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Kirsten Jenkins: Humanizing Sociotechnical Transitions Through Energy Justice

1. Go Check Out Uppity Peasants Site


This is a fairly new site, however, it has some interesting content on it. Well researched, it will give some alternative views on how we are really being controlled. It you haven’t been there, what are you waiting for?

2. About The Authors


CLICK HERE, for the profile of Kirsten Jenkins. Side note: no shocker she has cited Frank Geels.

CLICK HERE, for Benjamin Sovacool.

He is a Lead Author of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s Sixth Assessment Report (AR6), due to be published in 2022, and an Advisor on Energy to the European Commission’s Directorate General for Research and Innovation in Brussels, Belgium.

He has played a leadership role in winning and managing collaborative research grants worth more than $19.6 million, including those from the U.S. Department of Energy, U.S. National Science Foundation, MacArthur Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation, Energy Technology Development and Demonstration Program of Denmark, the Danish Council for Independent Research, and the European Commission. In the United Kingdom, he has served as a Principal Investigator on projects funded by the Economic and Social Research Council, Natural Environment Research Council, and the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council.

CLICK HERE, for Darren McCauley.

3. The Paper Itself

Humanizing sociotechnical transitions through energy justice: An ethical framework for global transformative change
Kirsten Jenkins, Benjamin K. Sovacool, Darren McCauley

Not even kidding. That is the title of the paper.

ABSTRACT
Poverty, climate change and energy security demand awareness about the interlinkages between energy systems and social justice. Amidst these challenges, energy justice has emerged to conceptualize a world where all individuals, across all areas, have safe, affordable and sustainable energy that is, essentially, socially just. Simultaneously, new social and technological solutions to energy problems continually evolve, and interest in the concept of sociotechnical transitions has grown. However, an element often missing from such transitions frameworks is explicit engagement with energy justice frameworks. Despite the development of an embryonic set of literature around these themes, an obvious research gap has emerged: can energy justice and transitions frameworks be combined? This paper argues that they can. It does so through an exploration of the multi-level perspective on sociotechnical systems and an integration of energy justice at the model’s niche, regime and landscape level. It presents the argument that it is within the overarching process of sociotechnical change that issues of energy justice emerge. Here, inattention to social justice issues can cause injustices, whereas attention to them can provide a means to examine and potential resolve them

This article is the first time I have encountered the term “energy justice”. Rather than simply dealing with a problem in a scientific and factual way, the authors add some social-justice element to it. The abstract doesn’t really explain how this works. Hopefully the body will.

Thus, it calls for greater engagement with the three-tenet energy justice approach (distributional justice, procedural justice and justice as recognition) when planning for more sustainable transitions.

Energy justice apparently consists of:

  • Distributional justice
  • Procedural justice
  • Justice as recognition

Okay, but that doesn’t really explain what it is.

Amidst serious sustainability challenges, transitions frameworks have evolved to either conceptualize or facilitate decarbonised energy systems that provide both security of supply and universal access to energy; a process that it is widely acknowledged will require new ways of producing, living and working with energy (Bridge et al., 2013; Heffron and McCauley, 2018; IEA, 2008; Mernier, 2007). In aiming to implement sociotechnical solutions, governments are increasingly utilising the language of transitions, and the concept has begun to feature in the energy policies of countries including Denmark, Switzerland and the United Kingdom (UK)

Some points that should be addressed:

  • They are quite blunt (and proud it seems) that their language is filtering into government activity.
  • Provide universal supply of energy? Is this meant to be some sort of socialist or communist idea?
  • Has it sunk in that if you remove all Carbon forms of energy that it will reduce supply, and make your universal supply harder to obtain?
  • When you say a “new way of living”, does this mean reducing the standard of living in the West to ensure that everyone has access to the same amount of energy?

Yet despite ongoing debates about ethics or justice across many fields of literature (including extended discussions between antagonist camps that have gone on across the history of political philosophy), one social element missing from transitions frameworks is explicit, practice oriented engagement with the energy justice concept and related approaches to justice concerns. Eames and Hunt (2013) draw attention to the fact that considerations of equity and justice are underrepresented within the sociotechnical transitions literature and the wider energy transitions debate, despite the fact that the concept of sustainable development, the target of many transition plans, is inherently rooted in these core notions (Hopwood et al., 2005). Transitions literatures can also fail to give due consideration to issues of landscape, health and existing property values too (Jefferson, 2017).

More points to be looked at:

  • This seems a shameless attempt to turn what is supposed to be an environmental issue into a “social justice”, and hence blur the lines.
  • “Equity and justice” and terms that need to be rammed into discussions.
  • It appears that including “social justice” would be a way to better market their ideas. They don’t seem to make an actual connection though.
  • If a platform needs to latch on to overused buzzwords to sell itself, then it’s probably not a very good platform.

Failure to adequately engage with questions of justice throughout the transition process is dangerous. It may lead to aggravated poverty, entrenched gender bias and non-participation as outcomes or by-products of ‘blinkered’ decision-making. Indeed, without a focus on justice, transitions may fail to acknowledge the burdens of having too much energy, such as waste, over-consumption and pollution, or from not having enough, where some individuals lack access, are challenged by under-consumption and poverty, and may face health burdens and shortened lives as a consequence of restricted energy choices (Sovacool et al.,2016a). This paper therefore utilizes the energy justice concept as a way of engaging with these ethical dilemmas within pre-existing transitions frameworks.

More nonsense which requires a response:

  • There is an obsession with redefining terms to suit an agenda.
  • This is energy we are talking about, not poverty, gender bias, or non-participation. That’s right, they really played the “gender” card here.
  • Burden of having too much? Can I assume the solution is to force sharing? Or rather, to force “rich” nations to hand over energy supplies?
  • Engaging with these ethical dilemmas? You haven’t demonstrated any sort of cause and effect yet.

The origins of the energy justice literature is largely reported as coming from activist accounts of energy issues using the environmental justice frame – a precursor to the energy justice concept which shares overlapping philosophical groundings

That’s right. A bunch of activists made this up.

Specifically, as environmental justice is commonly defined as the distribution of environmental hazards and access to all natural resources; it includes equal protection from burdens, meaningful involvement in decisions, and fair treatment in access to benefits……….. This approach forms the basis of the energy justice approach and framework. However, mentions of its core notions also appear elsewhere, including in the guise of the “three A’s” of availability, accessibility and affordability

It reads like the sort of nonsense one would get in a gender studies class. Only thing is that “energy” is being substituted for here.

note in this regard, that even ‘a “low-carbon” transition has the potential to distribute its costs and benefits just as unequally [as historical fossil-based transitions] without governance mindful of distributional justice’ or, as an extension, without attention to the issues of justice as recognition and due process–energy justice tenets we explore below. We argue that the energy justice concept provides one way of filling this gap.

Here, we get into some straight up Communism. Is it true that costs and benefits don’t impact everyone equally? Yes. However, there is no practical way to do this. Either you would have to forcefully arrange differences in benefits and costs to “make things right”, or you would have to alter everyone’s standard of living so that they were equal.

Guess the road to Hell could use a re-paving.

