Category: UK

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China’s Organ Harvesting Of Live People

1. Other Articles on Abortion/Infanticide

CLICK HERE, for #1: universities fighting against pro-life groups.
CLICK HERE, for #2: citing abortion stats now considered violence.
CLICK HERE, for #3: up to birth abortion now legal in VA/NY.
CLICK HERE, for #4: letting babies who survive abortion die.
CLICK HERE, for #5: UN supports abortion rights, even for kids.
CLICK HERE, for #6: fallout and some pushback on abortion.
CLICK HERE, for #7: ONCA rules docs must provide service or referral.
CLICK HERE, for #8: hypocrisy in summer jobs grant, purity tests.
CLICK HERE, for #9: partial funding lost for planned parenthood.

CLICK HERE, for trafficking, smuggling, child exploitation series.

2. Important Links


(1) https://chinatribunal.com/
(2) https://chinatribunal.com/about-etac/
(3) https://chinatribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Short-Form-Conclusion-China-Tribunal.pdf
(4) Short-Form-Conclusion-China-Tribunal (1)
(5) https://www.firstthings.com/blogs/firstthoughts/2011/08/vp-biden-okay-with-china-tyrannical-one-child-policy
(6) https://www.nationalreview.com/human-exceptionalism/china-stil-killing-and-harvesting-falun-gong-wesley-j-smith/
(7) https://www.lifenews.com/2019/06/20/china-is-harvesting-organs-of-political-prisoners-sometimes-while-theyre-still-alive/
(8) http://www.nbcnews.com/id/46849651/ns/world_news-asia_pacific/t/china-phase-out-prisoner-organ-donation/#.XQjdq_lKi9I
(9) https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/china-forcefully-harvests-organs-detainees-tribunal-concludes-n1018646

3. China Tribunal’s Findings


From the December 2018 interim report:

“The Tribunal’s members are certain – unanimously, and sure beyond reasonable doubt – that in China forced organ harvesting from prisoners of conscience has been practiced for a substantial period of time involving a very substantial number of victims.”

That was part of the interim report. But now the final report goes on even further:

The Tribunal has considered evidence, in its many forms, and dealt with individual issues according to the evidence relating to each issue and nothing else and thereby reached a series of conclusions that are free of any influence caused by the PRC’s reputation or other potential causes of prejudice.
These were as follows;
• That there were extraordinarily short waiting times (promised by PRC doctors and hospitals) for organs to be available for transplantation;
• That there was torture of Falun Gong and Uyghurs;
• That there was accumulated numerical evidence (excluding spurious PRC data) which indicated:
o the number of transplant operations performed, and
o the impossibility of there being anything like sufficient ‘eligible donors’ under the recently formed PRC voluntary donor scheme for that number of transplant operations;
• That there was a massive infrastructure development of facilities and medical personnel for organ transplant operations, often started before any voluntary donor system was even planned; That there was direct and indirect evidence of forced organ harvesting.

And this led to the conclusion that:

forced organ harvesting has been committed for years throughout China on a significant scale and that Falun Gong practitioners have been one – and probably the main – source of organ supply. The concerted persecution and medical testing of the Uyghurs is more recent and it may be that evidence of forced organ harvesting of this group may emerge in due course. The Tribunal has had no evidence that the significant infrastructure associated with China’s transplantation industry has been dismantled and absent a satisfactory explanation as to the source of readily available organs concludes that forced organ harvesting continues till today.

However, on the topic of “genocide” China Tribunal pussyfoots around the issue and says they cannot conclude there is intent for genocide. This despite stating that the actions met the other elements.

The Tribunal considered whether this constituted a crime of Genocide; The Falun Gong and the Uyghurs in the PRC each qualify as a ‘group’ for purposes of the crime of Genocide. For the Falun Gong, the following elements of the crime of Genocide are clearly established:
• Killing members of the group;
• Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group.
Thus, bar one element of the crime, Genocide is, on the basis of legal advice received, clearly proved to the satisfaction of the Tribunal. The remaining element required to prove the crime is the very specific intent for Genocide. Accepting legal advice about proving this intent, the Tribunal cannot be certain that the requisite intent is proved and thus cannot be certain that Genocide itself is proved.

That’s right. Due to legal advice, China Tribunal cannot actually conclude there is intent to commit genocide, despite the prolonged actions that would justify the claims.

China Tribunal then “appears” to condemn what happens to Falun Gong and the Uyghurs, but waters down the language to “criminality”, despite the included detail. The tribunal claims the “elements have been met for crimes against humanity”.

Commission of Crimes Against Humanity against the Falun Gong and Uyghurs has been proved beyond reasonable doubt by proof of one or more of the following, legally required component acts:
• murder;
• extermination;
• imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law;
• torture;
• rape or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;
• persecution on racial, national, ethnic, cultural or religious grounds that are universally recognised as impermissible under international law ;
• enforced disappearance
in the course of a widespread and systematic attack or attacks against the Falun Gong and Uyghurs.

This seems to be splitting hairs. It meets the criteria for crimes against humanity. Yet China Tribunal, on advice from their lawyers, refuse to state there is intent to qualify as “genocide”.

The report ends with a very interesting comment about the power of media and citizen journalists.

Governments and international bodies must do their duty not only in regard to the possible charge of Genocide but also in regard to Crimes against Humanity, which the Tribunal does not allow to be any less heinous. Assuming they do not do their duty, the usually powerless citizen is, in the internet age, more powerful than s/he may recognise. Criminality of this order may allow individuals from around the world to act jointly in pressurising governments so that those governments and other international bodies are unable not to act.

The China Tribunal has no power to actually do anything. However, it seems to believe that by spreading word online it can put pressure on governments to act.

4. Firstthings.com Article


Firstthings.com quotes former VP Joe Biden, on his take on China’s one-child policy.

But as I was talking to some of your leaders, you share a similar concern here in China. You have no safety net. Your policy has been one which I fully understand — I’m not second-guessing — of one child per family. The result being that you’re in a position where one wage earner will be taking care of four retired people. Not sustainable. So hopefully we can act in a way on a problem that’s much less severe than yours, and maybe we can learn together from how we can do that.

In order to maintain the 1-child policy, China has had to result to extreme and inhuman measures:

  • forced abortion
  • sex-selective abortions against girls
  • sterilizations
  • eugenics

Biden seemed critical that the declining birth rate would be able to sustain the retired population. However he seemed to have no concern over the mass aborting and sterilizations that went on.

5. NBC Coverage Of Issue


American news outlet NBC reported here, and also reported that:

In 2014, state media reported that China would phase out the practice of taking organs from executed prisoners and said it would rely instead on a national organ donation system.

The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Tuesday was not immediately available to comment on the tribunal’s findings.

In a statement released alongside the final judgment, the tribunal said many of those affected were practitioners of Falun Gong, a spiritual discipline that China banned in the 1990s and has called an “evil cult.” The tribunal added that it was possible that Uighur Muslims — an ethnic minority who are currently being detained in vast numbers in western China — were also being targeted.

China had been promising for years to end this practice, but it doesn’t seem to have happened.

6. Lifesite Take On The Situation

Still, there has been too much reporting for too long about this profound human-rights abuse to ethically continue to look the other way. The question thus becomes: Will the U.S. specifically outlaw traveling to China for the purpose of buying an organ — just as we do participating in pedophilia tourism overseas? (Spain, Israel, Italy, and Taiwan have passed such laws already.) I can’t think of one argument against pursuing such a course.

