Canadian HoC Foreign Affairs Committee Endorses UN Parliament In 1993, And Again In 2007

(Canada’s House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee approved the idea of a UN Parliament in 1993, and again in 2007)

1. Important Links

(1) https://canucklaw.ca/un-parliamentary-assembly-proposed-a-k-a-global-government/
(2) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Parliamentary_Assembly#cite_note-24
(3) http://archive.is/mslRy
(4) Wayback Machine, for archive of 1993, 8th Report, Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, House of Commons, Parliament of Canada, Spring 1993, chaired by Hon. Jon Bosley.
(5) https://web.archive.org/web/20071229011523/http://www.worldfederalistscanada.org/0896unpa.html
(6) http://archive.is/e9IMH
(7) https://www.ourcommons.ca/Content/committee/391/faae/reports/rp3066139/391_FAAE_Rpt08_PDF/391_FAAE_Rpt08-e.pdf
(8) CLICK HERE, for “conservative” Senator Douglas Roche.

(9) https://en.unpacampaign.org/proposal/
(10) http://archive.is/GMgwO
(11) https://en.unpacampaign.org/supporters/survey/
(12) http://archive.is/KpIqW
(13) https://en.unpacampaign.org/supporters/overview/?mapcountry=CA&mapgroup=mem
(14) http://archive.is/P7ZS9

(15) https://en.unpacampaign.org/meetings/november2007/
(16) http://archive.is/NKaj8
(17) http://archive.is/kRdVJ
(18) https://en.unpacampaign.org/meetings/november2008/
(19) http://archive.is/z1jUo
(20) http://archive.is/tNX9Z
(21) https://en.unpacampaign.org/239/establishment-of-a-global-parliament-discussed-at-international-meeting-in-new-york/
(22) http://archive.is/5lMyX
(23) http://archive.is/dXbo6
(24) https://en.unpacampaign.org/265/declaration-calls-for-intergovernmental-conference-on-un-parliament/
(25) http://archive.is/dXbo6
(26) https://en.unpacampaign.org/311/post-2015-agenda-should-include-elected-un-assembly-to-strengthen-democratic-participation/
(27) http://archive.is/xloAX
(28) http://archive.is/I4Mtb

2. Context For This Article

While the story of the United Nations Parliamentary Assembly (UNPA) is still in the news, it is still a theory, at least for now.

However, Canada’s globalist politicians have been at it since well before 2007. In fact, Brian Mulroney’s Government originally approved the idea in 1993.

Why should Canadians care? Well, if you think getting fair and adequate representation from Ottawa is difficult, try getting it from a global government.

3. Timeline For UN Parliament

  • Spring 1993 – CDA HoC Foreign Affairs Comm endorses UNPA
  • July 1993 – Brian Mulroney replaced by Campbell as PM
  • October 1993 – Jean Chretien elected as PM
  • 1996 – Support in Chretien’s Gov’t for UNPA
  • 2002 – Sen. Douglas Roche endorses UNPA
  • January 2006 – Harper replaces Martin as PM
  • July 2007 – CDA HoC Foreign Affairs Comm endorses UNPA
  • August 2007 – Bernier replaces MacKay as FA Minister
  • November 2007 – First UNPA Int’l Meeting, Switzerland
  • November 2008 – Second UNPA Int’l Meeting, Belgium
  • October 2009 – Third UNPA International Meeting, USA
  • July 2010 – Trudeau endorses UNPA as an MP
  • October 2010 – Fourth UNPA Int’l Meeting, Argentina
  • October 2013 – Fifth UNPA Int’l Meeting, Belgium
  • September 2015 – Harper signs Agenda 2030
  • October 2015 – Trudeau replaces Harper as PM
  • 4. Quotes From 1993 Standing Comm Report

    The decline in Canadian support for things international – and the decline is palpable – is explained more by loss of self-confidence among Canadians than by lack of caring. There is no more important task before us than to recover some of that confidence and no more important means of doing so than through the empowerment of the United Nations. People must see that the centre can hold and that they have a role to play in making it so.

    By way of building the public and political constituency for the United Nations, the Committee recommends that Canada support the development of a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly (21) and that we offer to host the preparatory meeting of the Assembly in the Parliament Buildings as the centrepiece in our celebration of the 50th anniversary of the United Nations in 1995. We would further recommend that the Government work closely with the national organizing committee for the 50th anniversary and encourage the active participation of non-governmental organizations in the planning and holding of the Assembly.

    Conclusion
    .
    In closing this long letter the Committee wishes to commend the Government for being one of the few that has contributed energetically to keeping An Agenda for Peace alive. But alive is not good enough. Much more needs to be done. The proposals of the Secretary General should be the beginning of a vital international process of reform and renewal of the United Nations system. Canada should work hard to help make it so. The Committee intends to keep the empowerment of the UN high on its agenda and to hold additional hearings in the new session of Parliament. We would ask that the Minister respond in writing to this letter by early May.

    This is what it sounds like. The Mulroney Government, which calls itself “conservative”, has the Foreign Affairs Committee approve in principle participation in a United Nations Parliament.

    Note: Mulroney had a huge majority at that time, so there was no real need to get opposition approval on this. So no one can say he was pressured into doing it.

    5. Approval Of UNPA In 1996

    In recent years the demands on the United Nations have increased. In response, the organization has been given more autonomous powers and responsibilities. At the same time, it is necessary that the UN maintain support for its actions and decisions of the world’s citizens and governments. Creation of a UN Parliamentary Assembly is a vital first step in this process of democratizing the United Nations and ensuring its legitimacy in the eyes of world public opinion.

    The European Parliament and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), demonstrate the important contributions that supranational parliamentary bodies can make to the work of international institutions. The history of both of these supranational parliaments also demonstrates the important, indeed essential, role in their creation to be undertaken by committed national parliamentarians.

    Under Andrº Ouellet, Canadian foreign policy was distinguished primarily by its emphasis on international trade issues. Trade promotion overshadowed some other progressive initiatives taken by Canada, notably Canada’s work at the UN on creation of an International Criminal Court, and the Canadian peacekeeping proposal (entitled Toward a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations) which was presented at last Fall’s session of the UN General Assembly.

    As Foreign Affairs critic when the Liberals were in opposition, Lloyd Axworthy was a strong proponent of arms control and human rights issues and is a strong advocate of improved multilateral institutions. Many analysts expect that under Mr. Axworthy these international law and ‘world order’ issues will become a greater priority.

    In the Spring of 1993, the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade (SCEAIT) brought forward a report on Canada’s role in the United Nations. One of the Committee’s three recommendations called for Canada to support creation of a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly (UNPA), and for Canada to host the preparatory meeting of the Assembly in the Canadian Parliament Buildings. Following release of the SCEAIT Report, an ad hoc committee of parliamentarians and non-governmental representatives was established to build political support for a UNPA. Lloyd Axworthy was among a handful of Liberals who participated in the ad hoc Committee’s two meetings. Unfortunately, very little was accomplished before the 1993 general election was called and the 1993 session of the House of Commons ended.

    The New Liberal Chretien Government shares the globalist appetite and ideas that the previous Mulroney Government did. More support for creating of the actual world government.

    6. Senator Douglas Roche & UNPA, 2002

    The arguments below contain these assumptions in their essence. However, it is understood (perhaps reluctantly) that world federalism and the end of the state system is not in the mainstream political agenda for a contemporary UN. The objectives of UN reform and addressing issues of international governance are reasonable and feasible in contemporary politics. Implications for a Kantian vision of world federalism can be bruited, but at this point not much more.1 A UNPA would not be a world parliament, although some supporters and detractors of a UNPA think of it as a step towards a form of world government or global federalism.

    World government is not a necessary criterion in discussing a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly. World government is not the case here. What is at issue is governance, by which is commonly understood to be the regulation of an increasingly complex and interconnected world comprising States, societies, corporations, individuals and epistemic communities.

    The question of a UNPA, then, becomes one relating to a UNPA within the UN system and a UNPA within both the growing interconnectedness of trans-national politics and existing networks of global governance. Governance, transparency, democracy, diplomacy and international norms of behaviour – how states behave when their affairs are so intertwined – these are the issues in the background when discussing the formation of a UNPA.4 Specifically discussed below are those aspects of these phenomena that today seem to drive the argument for a UNPA.

    Some nice double speak here. Senator Roche is trying to argue that a United Nations Parliament would not actually amount to a world government. Okay.

    7. Quotes From 2007 Standing Comm Report

    CHAPTER 8 CANADA’S ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND MULTILATERAL APPROACHES TO DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT
    [W]e need democracy as a basis of a safer world, we need democracy as the basis for a just system of international relations …
    Her Excellency Nino Burjandze, Speaker of the Parliament of Georgia

    The Committee has already made reference in previous chapters to Canada’s welcomed multilateralist approach to democratic development and to its valued contribution to multilateral bodies. We believe that should be continued, and enhanced where most effective, as part of the evaluation of all Canadian support for international democratic development that we have recommended.
    The Committee observes as well that international organizations are increasingly expanding their work into all areas of democratic development and governance. For example, in our meeting at the Commonwealth Secretariat, its Secretary General told the Committee that the Secretariat is trying to work both at the cultural level and with parliaments and political parties on understanding the role of the opposition and on introducing accountability measures. Mr. Christopher Child, Advisor and Head of the Democracy Section, commented that “we’d like to do much more party training.” Strengthening party systems has also become an important area of work for the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Systems (IDEA). The role of political parties in democracy-building was the subject of the Council of Europe Forum for the Future of Democracy which took place in Moscow in October 2006 with the involvement of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly to which Canada sends observers.

    The World Bank, to which Canada is an important contributor through the Department of Finance, is not allowed by its Charter to take into account the nature of the political regime, hence its role in “political development is obviously constrained,” as Sanjay Pradhan, Sector Director in the Public Sector Governance Unit told the Committee in Washington, D.C. However, within a broader conception of good governance that is linked to democratic development: “We are doing a lot in terms of accountability of the state to its citizens.” So the Bank works on things that might be considered “building blocks” of democracy. Mr. Pradhan distributed a paper “How Ongoing Operations of the World Bank Currently Strengthen Participation and Accountability,” which lists six major program areas for Bank interventions. One of these includes “parliamentary capacity development.”