Throughout, we present three main claims, each coinciding with a level in the MLP model; the niche, regime, and landscape:

(1) That the energy justice concept can expose exclusionary and/or inclusionary technological and social niches before they develop, leading to potentially new and socially just innovation;

(2) That in addition to using the MLP to describe regimes, the energy justice framework provides a way for these actors to normatively judge them, potentially destabilising existing regimes using moral criteria;

(3) That framing energy justice as a matter of priority at the landscape level could exert pressure on the regime below, leading to the widespread reappraisal of our energy choices, and integration of moral criteria.

(1) Sounds like a way to vilify or outcast technology that is scientifically sound, because it doesn’t meet their criteria.
(2) Appears to be a method of using peer pressure and social pressure as a way of destabilizing systems.
(3) Comes across as more overt propaganda.

This governance focus means that the socio-technical literature increasingly acknowledges the political dynamics related to the process through which innovations scale, diffuse or entrench. We focus here on the most prominent socio-technical transitions framework, the multi-level perspective (MLP). The MLP takes the form of a series of nested levels, the niche, regime, and landscape

Nothing scientific. Purely political manoeuvering.

Analysis through the energy justice lens reveals that although electric vehicles (EVs) do have laudable environmental (and social) attributes, they can be exclusionary in the sense that they can perpetuate already widening gaps between the wealthy and poor, as well as potentially raising new forms and geographies of injustice – distributional and justice as recognition concerns.

I thought the point was protecting the environment. But here, they talk about how electric cars will not impact everyone equally, even if they do have considerable environmental benefits. Again, is this an argument in favour of socialism or communism?

Equal opportunity v.s. equal outcome.

In addition to applications in niches, the energy justice framework can support the current role of the MLP to describe regimes by providing a means for policy actors to normatively judge them—exposing unjust practices and resultantly, increasing regime ‘humanisation’. We illustrate this first through the exploration of nuclear power and hydroelectric power production, regimes in which there is some consensus that technological development and lock-in raises issues of justice, or injustice. We identify that the metrics, frameworks, or checklists presented above – as well as the three-tenet framework of energy justice more generally – provide a means of normatively judging both planned and current energy and future sociotechnical regimes, leading to potential re-evaluation of our energy selection criteria. These approaches also recognise the need to politicise the actualisation of energy justice itself.

Finally some honesty. This is a political agenda.

And working to “humanize” a movement? What happened to simply relying on scientific consensus?

4. Conclusions From The Paper

Energy decisions are all too frequently made in a moral vacuum, culminating in a strong normative case for combining the literature on sociotechnical transitions with concepts arising from energy justice. Moreover, we illustrate that energy justice can play a role at each level of one of the more expansive sociotechnical transitions frameworks, the MLP. Within this latter contribution, (1) the energy justice concept could expose exclusionary niches, (2) provide a means for actors to normatively judge regimes, and (3) through the framing of energy justice at the landscape level foster the reappraisal of our energy choices and integration of moral principles. Across all stages of this argument, we present a case for not only mitigating environmental impacts of energy production via sociotechnical change, but doing so in an ethically defensible, socially just way.

To repeat, this is not about environmental protection. It is about blending a social justice causes and lingo into an unrelated topic.

Our caveats come as recognition of the intricacies of politics and political processes around energy transitions and energy justice. For as Meadowcroft (2009) highlights, long-term change is likely to be even messier and more contested than the transitions literature discusses. Indeed, there are likely to be political aspects that approaches such as the MLP are ill equipped to negotiate, and trade-offs that a tenet approach to energy justice cannot entirely resolve.

This may be the most honest thing they say. Politically, this is a very tough sell. They also admit that there “energy justice” approach will not answer the hard questions.

Nonetheless, they still cover those facts in academic jargon.

5. My Own Thoughts

The authors keep repeating that they are just “framing the issue”. In reality, they are publishing propaganda.

There is nothing scientific that the paper adds. There is no building on previous work, or fact checking of previous research. It is entirely about manipulating people to their cause by pretending it is a “social justice” issue. This is blatant activism, masquerading as science.

I also noticed a lot of overlap with the Frank W. Geels article. Do they merely cite each other, or do they just republish the same articles over and over again?

This environmental movement seems to have a lot of self-inflicted problems. For example, this obsession with “energy justice” and other non-issues actually stonewalls progress that they could have made.

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Frank Geels & Disruptive Innovation Framework

(From actual academic writing: Frank W. Geels)

(More academia: Sustainable Consumption Institute, Manchester University)

(Clayton Christiansen and “Disruptive Innovation” video)

(From the Uppity Peasants site)

1. Go Check Out Uppity Peasants Site


This is a fairly new site, however, it has some interesting content on it. Well researched, it will give some alternative views on how we are really being controlled.
Go check out “Uppity Peasants“.

2. Important Links


CLICK HERE, for the Sustainable Consumption Institute & Manchester Institute of Innovation Research, The University of Manchester, Denmark Road Building, M13 9PL, Manchester, United Kingdom.
CLICK HERE, for Clayton Christiansen and “Disruptive Innovation”.
CLICK HERE, for SCI Collective Action & Social Movements.
CLICK HERE, for SCI Social Inequality.
CLICK HERE, for Multi-Level Perspective on Sustainability.
CLICK HERE, for a Wiki explanation of disruptive innovation.
CLICK HERE, for removing the innovator’s dilemma.

CLICK HERE, for the Climate Change Scam Part I.
CLICK HERE, for Part II, the Paris Accord.
CLICK HERE, for Part III, Saskatchewan Appeals Court Reference.
CLICK HERE, for Part IV, Controlled Opposition to Carbon Tax.
CLICK HERE, for Part V, UN New Development Funding.

3. Quotes From The Geels Article

Disruption and low-carbon system transformation: Progress and new challenges in socio-technical transitions research and the Multi-Level Perspective

This will be elaborated on, but is about subverted the status quo, or “disruption”. Worth pointing out, that although these types of articles are published and marketed as “science”, they are anything but.

As this title would suggest, the article is extremely political. The concern is not about science itself, but how to “sell” the science. And the agenda here is searching for political methods of implementing the transition to a Carbon free

ABSTRACT
This paper firstly assesses the usefulness of Christensen’s disruptive innovation framework for low-carbon system change, identifying three conceptual limitations with regard to the unit of analysis (products rather than systems), limited multi-dimensionality, and a simplistic (‘point source’) conception of change. Secondly, it shows that the Multi-Level Perspective (MLP) offers a more comprehensive framework on all three dimensions. Thirdly, it reviews progress in socio-technical transition research and the MLP on these three dimensions and identifies new challenges, including ‘whole system’ reconfiguration, multi-dimensional struggles, bi-directional niche-regime interactions, and an alignment conception of change. To address these challenges, transition research should further deepen and broaden its engagement with the social scienceseconomy.

The usefulness of Christiansen’s disruptive innovation framework? While used in a business sense, it appears to be a way for entrepreneurs to get into a market or business. However, in this context it is used as disrupting an environmental policy.

It is mildly (or downright) creepy that the author, Frank Geels, openly suggests that research should broaden its engagement with social sciences. In plain English, this means merging, where scientific research is viewed through a “social” lens.

Christiansen’s “Disruptive Innovation Framework” is explained in the above video. Also see “disruption in financial services“.

Christensen [4] made important contributions to the long-standing debate in innovation management about new entrants, incumbents and industry structures. He argued that disruptive innovations enable new entrants to ‘attack from below’ and overthrow incumbent firms. Christensen thus has a particular understanding of disruption, focused mainly on the competitive effects of innovations on existing firms and industry structures. His framework was not developed to address systemic effects or broader transformations, so my comments below are not about the intrinsic merits of the framework, but about their usefulness for low-carbon transitions.

