Max Boykoff’s Revenge On Science: Creative Climate Communications, Part I

1. Important Links

CLICK HERE, for the Climate Change Scam Part I.
CLICK HERE, for Part II, the Paris Accord.
CLICK HERE, for Part III, Saskatchewan Appeals Court Reference.
CLICK HERE, for Part IV, Controlled Opposition to Carbon Tax.
CLICK HERE, for Part V, UN New Development Funding.
CLICK HERE, for Part VI, Disruptive Innovation Framework.
CLICK HERE, for Part VII, Blaming Arson On Climate Change.
CLICK HERE, for Part VIII, Review Of Green New Deal.
CLICK HERE, for Part VIII(II), Sunrise Movement & Green New Deal.
CLICK HERE, for Part IX, Propaganda Techniques, Max Boykoff.
CLICK HERE, for Part X, GG Pollution Pricing Act & Bill C-97.
CLICK HERE, for part XI, Dr. Shiva Ayyadurai Explains Paris Accord

2. US & Canadian Copyright Laws

Disclaimer #1: The Canadian Copyright Act has a “fair dealing” provision, which allows for copyrighted material to at times be used for specific purposes: research, private study, education, parody, satire, criticism, review and news reporting. Click Here and also Click Here for more information.

Disclaimer #2: The U.S. Copyright Act has a “fair use” provision, which states that the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. Click Here to read the text.

This should be obvious, but just to clarify, this article is about criticizing, commenting on, teaching and researching purposes.

3. About The Author, Maxwell Boykoff

His professional biography is available here.

Max’s research and creative work has developed primarily in two arenas:
(1) cultural politics of science, climate change and environmental issues = this refers to ways that attitudes, intentions, beliefs and behaviors of individuals and groups shape (and are shaped by) the perceived spectrum of possible action in the context of science-policy, climate change and environmental issues.
.
(2) transformations of carbon-based economies and societies (with emphasis on the interface of science and practical action) = this refers to decarbonization politics, policies and decision-making, with particular interest in how these activities find meaning in people’s everyday lives, as well as how they, in turn, feed back into science-policy decision-making.

Feel free to check into his other works.
Now for the book itself.

4. Table Of Contents

(1) Here And Now
(2) How We Know What We Know
(3) Do The Right Thing
(4) Ways Of Learning, Ways Of Knowing
(5) It’s Not You, It’s Me…. Actually It’s Us
(6) Academic Climate Advocacy & Activism
(7) Silver Buckshot
(8) Search For Meaning

5. Quoting Creative Climate Communications

(From back cover) Conversations about climate change at the science-policy interface and in our lives have been stuck for some time. This handbook integrates lessons from the social sciences and humanities to more effectively make connections through issues, people and things that everyday citizens care about. Readers will come away with an enhanced understanding that there is no “silver bullet” to communications about climate change; instead a “silver buckshot” approach is needed where strategies effectively reach different audiences in different contexts.

One thing that will be clear right away: this is not about using scientific methods to PROVE that climate change is a serious threat. Rather, it is about using scientific methods to CONVINCE people that climate change is a serious threat. Very different things.

We live in remarkable times. Amidst high-quality and well-funded research into the causes and consequences of climate change, conversations in our lives — and climate communications — are stuck. Consciously or unconsciously, a feeling of complacency has often weighed on our collective and our individual selves.

Another point made early on, Boykoff expresses no doubt whatsoever in the “scientific findings” of the climate change movement. The entire focus of the book is about using social science and humanities research to persuade people this is a problem.

(Page 2) Responding to these emergent needs, in recent years has been a blossoming of valuable research in the peer-review literature addressing various elements of this larger challenge. More research groups, organizations, institutions and practitioners around the world have increasingly explored creative spaces of climate communication to better understand what works where, with whom (what audiences), when and why.

Boykoff makes an important note here. He is not by any means a revolutionary here. “Climate communications” is a growing field, with people all over the world trying to determine better methods for “selling” the climate change claims. In short, this is research about marketing. Not science.

(Page 2) Creative approaches involve the deployment of multimodal communications. A mode is a system of choices used to communicate meaning. What might count as a mode is an open-ended set, ranging cross a number of systems, including but not limited to language, image, color, typography, music, voice, quality, dress, posture, gestures, special resources, perfume and cuisine.

What superficial points are listed?

  • language
  • image
  • colour
  • typography
  • music
  • voice
  • quality
  • dress
  • posture
  • gestures
  • special resources
  • perfume
  • cuisine

We are still just on the second page, and already getting an introduction into the very superficial traits which can subtly be used to convince people of our arguments.

Forget facts, research, data, and logic. This is all about presenting a good sales pitch.

(Page 3) Among many elements seeping into the environments, I consider the dynamics that shape creative and potentially effective messages as well as messengers of those climate change communications. Over time, broad references to communications through media platforms have generally pointed to television, films, books, fliers, magazines, radio and internet for pathways for largescale communications.

Additional modes and manifestations of communications also include (analyses of) documentary films about dystopian futures, stand-up comedy about climate and cultures, podcasts about climate science and policy interactions.

Boykoff notes the traditional forms of media, but laments that they are not enough by themselves to do the job. The job of course, is “pitching” the climate change agenda.

