Category: Human Rights

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Infanticide #6: Fallout And Some Pushback

1. Other Articles on Abortion/Infanticide

(1) https://canucklaw.ca/canadian-universities-fighting-against-free-speech-and-free-association-in-court/
(2) https://canucklaw.ca/the-new-lindsay-shepherd-statistics-are-now-violence-infanticide-2/
(3) https://canucklaw.ca/infanticide-part-3-ny-virginia-to-legalise-up-to-birth-abortion/
(4) https://canucklaw.ca/infanticide-part-4-leave-no-survivors/
(5) https://canucklaw.ca/infanticide-5-un-endorses-abortion-as-human-right-even-for-kids/

2. Important Links

(1) http://toresays.com/2019/03/23/oregon-bill-passed-to-legalize-starving-mentally-ill-patients-so-they-die-faster/
(2) https://olis.leg.state.or.us/liz/2018R1/Downloads/MeasureDocument/HB4135/Enrolled
(3) http://toresays.com/2019/03/21/beto-constituent-arrested-for-capital-murder-may-believe-infanticide-is-her-legal-right/
(4) https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/new-yorks-ultrapermissive-abortion-law-forced-prosecutors-to-drop-a-charge-against-a-man-who-allegedly-murdered-his-pregnant-girlfriend
(5) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fetal_heartbeat_bill
(6) CLICK HERE, for Florida’s SB 492, to make it a felony for a doctor to perform abortion if heartbeat detected.
(7) ttps://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2019/00235
(8) https://legislativenavigator.myajc.com/#bills/HB/481
(9) http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/webmga/frmMain.aspx?id=hb0933&stab=01&pid=billpage&tab=subject3&ys=2019RS
(10) http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/webmga/frmMain.aspx?id=hb0978&stab=01&pid=billpage&tab=subject3&ys=2019RS
(11) https://legiscan.com/MO/bill/HB126/2019
(12) http://www.wvlegislature.gov/Bill_Status/bills_history.cfm?INPUT=2903&year=2019&sessiontype=RS
(13) https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/311/text
(14) http://www1.cbn.com/cbnnews/us/2019/march/lsquo-defunded-of-all-taxpayer-money-rsquo-ohio-withdraws-all-funding-from-planned-parenthood

3. Stabbing Baby Post-Birth is “Abortion”

From the Toresays.com article, a 17 year old Texas teenager apparently gave birth, then murdered her infant. Here is a quote:

The infant girl was delivered naturally and there were nine entry wound sites. The infant was stabbed 5 times in her back, once on her side and three times in the neck. This was determined by Dr. Diaz who performed the forensic examination. She also determined that the child was found 12 hours after birth and died to homicidal violence.

Many of them quoted the snippets of coverage by MSM who claimed killing a child up until the time of birth is a “right of women’s health”. All these young children believe they have the right to end the life of an infant because “My Body My Right”.

What this young lady did was murder. She stabbed an innocent young baby girl 9 times and abandoned her in a shed and went straight to back to bed. The rhetoric of the radical leftists MSM along with the educational system that purports radical grievances and ideologies has torn the fabric of basic morals and the sanctity of life. “

This is disgusting. How did we get to the point where not only abortion is legal, but then giving birth and then killing your child is considered “your right”?

Perhaps the rationale here is: “well, I saved the taxpayers some money by not having them pay for a doctor, so I did you a favour.”

But at least there is some good news. The recent surge in pro-death sentiments has led to some backlash, and people reaffirming that life really does matter.

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Review Of Mark Bray’s Book: Antifa, The Anti-Fascist Handbook


Yes, this came out in 2017, but still worth a read.

Check out this amazing review of Antifa by YouTuber Matt Christiansen.

This review will mostly focus on the opening part. This is for a few reasons.
First: The book is fairly long.
Second: It gets very repetitive.
Third: You can get a good understanding just from the introduction.

Despite a resurgence of white-supremacist and fascistic violence across Europe and the United States, most consider the dead and the living to be safe because they believe fascism to be safely dead — in their eyes, the fascist enemy lost definitively in 1945. But the dead were not so safe when Italian prime minister Silvio Berlusconi described spending time in Mussolini’s prison camps as a “vacation” in 2003 or the French Front National (National Front) politician Jean-Marie Le Pen called Nazi gas chambers a mere “detail” of history in 2015.”

Assuming these details are accurate, Mark Bray lists 2 European leaders making inappropriate remarks as evidence of fascistic violence rising.

This book takes seriously the transhistorical terror of fascism and the power of conjuring the dead when fighting back. It is an unabashedly partisan call to arms that aims to equip a new generation of anti-fascists with the history and theory necessary to defeat the resurgent Far Right. Based on sixty-one interviews with current and former anti-fascists from seventeen countries in North America and Europe, it expands our geographical and temporal outlook to contextualize opposition to Trump and the alt-right within a much wider and broader terrain of resistance. Antifa is the first transnational history of postwar anti-fascism in English and the most comprehensive in any language. It argues that militant anti-fascism is a reasonable, historically informed response to the fascist threat that persisted after 1945 and that has become especially menacing in recent years. You may not walk away from this book a convinced anti-fascist, but at least you will understand that anti-fascism is a legitimate political tradition growing out of a century of global struggle.

Okay, some points to take away from this.

(1) The book’s author admits it is very partisan, and is a call to arms. And as he will show, he means it quite literally.

(2) Opposition to Trump and the Alt-Right? Seems an admission that Trump himself is not Alt-Right.

(3) Militant fascism is appropriate.

As historian Robert Paxton argued, fascists “reject any universal value other than the success of chosen peoples in a Darwinian struggle for primacy.” Even the party platforms that fascists put forward between the world wars were usually twisted or jettisoned entirely when the exigencies of the pursuit of power made those interwar fascists uneasy bedfellows with traditional conservatives. “Left” fascist rhetoric about defending the working class against the capitalist elite was often among the first of their values to be discarded. Postwar (after World War II) fascists have experimented with an even more dizzying array of positions by freely pilfering from Maoism, anarchism, Trotskyism, and other left-wing ideologies and cloaking themselves in “respectable” electoral guises on the model of France’s Front National and other parties

Bray seems not to grasp the hypocrisy here. This so-called Anti-Fascist movement does exactly that: it promotes the success of “marginalised people” in a struggle for supremacy. He is also correct about the “Left’s” claim to defend the working class is the first to be discarded.