Christensen’s disruptive innovation framework offers several useful insights for low-carbon transitions (although similar ideas can also be found elsewhere). First, it suggests that incumbent firms tend to focus their innovation efforts on sustaining technologies (which improve performance along established criteria), while new entrants tend to develop disruptive technologies (which offer different value propositions). Second, it proposes that disruptive technologies emerge in small peripheral niches, where early adopters are attracted by the technology’s new functionalities. Third, incumbent firms may initially overlook or under-estimate disruptive technologies (because of established beliefs) or are not interested in them, because the limited return on-investments associated with small markets do not fit with existing business models. Fourth, price/performance improvements may enable disruptive technologies to enter larger markets, out-compete existing technologies and overthrow incumbent firms

Worth pointing out right away, Geels has no interest in the “intrinsic merits” of the disruptive innovation framework that Christiansen talks about. Rather, he focuses on applying that technique to reducing/eliminating Carbon emissions from society.

Christiansen’s idea could be applied fairly practically to business, where new players want to establish themselves. However, Geels “weaponizes” this idea and wants to apply it with the climate-change agenda.

Geels also makes it obvious that overthrowing incumbents is a priority. Again, Christiansen’s writings were meant with the business approach, and trying to start your own, but Geels “repurposes” it.

While Christensen’s framework focuses on technical and business dimensions, the MLP also accommodates consumption, cultural, and socio-political dimensions. Although co-evolution has always been a core concept in the MLP, this is even more important for low-carbon transitions, which are goal-oriented or ‘purposive’ in the sense of addressing the problem of climate change. This makes them different from historical transitions which were largely ‘emergent’, with entrepreneurs exploiting the commercial opportunities offered by new technology

[27]. Because climate protection is a public good, private actors (e.g. firms, consumers) have limited incentives to address it owing to free rider problems and prisoner’s dilemmas. This means that public policy must play a central role in supporting the emergence and deployment of low-carbon innovations and changing the economic frame conditions (via taxes, subsidies, regulations, standards) that incentivize firms, consumers and other actors. However, substantial policy changes involve political struggles and public debate because: “[w]hatever can be done through the State will depend upon generating widespread political support from citizens within the context of democratic rights and freedoms” ([28]: 91).

Again, Geels hijacking a legitimate business concept, but using it for his enviro agenda.

How to implement this? Taxes, subsidies, regulations, standards for businesses and consumers. Use these to regulate and influence behaviour.

Geels rightly says that widespread political support will be needed. But he frames the climate change scam as a way to protect rights and freedoms. Nice bait-and-switch.

Conceptually, this means that we should analyse socio-technical transitions as multi-dimensional struggles between niche-innovations and existing regimes. These struggles include: economic competition between old and new technologies; business struggles between new entrants and incumbents; political struggles over adjustments in regulations, standards, subsidies and taxes; discursive struggles over problem framings and social acceptance; and struggles between new user practices and mainstream ones.

Despite Geels’ article being published in the Journal, “ENERGY RESEARCH AND SOCIAL SCIENCE”, this anything but scientific. If anything, it seems analogous to the “lawfare” that Islamic groups perpetuate on democratic societies.

While Geels promotes economic competition, this is anything but a fair competition. He also calls for:

  • Political struggles over regulations
  • New standards
  • Subsidies
  • Taxes
  • Discursive struggles over problem framings & social acceptance
  • Struggles between new and mainstream user practices

There is nothing scientific here. This is a call for using “political” manoeuvering for achieving social goals.

The importance of public engagement, social acceptance and political feasibility is often overlooked in technocratic government strategies and model-based scenarios, which focus on techno-economic dimensions to identify least-cost pathways [32]. In the UK, which is characterized by closed policy networks and top-down policy style, this neglect has led to many problems, which are undermining the low carbon transition.

• Onshore wind experienced local protests and permit problems, leading to negative public discourses and a political backlash, culminating in a post-2020 moratorium.

• Shale gas experienced public controversies after it was pushed through without sufficient consultation.

• Energy-saving measures in homes were scrapped in 2015, after the Green Deal flagship policy(introduced in2013) spectacularly failed, because it was overly complicated and poorly designed, leading to limited uptake.

• The 2006 zero-carbon homes target, which stipulated that all new homes should be carbon-neutral by 2016, was scrapped in 2015, because of resistance by major housebuilders and limited consumer interest.

• The smart meter roll-out is experiencing delays, because of controversies over standards, privacy concerns, and distribution of benefits (between energy companies and consumers).

While these points are in fact true, Geels suggests that problems could have been avoided if there was sufficient public consultation. This is wishful thinking.

These points raise many legitimate concerns with the eco-agenda. Yet Geels shrugs them off as the result of not engaging the public enough.

Christensen and other innovation management scholars typically adopt a ‘point source’ approach to disruption, in which innovators pioneer new technologies, conquer the world, and cause social change. Existing contexts are typically seen as ‘barriers’ to be overcome. This ‘bottom-up’ emphasis also permeates the Strategic Niche Management and Technological Innovation System literatures. While this kind of change pattern does sometimes occur, the MLP was specifically developed to also accommodate broader patterns, in which niche-innovations diffuse because they align with ongoing processes at landscape- or regime-levels [9].

The MLP thus draws on history and sociology of technology, where processual, contextual explanations are common. Mokyr [58], for instance, emphasizes that “The new invention has to be born into a socially sympathetic environment” (p. 292) and that “Macro-inventions are seeds sown by individual inventors in a social soil. (.) But the environment into which these seeds are sown is, of course, the main determinant of whether they will sprout” (p. 299). So, if radical innovations face mis-matches with economic, socio-cultural or political contexts, they may remain stuck in peripheral niches, hidden ‘below the surface’.

Since low-carbon transitions are problem-oriented, transition scholars should not only analyse innovation dynamics, but also ‘issue dynamics’ because increasing socio-political concerns about climate change can lead to changes in regime-level institutions and selection environments. Societal problems or ‘issues’ have their own dynamics in terms of problem definition and socio-political mobilization as conceptualized, for instance, in the issue lifecycle literature [59,50]. Low carbon transitions require stronger ‘solution’ and problem dynamics, and their successful alignment, which is not an easy process, as the examples below show.

These passages go into marketing strategies, and ways to “frame an argument”. Notice not once does Geels suggest doing more research, or checking the reliability of existing data. Instead, this is a push for emotional manipulation and shameless advertising.

Invention has to be born into a socially sympathetic environment. Science be damned.

There are also positive developments, however, that provide windows of opportunity. Coal is losing legitimacy in parts of the world, because it is increasingly framed as dirty, unhealthy and old-fashioned, and because oil and gas companies are distancing themselves from coal, leading to cracks in the previously ‘closed front’ of fossil fuel industries. The UK has committed to phasing out coal-fired power plants by 2025 and several other countries (Netherlands, France, Canada, Finland, Austria) also move in this direction, providing space for low-carbon alternatives, including renewables.

I would actually agree that coal being phased out would benefit society. However, Geels makes it a “marketing” issue rather than a scientific one. Coal is “increasingly framed” as dirty. Notice that the actual science, such as from this site, are very rarely described.

