Category: Canadian Decisions

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Federal “Injection Travel Mandate” Cases: Why Appeal When They Could Have Been Fixed?

This is yet another instance of “alternative” media not telling the whole story.

Recently, the news broke that 3 Applications for Leave to the Supreme Court of Canada had been denied. These were attempts at secondary Appeals for Peckford, Bernier and Naoum, challenging the “travel mandates” and the requirement to take the shots in order to travel.

There was actually a 4th Application grouped together, but those litigants have since filed a Statement of Claim instead. The other 3 chose to take the above route.

For context, the 4 related Applications were filed in late 2021 and into 2022. Because they covered essentially the same subject matter, they would be heard together.

  • T-145-22: Nabil Ben Naoum
  • T-247-22: Maxime Bernier
  • T-1991-21: Shaun Rickard, Karl Harrison
  • T-168-22: Brian Peckford, Leesha Nikkanen, Ken Baigent, Drew Belobaba, Natalie Grcic, Aedan MacDonald

To make a very long story short: it didn’t have to be this way.

The Federal Court ruled in October 2022 that the 4 cases were “moot”, meaning there was no active issue to try. Since mandates were no longer in effect, all that was sought was declaratory relief. This was in spite of talk that injection mandates could return at some point.

Now the Applicants could have taken another path, and commenced Actions (and filed Claims). This was made clear to them.

Rather than do this, they all chose to appeal the mootness ruling.

They appealed, instead of taking the easier path to fix their case.

Basically, this is Action4Canada 2.0

Action4Canada Case V.S. Travel Mandates Case

Consider 2 high profile cases in recent years.

(Case #1) Back in August 2022, the Action4Canada case (filed in Vancouver) was struck as “bad beyond argument“. This 391 page monster failed to follow even the basics of Civil Procedure. It was incoherent, and asked for all kinds of remedies outside the jurisdiction of a Civil Court. However, Justice Alan Ross did allow an amended Notice of Civil Claim to be filed.

Instead of filing a proper Claim, the ruling was appealed instead. They lost.

(Case #2) Back in October 2022, the Federal Court struck 4 Applications to Federal injection mandates for travel for “mootness”. Justice Jocelyne Gagné made a discretionary finding that there was no live issue to try, since the mandates were no longer in effect. However, Justice Gagné, and Associate Justice Tabib, had remarked that if there were damages, then these cases could proceed as Actions. Of course, this would involve filing Statements of Claim.

Instead of filing Actions, ALL of the Applicants appealed.

Following this, they (other than Rickard and Harrison) attempted to appeal again.

The Action4Canada and travel mandate cases share a common thread. Although the circumstances differed, all were given the option to correct the flaws in their pleadings. Instead, each of them chose to appeal.

Filing Actions V.S. Filing Judicial Reviews

JURISDICTION ACTION JUDICIAL REVIEW STEPS TAKEN
Federal Statement Of Claim Application Motion
Ontario Statement Of Claim Application Motion
British Columbia Notice Of Civil Claim Petition Application

Although the names vary somewhat, there are normally a few different ways to commence legal action.

The most common way is with an Action, and it involves filing a Statement of Claim, or some similar document. These can be very simple cases, or they can be very complex and tedious.

A lesser known and understood method is by Judicial Review. In essence, it’s the challenging of some sort of decision or order made by some Government official. Despite how it’s often used, the idea is to challenge simple rulings, such as licences being denied, or funding not being received. It’s typically a much more streamlined process than Actions.

There is overlap between them, and the circumstances of each case determines which would be appropriate.

Why does this matter? Because the Federal Court left open the possibility for these litigants to refile their grievances as Actions, and ask for damages. Instead, they appealed, because …. reasons.

Rickard and Harrison were quite aware of this, as their 2022 Motion indicates. So when the Applications were struck, they could have refiled, but as Actions. They appealed, because …. reasons.

Justices Tabib & Gagné Stated That Case Could Proceed As An Action

True, at an earlier Motion, Associate Justice Tabib did dismiss a Motion that would have allowed the Rickard/Harrison Application to be converted into an Action. Yes, the original pleading wasn’t permitted to be amended to include damages.

Yes, Justice Gagné did strike the Applications as being “moot”. Since no one (apparently) sought damages in their Application, and the travel mandates were lifted, there apparently wasn’t a “live” issue to try.

However, consider what was actually written in the October 2022 decision.

[41] As stated above, these proceedings will have no practical effect on the rights of the Applicants. They have obtained the full relief available to them and a decision of the remaining declaratory relief would provide them no practical utility. If they suffered damages as a result of these IOs/MO being in force, they would have to bring an action against the Crown and have their respective rights assessed in light of all the relevant facts.

This is from the ruling, and is pretty clear. If there were damages suffered, then the case should be brought as an Action, not an Application.

Standard For Review: Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33

After the 4 Applications were declared “moot” in the Fall of 2022, the Applicants could have converted them into Actions, and filed Statement of Claim for each (or one for everyone). Appealing made no sense, especially when looking at the “Standard of Review“. See highlighted version.

What this means is that different standards are applied, depending on whether someone is challenging a: (a) finding of fact; (b) application of or findings of the law; or (c) a discretionary act by a Judge.

Findings of fact: standard of review is “overriding palpable error”
Findings of law: standard of review is correctness
Exercises of discretion: standard of review is “overriding palpable error”

The standard of review for findings of fact is such that they cannot be reversed unless the trial judge has made a “palpable and overriding error”. A palpable error is one that is plainly seen. The reasons for deferring to a trial judge’s findings of fact can be grouped into three basic principles. First, given the scarcity of judicial resources, setting limits on the scope of judicial review in turn limits the number, length and cost of appeals. Secondly, the principle of deference promotes the autonomy and integrity of the trial proceedings. Finally, this principle recognizes the expertise of trial judges and their advantageous position to make factual findings, owing to their extensive exposure to the evidence and the benefit of hearing the testimony viva voce. The same degree of deference must be paid to inferences of fact, since many of the reasons for showing deference to the factual findings of the trial judge apply equally to all factual conclusions. The standard of review for inferences of fact is not to verify that the inference can reasonably be supported by the findings of fact of the trial judge, but whether the trial judge made a palpable and overriding error in coming to a factual conclusion based on accepted facts, a stricter standard. Making a factual conclusion of any kind is inextricably linked with assigning weight to evidence, and thus attracts a deferential standard of review. If there is no palpable and overriding error with respect to the underlying facts that the trial judge relies on to draw the inference, then it is only where the inference-drawing process itself is palpably in error that an appellate court can interfere with the factual conclusion.

A. Standard of Review for Questions of Law
.
On a pure question of law, the basic rule with respect to the review of a trial judge’s findings is that an appellate court is free to replace the opinion of the trial judge with its own. Thus the standard of review on a question of law is that of correctness: Kerans, supra, at p. 90.

There are at least two underlying reasons for employing a correctness standard to matters of law. First, the principle of universality requires appellate courts to ensure that the same legal rules are applied in similar situations. The importance of this principle was recognized by this Court in Woods Manufacturing Co. v. The King, [1951] S.C.R. 504, at p. 515:

Justice Gagné “exercised her discretion” to find that the 4 Applications were moot. In other words, she simply decided that the cases weren’t worth hearing. Now, why does it matter that she used her discretion?

As it turned out, the Appellants argued the wrong test. 2 of them thought it was “correctness”, and the other 2 didn’t specify what they wanted.

Appealing a “discretionary” order is damn near impossible. It’s not enough to say that someone can come to a different conclusion. It must be demonstrated that the Judge’s use of that discretion contained outright error. It’s a much higher standard than correctness.

The Appellants also tried arguing the merits of their cases. However, the only issue to be decided was whether Justice Gagné committed “overriding palpable error” by finding the cases to be moot. It seems that the lawyers don’t understand the purpose of appealing.

Considering that the Applicants could have simply refiled their cases as Actions, it’s baffling why they would do this.

Bernier, Peckford, Naoum Launch SECOND Appeal

The majority of these litigants apparently weren’t satisfied losing once in Appellate Court. They decided to try again with the Supreme Court of Canada. Remember, the goal here was to get the finding of “mootness” overturned. They (still) could have filed Actions — as they were advised — but appealed again, because …. reasons.