(Page 4) Meeting people where they are takes carefully planned and methodical work. It does not mean “dumbing things down” for different audiences. Through this process of assessment of research and practice in these areas, conversations can more capably seek answers to a provocative question Mike Hulme posted in 2009, “How does the idea of climate change the way we arrive at and achieve our personal aspirations and our collective social goals?”

(Page 5) KNOW THY AUDIENCE
These creative (climate) communication endeavors must start with consideration of the audience. These may be imagined, (un)intended or actual audiences. Researchers and practitioners have increasingly paid attention to differentiated audiences as key components to deliberate development of effective communication.

Knowing who your audience is actually a useful piece of advice, regardless of circumstances. However, in context of this book, it comes across as manipulation.

(Page 6) Audience segmentation and consequent message alteration has been a part of marketing and associated communications strategies since the 1950s (Smith 1956, Slater 1996). Audience segmentation endeavours as they relate to climate change communications, have proliferated over the last decade (Leal Finho 2019).

This book is about marketing strategies of climate change “communications”. Nothing more. It is about manipulative techniques designed to persuade by non-factual means.

6. Where Things Go From Here

The book is 300 pages, the last 60 of which are references. No doubt that an awful lot of work has gone into this. Yes, the intro article is relatively short, but it is setting the stage for later. Sequels will be longer and quote much more.

As alluded to earlier, this is really a book about marketing. It’s not about research done to prove that humans are causing climate change, but rather research to CONVINCE people that they are.

Rather than going into environmental research, the book delves in sociological and social psychological research methods. It looks at work previously done in the fields of persuasion, and applies those principles to “climate communications”.

Boykoff appears to have no doubts about humans causing climate change. Nor does he seem to have any reservations about using these social studies techniques to pursue what is essentially a political goal. He straightforwardly admits that it’s a growing field, and many have contributed to this area of research.

Boykoff admits that this area is “selling” or “pitching” the climate change narrative. While acknowledging it is a start, he has no problems with it. Seems the scientists have given up on the research area of climate science, and are throwing their resources into the marketing aspect.

It’s both nefarious and creepy.

Kevin O’Leary Sues Elections Canada Over Fundraising Limits

(Kevin O’Leary, former candidate for CPC, to replace Stephen Harper)

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CBC published an article announcing that former Conservative Party leadership candidate, Kevin O’Leary, is suing Elections Canada over ruling relating to how he can pay back campaign debt. During the election campaign, O’Leary accumulated about $2,000,000 in debt. Approximately $400,000 is still outstanding.

Kevin-O-Leary

A quote from the article states that:

In his claim, O’Leary said that it is proving too difficult to raise the necessary funds in the three-year timeframe set by Elections Canada laws because people are understandably “uninterested” in contributing to a failed campaign that is long over.

He has a good point. No one would be interested in contributing to a political campaign that has long since ended. So it does posse serious challenges for him to do so.

Further, the article raises an interesting question:

“If you’re out of the race, and you’re not a politician any more and you owe money to a fellow citizen, where is it right that the law protects you from ever paying it back? That’s un-Canadian. That’s unconstitutional. That’s simply wrong,”

Again, this is valid. O’Leary’s brief political career is finished. He claims to never wish to run for office again, so what is the issue with him simply paying the debts and moving on with his life? O’Leary states that he has the funds available to do so, but is prohibited from doing so under the Canada Elections Act.

The claim filed is available here, and let’s go through some of the better arguments.

Regarding the applicable laws, the claim states:

1. A declaration that subsections 367(1)(d), (6) and (7), 478.756), and 500(1) of the Canada Elections Act, SC. 2000, c. 9 (the ?Act?) (collectively referred to herein as the impugned provisions) infringe on and deny the rights and freedoms guaranteed by sections 3 and 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the Charter)

and are not saved by section 1 thereof;

2. A declaration that, insofar as the impugned provisions infringe on and deny the rights and freedoms guaranteed by sections 3 and/or 7 of the Charter and cannot be justified under section 1 of the Charter, those provisions are invalid and of no force and effect, to

the extent of the inconsistency;
3. In addition, or in the alternative:

a. A declaration that the impugned provisions violate the constitutional principle of the rule of law, which requires that laws be written and interpreted according to an intelligible legal standard that gives individuals fair notice of the conduct that will

attract imprisonment by the state;

b. A declaration that, insofar as the impugned provisions fail to meet the constitutional standard of legislative precision required by the rule of law, these provisions are invalid and of no force and effect or, in the alternative, must be read down so as to

satisfy this standard;

Okay, let’s dissect this word salad. O’Leary claims that portions of the Canada Elections Act, violate several provisions of the Canadian Charter. The “reasonable limitation is the Charter (section 1) would not apply and justify the C.E.A. Further, he implies that the C.E.A. is written in a too confusing standard to be followed.

Here is the Canada Elections Act.

Contribution limits
367 (1) Subject to subsection 373(4), no individual shall make contributions that exceed

(a) $1,500 in total in any calendar year to a particular registered party;
(b) $1,500 in total in any calendar year to the registered associations, nomination contestants and candidates of a particular registered party;
(c) $1,500 in total to a candidate for a particular election who is not the candidate of a registered party; and
(d) $1,500 in total in any calendar year to the leadership contestants in a particular leadership contest.