If we don’t at least do what we can, it seems to me that we make ourselves complicit in allowing the demand for black-market organs forcibly harvested from murdered prisoners to continue unimpeded — and the blood of the slaughtered victims will also be on us.

(Lifesite article here) This echoes what China Tribunal has been saying: that political pressure is needed to put a stop to this practice.

7. My Take On This Story


If the allegations are true, and they seem to be, then this is abhorrent.

At some level this is no different that what abortion industries like Planned Parenthood do: snuff out lives in order to obtain a commodity, their organs. If we subscribe to the idea that life is valuable, then this is little — though more heinous — than a common murder and robbery.

While donation of organs (for after death), should be encouraged, this is an entirely different matter. This is premeditated mass murder in order to steal those parts. The practice is barbaric.

Consider the flack Canada has taken over the Government’s genocide claims over Indigenous women and girls. Most of the deaths and disappearances (at least where it is known) were at the hands of Indigenous men they knew. That is apparently a “genocide”. Yet what is going on in China is not really worth the attention apparently.

But good luck getting Prime Minister Justin Trudeau to openly condemn the practice.

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Kirsten Jenkins: Humanizing Sociotechnical Transitions Through Energy Justice

1. Go Check Out Uppity Peasants Site


This is a fairly new site, however, it has some interesting content on it. Well researched, it will give some alternative views on how we are really being controlled. It you haven’t been there, what are you waiting for?

2. About The Authors


CLICK HERE, for the profile of Kirsten Jenkins. Side note: no shocker she has cited Frank Geels.

CLICK HERE, for Benjamin Sovacool.

He is a Lead Author of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s Sixth Assessment Report (AR6), due to be published in 2022, and an Advisor on Energy to the European Commission’s Directorate General for Research and Innovation in Brussels, Belgium.

He has played a leadership role in winning and managing collaborative research grants worth more than $19.6 million, including those from the U.S. Department of Energy, U.S. National Science Foundation, MacArthur Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation, Energy Technology Development and Demonstration Program of Denmark, the Danish Council for Independent Research, and the European Commission. In the United Kingdom, he has served as a Principal Investigator on projects funded by the Economic and Social Research Council, Natural Environment Research Council, and the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council.

CLICK HERE, for Darren McCauley.

3. The Paper Itself

Humanizing sociotechnical transitions through energy justice: An ethical framework for global transformative change
Kirsten Jenkins, Benjamin K. Sovacool, Darren McCauley

Not even kidding. That is the title of the paper.

ABSTRACT
Poverty, climate change and energy security demand awareness about the interlinkages between energy systems and social justice. Amidst these challenges, energy justice has emerged to conceptualize a world where all individuals, across all areas, have safe, affordable and sustainable energy that is, essentially, socially just. Simultaneously, new social and technological solutions to energy problems continually evolve, and interest in the concept of sociotechnical transitions has grown. However, an element often missing from such transitions frameworks is explicit engagement with energy justice frameworks. Despite the development of an embryonic set of literature around these themes, an obvious research gap has emerged: can energy justice and transitions frameworks be combined? This paper argues that they can. It does so through an exploration of the multi-level perspective on sociotechnical systems and an integration of energy justice at the model’s niche, regime and landscape level. It presents the argument that it is within the overarching process of sociotechnical change that issues of energy justice emerge. Here, inattention to social justice issues can cause injustices, whereas attention to them can provide a means to examine and potential resolve them

This article is the first time I have encountered the term “energy justice”. Rather than simply dealing with a problem in a scientific and factual way, the authors add some social-justice element to it. The abstract doesn’t really explain how this works. Hopefully the body will.

Thus, it calls for greater engagement with the three-tenet energy justice approach (distributional justice, procedural justice and justice as recognition) when planning for more sustainable transitions.

Energy justice apparently consists of:

  • Distributional justice
  • Procedural justice
  • Justice as recognition

Okay, but that doesn’t really explain what it is.

Amidst serious sustainability challenges, transitions frameworks have evolved to either conceptualize or facilitate decarbonised energy systems that provide both security of supply and universal access to energy; a process that it is widely acknowledged will require new ways of producing, living and working with energy (Bridge et al., 2013; Heffron and McCauley, 2018; IEA, 2008; Mernier, 2007). In aiming to implement sociotechnical solutions, governments are increasingly utilising the language of transitions, and the concept has begun to feature in the energy policies of countries including Denmark, Switzerland and the United Kingdom (UK)

Some points that should be addressed:

  • They are quite blunt (and proud it seems) that their language is filtering into government activity.
  • Provide universal supply of energy? Is this meant to be some sort of socialist or communist idea?
  • Has it sunk in that if you remove all Carbon forms of energy that it will reduce supply, and make your universal supply harder to obtain?
  • When you say a “new way of living”, does this mean reducing the standard of living in the West to ensure that everyone has access to the same amount of energy?

Yet despite ongoing debates about ethics or justice across many fields of literature (including extended discussions between antagonist camps that have gone on across the history of political philosophy), one social element missing from transitions frameworks is explicit, practice oriented engagement with the energy justice concept and related approaches to justice concerns. Eames and Hunt (2013) draw attention to the fact that considerations of equity and justice are underrepresented within the sociotechnical transitions literature and the wider energy transitions debate, despite the fact that the concept of sustainable development, the target of many transition plans, is inherently rooted in these core notions (Hopwood et al., 2005). Transitions literatures can also fail to give due consideration to issues of landscape, health and existing property values too (Jefferson, 2017).

More points to be looked at:

  • This seems a shameless attempt to turn what is supposed to be an environmental issue into a “social justice”, and hence blur the lines.
  • “Equity and justice” and terms that need to be rammed into discussions.
  • It appears that including “social justice” would be a way to better market their ideas. They don’t seem to make an actual connection though.
  • If a platform needs to latch on to overused buzzwords to sell itself, then it’s probably not a very good platform.

Failure to adequately engage with questions of justice throughout the transition process is dangerous. It may lead to aggravated poverty, entrenched gender bias and non-participation as outcomes or by-products of ‘blinkered’ decision-making. Indeed, without a focus on justice, transitions may fail to acknowledge the burdens of having too much energy, such as waste, over-consumption and pollution, or from not having enough, where some individuals lack access, are challenged by under-consumption and poverty, and may face health burdens and shortened lives as a consequence of restricted energy choices (Sovacool et al.,2016a). This paper therefore utilizes the energy justice concept as a way of engaging with these ethical dilemmas within pre-existing transitions frameworks.

More nonsense which requires a response:

  • There is an obsession with redefining terms to suit an agenda.
  • This is energy we are talking about, not poverty, gender bias, or non-participation. That’s right, they really played the “gender” card here.
  • Burden of having too much? Can I assume the solution is to force sharing? Or rather, to force “rich” nations to hand over energy supplies?
  • Engaging with these ethical dilemmas? You haven’t demonstrated any sort of cause and effect yet.

The origins of the energy justice literature is largely reported as coming from activist accounts of energy issues using the environmental justice frame – a precursor to the energy justice concept which shares overlapping philosophical groundings

That’s right. A bunch of activists made this up.