Not even “Mr. Bad Beyond Argument” attempted a second Appeal with Action4Canada.

“Applying for Leave” is a term that means asking for permission. The SCC doesn’t hear cases from all interested parties. Instead, it picks and chooses what it finds to be important. In fact, most Applications are denied.

Rickard and Harrison, to their credit, did finally make the right choice. However, their Claim has serious issues that will be addressed in a bit.

Bernier, Peckford, Naoum Likely Time Barred At This Point

Even if the above litigants wanted to refile their cases as Actions, it’s likely too late. For most things, the Statute of Limitations is 2 years. As we are now at the end of August 2024, it’s very unlikely that there would be any recent damages they could claim.

To sound like a broken record: they could have done this back in October 2022.

Rickard/Harrison Claim Not Properly Pleaded

Even though Rickard and Harrison are pursuing a Claim, they aren’t out of the woods yet. The pleading is Galati-level bad in terms of its quality.

The Claim is very bare-bones in terms of detail. A Judge might find that there aren’t sufficient facts pleaded. In fairness, the amended version fixes some of it.

Considering that there are allegations of “bad faith”, there’s a requirement to give full particulars, which hasn’t been done.

The Claim pleads breaches of s.6 (mobility), s.7 (security) and s.15 (equality) Charter Rights. However, none of them are properly pleaded. They don’t even specify that the Plaintiffs are Canadian citizens, which is required for the s.6 breach to have teeth. The Notice of Motion is actually quite a good reference point.

What Kind Of Idiot Appeals Instead Of Fixing Their Case?

Allison Pejovic, one of the lawyers involved in the SCC Leave Applications, released a video describing what had happened. She sounds very compelling and passionate. Taken at face value, there’s no reason to doubt anything she says.

However, what she fails to mention is that the Applicants (in all 4 cases) were able to proceed with the cases (as Actions) if there had been damages as a result. From the 2022 ruling:

[40] It is true that the parties, and to some extent the Court, have already invested financial and human resources in these files. However, most of the Court resources are yet to come with a five-day judicial review hearing and extensive writing time (these files comprise 23 affidavits and 15 expert reports totaling approximately 6,650 pages). That is without considering potential appeals to the Federal Court of Appeal and to the Supreme Court of Canada.

There were apparently: (a) 23 Affidavits; and (b) 15 expert reports, which totaled over 6,600 pages. Cross-examinations of witnesses also took place. And unlike with Action4Canada, these piles of documents actually exist. But because these lawyers appealed instead of refiling, these will never get to Trial.

And the way the Rickard/Harrison case is proceeding, it will go nowhere either.

One really has to wonder how all of the “freedom lawyers” can be so clueless and incompetent in pursuing cases against the Government.

FEDERAL COURT APPLICATIONS STRUCK:
(1) https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fct/doc/2022/2022fc1463/2022fc1463.html

FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL RULING:
(1) https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fca/doc/2023/2023fca219/2023fca219.html
(2) Travel Mandates Appeal Bernier Memorandum
(3) Travel Mandates Appeal Peckford Memorandum
(4) Travel Mandates Appeal Rickard-Harrison Memorandum
(5) Travel Mandates Appeal Respondents Memorandum

SUPREME COURT OF CANADA APPLICATIONS FOR LEAVE:
(1) https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc-l/doc/2024/2024canlii80713/2024canlii80713.html (Bernier)
(2) https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc-l/doc/2024/2024canlii80711/2024canlii80711.html (Peckford)
(3) https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc-l/doc/2024/2024canlii80702/2024canlii80702.html (Naoum)

RICKARD/HARRISON STATEMENT OF CLAIM:
(1) Rickard T-2536-23 Statement Of Claim
(2) Rickard T-2536-23 Notice Of Intent To Respond
(3) Rickard T-2536-23 Amended Statement Of Claim
(4) Rickard T-2536-23 Notice Of Motion

STANDARD OF REVIEW:
(1) https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2002/2002scc33/2002scc33.html
(2) Housen (Highlighted)

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HateGate, Part 2: Settling The Score With Bernie Farber

This continues the series on “Diagolon”. This is a so-called “meme” organization that shows the signs of being a honeypot run by either law enforcement or intelligence.

Parts 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Schill gun grab are here.
Part 1 of the HateGate Scam is available as well.

There’s a lot more to get into, all of it ignored by so-called “alternative” media.

In the last piece, we covered Elisa Hategan’s history with “Heritage Front”. This so-called white supremacist group turned out to be (at least in part) a CSIS operation. It was co-founded by Grant Bristow, who was a CSIS agent at the time.

As she co-authored the infamous “HateGate report” with Caryma Sa’d, it was strange to omit the possibility that Jeremy MacKenzie and “Diagolon” may be the next iteration. If the Government would manufacture at least one such group, what’s to stop them from doing it again? While this coincidence alone is not definitive proof, it’s not something that can be ignored either.

Now, we come across something which completely stands things on its head. Hategan went after Bernie Farber and Elizabeth Frederiksen (who still uses her maiden name, Moore) a few years ago. She lost.

Both Hategan and Moore/Frederiksen were part of Heritage Front, and both played a role in bringing down the group. As is noted by Justice Ferguson, both women’s stories have many similarities. However, their futures diverged greatly afterwards.

Farber and Moore/Frederiksen went on to lead the Canadian Anti-Hate Network, while Hategan was left in relative obscurity. Reading through the decision, it appears that she didn’t get the glory and recognition she felt was owed to her. Being able to share her story wasn’t enough, as she didn’t want others to have that same right.

Hategan went as far as to buy up many domain names with very similar names to Elizabeth Moore, so that they couldn’t be used. This behaviour is downright creepy.

Farber chose his “pet”, and it wasn’t Hategan, so she lashed out.

It’s baffling why Hategan would write the HateGate report — which is 85 pages long, and full of citations. She claims to be the main researcher and writer of the document. MacKenzie and his crew used it to claim “vindication” over Government overreach, and the invoking of the Emergencies Act. Considering Hategan now proudly shares her identity as Jewish and a lesbian, allying with them would make no sense. Ideologically, she has far more in common with Farber and Moore/Frederiksen.

However, it makes sense once the history between these people is revealed.

Put into context, the HateGate paper comes across as an act of revenge.

One has to wonder if this is why the “honeypot” narrative of Diagolon was glossed over. Sure, it would do damage to MacKenzie, Harrison and Vriend to reveal it, but not to Farber or CAHN.

Ironically, Hategan also feels sidelined by Caryma Sa’d, who has received the bulk of the publicity for the HateGate paper.

Timeline Of Major Events In Hategan Lawsuit

September 2017: Farber goes on “The Agenda”, and talks about Hategan and Frederiksen as “heroes” who helped take out the group, Heritage Front.

December 2018: Hategan files Statement of Claim against Moore/Frederiksen. It includes torts for (a) injurious falsehood; (b) civil conspiracy; (c) wrongful appropriation; (d) unlawful interference; and (e) negligence. None of it was pleaded properly, and one may say it was “bad beyond argument”.

January 2019: Statement of Defence (and a Counter-Claim) are filed by Frederiksen. She sued for (a) defamation; (b) invasion of privacy; (c) appropriation of likeness; and (d) interference with economic relations.

April 2019: Statement of Claim is amended, and Bernie Farber added as a Defendant.

July 2019: Farber filed a Statement of Defence, and also brought a Motion to Dismiss for Summary Judgement.

December 2020: Justice Ferguson hears Motions for Summary Judgement brought by Farber and Frederiksen. The decision is reserved, which is typical in these types of cases.

February, 2021: Justice Ferguson throws out Hategan’s Claim on a Summary Judgement Motion, and Frederiksen’s Counter-Claim is granted. Hategan was ordered to pay:

  • $100,000 for general damages;
  • $50,000 for aggravated damages;
  • $50,000 for punitive damages

March 2021: Hategan serves Notice of Appeal on Frederiksen and Farber.