Some historians have used this literal, minimalist definition to describe as “anti-fascist” a wide variety of historical actors, including liberals, conservatives, and others, who combated fascist regimes prior to 1945. Yet, the reduction of the term to a mere negation obscures an understanding of anti-fascism as a method of politics, a locus of individual and group self-identification, and a transnational movement that adapted preexisting socialist, anarchist, and communist currents to a sudden need to react to the fascist menace. This political interpretation transcends the flattening dynamics of reducing anti-fascism to the simple negation of fascism by highlighting the strategic, cultural, and ideological foundation from which socialists of all stripes have fought back. Yet, even within the Left, debates have raged between many socialist and communist parties, antiracist NGOs, and others who have advocated a legalistic pursuit of antiracist or anti-fascist legislation and those who have defended a confrontational, direct-action strategy of disrupting fascist organizing. These two perspectives have not always been mutually exclusive, and some anti-fascists have turned to the latter option after the failure of the former, but in general this strategic debate has divided leftist interpretations of anti-fascism.

(1) The author sees liberals and conservatives as unable to stop fascists, though he admits they are opposed to it.

(2) An interesting admission: Apparently legal and non-violent means of stopping fascism are ineffective, hence the need to turn to violence.

At the heart of the anti-fascist outlook is a rejection of the classical liberal phrase incorrectly ascribed to Voltaire that “I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.” After Auschwitz and Treblinka, anti-fascists committed themselves to fighting to the death the ability of organized Nazis to say anything.

Thus, anti-fascism is an illiberal politics of social revolutionism applied to fighting the Far Right, not only literal fascists. As we will see, anti-fascists have accomplished this goal in a wide variety of ways, from singing over fascist speeches, to occupying the sites of fascist meetings before they could set up, to sowing discord in their groups via infiltration, to breaking any veil of anonymity, to physically disrupting their newspaper sales, demonstrations, and other activities. Militant anti-fascists disagree with the pursuit of state bans against “extremist” politics because of their revolutionary, anti-state politics and because such bans are more often used against the Left than the Right.

A lot to unpack in these passages:

(1) Anti-fascism is illiberal.

(2) Anti-fascists reject free speech ideals.

(3) Anti-fascists don’t believe “Nazis” should have the right to speak at all in any organized way.

(4) Anti-fascism opposes the far right, not just fascism.

(5) Anti-fascists will drown out speakers they don’t like.

(6) Anti-fascists will infiltrate groups they don’t like.

(7) Anti-fascists will commit violence.

Bray makes an interesting comment about bans being used more often against the left than the right. Bray seems completely unaware that his words make such a ban seem popular.

So who does Mark Bray reject?
A/ Nazis, Fascists
B/ Far right individuals
C/ Conservatives
D/ Liberals, or at least liberal beliefs
Or, to be blunt, most of the political spectrum.

Despite the various shades of interpretation, antifa should not be understood as a single-issue movement. Instead, it is simply one of a number of manifestations of revolutionary socialist politics (broadly construed). Most of the anti-fascists I interviewed also spend a great deal of their time on other forms of politics (e.g., labor organizing, squatting, environmental activism, antiwar mobilization, or migrant solidarity work). In fact, the vast majority would rather devote their time to these productive activities than have to risk their safety and well-being to confront dangerous neo-Nazis and white supremacists. Antifa act out of collective self-defense.

(1) This seems like a bogus attempt to give Antifa some legitimacy. Saying it is more than a single issue movement distracts from the harm it does to free societies. Remember, this group openly rejects free speech and liberal ideology.

(2) Just because Antifa members have other things to do with their lives doesn’t whitewash the violence they commit against speakers they disagree with.

(3) Collective self defense? Who is the collective? Antifa has written off everyone who is Liberal and any further right. And attacking people whose viewpoints you don’t like is not “self-defense”.

Finally, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that anti-fascism has always been just one facet of a larger struggle against white supremacy and authoritarianism.

The lack of self awareness here. Mark Bray advocates for a violent, illiberal, ideology that rejects free speech …. but at the same time rejects authoritarianism.

For this reason, it is vital to understand anti-fascism as a solitary component of a larger legacy of resistance to white supremacy in all its forms. My focus on militant anti-fascism is in no way intended to minimize the importance of other forms of antiracist organizing that identify with anti-imperialism, black nationalism, or other traditions. Rather than imposing an anti-fascist framework on groups and movements that conceive of themselves differently, even if they are battling the same enemies using similar methods, I focus largely on groups that self-consciously situate themselves within the anti-fascist tradition.

-Anti-fascism is just part of the bigger picture?
-Your wording is confusing. Is BLACK NATIONALISM a good thing?
-You just focus on the violent groups? Okay.

Mark Bray’s Fall 2017 Book Tour
9/16 Philadelphia: Wooden Shoe Books (w/ George Ciccariello-Maher)
9/18 Durham, NC: Duke University
9/19 Chapel Hill, NC: Flyleaf Books
9/23 Atlanta: A Cappella Books
9/25 Richmond, VA: Babes of Carytown
9/26 Highland Park, NJ: Reformed Church of Highland Park
9/27 Brooklyn: Powerhouse Arena (w/ Kim Kelly)
9/28 Baltimore: Red Emma’s
9/29 DC: Politics and Prose
10/5 Ithaca, NY: Ithaca College
10/7 Rochester, NY: Gay Alliance of the Genesee Valley
10/8 Pittsburgh: National Association of Letter Carriers Branch 84
10/9 Detroit: The International Institute of Metropolitan Detroit
10/10 Ann Arbor, MI: Ann Arbor Friends Meeting
10/11 Flint, MI: University of Michigan at Flint
10/12 Chicago: (info tbd)
10/15 Minneapolis (info tbd)
10/16 Madison, WI: A Room of One’s Own
10/17 Detroit: Wayne State University
10/18 Toronto: Workers’ Action Center, 720 Spadina Ave., Suite 223
10/19 Ottawa: Dalhousie Community Center
10/26 Woodstock, VT: Yankee Bookshop
10/27 Montreal: CÉDA, 2515 rue Delisle
10/30 Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University (see below)

No one tried to shut him down. Weak fascists.

This guy is a lunatic, who supports violent, illiberal policies, and opposes free speech. Ironic that he relies on free speech to sell his book, and to promote his ideas.

That was just the introduction covered. But Bray repeatedly conflates speakers and ideas he doesn’t like with fascists. He also conflates right wingers with Nazis and fascists.

Could Antifa Logic Shut Down Antifa?
Serious thought: if you say that violence must be used to prevent violence from happening, could groups of people not pre-emptively attack you? This is the precedent you set.

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Florida Judge Rules Using Fake Documents To Get Driver’s License Isn’t Illegal

CLICK HERE, for text of the ruling.
CLICK HERE, for media on the subject.

“BETH BLOOM UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on the Government’s Motion for Reconsideration of Dismissal Order (“Motion”), ECF No. [53]. The Court has considered the Motion, the Defendant’s Response in Opposition, ECF No. [54], and is otherwise fully advised. For the following reasons, the Motion is denied.

