Category: Procedural

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A Case For Tort Reform: “Free-Speech” Grifters Want $5 Million

(Peterson interview after suing)

(Peterson announcing lawsuit to follow Shepherd)

(Pedantic Shepherd, YouTube is beside the point)

(Shepherd sues, then complains about being sued)

Background Information

The details of the Wilfrid Laurier University scandal (Lindsay Shepherd, the 3 staff members, and Jordan Peterson), is old news at this point. The article just focuses on the lawsuits brought against WLU and its staff by Peterson and Shepherd.

It is the opinion here that although the facts alleged are basically true, the claims are fraudulent. They are combined seeking 5 million dollars (Shepherd $3.6, Peterson $1.5M). This is an abuse of the court system, and a way to unjustly enrich themselves.

Keep in mind, Peterson’s only claim to damages was that the tape defamed him (comparing him to Hitler, and other comments). His critics were vilified by the media. He suffered no actual damage, other than being named in a tape that Shepherd released.

Shepherd claims that not only was this 42 minute meeting difficult (surely it was), but that she was never treated the same way again. She cites a few examples, but nothing that would lead a reasonable person to think this would be worth millions in damages. Shepherd claims to be unemployable in academia, but her new love for media probably helped that.

Did WLU staff act like d*****bags? YES
Were inappropriate things said? YES
Was a tape of this leaked to the media? YES
Does any of this amount to millions in damages? NO

Complete Hypocrisy

During the Louder With Crowder interview, Peterson (at 50:20) criticizes the Ontario Human Rights Code for automatically making employers vicariously liable for things employees say. However, he has no issue with USING vicarious liability in order to name the University in his lawsuit.

Peterson claimed that it was libel for Rambukkana to compare him to Hitler, yet Peterson compares trans activists to Communists, who have caused the deaths of millions of people.

Peterson has come to fame claiming to be a free speech champion, but has no issue deplatforming speakers he doesn’t agree with. Faith Goldy is a particularly bad example.

Shepherd and Peterson both claim to be free speech champions, but then sue over words they don’t like.

Karma In All Of This?

In 2018, Shepherd launched a $3.6 million lawsuit against Wilfrid Laurier University and 3 of its staff (Nathan Rambukkana, Herbert Pimlott, and Adria Joel). Although the infamous meeting was cited, there were other problems occurring later which were cited in the statement of defense.

Jordan Peterson filed a $1.5 million lawsuit of his own, claiming that Laurier hadn’t learned its lesson. Peterson claimed that the infamous tape had damaged his reputation.

Regarding Peterson’s claim, the WLU filed a 3rd party claim (Form 29A). It stated that if Peterson actually had suffered damages, he should be suing Lindsay Shepherd, as she made the tape secretly and released it.

Shepherd was outraged. After filing a lawsuit against her university, she is shocked that they would use her as a defence in a related lawsuit. She brought this on herself.

WLU should consider Rule 2.1.01

Some Law On Frivilous Proceedings

Rule 2.1 General Powers to Stay or Dismiss if Vexatious, etc.
.
Stay, Dismissal of frivolous, vexatious, abusive Proceeding
Order to Stay, Dismiss Proceeding
2.1.01 (1) The court may, on its own initiative, stay or dismiss a proceeding if the proceeding appears on its face to be frivolous or vexatious or otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. O. Reg. 43/14, s. 1

Although litigation tends to drag on a long time, something like this should be used. The litigation (particularly Peterson’s) is an abuse of process.

Ontario Libel & Slander Act

Definitions
1 (1) In this Act,
“broadcasting” means the dissemination of writing, signs, signals, pictures and sounds of all kinds, intended to be received by the public either directly or through the medium of relay stations, by means of,
.
(a) any form of wireless radioelectric communication utilizing Hertzian waves, including radiotelegraph and radiotelephone, or
(b) cables, wires, fibre-optic linkages or laser beams,
and “broadcast” has a corresponding meaning; (“radiodiffusion ou télédiffusion”, “radiodiffuser ou télédiffuser”)
“newspaper” means a paper containing public news, intelligence, or occurrences, or remarks or observations thereon, or containing only, or principally, advertisements, printed for distribution to the public and published periodically, or in parts or numbers, at least twelve times a year. (“journal”) R.S.O. 1990, c. L.12, s. 1 (1).

Wilfrid Laurier and its 3 staff members did not do this. Shepherd did. She released the recording to the media, with the intent of making it widely distributed. So Rambukkana and Pimlott have a valid point. If Peterson did suffer damages, it was caused by Lindsay Shepherd.

Yes, Rambukkana and Pimlott were unprofessional for making the comments in the first place. However, it is clear they never meant to be recorded.

There is also some ambiguity as to the Statute of Limitations, whether it would be 3 months, or 2 years. If it is 3 months, then it has already lapsed.

Some Canadian Cases

Here is Hill v Church of Scientology of Toronto (1995), which dropped “actual malice” as a requirement.

Here is Grant v Torstar (2009), which created an exception for responsible journalism.

Here is Crookes v Newton (2011), which ruled that linking, or hyperlinking stories does not count as publishing.

However, all of this may be irrelevant, since it was Shepherd who SECRETLY recorded the meeting, and then chose to publish it WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OR CONSENT of the other parties.