March 2021: Justice Ferguson confirmed the cost award against Hategan. Also the permanent injunction for her to stop publishing content about Frederiksen, remove existing content, release all domain names, and refrain from using identifiers of her likeness.

April 2021: The Registrar gave notice to Hategan that her Appeal would be dismissed for delay since she had missed the 30 day deadline to file her paperwork. Hategan thought there was 60 days, however, that didn’t apply since there was no transcript.

May 2021: Hategan retains another lawyer, who asks for consent for an extension to file the Appeal documents. The request is denied.

July 2021: The Registrar dismisses the Appeal for delay.

August 2021: Hategan’s counsel advises that there will be a Motion brought to challenge the administrative delay. There were procedural headaches after this. January 2022 is set as a date, but delayed again.

February 2022: Justice Pardu of the Court of Appeal for Ontario hears a Motion to set aside (invalidate) the Registrar’s dismissal of the Appeal for delay. It’s held via video conference.

March 2022: Justice Pardu dismisses Motion to set aside the Registrar’s dismissal for delay. Among the reasons given is that there is — on the surface — little or no merit to the Appeal. Frederiksen had agreed to waive costs if the Motion was dismissed, while Farber got the $5,000 he asked for.

July 2022: Justice Simmons orders Hategan to pay security for costs to Farber.

October 2022: Justices Lauwers, Roberts and Trotter dismissed a Review Motion (of Justice Simmons) requiring Hategan to pay security for costs.

January 2023: Court of Appeal hears a Review Motion from Hategan. She’s contesting the decision of the Registrar to dismiss her Appeal for unnecessary delay.

January 2023: Hategan’s Review Motion (at the Court of Appeal) is dismissed. Given her delay, prejudice to the Respondents, and the lack of merit to the Appeal, Justices Nordheimer, Miller and van Rensburg decided not to give her another chance. She was ordered to pay Frederiksen $7,500, and Farber another $5,000.

Hategan v. Farber, 2021 ONSC 874 (CanLII)
Hategan v. Frederiksen, 2022 ONCA 217 (CanLII)
Hategan v. Frederiksen, 2022 ONCA 715 (CanLII)
Hategan v. Frederiksen, 2023 ONCA 57 (CanLII)

Hategan Stalked, Doxed, Harassed And Impersonated Her Rival

Ms. Hategan has invaded Ms. Moore’s privacy

[138] Ms. Moore submits that Ms. Hategan’s actions amount to the tort of public disclosure of embarrassing private facts. The information about Ms. Moore’s former extra-marital affair was conveyed to Ms. Hategan under strict promises of confidentiality. By publishing statements about these sexual relations, and falsely claiming that this was done to advance Ms. Moore’s career, Ms. Hategan has clearly given publicity to a matter concerning the private life of Ms. Moore. Ms. Moore submits that this publication is (i) highly offensive to a reasonable person; and (ii) is not of legitimate concern to the public. Ontario courts have particularly noted the private nature of sexual relations and family quarrels, among others.

[139] Ms. Moore further submits that Ms. Hategan’s actions amount to the tort of breach of confidence. The information about Ms. Moore’s extra-marital affair was confidential, in that it was conveyed to Ms. Hategan under strict promises of confidentiality, and Ms. Hategan’s publication of that information was unauthorized and was to Ms. Moore’s detriment. This confidential and highly intimate information was used to denigrate Ms. Moore’s personal and professional reputation, imputing that Ms. Moore received professional benefits from this and other sexual relationships. Damages, sufficient to mark the wrong that has been done, are warranted.

[140] I agree that this tort has been made out. The information about Ms. Moore’s extra‑marital affair was conveyed to Ms. Hategan in confidentiality. I agree that this information is highly offensive to a reasonable person and is not a legitimate concern to the public.

Ms. Hategan appropriated Ms. Moore’s personality and likeness

[141] Ms. Moore submits that Ms. Hategan appropriated Ms. Moore’s likeness by registering multiple websites and social media handles (the “domains”) in Ms. Moore’s name. Ms. Hategan inked many of the domains directly to her own website, so that when a person searched for Ms. Moore, they were redirected to Ms. Hategan’s information. In doing so, Ms. Hategan took advantage of the name, reputation and likeness of Ms. Moore’s personality. Ms. Hategan did this for commercial purposes and to boost her own professional reputation. As a direct result, Ms. Moore cannot register many of the domains that would naturally be used for her business – including variations of her name. Instead of using her own name, Ms. Moore has to use a fictional phrase – “one moore liz” – to promote herself online.

[142] I agree with the defendant that these actions constitute an appropriation of Ms. Moore’s personality and likeness.

Interference with Ms. Moore’s economic relations

[143] On at least two separate occasions, Ms. Hategan threatened to sue Ms. Moore’s professional colleagues in an attempt to interfere with Ms. Moore’s economic relations. Ms. Moore alleges that this amounts to the tort of intimidation, and is an actionable wrong committed against a third party. In at least one instance, as admitted by Ms. Hategan, these threats led to a speaking engagement being cancelled. As a result of these actions, Ms. Moore has suffered economic harm and loss. Ms. Moore does not know how many other opportunities she may have lost out on, because Ms. Hategan has refused to produce relevant communications with third parties. Ms. Moore submits that an adverse inference should be drawn.

[144] Again, I agree with these submissions. Ms. Hategan has caused interference with Ms. Moore’s economic relation.

All of this comes from Justice Ferguson’s ruling in 2021. Hategan meddled in the business of Moore/Frederiksen to a significant degree, and damages were awarded.

Worth noting: Justice Ferguson also concluded that none of Hategan’s torts had any merit whatsoever. It was a baseless and frivolous lawsuit.

Rather than accepting the loss, Hategan managed to tie up the matter in Appellate Court for another 2 years. No Appeal was ever actually heard for Justice Ferguson’s 2021 decision.

Why Does Any Of This Matter In HateGate Report?

In a turn of events that should surprise no one, Hategan threatened to sue Derek Harrison earlier this year. She wasn’t happy with the entry in his (sarcastic?) book called “Meme Kampf”. She was apparently also arrested in December 2023 for criminal harassment. Again, not surprising.

Justice Ferguson found (among other things) that Hategan had been buying up various domain names so that Frederiksen would be unable to do business. This goes far beyond petty bullying. All things considered, she comes across as being unhinged.

If people are going to be claiming that there’s a complete failure of law enforcement and intelligence agencies in Canada, then the context of their writing is important. The FOIPIP (linked below) doesn’t really support their conclusions.

Again, Hategan claims to be the primary author of the report.

Hategan apparently had no problems being part of the “anti-hate industry”. The animosity only started after she didn’t get the credit and attention she believed she deserved. For better or worse, Farber chose Frederiksen, and gave her accolades for her work.

True, people should have their work judged on its merits. However, this case changes everything. It’s not some ancient D.U.I. from 20 years ago, but reflects directly on what’s happening now.

One final point: this isn’t to be construed that the people at CAHN are the “good guys”. They aren’t, and they’ve done considerable damage to people. In no way should this be seen as endorsing their “work”.