Following chemical reactions takes place in the combustion of coal with the release of heat:
C + O2 = CO2 + 8084 Kcal/ Kg of carbon (33940 KJ/Kg)
S + O2 = SO2 + 2224 Kcal/Kg of sulfur (9141 KJ/Kg)
2 H2 + O2 = 2 H2O + 28922 Kcal/Kg of hydrogen (142670 KJ/Kg)
2C + O2 = 2CO + 2430 Kcal/Kg of carbon (10120 KJ/Kg)

4. Geels’ Conclusions

The paper has also identified several research challenges, where the transitions community could fruitfully do more work. First, we should broaden our analytical attention from singular niche-innovations (which permeate the literature) to ‘whole system’ change. This may involve changes in conceptual imagery (from ‘point source’ disruption to gradual system reconfiguration) and broader research designs, which analyze multiple niche-innovations and their relations to ongoing dynamics in existing systems and regimes. That, in turn, may require more attention for change mechanisms like add-on, hybridisation, modular component substitution, knock-on effects, innovation cascades, multi regime interaction.

Second, we should better understand regime developments. Existing regimes can provide formidable barriers for low-carbon transitions. Incumbent actors can resist, delay or derail low-carbon transitions, but they can also accelerate them if they reorient their strategies and resources towards niche-innovations. The analysis of niche-to-regime dynamics (as in the niche empowerment literature) should thus be complemented with regime-to-niche dynamics, including incumbent resistance or reorientation. Additionally, we need more nuanced conceptualizations and assessments of degrees of lock-in, tensions, cracks, and destabilisation.

Third, we need greater acknowledgement that socio-technical systems are a special unit of analysis, which spans the social sciences and can be studied through different lenses and at different levels. The recent trend towards deepening our understanding of particular dimensions and societal groups is tremendously fruitful, because disciplinary theories offer more specific causal mechanisms. But, as a community, we should complement this with broad analyses of co-evolution, alignment, multi-dimensionality and ‘whole systems’.

This all sounds elegant, but read between the lines. It is about influencing public perception. Whenever academics, lawyers or politicians seem to make things confusing we need to ask: are they trying to obscure their goals?

5. More About Frank W. Geels

Selected publications of Geels
If you would like a broader cross section of Geels’ work, perhaps these publications will be of interest.

  • Geels, F.W., Berkhout, F. and Van Vuuren, D., 2016, Bridging analytical approaches for low-carbon transitions, Nature Climate Change, 6(6), 576-583
  • Geels, F.W., Kern, F., Fuchs, G., Hinderer, N., Kungl, G., Mylan, J., Neukirch, M., Wassermann, S., 2016, The enactment of socio-technical transition pathways: A reformulated typology and a comparative multi-level analysis of the German and UK low-carbon electricity transitions (19902014), Research Policy, 45(4), 896-913
  • Turnheim, B., Berkhout, F., Geels, F.W., Hof, A., McMeekin, A., Nykvist, B., Van Vuuren, D., 2015, Evaluating sustainability transitions pathways: Bridging analytical approaches to address governance challenges, Global Environmental Change, 35, 239–253
  • Penna, C.C.R. and Geels, F.W., 2015, ‘Climate change and the slow reorientation of the American car industry (1979-2011): An application and extension of the Dialectic Issue LifeCycle (DILC) model’, Research Policy, 44(5), 1029-1048
  • Geels, F.W., 2014, ‘Regime resistance against low-carbon energy transitions: Introducing politics and power in the multi-level perspective’, Theory, Culture & Society, 31(5), 21-40
  • Geels, F.W., 2013, ‘The impact of the financial-economic crisis on sustainability transitions: Financial investment, governance and public discourse’, Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions, 6, 67-95
  • Geels, F.W., 2012, ‘A socio-technical analysis of low-carbon transitions: Introducing the multi-level perspective into transport studies’, Journal of Transport Geography, 24, 471-482
  • Geels, F.W., Kemp, R., Dudley, G. and Lyons, G. (eds.), 2012, Automobility in Transition? A Socio Technical Analysis of Sustainable Transport, New York: Routledge
  • Verbong, G.P.J. and Geels, F.W., 2010, ‘Exploring sustainability transitions in the electricity sector with socio-technical pathways’, Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 77(8), 12141221 Verbong, G.P.J. and Geels, F.W., 2007, ‘The ongoing energy transition: Lessons from a sociotechnical, multi-level analysis of the Dutch electricity system (1960-2004)’, Energy Policy, 35(2), 1025-1037
  • Geels, F.W., 2002, ‘Technological transitions as evolutionary reconfiguration processes: A multi-level perspective and a case-study’, Research Policy, 31(8/9), 1257-1274

Frank Geels publicly available CV
Education
• Ph.D., Science, Technology and Innovation Studies, Twente University of Technology (Jan. 1998- July 2002), Netherlands. Supervisors: Arie Rip and Johan Schot. Title PhD thesis: Understanding the Dynamics of Technological Transitions: A co-evolutionary and socio-technical analysis.
• Masters degree in Philosophy of Science, Technology and Society, Twente University of Technology (1991-1996)
• Bachelor degree in Chemical Engineering, Twente University of Technology (1989-1991)

For what it’s worth, his formal education is pretty impressive. Where I lose respect is when he deviates from scientific argument in favour of political discourse. What could be very interesting work is corrupted be having an agenda.

His undergraduate degree is chemical engineering, which again, is very respectable. However, his Masters and PhD show a deviation from science and research.

While there are many other such authors, Frank W. Geels is a good case of what happens when political agendas and manoeuvering creep into science.

A morbidly fascinating topic. Check out some of his other publications.

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CCS #14: UN’s New Development Financing (The Bait-and-Switch)

(Ways to raise money)

(Sources of money for health initiatives)

An internationally concerted carbon tax could raise $250 billion per year…

(Page 13)
In this vein, a tax of $25 per ton of CO2 emitted by developed countries is expected to raise $250 billion per year in global tax revenues. Such a tax would be in addition to taxes already imposed at the national level, as many Governments (of developing as well as developed countries) already tax carbon emissions, in some cases explicitly, and in other cases, indirectly through taxes on specific fuels

…and a small currency transaction tax could add an estimated $40 billion…

1. Debunking The Climate Change Scam

CLICK HERE, for #1: major lies that the climate frauds tell.
CLICK HERE, for #2: review of the Paris Accord.
CLICK HERE, for #3: Bill C-97, the GHG Pollution Pricing Act.
CLICK HERE, for #4: in 3-2 decision, Sask. COA allows carbon tax.
CLICK HERE, for #5: controlled opposition to carbon tax.
CLICK HERE, for #6: controlled opposition Cons ==> Supreme Court.
CLICK HERE, for #7: climate bonds pitched as $100T industry.
CLICK HERE, for #8: Joel Wood pitching various pricing options.
CLICK HERE, for #9: Mark Carney and UN climate finance.
CLICK HERE, for #10: Goldman Sachs, Obama, Clinton, Chicago CX.
CLICK HERE, for #11: Coronavirus, Pirbright Inst, Gates, Depopulation.
CLICK HERE, for #12: AOC and the “Green New Deal”.
CLICK HERE, for #13: UN seeks new development financing.

CLICK HERE, for BOLD Like A Leopard Guest Posting.