Ontario’s Bill 52

Not sure if this would be relied on in the proceedings, but in 2015, the Ontario Government passed Bill 52 on this subject. Interesting is section 137.1

Dismissal of proceeding that limits debate
Purposes
Rejet d’une instance limitant les débats
Objects
137.1 (1) The purposes of this section and sections 137.2 to 137.5 are,
(a) to encourage individuals to express themselves on matters of public interest;
(b) to promote broad participation in debates on matters of public interest;
(c) to discourage the use of litigation as a means of unduly limiting expression on matters of public interest; and
(d) to reduce the risk that participation by the public in debates on matters of public interest will be hampered by fear of legal action.

Final Thoughts On This

The topic of tort reform is a popular one in recent years, particularly in the United States. Putting a cap on maximum damages, or making it harder to collect on bogus claims is a goal worth pursuing.

Any google or online search of “tort reform” will lead to an almost endless number of matches.

This is not at all to say that a person should “never” go to civil court. If an employer doesn’t pay your wages, or your property is damaged, or bills are not paid, then litigation can be a very valid path. Admittedly, “reasonable” is very subjective. However, most people can agree that one must suffer actual damages to go to court.

However, Shepherd and Peterson have both laid million dollar lawsuits because people said mean things to them. (Shepherd’s claim cites more detail). And hypocritically, both think nothing of mocking their detractors.

These 2 are not the free speech champions they pretend to be. Rather, they support free speech when it is convenient to do so. They are “free-speech grifters”.

Hard to feel sorry for her anymore.

(1) Jordan Peterson On United Nations sustainable Development Agenda
(2) Bill C-16, Gender Identity Bill In Canada
(3) Louder With Crowder interview
(4) Peterson & Cathy Newman
(5) Faith Goldy Deplatformed
(6) Deplatforming Faith Goldy At “Free Speech” Event
(7) https://www.identitygrifting.ca/
(8) Peterson announcing $1.5M lawsuit and WLU University and 3 employees
(9) Peterson Interview On Lawsuit (2:55)
(10) National Post article on WLU 3rd Party Defence
(11) Ontario Human Rights Code
(12) Ontario Court forms index.
(13) Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure
(14) Ontario Libel and Slander Act
(15) Hill v. Church of Scientology, 1995
(16) Ontario Bill 52, protecting expression in matters of public interest

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Diversity 101: RCMP Looking To Drop All Standards For New Recruits

(Another Case Of Diversity Trumping Merit)

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) are facing a personnel shortage, and have come up with an interesting solution: drop all standards, and focus on diversity. No, this is not an exaggeration.

1. Proposed Changes

1/ Criminal record may not be a barrier to entry
2/ Credit problems not to be a barrier to entry
3/ Aptitude testing to be eliminated
4/ Hearing tests to be reduced or eliminated
5/ Vision tests to be reduced or eliminated
6/ Long stints at the acadmeny (training) to be reduced
7/ Focus to be on recruiting women and visible minorities

This CBC article, article is very difficult to parody, as it reads as one. Also, the comments are well worth checking out.

2. Article Quotations

The RCMP are taking a radical look at their recruitment strategy and could ditch credit checks and the ban on recruits with criminal backgrounds to help them rebuild their depleted ranks.

The Mounties have been plagued by staffing challenges in recent years and are looking at how to convince more women and visible minorities to don the red serge.

An internal document, obtained through access to information, suggests credit checks, the criminal background ban, the two-hour aptitude test and long stints at the training depot could all be eliminated from the hiring process as senior ranks try to make a career as a Mountie more attractive.

The document notes that some of the mandatory requirements can create barriers for communities the force wants to attract, including “groups more likely to have contact with the criminal justice system.”
It asks: Are we “tuned-in or tone deaf?”

The review exercise is the brainchild of Vaughn Charlton, the director of gender-based-analysis-plus with the RCMP.
She was brought over from Status of Women Canada in April 2017 at the request of then-commissioner Bob Paulson and tasked with focusing on gender and inclusion within the force.

“We need to stop assuming there’s only one kind of person who belongs in policing,” she said in an interview with CBC News.

“If we’re going to have mandatory requirements, we want to make sure we’re not creating unintended barriers for reasons that really have nothing to do with whether you’d be a great police officer.”

For example, someone coming to the force later in life might not be able to spend 26 weeks at the training depot in Saskatchewan. Credit checks — long part of the RCMP security screening process — can be a barrier for single parents or those who’ve been forced to take long-term leave, said Charlton.

Staffing crunch

The document also flagged hearing and vision tests and long shifts as potential barriers and questioned the value of the aptitude screening assessment — which, among other things, tests memory, logic, judgment and comprehension.
“I can definitely say we are looking at everything really seriously,” Charlton said. “These are questions worth asking and thinking, ‘Are they still relevant criteria in 2019?'”

So far, Charlton said, her questions have gone over well with top brass.
The recruitment review exercise is ongoing with no set deadline, she said. The entrance exam is getting its own fairness review through the Public Service Commission.

“I think the challenge for us going forward is looking at diversity and inclusion as seriously as we look at security,” Charlton said.

‘Race to the bottom’

When Commissioner Brenda Lucki took over as top Mountie earlier this year, she was warned in a briefing binder that “the RCMP has a growing vacancy rate that exceeds its present ability to produce regular members at a rate that keeps pace with projected future demands.”

The briefing note says that in the last five years, there has been a “dramatic” increase in the number of new recruits required to fill operational vacancies and evolving program requirements.

The RCMP says that in 2018, 21.6 per cent of regular members self-identified as women and 20.8 per cent of members above the inspector level were women. According to a 2017 report, about 10 per cent of the force identify as visible minority and eight per cent are Indigenous.