SCHILL HEARING:
(1) https://www.canlii.org/en/on/oncj/doc/2024/2024oncj249/2024oncj249.html
(2) Evidence Of Officer Ernest Carmichael, Day 1
(3) Evidence Of Officer Ernest Carmichael, Day 2, Cross Examination

CARMICHAEL ASSAULTING A PRISONER:
(1) Ernest Carmichael Disciplinary Hearing Penalty Decision 25.07.2014
(2) https://toronto.ctvnews.ca/siu-lays-assault-charge-against-york-region-police-officer-1.1392108
(3) https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/york-police-officer-charged-with-assault/article_d1b43f97-a077-59b4-8603-747a94b76170.html

HERITAGE FRONT/CSIS:
(1) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d8CQ6pjKaJ8
(2) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gy7U8AOXhuw
(3) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A1cBOmr3pWg
(4) https://crier.co/the-hategate-affair-unmasking-canadas-hate-industry/
(5) Full Text Of HateGate Report (85 Pages)
(6) https://www.amazon.com/Race-Traitor-Canadian-Intelligence-Services-ebook/dp/B00JA05FYM
(7) https://open.canada.ca/en/search/ati
(8) https://open.canada.ca/en/search/ati/reference/0deb7fad4bfd4546cfd5e016c1667454
(9) https://x.com/elisahategan/status/1709587192715124829
(10) https://x.com/elisahategan/status/1757851798147117192
(11) https://x.com/elisahategan/status/1758258494740832409
(12) https://x.com/elisahategan/status/1762255316429803597/
(13) https://x.com/elisahategan/status/1798395395887997146
(14) https://x.com/elisahategan/status/1797682910516195560
(15) https://x.com/elisahategan/status/1734060656960090558
(16) https://x.com/elisahategan/status/1783193060005818703

HATEGAN STALKING CIVIL CASE:
(1) https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2021/2021onsc874/2021onsc874.html
(2) https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/2022/2022onca217/2022onca217.html
(3) https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/2022/2022onca715/2022onca715.html
(4) https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/2023/2023onca57/2023onca57.html

HATEGATE FOIPIP PACKAGE (FULL RELEASE):
(0) Previously Published Documents
(1) A-2022-06987 Release Package Part 1
(2) A-2022-06987 Release Package Part 2
(3) A-2022-06987 Release Package Part 3
(4) A-2022-06987 Release Package Part 4
(5) A-2022-06987 Release Package Part 5
(6) A-2022-06987 Release package Part 6
(7) A-2022-06987 Release Package Part 7
(8) A-2022-06987 Release Package Part 8
(9) A-2022-06987 Release Package Part 9
(10) A-2022-06987 Release Package Part 10
(11) A-2022-06987 Release Package Part 11
(12) A-2022-06987 Release Package Part 12
(13) A-2022-06987 Release Package Part 13
(14) A-2022-06987 Release package Part 14
(15) A-2022-06987 Release Package Part 15
(16) A-2022-06987 Release Package Part 16
(17) A-2022-06987 Release Package Part 17
(18) A-2022-06987 Release Package Part 18
(19) A-2022-06987 Release Package Part 19
(20) A-2022-06987 Release Package Part 20
(21) A-2022-06987 Release package Part 21

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Diagolon Gun Grab, Part 5: Carmichael’s 2013 Incident Of Assaulting A Prisoner

The recent focus on this site has been the Gary Schill case, dubbed the “Diagolon Gun Grab”. However, some information about the officer involved, Ernest Carmichael, needs to be shared as well. Back in 2013, the Special Investigations Unit was called over allegations of a police officer committing assault.

On the criminal end of things, Carmichael pleaded guilty to assault and received a conditional discharge. He was placed on probation for a year, meaning that he won’t have a record afterwrds.

As for the administrative side, Carmichael faced a count of “unnecessary force against a prisoner”. Now, this was an internal complaint within the police itself. This means that despite the guilty plea, he didn’t even lose his job. He admitted to kicking a prisoner in the head “2 or 3 times”, but wasn’t fired.

What ultimately happened to him was a 9 month demotion from 1st Class Constable to 2nd Class Constable, and 100 hours of community service.

This demonstrates that Carmichael has shown very poor judgement, but was allowed to keep his job which is considered a “position of trust”. Yes, it was a long time ago, but worth mentioning.

The case doesn’t seem to be cited on CanLII, but the decision is available nonetheless.

The agreed set of facts:

  1. Constable Ernest Carmichael #1950 has been a member of the York Regional Police since April of 2009. He has held the rank of First Class Constable since August of 2012.
  2. On April 21, 2013 at approximately 9:45 p.m., members of York Regional Police attended the public complainant’s residence to investigate an impaired driving complaint regarding her son. Her son had pulled into the driveway a few minutes earlier.
  3. The public complainant’s husband went to his front door and saw two uniformed police officers talking to his son. Mr. Horsak stepped outside and told the officers he wanted them off his property, as he believed they did not have cause to be there.
  4. The officers told Mr. Horsak that his son was under arrest and was going to be charged with impaired driving. Mr. Horsak replied that his son had just come home and was not impaired, and again told the officers to get off his property.
  5. While this conversation was taking place, the son ran inside the house. The two officers followed the public complainant’s son inside the home. The son then ran upstairs and locked himself inside a bathroom. The officers remained just inside the entrance of the house.
  6. Mr. Horsak told the officers to get out of his house and again to get off his property. The police did not leave the home and instead used their portable radios to request the attendance of more officers at the scene.
  7. Four more police officers, including PC Carmichael, arrived at the home a short while later and also entered the residence. Mr. Horsak pushed one of the officers, not PC Carmichael, on the chest to try to keep him from moving further into the house. A struggle ensued and two officers, PC Ron Peever #696 and PC Mark Kowalchuk #1823, took Mr. Horsak to the floor.
  8. Mr. Horsak ended up face-down on the floor in a prone position. One officer attempted to gain control of Mr. Horsak’s left arm while another officer attempted to gain control of his right arm, which were both under his body, in an attempt to handcuff him. According to Mr. Horsak, his arms are chronically susceptible to being dislocated, and he was trying to prevent this from occurring. However, he did not tell this to the police officers.
  9. While the two officers were attempting to subdue Mr. Horsak on the floor, PC Carmichael approached him and kicked him in the head two or three times. The officers were eventually able to place Mr. Horsak in handcuffs, then escorted him out of the house and placed him in the back of a police cruiser.
  10. On May, 20 2014, PC Carmichael appeared before the Honourable Justice Armstrong in the Ontario Court of Justice (Criminal Court). At that time, he entered a plea of guilty to the charge of assault contrary to section 255 of the Criminal Code of Canada. PC Carmichael received a conditional discharge and was placed on probation for a period of 12 months subject to terms, including.

(a) That he not associate or communicate directly or indirectly with Mr. Horsak except as may be required in the course of his duties as a police officer; and
(b) That he perform 100 hours of community service by April 15, 2015

The terms of Carmichael’s probation still allowed him to associate with the victim as long as it was “required in the course of his duties as a police officer”.

Disposition:
.
In light of the seriousness of these allegations and bearing in mind all the evidence placed before me, Constable Ernest Carmichael #1950 will be demoted from his position of First Class Constable to Second Class Constable immediately for a period of nine (9) months and will return to First Class Constable upon the completion of the nine months at the Second Class Constable level pursuant to Section 85 (1) (c) of the Police Services Act.

Further, you will receive remedial training with the Policies of the York Regional Police Service as it relates to Use of Force and any other Policies as required and deemed necessary by your immediate supervisor in consultation with Senior Command of the York Regional Police Service.

In reading through the submissions on sentencing, it appears that these sort of complaints often bring fairly lax consequences.

I have considered the five (5) cases presented to me by Counsel. As I communicated earlier in this disposition the cases presented to me are not on point, however they were instructive for disposition considerations.

In Schofield vs. Metro Toronto Police (1994) the Commission stated:

“Consistency in the discipline process is often the earmark of fairness. The penalty must be consistent with the facts and consistent with similar cases that have been dealt with in earlier occasions. “

It’s rather disturbing to see the Adjudicator go on and on about the public needing to have confidence in law enforcement. But this decision, and the overall pattern, seem to do anything but inspire confidence.

Despite not being convicted of a crime, Carmichael was able to have Schill’s firearms taken away for things he posted online, homemade ammunition crafting, and largely speculative claims about a “militia”. Meanwhile, Carmichael admits to assaulting a prisoner, and gets to keep his service revolver (a restricted weapon), and his job (a position of trust). Interesting standards.

Final fun fact: Carmichael was successful in the Application to get Schill’s gun licence suspended (in large part) because of his association with Jeremy MacKenzie. At his hearing for excessive force, Carmichael’s Defence Counsel was named William MacKenzie. Small world, it seems.

Parts 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the series are available as well.

Thank you to the reader who forwarded this decision. It does give some much needed balance and context for what’s been going on.