The Government asks the Court to reconsider its ruling dismissing the Superseding Indictment against the Defendant. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not provide for motions for reconsideration. In ruling on a motion for reconsideration in a criminal case, federal district courts apply civil standards and exercise substantial discretion. See United States v. Sabooni, No. 09-20298-CR, 2014 WL 4385446, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 4, 2014) (Seitz, J.) (citing United States v. Pugh, 426 F. App’x 876, 876 (11th Cir. 2011)). “The only grounds for granting a motion for reconsideration are newly-discovered evidence or manifest errors of law or fact.” Smith v. Ocwen Fin., 488 F. App’x 426, 428 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007)). “A motion for reconsideration should not simply rehash previously litigated issues[.]” United States v. Russo, No. 11-6337-RSR, 2011 WL 3044844, at *1 (S.D. Fla. July 25, 2011) (Rosenbaum, J.); see also Smith, 488 F. App’x at 428 (“A motion for reconsideration cannot be used to relitigate old matters, raise arguments, or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment” (citing Arthur, 500 F.3d at 1343))).
In its Motion, the Government rehashes essentially the same arguments raised in its Response to the Defendant’s Motion for Dismissal, during argument at calendar call, and in its Response to Defendant’s Supplemental Memorandum. The Government disagrees with the Court’s conclusion that the Government has failed to identify any federal statute or regulation prescribing an Order of Supervision as evidence of authorized stay in the United States. Yet the Government fails to point to any new facts or law, demonstrate clear error or manifest injustice, or identify any federal statute or regulation that would require the Court to change its prior finding. Simply put, the Government’s arguments amount to “mere disagreement” with the Court and do not warrant reconsideration. See Linet Inc. v. Village of Wellington, Florida, 408 F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir. 2015) (affirming denial of reconsideration where plaintiff merely “disagreed with the district court’s treatment of certain facts and its legal conclusions” in the earlier order under review); see also Roggio v. United States, No. 11-22847-CIV, 2013 WL 11320226, at *1 (S.D. Fla. July 30, 2013) (Goodman, J.).

It appears the Government argues that evidence of authorized employment in the United States necessarily equates to evidence of authorized stay in the United States. However, this argument is not persuasive because Section 1546(a) clearly delineates documents evidencing “authorized stay” and documents evidencing “authorized employment” as two distinct forms of authorization. By equating these two forms of authorization, the Government’s interpretation of Section 1546(a) necessarily renders the words “or [authorized] employment” superfluous. See In Re Walter Energy, Inc., 911 F.3d 1121 (11th Cir. 2018) (“[W]e generally construe a statute so that ‘no clause, sentence, or word’ is rendered superfluous, void, or insignificant.” (quoting TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19 (2001))). While the Court agrees with the Government that, when amending Section 1546(a) in 1986, Congress intended to broaden the types of documents encompassed by Section 1546(a) beyond those “required for entry into the United States,” see ECF No. , the Government’s Superseding Indictment did not provide the Defendant notice of any intent to prove that an Order of Supervision is “prescribed by statute or regulation… as evidence of authorized… employment in the United States,” ECF No. [22].

Accordingly, it is
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Government’s Motion for Reconsideration of Dismissal Order, ECF No. [53], is DENIED.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this 7th day of March, 2019.

This is absurd. The driver’s license was obtained under false pretenses. Shrugging this off as “procedural” is setting a dangerous precedent. It will be interesting to see if this is appealed.

Hopefully either it is overturned, or the State Congress will enact legislation to prevent this from happening again.

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UN Issues “Human Rights Compliant Guidance” For Treating Returning Terrorists

(1) https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Human-Rights-Responses-to-Foreign-Fighters-web-final.pdf
(2) UNCHR Human Rights Responses to Foreign Fighters or Terrorists
(3) https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/FTF-Report-1-3_English.pdf
(4) https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/4/7/393503_2.pdf
(5) OSCE Guidelines for Addressing the Foreign Terrorists Fighters
(6) https://stepstojustice.ca/steps/1-understand-grounds-detention

“Guidance to States on human rights-compliant responses to the threat posed by foreign fighters”

That title is a direct quote. The UN promotes “human rights-compliant responses” to terrorists who have left their country to take up arms against them, commit atrocities, then expect to be welcomed back.

” In June 2014, it was estimated that up to 12,000 people from more than 80 countries had travelled to Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic to join groups such as the Al-Nusrah Front and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). In September 2015, that number was thought to have grown to almost 30,000 from more than 100 countries. By August 2017, the flow of people to Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic had diminished dramatically in light of the military efforts against ISIL. In October 2017 it was estimated that over 40,000 people from more than 110 countries had joined ISIL, and that at least 5,600 of them had returned home.”

1/ In 2014, 12,000 people across 80 countries travelled to Iraq and Syria.
2/ In 2015, that number thought to be 30,000.
3/ In 2017, thought to be 40,000.
4/ At least 5,600 thought to have returned home.
How is this not a crisis?

“2. There is no clear profile for foreign terrorist fighters. Some are motivated by extremist ideology, while others appear more driven by alienation and boredom. Motivation may also change over time. Motivational factors may also include the desire to belong to a group or to gain peer acceptance; kinship, nationalism or patriotism; and humanitarian reasons, namely to protect the local population. Financial or material gain may also be a factor. The Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy points to prolonged unresolved conflicts, dehumanization of victims of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, lack of the rule of law and violations of human rights, ethnic, national and religious discrimination, political exclusion, socio-economic marginalization and lack of good governance conditions among the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism”

This seems deliberately designed to avoid the obvious: above, 12,000-40,000 people were thought to have joined ISIS. You know what motivates them? ISLAM. This UN report dances around that point, and implies that any form of unhappiness or social exclusion leads to people joining.

“3. The movement of people for the purposes of joining and supporting terrorist groups as well as their return to their countries of origin poses serious challenges to States in their efforts to prevent acts of terrorism. It is crucial that States adopt comprehensive long-term responses that deal with this threat and manage the return of fighters, and that in doing so they comply with their obligations under international human rights law. States have an obligation to protect the lives of individuals subject to their jurisdiction, and this includes the adoption of effective measures to counter the threat posed by foreign fighters. However, in its 2016 review of the Global Counter- Terrorism Strategy, the General Assembly expressed serious concern at the occurrence of violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms committed in the context of countering terrorism and stressed that, when counter-terrorism efforts neglected the rule of law and violated international law, they not only betrayed the values they sought to uphold, but they might also further fuel violent extremism that could be conducive to terrorism.”

That’s right. The UN expects host nations to “manage” the return of foreign fighters, who — to be frank — are overwhelmingly muslim. Nations have an obligation to ensure that “their” human rights are not violated in any way.

Curious to know: how does punishing them “further fuel violent extremism”? They are already violent, and anyone looking to join ISIS is a radical anyway.