2. Important Links


UN.new.development.financing.2012.178pages
CLICK HERE, for the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime.
CLICK HERE, for UN Sustainable Development Goals.
CLICK HERE, for Devex article explaining debt-for-development.
CLICK HERE, for World Bank explanation for debt-for-development trade.
CLICK HERE, for debt swaps for sustainable development.
CLICK HERE, for loss of sovereignty article.
CLICK HERE, for an IMF article on debt swaps.

3. This Is The Bait:

(From Page 10)
Two main sources are considered: taxes levied on international transactions and/or taxes that are internationally concerted, such as the air-ticket solidarity levy, financial or currency transaction taxes and carbon taxes; and revenues from global resources, such as SDR allocations and proceeds derived from the extraction of resources from the global commons, through, for example, seabed mining in international waters. Proposals on potential sources of finance for international development cooperation in both categories have been discussed for decades, although most of these, with the exception of the proposal on an airline levy, have not yet been adopted.

So what kind of “revenues” are raised?

  • taxes on international transactions
  • internationally concerted taxes
  • air-ticket solidarity levy
  • financial or currency transaction taxes
  • carbon taxes

This is how bait-and-switch works:
(1) Raise money using cause A.
(2) Actually spend the money on cause B.

4. And Here Is The Switch:

An array of other options with large fundraising potential have been proposed (see figure O.1 and table O.1), but have not been agreed upon internationally thus far. These include taxes on financial and currency transactions and on greenhouse gas emissions, as well as the creation of new international liquidity through issuance of special drawing rights (SDRs) by the International Monetary Fund IMF), to be allocated with a bias favouring developing countries or leveraged as development financing. Though their potential may be high, these proposals are subject to political controversy. For instance, many countries are not willing to support international forms of taxation, as these are said to undermine national sovereignty.

There are also challenges in the use and allocation of funds mobilized internationally. Most existing innovative financing mechanisms earmark resources upfront for specific purposes, as is the case for the global health funds. There are perceived benefits in doing so. Advocates argue that the earmarking helps build political support and attract funds by establishing a clear link between fundraising and popular causes. This may come at a cost, however, since earmarking funds can limit domestic policy space for channelling resources to nationally defined priorities.

This explains why there is the bait-and-switch. Countries are not willing to support international taxation. Therefore it is necessary to raise money under the pretense of “environmentalism”. It also shows that the UN feels little resistance to misleading the public on where money is being used for.

(From Page 10)
Some innovations focus on intermediation mechanisms designed to better match funding and needs by facilitating front-loading of resources (which include several mechanisms channelling resources to global health funds and some debt-for-development swap mechanisms), by mobilizing public means to guarantee or insure natural disaster risks or technology development for public causes, or by securing specific-purpose voluntary contributions from the private sector for official development cooperation. Various mechanisms of these types do exist, but they are not large in size.

Several global funds that act as allocation mechanisms are generally also considered to come under the rubric of innovative development financing. Disbursement mechanisms in the health sector include the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, UNITAID and the GAVI Alliance. These mechanisms collect financing directly from sources or through intermediary financing mechanisms. UNITAID is the only disbursement mechanism that obtains the bulk of its financing from an innovative source, the air-ticket solidarity levy. Other funds rely mainly on traditional sources of financing.

Though the bulk of money raised is collected under the pretense of “environmentalism”, the UN makes it clear that the cash will be spent on a few “other” purposes.

  1. Global Health Funds
  2. Debt-for-Development Swap Mechanisms

5. UN Violates Own Convention


From the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime

Article 4(1)

Article 4. Protection of sovereignty
1. States Parties shall carry out their obligations under this Convention in a manner consistent with the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity of States and that of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other States.
2. Nothing in this Convention entitles a State Party to undertake in the territory of another State the exercise of jurisdiction and performance of functions that are reserved exclusively for the authorities of that other State by its domestic law.

Article 5

Article 5. Criminalization of participation in an organized criminal group
1. Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally:
(a) Either or both of the following as criminal offences distinct from those involving the attempt or completion of the criminal activity:
(i) Agreeing with one or more other persons to commit a serious crime for a purpose relating directly or indirectly to the obtaining of a financial or other material benefit and, where required by domestic law, involving an act undertaken by one of the participants in furtherance of the agreement or involving an organized criminal group;

Consider that the New Development Financing involves obtaining huge sums of money under false pretenses. While the publics are told that much of this revenue will be for environmental causes, it becomes clear from later in the document that it will be spent on other purposes (such as debt-for-development and health care causes).

Taking money for purposes other than what is advertised is fraud.

6. Debt Conversion Mechanisms

(Page 86) Debt-conversion mechanisms
Debt conversion entails the cancellation by one or more creditors of part of a country’s debt in order to enable the release of funds which would otherwise have been used for debt-servicing, for use instead in social or environmental projects. Where debt is converted at a discount with respect to its face value, only part of the proceeds fund the projects, the remainder reducing the external debt burden, typically as part of a broader debt restructuring.

Debt to developing nations can be “forgiven”, at least partly, if certain conditions are met. However, the obvious question must be asked:

Can nations be loaned money they could never realistically pay back, in order to ensure their compliance in UN or other global agenda, by agreeing to “forgive” part of it?

(Page 86) Debt conversion first emerged, in the guise of debt-for-nature swaps, during the 1980s debt crisis, following an opinion article by Thomas Lovejoy, then Executive Vice-President of the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), in the New York Times in 1984. Lovejoy argued that a developing country’s external debt could be reduced (also providing tax relief to participating creditor banks) in exchange for the country’s taking measures to address environmental challenges. Estimates based on Sheikh (2010) and Buckley, ed. (2011) suggest that between $1.1 billion and $1.5 billion of debt has been exchanged through debt-for-nature swaps since the mid–1980s, although it is not possible to assess how much of this constitutes IDF, for the reasons discussed in box III.1.

If debt can be forgiven in return for environmental measures, then why not simply fund these environmental measures from the beginning? Is it to pressure or coerce otherwise unwilling nations into agreeing with such measures?

(Page 88)
There have been two basic forms of debt-for-nature exchanges (Buckley and Freeland, 2011). In the first, part of a country’s external debt is purchased by an environmental non-governmental organization and offered to the debtor for cancellation in exchange for a commitment to protect a particular area of land. Such transactions occurred mainly in the late 1980s and 1990s and were generally relatively small-scale. An early example was a 1987 deal under which Conservation International, a Washington, D.C.-based environmental non-governmental organization, bought $650,000 of the commercial bank debt of Bolivia (now Plurinational State of Bolivia) in the secondary market for $100,000, and exchanged this for shares in a company established to preserve 3.7 million acres of forest and grassland surrounding the Beni Biosphere Reserve in the north-east part of the country.
In the second form, debt is exchanged for local currency (often at a discount), which is then used by local conservation groups or government agencies to fund projects in the debtor country. Swaps of this kind are generally much larger, and have predominated since the 1990s. The largest such swap came in 1991, when a group of bilateral creditors agreed to channel principal and interest payments of $473 million (in local currency) into Poland’s Ecofund set up to finance projects designed to counter environmental deterioration. The EcoFund financed 1,500 programmes between 1992 and 2007, providing grants for conservation projects relating to cross-border air pollution, climate change, biological diversity and the clean-up of the Baltic Sea (Buckley and Freeland, 2011).