SCHILL HEARING:
(1) https://www.canlii.org/en/on/oncj/doc/2024/2024oncj249/2024oncj249.html
(2) Evidence Of Officer Ernest Carmichael, Day 1
(3) Evidence Of Officer Ernest Carmichael, Day 2, Cross Examination

CARMICHAEL ASSAULTING A PRISONER:
(1) Ernest Carmichael Disciplinary Hearing Penalty Decision 25.07.2014
(2) https://toronto.ctvnews.ca/siu-lays-assault-charge-against-york-region-police-officer-1.1392108
(3) https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/york-police-officer-charged-with-assault/article_d1b43f97-a077-59b4-8603-747a94b76170.html

POEC HEARINGS:
(1) https://publicorderemergencycommission.ca/
(2) POEC Report, Volume 1: Overview
(3) Public Order Emergency Report Volume 1 Overview
(4) POEC Report, Volume 2: Analysis (Part 1)
(5) Public Order Emergency Report Volume 2 Analysis Part 1
(6) POEC Report, Volume 3: Analysis (Part 2)
(7) Public Order Emergency Report Volume 3 Analysis Part 2 Recommendations
(8) POEC Report, Volume 4: Process and Appendices
(9) Public Order Emergency Report Volume 4 Process And Appendices
(10) POEC Report, Part 5: Policy Papers
(11) Public Order Emergency Report Volume 5 Policy Papers

MOSLEY DECISION:
(1) https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fct/doc/2024/2024fc42/2024fc42.html#par41

CASELAW ON REVOKING FIREARMS PERMITS:
(1) R. v. Zeolkowski, 1989 CanLII 72 (SCC), [1989] S.C.J. No. 50, at para 12, 16, 17, 18
(2) British Columbia (Chief Firearms Officer) v. Fahlman, 2004 BCCA 343, at para 25.
(3) R. v. Christiansen, 2006 BCCA 189, at para 7.
(4) R. v. Bokhari, 2009 ONCJ 691, at para 10, relying on R. v. Day, [2006] O.J. No. 3187 (S.C.J.) and R. v. Morgan, [1995] O.J. No. 18 (Ont.Ct.(Prov.Div.)).
(5) R. v. Peacock-McDonald, 2007 ONCA 128, at para 40
(6) R. v. Douglas, 2013 ONCJ 649, at paras 45, 57.
(7) R. v. Mourtzis, 2015 ONCJ 74, at para 25.
(8) R. v. Roman, 2018 ONCJ 344, at para 89.
(9) R. v. Hurrell, 2002 CanLII 45007 (ON CA), [2002] O.J. No. 2819, at para 48.
(10) R. v. Christiansen, supra, at para 7.
(11) Fahlman, supra, at para 25.
(12) R. v. Peacock-Macdonald, supra, at para 40.
(13) R. v. Roman, supra, at para 89.
(14) R. v. Wiles, 2005 SCC 84, at para 9.

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Diagolon Gun Grab, Part 4: Caselaw Makes It Surprisingly Easy To Do

This continues the series on the “meme group” Diagolon, and the threat that it poses to gun ownership in Canada. Part 1 focused on the ruling of Gary Schill, which saw his privileges suspended for 5 years. Part 2 and Part 3 covered the testimony given by Detective Constable Ernest Carmichael.

The short version is that an Ontario Judge decided it was in the public interest to suspend Schill’s licence because of what he might do. This wasn’t because of a criminal conviction, or ties to terrorism or sedition. He was an administrator of the Diagolon Telegrams, and his posting came to police attention.

Yes, he was arrested for assault, and it was dropped. But it was the content he had posted online, his associations, his views, and making ammunition at home which led to the ban.

The hearsay evidence of his then-wife was also considered at the hearing, despite her not testifying at all. She had told police that a militia was being formed.

Now, how easy is it to suspend or revoke gun rights (or privileges) in Canada? Looking at the cases cited in the Schill decision, it’s actually pretty straightforward. Cases cited are listed at the bottom of the article, although not all are available on CanLII.

Starting with the Supreme Court of Canada:

(1) R. v. Wiles, 2005 SCC 84 (CanLII), [2005] 3 SCR 895

[9] I agree with the Court of Appeal. Mr. Wiles has not established that the imposition of the mandatory weapons prohibition orders constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. As noted by the Court of Appeal, the prohibition has a legitimate connection to s. 7 offences. The mandatory prohibition relates to a recognized sentencing goal — the protection of the public, and in particular, the protection of police officers engaged in the enforcement of drug offences. The state interest in reducing the misuse of weapons is valid and important. The sentencing judge gave insufficient weight to the fact that possession and use of firearms is not a right or freedom guaranteed under the Charter, but a privilege. It is also a heavily regulated activity, requiring potential gun-owners to obtain a licence before they can legally purchase one. In Reference re Firearms Act (Can.), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 783, 2000 SCC 31, this Court held that requiring the licensing and registration of firearms was a valid exercise of the federal criminal law power. If Parliament can legitimately impose restrictions on the possession of firearms by general legislation that applies to all, it follows that it can prohibit their possession upon conviction of certain criminal offences where it deems it in the public interest to do so. It is sufficient that Mr. Wiles falls within a category of offenders targeted for the risk that they may pose. The sentencing judge’s insistence upon specific violence, actual or apprehended, in relation to the particular offence and the individual offender takes too narrow a view of the rationale underlying the mandatory weapons prohibition orders.

To state the obvious: the above case dealt with a mandatory prohibition following a criminal conviction, whereas Schill had his charge dropped. So there is a difference.

Nonetheless, there are strong parallels in the reasoning. The Supreme Court ruled that owning firearms is not a right, but a privilege. There’s a valid principle of public safety at stake, and Parliament has the right to regulate firearm use and possession. Now, many people would take issue with this, but that is what was said.

By stating the firearm ownership is a privilege and not a right, it means there will always be the possibility of having them seized.

(2) R. v. Zeolkowski, 1989 CanLII 72 (SCC), [1989] 1 SCR 1378

A police officer made application in provincial court, pursuant to s. 98(4) of the Criminal Code, for an order prohibiting respondent from possessing any firearms or ammunition or explosive substances. Prior to the calling of any evidence, counsel for the respondent requested a general ruling as to the admission of hearsay evidence. The “custom” in Manitoba provincial courts had been to permit hearsay testimony at hearings on applications for a firearm prohibition. When the judge ruled that evidence at a firearm prohibition hearing was to be limited to what would be admissible at a criminal trial, counsel for the Crown, who had intended to rely on hearsay evidence as to threats made by respondent, called no evidence and the application was dismissed. The ruling as to admissibility was upheld on appeal by the Crown, first by the Court of Queen’s Bench, and then by a majority of the Court of Appeal.

However, the Supreme Court would decide otherwise and allow the Appeal.

Hearsay evidence is admissible at a firearm prohibition hearing under s. 98(6) unless such a result is precluded by the words “all relevant evidence”. The provincial court judge’s role in such hearings is to confirm the existence of the reasonable grounds which led the peace officer to launch the application, as proved on a balance of probabilities. It was not intended that the provincial court judge strictly apply the rules of evidence.

The expression “all relevant evidence” means all facts which are logically probative of the issue. The rules of evidence as to admissibility signify that the fact is relevant and that it satisfies auxiliary tests and extrinsic policies. Parliament, by using the phrase “all relevant evidence”, required only that the evidence at the firearm prohibition hearing be relevant; it did not address the question of exclusionary rules. The effect of the exclusionary rules is left to the provincial court judge as part of the whole body of evidence on which the provincial court judge determines whether reasonable grounds exist. Frailties in the evidence are a matter of weight.

When an Application is filed to revoke someone’s guns and licence, the standards are nowhere near as stringent as in a criminal trial. Yes, the basis for the Application is based on the Criminal Code of Canada, but it follows different rules.

Specifically, the standard of “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” has been replaced by “on the balance of probabilities”, which would be the civil test. Additionally, hearsay evidence which would typically be excluded in criminal cases is permitted here, but with the Judge typically giving less weight to it.

This is a 1989 case, so it’s been around for a very long time.