“5. In resolution 2178 (2014), the Security Council underscored that respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law are complementary and mutually reinforcing with effective counter-terrorism measures, and are an essential part of a successful counter-terrorism effort. It noted the importance of respect for the rule of law so as to effectively prevent and combat terrorism, and that failure to comply with these and other international obligations, including under the Charter of the United Nations, is one of the factors contributing to increased radicalization and fosters a sense of impunity. The Counter-Terrorism Committee has noted the importance, as States revise legislation and policy to stem the flow of foreign terrorist fighters, to recognize that the protection of human rights and the rule of law contribute to the countering of terrorism. Arbitrary arrests, incommunicado detentions, torture and unfair trials fuel a sense of injustice and may in turn encourage terrorist recruitment, including of foreign terrorist fighters”

This is asinine. Somehow, if nations were nice and tolerant to returning terrorists, and ensured they have all the human rights they rejected…. then people won’t turn to terrorism. Perhaps there is a flow of terrorists because host countries are weak. Something to consider.

“7. In December 2017, the Security Council adopted resolution 2396 (2017), building on resolution 2178 (2014) and providing greater focus on measures to address returning and relocating foreign terrorist fighters and their families, and requiring States to strengthen their efforts in border security, information-sharing, and criminal justice. In order to protect public order and safety in the countries to which foreign terrorist fighters return or relocate, resolution 2396 (2017) sets out additional measures beyond those in resolution 2178 (2014), which may raise concerns from a human rights perspective”

Interesting. Not only do we have obligations to terrorists, but to their families as well.

” The document then analyses the gender aspects and the situation of children affected by or involved in foreign fighter activities and provides guidance on how to ensure information exchange, data collection and analysis in conformity with human rights. The document then addresses criminal justice measures, including the definition of terrorism; prosecution, fair trial and due process rights; rehabilitation and reintegration of returnees; and special laws, sunset clauses and review mechanisms. Finally, the document provides guidance on the right to an effective remedy for those whose rights have been violated and on preventing and countering violent extremism and incitement.”

Wouldn’t be the UN without a few gender references.

You read that right: rehabilitation and reintegration of returnees.

“11. Any measures undertaken to implement resolutions 2178 (2014), 2396 (2017) or other Security Council resolutions must comply with general human rights principles grounded in treaty law and customary law. This means that any measures which may limit or restrict human rights must be prescribed by law, be necessary, proportionate to the pursuance of legitimate aims and non-discriminatory. They should also be procedurally fair and offer the opportunity of legal review.“

What do you consider reasonable then? Is leaving to go join ISIS not a valid reason for the host country to fear for the safety of its citizens, should you return? As far as legal process goes: how does one investigate in a war zone across the world?

“13. In a limited set of circumstances, States may also take measures to temporarily derogate from certain international human rights law provisions. As noted by the Human Rights Committee, measures derogating from the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights must be of an exceptional and temporary nature. Two fundamental conditions must be met: the situation must amount to a public emergency which threatens the life of the nation; and the State party must have officially proclaimed a state of emergency. The obligation to limit any derogations to those strictly required by the exigencies of the situation reflects the principle of proportionality which is common to derogation and limitation powers.”

Okay, from your criteria: #1 is met. These fighters are a threat to the public.
As for #2, “why” must a public declaration be made?

14. The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, along with regional refugee instruments,22 are the core legal instruments of the international refugee regime, complemented by customary international law and international human rights law. These instruments define the term “refugee” and establish an international framework for the protection of refugees

These people are not refugees. UN is deliberately obfuscating here. They are terrorists, who “chose” to leave their country.

“16. International humanitarian law is also known as the law of war or the law of armed conflict and is applicable to both situations of international or non-international armed conflicts. These rules are enshrined in the four Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, as well as in customary rules of international humanitarian law. International humanitarian law is a set of rules which seek, for humanitarian reasons, to limit the effects of armed conflict. It protects persons, civilians, who are not or are no longer participating in the hostilities as well as fighters hors de combat and restricts the means and methods of warfare.“

This is not an official war. People can’t just leave their country, join a foreign army, then expect to return afterwards. They have committed treason. It’s idiotic to claim that humanitarian law would apply to these people.

“18. States have used different measures, whether legislative, administrative or operational, to prevent the departure of foreign fighters to conflict areas as well as to prevent their return. These could include travel bans, the seizure, retention, withdrawal and non-renewal of passports or identity cards, the stripping of citizenship, restrictions on travel or entry to territory and various types of house arrests or preventive detention. All of these measures have a serious impact on a number of fundamental human rights, including the rights to personal liberty and freedom of movement. They also raise a number of serious due process concerns if, for example, decisions are taken following secretive proceedings, in absentia or on the basis of vaguely defined criteria without adequate safeguards to prevent statelessness.“

Here’s the thing: very few people would actually care if any terrorists were left stateless as a result. If you leave to take up arms against a nation or it’s allies, you are a TRAITOR. You have forfeited your rights to be a citizen.

“21. The right to life, liberty and security of person is fundamental in international human rights law. It is the first substantive right protected by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Deprivation of liberty involves a more severe restriction on motion than merely interfering with freedom of movement. Examples of deprivation of liberty include arrest, imprisonment, house arrest, administrative detention and involuntary transportation, but may also include the cumulative effects of multiple restrictions on freedom of movement when, taken together, they would amount to a de facto deprivation of liberty. International human rights law protects against such deprivation of liberty, except on grounds of and in accordance with procedures established by law. But, even assuming that a deprivation of liberty is lawful, international human rights law also absolutely prohibits any deprivation of liberty that is arbitrary. The prohibition of arbitrary detention is non-derogable and must be understood to incorporate elements of “inappropriateness, injustice, lack of predictability and due process of law as well as elements of reasonableness, necessity and proportionality”. The right to life is non-derogable, and the Human Rights Committee has stated that the fundamental guarantee against arbitrary detention is also non-derogable insofar as even situations that allow for derogations in accordance with article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights cannot justify a deprivation of liberty that is unreasonable or unnecessary under the circumstances.”

It would be nice if the UN at some point starts listing rights and protections that society should have.

I’ll stop it here, but it goes on about ensuring that foreign fighters and terrorists have their human rights met. Ironic, since this group would never extend human rights or life to others.

Noticeably absent is any concern for the populations of these countries. Returning terrorists will pose a risk to the public, most likely for life. However, the UN talks about “managing” those risks.

Canadian Criminal Code:

Purpose and Principles of Sentencing
Marginal note:
Purpose
718 The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives:
(a) to denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community that is caused by unlawful conduct;
(b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences;
(c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary;
(d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders;
(e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and
(f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims or to the community.

I think that terrorism would certainly qualify under the first 3 criteria. We must (a) denounce the conduct; (b) deter the offender, and others, and (c) separate the offender from society. The other 3 are of much less concern.