    Mr. Steen Lau Jorgensen, Director of the Bank’s Sustainable Development Network, elaborated that the Bank has programs directly involving local communities in development decisions, thereby increasing the effectiveness of projects. In the Bank’s experience, more open countries do much better in achieving their development goals. The Bank therefore has an interest in building the capacity of civil society and it now even gets close to election-related processes, as in Ivory Coast where it is helping with the compiling of a national registration list. In this case, the Bank is working with the EU and the UN and through the country’s prime minister’s office. Registration is not just about elections but about establishing citizen’s eligibility for social services.

    As Mr. Jorgensen put it, there has been a “fundamental change in mindset” towards seeing poor people as citizens having rights and responsibilities. The Bank’s consequent shift away from major infrastructure projects since the late 1980s has been approved by its Board. The Bank sees this as linked to development effectiveness, which incorporates a good governance and anti-corruption agenda. For example, in the public procurement process, the Bank has established oversight through a “Procurement Watch” mechanism, and it now has a “zero tolerance” policy on corruption in World Bank-supported projects. Mention was also made of a “Global Integrity Alliance” as part of an anti-corruption strategy involving leaders in the recipient countries.

    The role of a major international financial institution like the World Bank is noteworthy in another sense, since many believe that these powerful international organizations are not themselves sufficiently democratically accountable to the publics in the countries which make up their memberships. Several of the Committee’s witnesses addressed the issue of the need to advance democratization processes from the local and national levels of governance, to the dimension of global governance. For example, John Foster of the North-South Institute referred to the Finnish-supported “Helsinki Process” which produced a 2005 Report, Governing Globalization-Globalizing Governance, that made recommendations for democratizing oversight of the global economy and strengthening the role of parliamentarians and civil society in that regard. He also made reference to the work of the Forum International de Montreal — which gets most of its funding from non-Canadian sources — and to the Spanish-based “World Forum of Civil Society Networks and its Campaign for an In-Depth Reform of the System of International Institutions…”

    The presentation to the Committee by the World Federalist Movement — Canada also devoted a lot of attention to advancing democratization at the level of international institutions, in particular in the context of United Nations reforms. Indeed it noted that this Committee in 1993 had supported the concept of a parliamentary assembly at the UN, and it went on to state:
    In April 2007, the Committee for a democratic UN (an NGO organizing network working with parliamentarians) will present publicly the “International Appeal for the Establishment of a United National Parliamentary Assembly, at press conferences around the world. Following the Appeal launch in April, an international parliamentary conference is planned for October 2007 in Geneva.

    The World Federalist representatives urged the Committee to give favourable consideration to this international appeal. We note as well that the European Parliament has supported the establishment of UN Parliamentary Assembly as part of overall UN reform, most recently in a resolution of June 9, 2005.

    In terms of working through international organizations, the biggest of all is of course the UN system. Most of the UN funding related to democratic development and governance goes through the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). Indeed, when the Committee met with the UNDP’s Pippa Norris, Director of the Democratic Governance Group, Bureau of Development Policy, and other senior staff (many of them Canadians) at the UN in New York, it was noted that this group is the largest within the UNDP.

    Ms. Norris shared with the Committee the group’s Strategic Plan, 2008-2011, and explained that its mandate in the area of democratic governance comes from various UN sources including the Millennium Declaration and a General Assembly resolution in 2000, the 2002 statement Democratic Governance Practice in UNDP, and a recent high-level panel report Delivering As One. Documents provided to the Committee included the UNDP’s Global Programme on Parliamentary Strengthening, on Support for Arab Parliaments, on Strengthening the Role of Parliaments in Reconstruction and the Prevention of Conflicts, and the annual report of its Democratic Governance Thematic Trust Fund. There was also a briefing note on CIDA-UNDP collaboration in Afghanistan. On gender issues, the Committee was told that an international knowledge network on women and politics was to be launched in February 2007, centred on an on-line tool to help education in this area. In addition, the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) does a lot of work on civic education for women. On electoral assistance, it was noted that collaboration between Elections Canada and UNDP goes back as far as Cambodia in 1993. However, another Canadian staff member Elissar Sarrouh (Policy Advisor, Public Administration Reform) — who formerly worked at the Parliamentary Centre — added that Elections Canada is always short of resources. So when countries express interest in having Canadian expertise, sometimes the resources are not there.

    On the UN’s work on election processes, the Committee also met with Craig Jenness (again, a Canadian), Director of the Electoral Assistance Division within the Department for Political Affairs, who explained that this takes the form both of direct electoral support, and work on electoral best practices. Rather than election observation, the UN focuses either on providing assistance to electoral offices in host countries, or on assisting with electoral operations as part of peacekeeping missions in places like the Democratic Republic of the Congo or Haiti. The budget is relatively small, with a dozen people at headquarters, although a large roster of people — including many Canadians — work around the world. Also, there is a small trust fund to allow the quick deployment of people when necessary to places like Nepal. Some 102 UN member states — and four non-member states have requested electoral assistance since 1992, and over 30 countries are now receiving or have requested such assistance — most of them in Asia, Africa and the Middle East.

    One important reason UN help is requested is that this helps legitimate the result and get it accepted — for example, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The UN does not work with countries unless asked by the host government or there is a Security Council mandate. The UN tries to not run elections themselves, but to assist the host government in setting up the necessary structures to do so. In post-conflict situations, a problem that often comes up is that everyone wants to win an election, but it is often difficult to convince the losers that there is a real role for oppositions. According to Mr. Jenness, “parliamentarians can help” with that since they can talk to colleagues in other countries on a peer-to-peer basis.

    Before turning to UN’s innovation of a “Democracy Fund” in 2005, and Canada’s potential role in that, it is important to recognize that notwithstanding all of this work, many questions still surround the UN’s involvement in democratic development, as well as that of international organizations such as the Community of Democracies or alternatives, which can be more explicit than the UN about their pro-democracy aims since their memberships are limited to at least nominally democratic states.

    In observing that “the UN has often been in a situation where it has been an advocate of democracy”, Jane Boulden, Canada Research Chair in International Relations and Security Studies at the Royal Military College of Canada, told the Committee:
    There are a number of member states that are not happy about the fact that the UN should play a role in advocating democracy, even when it comes to post-conflict situations where parties have agreed to democracy as part of the peace agreement.
    This relates partly to the ongoing questions about sovereignty. With the responsibility to protect, for example, there’s been an increasing acceptance that sovereignty is not sacrosanct, and for those who are resistant to these ideas, the idea that democratization or democracy is an important universal value is seen as yet another hook that western states can use as a criterion for intervention in states.

    If democracy is to be put forward as a universal value, we need to be able to make that case more effectively than we are now. That’s a factor the United Nations is grappling with, but I think it goes across the board for states as well. On this point, the questions of perceptions relate as well to the image or the perception in a number of states that the UN engages in a number of double standards. Why do we, through the United Nations, react to some conflicts and by extension then deal with some post-conflict scenarios with resources and commitment, and not others? When we feed that into the broader question about whether democracy is a western value or not, you can see how the whole package becomes an issue.

    Scepticism about UN multilateralism combined with the need to engage the United States multilaterally has led to various alternatives being suggested. For example, two prominent U.S. scholars have recently made a detailed proposal for the establishment of a 60-member “Concert of Democracies.”

    Yet to get around the fact that the UN includes many non-democracies, there has already been the creation of the Community of Democracies in 2000, with Canada as a founding member, and which met for the first time at the UN in 2004 as a UN “Democracy Caucus”. The Committee was told during our New York meetings in February 2007 that the 100-member “Caucus” is currently chaired by Mali, which is also an active member of the Group of New and Restored Democracies. His Excellency, Cheick Sidi Diarra, Ambassador and Permament Representative to the UN of Mali, was among a group of UN ambassadors and permanent representatives with whom the Committee met. We have already referred in Chapter 4 to Canada’s participation in the Community of Democracies (CD). One of our Canadian witnesses, Jeffrey Kopstein argued that, given the UN’s weaknesses and limitations, the CD should be bolstered. In Washington, where we met with Richard Rowson, President of the CD’s Council, Theodore Piccone, Director of the Democracy Coalition Project (and representative of the Club of Madrid in Washington) argued that “Canada should be a member of the [CD] Convening Group,” and that notwithstanding our multi-lateralist reputation, Canada “has been mostly at the margins in this regard.”
    Others were less convinced of the CD’s effectiveness. Richard Haas, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, told the Committee that the CD defines its democracy membership criteria too broadly and is too large to be a meaningful actor. Thomas Melia, Deputy Director of Freedom House told the Committee in Washington that the Convening Group of the CD represents in part the strategic interests of the member governments. For example, Morocco is a member although it does not meet the democracy criteria. Mr. Melia also had some cautionary words on trying for global coordination, stating that “a lot of effort can be diverted into coordination.” Instead he saw the need for “complementarity,” and “the way to pursue that is to build one’s niche.”
    Gareth Evans, President of the International Crisis Group, has also cautioned:

    Don’t pin too many hopes on Democracy Caucuses and similar grand international strategies. While in principle an attractive idea, there are simply too many institutional and interest differences between democratic countries for a united front to be sustained on anything very much, and it is not at all clear that the tentative moves to create such mechanisms have so far placed any useful pressure on non-democracies, or generated any net positive returns.

    At the same time, Mr. Evans, who remains a strong believer in a strengthened and reformed UN system, points out that individual democratic countries, notably those with great-power interests such as the U.S., are often not the best placed to promote democratic development. Even if, as several U.S. witnesses told the Committee, Canada is sometimes able to do things that the U.S. cannot, Canada cannot go it alone in this field either. Mr. Evans argues that: “One way to have an impact without such visible badging [association with Western big-power interests] is working through collaboration with multilateral coordinating mechanisms in the UN and elsewhere — the new UN Democracy Fund now getting off the ground will hopefully prove of real utility in this respect.”

    The Committee shares that hope. Indeed, there is no substitute for action by the UN, for all its faults, since it is the only truly global body. We, too, want to see it reformed and made into a more credible instrument for advancing democratic development. With respect to the UN Democracy Fund (UNDEF) set up as a result of the September 2005 UN Summit, it is supported through voluntary donations not assessed contributions. The largest donor by far is the U.S., and the second largest donor has been India, the world’s most populous democracy, with a contribution of US$10 million. That amount was matched by Japan in early March 2007, adding to UNDEF’s funding capacity of about US$ 65 million, and making it the Fund’s 28th donor country. So far Canada is not among these.