Specifically, as environmental justice is commonly defined as the distribution of environmental hazards and access to all natural resources; it includes equal protection from burdens, meaningful involvement in decisions, and fair treatment in access to benefits……….. This approach forms the basis of the energy justice approach and framework. However, mentions of its core notions also appear elsewhere, including in the guise of the “three A’s” of availability, accessibility and affordability

It reads like the sort of nonsense one would get in a gender studies class. Only thing is that “energy” is being substituted for here.

note in this regard, that even ‘a “low-carbon” transition has the potential to distribute its costs and benefits just as unequally [as historical fossil-based transitions] without governance mindful of distributional justice’ or, as an extension, without attention to the issues of justice as recognition and due process–energy justice tenets we explore below. We argue that the energy justice concept provides one way of filling this gap.

Here, we get into some straight up Communism. Is it true that costs and benefits don’t impact everyone equally? Yes. However, there is no practical way to do this. Either you would have to forcefully arrange differences in benefits and costs to “make things right”, or you would have to alter everyone’s standard of living so that they were equal.

Guess the road to Hell could use a re-paving.

Throughout, we present three main claims, each coinciding with a level in the MLP model; the niche, regime, and landscape:

(1) That the energy justice concept can expose exclusionary and/or inclusionary technological and social niches before they develop, leading to potentially new and socially just innovation;

(2) That in addition to using the MLP to describe regimes, the energy justice framework provides a way for these actors to normatively judge them, potentially destabilising existing regimes using moral criteria;

(3) That framing energy justice as a matter of priority at the landscape level could exert pressure on the regime below, leading to the widespread reappraisal of our energy choices, and integration of moral criteria.

(1) Sounds like a way to vilify or outcast technology that is scientifically sound, because it doesn’t meet their criteria.
(2) Appears to be a method of using peer pressure and social pressure as a way of destabilizing systems.
(3) Comes across as more overt propaganda.

This governance focus means that the socio-technical literature increasingly acknowledges the political dynamics related to the process through which innovations scale, diffuse or entrench. We focus here on the most prominent socio-technical transitions framework, the multi-level perspective (MLP). The MLP takes the form of a series of nested levels, the niche, regime, and landscape

Nothing scientific. Purely political manoeuvering.

Analysis through the energy justice lens reveals that although electric vehicles (EVs) do have laudable environmental (and social) attributes, they can be exclusionary in the sense that they can perpetuate already widening gaps between the wealthy and poor, as well as potentially raising new forms and geographies of injustice – distributional and justice as recognition concerns.

I thought the point was protecting the environment. But here, they talk about how electric cars will not impact everyone equally, even if they do have considerable environmental benefits. Again, is this an argument in favour of socialism or communism?

Equal opportunity v.s. equal outcome.

In addition to applications in niches, the energy justice framework can support the current role of the MLP to describe regimes by providing a means for policy actors to normatively judge them—exposing unjust practices and resultantly, increasing regime ‘humanisation’. We illustrate this first through the exploration of nuclear power and hydroelectric power production, regimes in which there is some consensus that technological development and lock-in raises issues of justice, or injustice. We identify that the metrics, frameworks, or checklists presented above – as well as the three-tenet framework of energy justice more generally – provide a means of normatively judging both planned and current energy and future sociotechnical regimes, leading to potential re-evaluation of our energy selection criteria. These approaches also recognise the need to politicise the actualisation of energy justice itself.

Finally some honesty. This is a political agenda.

And working to “humanize” a movement? What happened to simply relying on scientific consensus?

4. Conclusions From The Paper

Energy decisions are all too frequently made in a moral vacuum, culminating in a strong normative case for combining the literature on sociotechnical transitions with concepts arising from energy justice. Moreover, we illustrate that energy justice can play a role at each level of one of the more expansive sociotechnical transitions frameworks, the MLP. Within this latter contribution, (1) the energy justice concept could expose exclusionary niches, (2) provide a means for actors to normatively judge regimes, and (3) through the framing of energy justice at the landscape level foster the reappraisal of our energy choices and integration of moral principles. Across all stages of this argument, we present a case for not only mitigating environmental impacts of energy production via sociotechnical change, but doing so in an ethically defensible, socially just way.

To repeat, this is not about environmental protection. It is about blending a social justice causes and lingo into an unrelated topic.

Our caveats come as recognition of the intricacies of politics and political processes around energy transitions and energy justice. For as Meadowcroft (2009) highlights, long-term change is likely to be even messier and more contested than the transitions literature discusses. Indeed, there are likely to be political aspects that approaches such as the MLP are ill equipped to negotiate, and trade-offs that a tenet approach to energy justice cannot entirely resolve.

This may be the most honest thing they say. Politically, this is a very tough sell. They also admit that there “energy justice” approach will not answer the hard questions.

Nonetheless, they still cover those facts in academic jargon.

5. My Own Thoughts

The authors keep repeating that they are just “framing the issue”. In reality, they are publishing propaganda.

There is nothing scientific that the paper adds. There is no building on previous work, or fact checking of previous research. It is entirely about manipulating people to their cause by pretending it is a “social justice” issue. This is blatant activism, masquerading as science.

I also noticed a lot of overlap with the Frank W. Geels article. Do they merely cite each other, or do they just republish the same articles over and over again?

This environmental movement seems to have a lot of self-inflicted problems. For example, this obsession with “energy justice” and other non-issues actually stonewalls progress that they could have made.

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Frank Geels & Disruptive Innovation Framework

(From actual academic writing: Frank W. Geels)

(More academia: Sustainable Consumption Institute, Manchester University)

(Clayton Christiansen and “Disruptive Innovation” video)

(From the Uppity Peasants site)

1. Go Check Out Uppity Peasants Site


This is a fairly new site, however, it has some interesting content on it. Well researched, it will give some alternative views on how we are really being controlled.
Go check out “Uppity Peasants“.

2. Important Links


CLICK HERE, for the Sustainable Consumption Institute & Manchester Institute of Innovation Research, The University of Manchester, Denmark Road Building, M13 9PL, Manchester, United Kingdom.
CLICK HERE, for Clayton Christiansen and “Disruptive Innovation”.
CLICK HERE, for SCI Collective Action & Social Movements.
CLICK HERE, for SCI Social Inequality.
CLICK HERE, for Multi-Level Perspective on Sustainability.
CLICK HERE, for a Wiki explanation of disruptive innovation.
CLICK HERE, for removing the innovator’s dilemma.

CLICK HERE, for the Climate Change Scam Part I.
CLICK HERE, for Part II, the Paris Accord.
CLICK HERE, for Part III, Saskatchewan Appeals Court Reference.
CLICK HERE, for Part IV, Controlled Opposition to Carbon Tax.
CLICK HERE, for Part V, UN New Development Funding.

3. Quotes From The Geels Article

Disruption and low-carbon system transformation: Progress and new challenges in socio-technical transitions research and the Multi-Level Perspective

This will be elaborated on, but is about subverted the status quo, or “disruption”. Worth pointing out, that although these types of articles are published and marketed as “science”, they are anything but.

As this title would suggest, the article is extremely political. The concern is not about science itself, but how to “sell” the science. And the agenda here is searching for political methods of implementing the transition to a Carbon free

ABSTRACT
This paper firstly assesses the usefulness of Christensen’s disruptive innovation framework for low-carbon system change, identifying three conceptual limitations with regard to the unit of analysis (products rather than systems), limited multi-dimensionality, and a simplistic (‘point source’) conception of change. Secondly, it shows that the Multi-Level Perspective (MLP) offers a more comprehensive framework on all three dimensions. Thirdly, it reviews progress in socio-technical transition research and the MLP on these three dimensions and identifies new challenges, including ‘whole system’ reconfiguration, multi-dimensional struggles, bi-directional niche-regime interactions, and an alignment conception of change. To address these challenges, transition research should further deepen and broaden its engagement with the social scienceseconomy.