Time for civilian governance at RCMP, watchdog says in harassment report

Analysis: Toxic culture, harassment issues overshadow RCMP commissioner’s tenure
Christian Leuprecht, a Royal Military College professor who has written about the RCMP’s structure, said public service organizations like police forces are plagued by cumbersome hiring processes and low pay. On top of that, the RCMP have been plagued in recent years by allegations of sexual harassment, bullying and intimidation within the ranks.

“What this all points to is that the RCMP is going to have to change the way they do business, both as an organization and in particular in the way they recruit,” he said.

But Leuprecht cautioned against dropping too many of the mandatory requirements simply to raise the number of applicants. In an age of complex cybercrime investigations, terrorist threats and sophisticated organized crime operations, he said the force needs to ask itself how it can bring in more of the country’s top minds.
“The discussion is always about, ‘Well what can we do to kind of eliminate some barriers to this race to the bottom?'” he said.

“The RCMP is the largest police organization in the country and it is also our federal police force. This needs to be the force that shows the greatest professionalism, the greatest competence and that needs to position itself as an employer of choice and an employer that affords equality of opportunity to all Canadians.”

With files from the CBC’s Kathleen Harris

3. Thoughts On The Proposal

(1) Dropping the prohibition against people with a criminal record is non-sensical. Having a “pardoned” criminal record is one thing, but letting actual criminals in to do the policing?

Additionally, there are way too many questions here:
(a) Which offences will be grounds for exclusion?
(b) Will there be any specific cut-off, or is it case by case?
(c) Will there be a waiting period before a person can enter?
(d) Will people on parole or probation be allowed to enter?
(e) If an ex-con has a firearms ban, will that be waived?
(f) If an ex-con has a driving prohibition, will that be waived?

(2) Credit checks are used in places like banks. When putting someone is a position of trust, it is important to have some knowledge that they can manage finances, and will be less likely to abuse that trust.

Furthermore, ”employment credit checks” do not show anywhere near as much information as say, getting a check for a loan or credit card. These ones are severely restricted in the information disclosed, as it is to measure trustworthiness, not the balance on your cards or mortgage.

(3) Dropping the aptitude test? Do we not want some intellectual standards for RCMP recruits? If a person cannot meet a basic entry level exam, then excluding that person, or people, is in the best interest of the organization. It does raise the question though: is this an attempt to gain more ESL recruits?

(4) Hearing and vision tests are useful, since your physical health and sense are essential to one’s ability to do the job. Further, given how dangerous and gruelling policing can be, physical strength and stamina are needed.

(5)Yes, being away from the family for 6 months can be a burden, but training to be a police officer is a serious commitment. It cannot simply be gutted.

(6) Who cares how many people are women (or trannies identifying as women), or how many people are of a particular background? The focus should be on creating a strong force of intelligent, fit people with good moral character. The rest is just pandering to identity politics.

(7) “”….If we’re going to have mandatory requirements, we want to make sure we’re not creating unintended barriers for reasons that really have nothing to do with whether you’d be a great police officer.””

If we’re going to have mandatory requirements? These people seem uncertain about that. Also, the above criteria are VERY important in selecting police recruits.

(8) Assuming the claims of a culture of harassment are true — fire any and all people engaging in behaviour and focus on building a force with better decency. Don’t eliminate standards. This is sort of like having Problem “A”, and coming up with Solution “B”.

(9) Why change the way you do business? Again, terminate the bad apples, but don’t make it open-recruitment under the guide of ”inclusiveness”.

(10) An interesting point is made: in an era where technology and crime is becoming more sophisticated, do we want to be LOWERING our IQ entry requirements?

(11) Regarding the obsession with Gender-Based Analysis: no one is saying that women should not be police officers. Rather, their abilities should be valued more, and the focus on being women should be stopped. This is a frequent straw-man lefties use: assume any difference in stats is due to discrimination, and not due to personal choices.

4. Moronic To The Extreme

This quote says it all:


“We need to stop assuming there’s only one kind of person who belongs in policing,” she said in an interview with CBC News.

The challenge for us going forward is looking at diversity and inclusion as seriously as we look at security.

– Vaughn Charlton

Yes, we need to focusing on diversity and inclusion as much as security. So, people with criminal records, poor credit, low IQ, lack of commitment, poor hearing/vision, etc…. are just “another form of diversity”?

Enough of the endless pandering. Simply hire good quality recruits. If needed, make the compensation and benefits package more attractive. Offer flexibility in work locations. Don’t water down the standards.

Again, pretty difficult to parody this article.

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Supreme Court Will Hear Woman Arrested for Not Holding Handrail

(Bela Kosoian, taking legal action to S.C.C.)

***********************************************************************
The full text for UN Global Migration Compact is RIGHT HERE.

Please sign this: PETITION E-1906 CLICK HERE
***********************************************************************

The Supreme Court of Canada has agreed to hear Bela Kosoian, a woman detained in Laval, Quebec, for refusing to hold a hand rail.

(1) Backstory of the Case
This is a a bizarre story, starting in 2009, of a woman in a Laval, QC, subway station, refused instructions from transit officers to hold a handrail while on an escalator.

When transit officers attempted to write her a ticket for the refusal to obey, she refused to identify herself. Identity is rather important in enforcing tickets. This led to her being detained for about a half hour, after which point she did reveal her name.

Kosoian was issued 2 tickets from that incident, one for $100, and one for $320. She contested both, and they were eventually thrown out.

Since then, she has taken legal action against the city, the STM, and a staff member. After a series of legal twists, it will now be heard by the Supreme Court of Canada.