    When the Committee met with UNDEF representatives, Acting Executive Director Magdy Martinez-Soliman and Senior programme Officer Randi Davis (a Canadian) in New York in February 2007, Mr. Martinez-Soliman observed that the Fund is the first UN organization to use the word “democracy” in its title.377 Moreover, parliaments have been one of the better allies of the new fund; UNDEF staff having met with delegations from India, the United Kingdom, the European Union, the United States and others, now including Canada. The visit of the Committee was prominently noted on UNDEF’s web site (http://www.un.org/democracyfund/). It was made clear to the Committee that Canada’s involvement would be welcomed, especially as Canada’s democracy is looked upon favourably by many countries in the world.

    The idea for UNDEF was explained as a U.S. initiative proposed as part of the UN reform debate along with priorities such as human rights, management reform and a Peacebuilding Commission. (The Committee also met separately with Canadian Carolyn McAskie, UN Assistant Secretary-General in charge of the Peacebuilding Support Office.379) UNDEF currently works mostly through civil society organizations as well as partnerships with other UN organizations, including peacekeeping missions. Its first funding tranche in August 2006 involved some 70 NGOs, including in Canada the Parliamentary Centre and a journalists group in Toronto. Importantly, UNDEF funding also comes from the South; it is not in the “import-export” business in terms of democracy, and does not offer a democratic model for others to copy. Significantly, too, UNDEF does not require host government permission when it decides on funding projects. It operates with the support and legitimization of the Secretary-General and the states that make up its board, composed of the six largest contributors. UNDEF is also one of the earliest examples of the “One UN” model proposed by the report of a recent High Level UN Panel on Coherence, Delivering as One,380 that was also referred to in the Committee’s meeting at the UNDP.

    UNDEF is still a fledgling organization with only six staff (as of February 2007), and has just starting work on the ground, although it already has some 125 projects in 110 states and territories. Its regional priority is Africa (37% of project funding), followed by least developed countries outside of Africa. Project decisions are made on the basis of detailed proposals after consultation with the UN’s Department of Political Affairs and other UN organizations active in each country, following which a short list is made and presented to the board, which makes an even shorter list for presentation to the Secretary-General. With no formal advertising, UNDEF received over 1,300 applications in its first two weeks of operation — although about 700 of these did not meet its criteria. (Even when UNDEF did not fund projects, however, it has shared its database of proposals with other UN bodies, so these projects may get funding from elsewhere.)

    The UNDEF governance structure is bi-level: one composed of UN member states, and one of NGOs, respecting geographic balance, and with an advisory board that includes international democracy experts such as Guillermo O’Donnell cited by the Committee in Chapter 1. Asked why UNDEF has accepted funding from states such as Qatar that are not fully democratic, Mr. Martinez-Soliman responded that UNDEF does not judge the degree to which its donors are democratic, but poses the larger questions of: Do the citizens within a state think it is democratic, and do other states think so?

    Mr. Martinez-Soliman added that UNDEF has about 15 projects that work directly with political parties in countries such as Bolivia, Serbia and Peru. There are obviously sensitivities involved in such work. Observing that some countries have tightened their legislation on the transfer of foreign money to NGOs, in order to prevent these countries from shutting the door, UNDEF specifies that NGOs must be recognized either nationally or internationally. UNDEF also works in partnership with global and regional interparliamentary forums — for example, the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), particularly on the issue of support for increasing the number of women parliamentarians, and including the Assemblée parlementaire de la francophonie.

    The Committee was told, by our Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations John McNee, that Canada’s official position on UNDEF remains one of “wait and see.” We agree that UNDEF is a work in progress. But at the same time, it is part of UN reform and a global UN effort to take democratic development seriously. Surely that goal merits Canadian support. We note as well that among UNDEF’s donors are five of Canada’s G7 partners and its Commonwealth partner, Australia. Accordingly, we believe that Canada should consider whether to become a UNDEF donor.

    Finally, there is a recurring theme that has struck the Committee during its meetings with international organizations supported by Canada that are involved in democratic development: namely, the impressive number of Canadians who are working in these organizations, often at senior levels. This is a great pool of expertise and experience upon which to draw. While some of these Canadians may be attracted back to Canada by the new Canada foundation for international democratic development that we proposed in Recommendation 12, it is also a good to have Canadians in positions of influence inside the multilateral organizations that Canada funds.

    The Committee believes that a greater effort should be made to tap into the knowledge accumulated by Canadians working in multilateral organizations. This could enrich Canada’s own approach to democratic development as it is elaborated through an enlarged Democracy Council and through the independent Canada foundation that we have proposed.

    The Foreign Affairs Committee of Stephen Harper’s Government also approved the idea of participating in a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly in July 2007. It seems that all of these successive administrations are globalists.

    8. Recommendations From 2007 Report

    Recommendation 19
    The independent evaluation of all Canadian support for democratic development that we have recommended should also assess the effectiveness of multilateral channels to which Canada provides funding. That evaluation should guide appropriate funding levels.

    Recommendation 20
    Recognizing that the future challenges of democratization processes involve governance at the level of international organizations, as well as in national and local settings, the Canada foundation for international democratic development should include these dimensions within its mandate, and should consider related proposals for support from Canadian non-governmental bodies and civil-society groups working in this area.

    Recommendation 21
    As part of the essential role of a reformed and strengthened United Nations in global democratic development, the Parliament of Canada should give favourable consideration to the establishment of a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly.

    Recommendation 22
    In light of the establishment of the United Nations Democracy Fund (UNDEF) as part of UN reform proposals in 2005, Canada should consider whether to become a donor to UNDEF.

    Recommendation 23
    Taking into account the expertise and experience on democratic development that has been accumulated by Canadians working in this field through multilateral organizations, Canada should make an effort to tap into this pool of knowledge in furthering its own approach to democratic development.

    Exactly what it sounds like: create and participate in a United Nations Parliament.

    9. Trudeau Endorses UN Parliament

    Our current Prime Minister endorsed the concept back in 2010. It seems doubtful that he has changed his mind since.

    Interestingly, Green Party leader Elizabeth May (who also sits on the Trudeau Foundation) has endorsed this as well.

    10. CDA Globalist Gov’ts All In Support

    Successive Canadian Governments all support being part of a UN Parliament if it ever became a reality. Canada is pretty screwed.

    Bit Of History: Peter MacKay Shanks David Orchard In 2003 PC Leadership Race

    (Peter Mackay pledges – in writing – no merger with Alliance if he wins)

    (Peter MacKay sticking the knife in again?)

    1. Important Links


    CLICK HERE, for the Peter McKay/David Orchard alliance.
    http://archive.is/DJ6M8
    CLICK HERE, for CBC article on the broken deal.
    http://archive.is/fAEgs
    CLICK HERE, for ONSC denying Orchard’s application in full.
    http://archive.is/niIKc
    CLICK HERE, for an ONSC judge refusing costs for defamation.
    http://archive.is/NgxG0
    CLICK HERE, for Orchard’s ON Court of Appeal Factum.
    http://archive.is/nsX0V/image
    CLICK HERE, for ONCA dismissing appeal/cross appeal/motion.
    http://archive.is/nBrOy
    CLICK HERE, for Stevens v. CPC, Federal Court of Canada.
    http://archive.is/iwCyI
    CLICK HERE, for Stevens v. CPC, Federal Court of Appeal.
    http://archive.is/6S6am

    CLICK HERE, for a May 2019 article on replacing Scheer (before election).
    http://archive.is/ZPFdF
    CLICK HERE, for MacKay commenting on Scheer’s 2019 loss.
    http://archive.is/SFvWr

    2. Context For This Article


    In 2003, the current Conservative Party of Canada did not exist. Instead, there was the Alliance Party, led by Stephen Harper, and the Progressive Conservative Party, undergoing a leadership race.

    Two candidates in that race, David Orchard and Peter Mackay, struck a deal: Orchard would support MacKay’s leadership bid in return for a written pledge not to pursue a merger or deal with the Alliance. At that time, a merger had been seriously considered, as a way to form a united alternative to the Liberal Party. But MacKay promised — in writing — not to pursue this if he was supported for leader of the Progressive Conservative leadership.

    The deal went ahead as planned (so it seemed), and MacKay became leader of the party. However, it appeared he had no intention of honouring his deal. Almost immediately, he pursued merger talks with the Alliance. The eventually merged, and the new party formed government from 2006 until 2015. MacKay’s deceptive and underhanded tactics had won in the long term.

    Fast forward more than a decade from 2003, and another controversy. See section #9 for more on that.

    3. Text Of McKay/Orchard Deal

    May 31, 2003 Agreement between Peter MacKay and David Orchard
    1) No merger, joint candidates w[ith] Alliance. Maintain 301.
    2) Review of FTA/NAFTA – blue ribbon commission with D[avid] O[rchard] w[ith] choice of chair w[ith] P[eter] M[acKay’s] agreement. Rest of members to be jointly agreed upon.
    3) Clean up of head office including change of national director in consultation (timing w[ithin] reasonable period in future, pre-election) and some of DO’s people working at head office.
    4) Commitment to making environmental protection front and center incl[uding] sustainable agriculture, forestry, reducing pollution through rail.
    [Signed by Peter MacKay and David Orchard]

    Looks pretty straightforward.
    No merger. Fix our party instead.

    4. ON Court Challenge By Orchard, Others

    Administrative law — Voluntary association — Political parties — Political parties registered under Canada Elections Act — Leaders of Progressive Conservative Party of Canada and Canadian Reform Conservative Alliance reaching agreement for merger of political parties — Common law principles regarding unregulated voluntary associations did not apply to political parties registered under Canada Elections Act — Canada Elections Act governing merger of registered political parties — Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c. 9.

    On October 15, 2003, Peter MacKay, leader of the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada (“PC Party”), reached an agreement in principle with Steven [page278] Harper, leader of the Canadian Reform Conservative Alliance (“Alliance”), for the establishment of the “Conservative Party of Canada”. PC Party members who were opposed to the agreement applied to the court for several declarations. The premise of these declarations was that the PC Party could not be dissolved or merged with another political party except with the unanimous consent of all its members. The applicants also sought a permanent injunction to prevent anyone from dealing with the party’s assets.

