses and a political backlash, culminating in a post-2020 moratorium.

• Shale gas experienced public controversies after it was pushed through without sufficient consultation.

• Energy-saving measures in homes were scrapped in 2015, after the Green Deal flagship policy(introduced in2013) spectacularly failed, because it was overly complicated and poorly designed, leading to limited uptake.

• The 2006 zero-carbon homes target, which stipulated that all new homes should be carbon-neutral by 2016, was scrapped in 2015, because of resistance by major housebuilders and limited consumer interest.

• The smart meter roll-out is experiencing delays, because of controversies over standards, privacy concerns, and distribution of benefits (between energy companies and consumers).

While these points are in fact true, Geels suggests that problems could have been avoided if there was sufficient public consultation. This is wishful thinking.

These points raise many legitimate concerns with the eco-agenda. Yet Geels shrugs them off as the result of not engaging the public enough.

Christensen and other innovation management scholars typically adopt a ‘point source’ approach to disruption, in which innovators pioneer new technologies, conquer the world, and cause social change. Existing contexts are typically seen as ‘barriers’ to be overcome. This ‘bottom-up’ emphasis also permeates the Strategic Niche Management and Technological Innovation System literatures. While this kind of change pattern does sometimes occur, the MLP was specifically developed to also accommodate broader patterns, in which niche-innovations diffuse because they align with ongoing processes at landscape- or regime-levels [9].

The MLP thus draws on history and sociology of technology, where processual, contextual explanations are common. Mokyr [58], for instance, emphasizes that “The new invention has to be born into a socially sympathetic environment” (p. 292) and that “Macro-inventions are seeds sown by individual inventors in a social soil. (.) But the environment into which these seeds are sown is, of course, the main determinant of whether they will sprout” (p. 299). So, if radical innovations face mis-matches with economic, socio-cultural or political contexts, they may remain stuck in peripheral niches, hidden ‘below the surface’.

Since low-carbon transitions are problem-oriented, transition scholars should not only analyse innovation dynamics, but also ‘issue dynamics’ because increasing socio-political concerns about climate change can lead to changes in regime-level institutions and selection environments. Societal problems or ‘issues’ have their own dynamics in terms of problem definition and socio-political mobilization as conceptualized, for instance, in the issue lifecycle literature [59,50]. Low carbon transitions require stronger ‘solution’ and problem dynamics, and their successful alignment, which is not an easy process, as the examples below show.

These passages go into marketing strategies, and ways to “frame an argument”. Notice not once does Geels suggest doing more research, or checking the reliability of existing data. Instead, this is a push for emotional manipulation and shameless advertising.

Invention has to be born into a socially sympathetic environment. Science be damned.

There are also positive developments, however, that provide windows of opportunity. Coal is losing legitimacy in parts of the world, because it is increasingly framed as dirty, unhealthy and old-fashioned, and because oil and gas companies are distancing themselves from coal, leading to cracks in the previously ‘closed front’ of fossil fuel industries. The UK has committed to phasing out coal-fired power plants by 2025 and several other countries (Netherlands, France, Canada, Finland, Austria) also move in this direction, providing space for low-carbon alternatives, including renewables.

I would actually agree that coal being phased out would benefit society. However, Geels makes it a “marketing” issue rather than a scientific one. Coal is “increasingly framed” as dirty. Notice that the actual science, such as from this site, are very rarely described.

Following chemical reactions takes place in the combustion of coal with the release of heat:
C + O2 = CO2 + 8084 Kcal/ Kg of carbon (33940 KJ/Kg)
S + O2 = SO2 + 2224 Kcal/Kg of sulfur (9141 KJ/Kg)
2 H2 + O2 = 2 H2O + 28922 Kcal/Kg of hydrogen (142670 KJ/Kg)
2C + O2 = 2CO + 2430 Kcal/Kg of carbon (10120 KJ/Kg)

4. Geels’ Conclusions

The paper has also identified several research challenges, where the transitions community could fruitfully do more work. First, we should broaden our analytical attention from singular niche-innovations (which permeate the literature) to ‘whole system’ change. This may involve changes in conceptual imagery (from ‘point source’ disruption to gradual system reconfiguration) and broader research designs, which analyze multiple niche-innovations and their relations to ongoing dynamics in existing systems and regimes. That, in turn, may require more attention for change mechanisms like add-on, hybridisation, modular component substitution, knock-on effects, innovation cascades, multi regime interaction.