(2) Quebec Court of Justice — Trial Court
Kosoian took legal action against: (a) the City of Laval; (b) Fabio Camacho — one of the officers; and (c) the Transportation Company of Montreal — aka the STM. She sought $24,000 for moral damages, pain, suffering, inconvenience and exemplary damages, and another $45,000 for moral and punitive damages for the fault committed by its agent.

Kosoian submitted a VERY LENGTHY list and description of physical and psychological trauma suffered as a resukt of being detained for about half an hour. On the surface, it seems like malingering.

Section 49 of the Canadian Charter was invoked, which states:

CHAPTER V
SPECIAL AND INTERPRETATIVE PROVISIONS

49. Any unlawful interference with any right or freedom recognized by this Charter entitles the victim to obtain the cessation of such interference and compensation for the moral or material prejudice resulting therefrom.
In case of unlawful and intentional interference, the tribunal may, in addition, condemn the person guilty of it to punitive damages.

For it’s part, the STM Referenced By-Law R-036

” BY-LAW R-036

“REGULATIONS RESPECTING THE SAFETY AND BEHAVIOR STANDARDS OF PERSONS IN ROAD EQUIPMENT AND BUILDINGS OPERATED BY OR FOR THE MONTREAL TRANSPORTATION CORPORATION”

[…]

SECTION III – GENERAL PROVISIONS

3. Subject to the law and regulations, any person has the right to use the public transportation system of the Company in comfort and safety.

Subsection I – Citizenship

4. In or on a building or rolling stock, no person shall

(a) impede or hinder the free movement of persons, including standing still, lurking, strolling, laying down or carrying a bag, container or other object;

(b) endanger the safety of persons or rolling stock, in particular by depositing or carrying a bag, container or other object;

[…]

e) to disobey a directive or pictogram posted by the Society;

[…]

h) to delay or interfere with the work of a servant of the Corporation; “

But according to the STM staff, it is not the potential safety infraction that led to Bela Kosoian being arrested. Rather, it was her refusal to identity herself when being written a ticket.

In August 2015, a Quebec Court rejected the claim. It stated that the officers acted reasonably, and that the situation was largely self-inflicted

(3) Motion for Leave, Quebec Court of Appeal
Kosoian sought leave to go to the Quebec Court of Appeal.

On December 2015, in an extremely brief ruling, the Quebec Court of Appeal allowed the appeal to proceed, dismissing a motion from the Respondents.

(4) Appeal, Quebec Court of Appeal
In a 2-1 split decision, Kosoian lost her appeal at the Quebec Court of Appeals. 2 Justices ruled that the STM and its staff had acted reasonably. In dissent, the other Justice says he would have set aside the Trial ruling, and ordered $15,000 in damages.

[ 1 ] The appellant appeals against a judgment rendered on August 11, 2015, by the Court of Quebec, District of Laval (the Honorable Denis Le Reste), dismissing the appellant’s motion to institute damages for damages .
[ 2 ] For the reasons of Dutil and Vauclair JJ., THE COURT :
[ 3 ] REJECTS the appeal with court costs.
[ 4 ] For other reasons, Schrager JA would have allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment at trial, granted the motion to institute proceedings, ordered the respondents, jointly and severally, to pay the appellant the sum of 15,000 $ with interest and the additional indemnity since the summons at first instance, as well as legal costs at first instance and on appeal, and stated that between the respondents, the Montreal Transit Corporation will have to assume the entire conviction.

(5) Supreme Court of Canada
This leads things to where they are today. Once again, the Supreme Court granting leave to appeal just now.

The motion for an extension of time and the application for leave to appeal is granted. The application for leave to appeal to the judgment of theCourt of Appeal of Quebec (Montreal), Number 500-09-025644-154, 2017 QCCA 1919 (CanLII) , date December 5, 2017, is awarded with costs in the case. The schedule for serving and filing materials will be set by the Registrar .

An interesting split so far in the courts. In Kosoian’s favour:
-Supreme Court of Canada, leave to appeal
-Quebec Court of appeal, dissenting opinion
-Quebec Court of Appeal, motion for leave

And against Kosoian:
-Quebec Court of Appeal, majority opinion
-Quebec Trial Court
-Laval ruling which dismissed the original tickets.

Personally, I see blame on both sides here. While ticketing her for refusing to hold a handrail does seem excessive, the escalation of the problems resulted from Kosoian herself. She did refuse to identify herself when being ticketed, which for the STM was a legitimate demand. Also, her claims of emotional and psychological damages seem grossly exaggerated, and manipulated to seek a huge damages amount.

The Supreme Court Appeal Panel will now decide the case.

Posted on

Privacy Commissioner, Banks, Throw StatsCan Under the Bus

(The issue of bank data being seized is raised in Parliament)

This article was released by Global News on October 26, 2018, and CanuckLaw covered it here on October 28. In short, Statistics Canada wants to seize the banking information of 500,000 Canadians (each year), and do it without the knowledge or consent of Canadians.

(at 1:40 in the video) Statistics Canada representative James Tabreke in a very blunt way claims that this is a ”new way of getting economic data to make government decisions”. He also claims that StatsCan is being open with the public, and that the Canadian Banks were aware of this.

(at 2:32 in the video) Claim that the Privacy Commissioner has okayed the project.

Prime Minister Trudeau, in his typically partisan manner, defended the data seizure. Of course blamed Stephen Harper for eliminating the long form census in 2010. He claimed StatsCan was working closely with the Privacy Commissioner.