Contributions — candidates and leadership contestants
(6) Subject to subsection (7), no candidate in a particular election and no leadership contestant in a particular leadership contest shall make a contribution out of their own funds to their own campaign.
Marginal note:

Exception — certain contributions to own campaign
(7) The following contributions are permitted:
(a) contributions that do not exceed $5,000 in total by a candidate for a particular election out of their own funds to their own campaign; and
(b) contributions that do not exceed $25,000 in total by a leadership contestant in a particular leadership contest out of their own funds to their own campaign.

Okay, 367(1)(d) has to do with individuals making contributions being limited to $1,500 per year to any leadership contestant. Sections (6) and (7) have to do with overall individual limits. It is definitely reasonable that there should be contribution limits, in order to avoid having candidates “BOUGHT AND PAID FOR”. However, should that apply to former candidates who have since moved on.

3 potential counter arguments against O’Leary though:
(a) What if a person “hasn’t” moved on, and intends to use this relief for future campaigns?
(b) Would removing this cap be an end-run around spending limits?
(c) Would this restriction be necessary to ensure “smaller candidates” get a fair shot?

There is no 478.756 in the Canada Elections Act. It appears to be a type in the claim. However, this is the provision that I believe O’Leary was referring to. That is 478.75.

Payment within three years
478.75 (1) If a claim for a leadership campaign expense is evidenced by an invoice or other document that has been sent under section 478.74, or if a claim for repayment of a loan is made to the leadership contestant under section 373, the claim shall be paid within three years after the day on which the leadership contest ends.

Once more this seems to make a good point. The C.E.A requires repayment within 3 years. However, if former candidates must: (I) pay in 3 years or less; (II) are not actually able to raise more donations because they are not running; and (III) have strict limits as to how much of their personal wealth they can use, then there seem to be few, if any options.

Now, for section 500 of the C.E.A.:

Marginal note:
Punishment — strict liability offences
500 (1) Every person who is guilty of an offence under any of subsections 484(1), 486(1), 489(1), 491(1), 492(1), 495(1), 495.1(1), 495.2(1), 496(1), 497(1), 497.1(1), 497.2(1), 497.3(1), 497.4(1), 497.5(1) and 499(1) is liable on summary conviction to a fine of not more than $2,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than three months, or to both.

I’m not going to quote the entirety of Section 500. The point is that O’Leary is correct, the C.E.A. does in fact threaten jail time as a punishment for failing to comply.

One the surface, Kevin O’Leary’s claim seems to be valid, given the strict rules the C.E.A. sets out. But let’s now check out the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms which the lawsuit references as relief.

Democratic rights of citizens
3. Every citizen of Canada has the right to vote in an election of members of the House of Commons or of a legislative assembly and to be qualified for membership therein.

Life, liberty and security of person
7. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.

Rights and freedoms in Canada
1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.

O’Leary makes the argument that fairly large campaigns are necessary to be elected as part of a legislative assembly. Without debating the merits of “big money”, it is a fact. Campaigns and elections are expensive to run.

Section 7 has to do with punishments, which Section 500 of the C.E.A. establishes can be up to 90 days in prison for violating provisions of the act.

Section 1 is often invoked as a “reasonable justification” for restricting Charter rights. Obviously, in order to restrict, there must be some societal overall good. While Elections Canada will obviously argue differently, O’Leary is attempting to preempt the defence by stating there is none.

Thoughts And Conclusions
Obviously, this is only beginning. The claim has been filed, but no response or defence has yet been made.

On the surface, the claim makes valid points. O’Leary, like all Canadian citizens, is allowed to run for any legislative assembly or body he wishes to. Today’s reality is that campaigns are long, expensive, and a financial drain to run. However, candidates may find themselves hamstrung by campaign finance rules, which seem overly complex and tedious.

As stated earlier, I see a few possible defences for Elections Canada
(a) What if a person “hasn’t” moved on, and intends to use this relief for future campaigns?
(b) Would removing this cap be an end-run around spending limits?
(c) Would this restriction be necessary to ensure “smaller candidates” get a fair shot?

Politicians (and aspiring politicians) across the country will likely be tracking this case, as it will have real impact on future elections and party leadership races.

As a side note: CBC published the article a month after the case was filed. Not that it is relevant to the case, but did they not know about it until then?

Privacy Commissioner, Banks, Throw StatsCan Under the Bus

(The issue of bank data being seized is raised in Parliament)

This article was released by Global News on October 26, 2018, and CanuckLaw covered it here on October 28. In short, Statistics Canada wants to seize the banking information of 500,000 Canadians (each year), and do it without the knowledge or consent of Canadians.

(at 1:40 in the video) Statistics Canada representative James Tabreke in a very blunt way claims that this is a ”new way of getting economic data to make government decisions”. He also claims that StatsCan is being open with the public, and that the Canadian Banks were aware of this.

(at 2:32 in the video) Claim that the Privacy Commissioner has okayed the project.

Prime Minister Trudeau, in his typically partisan manner, defended the data seizure. Of course blamed Stephen Harper for eliminating the long form census in 2010. He claimed StatsCan was working closely with the Privacy Commissioner.

Now the lies get exposed:
First, Trudeau is distorting the truth with reference to Harper gutting the long-form census. In the original video, Statistics Canada claimed bank seizure was a move done to replace the long form census. So Harper cancelling the LFC in 2010 was actually irrelevant, as StatsCan was going to pull this stunt anyway.

Second, StatsCan claims that they have been open with what they are doing. Yet, these talks have been going on for a year now without the public’s knowledge.