Second, we should better understand regime developments. Existing regimes can provide formidable barriers for low-carbon transitions. Incumbent actors can resist, delay or derail low-carbon transitions, but they can also accelerate them if they reorient their strategies and resources towards niche-innovations. The analysis of niche-to-regime dynamics (as in the niche empowerment literature) should thus be complemented with regime-to-niche dynamics, including incumbent resistance or reorientation. Additionally, we need more nuanced conceptualizations and assessments of degrees of lock-in, tensions, cracks, and destabilisation.

Third, we need greater acknowledgement that socio-technical systems are a special unit of analysis, which spans the social sciences and can be studied through different lenses and at different levels. The recent trend towards deepening our understanding of particular dimensions and societal groups is tremendously fruitful, because disciplinary theories offer more specific causal mechanisms. But, as a community, we should complement this with broad analyses of co-evolution, alignment, multi-dimensionality and ‘whole systems’.

This all sounds elegant, but read between the lines. It is about influencing public perception. Whenever academics, lawyers or politicians seem to make things confusing we need to ask: are they trying to obscure their goals?

5. More About Frank W. Geels

Selected publications of Geels
If you would like a broader cross section of Geels’ work, perhaps these publications will be of interest.

  • Geels, F.W., Berkhout, F. and Van Vuuren, D., 2016, Bridging analytical approaches for low-carbon transitions, Nature Climate Change, 6(6), 576-583
  • Geels, F.W., Kern, F., Fuchs, G., Hinderer, N., Kungl, G., Mylan, J., Neukirch, M., Wassermann, S., 2016, The enactment of socio-technical transition pathways: A reformulated typology and a comparative multi-level analysis of the German and UK low-carbon electricity transitions (19902014), Research Policy, 45(4), 896-913
  • Turnheim, B., Berkhout, F., Geels, F.W., Hof, A., McMeekin, A., Nykvist, B., Van Vuuren, D., 2015, Evaluating sustainability transitions pathways: Bridging analytical approaches to address governance challenges, Global Environmental Change, 35, 239–253
  • Penna, C.C.R. and Geels, F.W., 2015, ‘Climate change and the slow reorientation of the American car industry (1979-2011): An application and extension of the Dialectic Issue LifeCycle (DILC) model’, Research Policy, 44(5), 1029-1048
  • Geels, F.W., 2014, ‘Regime resistance against low-carbon energy transitions: Introducing politics and power in the multi-level perspective’, Theory, Culture & Society, 31(5), 21-40
  • Geels, F.W., 2013, ‘The impact of the financial-economic crisis on sustainability transitions: Financial investment, governance and public discourse’, Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions, 6, 67-95
  • Geels, F.W., 2012, ‘A socio-technical analysis of low-carbon transitions: Introducing the multi-level perspective into transport studies’, Journal of Transport Geography, 24, 471-482
  • Geels, F.W., Kemp, R., Dudley, G. and Lyons, G. (eds.), 2012, Automobility in Transition? A Socio Technical Analysis of Sustainable Transport, New York: Routledge
  • Verbong, G.P.J. and Geels, F.W., 2010, ‘Exploring sustainability transitions in the electricity sector with socio-technical pathways’, Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 77(8), 12141221 Verbong, G.P.J. and Geels, F.W., 2007, ‘The ongoing energy transition: Lessons from a sociotechnical, multi-level analysis of the Dutch electricity system (1960-2004)’, Energy Policy, 35(2), 1025-1037
  • Geels, F.W., 2002, ‘Technological transitions as evolutionary reconfiguration processes: A multi-level perspective and a case-study’, Research Policy, 31(8/9), 1257-1274

Frank Geels publicly available CV
Education
• Ph.D., Science, Technology and Innovation Studies, Twente University of Technology (Jan. 1998- July 2002), Netherlands. Supervisors: Arie Rip and Johan Schot. Title PhD thesis: Understanding the Dynamics of Technological Transitions: A co-evolutionary and socio-technical analysis.
• Masters degree in Philosophy of Science, Technology and Society, Twente University of Technology (1991-1996)
• Bachelor degree in Chemical Engineering, Twente University of Technology (1989-1991)

For what it’s worth, his formal education is pretty impressive. Where I lose respect is when he deviates from scientific argument in favour of political discourse. What could be very interesting work is corrupted be having an agenda.

His undergraduate degree is chemical engineering, which again, is very respectable. However, his Masters and PhD show a deviation from science and research.

While there are many other such authors, Frank W. Geels is a good case of what happens when political agendas and manoeuvering creep into science.

A morbidly fascinating topic. Check out some of his other publications.