Now the lies get exposed:
First, Trudeau is distorting the truth with reference to Harper gutting the long-form census. In the original video, Statistics Canada claimed bank seizure was a move done to replace the long form census. So Harper cancelling the LFC in 2010 was actually irrelevant, as StatsCan was going to pull this stunt anyway.

Second, StatsCan claims that they have been open with what they are doing. Yet, these talks have been going on for a year now without the public’s knowledge.

Third, the C.B.A. (Canadian Bankers Association) has publicly objected, claiming they thought StatsCan was just in an exploratory stage. C.B.A. says they didn’t know StatsCan was going ahead with this, and says they will oppose the measure. Here is their statement:

Statement from the Canadian Bankers Association

Protecting the information privacy of their valued customers is a top priority for banks in Canada. Banks believed this proposed data acquisition project was still in the exploratory stages and were not aware that Statistics Canada was moving to compel disclosure of this information. No customer transaction data or other personal information has been transferred to Statistics Canada under this request. The CBA is working with members to understand the nature of this request and next steps.

Fourth, the Privacy Commissioner, seen here appearing before the Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, refutes the claim that he ”okayed the move”. Instead, he stated that he does not have the authority to approve such a thing, and is only able to provide general advice on privacy laws.

Fifth, the Privacy Commissioner claims he was unaware until very recently that Statistics Canada that they wanted to do this to 500,000 Canadians. He says numbers were not discussed. In the hearing he states, ”Proportionality is very important.”

Sixth, the Privacy Commissioner states he was unaware or just how much information would be seized by such a move.

Seventh, the Privacy Commissioner admits that StatsCan was not nearly as transparent as it could have been.

Eighth, and this is a glaring omission: StatsCan doesn’t say how this massive intrusion would actually help. There are just vague references to ”economic information”.

Certainly, that 15 years of credit card data had recently been seized also doesn’t sit well with many Canadians.

Now that formal complaints against this measure have been filed with the Privacy Commissioner, there is no longer the option of just giving general legal information. At this point, an investigation is mandated by law.

The proposal appears to be dead in the water, as public outrage and the threats of legal action are forcing StatsCan to back off. But it will be interesting to see if the Federal Liberals continue to support this Orwellian measure.

Note:
Statistics Canada, Equifax, Transunion, the C.B.A., and the major banks have all been contacted by CanuckLaw for comment. Any responses will be posted here as updates.

Canadian Banker’s Association rep Aaron Boles
Thanks, Alex.

The most important take-away from yesterday is that StatsCan is suspending any movement on its proposed project until the Office of the Privacy Commissioner has completed its report, which we understand will be January at the earliest. We were firm in our appearance before the Senate Committee that all options are on the table in terms of defending the privacy and security of bank customers’ personal information and transaction records. Until the OPC report is tabled and StatsCan responds about what it proposes to do thereafter, there’s little point in speculating on how information on spending habits would be collected, if at all.

Best,

AEB

From RBC
Hi Alex – please refer to the CBA for comment on this.

Best,
AJ

AJ Goodman I Director, External Communications, Personal & Commercial Banking I

From TD Canada
Hi Alex,

We refer your inquiry to the CBA, however can tell you that TD takes the trust our customers place in us extremely seriously and has not agreed to share customer data.

Thanks,

Alison

From Statistics Canada
Hello,

“I can assure you that we will not proceed with this project until we have addressed the privacy concerns expressed by Canadians by working cooperatively with the Privacy Commissioner and with financial institutions.”

Anil Arora, Chief Statistician of Canada (Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, November 8, 2018)

Thank you,

Laurence Beaudoin-Corriveau

Manager (Acting), Media Relations, Communications
Statistics Canada, Government of Canada

laurence.beaudoin-corriveau@canada.ca / Tel: 613-951-2599

From Equifax
Hello Alex.

In our database, Equifax Canada has information on ~27M Canadian consumers, which we maintain as a registered Canadian credit bureau in accordance with applicable credit reporting and privacy laws. Statistics Canada has never directed Equifax Canada to provide them with, and subsequently, Equifax Canada has not provided to Statistics Canada all of its data pursuant to its enabling legislation.

In any instance where a regulated body relying on legislative authority requests information from Equifax, our standard process is to conduct a review against our internal data governance and security processes, as well as to consider applicable law prior to disclosure.

We don’t have any information on the rumour you mentioned about credit data from 15 years ago.

Media Relations | Equifax Canada Co.

5700 Yonge St., Suite 1700, Toronto, Ontario, Canada M2M 4K2

Posted on

Canada’s Bill C-75 (Watering Down Penalties for Terrorism, Rioting, Weapons)

(The Canadian Criminal Code, which typically gets amended every year)

Criminal offences in Canada are categorized like this

SUMMARY OFFENCE: more minor, lesser penalties (misdemeanor)
INDICTABLE OFFENCE: more serious, harsher penalties (felony)
HYBRID OFFENCE: Prosecutor has discretion as to proceed “summarily” or “by indictment”

For a good video on this subject, Julie Mora posted a video seen here. It had 2 parts: (a) an expanded gun registry, Bill C-71, and (b) changes to the Canadian Criminal Code, Bill C-75. Julie is a fine blogger, and her videos are well worth a watch by all Canadians. She claims in this video that the bill will “hybridize” many serious charges, meaning that they may now be tried summarily. And she is right. Below are the major points.

This is not trivial at all. Terrorism and rioting offence should be treated seriously. Yet, if this bill were actually to pass, the penalties for serious crimes may be gutted. True, for hybrid offences, Prosecutors could still choose to try the case by indictment. However, most people would agree that the option should not exist

Relevant links are below:
CLICK HERE for the Criminal Code as it currently exists.
CLICK HERE for the Liberal Bill C-75.