Grounds to Deny Bail

The Crown considers 3 grounds of detention:
Primary – You may not go to court when required.
Secondary – You may commit another crime, or the public may not be safe while you’re out on bail.
Tertiary – Because of the circumstances of your offence, the public might feel that the justice system is not working if you’re let out of custody.

Terrorists would qualify on all 3 grounds.

Regardless, the overwhelming majority of the public does not want these people coming back. Not now, not ever.

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UN Security Council: Legalized Aggression


(Then President George W. Bush, arguing for an invasion of Iraq under blatantly false pretenses. The UN Security Council approved the use of force in 2002 by a 15-0 vote. War was launched on March 20, 2003).


(A critique on the problem with veto power)

1. Important Links

CLICK HERE, for UN Security Council home page.
CLICK HERE, for the page on sanctions.
CLICK HERE, the UN Charter.
CLICK HERE, for Article 41 of the UN Charter (Sanctions).
CLICK HERE, for an index of voting records.
CLICK HERE, for Wikipedia page on “Proxy Wars”.

2. Stated Mission

Peace and Security

The Security Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. It has 15 Members, and each Member has one vote. Under the Charter of the United Nations, all Member States are obligated to comply with Council decisions.

The Security Council takes the lead in determining the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression. It calls upon the parties to a dispute to settle it by peaceful means and recommends methods of adjustment or terms of settlement. In some cases, the Security Council can resort to imposing sanctions or even authorize the use of force to maintain or restore international peace and security.

That is correct. 15 nations can decide what is “in the interest of global peace and security”. Hardly seems that other nations get much of a say in international matters. Would your own sovereignty be limited by what these 15 members of the “Global Community” have to say?

Even more undemocratic is the make up of the Security Council. There are 15 members, 5 of which are permanent, and 10 others which are chosen on a rotational basis.

The 5 permanent members are: 1/ the United States; 2/ Russia (formerly the Soviet Union); 3/ Britain; 4/ France; and 5/ China. These were the “winners” of World War II, when the UN was founded. Each of the 5 permanent members has “veto” power, meaning they can unilaterally block any resolution from passing.

In order to pass a Security Council resolution, a majority of members have to approve it. Additionally, none of the “Permanent 5” can veto. They each have to abstain or support.

3. Non Military Options

What if the UN doesn’t opt for military force? There are less direct, but more passive-aggressive measures called “sanctions”. These are essentially punishments the Security Council imposes.

(From Article 41)

“The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.”

From the page on sanctions:

“Security Council sanctions have taken a number of different forms, in pursuit of a variety of goals. The measures have ranged from comprehensive economic and trade sanctions to more targeted measures such as arms embargoes, travel bans, and financial or commodity restrictions. The Security Council has applied sanctions to support peaceful transitions, deter non-constitutional changes, constrain terrorism, protect human rights and promote non-proliferation.”

The UN Security Council also lists who it has imposed sanctions upon: “Since 1966, the Security Council has established 30 sanctions regimes, in Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, the former Yugoslavia (2), Haiti, Iraq (2), Angola, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Eritrea, Eritrea and Ethiopia, Liberia (3), DRC, Côte d’Ivoire, Sudan, Lebanon, DPRK, Iran, Libya (2), Guinea-Bissau, CAR, Yemen, South Sudan and Mali, as well as against ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida and the Taliban.”

4. UN Contributing To World Peace?

Does UN Security Council Create World Peace?
Not really. This is especially true when one of the “Permanent 5” has veto power over any resolution to stop or condemn the aggression. Though the major powers may not directly be involved, they may provide aid to others and fight proxy wars.

Though not always the best site, Wikipedia is great for a quick reference.

Chinese Civil War (1944–1949)
Greek Civil War (1944–1949)
Iran crisis of 1946 (1945–1946)
First Indochina War (1946–1954)
Paraguayan Civil War (1947)
Malayan Emergency (1948–1960)
Internal conflict in Myanmar (1948– )
Balochistan conflict (1948– )
Arab–Israeli conflict (1948–present)
Korean War (1950–1953)
Mau Mau Uprising (1952–1960)
Second Indochina War (First Taiwan Strait Crisis (1953–1975))
Algerian War (1954–1962)
First Sudanese Civil War (1955–1972)
Suez Crisis (1956–1957)
Second Taiwan Strait Crisis (1958)
Lebanon crisis (1958)
Tibetan uprising (1959–1962)
Central American crisis (1960–1996)
Congo Crisis (1960–1965)
Portuguese Colonial War (1960–1974)
Xinjiang conflict (1960s–present)
First Iraqi–Kurdish War (1961–1970)
Eritrean War of Independence (1961-1991)
North Yemen Civil War (1962–1970)
Dhofar Rebellion (1962–1976)
Sarawak Communist Insurgency (1962–1990)
Sand War (1963)
Aden Emergency (1963–1967)
Insurgency in Northeast India (1963–present)
Rhodesian Bush War (1964–1979)
Dominican Civil War (1965)
Communist insurgency in Thailand (1965–1983)
Bolivian Campaign (1966–1967)
Korean DMZ Conflict (1966–1969)
South African Border War (1966–1990)
Nigerian Civil War (1967–1970)
Naxalite–Maoist insurgency (1967–present)
Communist insurgency in Malaysia (1968–1989)
Operation Condor (1968–1989)
Al-Wadiah War (1969-present)
Civil conflict in the Philippines (1969–present)
Yemenite War (1972)
Angolan Civil War (1974–2002)
Ethiopian Civil War (1974–1991)
Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990)
Western Sahara War (1975–1991)
Indonesian occupation of East Timor (1975–1999)
Cabinda War (1975–present)
Insurgency in Laos (1975–present)
Civil conflict in Turkey (1976–present)
Shaba I (1977)
Ogaden War (1977–1978)
Cambodian-Vietnamese War (1977–1991)
Mozambican Civil War (1977–1992)
Chittagong Hill Tracts conflict (1977–1997)
Shaba II (1978)
Uganda–Tanzania War (1978–1979)
NDF Rebellion (1978–1982)
Chadian–Libyan conflict (1978–1987)
Yemenite War of (1979)
Soviet–Afghan War (1979–1989)
Sino-Vietnamese War (1979
Internal conflict in Peru (1980–present)
Ethiopian–Somali Border War (1982)
Sri Lankan Civil War (1983–2009)

This isn’t even a complete list. But when researching conflicts, you will find that it is most often one or more of the “Permanent 5” behind these conflicts. How can the UN actually help world peace when its own Security Council members can flaunt the principles without consequences?

Why are a nation’s well being and sovereignty dependant on the will of 15 nations, 5 of whom appointed themselves as permanent members with a veto.

This is not to say that nations should not be free to enter into military alliances and pacts. However, this arrangement seems stacked against smaller and weaker nations.