The usefulness of Christiansen’s disruptive innovation framework? While used in a business sense, it appears to be a way for entrepreneurs to get into a market or business. However, in this context it is used as disrupting an environmental policy.

It is mildly (or downright) creepy that the author, Frank Geels, openly suggests that research should broaden its engagement with social sciences. In plain English, this means merging, where scientific research is viewed through a “social” lens.

Christiansen’s “Disruptive Innovation Framework” is explained in the above video. Also see “disruption in financial services“.

Christensen [4] made important contributions to the long-standing debate in innovation management about new entrants, incumbents and industry structures. He argued that disruptive innovations enable new entrants to ‘attack from below’ and overthrow incumbent firms. Christensen thus has a particular understanding of disruption, focused mainly on the competitive effects of innovations on existing firms and industry structures. His framework was not developed to address systemic effects or broader transformations, so my comments below are not about the intrinsic merits of the framework, but about their usefulness for low-carbon transitions.

Christensen’s disruptive innovation framework offers several useful insights for low-carbon transitions (although similar ideas can also be found elsewhere). First, it suggests that incumbent firms tend to focus their innovation efforts on sustaining technologies (which improve performance along established criteria), while new entrants tend to develop disruptive technologies (which offer different value propositions). Second, it proposes that disruptive technologies emerge in small peripheral niches, where early adopters are attracted by the technology’s new functionalities. Third, incumbent firms may initially overlook or under-estimate disruptive technologies (because of established beliefs) or are not interested in them, because the limited return on-investments associated with small markets do not fit with existing business models. Fourth, price/performance improvements may enable disruptive technologies to enter larger markets, out-compete existing technologies and overthrow incumbent firms

Worth pointing out right away, Geels has no interest in the “intrinsic merits” of the disruptive innovation framework that Christiansen talks about. Rather, he focuses on applying that technique to reducing/eliminating Carbon emissions from society.

Christiansen’s idea could be applied fairly practically to business, where new players want to establish themselves. However, Geels “weaponizes” this idea and wants to apply it with the climate-change agenda.

Geels also makes it obvious that overthrowing incumbents is a priority. Again, Christiansen’s writings were meant with the business approach, and trying to start your own, but Geels “repurposes” it.

While Christensen’s framework focuses on technical and business dimensions, the MLP also accommodates consumption, cultural, and socio-political dimensions. Although co-evolution has always been a core concept in the MLP, this is even more important for low-carbon transitions, which are goal-oriented or ‘purposive’ in the sense of addressing the problem of climate change. This makes them different from historical transitions which were largely ‘emergent’, with entrepreneurs exploiting the commercial opportunities offered by new technology

[27]. Because climate protection is a public good, private actors (e.g. firms, consumers) have limited incentives to address it owing to free rider problems and prisoner’s dilemmas. This means that public policy must play a central role in supporting the emergence and deployment of low-carbon innovations and changing the economic frame conditions (via taxes, subsidies, regulations, standards) that incentivize firms, consumers and other actors. However, substantial policy changes involve political struggles and public debate because: “[w]hatever can be done through the State will depend upon generating widespread political support from citizens within the context of democratic rights and freedoms” ([28]: 91).

Again, Geels hijacking a legitimate business concept, but using it for his enviro agenda.

How to implement this? Taxes, subsidies, regulations, standards for businesses and consumers. Use these to regulate and influence behaviour.

Geels rightly says that widespread political support will be needed. But he frames the climate change scam as a way to protect rights and freedoms. Nice bait-and-switch.

Conceptually, this means that we should analyse socio-technical transitions as multi-dimensional struggles between niche-innovations and existing regimes. These struggles include: economic competition between old and new technologies; business struggles between new entrants and incumbents; political struggles over adjustments in regulations, standards, subsidies and taxes; discursive struggles over problem framings and social acceptance; and struggles between new user practices and mainstream ones.

Despite Geels’ article being published in the Journal, “ENERGY RESEARCH AND SOCIAL SCIENCE”, this anything but scientific. If anything, it seems analogous to the “lawfare” that Islamic groups perpetuate on democratic societies.

While Geels promotes economic competition, this is anything but a fair competition. He also calls for:

  • Political struggles over regulations
  • New standards
  • Subsidies
  • Taxes
  • Discursive struggles over problem framings & social acceptance
  • Struggles between new and mainstream user practices

There is nothing scientific here. This is a call for using “political” manoeuvering for achieving social goals.

The importance of public engagement, social acceptance and political feasibility is often overlooked in technocratic government strategies and model-based scenarios, which focus on techno-economic dimensions to identify least-cost pathways [32]. In the UK, which is characterized by closed policy networks and top-down policy style, this neglect has led to many problems, which are undermining the low carbon transition.

• Onshore wind experienced local protests and permit problems, leading to negative public discourses and a political backlash, culminating in a post-2020 moratorium.

• Shale gas experienced public controversies after it was pushed through without sufficient consultation.

• Energy-saving measures in homes were scrapped in 2015, after the Green Deal flagship policy(introduced in2013) spectacularly failed, because it was overly complicated and poorly designed, leading to limited uptake.

• The 2006 zero-carbon homes target, which stipulated that all new homes should be carbon-neutral by 2016, was scrapped in 2015, because of resistance by major housebuilders and limited consumer interest.

• The smart meter roll-out is experiencing delays, because of controversies over standards, privacy concerns, and distribution of benefits (between energy companies and consumers).

While these points are in fact true, Geels suggests that problems could have been avoided if there was sufficient public consultation. This is wishful thinking.

These points raise many legitimate concerns with the eco-agenda. Yet Geels shrugs them off as the result of not engaging the public enough.

Christensen and other innovation management scholars typically adopt a ‘point source’ approach to disruption, in which innovators pioneer new technologies, conquer the world, and cause social change. Existing contexts are typically seen as ‘barriers’ to be overcome. This ‘bottom-up’ emphasis also permeates the Strategic Niche Management and Technological Innovation System literatures. While this kind of change pattern does sometimes occur, the MLP was specifically developed to also accommodate broader patterns, in which niche-innovations diffuse because they align with ongoing processes at landscape- or regime-levels [9].

The MLP thus draws on history and sociology of technology, where processual, contextual explanations are common. Mokyr [58], for instance, emphasizes that “The new invention has to be born into a socially sympathetic environment” (p. 292) and that “Macro-inventions are seeds sown by individual inventors in a social soil. (.) But the environment into which these seeds are sown is, of course, the main determinant of whether they will sprout” (p. 299). So, if radical innovations face mis-matches with economic, socio-cultural or political contexts, they may remain stuck in peripheral niches, hidden ‘below the surface’.

Since low-carbon transitions are problem-oriented, transition scholars should not only analyse innovation dynamics, but also ‘issue dynamics’ because increasing socio-political concerns about climate change can lead to changes in regime-level institutions and selection environments. Societal problems or ‘issues’ have their own dynamics in terms of problem definition and socio-political mobilization as conceptualized, for instance, in the issue lifecycle literature [59,50]. Low carbon transitions require stronger ‘solution’ and problem dynamics, and their successful alignment, which is not an easy process, as the examples below show.

These passages go into marketing strategies, and ways to “frame an argument”. Notice not once does Geels suggest doing more research, or checking the reliability of existing data. Instead, this is a push for emotional manipulation and shameless advertising.

Invention has to be born into a socially sympathetic environment. Science be damned.