ORIGINAL

Marginal note:
Punishment of rioter
65 (1) Every one who takes part in a riot is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.
Marginal note:
Concealment of identity
(2) Every person who commits an offence under subsection (1) while wearing a mask or other disguise to conceal their identity without lawful excuse is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years.

REPLACEMENT

Punishment of rioter
65 (1) Every person who takes part in a riot is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than two years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.
Concealment of identity
(2) Every person who commits an offence under subsection (1) while wearing a mask or other disguise to conceal their identity without lawful excuse is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.

ORIGINAL

Neglect by peace officer
69 A peace officer who receives notice that there is a riot within his jurisdiction and, without reasonable excuse, fails to take all reasonable steps to suppress the riot is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.

REPLACEMENT

Neglect by peace officer
69 A peace officer who receives notice that there is a riot within their jurisdiction and, without reasonable excuse, fails to take all reasonable steps to suppress the riot is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than two years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.

ORIGINAL

Possession without lawful excuse
82 (1) Every person who, without lawful excuse, the proof of which lies on the person, makes or has in the possession or under the care or control of the person any explosive substance is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years.

REPLACEMENT

14 Subsection 82(1) of the Act is replaced by the following:

Possession of explosive
82 (1) Every person who, without lawful excuse, makes or has in their possession or under their care or control any explosive substance is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than five years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.

ORIGINAL

Financing of Terrorism
Marginal note:
Providing or collecting property for certain activities
83.02 Every one who, directly or indirectly, wilfully and without lawful justification or excuse, provides or collects property intending that it be used or knowing that it will be used, in whole or in part, in order to carry out
(a) an act or omission that constitutes an offence referred to in subparagraphs (a)(i) to (ix) of the definition of terrorist activity in subsection 83.01(1), or
(b) any other act or omission intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to a civilian or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, if the purpose of that act or omission, by its nature or context, is to intimidate the public, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or refrain from doing any act,
is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years.

REPLACEMENT

Providing or collecting property for certain activities
83.‍02 Every person is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years or is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction who, directly or indirectly, wilfully and without lawful justification or excuse, provides or collects property intending that it be used or knowing that it will be used, in whole or in part, in order to carry out
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than five years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.

ORIGINAL

Providing, making available, etc., property or services for terrorist purposes
83.03 Every one who, directly or indirectly, collects property, provides or invites a person to provide, or makes available property or financial or other related services
(a) intending that they be used, or knowing that they will be used, in whole or in part, for the purpose of facilitating or carrying out any terrorist activity, or for the purpose of benefiting any person who is facilitating or carrying out such an activity, or
(b) knowing that, in whole or part, they will be used by or will benefit a terrorist group,
is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years.

REPLACEMENT

Providing, making available, etc.‍, property or services for terrorist purposes
83.‍03 Every person is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years or is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction who, directly or indirectly, collects property, provides or invites a person to provide, or makes available property or financial or other related services
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than five years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.

ORIGINAL

Using or possessing property for terrorist purposes
83.04 Every one who
(a) uses property, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, for the purpose of facilitating or carrying out a terrorist activity, or
(b) possesses property intending that it be used or knowing that it will be used, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, for the purpose of facilitating or carrying out a terrorist activity,
is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years.

REPLACEMENT

Using or possessing property for terrorist purposes

83.‍04 Every person is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years or is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction

ORIGINAL

Offences — freezing of property, disclosure or audit
83.12 (1) Every one who contravenes any of sections 83.08, 83.1 and 83.11 is guilty of an offence and liable
(a) on summary conviction, to a fine of not more than $100,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than one year, or to both; or
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years.

REPLACEMENT

Paragraphs 83.‍12(1)‍(a) and (b) of the Act are replaced by the following:

(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years; or
(b) on summary conviction, to a fine of not more than $100,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than two years less a day, or to both.

ORIGINAL

Participation in activity of terrorist group
83.18 (1) Every one who knowingly participates in or contributes to, directly or indirectly, any activity of a terrorist group for the purpose of enhancing the ability of any terrorist group to facilitate or carry out a terrorist activity is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years.

REPLACEMENT

Participation in activity of terrorist group
83.‍18 (1) Every person who knowingly participates in or contributes to, directly or indirectly, any activity of a terrorist group for the purpose of enhancing the ability of any terrorist group to facilitate or carry out a terrorist activity is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than10 years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.

ORIGINAL

Leaving Canada to participate in activity of terrorist group
83.181 Everyone who leaves or attempts to leave Canada, or goes or attempts to go on board a conveyance with the intent to leave Canada, for the purpose of committing an act or omission outside Canada that, if committed in Canada, would be an offence under subsection 83.18(1) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years

REPLACEMENT

21 Section 83.‍181 of the Act is replaced by the following:

Leaving Canada to participate in activity of terrorist group
83.‍181 Every person who leaves or attempts to leave Canada, or goes or attempts to go on board a conveyance with the intent to leave Canada, for the purpose of committing an act or omission outside Canada that, if committed in Canada, would be an offence under subsection 83.‍18(1) is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.

ORIGINAL

Advocating or promoting commission of terrorism offences
83.221 (1) Every person who, by communicating statements, knowingly advocates or promotes the commission of terrorism offences in general — other than an offence under this section — while knowing that any of those offences will be committed or being reckless as to whether any of those offences may be committed, as a result of such communication, is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than five years.