Third, the C.B.A. (Canadian Bankers Association) has publicly objected, claiming they thought StatsCan was just in an exploratory stage. C.B.A. says they didn’t know StatsCan was going ahead with this, and says they will oppose the measure. Here is their statement:

Statement from the Canadian Bankers Association

Protecting the information privacy of their valued customers is a top priority for banks in Canada. Banks believed this proposed data acquisition project was still in the exploratory stages and were not aware that Statistics Canada was moving to compel disclosure of this information. No customer transaction data or other personal information has been transferred to Statistics Canada under this request. The CBA is working with members to understand the nature of this request and next steps.

Fourth, the Privacy Commissioner, seen here appearing before the Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, refutes the claim that he ”okayed the move”. Instead, he stated that he does not have the authority to approve such a thing, and is only able to provide general advice on privacy laws.

Fifth, the Privacy Commissioner claims he was unaware until very recently that Statistics Canada that they wanted to do this to 500,000 Canadians. He says numbers were not discussed. In the hearing he states, ”Proportionality is very important.”

Sixth, the Privacy Commissioner states he was unaware or just how much information would be seized by such a move.

Seventh, the Privacy Commissioner admits that StatsCan was not nearly as transparent as it could have been.

Eighth, and this is a glaring omission: StatsCan doesn’t say how this massive intrusion would actually help. There are just vague references to ”economic information”.

Certainly, that 15 years of credit card data had recently been seized also doesn’t sit well with many Canadians.

Now that formal complaints against this measure have been filed with the Privacy Commissioner, there is no longer the option of just giving general legal information. At this point, an investigation is mandated by law.

The proposal appears to be dead in the water, as public outrage and the threats of legal action are forcing StatsCan to back off. But it will be interesting to see if the Federal Liberals continue to support this Orwellian measure.

Note:
Statistics Canada, Equifax, Transunion, the C.B.A., and the major banks have all been contacted by CanuckLaw for comment. Any responses will be posted here as updates.

Canadian Banker’s Association rep Aaron Boles
Thanks, Alex.

The most important take-away from yesterday is that StatsCan is suspending any movement on its proposed project until the Office of the Privacy Commissioner has completed its report, which we understand will be January at the earliest. We were firm in our appearance before the Senate Committee that all options are on the table in terms of defending the privacy and security of bank customers’ personal information and transaction records. Until the OPC report is tabled and StatsCan responds about what it proposes to do thereafter, there’s little point in speculating on how information on spending habits would be collected, if at all.

Best,

AEB

From RBC
Hi Alex – please refer to the CBA for comment on this.

Best,
AJ

AJ Goodman I Director, External Communications, Personal & Commercial Banking I

From TD Canada
Hi Alex,

We refer your inquiry to the CBA, however can tell you that TD takes the trust our customers place in us extremely seriously and has not agreed to share customer data.

Thanks,

Alison

From Statistics Canada
Hello,

“I can assure you that we will not proceed with this project until we have addressed the privacy concerns expressed by Canadians by working cooperatively with the Privacy Commissioner and with financial institutions.”

Anil Arora, Chief Statistician of Canada (Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, November 8, 2018)

Thank you,

Laurence Beaudoin-Corriveau

Manager (Acting), Media Relations, Communications
Statistics Canada, Government of Canada

laurence.beaudoin-corriveau@canada.ca / Tel: 613-951-2599

From Equifax
Hello Alex.

In our database, Equifax Canada has information on ~27M Canadian consumers, which we maintain as a registered Canadian credit bureau in accordance with applicable credit reporting and privacy laws. Statistics Canada has never directed Equifax Canada to provide them with, and subsequently, Equifax Canada has not provided to Statistics Canada all of its data pursuant to its enabling legislation.

In any instance where a regulated body relying on legislative authority requests information from Equifax, our standard process is to conduct a review against our internal data governance and security processes, as well as to consider applicable law prior to disclosure.

We don’t have any information on the rumour you mentioned about credit data from 15 years ago.

Media Relations | Equifax Canada Co.

5700 Yonge St., Suite 1700, Toronto, Ontario, Canada M2M 4K2

Statistics Canada Wants Banks to Hand Over Customer Data

(An Orwellian scheme is being devised here)

If true, this story is disturbing. Statistics Canada wants to collect the banking data from 500,000 Canadians each year.

Statistics Canada claims it wants: “to start collecting, on a limited basis, financial transactions data from banks, as well as other organizations that may process financial transactions data.

Section 13 of the Statistics Act reads as follows:

Access to records
.
13 A person having the custody or charge of any documents or records that are maintained in any department or in any municipal office, corporation, business or organization, from which information sought in respect of the objects of this Act can be obtained or that would aid in the completion or correction of that information, shall grant access thereto for those purposes to a person authorized by the Chief Statistician to obtain that information or aid in the completion or correction of that information.
R.S., 1985, c. S-19, s. 13;

So, “anyone” with “any” records of “any” sort MUST disclose them if Statistics Canada believes the information can be used for statistical purposes. That is what the law says.

Furthermore, the Canadian Privacy Act is really no help here. It claims data collection is okay, as long as it relates to its purpose.

Collection, Retention and Disposal of Personal Information
Marginal note:
.
Collection of personal information
.
4 No personal information shall be collected by a government institution unless it relates directly to an operating program or activity of the institution.