    [4] The applicants are PC Party members who are opposed to the merger of the party with the Alliance. They request that the court make a number of declarations, which are all premised on their view that the PC Party cannot be dissolved or merged with another political party, except with the unanimous consent of all of its members. They also seek a permanent injunction to prevent anyone from otherwise dealing with the party’s assets.

    [5] I note that several items of the relief set out in the Notice of Application are not pursued before me. Paragraph 1(j) requested a declaration that Mr. MacKay is in breach of his written agreement, dated June 1, 2003, with Mr. Orchard, and sought consequential relief. The request for this relief was withdrawn on the consent of counsel prior to the date set for the hearing. Paragraph 1(e) sought a declaration that the procedures set by the Management Committee of the PC Party for the special meeting scheduled for December 6, 2003 are contrary to the Party’s Constitution and by-laws. Counsel for the applicants indicated they [page280] were not seeking such relief and informed the court the applicants were making no attack on the specific procedures adopted by the Party respecting the special meeting. Counsel also informed the court that the applicants were not requesting the court to deal with the relief sought in para. 1(g) which sought a declaration that the Constitution of the PC Party prohibited its leader from agreeing with the leader of another political party that the PC Party will not nominate candidates in every federal constituency in Canada.

    [6] Traditionally, the courts have been reluctant to get involved in supervising the internal affairs of voluntary associations. However, courts do recognize that membership in a voluntary association can give individuals important social rights that are worthy of some protection. Members may request the courts to require that the organization carry out its affairs honestly, in good faith and in accordance with its governing rules.

    [7] In this case we are dealing with a political party. The social interest of members in ensuring that the organization’s affairs are conducted in accordance with its governing Constitution is apparent. Citizens exercise important rights in participating in political activity through membership in political parties. However, the court must be careful not to intrude into the political realm. There were submissions and evidence in this case that I considered to be political rhetoric. I have disregarded all such evidence and submissions.

    [13] I am satisfied that the situation is sufficiently developed to give rise to an actual dispute between the parties. Both sides have important interests at stake. The leadership of the PC Party has embarked on a path to merge the party. The applicants are opposed to the course of action being taken. Counsel for both sides indicated to the court that it would be of assistance to have a decision before the vote is taken tomorrow. Given their national significance, there is good reason to determine the questions raised by this actual dispute, and I am satisfied that the court’s decision will be of practical effect in resolving the dispute.

    [14] I have concluded that this dispute does not fall within the ambit of the internal dispute resolution in Article 13 of the PC Party’s Constitution. I regard the internal process as intended to deal with questions about whether the ongoing affairs of the party are being conducted in compliance with its Constitution and by-laws. This dispute arises in extraordinary circumstances not contemplated by its Constitution, concerns its continued existence, and as will be seen, is in large measure about the proper interpretation and effect of a public statute. In deciding not to defer to the internal arbitration process, I paid no heed to the applicants’ arguments that that process was flawed by relationship and institutional bias. I regard the applicant’s apprehension of bias to be without merit.

    [40] In expressing this view, I should not be taken to be declaring the law. In this proceeding I was asked to make declarations that the PC Party cannot merge, transfer its assets, or dissolve without the unanimous consent of every one of its individual members. I have decided, based on the view I take of the law, that it is not appropriate to make such declarations.

    [41] A further comment must be made about para. 1(h) of the application. Paragraph 1(h) seeks “a declaration that the resolution [before the December 6 special meeting] does not constitute the resolution required pursuant to s. 400(2)(b) of the Canada Elections Act in order for the PC Party to merge with another registered party under the Act”. Whether the resolution being acted upon tomorrow, or any other resolution, satisfies the requirements of the Act must, in the first instance, be decided by the Chief Electoral Officer. I refuse the relief requested in para. 1(h) on that basis.

    [42] The application is dismissed in its entirety. Counsel may make an appointment through my secretary to address costs.
    Application dismissed.

    In short the Court ruled that the matter should be decided internally. The parties have governing documents (such as constitutions) which set out terms for various issues, including mergers.

    One way to look at this would be the “sort out your own business” line of reasoning prevailed. And while members of an organization should expect leaders to behave in a good faith manner, the Court apparently isn’t always the place to demand such a resolution.

    While the Judge “could” have intervened, the decision was made not to.

    See the next section for the Elections Act (400-403)

    5. Canada Elections Act

    [34] I set out the provisions in full, underlining the particular phrases that I find helpful in interpreting the provisions. I discuss some of the particular phrases below.

    400(1) Two or more registered parties may, at any time other than during the period beginning 30 days before the issue of a writ for an election and ending on polling day, apply to the Chief Electoral Officer to become a single registered party resulting from their merger.
    (2) An application to merge two or more registered parties must
    (a) be certified by the leaders of the merging parties;
    (b) be accompanied by a resolution from each of the merging parties approving the proposed merger; and
    (c) contain the information required from a party to be registered, except for the information referred to in paragraph 366(2)(i).

    401(1) The Chief Electoral Officer shall amend the registry of parties by replacing the names of the merging parties with the name of the merged party if
    (a) the application for the merger was not made in the period referred to in subsection 400(1); and
    (b) the Chief Electoral Officer is satisfied that
    (i) the merged party is eligible for registration as a political party under this Act, and
    (ii) the merging parties have discharged their obligations under this Act, including their obligations to report on their financial transactions and their election expenses and to maintain valid and up-to-date information concerning their registration.
    (2) The Chief Electoral Officer shall notify the officers of the merging parties in writing whether the registry of parties is to be amended under subsection (1).
    (3) If the Chief Electoral Officer amends the registry of parties, he or she shall cause to be published in the Canada Gazette a notice that the names of the merging parties have been replaced in the registry with the name of the merged party.

    402(1) A merger of registered parties takes effect on the day on which the Chief Electoral Officer amends the registry of parties under subsection 401(1).
    (2) On the merger of two or more registered parties,
    (a) the merged party is the successor of each merging party;
    (b) the merged party becomes a registered party;
    (c) the assets of each merging party belong to the merged party;
    (d) the merged party is responsible for the liabilities of each merging party; [page287]
    (e) the merged party is responsible for the obligations of each merging party to report on its financial transactions and election expenses for any period before the merger took effect;

    (f) the merged party replaces a merging party in any proceedings, whether civil, penal or administrative, by or against the merging party; and
    (g) any decision of a judicial or quasi-judicial nature involving a merging party may be enforced by or against the merged party.

    403. Within six months after a merger
    (a) each of the merging parties shall provide the Chief Electoral Officer with the documents referred to in subsection 424(1) for
    (i) the portion of its current fiscal period that ends on the day before the day on which the merger takes effect, and
    (ii) any earlier fiscal period for which those documents have not been provided; and
    (b) the merged party shall provide the Chief Electoral Officer with
    (i) a statement, prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, of its assets and liabilities, including any surplus or deficit, at the date of the merger,
    (ii) an auditor’s report, submitted to the chief agent of the merged party, as to whether the statement presents fairly and in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles the information on which it was based, and
    (iii) a declaration in the prescribed form by the chief agent of the merged party concerning the statement.

    These sections of the Canada Elections Act are cited in both the Provincial and Federal Court rulings. As such, we should know what they actually say. In short, they quite clearly allow for party mergers. Broken promises and backroom deals don’t actually appear anywhere in the text.

    6. ON Court Of Appeal (Orchard et al.)

    [17] As a preliminary matter, the respondent moves to quash the appeal as now being moot. It argues that there is no longer a live issue affecting the rights of the parties because the merger has happened and the Conservative Party has been registered by the Chief Electoral Officer in place of the PC Party and the Alliance Party.

    [18] In my view, the motion must be dismissed. There remains the same real legal issue between the parties that existed before December 6, 2003, namely, whether the PC Party can be dissolved or merged with another political party without the unanimous consent of all of its members. The only difference is that if [page134] they are successful, the appellants must now seek a remedial order undoing what has happened rather than an order to prevent it from occurring. The respondent has not shown that this would be impossible. The underlying legal issues still have an effect on the rights of the parties and hence mootness does not apply.

    [19] On the appeal itself, the appellants’ fundamental contention is that the common law requires the PC Party to obtain the unanimous consent of all of its members to merge with the Alliance Party. In making this argument they place significant reliance on Astgen.

    [45] By the terms of the constitution this decision is final and binding. Having had the opportunity to participate in that process the appellants are bound to accept it as final and binding, subject to judicial review which they have not sought. This is a corollary to the obligation of an organization like a trade union to give notice of an arbitration to a member whose rights will be affected because the decision of the arbitration board is final and binding. See, for example, Hoogendoorn v. Greening Metal Products and Screening Equipment Co. (1967), 1967 CanLII 20 (SCC), [1968] S.C.R. 30, 65 D.L.R. (2d) 641. It is not open to the appellants to seek a determination by the court that the resolution is of no legal effect because the PC Party failed to comply with the procedures required by its constitution. In this circumstance, that is a matter for the Arbitration Committee.

    [46] In summary, therefore, the appellants’ arguments on appeal must be rejected.

    [47] The respondent has cross-appealed from the decision of the application judge to award no costs because of the public importance of the issues raised. We did not call on the appellants to respond to the cross-appeal. In our view, it was an entirely appropriate exercise of discretion by the judge of first instance.

    [48] As to the costs of the proceedings in this court, success has been divided. The appellants failed on the appeal. The respondent failed to establish mootness and failed on the cross-appeal. Together with the public importance of the questions raised, this makes it appropriate to order that there be no costs in this court. [page141]

    [49] I would therefore dismiss the motion to quash and the appeal and the cross-appeal. No costs in this court.

    Among other things, the Court of Appeals states that relief should have come in the form of an application for judicial review challenging the Elections Commission.

    Beyond that, the Appeals Panel sidesteps the underhanded nature of MacKay’s duplicity. Instead, they point out that the Canada Elections Act explicitly allows for mergers except in very limited cases. Unanimity from all participants is not required.

    To sum up, there is nothing new to add here, so appeal dismissed.