REPLACEMENT

22 Subsection 83.‍221(1) of the Act is replaced by the following:

Advocating or promoting commission of terrorism offences
83.‍221 (1) Every person who, by communicating statements, knowingly advocates or promotes the commission of terrorism offences in general — other than an offence under this section — while knowing that any of those offences will be committed or being reckless as to whether any of those offences may be committed, as a result of such communication, is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than five years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction

ORIGINAL

Concealing person who carried out terrorist activity
83.23 (1) Everyone who knowingly harbours or conceals any person whom they know to be a person who has carried out a terrorist activity, for the purpose of enabling the person to facilitate or carry out any terrorist activity, is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment
(a) for a term of not more than 14 years, if the person who is harboured or concealed carried out a terrorist activity that is a terrorism offence for which that person is liable to imprisonment for life; and
(b) for a term of not more than 10 years, if the person who is harboured or concealed carried out a terrorist activity that is a terrorism offence for which that person is liable to any other punishment.

REPLACEMENT

Concealing person who carried out terrorist activity
83.‍23 (1) Every person who knowingly harbours or conceals another person whom they know to be a person who has carried out a terrorist activity, for the purpose of enabling that other person to facilitate or carry out any terrorist activity, is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 14 years, if the person who is harboured or concealed carried out a terrorist activity that is a terrorism offence for which that person is liable to imprisonment for life; and
(b) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years or an offence punishable on summary conviction, if the person who is harboured or concealed carried out a terrorist activity that is a terrorism offence for which that person is liable to any other punishment.

ORIGINAL

Concealing person who is likely to carry out terrorist activity
(2) Everyone who knowingly harbours or conceals any person whom they know to be a person who is likely to carry out a terrorist activity, for the purpose of enabling the person to facilitate or carry out any terrorist activity, is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years.

REPLACEMENT

Concealing person who is likely to carry out terrorist activity
(2) Every person who knowingly harbours or conceals another person whom they know to be a person who is likely to carry out a terrorist activity, for the purpose of enabling that other person to facilitate or carry out any terrorist activity, is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction

ORIGINAL

Person to be brought before judge
(3) A peace officer who arrests a person in the execution of the warrant shall, without delay, bring the person, or cause them to be brought, before the judge who issued the warrant or another judge of the same court. The judge in question may, to ensure compliance with the order, order that the person be detained in custody or released on recognizance, with or without sureties.

REPLACEMENT

25 Subsection 83.‍29(3) of the Act is replaced by the following:

Person to be brought before judge
(3) A peace officer who arrests a person in the execution of a warrant shall, without delay, bring the person, or cause the person to be brought, before the judge who issued the warrant or another judge of the same court. The judge in question may, to ensure compliance with the order, order that the person be detained in custody or make a release order, the form of which may be adapted to suit the circumstances

[Note: the new wording is such that is seems intended to make it easier to release suspected terrorists]

ORIGINAL

Possession of prohibited or restricted firearm with ammunition

Punishment
(2) Every person who commits an offence under subsection (1)
(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of
(i) in the case of a first offence, three years, and
(ii) in the case of a second or subsequent offence, five years; or
(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year.

REPLACEMENT

27 Paragraph 95(2)‍(b) of the Act is replaced by the following:

(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

ORIGINAL

Possession of weapon obtained by commission of offence

96 (1) Subject to subsection (3), every person commits an offence who possesses a firearm, a prohibited weapon, a restricted weapon, a prohibited device or any prohibited ammunition that the person knows was obtained by the commission in Canada of an offence or by an act or omission anywhere that, if it had occurred in Canada, would have constituted an offence.
Marginal note:
Punishment
(2) Every person who commits an offence under subsection (1)
(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of one year; or
(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year.

REPLACEMENT

28 Paragraph 96(2)‍(b) of the Act is replaced by the following:

(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

As absurd as it sounds, here is the “SUMMARY” of Bill C-75.

SUMMARY

This enactment amends the Criminal Code to, among other things,
(a) modernize and clarify interim release provisions to simplify the forms of release that may be imposed on an accused, incorporate a principle of restraint and require that particular attention be given to the circumstances of Aboriginal accused and accused from vulnerable populations when making interim release decisions, and provide more onerous interim release requirements for offences involving violence against an intimate partner;
(b) provide for a judicial referral hearing to deal with administration of justice offences involving a failure to comply with conditions of release or failure to appear as required;
(c) abolish peremptory challenges of jurors, modify the process of challenging a juror for cause so that a judge makes the determination of whether a ground of challenge is true, and allow a judge to direct that a juror stand by for reasons of maintaining public confidence in the administration of justice;
(d) increase the maximum term of imprisonment for repeat offences involving intimate partner violence and provide that abuse of an intimate partner is an aggravating factor on sentencing;
(e) restrict the availability of a preliminary inquiry to offences punishable by imprisonment for life and strengthen the justice’s powers to limit the issues explored and witnesses to be heard at the inquiry;
(f) hybridize most indictable offences punishable by a maximum penalty of 10 years or less, increase the default maximum penalty to two years less a day of imprisonment for summary conviction offences and extend the limitation period for summary conviction offences to 12 months;
(g) remove the requirement for judicial endorsement for the execution of certain out-of-province warrants and authorizations, expand judicial case management powers, allow receiving routine police evidence in writing, consolidate provisions relating to the powers of the Attorney General and allow increased use of technology to facilitate remote attendance by any person in a proceeding;
(h) allow the court to exempt an offender from the requirement to pay a victim surcharge if the offender satisfies the court that the payment would cause the offender undue hardship, provide the court with guidance as to what constitutes undue hardship, provide that a victim surcharge is to be paid for each offence, with an exception for certain administration of justice offences if the total amount of surcharges imposed on an offender for those types of offences would be disproportionate in the circumstances, require courts to provide reasons for granting any exception for certain administration of justice offences or any exemption from the requirement to pay a victim surcharge and clarify that the amendments described in this paragraph apply to any offender who is sentenced after the day on which they come into force, regardless of whether or not the offence was committed before that day; and
(i) remove passages and repeal provisions that have been ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Canada, repeal section 159 of the Act and provide that no person shall be convicted of any historical offence of a sexual nature unless the act that constitutes the offence would constitute an offence under the Criminal Code if it were committed on the day on which the charge was laid.