There are also positive developments, however, that provide windows of opportunity. Coal is losing legitimacy in parts of the world, because it is increasingly framed as dirty, unhealthy and old-fashioned, and because oil and gas companies are distancing themselves from coal, leading to cracks in the previously ‘closed front’ of fossil fuel industries. The UK has committed to phasing out coal-fired power plants by 2025 and several other countries (Netherlands, France, Canada, Finland, Austria) also move in this direction, providing space for low-carbon alternatives, including renewables.

I would actually agree that coal being phased out would benefit society. However, Geels makes it a “marketing” issue rather than a scientific one. Coal is “increasingly framed” as dirty. Notice that the actual science, such as from this site, are very rarely described.

Following chemical reactions takes place in the combustion of coal with the release of heat:
C + O2 = CO2 + 8084 Kcal/ Kg of carbon (33940 KJ/Kg)
S + O2 = SO2 + 2224 Kcal/Kg of sulfur (9141 KJ/Kg)
2 H2 + O2 = 2 H2O + 28922 Kcal/Kg of hydrogen (142670 KJ/Kg)
2C + O2 = 2CO + 2430 Kcal/Kg of carbon (10120 KJ/Kg)

4. Geels’ Conclusions

The paper has also identified several research challenges, where the transitions community could fruitfully do more work. First, we should broaden our analytical attention from singular niche-innovations (which permeate the literature) to ‘whole system’ change. This may involve changes in conceptual imagery (from ‘point source’ disruption to gradual system reconfiguration) and broader research designs, which analyze multiple niche-innovations and their relations to ongoing dynamics in existing systems and regimes. That, in turn, may require more attention for change mechanisms like add-on, hybridisation, modular component substitution, knock-on effects, innovation cascades, multi regime interaction.

Second, we should better understand regime developments. Existing regimes can provide formidable barriers for low-carbon transitions. Incumbent actors can resist, delay or derail low-carbon transitions, but they can also accelerate them if they reorient their strategies and resources towards niche-innovations. The analysis of niche-to-regime dynamics (as in the niche empowerment literature) should thus be complemented with regime-to-niche dynamics, including incumbent resistance or reorientation. Additionally, we need more nuanced conceptualizations and assessments of degrees of lock-in, tensions, cracks, and destabilisation.

Third, we need greater acknowledgement that socio-technical systems are a special unit of analysis, which spans the social sciences and can be studied through different lenses and at different levels. The recent trend towards deepening our understanding of particular dimensions and societal groups is tremendously fruitful, because disciplinary theories offer more specific causal mechanisms. But, as a community, we should complement this with broad analyses of co-evolution, alignment, multi-dimensionality and ‘whole systems’.

This all sounds elegant, but read between the lines. It is about influencing public perception. Whenever academics, lawyers or politicians seem to make things confusing we need to ask: are they trying to obscure their goals?

5. More About Frank W. Geels

Selected publications of Geels
If you would like a broader cross section of Geels’ work, perhaps these publications will be of interest.

  • Geels, F.W., Berkhout, F. and Van Vuuren, D., 2016, Bridging analytical approaches for low-carbon transitions, Nature Climate Change, 6(6), 576-583
  • Geels, F.W., Kern, F., Fuchs, G., Hinderer, N., Kungl, G., Mylan, J., Neukirch, M., Wassermann, S., 2016, The enactment of socio-technical transition pathways: A reformulated typology and a comparative multi-level analysis of the German and UK low-carbon electricity transitions (19902014), Research Policy, 45(4), 896-913
  • Turnheim, B., Berkhout, F., Geels, F.W., Hof, A., McMeekin, A., Nykvist, B., Van Vuuren, D., 2015, Evaluating sustainability transitions pathways: Bridging analytical approaches to address governance challenges, Global Environmental Change, 35, 239–253
  • Penna, C.C.R. and Geels, F.W., 2015, ‘Climate change and the slow reorientation of the American car industry (1979-2011): An application and extension of the Dialectic Issue LifeCycle (DILC) model’, Research Policy, 44(5), 1029-1048
  • Geels, F.W., 2014, ‘Regime resistance against low-carbon energy transitions: Introducing politics and power in the multi-level perspective’, Theory, Culture & Society, 31(5), 21-40
  • Geels, F.W., 2013, ‘The impact of the financial-economic crisis on sustainability transitions: Financial investment, governance and public discourse’, Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions, 6, 67-95
  • Geels, F.W., 2012, ‘A socio-technical analysis of low-carbon transitions: Introducing the multi-level perspective into transport studies’, Journal of Transport Geography, 24, 471-482
  • Geels, F.W., Kemp, R., Dudley, G. and Lyons, G. (eds.), 2012, Automobility in Transition? A Socio Technical Analysis of Sustainable Transport, New York: Routledge
  • Verbong, G.P.J. and Geels, F.W., 2010, ‘Exploring sustainability transitions in the electricity sector with socio-technical pathways’, Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 77(8), 12141221 Verbong, G.P.J. and Geels, F.W., 2007, ‘The ongoing energy transition: Lessons from a sociotechnical, multi-level analysis of the Dutch electricity system (1960-2004)’, Energy Policy, 35(2), 1025-1037
  • Geels, F.W., 2002, ‘Technological transitions as evolutionary reconfiguration processes: A multi-level perspective and a case-study’, Research Policy, 31(8/9), 1257-1274

Frank Geels publicly available CV
Education
• Ph.D., Science, Technology and Innovation Studies, Twente University of Technology (Jan. 1998- July 2002), Netherlands. Supervisors: Arie Rip and Johan Schot. Title PhD thesis: Understanding the Dynamics of Technological Transitions: A co-evolutionary and socio-technical analysis.
• Masters degree in Philosophy of Science, Technology and Society, Twente University of Technology (1991-1996)
• Bachelor degree in Chemical Engineering, Twente University of Technology (1989-1991)

For what it’s worth, his formal education is pretty impressive. Where I lose respect is when he deviates from scientific argument in favour of political discourse. What could be very interesting work is corrupted be having an agenda.

His undergraduate degree is chemical engineering, which again, is very respectable. However, his Masters and PhD show a deviation from science and research.

While there are many other such authors, Frank W. Geels is a good case of what happens when political agendas and manoeuvering creep into science.

A morbidly fascinating topic. Check out some of his other publications.

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Abuse of Safe Third Country Agreement & Coming To Canada Under False Pretenses

CLICK HERE, for previous article on the Canada/US Safe 3rd Country Agreement (signed in 2002)

1. Interesting Cases

(1) CLICK HERE, for a marriage of convenience.
Liang v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, 2014 CanLII 90636 (CA IRB)

(2) CLICK HERE, for committing identity fraud in order to gain entry to Canada.
Shaikh v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2018 CanLII 89040 (CA IRB)

(3) CLICK HERE, for an actual terrorist wanting to stay in Canada.
Singh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1997 CanLII 5893 (FC)

(4) CLICK HERE, for a failed US asylum seeker, relying on falsified psychological documents.
X (Re), 2016 CanLII 152912 (CA IRB)

(5) CLICK HERE, for a failed US asylum seeker changing his story this time.
X (Re), 2013 CanLII 99499 (CA IRB)

(6) CLICK HERE, for an Indian man claiming to be from Tibet to gain asylum (Mariam Monself, take note).
X (Re), 2014 CanLII 100882 (CA IRB)

(7) CLICK HERE, for a “refugee” who lived illegally in the US for 14 years, then trying to claim asylum in Canada
X (Re), 2015 CanLII 44019 (CA IRB)

(8) CLICK HERE, for a wanted fugitive from China trying to get asylum in Canada.
X (Re), 2015 CanLII 107837 (CA IRB)

These 8 cases are just a small sample of the tidal wave of fraudulent “refugee” claims that have been made over the last several years. Although many get rejected, many still get through. This happens even when adjudicators admit that applicants have been deceptive.