(3) B.C. (Chief Firearms Officer) v. Fahlman, 2004 BCCA 343 (CanLII)

[25] I read s. 5 differently. Section 5(1) creates a broad safety standard for eligibility to hold a firearms licence or to continue to hold one following a revocation inquiry. Section 5(2) requires a firearms officer or a Provincial Court judge on a reference to “have regard to” certain conduct by the applicant or licence holder. I do not read s. 5(2) as being exhaustive of the matters to be considered as affecting safety concerns under s. 5(1). There are many other things a firearms officer or a judge might consider that do not fit into s. 5(2) and that might logically and reasonably give rise to valid safety concerns. I agree with the appellant’s submission that there is no statutory obligation to decide the safety issue in favour of the applicant or licence holder when none of the criteria in s. 5(2) is present; and that there is no obligation to refuse a licence or order a revocation if one or more of those criteria are present. A plain reading of the section by itself evinces no such intention by Parliament. The firearms officer and the judge are entitled to consider anything about the background or conduct of the applicant or licence holder that is relevant to public safety.

The Court of Appeal for British Columbia had held that the Firearms Officer and the Judge are allowed to consider anything about the licence holder. The only question is whether their decisions are seen as “reasonable”.

(4) R. v. Christiansen, 2006 BCCA 189 (CanLII)

[7] After reviewing these statutory provisions and the authorities cited on this appeal (other than Fahlman, which supports his reasoning and conclusion), the appeal court judge found (at paras. 35 – 37) that s. 111 of the Code does not “exclusively deal with behaviour that could be characterized as involving criminal conduct or acts of violence against others.” Nor do the three criteria set out in the Firearms Act operate as “exhaustive criteria” for the application of s. 5 of that Act. Thus, a provincial court judge conducting a hearing under s. 111 of the Code is not confined to a determination of whether the three criteria set out in s. 5(2) of the Firearms Act are met in order to impose a prohibition. He concluded that the provincial court judge had made no error “in holding that there can be a firearms prohibition without criminal conduct, a history of real or threatened violent behaviour or a documented mental disorder that leads to violence.”

This is also from the Court of Appeal for British Columbia. Firearms prohibitions can happen even without a history of violent behaviour or a documented mental disorder. It’s very subjective.

(5) R. v. Hurrell, 2002 CanLII 45007 (ON CA)

[48] Applying that reasoning to this case, I am satisfied that when the words “not desirable”, which in my view simply mean “not advisable”, are read in context, they can hardly be described as so subjective, vague and amorphous that they fail to provide an adequate basis for legal debate. The fact that language may be open to judicial interpretation does not render it impermissibly vague. Flexibility and vagueness are not synonymous: see Reference re Criminal Code, Sections 193 & 195.1(1)(c), 1990 CanLII 105 (SCC), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123 at p. 1156, 56 C.C.C. (3d) 65 at p. 89 and French Estate v. Ontario (Attorney General) (1998), 1998 CanLII 1771 (ON CA), 38 O.R. (3d) 347 at p. 361, 157 D.L.R. (4th) 144 (C.A.); application for leave to appeal dismissed, [1998] S.C.C.A. No. 139). Moreover, because s. 117.04(1) is procedural and does not carry with it the threat of a criminal record or imprisonment, the need for precision is diminished: see French, supra, at p. 363 O.R. Finally, to the extent that the police or the issuing justice need a framework within which to assess the “non-desirability/public interest” component of s. 117.04(1), Parliament itself has provided guidance in ss. 5(1) and (2) of the Firearms Act, S.C. 1995, c. 39. These provisions deal with the eligibility for holding a firearms licence and read as follows:

The Court of Appeal for Ontario ruled that the language used was not unconstitutionally vague. The Court does go on to explain what examples are provided, but they are not exhaustive.

These are just a few of the cases that were used as a basis to have Schill’s guns taken away. The list is provided below, though some rulings aren’t published online. The short version of this is that it can happen for nearly any reason, hearsay evidence may be used, and it’s a low burden of proof.

Schill may be the first person to have his firearms taken away because of his “association” with Jeremy MacKenzie and Diagolon. But he won’t be the last.

Next up: the Public Emergency Order Commission (PEOC) hearings.

SCHILL HEARING:
(1) https://www.canlii.org/en/on/oncj/doc/2024/2024oncj249/2024oncj249.html
(2) Evidence Of Officer Ernest Carmichael, Day 1
(3) Evidence Of Officer Ernest Carmichael, Day 2, Cross Examination

POEC HEARINGS:
(1) https://publicorderemergencycommission.ca/
(2) POEC Report, Volume 1: Overview
(3) Public Order Emergency Report Volume 1 Overview
(4) POEC Report, Volume 2: Analysis (Part 1)
(5) Public Order Emergency Report Volume 2 Analysis Part 1
(6) POEC Report, Volume 3: Analysis (Part 2)
(7) Public Order Emergency Report Volume 3 Analysis Part 2 Recommendations
(8) POEC Report, Volume 4: Process and Appendices
(9) Public Order Emergency Report Volume 4 Process And Appendices
(10) POEC Report, Part 5: Policy Papers
(11) Public Order Emergency Report Volume 5 Policy Papers

MOSLEY DECISION:
(1) https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fct/doc/2024/2024fc42/2024fc42.html#par41

CASELAW ON REVOKING FIREARMS PERMITS:
(1) R. v. Zeolkowski, 1989 CanLII 72 (SCC), [1989] S.C.J. No. 50, at para 12, 16, 17, 18
(2) British Columbia (Chief Firearms Officer) v. Fahlman, 2004 BCCA 343, at para 25.
(3) R. v. Christiansen, 2006 BCCA 189, at para 7.
(4) R. v. Bokhari, 2009 ONCJ 691, at para 10, relying on R. v. Day, [2006] O.J. No. 3187 (S.C.J.) and R. v. Morgan, [1995] O.J. No. 18 (Ont.Ct.(Prov.Div.)).
(5) R. v. Peacock-McDonald, 2007 ONCA 128, at para 40
(6) R. v. Douglas, 2013 ONCJ 649, at paras 45, 57.
(7) R. v. Mourtzis, 2015 ONCJ 74, at para 25.
(8) R. v. Roman, 2018 ONCJ 344, at para 89.
(9) R. v. Hurrell, 2002 CanLII 45007 (ON CA), [2002] O.J. No. 2819, at para 48.
(10) R. v. Christiansen, supra, at para 7.
(11) Fahlman, supra, at para 25.
(12) R. v. Peacock-Macdonald, supra, at para 40.
(13) R. v. Roman, supra, at para 89.
(14) R. v. Wiles, 2005 SCC 84, at para 9.

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Diagolon Gun Grab, Part 3: The Carmichael Testimony (Cont’d)

This continues the testimony of Detective Constable Ernest Carmichael. Both Day 1 and Day 2 of the hearings are available, along with the ruling itself.

Why does this matter? Because police were successful back in May 2024 for an Application to have Gary Schill’s firearms and licence suspended for 5 years. See Part 1 and Part 2 for more background information. It was largely (though not entirely) due to his association with Jeremy MacKenzie and Diagolon.

Schill had faced a charge of assault causing bodily harm against his then wife, Jennifer McNeil. She was also charged with a lesser count against him. Both were eventually dropped. Nonetheless, the police were still able to get a firearms suspension for Schill.

It’s immediately obvious that the standards for an Application to suspend or revoke a gun permit are far lower than when someone faces a criminal charge. Speculation and hearsay are permitted a lot more. Instead of “beyond a reasonable doubt”, the police must only demonstrate “on a balance of probabilities”. The Judge also has wide discretion to deem such a ban to be “in the public interest”.

Carmichael entered into evidence a document which he claims (or speculates) shows a plot to steal fuel during the trucker convoy. He says this is likely to circumvent the fuel shortages that had been intentionally imposed.

As for hearsay being admitted into the hearing, this is noteworthy:

Carmichael testifed that Jennifer McNeil, Schill’s wife at the time, provided other information to law enforcement during her victim statement. Specifically, she said that Schill was part of Diagolon, part of a militia, and targeting military and law enforcement members for recruitment.

Interestingly, McNeil herself didn’t testify at the hearing. Only Carmichael did. In a regular Court proceeding, her statements would have been considered “hearsay” and deemed inadmissible. The Judge allowed this in, and it doesn’t appear to have been challenged.

Carmichael continues (on page 8).