While this seems — at least on paper — to be legal, one could easily argue that neither the Statistics Act nor the Privacy Act were ever designed for this

The transaction data would include:
(a) Description of the transaction
(b) Date and Time
(c) Location
(d) Value of the transactions

The transactions would be linked to a customer by way of:
(I) Name
(II) Social Insurance Number
(III) Date of Birth
(IV) Gender
(V) Address

Spokesman James Tabreke claims that obtaining all the personal identifiers is necessary in order to “gain a snapshot” of certain types of customers. He says that StatsCan is not interested in anyone in particular, but just using the information to observe trends.

Even if this were true, the idea of banks handing over such information “without the customers’ knowledge or consent” is quite chilling indeed.

The math provided by the Global article is confusing.

First, supposedly, 500,000 people’s data is to be taken. It states the odds of being chosen are 1 in 20. That would only be true if there were 10 million people in Canada. There are 36-37 million at this point. Teenagers and adolescents frequently have bank accounts too. So, where does the 1 in 20 chance come from?

Second, if this were being done for statistical purposes, why would 500,000 people need to be selected? Political polling, for example, uses samples between 500 and 2000. A sample of perhaps 10,000 would obtain results accurate to within 1% error.

Third, an omission here: if there were to be 500,000 Canadians each year, would StatsCan be using the data of the same people, and contrasting their behavioural changes, or would it be 500,000 more Canadians?

For media inquiries of the Canadian Banker’s Association:
Aaron Boles
Tel: (416) 362-6093 ext. 350
Cell: (647) 274-8495
Email:aboles@cba.ca

For media inquiries from Statistics Canada:
Media Relations — Media Hotline
613-951-INFO (951-4636)
8:30am to 5:00pm Eastern Time, Monday to Friday, excluding holidays.
E-mail: statcan.mediahotline-ligneinfomedias.statcan@canada.ca

At the time of writing, messages have been left with both institutions.

Tabreke claims that this method of forcing banks to hand over personal data will improve on, and eventually replace the surveys that have traditionally been mailed out. While the honesty is refreshing, it is downright creepy how calm and straightforward he is.

Of course, it leaves out the obvious question — why not get the stores to report their consumer trends? Not customer information, but sales trends. Why go for this invasive tactic?

Yes, that is indeed what he says. Forget voluntary disclosure. We will rummage through your financial life and take the information for ourselves. This is wrong on many levels.

Going cash only or using crypto-currency seem like appealing options at this point.


Followup to the Story

Aaron Boles did return the call quite shortly after this article was published. He stated that the C.B.A. has and will continue to refuse the demand. Although the C.B.A. and banks ”do” comply with most requests from Statistics Canada, this was just too far. Boles stated quite bluntly that banks need to have the trust of their customers, and this would erode it.

The C.B.A. claims that no data sharing proposed here has so far actually taken place. Here is the statement they released to Global Media:

Statement from the Canadian Bankers Association

Protecting the information privacy of their valued customers is a top priority for banks in Canada. Banks believed this proposed data acquisition project was still in the exploratory stages and were not aware that Statistics Canada was moving to compel disclosure of this information. No customer transaction data or other personal information has been transferred to Statistics Canada under this request. The CBA is working with members to understand the nature of this request and next steps.

Further Followup (October 29)
The Liberal government has announced in Parliament that it is okay with the push by Statistics Canada, and claims it is necessary in order to advance government policy. See this video.

Canada’s Bill C-75 (Watering Down Penalties for Terrorism, Rioting, Weapons)

(The Canadian Criminal Code, which typically gets amended every year)

Criminal offences in Canada are categorized like this

SUMMARY OFFENCE: more minor, lesser penalties (misdemeanor)
INDICTABLE OFFENCE: more serious, harsher penalties (felony)
HYBRID OFFENCE: Prosecutor has discretion as to proceed “summarily” or “by indictment”

For a good video on this subject, Julie Mora posted a video seen here. It had 2 parts: (a) an expanded gun registry, Bill C-71, and (b) changes to the Canadian Criminal Code, Bill C-75. Julie is a fine blogger, and her videos are well worth a watch by all Canadians. She claims in this video that the bill will “hybridize” many serious charges, meaning that they may now be tried summarily. And she is right. Below are the major points.

This is not trivial at all. Terrorism and rioting offence should be treated seriously. Yet, if this bill were actually to pass, the penalties for serious crimes may be gutted. True, for hybrid offences, Prosecutors could still choose to try the case by indictment. However, most people would agree that the option should not exist

Relevant links are below:
CLICK HERE for the Criminal Code as it currently exists.
CLICK HERE for the Liberal Bill C-75.


ORIGINAL

Marginal note:
Punishment of rioter
65 (1) Every one who takes part in a riot is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.
Marginal note:
Concealment of identity
(2) Every person who commits an offence under subsection (1) while wearing a mask or other disguise to conceal their identity without lawful excuse is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years.

REPLACEMENT

Punishment of rioter
65 (1) Every person who takes part in a riot is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than two years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.
Concealment of identity
(2) Every person who commits an offence under subsection (1) while wearing a mask or other disguise to conceal their identity without lawful excuse is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.


ORIGINAL

Neglect by peace officer
69 A peace officer who receives notice that there is a riot within his jurisdiction and, without reasonable excuse, fails to take all reasonable steps to suppress the riot is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.