We will “forgive” your debt if:
(1) A portion of your land is off limits; or
(2) Debt converted to currency to fund “projects”

Debt For Health

(Page 89)
Since the development of debt swaps in the 1980s, there has been a diversification of their uses to encompass social projects, most recently in the area of health under the Debt2Health initiative, which was launched by the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria in 2007 to harness additional resources for its programmes. Under Debt2Health, a donor country agrees to reduce part of a loan ineligible for debt relief under global initiatives such as the HIPC and Multilateral Debt Reduction Initiatives, in exchange for a commitment by the debtor to invest (in local currency) half of the nominal value of the debt in programmes approved by the Global Fund. The Global Fund is committed to devoting all of the funds thus generated to financing programmes in the country rather than overhead costs (Buckley, 2011c).

Debt For Education

(Page 90)
In addition to the uses described above, debt swaps have also been successfully implemented for education and development.2 Clear delineation among the various types of swaps is often problematic, however, as debt-for-development swaps typically provide funding for environmental, health and/or education projects.
……..
. Although nominally debt-conversion operations, these Contracts stipulate that debtor countries are to continue to service these debts in full, while receiving, however, an equivalent amount of new ODA grants tied to specific programmes when they do so (Agence Française de Développement, n.d.). Thus, resources are not redirected from debt servicing to other uses; rather, potential fiscal savings from debt-service reduction are forgone, the resources instead being directed to specific uses (Buckley, 2011a). These transactions thus cannot be considered to constitute IDF

So in these cases the debt isn’t really forgiven. The indebted nation will still have to make payments, while other money will be coming in for other purposes.

The funding generated by debt swaps is closely tied to their designated end use (although the effectiveness of this depends on monitoring mechanisms). While this effective earmarking of budgetary funds indicates a trade-off with policy space, the debt relief provided by converting debt at a discount (where the debt would otherwise have been serviced) releases resources for use in accordance with national priorities. However, the exclusion of relevant ministries and limited civil society participation in the design and implementation processes may undermine coherence with medium-term national development strategies.

To make absolutely clear, this debt forgiveness isn’t free. There is always some trade off. Here, it seems to be having your nation’s sovereignty eroded in return for being cut a break.

While all of this is couched in very pretty rhetoric, one really has to ask what is really the costs?

7. “Voluntary” Pesticide Use In Crops


Here is one such “pull measure” (page 98)

The World Bank is currently developing agricultural projects based on pull mechanisms through the Agricultural Pull Mechanism (AGPM) initiative, with the objectives of increasing production, reducing losses and enhancing food security for small farmers. There are six pilot programmes currently being developed, which are expected to be launched in June 2012. Their objectives are:
-To develop distribution networks for bio-fortified crop varieties (high pro-vitamin A cassava, maize and sweet potato, and high in iron beans) in Africa
-To promote the development and use of new hybrid rice varieties in South Asia
-To develop improved fertilizers and fertilizer production processes
-To promote adoption of improved post-harvest storage technologies
-To incentivize the use of biocontrol mechanisms against aflatoxin contamination of crops
-To promote development and use of a vaccine against peste des petits ruminants in livestock in Africa

Interesting. How much of this is done in the first world?

8. Now Comes Climate Change

(Page 120)
The unprecedented global improvements in average living standards over the last two centuries have come at the cost of serious degradation of the natural environment. The most serious environmental threat is climate change, brought about by global emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases. In addition to considerable expenditure for adaptation, climate change necessitates a fundamental shift in development strategies towards a much less carbon-intensive model, and a major reduction in reliance on fossil fuels.

While climate change arises overwhelmingly from historical emissions in developed countries, it impacts disproportionately the well-being and livelihoods of people in developing countries. This makes a compelling case for the assumption by richer countries of the costs of mitigation and adaptation

Read the next several pages. While the paper talks at length about how to “raise” money for climate change causes, it is surprisingly vague about how this money will actually be spent. There are some bland references to technology, but no specifics.

The paper cites “Carbon Dioxide and other greenhouse gases” but CO2 is the only one to actually be named.

Furthermore, the UN tries to promote mass migration to the West. However, this would be illogical, since on average, Western nations leave a much bigger “footprint” than others do.

While “financing” climate change efforts features prominently in later sections of the paper, it gives no real information on how the money would be put to use.

9. Is This Predatory?

From the Journal of Politics and Law Article (see here).

Budget constraints are severely undermining the capacity of governments of developing countries to provide their people even the most basic of social services. This lack of finance is in turn caused by several factors including, among others, huge military spending, pervasive corruption and large repayments of debts owed to the developed world. These factors, either singly or in combination, eat up government funds that can otherwise be spent on education, health, housing and other social services. Economists have a better way of describing it – these factors ‘crowd out’ essential public spending designed to benefit the people. (Note 1) As a result, these governments are unable to steer their countries towards the path of economic development and entire peoples are unable to enjoy the most fundamental of economic, social and cultural rights“

This is what we are financing.

Our leaders take from us, claiming it is for efforts to “protect the environment”. Money is then spent abroad in the developing world, often awarded in the form of loans. When such nations cannot pay back the money they owe, they become indebted to their creditors. This is usually bodies like the UN or IMF.

Bait: Tax to save environment
Switch: Predatory loans to developing world.

This is the bait-and-switch. It is highly unethical to take advantage of people like this.

Posted on

Bilderberg Meetings: Deep State Gettogethers

1. Important Links

CLICK HERE, for the main page.
CLICK HERE, for the FAQ section.
CLICK HERE, for the “Participants” section.
CLICK HERE, for then Immigration Minister Jason Kenney attending in 2014.

2. 2018 Bilderberg Meetings

Turin, Italy 7-10 June 2018

CHAIRMAN STEERING COMMITTEE
Castries, Henri de (FRA), Chairman, Institut Montaigne