    7. Stevens v. CPC (Federal Court)


    This was not the only case that was launched. There was an Application for Judicial Review started in Federal Court to contest the ruling that allowed the merger.

    [76] The Applicant argued that the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal confirmed the opinion of the application judge that section 401(1)(b)(ii) of the Act vests the CEO not the Court, with the mandate of determining if the merger application met the statutory requirements. However, he also submits that the Court of Appeal recognized that section 400(2)(b) of the Act implicitly requires that a merger resolution be passed in accordance with the constitution of a merging party.

    [77] Accordingly, the Applicant argues that this holding supports his contention that the CEO erred in law by rejecting the constitution of the PC Party as being relevant to his decision. The Applicant repeats and relies upon his earlier submissions that the constitution of that party specifically prohibits the merger application that was made.

    [78] Further, the Applicant says that the judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal does not address the argument that the common law rights of voluntary associations include the right to be heard when such association is a political party that is at risk of dissolution.

    ii) The Respondent

    [79] The Respondent disagrees with the Applicant’s interpretation of the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision and argues that the Court rejected the arguments that the merger of the PC Party and the Alliance Party attracted application of the common law rule that the unanimous consent of each party member was required for the merger of those parties. Further, the Respondent submits that the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the Act did not require unanimous consent for such merger.

    [80] In conclusion, the Respondent relies on the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal as supporting its view that the decision of the CEO to amend the registry of parties on December 7, 2003, was correct.

    <

    p style=”padding: 2px 6px 4px 6px; color: #555555; background-color: #eeeeee; border: #dddddd 2px solid;”>

    [114] A waiting period of sixty days applies when a political party initially applies for registration. In my view, it is reasonable that a waiting period, albeit a reduced one, will also apply when two registered parties apply for merger.

    [115] It follows, then, that in my opinion, the CEO erred by amending the registry of parties on the same day that the merger application was made and without waiting for thirty days, to ensure that no election writ would be issued, thereby activating the commencement of the prohibited period.

    [116] As noted earlier, the Applicant seeks an order quashing the decision of the CEO and reinstating the PC Party on the registry of parties. Alternatively, the Applicant seeks an order setting aside the decision of December 7, 2003 and referring the matter back to the CEO.

    [117] In my opinion, the remedies sought by the Applicant should not be granted. Pursuant to section 18.1(3) of the Federal Courts Act, supra, the Court has discretion in the matter of granting relief upon an application for judicial review. On occasion, relief has been denied and in this regard, I refer to Mobil Oil Canada Ltd. v. Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board, 1994 CanLII 114 (SCC), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 202.

    [118] In the present case, I take judicial notice of the fact that no writ for an election was issued in the thirty days following December 7, 2003. In the result, the CEO’s action in immediately amending the registry of parties, although contrary to my interpretation of the Act, had no material effect. In the exercise of my discretion, I decline to grant the relief sought.

    [119] The application for judicial review is dismissed. However, the Applicant has raised a valid point and is entitled to his assessed costs under Column III.

                                             <center>  ORDER</center>
    

    IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:
    .
    The application for judicial review is dismissed, the Applicant to have his assessed costs under Column III

    Much the same as with the Ontario Courts. The Court declines to intervene, and rules the merger allowed under the Canada Elections Act.

    8. Stevens v. CPC (Federal Court of Appeal)

    [49]I therefore find that the only interpretation that would give a concrete meaning to the texts in question is the one that requires the Chief Electoral Officer to let 30 days expire once the merger application is received before accepting it. If this was not Parliament’s intention, it is free to correct our vision with a more specific legislative text.

    Exercising discretionary power for judicial review
    [50]Justice Heneghan refused to grant the relief sought despite the fact that the Chief Electoral Officer, by not waiting 30 days before making his decision, violated the Canada Elections Act. Taking judicial notice of the fact that no writ ordering an election was issued in the 30 days following the merger application, she found, at paragraph 118 of her reasons:
    In the result, the CEO’s action in immediately amending the registry of parties, although contrary to my interpretation of the Act, had no material effect. In the exercise of my discretion, I decline to grant the relief sought.

    [51]Justice Heneghan, in my opinion, judiciously exercised the discretion inherent to the power for judicial review. The existence of this discretion is based both on the text of subsection 18.1(3) [as enacted by S.C. 1990, c. 8, s. 5; 2002, c. 8, s. 27] of the Federal Courts Act [R.S.C., 1985, c. F-7 , s. 1 (as am. by S.C. 2002, c. 8, s. 14)] under which the “Federal Court may” [emphasis added] quash the decision of a federal board, commission or tribunal, and on the principles associated with traditional prerogative writs. In this regard, it would be appropriate to return to this long excerpt from Justice Hugessen’s reasons in Schaaf v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, 1984 CanLII 3622 (FCA), [1984] 2 F.C. 334 (C.A.), at pages 342-344, which summarize the basis of this discretion best, with the adaptations required by the new, more explicit formulation of section 18 [as am. by S.C. 1990, c. 8, s. 4; 2002, c. 8, s. 26]:

    In my view, nothing in the words used makes them other than attributive of jurisdiction. They create the power in the Court to set aside decisions which offend in one of the stated ways but do not impose a duty to do so in every case.

    More of the same. The Federal Court can use discretion and choose not to intervene.

    9. Current CPC Leadership Antics

    This is the follow-up to Section #2. Andrew Scheer becomes leader of the Conservative Party of Canada in May 2017, is a surprise (and contested) 13th ballot over Maxime Bernier. However, it soon becomes clear that many people did not want this, and Scheer is undermined within his own party.

    Bernier leaves in August 2018 to start his own party, the bizarrely named “People’s Party of Canada”. He claims that the CPC is no longer conservative, and that he will form an alternative. He also starts adopting populist rhetoric, something he previously hadn’t shown. Interestingly, Bernier spends more time attacking Scheer than the Liberal Party, which is currently in government.

    Curiously, the People’s Party is missing a lot:
    (a) Bernier has never called a leadership campaign
    (b) No policies have ever been voted on
    (c) There is no party constitution
    (d) There are no by-laws, or other governing documents
    (e) There is no national council, or senior board
    (f) The platform was recycled from Bernier’s 2016/17 leadership run

    Critics claim it is a “temporary” party meant to keep the Conservatives from winning, and to get Scheer ejected. Strangely enough, Peter MacKay’s name gets floated as a possible successor should Scheer not become Prime Minister.

    Ultimately, Justin Trudeau did win again, but this time a minority. Despite winning the popular vote and increasing the seat total, Scheer was pressured to resign from the CPC leadership.

    Could MacKay be at it again? Is this another scheme to undermine the will of conservative party members and select the party’s leader? Was the PPC just a psy-op to get rid of Scheer and install another leader instead?

    10. Politics Is Rotten To The Core


    This current fiasco has relevance to the 2003 one for a simple reason: some of the same people are involved in both. Now, could Peter MacKay be up to his old tricks of deceit and backstabbing? Choosing who becomes leader?

    Actually governing people always seems to take a backseat to the infighting, pettiness, and selfishness of the politicians involved. Public servants appear to be anything but.

    Giving your word, even in writing, seems to mean little. Alliances will always give way to self interest.

    Ending (Political) Corporate Welfare

    1. Previous Solutions Offered

    A response that frequently comes up is for people to ask what to do about it. Instead of just constantly pointing out what is wrong, some constructive suggestions should be offered. This section contains a list of proposals that, if implemented, would benefit society. While the details may be difficult to implement, at least they are a starting point.

    2. Important Links

    (1) https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/taxes/income-taxes/corporate/credits/political-contribution
    (2) https://www.leg.bc.ca/parliamentary-business/legislation-debates-proceedings/41st-parliament/2nd-session/bills/third-reading/gov03-3
    (3) https://www.elections.ab.ca/parties-and-candidates/forms-and-guides/tax-credits/
    (4) https://www.elections.sk.ca/candidates-political-parties/electoral-finance/contributions/
    (5) https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/winnipeg-election-donation-rebate-1.4587966
    (6) https://ipolitics.ca/2018/02/16/loss-per-vote-subsidy-still-hurting-ndps-pockets/

    3. Context For The Article

    It has been in the news a lot lately: the idea of scrapping corporate welfare. This notion is based on the simple concept that taxpayers shouldn’t have to subsidize businesses which privatize the profits.

    While this is certainly valid, let’s expand that idea. Why are taxpayers forced to subsidize the voting preferences of people who donate to political candidates or parties? If a person wishes to support their local candidates, that is their choice. But how come the public has to provide tax breaks?

    Whatever happened to personal responsibility?
    Your donation should come from your wallet.
    Practice what you preach.

    And no, this article is not directed at any one party or politician. “ALL” parties and candidates should be forced to be self-sufficient. Stop reaching into the public purse to finance your campaigns.

    4. Proposal In Winnipeg

    Mayor Brian Bowman wants to end the practice of rebating Winnipeg election-campaign donations in a move one critic describes as a means of providing another advantage to incumbent candidates.

    Bowman said in a notice of motion the city could save $700,000 by eliminating the rebates, stating “it is undesirable to fund election campaign expenses” and candidates should “solicit financial support from donors based on the strength of their platform rather than relying on taxpayer funds.

    To be fair, there is some valid criticism that this will favour incumbents who are effectively able to campaign while under the pretext of doing their jobs.

    However, taxpayers shouldn’t be forced help finance voting preferences. People who wish to make donations are free to do, but should use their own money. If a party platform is so unappealing that it needs taxpayer money to encourage donations, then it probably isn’t a very good one.

    5. Ending The Per-Vote Subsidy

    The NDP still hasn’t adapted to losing access to the per-vote party subsidy cancelled by the Harper government, the party’s treasurer said at the NDP convention in Ottawa Friday.

    The federal Conservatives had phased out the per-vote subsidy by 2015, which was a party financing policy brought about in the Chretien-era that paid out public funds to parties based on their share of the popular vote.

    Party Treasurer Tania Jarzebiak said the party plans to step up its fundraising with a “big push” on monthly giving and will invest more into its fundraising capacity, and has “ambitious plans” to reach an annual revenue target of $10.5 million.

    Stephen Harper was criticized for this move, claiming it was designed to bankrupt smaller parties. It’s probably true, that the move ultimately benefitted the Conservative Party.