REPLACEMENT

Neglect by peace officer
69 A peace officer who receives notice that there is a riot within their jurisdiction and, without reasonable excuse, fails to take all reasonable steps to suppress the riot is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than two years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.


ORIGINAL

Possession without lawful excuse
82 (1) Every person who, without lawful excuse, the proof of which lies on the person, makes or has in the possession or under the care or control of the person any explosive substance is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years.

REPLACEMENT

14 Subsection 82(1) of the Act is replaced by the following:

Possession of explosive
82 (1) Every person who, without lawful excuse, makes or has in their possession or under their care or control any explosive substance is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than five years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.


ORIGINAL

Financing of Terrorism
Marginal note:
Providing or collecting property for certain activities
83.02 Every one who, directly or indirectly, wilfully and without lawful justification or excuse, provides or collects property intending that it be used or knowing that it will be used, in whole or in part, in order to carry out
(a) an act or omission that constitutes an offence referred to in subparagraphs (a)(i) to (ix) of the definition of terrorist activity in subsection 83.01(1), or
(b) any other act or omission intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to a civilian or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, if the purpose of that act or omission, by its nature or context, is to intimidate the public, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or refrain from doing any act,
is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years.

REPLACEMENT

Providing or collecting property for certain activities
83.‍02 Every person is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years or is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction who, directly or indirectly, wilfully and without lawful justification or excuse, provides or collects property intending that it be used or knowing that it will be used, in whole or in part, in order to carry out
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than five years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.


ORIGINAL

Providing, making available, etc., property or services for terrorist purposes
83.03 Every one who, directly or indirectly, collects property, provides or invites a person to provide, or makes available property or financial or other related services
(a) intending that they be used, or knowing that they will be used, in whole or in part, for the purpose of facilitating or carrying out any terrorist activity, or for the purpose of benefiting any person who is facilitating or carrying out such an activity, or
(b) knowing that, in whole or part, they will be used by or will benefit a terrorist group,
is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years.

REPLACEMENT

Providing, making available, etc.‍, property or services for terrorist purposes
83.‍03 Every person is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years or is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction who, directly or indirectly, collects property, provides or invites a person to provide, or makes available property or financial or other related services
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than five years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.


ORIGINAL

Using or possessing property for terrorist purposes
83.04 Every one who
(a) uses property, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, for the purpose of facilitating or carrying out a terrorist activity, or
(b) possesses property intending that it be used or knowing that it will be used, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, for the purpose of facilitating or carrying out a terrorist activity,
is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years.

REPLACEMENT

Using or possessing property for terrorist purposes

83.‍04 Every person is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years or is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction


ORIGINAL

Offences — freezing of property, disclosure or audit
83.12 (1) Every one who contravenes any of sections 83.08, 83.1 and 83.11 is guilty of an offence and liable
(a) on summary conviction, to a fine of not more than $100,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than one year, or to both; or
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years.

REPLACEMENT

Paragraphs 83.‍12(1)‍(a) and (b) of the Act are replaced by the following:

(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years; or
(b) on summary conviction, to a fine of not more than $100,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than two years less a day, or to both.


ORIGINAL

Participation in activity of terrorist group
83.18 (1) Every one who knowingly participates in or contributes to, directly or indirectly, any activity of a terrorist group for the purpose of enhancing the ability of any terrorist group to facilitate or carry out a terrorist activity is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years.

REPLACEMENT

Participation in activity of terrorist group
83.‍18 (1) Every person who knowingly participates in or contributes to, directly or indirectly, any activity of a terrorist group for the purpose of enhancing the ability of any terrorist group to facilitate or carry out a terrorist activity is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than10 years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.


ORIGINAL

Leaving Canada to participate in activity of terrorist group
83.181 Everyone who leaves or attempts to leave Canada, or goes or attempts to go on board a conveyance with the intent to leave Canada, for the purpose of committing an act or omission outside Canada that, if committed in Canada, would be an offence under subsection 83.18(1) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years

REPLACEMENT

21 Section 83.‍181 of the Act is replaced by the following:

Leaving Canada to participate in activity of terrorist group
83.‍181 Every person who leaves or attempts to leave Canada, or goes or attempts to go on board a conveyance with the intent to leave Canada, for the purpose of committing an act or omission outside Canada that, if committed in Canada, would be an offence under subsection 83.‍18(1) is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.


ORIGINAL

Advocating or promoting commission of terrorism offences
83.221 (1) Every person who, by communicating statements, knowingly advocates or promotes the commission of terrorism offences in general — other than an offence under this section — while knowing that any of those offences will be committed or being reckless as to whether any of those offences may be committed, as a result of such communication, is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than five years.

REPLACEMENT

22 Subsection 83.‍221(1) of the Act is replaced by the following:

Advocating or promoting commission of terrorism offences
83.‍221 (1) Every person who, by communicating statements, knowingly advocates or promotes the commission of terrorism offences in general — other than an offence under this section — while knowing that any of those offences will be committed or being reckless as to whether any of those offences may be committed, as a result of such communication, is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than five years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction


ORIGINAL

Concealing person who carried out terrorist activity
83.23 (1) Everyone who knowingly harbours or conceals any person whom they know to be a person who has carried out a terrorist activity, for the purpose of enabling the person to facilitate or carry out any terrorist activity, is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment
(a) for a term of not more than 14 years, if the person who is harboured or concealed carried out a terrorist activity that is a terrorism offence for which that person is liable to imprisonment for life; and
(b) for a term of not more than 10 years, if the person who is harboured or concealed carried out a terrorist activity that is a terrorism offence for which that person is liable to any other punishment.