PARTICIPANTS

Achleitner, Paul M. (DEU), Chairman Supervisory Board, Deutsche Bank AG; Treasurer, Foundation Bilderberg Meetings
Agius, Marcus (GBR), Chairman, PA Consulting Group
Alesina, Alberto (ITA), Nathaniel Ropes Professor of Economics, Harvard University
Altman, Roger C. (USA), Founder and Senior Chairman, Evercore
Amorim, Paula (PRT), Chairman, Américo Amorim Group
Anglade, Dominique (CAN), Deputy Premier of Quebec; Minister of Economy, Science and Innovation
Applebaum, Anne (POL), Columnist, Washington Post; Professor of Practice, London School of Economics
Azoulay, Audrey (INT), Director-General, UNESCO
Baker, James H. (USA), Director, Office of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense
Barbizet, Patricia (FRA), President, Temaris & Associés
Barroso, José M. Durão (PRT), Chairman, Goldman Sachs International; Former President, European Commission
Beerli, Christine (CHE), Former Vice-President, International Committee of the Red Cross
Berx, Cathy (BEL), Governor, Province of Antwerp
Beurden, Ben van (NLD), CEO, Royal Dutch Shell plc
Blanquer, Jean-Michel (FRA), Minister of National Education, Youth and Community Life
Botín, Ana P. (ESP), Group Executive Chairman, Banco Santander
Bouverot, Anne (FRA), Board Member; Former CEO, Morpho
Brandtzæg, Svein Richard (NOR), President and CEO, Norsk Hydro ASA
Brende, Børge (INT), President, World Economic Forum
Brennan, Eamonn (IRL), Director General, Eurocontrol
Brnabic, Ana (SRB), Prime Minister
Burns, William J. (USA), President, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Burwell, Sylvia M. (USA), President, American University
Caracciolo, Lucio (ITA), Editor-in-Chief, Limes
Carney, Mark J. (GBR), Governor, Bank of England
Castries, Henri de (FRA), Chairman, Institut Montaigne; Chairman, Steering Committee Bilderberg Meetings
Cattaneo, Elena (ITA), Director, Laboratory of Stem Cell Biology, University of Milan
Cazeneuve, Bernard (FRA), Partner, August Debouzy; Former Prime Minister
Cebrián, Juan Luis (ESP), Executive Chairman, El País
Champagne, François-Philippe (CAN), Minister of International Trade
Cohen, Jared (USA), Founder and CEO, Jigsaw at Alphabet Inc.
Colao, Vittorio (ITA), CEO, Vodafone Group
Cook, Charles (USA), Political Analyst, The Cook Political Report
Dagdeviren, Canan (TUR), Assistant Professor, MIT Media Lab
Donohoe, Paschal (IRL), Minister for Finance, Public Expenditure and Reform
Döpfner, Mathias (DEU), Chairman and CEO, Axel Springer SE
Ecker, Andrea (AUT), Secretary General, Office Federal President of Austria
Elkann, John (ITA), Chairman, Fiat Chrysler Automobiles
Émié, Bernard (FRA), Director General, Ministry of the Armed Forces
Enders, Thomas (DEU), CEO, Airbus SE
Fallows, James (USA), Writer and Journalist
Ferguson, Jr., Roger W. (USA), President and CEO, TIAA
Ferguson, Niall (USA), Milbank Family Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University
Fischer, Stanley (USA), Former Vice-Chairman, Federal Reserve; Former Governor, Bank of Israel
Gilvary, Brian (GBR), Group CFO, BP plc
Goldstein, Rebecca (USA), Visiting Professor, New York University
Gruber, Lilli (ITA), Editor-in-Chief and Anchor “Otto e mezzo”, La7 TV
Hajdarowicz, Greg (POL), Founder and President, Gremi International Sarl
Halberstadt, Victor (NLD), Professor of Economics, Leiden University; Chairman Foundation Bilderberg Meetings
Hassabis, Demis (GBR), Co-Founder and CEO, DeepMind
Hedegaard, Connie (DNK), Chair, KR Foundation; Former European Commissioner
Helgesen, Vidar (NOR), Ambassador for the Ocean
Herlin, Antti (FIN), Chairman, KONE Corporation
Hickenlooper, John (USA), Governor of Colorado
Hobson, Mellody (USA), President, Ariel Investments LLC
Hodgson, Christine (GBR), Chairman, Capgemini UK plc
Hoffman, Reid (USA), Co-Founder, LinkedIn; Partner, Greylock Partners
Horowitz, Michael C. (USA), Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania
Hwang, Tim (USA), Director, Harvard-MIT Ethics and Governance of AI Initiative
Ischinger, Wolfgang (INT), Chairman, Munich Security Conference
Jacobs, Kenneth M. (USA), Chairman and CEO, Lazard
Kaag, Sigrid (NLD), Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation
Karp, Alex (USA), CEO, Palantir Technologies
Kissinger, Henry A. (USA), Chairman, Kissinger Associates Inc.
Knot, Klaas H.W. (NLD), President, De Nederlandsche Bank
Koç, Ömer M. (TUR), Chairman, Koç Holding A.S.
Köcher, Renate (DEU), Managing Director, Allensbach Institute for Public Opinion Research
Kotkin, Stephen (USA), Professor in History and International Affairs, Princeton University
Kragic, Danica (SWE), Professor, School of Computer Science and Communication, KTH
Kravis, Henry R. (USA), Co-Chairman and Co-CEO, KKR
Kravis, Marie-Josée (USA), Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute; President, American Friends of Bilderberg
Kudelski, André (CHE), Chairman and CEO, Kudelski Group
Lepomäki, Elina (FIN), MP, National Coalition Party
Leyen, Ursula von der (DEU), Federal Minster of Defence
Leysen, Thomas (BEL), Chairman, KBC Group
Makan, Divesh (USA), CEO, ICONIQ Capital
Massolo, Giampiero (ITA), Chairman, Fincantieri Spa.; President, ISPI
Mazzucato, Mariana (ITA), Professor in the Economics of Innovation and Public Value, University College London
Mead, Walter Russell (USA), Distinguished Fellow, Hudson Institute
Michel, Charles (BEL), Prime Minister
Micklethwait, John (USA), Editor-in-Chief, Bloomberg LP
Minton Beddoes, Zanny (GBR), Editor-in-Chief, The Economist
Mitsotakis, Kyriakos (GRC), President, New Democracy Party
Mota, Isabel (PRT), President, Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation
Moyo, Dambisa F. (USA), Global Economist and Author
Mundie, Craig J. (USA), President, Mundie & Associates
Neven, Hartmut (USA), Director of Engineering, Google Inc.
Noonan, Peggy (USA), Author and Columnist, The Wall Street Journal
Oettinger, Günther H. (INT), Commissioner for Budget & Human Resources, European Commission
O’Leary, Michael (IRL), CEO, Ryanair D.A.C.
O’Neill, Onora (GBR), Emeritus Honorary Professor in Philosophy, University of Cambridge
Osborne, George (GBR), Editor, London Evening Standard
Özkan, Behlül (TUR), Associate Professor in International Relations, Marmara University
Papalexopoulos, Dimitri (GRC), CEO, Titan Cement Company S.A.
Parolin, H.E. Pietro (VAT), Cardinal and Secretary of State
Patino, Bruno (FRA), Chief Content Officer, Arte France TV
Petraeus, David H. (USA), Chairman, KKR Global Institute
Pichette, Patrick (CAN), General Partner, iNovia Capital
Pouyanné, Patrick (FRA), Chairman and CEO, Total S.A.
Pring, Benjamin (USA), Co-Founder and Managing Director, Center for the Future of Work
Rankka, Maria (SWE), CEO, Stockholm Chamber of Commerce
Ratas, Jüri (EST), Prime Minister
Rendi-Wagner, Pamela (AUT), MP (SPÖ); Former Minister of Health
Rivera Díaz, Albert (ESP), President, Ciudadanos Party
Rossi, Salvatore (ITA), Senior Deputy Governor, Bank of Italy
Rubesa, Baiba A. (LVA), CEO, RB Rail AS
Rubin, Robert E. (USA), Co-Chairman Emeritus, Council on Foreign Relations; Former Treasury Secretary
Rudd, Amber (GBR), MP; Former Secretary of State, Home Department
Rutte, Mark (NLD), Prime Minister
Sabia, Michael (CAN), President and CEO, Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec
Sadjadpour, Karim (USA), Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Sáenz de Santamaría, Soraya (ESP), Deputy Prime Minister
Sawers, John (GBR), Chairman and Partner, Macro Advisory Partners
Schadlow, Nadia (USA), Former Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategy
Schneider-Ammann, Johann N. (CHE), Federal Councillor
Scholten, Rudolf (AUT), President, Bruno Kreisky Forum for International Dialogue
Sikorski, Radoslaw (POL), Senior Fellow, Harvard University; Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Poland
Simsek, Mehmet (TUR), Deputy Prime Minister
Skartveit, Hanne (NOR), Political Editor, Verdens Gang
Stoltenberg, Jens (INT), Secretary General, NATO
Summers, Lawrence H. (USA), Charles W. Eliot University Professor, Harvard University
Thiel, Peter (USA), President, Thiel Capital
Topsøe, Jakob Haldor (DNK), Chairman, Haldor Topsøe Holding A/S
Turpin, Matthew (USA), Director for China, National Security Council
Wahlroos, Björn (FIN), Chairman, Sampo Group, Nordea Bank, UPM-Kymmene Corporation
Wallenberg, Marcus (SWE), Chairman, Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB
Woods, Ngaire (GBR), Dean, Blavatnik School of Government, Oxford University
Yetkin, Murat (TUR), Editor-in-chief, Hürriyet Daily News
Zeiler, Gerhard (AUT), President, Turner International

As should be obvious from the list, a lot of banks and investment holding companies are represented. Why would that be? Are there some big profits to be made in all this?