In the very beginning, we weren’t 100 percent sure. The Freedom Convoy was quite organic and it, it began in Western Canada and transitioned across the, the country to Ottawa. As we understood it, there was going to be a convergence of vehicles, large trucks, arriving in Ottawa. I was involved in the project team that monitored the number of vehicles who would be attending, what the dynamic of the crowd would be, and trying to get an intelligence assessment of what the Freedom Convoy would look like once it arrived in Ottawa. Of concern to us was the presence and interest of most of Diagolon. Most members, because our investigation actually started prior to the Freedom Convoy.

We had the benefit of, of monitoring a lot of the individuals we were interested in, leading up to the Freedom Convoy and, subsequently, their travel to Ottawa. Our concern was obviously Diagolon had made their ideology quite well-known, from our perspective. They were preparing for a civil war. They had an appetite to overthrow the government and force the government to change their policies relating to the COVID-19 response. So our concern was that what had the potential to be a peaceful protest in Ottawa could evolve into a violent confrontation because of the extremist elements we knew of that would also be attending.

We had, we had a lot of examples of conversations that was happening leading up to the Freedom Convoy. The organizers themselves stated that they intended to stay in Ottawa until the government changed their position on the COVID-19 response. MacKenzie himself has spoken of civil war and encouraged his members to prepare for it.

They use a phrase often, which is, “Gun or rope.” And this implies that when civil war occurs, it’s going to be a Diagolon versus everybody response. And Diagolon’s – the way they, they would treat their enemies during this uprising or civil war would be – they, they would be afforded the option to be executed by firing squad or hung. So that was what the, the, “Gun or rope,” phrase often referred to. So there was a lot of examples of, of rhetoric like that leading up to the Freedom Convoy that, that indicated to us that these individuals had an appetite to arm themselves, prepare themselves and had an appetite for violent confrontation. In fact, I, I believe I quoted yesterday, one of the Ticker Tape messages on Jeremy MacKenzie’s podcast where he says, “You want blood, come and get it,” and then it was the, “Fuck you, make me.”

Remember all of those edgy podcast jokes and memes? Guess what? They’re being entered into evidence as legitimate threats to public safety. The police are actually doing it, and the Judge is taking it all seriously.

Here’s a thought: maybe rampant fed-posting wasn’t such a good idea.

Carmichael testifies that it wasn’t necessary to conduct direct surveillance on Diagolon itself during the trucker convoy. This was because so many people simply posted photos, videos and details online, police could simply monitor it.

He then references a video which he calls a “Diagolon meet up”, which include Schill, MacKenzie and several others.

Carmichael eventually gets into the arrests at Coutts, Alberta. One of them was Chris Lysak. It was apparently a joke that he was the “Head of Security for Diagolon”, given his size.

One of the ballistic vests seized apparently had 2 Diagolon flags on them.

Carmichael then goes on about the various meet-ups that had been arranged, and how the information was obtained by monitoring Telegram channels. Now this:

In preparation for this hearing, the Crown was required to provide disclosure to Schill. Specifically, Carmichael’s Affidavit was sent to him. For some reason, MacKenzie published portions of it on his Substack. This was used to help establish a direct connection.

Interestingly, Carmichael testifies that the authorities weren’t willing to pay for a subscription to MacKenzie’s Substack, which would have allowed them to view everything. They consider him a public threat, and spend large amounts of money monitoring Diagolon, but wouldn’t pay this nominal fee?

Carmichael also explains that police wanted to know exactly who was posting on Telegram — since most accounts were anonymous. Yes, the servers aren’t located within Canada. However, it doesn’t seem any real effort was put in to try. Or perhaps they did get in, but don’t want to disclose that.

Carmichael concedes that he doesn’t believe that everyone associated with Diagolon is a terrorist or an extremist. He says that there is a broad range of people who are attached in some way.

Carmichael then goes on to speculate at length about how he believes Diagolon has simply “gone underground” given the attention they’ve received. Without really providing evidence or support, he claims that it’s still a threat to the public.

On cross-examination from Schill’s Amicus Counsel (starting at page 25) Carmichael reiterates that he’s been monitoring the Telegram chats constantly. Even on his off days he often listens to podcasts. In his notes, he states that he has listened to at least 38 episodes.

Of course, this doesn’t include what other members of intelligence or law enforcement have been listening to.

It’s fascinating how such a bad spin is put on these things. “Get offline and find your friends” is a legitimate goal, in that the online world doesn’t reflect reality. However, it’s being construed to mean the formation of militias for the purpose of causing violence and civil unrest.

In some sense, Schill’s Amicus Counsel actually seems to have done more harm than good. He gets Carmichael to explain new things — such as cutting down towers to stop 5G — that weren’t previously testified to.

Carmichael then goes on about the risk that “fed posting” causes. He says that Diagolon members fear being entrapped by someone saying overtly illegal things. This, he concludes, has caused them to go offline a lot more, and to be more guarded in their speech.

Carmichael admits that there’s no reference to “military style shooting” in the chats he’s reviewed. This implies that it was simply his interpretation. Nonetheless, this sort of this was allowed into evidence.

Carmichael also concedes that Schill himself didn’t participate in the conversations about bush craft of firearms tactics. Moreover, he concludes that he didn’t have grounds to support the conclusion that Schill was involved with terrorism or sedition.

Carmichael concedes that there’s no evidence Schill ever went to a so-called “Diagolon meet up”. He admits that no surveillance on Schill’s residence concluded otherwise.

The topic of the arrest for domestic violence is discussed. Again, the charge was dropped at the time of this hearing.

The Crown briefly reexamines Carmichael, who testifies that they found ammunition at Schill’s residence that wasn’t compatible with any of his legally obtained firearms.

Ultimately, Justice Robinson does grant the Application, and issues a 5 year prohibition for Schill. He refuses to allow any exemptions, including for a crossbow for hunting.

He cites the Public Emergency Order Commission (PEOC) Report from Paul Rouleau as well. It states that: “[l]aw enforcement and intelligence agencies view Diagolon as a militia-like extremist organization.”

Unfortunately, too many people post without having any understanding of what’s been going on. The Emergencies Act wasn’t invoked because of a meme, and the “Hate Gate” emails didn’t clear anyone. The PEOC Report was referenced in the decision to take Schill’s firearms and licence.

Even though Diagolon isn’t listed as a terrorist entity, and despite no evidence Schill was involved in terrorism or sedition, Schill’s firearms were taken away anyway. Yes, his assault charge had been dropped, but that wasn’t enough.

The standard for revoking or suspending firearms is actually quite low, and can be done for nearly any reason. This will be addressed in the next part.

SCHILL HEARING:
(1) https://www.canlii.org/en/on/oncj/doc/2024/2024oncj249/2024oncj249.html
(2) Evidence Of Officer Ernest Carmichael, Day 1
(3) Evidence Of Officer Ernest Carmichael, Day 2, Cross Examination

POEC HEARINGS:
(1) https://publicorderemergencycommission.ca/
(2) POEC Report, Volume 1: Overview
(3) Public Order Emergency Report Volume 1 Overview
(4) POEC Report, Volume 2: Analysis (Part 1)
(5) Public Order Emergency Report Volume 2 Analysis Part 1
(6) POEC Report, Volume 3: Analysis (Part 2)
(7) Public Order Emergency Report Volume 3 Analysis Part 2 Recommendations
(8) POEC Report, Volume 4: Process and Appendices
(9) Public Order Emergency Report Volume 4 Process And Appendices
(10) POEC Report, Part 5: Policy Papers
(11) Public Order Emergency Report Volume 5 Policy Papers

MOSLEY DECISION:
(1) https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fct/doc/2024/2024fc42/2024fc42.html#par41

Posted on

Diagolon Gun Grab, Part 2: The Carmichael Testimony

This continues the series on “Diagolon”, and the consequences that have resulted from this group. The last article focused on the ruling of Justice Robinson, who suspended Gary Schill’s firearms licence and weapons for a period of 5 years. Schill was a former administrator of the Diagolon podcast.

This doesn’t just automatically happen. A police officer brings an Application under Section 111 of the Criminal Code to ask a Judge to suspend someone’s rights. This isn’t as formal as a Trial, and the proof standards aren’t anywhere near as high.