5. What Does UN Say About It?

Under the United Nations Charter, the functions and powers of the Security Council are:
.
-to maintain international peace and security in accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations;
-to investigate any dispute or situation which might lead to international friction;
-to recommend methods of adjusting such disputes or the terms of settlement;
-to formulate plans for the establishment of a system to regulate armaments;
-to determine the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression and to recommend what action should be taken;
-to call on Members to apply economic sanctions and other measures not involving the use of force to prevent or stop aggression;
-to take military action against an aggressor;
-to recommend the admission of new Members;
-to exercise the trusteeship functions of the United Nations in “strategic areas”;
-to recommend to the General Assembly the appointment of the Secretary-General and, together with the Assembly, to elect the Judges of the International Court of Justice.

There has been much speculation within Canada that Justin Trudeau is being so “UN compliant” because he is aiming for a seat on the Security Council. Not sure if this is true, though it’s certainly possible.

Military aggression. But “democratically performed” military aggression.”

6. Who’s Behind US Military Aggression?

In a word: Israel.

The State of Israel has been influencing US military policy, particularly in the Middle East, for decades. Western (Christian) nations go to war against Muslim nations. This in turn creates refugees who are forced to take shelter in other countries. Of course Israel won’t take them, but will help ship them off to the West.

Posted on

BC Supreme Court Rules Dad Can’t Stop 11 Y/O From Getting Sex Change, BCCA Upholds

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FvtLOqyw95E

1. Important Links

(1) https://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcsc/doc/2019/2019bcsc254/2019bcsc254.html
(2) http://archive.is/sJs12
(3) https://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcsc/doc/2019/2019bcsc1057/2019bcsc1057.html
(4) http://archive.is/of5UU
(5) https://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcca/doc/2019/2019bcca256/2019bcca256.html
(6) http://archive.is/O4UGr
(7) http://www.bclaws.ca/civix/document/id/complete/statreg/169_2009_01
(8) http://www.bclaws.ca/civix/document/id/complete/statreg/96223_01
(9) https://www.newsweek.com/transgender-women-transgender-men-sex-change-sex-reassignment-surgery-676777
(10) https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1994/1994canlii117/1994canlii117.pdf

2. Ban On Publishing Identities

Restriction on publication: Order sealing court records in effect. There is a
publication ban imposed by orders of this court restricting the publication, broadcast
or transmission of any information that could identify the names of the parties
referred to in these proceedings as A.B., C.D., E.F., G.H., I.J., K.L., M.N., O.P.,
Q.R., S.T., U.V. and W.X. This publication ban applies indefinitely unless otherwise ordered.

The story can be made public, but not the names.

3. Review Of Ruling, 2019

Introduction
.
[1] Three applications are before the court.
.
[2] The first is by “A.B.” who was born on October 18, 2004. He is described as a transgender boy who was assigned female at birth.
He has commenced proceedings by Notice of Family Claim and now applies for various orders under the Family Law Act, SBC 2011, c 25, the most important one being that the court find it to be in his best interests to undergo medical treatment for gender dysphoria including hormone treatments.
.
[3] The second application is by C.D., who is A.B.’s father. He has filed a Petition now seeks an interlocutory injunction until April 5, 2019, when the Petition may be heard, by way of an order extending an injunction granted by the Provincial Court of B.C. that restrains gender transition treatments for A.B. until February 19, 2019. The order by the Provincial Court has been extended by this court until this decision is released.
.
[4] The third application is for an order anonymizing the names of some of the parties in these proceedings and counsel for A.B. and an order banning the publication of anything that could lead to the identification of the parties. A.B.’s mother is referred to in these reasons as “E.F.”
.
[5] These reasons reflect the brevity of the submissions made to the Court and the need for this decision to be released expeditiously.

Okay, three linked petitions:
A/ Child wanting to under hormone treatement
B/ Extending an injunction
C/ Privacy of the parties

Rule 10-9 — Urgent Applications
When Applications May Be Heard on Short Notice
.
Short notice
(1)
Without limiting subrule (6), in case of urgency, a person wishing to bring an application (in this subrule and in subrules (2) to (5) called the “main application”) on less notice than would normally be required may make an application (in this subrule and in subrules (2) to (4) called the “short notice application”) for an order that the main application may be brought on short notice.
.
How to make a short notice application
(2)
A short notice application may be made by requisition in Form F17, without notice, and in a summary way.
.
Rule 10-11 — Final Orders in Defended Family Law Cases
.
Final orders in defended family law cases
(1)
To obtain a final order, other than at trial, in a defended family law case begun by the filing of a notice of family claim, a party must apply by way of summary trial in accordance with Rule 11-3.

Under BC Supreme Court Family Rules, 10-9 allows parties allows applications to be brought on short notice, but stipulates that a summary trial (abbreviated trial) is the method that must be used.

“[11] A.B. was born on October 18, 2004. Since age 11, A.B. has gender identified as a male. He informed his school counsellor of that when he was 12 years old and in Grade 7.
.
[12] He is presently enrolled in Grade 9 at high school under his chosen male name and is referred to by his teachers and peers as a boy and with male pronouns. He has transitioned socially to being a boy. To respect his gender identity, in this decision, the court will refer to A.B. using male pronouns.
.
[13] With his mother’s help, A.B. sought medical assistance to allow him to begin a physical transition to a boy. He was seen by Dr. Wallace Wong, a registered psychologist experienced in treating children with gender dysphoria, on a number of occasions.”

I have sympathy for anyone with this condition. However, making permanent changes can do untold destruction and harm to adolescents who are still developing.

“[25]
Dr. Hursh expresses the view that the delay of hormone treatment is not a neutral option because A.B. is experiencing ongoing and unnecessary suffering and continued gender dysphoria. He opines that when youth are provided with affirming hormone therapy they may have an improvement of gender dysphoria and relief from other co-morbid mental issues. He says that they are also less likely to suffer from harassment and victimizations by others.
.
[26] Significantly, Dr. Hursh expresses his concern that continued delay in hormone treatment will place A.B. at risk of suicide.”

Except what will happen to the child if the dysphoria goes away? What if the child makes irreversible changes at 13 or 14, but then at 19 eventually “ages out” of it?

“[33] In her affidavits, A.B.’s mother states that she has serious concerns for A.B.’s well-being if he has to wait to begin treatment for his gender dysphoria. She says, “If his treatment is put on hold, I am terrified that A.B. will conclude there is no hope and will take his life.””

Again, I have sympathy for the child, but being suicidal if not allowed to modify a body in such an irreversible way?! There are bigger issues than just gender dysphoria.

[36] A.B. ’s father filed an affidavit with the court on February 11, 2019. He refers to a written agreement between him and A.B. ’s mother under the Family Law Act. Paragraph 1 of that agreement provides that each parent will exercise all parental responsibilities with respect to A.B. , “…subject to section 17 of the Infants Act, giving, refusing or withdrawing consent to medical dental and other health-related treatments for the child”

Here is section 17 of the Infants Act, which the Court is referencing. This relates to consent for medical treatment.