2. UN Promotes Abuse Of S3CA

CLICK HERE, for the UN link.

Exceptions to the Safe Third Country Agreement with Canada

The U.S. and Canada have an agreement preventing people who first enter one country from applying for asylum or refugee status in the other. This means that if you entered the U.S. first and then try to apply for asylum in Canada, you may not be able to. However, there are exceptions to the agreement that may allow you to apply for asylum in Canada, even if you came to the U.S. first. For one thing, this agreement only applies to you if you are planning on arriving at entry ports on the U.S.-Canada land border. It does not apply if you plan on arriving in Canada at air or marine ports.

The following questions will determine whether you meet any of the exceptions that will allow you to apply for asylum in Canada at a U.S.-Canada land border even if you arrived in the U.S. first.

EXCEPTION # 1 Land Border Entry Ports Only

Are you going to arrive in Canada from a land border?

NO ==> You qualify under this exception!

YES ==> You do not qualify under this exception. Check to see if you qualify under any other exception.

EXCEPTION # 2 Family Connections in Canada

Do you have any of the following family members in Canada?

  • A spouse
  • A common-law partner (a common law partner is person of the same or opposite sex with whom you are cohabiting in a conjugal relationship and have cohabited for at least a year.)
  • A legal guardian
  • A child
  • A father or mother
  • A brother or sister
  • A grandfather or grandmother
  • A grandchild
  • An uncle or aunt
  • A nephew or niece

NO ==> You do not qualify under this exception. Check to see if you qualify under any other exception.

YES ==> Is your family member any of the following?

  • A Canadian citizen
  • A permanent resident
  • A protected person (i.e. determined to be a refugee or a person in need of protection)
  • Accepted in principle on humanitarian and compassionate grounds (removal order stayed under Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations 233)
  • 18 years of age or over and is a refugee claimant (and the claim has not been rejected, withdrawn, found abandoned or ineligible)
  • 18 years of age or over and is in Canada on a work permit or study permit (but check the exceptions)

    • YES ==> You qualify under this exception!
    NO ==> You do not qualify under this exception. Check to see if you qualify under any other exception.

    EXCEPTION # 3 Unaccompanied Minor
    Are you under 18?
    NO ==> You do not qualify under the unaccompanied minor exception. Check to see if you qualify under any other exception.
    YES ==> Were you accompanied here by your father, mother, or legal guardian? Are you married? Is your father, mother, or legal guardian in Canada or the United States?

    If NO to all these questions ==> You qualify under this exception!
    If YES to any of these questions ==> You do not qualify under this exception. Check to see if you qualify under any other exception.

    EXCEPTION # 4 Countries to which Canada Does Not Remove

    Are you a national of any of the following countries?

    • Afghanistan
    • Burundi
    • Democratic Republic of Congo
    • Haiti
    • Iraq
    • Liberia
    • Rwanda
    • Zimbabwe

    NO ==> You do not qualify under this exception. Check to see if you qualify under any other exception.

    YES ==> Have you been convicted of any crimes?

    NO ==> You qualify under this exception!

    YES ==> You may not qualify under this exception. Canada does not admit people who have been convicted of certain crimes. Whether you qualify under this exception depends on the type of crime(s) you were convicted of.

    EXCEPTION # 5 Death Penalty

    Have you been charged or convicted of an offence punishable with the death penalty in the country?

    YES ==> You MAY qualify under this exception. Canada does not admit people who have been convicted of certain crimes. Whether you qualify under this exception depends on the type of crime(s) you were convicted of.

    NO ==> You do not qualify under this exception. Check to see if you qualify under any other exception.

    EXCEPTION # 6 Valid Visa Exception

    Do you have a valid visa to enter Canada, other than a transit visa?

    YES ==> You qualify under this exception!

    NO ==> You do not qualify under this exception. Check to see if you qualify under any other exception.

    EXCEPTION # 7 Visa Required in U.S. But Not in Canada

    Are you a national of any of the following countries?

    • Antigua and Barbuda
    • Barbados
    • Botswana
    • Cyprus
    • Greece
    • Malta
    • Mexico
    • Namibia
    • Papua New Guinea
    • Republic of (South) Korea
    • St. Kitts and Nevis
    • St. Lucia
    • St. Vincent
    • Solomon Islands
    • Swaziland
    • Western Samoa

    NO ==> You do not qualify under this exception. Check to see if you qualify under any other exception.

    YES ==> You qualify under this exception!

    From Canadian Website

    CLICK HERE, for Canadian Government website.

    Where the Agreement is in effect
    The Safe Third Country Agreement applies only to refugee claimants who are seeking entry to Canada from the U.S.:
    at Canada-U.S. land border crossings
    by train or
    at airports, only if the person seeking refugee protection in Canada has been refused refugee status in the U.S. and is in transit through Canada after being deported from the U.S.

    Exceptions to the Agreement
    Exceptions to the Agreement consider the importance of family unity, the best interests of children and the public interest.
    There are four types of exceptions:

    1. Family member exceptions
    2. Unaccompanied minors exception
    3. Document holder exceptions
    4. Public interest exceptions

    Even if they qualify for one of these exceptions, refugee claimants must still meet all other eligibility criteria of Canada’s immigration legislation. For example, if a person seeking refugee protection has been found inadmissible in Canada on the grounds of security, for violating human or international rights, or for serious criminality, that person will not be eligible to make a refugee claim.

    Family member exceptions
    Refugee claimants may qualify under this category of exceptions if they have a family member who:

    • is a Canadian citizen
    • is a permanent resident of Canada
    • is a protected person under Canadian immigration legislation
    • has made a claim for refugee status in Canada that has been accepted by the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB)
    • has had his or her removal order stayed on humanitarian and compassionate grounds
    • holds a valid Canadian work permit
    • holds a valid Canadian study permit, or
    • is over 18 years old and has a claim for refugee protection that has been referred to the IRB for determination. (This claim must not have been withdrawn by the family member, declared abandoned or rejected by the IRB or found ineligible for referral to the IRB.)

    Unaccompanied minors exception
    Refugee claimants may qualify under this category of exceptions if they are minors (under the age of 18) who:
    are not accompanied by their mother, father or legal guardian
    have neither a spouse nor a common-law partner, and
    do not have a mother, a father or a legal guardian in Canada or the United States.

    Document holder exceptions
    Refugee claimants may qualify under this category of exceptions if they:
    hold a valid Canadian visa (other than a transit visa)
    hold a valid work permit
    hold a valid study permit
    hold a travel document (for permanent residents or refugees) or other valid admission document issued by Canada, or
    are not required (exempt) to get a temporary resident visa to enter Canada but require a U.S.–issued visa to enter the U.S.

    Public interest exceptions
    Refugee claimants may qualify under this category of exceptions if:
    they have been charged with or convicted of an offence that could subject them to the death penalty in the U.S. or in a third country. However, a refugee claimant is ineligible if he or she has been found inadmissible in Canada on the grounds of security, for violating human or international rights, or for serious criminality, or if the Minister finds the person to be a danger to the public.