Now, what was said during the hearing?

Fortunately, a redacted version of the Day 1 and Day 2 transcripts were published. The redactions appear to have been done to remove the name of Schill’s ex-wife. Yes, it’s from Antihate, but still worth a read.

Schill was represented by an Amicus Curiae. This is someone who isn’t a party, but is allowed to assist and make submissions for parties. Think of them as “duty-counsel”. They can be common for self-represented litigants and accused persons.

Ernest Carmichael is a detective constable with York Regional Police Service. He testified that he had been with the Tactical Intelligence Unit for 5 years. He went on to explain what had he and his group had been doing lately.

He testified that there had been a complaint that a member of the York Regional Police had publicly associated himself with Jeremy MacKenzie and Diagolon. That person is apparently no longer part of the force. It’s implied (though not explicitly stated) that the association cost him his position.

It paints a disturbing picture for many reasons.

First, the standard of proof needed to revoke a firearms licence is surprisingly low. Even though this is based in the Criminal Code, there’s no “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” needed. Far from it. “Balance of probabilities” is what’s important here.

Second, the rules of evidence are also much more lax, including hearsay evidence that should otherwise be prohibited. This included and Affidavit from Detective Constable Dimitri Kritsotakis, submitted, despite him not appearing. Carmichael is given wide latitude to speculate on matters.

Third, it’s explained here just how heavily surveilled podcasts and social media sites are. Without speaking to a single witness, this police officer was able to get a warrant to seize electronic devices.

Fourth, freedom of association — a protected right — seems meaningless when someone can lose their job because of who they interact with. Unfortunately, the circumstances here are not explained. The officer is not named, nor is his exact fate spelled out.

Fifth, it shows just how clueless and out-of-touch MacKenzie’s followers are with reality. They are oblivious to the basic facts. The Emergencies Act wasn’t declared because of a “meme”, and people weren’t exonerated due to some “Hate Gate emails”.

The above is from page 8. No actual interviews had to be conducted. The information obtained online was sufficient, which should really scare people.

Carmichael goes on to testify that he came across a video MacKenzie posted, just before receiving the formal complaint. He describes the “Raging Dissident persona” as this: He sells anger, really, on his podcast. He’s often vehemently anti-government, anti-authority. So by virtue of that, his following tends to be of the same vein.

Carmichael testifies that he had been monitoring “these channels” for the better part of 2 years. While it implies he refers to Diagolon channels, it could mean others as well. Then there’s this on page 14:

Yeah. The majority of the content was – especially considering the time, it was very anti-COVID, anti-vaccine, anti-government material. There was a lot of conspiracy theory material in that. There was a lot of what I would define as White nationalists, White supremacy ideology existing within that space. There was also a lot of what I would define as militia-type discussions. There was a lot of talk of acquiring weaponry, body armour, ammunition, planning meet-ups, organizing community events, and then also articulating the purpose of these events beyond simply….

This is getting to the heart of it. Carmichael alleges that there’s more than just racist and anti-authoritarian posting done here. Conversations also involved firearms, body armour and meet-ups.

“The Day Of The Rope” and “The Turner Diaries” are both cited as well.

Carmichael testifies that not only was he observing and documenting conversations about guns and meetings, but that meetings themselves were surveilled.

Carmichael does go on about the backstory of the name “Diagolon”. Specifically, that it was based on the idea of a fictional country made up of the more sane and stable Provinces and U.S. States. That detail is agreed on by everyone.

However, Carmichael states (or opines?) that it became more of a separatist movement.

Carmichael also explains how he identified Schill, and it’s pretty stupid. He used his real name, real photo, and dropped details about the region he was living in. From there, a simple background check from a prior arrest revealed everything else.

Yes. So Mr. Schill made a number of statements that caused concern for us. With these statements, he was also promoting the fact that he was a firearms fanatic; he was involved in reloading within his garage, which means taking – basically, building bullets himself rather than commercially purchasing them…

…and producing a large amount of ammunition in his private residence. So this, like, compounded with the rhetoric, plus what we already understood about Diagolon raised our concerns related to public safety.

So I’ll, I’ll expand on some of the conversation pieces that we observed, but as an example, for – some of the messaging that Jeremy MacKenzie provided his, his members, I can read some of the messaging that was included on his podcast that would have been re-shared in the Telegram channels. He stated – during a podcast, there was a ticker tape, similar to what you would see on maybe CP24 that would scroll across the screen. And the banner stated:

Mentally prepare yourself for the hardest decade of your life. Your children need you to reject the system in its entirety. It isn’t for you. It is for your enemy, and it seeks to subvert, subjugate, and destroy you. You either pro-human freedom or you are not. One of those choices makes you our mortal enemy. Death to Circulon. We all just wanted to be left alone. You want blood. We got what you want. Come and get it. Fuck you, make me.

So that was some of the rhetoric that Jeremy MacKenzie was, was pumping out to his followers, who would then re-share it on the Telegram channel. So on the heels of a statement like that his members would then begin organizing in-person meetings. They would discuss what the purpose of these meetings would be. It was almost always around planning. I can quote, “bush craft, survival training, firearms training.” In fact, I can recall a conversation that involved Mr. Schill where they were discussing shooting and firearm training, but then Mr. Schill had stated something to the effect of, “Well, I don’t want to just go shoot. I’d like smaller groups. And I want to shoot with a purpose.” I interpreted that to mean they didn’t want to just go target shooting on a range. They wanted to apply practical skills to their shooting, similar to what you’d see the military or law enforcement trained to do.

It would be interesting to know — though it’s not expanded on — is whether this is just conversations being recorded, or whether the police (or CSIS) have actually gone to these meets.

Carmichael goes on (page 29) about conversations that happened about body armour, and what some good choices were. This is largely opinion, but he implies that it was directed for non-civilian use.

Because when compounded with the information we’d already had, and now it was quite clear that they were starting to develop their in-person meetings to include shooting and what we had interpreted as militia-type training, our concern was strictly public safety and whether we had a private militia forming within the region.

Keep in mind, this is a hearing over a gun licence, not a criminal trial. While most of this testimony wouldn’t have been permitted in other settings, it is here.

Carmichael then gets into the topic of Schill’s arrest for assault causing bodily harm, along with the arrest of his (now) ex-wife. Electronic devices were seized during a search. Schill had 3 guns, all legally owned and safely stored. However, he had ammunition which didn’t appear to fit any of them.

The hearing continued the next day, and more on that.

If there is one takeaway here, it’s that the police are arguing that Diagolon is more than just edgy podcasting, racism, and memes. Carmichael is trying to convince the Judge that it’s an actual group and a threat to the public. He’s trying to show that this is an extremist group with a violent agenda.

People reading this transcript may — reasonably — think that it’s full of speculation, innuendo and hearsay. And they’d be right. However, this isn’t a criminal charge, and the standard is much, MUCH lower.

The Public Emergency Order Commission (PEOC) Report and Mosley decision have laid the groundwork for what’s coming. Followers of “Diagolon” really have no clue what’s been going on. This case is the first of what will likely be many gun seizures.

SCHILL HEARING:
(1) https://www.canlii.org/en/on/oncj/doc/2024/2024oncj249/2024oncj249.html
(2) Evidence Of Officer Ernest Carmichael, Day 1
(3) Evidence Of Officer Ernest Carmichael, Day 2, Cross Examination

POEC HEARINGS:
(1) https://publicorderemergencycommission.ca/
(2) POEC Report, Volume 1: Overview
(3) Public Order Emergency Report Volume 1 Overview
(4) POEC Report, Volume 2: Analysis (Part 1)
(5) Public Order Emergency Report Volume 2 Analysis Part 1
(6) POEC Report, Volume 3: Analysis (Part 2)
(7) Public Order Emergency Report Volume 3 Analysis Part 2 Recommendations
(8) POEC Report, Volume 4: Process and Appendices
(9) Public Order Emergency Report Volume 4 Process And Appendices
(10) POEC Report, Part 5: Policy Papers
(11) Public Order Emergency Report Volume 5 Policy Papers

MOSLEY DECISION:
(1) https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fct/doc/2024/2024fc42/2024fc42.html#par41