    However, he should have ended all subsidies and tax breaks, not just pick and choose. If he truly cared about public money then those tax rebates would have been scrapped as well.

    6. British Columbia

    The credit is calculated as the lesser of:
    1) The total of:
    -75% of contributions up to $100
    -50% of contributions between $100 and $550
    -33 1/3% of contributions in excess of $550
    2) $500

    In B.C. taxpayers are on the hook for up to $500 for each person who contributes to B.C. political parties in a given year.

    7. Alberta

    According to Elections Alberta, the public has to pay up to $1000 in tax refunds to subsidize the voting preferences of people contributing to Provincial Candidates.

    8. Saskatchewan

    Taxpayers in Saskatchewan may be stuck with having to subsidize up to $650 for a resident’s political preferences. Seems that money could be better spent elsewhere.

    9. Some Conclusions

    The above listings are just a few examples of laws which force the public to help fund the donation choices of politically active people.

    To be clear, I do not care whom you support, or what ideology the party or candidate is running on. The concern is that this subsidy amounts to corporate welfare, which we should not be paying. If the only way a person or party is able to finance a campaign is by bailouts with public money, then it probably isn’t very strong to begin with.

    One final note: the common practice of “advertising” using taxpayer money is also abhorrent. True, incumbents do have an advantage in their ability to make announcements and fund plans to boost their image. That is not to be condoned either.

    IMM #2(D): Replacement Migration In Canada Since 2004

    (From 2018 Report to Parliament)

    1. Mass LEGAL Immigration In Canada

    Despite what many think, LEGAL immigration into Canada is actually a much larger threat than illegal aliens, given the true scale of the replacement that is happening. What was founded as a European (British) colony is becoming unrecognizable due to forced demographic changes. There are also social, economic, environmental and voting changes to consider. See this Canadian series, and the UN programs for more detail. Politicians, the media, and so-called “experts” have no interest in coming clean on this.

    CLICK HERE, for UN Genocide Prevention/Punishment Convention.
    CLICK HERE, for Barcelona Declaration & Kalergi Plan.
    CLICK HERE, for UN Kalergi Plan (population replacement).
    CLICK HERE, for UN replacement efforts since 1974.
    CLICK HERE, for tracing steps of UN replacement agenda.

    Note: If there are errors in calculating the totals, please speak up. Information is of no use to the public if it isn’t accurate.

    2. Important Links

    2004.annual.immigration.report.to.parliament
    2005.annual.immigration.report.to.parliament
    2006.annual.immigration.report.to.parliament
    2007.annual.immigration.report.to.parliament
    2008.annual.immigration.report.to.parliament
    2009.annual.immigration.report.to.parliament
    2010.annual.immigration.report.to.parliament
    2011.annual.immigration.report.to.parliament
    2012.annual.immigration.report.to.parliament
    2013.annual.immigration.report.to.parliament
    2014.annual.immigration.report.to.parliament
    2015.annual.immigration.report.to.parliament
    2016.annual.immigration.report.to.parliament
    2017.annual.immigration.report.to.parliament
    2018.annual.immigration.report.to.parliament
    2019.annual.immigration.report.to.parliament

    CLICK HERE, for archived listings.

    CLICK HERE, for earlier piece on immigration rates in 2017.
    CLICK HERE, for CDN immigration at 1M/year.
    CLICK HERE, for more detail on replacement migration.

    3. Quote From 2007 Report (Page 3)

    Canada has one of the largest and best-known permanent immigration programs in the world, with approximately 250,000 new immigrants coming to this country each year. In addition to these newcomers, a further 200,000 temporary foreign workers and international students come to Canada to help respond to labour-market needs, support Canadian businesses and influence our culturally diverse communities.

    Balancing the economic, family-reunification and refugee components of our immigration program, Canada welcomed over 251,000 newcomers in 2006. In 2008, we expect to welcome somewhere in the range of 240,000 to 265,000 newcomers.

    This is important for a very simple reason: disclosure. We are told that the rate during this time has been about 250,000 people. But it’s not. The majority of so-called “temporary” worker and student positions want to remain in Canada. This results in a doubling of the actual immigration rate, if not more.

    Live-in Caregiver Program The Live-in Caregiver Program allows Canadian families to hire temporary workers from abroad to provide live-in home care to a child, an elderly person or individuals with disabilities when there is a demonstrated shortage of workers already in Canada who are able to fill available positions. In 2013, 4,671 TFWs were admitted under this program. Caregivers first come to Canada on a temporary basis and become eligible to apply for permanent residence in Canada after working for two years as a live-in caregiver. In 2013, CIC admitted 8,797 live-in caregivers for permanent residence.

    Also worth noting in the 2014, live-in caregiver is a pathway to PR program.

    4. Information On “Diversity” Rates

    The diversity in data recording systems and legislation makes international migration statistics difficult to compare. However, if immigration is expressed in terms of a foreign-born population, Canada can be compared to the United States and Australia. In 2001, Australia’s foreign-born population was 4,482,000, or 23 percent of its total population. Canada’s was 5,448,485, or 18.4 percent of its total population. The United States had a foreign-born population of 31,811,000, but this high number represented only 11 percent of its total population

    The 2004 report claims that 18.4% of Canada’s population had been born outside of Canada.

    5. Countries Of Origin For PR

    So, where are people coming from? Let’s get a better grasp of the situation.

    (Below: PR, top 10 countries of origin in 2004 Report)

    Rank Country Percent (%)
    #1 China 16.3
    #2 India 11.1
    #3 Pakistan 5.6
    #4 Philippines 5.4
    #5 S. Korea 3.2
    #6 U.S. 2.7
    #7 Iran 2.6
    #8 Romania 2.5
    #9 U.K. & Colonies 2.4
    #10 Sri Lanka 2.0

    (Below: PR, top 10 countries of origin in 2007 Report)

    Rank Country Percent (%)
    #1 China 13.2
    #2 India 12.2
    #3 Philippines 7.0
    #4 Pakistan 4.9
    #5 U.S.A. 4.3
    #6 Iran 2.8
    #7 U.K. 2.6
    #8 S. Korea 2.5
    #9 Colombia 2.3
    #10 France 2.0

    (Below: PR, top 10 countries of origin in 2010 Report)

    Rank Country Percent (%)
    #1 China 12
    #2 Philippines 11
    #3 India 10
    #4 U.S.A 4
    #5 U.K. & Colonies 4
    #6 France 3
    #7 Pakistan 2
    #8 Iran 2
    #9 S. Korea 2
    #10 Morocco 2

    (Below: PR, top 10 countries of origin in 2013 Report)

    Rank Country Percent (%)
    #1 China 12.8
    #2 Philippines 12.7
    #3 India 11.2
    #4 Pakistan 3.9
    #5 U.S.A 3.7
    #6 France 3.2
    #7 Iran 2.5
    #8 U.K. & Colonies 2.5
    #9 Haiti 2.2
    #10 S. Korea 2.1

    (Below: PR, top 10 countries of origin in 2016 Report)

    Rank Country Percent (%)
    #1 Philippines 18.7
    #2 India 14.5
    #3 China 7.2
    #4 Iran 4.3
    #5 Pakistan 4.2
    #6 Syria 3.6
    #7 U.S.A. 3.0
    #8 France 2.0
    #9 U.K. & Colonies 2.0
    #10 Nigeria 2.0

    Note: Just to clarify, the report year actually references the total entries made in the year prior. Example, 2015 report actually covers 2014 totals.

    6. “Official” Government Numbers

    Report Year Numbers
    2004 221,352
    2005 235,824
    2006 262,236
    2007 251,649
    2008 236,758
    2009 247,243
    2010 252,179
    2011 280,681
    2012 248,748
    2013 257,887
    2014 258,953
    2015 260,404
    2016 271,845
    2017 296,346
    2018 331,226

    Note: Just to clarify, the report year actually references the total entries made in the year prior. Example, 2015 report actually covers 2014 totals.

    7. “Temporary” Foreign Workers

    Report Year Numbers
    2004 82,151
    2005 90,668
    2006 99,146
    2007 112,658
    2008 165,198
    2009 192,519
    2010 178,478
    2011 182,276
    2012 190,842
    2013 213,573
    2014 221,310
    2015 95,086
    2016 73,016
    2017 78,402
    2018 78,788

    Note: Just to clarify, the report year actually references the total entries made in the year prior. Example, 2015 report actually covers 2014 totals.

    Note: For 2016-2018 there is a discrepancy between the reports and the 2018 charts. The 2018 chart is used as it is the latest, and likely most accurate.

    Temporary Foreign Workers spiked under the Conservatives. They sure seem to love their cheap foreign labour.

    8. Student Visas Issued

    Report Year Numbers
    2004 61,293
    2005 56,536
    2006 57,476
    2007 61,703
    2008 64,636
    2009 79,509
    2010 85,140
    2011 96,157
    2012 98,383
    2013 104,810
    2014 111,865
    2015 127,698
    2016 219,143
    2017 265,111
    2018 317,328

    Note: Just to clarify, the report year actually references the total entries made in the year prior. Example, 2015 report actually covers 2014 totals.

    9. International Mobility Program

    Report Year Numbers
    2004 included
    2005 included
    2006 included
    2007 included
    2008 included
    2009 included
    2010 included
    2011 included
    2012 included
    2013 included
    2014 included
    2015 197,924
    2016 175,967
    2017 207,829
    2018 224,033

    Note: Just to clarify, the report year actually references the total entries made in the year prior. Example, 2015 report actually covers 2014 totals.

    Split Up Of TFWP

    To offer greater clarity and transparency, the current TFWP is being reorganized and new International Mobility Programs (IMPs) are being created. The TFWP will now refer to those streams under which foreign workers enter Canada at the request of employers following approval through a new Labour Market Impact Assessment (LMIA). The new IMPs will incorporate those streams in which foreign nationals are not subject to an LMIA, and whose primary objective is to advance Canada’s broad economic and cultural national interest, rather than filling particular jobs. These reorganized programs will improve accountability, with Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC) being the lead department for the TFWP, and Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) the lead department for the IMPs. In addition, ESDC will publicly post data on the number of positions for temporary foreign workers approved through the TFWP on a quarterly basis, and will post the names of corporations that receive permission to hire temporary foreign workers through LMIAs.