    Making a refugee claim under the Safe Third Country Agreement
    For detailed information on making a refugee claim for protection in Canada at the Canada–U.S. border, please refer to the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA).

    There are so many exemptions in this agreement that it’s difficult to find someone who “doesn’t” qualify on one or more grounds.

    4. Canada Admits U.S. A Safe Country

    Factor 3: Human rights record of the United States
    The United States meets a high standard with respect to the protection of human rights. It is an open democracy with independent courts, separation of powers and constitutional guarantees of essential human rights and fundamental freedoms.

    Factor 4: Whether the United States is party to an agreement with Canada for the purpose of sharing responsibility with respect to claims for refugee protection

    The Safe Third Country Agreement between Canada and the United States was signed on December 5, 2002, came into force on December 29, 2004, and remains in force.

    The US is a safe country. That “should” end the discussion on fake refugees coming here.

    After all, simply being in the country illegally isn’t a defense.

    Posted on

    UN Security Council: Legalized Aggression


    (Then President George W. Bush, arguing for an invasion of Iraq under blatantly false pretenses. The UN Security Council approved the use of force in 2002 by a 15-0 vote. War was launched on March 20, 2003).


    (A critique on the problem with veto power)

    1. Important Links

    CLICK HERE, for UN Security Council home page.
    CLICK HERE, for the page on sanctions.
    CLICK HERE, the UN Charter.
    CLICK HERE, for Article 41 of the UN Charter (Sanctions).
    CLICK HERE, for an index of voting records.
    CLICK HERE, for Wikipedia page on “Proxy Wars”.

    2. Stated Mission

    Peace and Security

    The Security Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. It has 15 Members, and each Member has one vote. Under the Charter of the United Nations, all Member States are obligated to comply with Council decisions.

    The Security Council takes the lead in determining the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression. It calls upon the parties to a dispute to settle it by peaceful means and recommends methods of adjustment or terms of settlement. In some cases, the Security Council can resort to imposing sanctions or even authorize the use of force to maintain or restore international peace and security.

    That is correct. 15 nations can decide what is “in the interest of global peace and security”. Hardly seems that other nations get much of a say in international matters. Would your own sovereignty be limited by what these 15 members of the “Global Community” have to say?

    Even more undemocratic is the make up of the Security Council. There are 15 members, 5 of which are permanent, and 10 others which are chosen on a rotational basis.

    The 5 permanent members are: 1/ the United States; 2/ Russia (formerly the Soviet Union); 3/ Britain; 4/ France; and 5/ China. These were the “winners” of World War II, when the UN was founded. Each of the 5 permanent members has “veto” power, meaning they can unilaterally block any resolution from passing.

    In order to pass a Security Council resolution, a majority of members have to approve it. Additionally, none of the “Permanent 5” can veto. They each have to abstain or support.

    3. Non Military Options

    What if the UN doesn’t opt for military force? There are less direct, but more passive-aggressive measures called “sanctions”. These are essentially punishments the Security Council imposes.

    (From Article 41)

    “The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.”

    From the page on sanctions:

    “Security Council sanctions have taken a number of different forms, in pursuit of a variety of goals. The measures have ranged from comprehensive economic and trade sanctions to more targeted measures such as arms embargoes, travel bans, and financial or commodity restrictions. The Security Council has applied sanctions to support peaceful transitions, deter non-constitutional changes, constrain terrorism, protect human rights and promote non-proliferation.”

    The UN Security Council also lists who it has imposed sanctions upon: “Since 1966, the Security Council has established 30 sanctions regimes, in Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, the former Yugoslavia (2), Haiti, Iraq (2), Angola, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Eritrea, Eritrea and Ethiopia, Liberia (3), DRC, Côte d’Ivoire, Sudan, Lebanon, DPRK, Iran, Libya (2), Guinea-Bissau, CAR, Yemen, South Sudan and Mali, as well as against ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida and the Taliban.”

    4. UN Contributing To World Peace?

    Does UN Security Council Create World Peace?
    Not really. This is especially true when one of the “Permanent 5” has veto power over any resolution to stop or condemn the aggression. Though the major powers may not directly be involved, they may provide aid to others and fight proxy wars.

    Though not always the best site, Wikipedia is great for a quick reference.

    Chinese Civil War (1944–1949)
    Greek Civil War (1944–1949)
    Iran crisis of 1946 (1945–1946)
    First Indochina War (1946–1954)
    Paraguayan Civil War (1947)
    Malayan Emergency (1948–1960)
    Internal conflict in Myanmar (1948– )
    Balochistan conflict (1948– )
    Arab–Israeli conflict (1948–present)
    Korean War (1950–1953)
    Mau Mau Uprising (1952–1960)
    Second Indochina War (First Taiwan Strait Crisis (1953–1975))
    Algerian War (1954–1962)
    First Sudanese Civil War (1955–1972)
    Suez Crisis (1956–1957)
    Second Taiwan Strait Crisis (1958)
    Lebanon crisis (1958)
    Tibetan uprising (1959–1962)
    Central American crisis (1960–1996)
    Congo Crisis (1960–1965)
    Portuguese Colonial War (1960–1974)
    Xinjiang conflict (1960s–present)
    First Iraqi–Kurdish War (1961–1970)
    Eritrean War of Independence (1961-1991)
    North Yemen Civil War (1962–1970)
    Dhofar Rebellion (1962–1976)
    Sarawak Communist Insurgency (1962–1990)
    Sand War (1963)
    Aden Emergency (1963–1967)
    Insurgency in Northeast India (1963–present)
    Rhodesian Bush War (1964–1979)
    Dominican Civil War (1965)
    Communist insurgency in Thailand (1965–1983)
    Bolivian Campaign (1966–1967)
    Korean DMZ Conflict (1966–1969)
    South African Border War (1966–1990)
    Nigerian Civil War (1967–1970)
    Naxalite–Maoist insurgency (1967–present)
    Communist insurgency in Malaysia (1968–1989)
    Operation Condor (1968–1989)
    Al-Wadiah War (1969-present)
    Civil conflict in the Philippines (1969–present)
    Yemenite War (1972)
    Angolan Civil War (1974–2002)
    Ethiopian Civil War (1974–1991)
    Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990)
    Western Sahara War (1975–1991)
    Indonesian occupation of East Timor (1975–1999)
    Cabinda War (1975–present)
    Insurgency in Laos (1975–present)
    Civil conflict in Turkey (1976–present)
    Shaba I (1977)
    Ogaden War (1977–1978)
    Cambodian-Vietnamese War (1977–1991)
    Mozambican Civil War (1977–1992)
    Chittagong Hill Tracts conflict (1977–1997)
    Shaba II (1978)
    Uganda–Tanzania War (1978–1979)
    NDF Rebellion (1978–1982)
    Chadian–Libyan conflict (1978–1987)
    Yemenite War of (1979)
    Soviet–Afghan War (1979–1989)
    Sino-Vietnamese War (1979
    Internal conflict in Peru (1980–present)
    Ethiopian–Somali Border War (1982)
    Sri Lankan Civil War (1983–2009)

    This isn’t even a complete list. But when researching conflicts, you will find that it is most often one or more of the “Permanent 5” behind these conflicts. How can the UN actually help world peace when its own Security Council members can flaunt the principles without consequences?

    Why are a nation’s well being and sovereignty dependant on the will of 15 nations, 5 of whom appointed themselves as permanent members with a veto.

    This is not to say that nations should not be free to enter into military alliances and pacts. However, this arrangement seems stacked against smaller and weaker nations.