The enactment also amends the Youth Criminal Justice Act in order to reduce delays within the youth criminal justice system and enhance the effectiveness of that system with respect to administration of justice offences. For those purposes, the enactment amends that Act to, among other things,
(a) set out principles intended to encourage the use of extrajudicial measures and judicial reviews as alternatives to the laying of charges for administration of justice offences;
(b) set out requirements for imposing conditions on a young person’s release order or as part of a sentence;
(c) limit the circumstances in which a custodial sentence may be imposed for an administration of justice offence;
(d) remove the requirement for the Attorney General to determine whether to seek an adult sentence in certain circumstances; and
(e) remove the power of a youth justice court to make an order to lift the ban on publication in the case of a young person who receives a youth sentence for a violent offence, as well as the requirement to determine whether to make such an order.

Finally, the enactment amends among other Acts An Act to amend the Criminal Code (exploitation and trafficking in persons) so that certain sections of that Act can come into force on different days and also makes consequential amendments to other Acts.
Bill C-75 is too long to possibly cover entirely in one article, though this is the most serious of it.

Having much smaller bills introduced would certainly be preferable. Far too often, governments ram through much unrelated material into a bill, called “omnibus bills”, such that proper debate never actually happens.

A more thorough debate could be had if this were broken up into 6-8 separate bills

And just reiterate, terrorism and other major crimes should always be tried by indictment.

Posted on

European Union Censorship

(Provocative, but you get the point)

September 12, 2018 — the European Union passed this law, the “Copyright Directive”, in a 438-226 vote.

Other media on the subject can be found: here, here, here, and here.

The “Copyright Directive” was originally stopped in July of this year, primarily over concerns over Articles 11 and 13. And to a degree, the concerns were over the same thing. Responding to, or critiquing another’s work is very common, and makes way for advancement of discussion of ideas. As long as there is some educational, critical or reporting use (and not blatant copyright), then using portions of a person or institution’s work is fine. In fact, this very website, Chimeratsk.com, cites Canadian “Fair Dealing“, and American “Fair Use” provisions.

Article 11, a.k.a. the “link tax”, concerned ways for original content creators to get paid via taxes or royalties. In practice though, how would one know who the original content creator was? Perhaps the royalties would be going to someone who is at least in part responding to another person’s work.

Article 13 had to do with platforms such as Facebook and YouTube being blocked from sharing protected content. Apparently there is to be a huge database on protected material, which by itself sounds creepy. To be fair though, the law says that encyclopedia-type platforms like Wikipedia will be exempt. However, as many images, text and music can sound similar, how would the original creator be identified?

Further, copyrighted material does not last forever. For example, the book “1984”, written by George Orwell (a.k.a. Eric Arthur Blair was written in 1949, so after 1999, a Canuck should be free to use it freely. Under Canadian Copyright Law, 50 years after death, copyright protection would disappear. Yes, ironic to use the Orwewll book here. However, would this EU driven database(s) know when copyright on each image, unique, phrase, text, etc… lapse?

On a semi-related note: there is an academic database — turnitin.com which college and university students would upload digitial copies of essays and other papers. This is an anti-plagiarism site which was to ensure that students were handing in original work. The site would compare and contrast the student paper against millions of others and look for regions of overlap. Sounds great, except for problems those arose in this.

At its core, the Copyright Directive seems to nullify what may be considered Fair Dealing/Fair Use exemptions (by listing the original content creator as the copyright owner of any and all of its content, and responses. CLICK HERE, for an article on the proposed revisions of Article 11 and 13.

Some accidental incidents of censorship occurred here, here, and here.

While the E.U. has passed this Copyright Directive, there are reasons to be cautiously optimistic:

First, even if nothing is done, this seems absurd on its face to implement. (See the earlier criticism on logistical issues). Yes, content is still getting blocked, even the most innocuous stuff. While this is done under the guise of “protecting” creators, the complications that will arise will cause more and more headaches. Oddly, creators will “lose” money if research and ad revenue plummet.

Second, the law will undoubtedly face legal challenges and be tied up in the courts for years.

Third, each memberstate will implement their own version of this law, and that will likely not happen for a year or 2. Harder to enforce when the rules aren’t uniform. And on a related note: what about the UK, who is leaving the E.U.? What about any other member who may leave? What happens if governments change and their successors don’t agree with what they see? And won’t any inconsistencies in member laws make it easier to challenge the law?

Fourth, what if any E.U. members decide to just ignore the directive altogether? The EU has shown itself to be rather toothless in enforcing its own rules and orders.

Fifth, how will this be enforced when using material from, or creating new content in countries that do not have these laws, or subscribe to this version of them?

Online creators decry this EU directive, and they do have reason to be worried. However, there are many options available to fight it, and many hurdles it will face.