    Source is right here.

    In 2014, 95,086 individuals were admitted to Canada under the TFW Program and 197,924 under the International Mobility Program. In addition, 46,520 TFW Program and International Mobility Program work permit holders transitioned to permanent residence under an Economic Class program.

    In case anyone has any doubts, International Mobility Program “does” have a pathway to permanent residence.

    10. Total “Temporary” Categories

    Report Year Numbers
    2004 143,444
    2005 147,204
    2006 156,622
    2007 174,361
    2008 229,834
    2009 272,028
    2010 263,618
    2011 278,433
    2012 289,225
    2013 318,383
    2014 333,175
    2015 420,708
    2016 468,126
    2017 551,342
    2018 620,149

    DISCLAIMER: It is true that not all TFW, students and International Mobility Program participants will stay. Many will leave. But a lot will either transition into permanent resident, or find another way to stay in Canada.

    11. Stated V.S. Actual Intake

    Report Year Stated Imm Temporary Actual Imm
    2004 221,352 143,444 364,796
    2005 235,824 147,204 383,028
    2006 262,236 156,622 418,858
    2007 251,649 174,361 426,010
    2008 236,758 229,834 466,592
    2009 247,243 272,028 519,271
    2010 252,179 263,618 515,797
    2011 280,681 278,433 559,114
    2012 248,748 289,225 537,973
    2013 257,887 318,383 576,270
    2014 258,953 333,175 592,128
    2015 260,404 420,708 681,112
    2016 271,845 468,126 739,971
    2017 296,346 551,342 847,688
    2018 331,226 620,149 951,375

    Note: Just to clarify, the report year actually references the total entries made in the year prior. Example, 2015 report actually covers 2014 totals.

    Note: The International Mobility Program was operational prior to 2014, but was not specifically mentioned in the “temporary” category.

    12. CPC Supports Temps Becoming PR

    Official policy of the Conservative Party of Canada is to transition “temporary” workers into permanent residents wherever possible. Furthermore, party policy is to endorse CANZUK, the globalist free-movement agreement which will erase borders between as many as 50 nations.

    Currently, there are no specific policies to address immigration rates in 2019.

    13. PPC Doesn’t Address This

    Thing is: immigration was NEVER ~250,000/year when Harper was PM. With all of the “temporary” groups which lead to permanent resident status, it has always been double that. After 3 years of campaigning on Harper-level immigration, Bernier has decided to “reduce from 350K to 100-150K. But again, immigration levels aren’t 250-350K, so this pledge must be taken with an ounce of salt.

    14. Some Do Address True Rates

    (Stephen Garvey, of National Citizens Alliance, is willing to address the full scale of mass migration into Canada)

    Honourable mention to Rants Derek, Immigration Watch Canada, and Spencer Fernando. Faith Goldy, did address it, but the video has since been taken down.

    15. Final Thoughts

    This is an unpleasant subject to cover, but it has to be done. People need to know the full truth about the replacement agenda going on in Canada.

    Worth noting, that each of these reports to parliament includes a lengthy preamble about multiculturalism and diversity. However, it never talks about cohesiveness and a common culture. It is a common IDENTITY that bonds people (race, culture, ethnicity, language, religion, customs, heritage, etc….). Civic nationalism, or VALUES based societies, are doomed to crumble.

    While TFW were much higher under the CPC, the Liberals have decided to crank up the student visas and begin issuing more International Mobility Visas. Guess globalists have their preferences.

    Conservatism and Libertarianism are globalist ideologies. So arguing over who is the “real” conservative or libertarian serves no real purpose.

    It’s difficult to swallow that the aim of these policies is to break up the country along ethnic and cultural lines. But it’s the most logical explanation.

    The real immigration rates need to be discussed openly. It’s not 250,000 under Harper, and it’s not 350,000 under Trudeau. You are being lied to.

    Response From Elections Canada Questions

    Below is the response from July 5, 2019 email


    Thank you for your correspondence dated July 5, 2019, in which you seek clarification on four distinct federal election topics. Please note that we cannot provide legal advice regarding specific factual situations. We can, however, provide guidance with respect to general principles of the Canada Elections Act (Act), which may be of assistance with your enquiries.

    1. Voter Identification

    In 2007, Parliament imposed, for the first-time, voter identification requirements for electors voting at the polls, giving them three options (see s. 143 of the Act):

    1. provide one piece of identification issued by a Canadian government or agency (federal, provincial, or local) that includes their name, address, and photo (e.g. driver’s licence);

    2. provide two pieces of identification from a list authorized by the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada (CEO), both of which must include the elector’s name and at least one of which includes their address; or

    3. swear an oath or affirmation and be vouched for by another eligible elector with acceptable proof of identity and residence whose name appeared on the electoral list for that polling division and who had not previously either been vouched for or vouched for another elector in that election, prior to receiving a ballot.

    In 2014, Bill C-23, An Act to amend the Canada Elections Act and other Acts and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts, replaced the vouching process (the third option above) with a new attestation process. Through attestation, an elector could provide two pieces of identification, each of which established the elector’s name, and have someone attest to their residence on oath in writing. The attestor’s name had to appear on the list of electors for the same polling division. The attestor had to know the elector personally, know that the elector resides in the polling division and be able to prove his or her own identity and residence without attestation. The attestor could not attest to the residence of another person. Both the elector and the attestor had to receive oral advice from the person who administered their oath of the penalty that may be imposed for contravention of the attestation rules.

    Bill C-76, the Elections Modernization Act, which came into force on June 13, 2019, reinstated vouching as a way for an elector who has no identification to prove identity and address. The person being vouched for does not require a piece of identification, however the elector vouching for them does. The elector must solemnly declare in writing that he or she resides at the address at which he or she claims to reside, ii) is at least 18 years old or will be on polling day, iii) is a Canadian citizen and iv) has not previously voted in the election. Anyone vouching for the elector must sign a written solemn declaration providing that i) they know the elector; ii) the elector resides in the polling division; iii) to the best of their knowledge the elector has not previously voted at the election; iv) the voucher is a Canadian citizen when the other elector votes; v) the voucher has not vouched for the residence of another elector at the election (an exception applies in institutions where seniors or persons with a disability reside); vi) their own residence has not been vouched for by another elector at the election. Warnings must still be provided to both the voucher and the person being vouched for as to the potential penal consequences for making a false declaration, voting or attempting to vote at an election knowing they are not qualified, or committing a vouching offence, although these warnings can now be provided in writing, and do not have to be read out at the polls.

    2. Vote by Canadian citizens residing outside Canada

    On January 11, 2019, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled in Frank v. Canada (Attorney General) that a Canadian elector, living abroad, who has previously resided in Canada, is entitled to vote by special ballot in federal elections regardless of how long they have been living abroad (see ss. 220-230 of the Act).

    Elections Canada maintains a register of electors who are residing outside Canada. Electors may register by sending Elections Canada an Application for Registration and Special Ballot form.
    The elector’s completed application must be received by Elections Canada in Ottawa no later than 6:00 p.m., Eastern Time, on the Tuesday before polling day. The application may be sent by fax and be accompanied by a photocopy of proof of identity (a copy – of pages 2 and 3 – of a Canadian passport, a birth or baptismal certificate attesting that the elector was born in Canada, or a Canadian citizenship certificate or card).

    Once the elector’s application is approved, Elections Canada sends a voting kit to the elector. The elector then completes the ballot and inserts it into a series of envelopes in accordance with the instructions provided and ensures that Elections Canada receives it no later than 6:00 p.m., Eastern Time, on polling day in order to be counted. On one of these envelopes, the elector signs a declaration that states that the elector’s name is as shown on the envelope, and that he or she has not already voted and will not attempt to vote again in the election.

    3. Social Media

    You ask if the government should be looking into social media influence. This is an issue best addressed by Parliament’s legislative branch. Elections Canada is a neutral agent of Parliament that operates independently of the government. We invite you to write to your local Member of Parliament for further information on this matter.

    Please note that Parliament recently added new provisions to the Act that define online platforms and impose obligations on them with respect to digital ad registries. Elections Canada (EC) has recently issued an online guide entitled New Registry Requirements for Political Ads on Online Platforms to assist online platforms in complying with the new requirements. The Act also requires certain ads placed by parties, candidates and third parties to bear tag lines saying who placed the ad (s.320, 349.5, 352 and 429.3). This applies to social media ads.

    Bill C-76 also clarified and expanded existing provisions against some kinds of online impersonation, misleading publications as well as false statements about candidates (see ss. 91, 480.1 and 481).

    Elections Canada’s role is to ensure that Canadians have easy access to accurate information about the voting process, including where, when, and how to register and vote. We will be monitoring the social media environment to enable us to rapidly correct any inaccurate information about the voting process. We have created an online repository of all of our public communications, so that citizens and journalists can verify if information that appears to be coming from Elections Canada truly is.

    4. Cash-for-Access

    Bill C-50, An Act to amend the Canada Elections Act (political financing), came into force on December 21, 2018. This bill introduces notice and reporting requirements for certain regulated fundraising events. The bill does not prohibit cash-for-access types of fundraisers, but it makes certain types of fundraisers subject to the scrutiny of the public or the media.

    First, the fundraising activity must be organized for the benefit of a party represented in the House of Commons, or one of its affiliated political entities. Second, the activity must be attended by a leader, a leadership contestant, or a cabinet minister. Third, it must be attended by at least one person who has contributed over $200, or who has paid an amount of more than $200 that includes a contribution to attend.

    If the fundraising event meets these conditions, two types of disclosure are required. First, notice of the event must be prominently posted on a party’s website for five days before it takes place. Second, a report must be provided by the party to the Chief Electoral Officer within 30 days of the fundraiser. During a general election, notice of fundraisers would not be required, and a single report for all fundraising events held during the election would be due within 60 days after polling day.

    For more on this topic, we invite you to view Elections Canada’s online Guideline on Regulated Fundraising Events.

    I trust that the above information is of assistance and thank you for your interest in the federal electoral process.

    For more information about the Canadian federal electoral system, visit our website at elections.ca or call 1-800-463-6868, toll-free in Canada and the United States. Our hours of operation are from Monday to Friday, 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. (Eastern Time).