    5. What Does UN Say About It?

    Under the United Nations Charter, the functions and powers of the Security Council are:
    .
    -to maintain international peace and security in accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations;
    -to investigate any dispute or situation which might lead to international friction;
    -to recommend methods of adjusting such disputes or the terms of settlement;
    -to formulate plans for the establishment of a system to regulate armaments;
    -to determine the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression and to recommend what action should be taken;
    -to call on Members to apply economic sanctions and other measures not involving the use of force to prevent or stop aggression;
    -to take military action against an aggressor;
    -to recommend the admission of new Members;
    -to exercise the trusteeship functions of the United Nations in “strategic areas”;
    -to recommend to the General Assembly the appointment of the Secretary-General and, together with the Assembly, to elect the Judges of the International Court of Justice.

    There has been much speculation within Canada that Justin Trudeau is being so “UN compliant” because he is aiming for a seat on the Security Council. Not sure if this is true, though it’s certainly possible.

    Military aggression. But “democratically performed” military aggression.”

    6. Who’s Behind US Military Aggression?

    In a word: Israel.

    The State of Israel has been influencing US military policy, particularly in the Middle East, for decades. Western (Christian) nations go to war against Muslim nations. This in turn creates refugees who are forced to take shelter in other countries. Of course Israel won’t take them, but will help ship them off to the West.

    Posted on

    Stop Replacement Migration, Have Bigger Families


    (UN Promotes replacement migration)


    (Hungary proposes making it more affordable for Hungarian women to have children)

    1. Previous Solutions Offered

    A response that frequently comes up is for people to ask what to do about it. Instead of just constantly pointing out what is wrong, some constructive suggestions should be offered. This section contains a list of proposals that, if implemented, would benefit society. While the details may be difficult to implement, at least they are a starting point.

    2. Population Replacement Agenda

    CLICK HERE, for the topic of “REPLACEMENT MIGRATION”.
    CLICK HERE, for March 2000 Report.

    NEW REPORT ON REPLACEMENT MIGRATION ISSUED BY UN POPULATION DIVISION
    20000317

    NEW YORK, 17 March (DESA) — The Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) has released a new report titled “Replacement Migration: Is it a Solution to Declining and Ageing Populations?”. Replacement migration refers to the international migration that a country would need to prevent population decline and population ageing resulting from low fertility and mortality rates.

    United Nations projections indicate that between 1995 and 2050, the population of Japan and virtually all countries of Europe will most likely decline. In a number of cases, including Estonia, Bulgaria and Italy, countries would lose between one quarter and one third of their population. Population ageing will be pervasive, bringing the median age of population to historically unprecedented high levels. For instance, in Italy, the median age will rise from 41 years in 2000 to 53 years in 2050. The potential support ratio — i.e., the number of persons of working age (15-64 years) per older person — will often be halved, from 4 or 5 to 2.
    Focusing on these two striking and critical trends, the report examines in detail the case of eight low-fertility countries (France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States) and two regions (Europe and the European Union). In each case, alternative scenarios for the period 1995-2050 are considered, highlighting the impact that various levels of immigration would have on population size and population ageing.

    Major findings of this report include:
    — In the next 50 years, the populations of most developed countries are projected to become smaller and older as a result of low fertility and increased longevity. In contrast, the population of the United States is projected to increase by almost a quarter. Among the countries studied in the report, Italy is projected to register the largest population decline in relative terms, losing 28 per cent of its population between 1995 and 2050, according to the United Nations medium variant projections. The population of the European Union, which in 1995 was larger than that of the United States by 105 million, in 2050, will become smaller by 18 million.

    — Population decline is inevitable in the absence of replacement migration. Fertility may rebound in the coming decades, but few believe that it will recover sufficiently in most countries to reach replacement level in the foreseeable future.

    – 2 – Press Release DEV/2234 POP/735 17 March 2000

    — Some immigration is needed to prevent population decline in all countries and regions examined in the report. However, the level of immigration in relation to past experience varies greatly. For the European Union, a continuation of the immigration levels observed in the 1990s would roughly suffice to prevent total population from declining, while for Europe as a whole, immigration would need to double. The Republic of Korea would need a relatively modest net inflow of migrants — a major change, however, for a country which has been a net sender until now. Italy and Japan would need to register notable increases in net immigration. In contrast, France, the United Kingdom and the United States would be able to maintain their total population with fewer immigrants than observed in recent years.

    — The numbers of immigrants needed to prevent the decline of the total population are considerably larger than those envisioned by the United Nations projections. The only exception is the United States.

    — The numbers of immigrants needed to prevent declines in the working- age population are larger than those needed to prevent declines in total population. In some cases, such as the Republic of Korea, France, the United Kingdom or the United States, they are several times larger. If such flows were to occur, post-1995 immigrants and their descendants would represent a strikingly large share of the total population in 2050 — between 30 and 39 per cent in the case of Japan, Germany and Italy.

    — Relative to their population size, Italy and Germany would need the largest number of migrants to maintain the size of their working-age populations. Italy would require 6,500 migrants per million inhabitants annually and Germany, 6,000. The United States would require the smallest number — 1,300 migrants per million inhabitants per year.

    — The levels of migration needed to prevent population ageing are many times larger than the migration streams needed to prevent population decline. Maintaining potential support ratios would in all cases entail volumes of immigration entirely out of line with both past experience and reasonable expectations.

    — In the absence of immigration, the potential support ratios could be maintained at current levels by increasing the upper limit of the working-age population to roughly 75 years of age.

    — The new challenges of declining and ageing populations will require a comprehensive reassessment of many established policies and programmes, with a long-term perspective. Critical issues that need to be addressed include: (a) the appropriate ages for retirement; (b) the levels, types and nature of retirement and health care benefits for the elderly; (c) labour force participation; (d) the assessed amounts of contributions from workers and employers to support retirement and health care benefits for the elderly population; and (e) policies and programmes relating to international migration,

    – 3 – Press Release DEV/2234 POP/735 17 March 2000

    in particular, replacement migration and the integration of large numbers of recent migrants and their descendants.
    The report may be accessed on the internet site of the Population Division (http://www.un.org/esa/population/unpop.htm). Further information may be obtained from the office of Joseph Chamie, Director, Population Division, United Nations, New York, NY, 10017, USA; tel. 1-212-963-3179; fax 1-212-963-2147.

    3. The Hungarian Alternative

    Far better than “importing” replacement populations, Hungary has decided to make it more affordable to have their own children. Recently, Prime Minister Victor Orban announced a policy that women who have 4 children or more will no longer pay income tax. The goal is to encourage women to have more children, and reverse falling birth rates.

    By growing your own population, you don’t have to worry about “multiculturalism”. You don’t have to hope that a group assimilates and adopts your values. There isn’t language and culture clash, like their is with mass migration.

    Mostly importantly, you don’t have to worry about cultures (like Islam) INTENTIONALLY REFUSING to assimilate and replace your way of life with their way of life.

    Note: in small amounts, immigration “can” benefit a nation. But mass migration to “replace” the dwindling old-stock simply leads to the disappearance of the host culture and people.

    4. Conservatism & Libertarianism Fail

    In order to preserve a nation, unity and common bonds are far more important than merely “keeping the numbers up”. There is more to a nation than number of people, GDP, and economic growth. Nationalists understand this. Conservatives and Libertarians do not.

    Canada — and all nations — wanting to grow, should follow the Hungarian lead of boosting its own population. Forget about using replacement migration as a solution.