Consent of infant to medical treatment
17 (1) In this section:
“health care” means anything that is done for a therapeutic, preventive, palliative, diagnostic, cosmetic or other health related purpose, and includes a course of health care;
“health care provider” includes a person licensed, certified or registered in British Columbia to provide health care.
.
(2) Subject to subsection (3), an infant may consent to health care whether or not that health care would, in the absence of consent, constitute a trespass to the infant’s person, and if an infant provides that consent, the consent is effective and it is not necessary to obtain a consent to the health care from the infant’s parent or guardian.
.
(3) A request for or consent, agreement or acquiescence to health care by an infant does not constitute consent to the health care for the purposes of subsection (2) unless the health care provider providing the health care
(a) has explained to the infant and has been satisfied that the infant understands the nature and consequences and the reasonably foreseeable benefits and risks of the health care, and
(b) has made reasonable efforts to determine and has concluded that the health care is in the infant’s best interests.

The Judge also takes a shot at the Father, who opposes the medical treatment.

[43] There is some evidence that indicates the A.B. ’s father is somewhat disingenuous in seeking to present more scientific evidence relating to gender transition treatment. Rather, some evidence suggests that he has been delaying proceedings as a way of preventing his son from obtaining the gender transition treatment that he seeks.

The science is far from definitive. But even if it is true, the Father’s motivations are good, wanting the child to hold off longer, to see what develops. Remember, this is a child!

[50] Having said that, it still remains to consider whether further delay to allow the
father time to obtain more opinions is in the best interests of A.B.
.
[51] In my view it is not.
.
[52] The totality of the evidence regarding A.B.’s medical needs including the opinions of Dr. Wong, Dr. Hursh, Dr. Metzger, and Dr. Chapman, leads me to conclude that his hormone treatment should not be delayed further.
.
[53] The risks to A.B. of further delay have also been clearly identified by Dr. Metzger and A.B.’s mother both of whom are concerned that having previously attempted suicide, further delay may result in him attempting it again.”

The Judge doesn’t seem to realize that if the child is truly suicidal, other options should be explored at this point, rather than making body altering changes that will be irreversible.

Now, the Judge applies the case cited above: RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 SCR 311, 1994 CanLII 117 (SCC), for some guidelines in applying the test.

[58] In view of the established law regarding the right of a mature minor to consent to medical treatment and the assessments of a number of physicians that A.B. has capacity to consent as well as the evidence of his health care providers that the proposed treatment is in A.B.’s best interests, there is no serious question to be tried.
.
[59] At the second stage of the RJR test, the inquiry is whether the litigant who seeks the interlocutory injunction would, unless the injunction is granted, suffer irreparable harm. A.B.’s father has not demonstrated that a refusal to grant the injunction would adversely affect or irreparably harm him.
.
[60] As to the third stage, I accept Dr. Hursh’s evidence that delaying hormone therapy for A.B. is not a neutral option as he is experiencing ongoing and unnecessary suffering from gender dysphoria. In my view the balance of convenience clearly favours
A.B.”

While certainly meaning well, the BC Supreme Court Judge fails to actually protect the child. Virtue signalling seems to win over child well being.

I have nothing against adults who are trans. But allowing children at this young age to do it amounts to child abuse.

It will be interesting to see if it is appealed.

UPDATE: It was.

4. BC Court of Appeals Ruling

CD appeals three orders of the Supreme Court. The first found his child AB to have validly consented to medical treatment for gender dysphoria and made declarations respecting AB’s best interests and family violence. The second was a protection order against CD, and the third dismissed a second proceeding commenced by CD. At issue is whether the orders were procedurally unfair, authorized by the legislative scheme, or violated CD’s Charter rights. Held: Appeal allowed in part. The bald declarations under s. 37 of the Family Law Act pertaining to AB’s best interests and family violence were not permitted by the statutory scheme, and the protection order was consequently without foundation. Substituted for some of these orders are a declaration that AB’s consent to the medical treatment was validly made under s. 17 of the Infants Act and conduct orders under s. 227(c) of the Family Law Act.

The BCCA ruling is far too long to go through entirely, so let’s look at some parts of it.

1. Protection orders and family violence
[156] Protection orders, which fall under Part 9 of the FLA entitled “Protection from Family Violence”, are powerful tools to address family violence.

[157] “Family violence” is defined in s. 1 of the FLA as:
.
(a) physical abuse of a family member, including forced confinement or deprivation of the necessities of life, but not including the use of reasonable force to protect oneself or others from harm,
(b) sexual abuse of a family member,
(c) attempts to physically or sexually abuse a family member,
(d) psychological or emotional abuse of a family member, including
(i) intimidation, harassment, coercion or threats, including threats respecting other persons, pets or property,
(ii) unreasonable restrictions on, or prevention of, a family member’s financial or personal autonomy,
(iii) stalking or following of the family member, and
(iv) intentional damage to property, and
(e) in the case of a child, direct or indirect exposure to family violence;

[167] In this case, Marzari J. assumed that the conduct identified in para. 2(c) of the Bowden Order—attempting to persuade AB to abandon the treatment, addressing him by his birth name and referring to him as a girl or with female pronouns—constituted family violence as defined in the FLA. She made additional findings that CD’s conduct in speaking publicly about AB’s personal issues was harmful to AB.

[168] While the judge did not explicitly conclude that this conduct constituted “family violence”, her finding that it was harmful to AB appears to ground her conclusion that CD was likely to continue to engage in “conduct that constitutes family violence against AB”. We take this from para. 46 of her reasons, where she found that CD’s conduct “both before and after the determinations made by this Court” indicated that he was likely to continue to engage in conduct that constitutes family violence against AB, “through conduct already determined to be family violence by this court, and the publication and sharing of deeply private information that is harmful to AB”.

[169] The declaration in para. 2(c) of the Bowden Order may have formed the basis for AB’s decision to take the matter further and seek a protection order. It did form the initial basis for Marzari J.’s consideration of “family violence”. This is indeed unfortunate, as it is our view that raising the issue of family violence in the context of this case caused the parties to become increasingly polarized in their positions, thus exacerbating the conflict and raising the stakes in the litigation. We see none of this to be in AB’s best interests.

[170] Moreover, given our opinion that para. 2(c) of the Bowden Order should be set aside, and perhaps more importantly the fact that Bowden J. made no findings on the issue of family violence in this context, para. 1 of the Marzari Order should also be set aside.

[171] There is evidence that CD’s refusal to acknowledge AB’s gender is clearly hurtful to AB, but there is insufficient evidence in the record before both Bowden J. and Marzari J. that CD’s conduct was grounded by an intent to hurt AB or that his refusal to agree with AB’s decision about the treatment was ultimately unresponsive to AB when AB wished to disengage.