    Public Enquiries Unit
    Elections Canada

    SNC-Lavalin: Lobbying The Entire Legislature For Deferred Prosecution

    1. Important Links

    Previous Coverage:
    CLICK HERE, for deferred prosecution agreement, Bill C-74.
    CLICK HERE, for SNC Lavalin’s political connections.
    CLICK HERE, for David Lametti, the AG who freed SNC-Lavalin, in return for a $200M kickback to McGill University.

    CLICK HERE, for the Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying in Canada.

    2. SNC-Lavalin Lobbied David Lametti Personally

    CLICK HERE, for the report associated with the meeting between David Lametti and SNC Lavalin.That’s right. On May 30, 2017, almost 2 years before becoming Attorney General of Canada, David Lametti met with SNC-Lavalin over exactly this issue. The company was looking to have the laws changed regarding so-called “white collar crime”.

    3. SNC-Lavalin Lobbied Gerald Butts

    CLICK HERE, for the report. On February 23, 2017, Trudeau’s Chief of Staff, Gerald Butts, met with SNC-Lavalin to discuss the possibility of a deferred prosecution agreement, which would have allowed SNC to keep getting Canadian Government contracts.

    4. SNC-Lavalin Lobbied Finance Minister Bill Morneau

    CLICK HERE, for the report. On October 16, 2018, SNC-Lavalin lobbied the sitting Finance Minister, Bill Morneau. One of the topics discussed was the creation of alternatives for white collar crime, or the DPA.

    5. Privy Council Clerk Michael Wernick Lobbied

    CLICK HERE, for the report. Lavalin actually lobbied the Clerk of the Privy Council, Michael Wernick, in the hopes of getting the DPA.

    Also worth noting is that there is a HUGE conflict of interest here. Kevin Lynch, Chairman of SNC-Lavalin, among other roles, was Clerk of the Privy Council. He clearly still has access to the Council. (Taken from his BMO profile.)

    6. SNC-Lavalin Lobbied Group Of MPs

    CLICK HERE, for the report of the meeting. As before, one common item keeps coming up: changes to policies regarding white collar crime (a.k.a. the deferred prosecution agreement).

    One thing that needs to be mentioned: Peter Van Loan is a CONSERVATIVE Member of Parliament. So much for this being a Liberal-only problem.

    7. CONSERVATIVE Senator Larry Smith Lobbied

    CLICK HERE, for the report. Lavalin has actually taken to lobbying at least one Conservative Senator.

    8. List Of Public Figures Lobbied (DPA)

    (Source is here.)
    Dean Allison, Member of Parliament | House of Commons
    Omar Alghabra, Parliamentary Secretary | Global Affairs Canada (GAC)
    Navdeep Bains, Minister | Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada (ISED)
    Simon Beauchemin, Advisor | Prime Minister’s Office (PMO)
    Stefanie Beck, Assistant Deputy Minister | Global Affairs Canada (GAC)
    Karl Belanger, Chief of Staff | Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC)
    Mathieu Belanger, Director of Policy | Infrastructure Canada (INFC)
    Susan Bincoletto, Assistant Deputy Minister and Chief Trade Commissioner | Global Affairs Canada (GAC)
    Michael Binder, President and Chief Executive Officer | Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC)
    Richard Botham, Assistant Deputy Minister | Finance Canada (FIN)
    Mathieu Bouchard, Senior Advisor | Prime Minister’s Office (PMO)
    Scott Brison, Member of Parliament | House of Commons
    Gianluca Cairo, Chief of Staff | Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada (ISED)
    Rebecca Caldwell, Chief of Staff | Status of Women Canada (SWC)
    Zoe Caron, Chief of Staff | Natural Resources Canada (NRCan)
    Celina Cesar-Chavannes, Member of Parliament | House of Commons
    Francois-Philippe Champagne, Minister of Infrastructure and Communities | Infrastructure Canada (INFC)
    Jim Carr, Minister | Global Affairs Canada (GAC)
    Ben Chin, Chief of Staff | Finance Canada (FIN)
    Brian Clow, Director | Prime Minister’s Office (PMO)
    Martin Crevier, Legislative Assistant to Peter Schiefke | House of Commons
    Roger Cuzner, Member of Parliament | House of Commons
    Kathleen Davis, Special Assistant | Prime Minister’s Office (PMO)
    Bernie Derible, Senior Policy Advisor | Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC)
    Rebecca Dixon, Advisor | Senate of Canada
    Percy Downe, Senator | Senate of Canada
    Scott Driscoll, Vice President and Chief Compliance and Ethics | Export Development Canada (EDC)
    Pierre-Luc Dusseault, Member of Parliament | House of Commons
    Mark Eyking, Member of Parliament | House of Commons
    Greg Fergus, Member of Parliament | House of Commons
    Marc Fortin, Assistant Deputy Minister | Infrastructure Canada (INFC)
    Kelly Gillis, Deputy Minister | Infrastructure Canada (INFC)
    Mark Glauser, Director General | Global Affairs Canada (GAC)
    Pamela Goldsmith-Jones, Member of Parliament | House of Commons
    Paul Halucha, Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet | Privy Council Office (PCO)
    Tasha Hanes, Chief of Staff | Finance Canada (FIN)
    Jamie Innes, Director of Parliamentary Affairs | Global Affairs Canada (GAC)
    Diamond Isinger, Special Assistant | Prime Minister’s Office (PMO)
    Phil Jennings, Associate Deputy Minister | Natural Resources Canada (NRCan)
    Stephen Kelly, Chief of Staff | Senate of Canada
    Jay Khosla, Assistant Deputy Minister | Natural Resources Canada (NRCan)
    Jean-Frederique Lafaille, Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet | Privy Council Office (PCO)
    Paul Lefebvre, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Natural Resources | Natural Resources Canada (NRCan)
    Andrew Leslie, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs | Global Affairs Canada (GAC)
    Gavin Liddy, Associate Deputy Minister | Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC)
    Stephen Lucas, Deputy Minister | Environment and Climate Change Canada (ECCC)
    Steve MacKinnon, Member of Parliament | House of Commons
    David Maloney, Member of Parliament | House of Commons
    Elder Marques, Senior Advisor | Prime Minister’s Office (PMO)
    Brian Masse, Member of Parliament | House of Commons
    Remi Masse, Member of Parliament | House of Commons
    John McCallum, Ambassador of Canada to the People’s Republic of China | Global Affairs Canada (GAC)
    David McGovern, Associate Deputy Minister | Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada (ISED)
    Duane McMullen, Director General | Global Affairs Canada (GAC)
    Michael McNair, Executive Director | Prime Minister’s Office (PMO)
    David McNaughton, Ambassador of Canada to the United States | Global Affairs Canada (GAC)
    Marc Miller, Member of Parliament | House of Commons
    Grant Mitchell, Senator | Senate of Canada
    Martin Moen, Director General | Global Affairs Canada (GAC)
    Renze Nauta, Director of Policy and Planning | House of Commons
    Kyle Nicholson, Special Assistant, Policy | Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC)
    Julian Ovens, Chief of Staff | Global Affairs Canada (GAC)
    Tracey Ramsey, Member of Parliament | House of Commons
    Phil Rheault, Senior Policy Advisor | Global Affairs Canada (GAC)
    Paul Rochon, Deputy Minister | Finance Canada (FIN)
    Kim Rudd, Member of Parliament | House of Commons
    Tim Sargent, Deputy Minister | Global Affairs Canada (GAC)
    Dev Saxena, Policy Advisor | Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada (ISED)
    Sandra Schwartz, Senior Policy Advisor | House of Commons
    Andrew Scheer, Leader of the Official Opposition | House of Commons
    Richard Sexton, President and CEO | Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL)
    Judy Sgro, Member of Parliament | House of Commons
    Miguel Simard, General Counsel | Export Development Canada (EDC)
    Jagmeet Singh, Leader of the New Democratic Party of Canada | House of Commons
    Rick Stewart, Assistant Deputy Minister | Finance Canada (FIN)
    Catrina Tapley, Secretary to the Cabinet (Operations) | Privy Council Office (PCO)
    Owen Teo, Director of Policy | Global Affairs Canada (GAC)
    Justin To, Director of Policy and Policy Advisor | Prime Minister’s Office (PMO)
    Chrystine Tremblay, Deputy Minister | Natural Resources Canada (NRCan)
    Shawn Tupper, Associate Deputy Minister | Natural Resources Canada (NRCan)
    David Usher, Ambassador of Canada to Argentina | Global Affairs Canada (GAC)
    Michael Wernick, Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to the Cabinet | Privy Council Office (PCO)
    Steve Verheul, Assistant Deputy Minister | Global Affairs Canada (GAC)
    Howard Wetston, Senator | Senate of Canada
    Yuen Pau Woo, Senator | Senate of Canada
    Ava Yaskiel, Associate Deputy Minister | Finance Canada (FIN)
    Martin Zablocki, President and CEO | Canadian Commercial Corporation (CCC)

    I might have missed a few, but this is still pretty extensive.

    To reiterate, all of these meetings took place during the period when SNC-Lavalin was lobbying for a DPA.

    8. Opposition Leader Andrew Scheer Lobbied

    CLICK HERE, for report. On May 29, 2018, Andrew Scheer, Opposition Leader, and supposedly a “Conservative” was also lobbied by SNC-Lavalin. This could explain why he is so open to giving Lavalin the deferred prosecution, in spite of the corruption. He’s controlled as well.

    9. NDP Leader Jagmeet Singh Lobbied By SNC

    CLICK HERE, for the report. Jagmeet Singh, yes the NDP leader, was “also” lobbied by SNC-Lavalin. One of the topics was “changes related to white collar crime”. Of course, this is a euphemism for the DPA (deferred prosecution agreement). Is the entire legislature in on this? Might be, from the number of Senators and MPs involved.

    10. Lobbyists Bruce Hartley & William Pristanski

    Also worth noting, SNC-Lavalin has two professional shills (I mean lobbyists), Bruce Hartley and William Pristanski. Both are lobbying specifically in relation to obtaining a DPA for SNC-Lavalin.

    11. Is This Why Opposition So Tepid?

    It seems that all parties are in on it.

    Is all the bickering in the House of Commons just for show? Does SNC-Lavalin have the entire legislature in their pockets?