REPLACEMENT

Concealing person who carried out terrorist activity
83.‍23 (1) Every person who knowingly harbours or conceals another person whom they know to be a person who has carried out a terrorist activity, for the purpose of enabling that other person to facilitate or carry out any terrorist activity, is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 14 years, if the person who is harboured or concealed carried out a terrorist activity that is a terrorism offence for which that person is liable to imprisonment for life; and
(b) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years or an offence punishable on summary conviction, if the person who is harboured or concealed carried out a terrorist activity that is a terrorism offence for which that person is liable to any other punishment.


ORIGINAL

Concealing person who is likely to carry out terrorist activity
(2) Everyone who knowingly harbours or conceals any person whom they know to be a person who is likely to carry out a terrorist activity, for the purpose of enabling the person to facilitate or carry out any terrorist activity, is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years.

REPLACEMENT

Concealing person who is likely to carry out terrorist activity
(2) Every person who knowingly harbours or conceals another person whom they know to be a person who is likely to carry out a terrorist activity, for the purpose of enabling that other person to facilitate or carry out any terrorist activity, is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction


ORIGINAL

Person to be brought before judge
(3) A peace officer who arrests a person in the execution of the warrant shall, without delay, bring the person, or cause them to be brought, before the judge who issued the warrant or another judge of the same court. The judge in question may, to ensure compliance with the order, order that the person be detained in custody or released on recognizance, with or without sureties.

REPLACEMENT

25 Subsection 83.‍29(3) of the Act is replaced by the following:

Person to be brought before judge
(3) A peace officer who arrests a person in the execution of a warrant shall, without delay, bring the person, or cause the person to be brought, before the judge who issued the warrant or another judge of the same court. The judge in question may, to ensure compliance with the order, order that the person be detained in custody or make a release order, the form of which may be adapted to suit the circumstances

[Note: the new wording is such that is seems intended to make it easier to release suspected terrorists]


ORIGINAL

Possession of prohibited or restricted firearm with ammunition

Punishment
(2) Every person who commits an offence under subsection (1)
(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of
(i) in the case of a first offence, three years, and
(ii) in the case of a second or subsequent offence, five years; or
(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year.

REPLACEMENT

27 Paragraph 95(2)‍(b) of the Act is replaced by the following:

(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.


ORIGINAL

Possession of weapon obtained by commission of offence

96 (1) Subject to subsection (3), every person commits an offence who possesses a firearm, a prohibited weapon, a restricted weapon, a prohibited device or any prohibited ammunition that the person knows was obtained by the commission in Canada of an offence or by an act or omission anywhere that, if it had occurred in Canada, would have constituted an offence.
Marginal note:
Punishment
(2) Every person who commits an offence under subsection (1)
(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of one year; or
(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year.

REPLACEMENT

28 Paragraph 96(2)‍(b) of the Act is replaced by the following:

(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.


As absurd as it sounds, here is the “SUMMARY” of Bill C-75.

SUMMARY

This enactment amends the Criminal Code to, among other things,
(a) modernize and clarify interim release provisions to simplify the forms of release that may be imposed on an accused, incorporate a principle of restraint and require that particular attention be given to the circumstances of Aboriginal accused and accused from vulnerable populations when making interim release decisions, and provide more onerous interim release requirements for offences involving violence against an intimate partner;
(b) provide for a judicial referral hearing to deal with administration of justice offences involving a failure to comply with conditions of release or failure to appear as required;
(c) abolish peremptory challenges of jurors, modify the process of challenging a juror for cause so that a judge makes the determination of whether a ground of challenge is true, and allow a judge to direct that a juror stand by for reasons of maintaining public confidence in the administration of justice;
(d) increase the maximum term of imprisonment for repeat offences involving intimate partner violence and provide that abuse of an intimate partner is an aggravating factor on sentencing;
(e) restrict the availability of a preliminary inquiry to offences punishable by imprisonment for life and strengthen the justice’s powers to limit the issues explored and witnesses to be heard at the inquiry;
(f) hybridize most indictable offences punishable by a maximum penalty of 10 years or less, increase the default maximum penalty to two years less a day of imprisonment for summary conviction offences and extend the limitation period for summary conviction offences to 12 months;
(g) remove the requirement for judicial endorsement for the execution of certain out-of-province warrants and authorizations, expand judicial case management powers, allow receiving routine police evidence in writing, consolidate provisions relating to the powers of the Attorney General and allow increased use of technology to facilitate remote attendance by any person in a proceeding;
(h) allow the court to exempt an offender from the requirement to pay a victim surcharge if the offender satisfies the court that the payment would cause the offender undue hardship, provide the court with guidance as to what constitutes undue hardship, provide that a victim surcharge is to be paid for each offence, with an exception for certain administration of justice offences if the total amount of surcharges imposed on an offender for those types of offences would be disproportionate in the circumstances, require courts to provide reasons for granting any exception for certain administration of justice offences or any exemption from the requirement to pay a victim surcharge and clarify that the amendments described in this paragraph apply to any offender who is sentenced after the day on which they come into force, regardless of whether or not the offence was committed before that day; and
(i) remove passages and repeal provisions that have been ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Canada, repeal section 159 of the Act and provide that no person shall be convicted of any historical offence of a sexual nature unless the act that constitutes the offence would constitute an offence under the Criminal Code if it were committed on the day on which the charge was laid.