Yes, we are at a point where a parent using a child’s name and pronouns are seriously being considered as “family violence” by the BC courts. It seems to attach malice to a parent’s words.

[178] In bringing his concerns to public forums like the Federalist and Culture Guard, CD apparently took no account of the extent to which AB would be negatively affected. Not only did CD continue to disrespect AB’s decisions, he also appeared to be oblivious to the effect of his conduct on AB as well as the very derogatory public comments related to AB posted on the Federalist website. Marzari J.’s finding that CD had made AB “an unwilling poster child (albeit anonymously)” was well founded (at para. 69).

[179] As concerning as CD’s conduct was, however, it does not necessarily follow that such conduct equates to the kind of psychological or emotional abuse that would constitute “family violence” under the FLA. As we have observed, the evidence does not suggest that CD deliberately intended to harm AB; rather the evidence suggests that CD cares deeply for AB but, as Marzari J. found, he has been irresponsible in the way in which he has dealt with his disagreement with AB about what is in AB’s best interests. We agree that his conduct in this regard has been seriously misguided but in the unique circumstances of this case, we do not agree that it should be characterized as “family violence” justifying the issuance of a protection order.

[180] It is apparent to us that Marzari J. was heavily influenced in her approach to family violence by “conduct already determined to be family violence by this court” (at para. 46). In the absence of the declaration in the Bowden Order, it is questionable whether she would have proceeded further down that path, particularly in light of her acknowledgement that restraining CD from publishing and sharing information about the issues in this case would restrict his freedom of expression not only within his own family but more broadly (at para. 47). This is not to suggest that CD’s right to expressive freedom precludes any restrictions, a subject which we discuss below in respect of Charter values.

[181] It is our view, therefore, that para. 2 of the Marzari Order should be set aside. As paras. 3, 4, and 5 were also made under s. 183, they should also be set aside.

The panel was not happy that the father had made media appearances, even if it was done without the names being disclosed. They thought it would still have a harmful effect.

[194] CD submits that orders that require him to acknowledge AB as male violated his right to freedom of conscience and belief under s. 2(a) of the Charter because they require him to adopt views that are not his own. He also submits that both the Bowden and Marzari Orders infringe his s. 2(b) rights in three ways: (1) they censor him from using AB’s proper name and female pronouns in speaking with AB or referring to AB as his daughter in communications with third parties; (2) they compel him to refer to AB as a boy, to use male pronouns and to use the male name AB has chosen when speaking to AB or when speaking about AB to third parties; and (3) they censor him from discussing the case with anybody except his lawyers, who are also censored from talking about the case. CD says that referring to AB as his “daughter” lies at the core of the purpose of s. 2(b)—protecting truth-seeking.

[195] CD further submits that the orders that restrain him from discussing the medical treatment with AB prevent him from playing an important parental role in discussing an important medical decision with AB, thus violating his liberty right under s. 7 of the Charter to make decisions for his child in fundamental matters such as medical care.

[196] CD’s position is supported by ARPA and JCCF.

[197] ARPA submits that a parent’s freedom to hold certain beliefs, which include beliefs about gender, is protected by s. 2(b). It says that parents also have the right and the duty to give guidance to their children in accordance with those beliefs, and the state cannot prohibit parents from sharing their beliefs and opinions with their children. While ARPA’s submissions focus on the interpretation of s. 183 of the FLA, the essence of its position is that such provisions—which we assume would include provisions for orders under the FLA other than protection orders—should be interpreted in light of their text and their context within the FLA as a whole, as well as consistently with the Charter.

[198] JCCF supports CD’s position that the kind of orders made here violate CD’s rights under ss. 2(b) and 7 of the Charter.

An interesting argument. Forcing someone to use language (and that the person considers untrue) might be a violation of their free speech and security of the person.

[203] The law is clear that the Charter does not apply to judicial orders made in private disputes: RWDSU v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., 1986 CanLII 5 (SCC), [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573. In Young v. Young, 1993 CanLII 34 (SCC), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3 and P.(D.) v. S.(C.), 1993 CanLII 35 (SCC), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 141, L’Heureux-Dubé J. applied this principle to court orders made in private family law disputes, but held that underlying Charter values are not to be ignored by courts when making such decisions.

[204] The Attorney General points out recent judicial and academic commentary that has been critical of the consideration of Charter values in making decisions and interpreting legislation: see Ojeikere v. Ojeikere, 2018 ONCA 372, Miller J.A.; E.T. v. Hamilton-Wentworth District School Board, 2017 ONCA 893; Gehl v. Canada (Attorney General), 2017 ONCA 319, Lauwers and Miller JJ.A. While each of these cases involve different circumstances, the primary concern expressed is that reasoning based on Charter values lacks the doctrinal rigour of a traditional Charter analysis, which must also consider the competing principles in s. 1. The Attorney General also points to Wilson v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles), 2015 SCC 47, where the Court held that Charter values had no role to play in interpreting legislation in the absence of an ambiguity. This court applied the same principle in the family law context in J.E.S.D. v. Y.E.P., 2018 BCCA 286.

The Charter is not intended to apply to private disputes.

[212] CD’s refusal to respect AB’s decisions regarding his gender identity is troublesome. The evidence shows that his rejection of AB’s identity has caused AB significant pain and has resulted in a rupture of what both parties refer to as an otherwise loving parent-child relationship. This rupture is not in AB’s best interests. He clearly wants and needs acceptance and support from his father.

[213] While of course CD is fully entitled to his opinions and beliefs, he cannot forget that AB, now a mature 15-year-old, with the support of his mother and his medical advisors, has chosen a course of action that includes not only hormone treatment, but a legal change of his name and gender identity.

[214] It is our view that in these circumstances, a limited conduct order, made with the objective of protecting the best interests of AB, is consistent with the Charter values underlying ss. 2(a), 2(b), and 7. CD has the right to his opinion and belief about AB’s gender identity and choice of medical treatment. His right to hold a contrary opinion would not be unduly affronted by an order that CD respect AB’s choices by acknowledging them in his communications with AB and publicly with third parties, both generally and in respect of these proceedings. His right to express his opinion publicly and to share AB’s private information to third parties may properly be subject to constraints aimed at preventing harm to AB. However, we would not restrict CD’s right to express his opinion in his private communications with family, close friends and close advisors, provided none of these individuals is part of or connected with the media or any public forum, and provided CD obtain assurances from those with whom he shares information or views that they will not share that information with others.

What is unsettling in all of this is that the courts either don’t know — or just don’t care — that there is an incredibly high rate of regret and eventual detransitioning that happens. Sure, the child is 15 now, and certain. But what about at age 20? Age 25? Age 30?

While some minor amendments were made to existing orders, the bulk of it remained intact. The dad is viewed as having lost the appeal.