The enactment also amends the Youth Criminal Justice Act in order to reduce delays within the youth criminal justice system and enhance the effectiveness of that system with respect to administration of justice offences. For those purposes, the enactment amends that Act to, among other things,
(a) set out principles intended to encourage the use of extrajudicial measures and judicial reviews as alternatives to the laying of charges for administration of justice offences;
(b) set out requirements for imposing conditions on a young person’s release order or as part of a sentence;
(c) limit the circumstances in which a custodial sentence may be imposed for an administration of justice offence;
(d) remove the requirement for the Attorney General to determine whether to seek an adult sentence in certain circumstances; and
(e) remove the power of a youth justice court to make an order to lift the ban on publication in the case of a young person who receives a youth sentence for a violent offence, as well as the requirement to determine whether to make such an order.

Finally, the enactment amends among other Acts An Act to amend the Criminal Code (exploitation and trafficking in persons) so that certain sections of that Act can come into force on different days and also makes consequential amendments to other Acts.
Bill C-75 is too long to possibly cover entirely in one article, though this is the most serious of it.


Having much smaller bills introduced would certainly be preferable. Far too often, governments ram through much unrelated material into a bill, called “omnibus bills”, such that proper debate never actually happens.

A more thorough debate could be had if this were broken up into 6-8 separate bills

And just reiterate, terrorism and other major crimes should always be tried by indictment.

Child Killer Gets Transfer to “Healing Lodge” Because of her Race

(Interrogation of McClintic)

(Interrogation of Rafferty)

(News on McClintic’s Transfer To Healing Lodge)

As cited in a previous article, see here, all defendants/prisoners are not equal in the eyes of the law. This is a racially discriminating practice that Canada has been involved in doing since the late 1990s.

Here is section 718.2(e) of the Canadian Criminal Code:

all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders.

Yes, one racial group is allowed to get what amounts to a race based discount. The 1999 Gladue ruling essentially paved the way for this to be normalized across Canada, while the Ipeelee decision expanded the scope to include long term offenders.

Here are the links to the Court decisions of Gladue (1997, 1999) and Ipeelee (2012).

R. v. Gladue, 1997 CanLII 3015 (BC CA)
R. v. Gladue, [1999] 1 SCR 688, 1999 CanLII 679 (SCC)
R. v. Ipeelee, [2012] 1 SCR 433, 2012 SCC 13 (CanLII)

While Indigenous people getting a race-based discount is nothing new in Canada, the transfer of child killer Terry McClintic to a “healing lodge” has the Canadian public flared up.

In 2009, 8 year old Tori Stafford was murdered by Terri McClintic, who was an accomplice to Michael Rafferty. In 2010, both McClintic and Rafferty received life sentences, with a 25 year custodial minimum. In 2014, McClintic was transferred to a medium security prison. Now, in 2018, McClintic is being sent to this “healing lodge”.

Not only is McClintic a child killer, but she viciously assaulted another inmate in 2012, and bragged that she only regretted not causing worse injury. Definitely a candidate for transfer from maximum to medium security prison.

Unfortunately, the federal parties are playing politics with it, while avoiding the real issue. The Liberals, now in government, blame the Conservatives for the 2014 transfer to medium security prison (when Stephen Harper was PM). The Conservatives blame the Liberals for not stopping this transfer. Both blame the other, while saying that they were not able to do anything — that Corrections Canada makes the decisions.

But the real issue that both Liberals and Conservatives dodge is that the entire law giving special treatment to Aboriginal/Indigenous/First Nations peoples. No group should receive “any” special treatment. Raced-based discounts are immoral.

What “should” be done is have the Gladue/Ipeelee rulings overturned. Yes, the Supreme Court of Canada endorsed this nonsense, but it can be stopped permanently using Section 33, the Notwithstanding Clause of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Application of Charter
32. (1) This Charter applies
(a) to the Parliament and government of Canada in respect of all matters within the authority of Parliament including all matters relating to the Yukon Territory and Northwest Territories; and
(b) to the legislature and government of each province in respect of all matters within the authority of the legislature of each province.
Marginal note:
Exception
(2) Notwithstanding subsection (1), section 15 shall not have effect until three years after this section comes into force.
Marginal note:
Exception where express declaration
33. (1) Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act of Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of this Charter.

Rafferty/McClintic have frequently been compared to Paul Bernardo/Karla Homolka, another male/female child killing couple. Karla Homolka’s mere 12 year sentence outraged Canadians, as does the McClintic transfer now.

Rather than bickering about whose government dropped the ball, this soft bigotry of low expectations needs to end. Legislate this nonsense out of Canadian law.

Update on the Story: On October 3, the Liberals, NDP and Green Party voted against a Conservative motion that would have kept Terri-Lynn McClintic in prison. See this link.

Further Update on the Story
On November 8, the Liberals have announced they will make new rules to send McClintic back. However, it doesn’t address underlying racist nature of the law — different sentencing rules based on skin colour, or even on ”how someone identifies”.