3. Brief History

The Bilderberg meeting is an annual three-day forum for informal discussions designed to foster dialogue between Europe and North America. The pioneering meeting grew out of the concern, expressed by leading citizens on both sides of the Atlantic, that Western Europe and North America were not working together as closely as they should on issues of common interest.

The first meeting took place in Hotel De Bilderberg in Oosterbeek, Netherlands, from 29 to 31 May 1954. Representatives from economic, social, political and cultural fields were invited to hold informal discussions to help create a better understanding of the complex forces and major trends affecting Western nations in the difficult post-war period.

Throughout the years, the annual meetings have become a forum for discussion on a wide range of topics – from trade to jobs, from monetary policy to investment and from ecological challenges to the task of promoting international security. In the context of a globalised world, it is hard to think of any issue in either Europe or North America that could be tackled unilaterally.

4. Steering Committee

CHAIRMAN
Castries, Henri de (FRA), Chairman, Institut Montaigne

Achleitner, Paul M. (DEU), Chairman Supervisory Board, Deutsche Bank AG; Treasurer, Foundation Bilderberg Meetings
Altman, Roger C. (USA), Founder and Senior Chairman, Evercore
Barbizet, Patricia (FRA), President, Temaris & Associés
Barroso, José M. Durão (PRT), Chairman, Goldman Sachs International; Former President, European Commission
Botín, Ana P. (ESP), Group Executive Chairman, Banco Santander
Brandtzæg, Svein Richard (NOR), President and CEO, Norsk Hydro ASA
Döpfner, Mathias (DEU), Chairman and CEO, Axel Springer SE
Elkann, John (ITA), Chairman, Fiat Chrysler Automobiles
Gruber, Lilli (ITA), Editor-in-Chief and Anchor “Otto e mezzo”, La7 TV
Halberstadt, Victor (NLD), Professor of Economics, Leiden University; Chairman Foundation Bilderberg Meetings
Hedegaard, Connie (DNK), Chair, KR Foundation; Former European Commissioner
Hobson, Mellody (USA), President, Ariel Investments LLC
Karp, Alex (USA), CEO, Palantir Technologies
Koç, Ömer M. (TUR), Chairman, Koç Holding A.S.
Kravis, Marie-Josée (USA), Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute; President, American Friends of Bilderberg Inc.
Kudelski, André (CHE), Chairman and CEO, Kudelski Group
Leysen, Thomas (BEL), Chairman, KBC Group
Micklethwait, John (USA), Editor-in-Chief, Bloomberg LP
Minton Beddoes, Zanny (GBR), Editor-in-Chief, The Economist
Mundie, Craig J. (USA), President, Mundie & Associates
O’Leary, Michael (IRL), CEO, Ryanair D.A.C.
Papalexopoulos, Dimitri (GRC), CEO, Titan Cement Company S.A.
Sabia, Michael (CAN), President and CEO, Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec
Sawers, John (GBR), Chairman and Partner, Macro Advisory Partners
Schadlow, Nadia (USA), Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute
Schmidt, Eric E. (USA), Technical Advisor, Alphabet Inc.
Scholten, Rudolf (AUT), President, Bruno Kreisky Forum for International Dialogue
Sikorski, Radoslaw (POL), Senior Fellow, Harvard University; Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Poland
Thiel, Peter (USA), President, Thiel Capital
Wallenberg, Marcus (SWE), Chairman, Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB

5. Bilderberg Goals

What are the Bilderberg Meetings and what are its goals?
The Bilderberg Meeting is an annual meeting designed to foster dialogue between Europe and North America. Bilderberg was established in 1954 as a forum for informal discussions, bringing together individuals who share an active interest in affairs relevant to the relationship between Europe and Northern America. The meeting has one main goal: to foster discussion and dialogue. There is no desired outcome, there is no closing statement, there are no resolutions proposed or votes taken.

Sounds so harmless and innocuous.
But then, it always does.

Posted on

New York Declaration (September 2016), Prelude to The Global Migration Compact

1. Important Links

(1) https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/migration-compact
(2) https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/declaration
(3) https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/71/1
(4) https://www.un.org/pga/72/wp-content/uploads/sites/51/2018/07/migration.pdf

2. The Timeline

  • September, 2016, New York Declaration agreed to.
  • July 2018, Text of Global Migration Compact agreed to
  • December 2018, formal siging ceremony for Global Migration Compact

To give some context, this conference in New York happened TWO YEARS before the signing. And comparing the NY Declaration to the Compact text, it seems that the opinions didn’t change much along the way.

3. Summary Of NY Declaration

Note: for ease of comparison, the points are numbered, although not done so in the actual text.

What are the commitments?
The New York Declaration contains bold commitments both to address the issues we face now and to prepare the world for future challenges. These include commitments to:

  1. Protect the human rights of all refugees and migrants, regardless of status. This includes the rights of women and girls and promoting their full, equal and meaningful participation in finding solutions.
  2. Ensure that all refugee and migrant children are receiving education within a few months of arrival.
  3. Prevent and respond to sexual and gender-based violence.
  4. Support those countries rescuing, receiving and hosting large numbers of refugees and migrants.
  5. Work towards ending the practice of detaining children for the purposes of determining their migration status.
  6. Strongly condemn xenophobia against refugees and migrants and support a global campaign to counter it.
  7. Strengthen the positive contributions made by migrants to economic and social development in their host countries.
  8. Improve the delivery of humanitarian and development assistance to those countries most affected, including through innovative multilateral financial solutions, with the goal of closing all funding gaps.
  9. Implement a comprehensive refugee response, based on a new framework that sets out the responsibility of Member States, civil society partners and the UN system, whenever there is a large movement of refugees or a protracted refugee situation.
  10. Find new homes for all refugees identified by UNHCR as needing resettlement; and expand the opportunities for refugees to relocate to other countries through, for example, labour mobility or education schemes.
  11. Strengthen the global governance of migration by bringing the International Organization for Migration into the UN system.

What will happen next?
The New York Declaration also contains concrete plans for how to build on these commitments:
Start negotiations leading to an international conference and the adoption of a global compact for safe, orderly and regular migration in 2018. The agreement to move toward this comprehensive framework is a momentous one. It means that migration, like other areas of international relations, will be guided by a set of common principles and approaches.

Develop guidelines on the treatment of migrants in vulnerable situations. These guidelines will be particularly important for the increasing number of unaccompanied children on the move.

Achieve a more equitable sharing of the burden and responsibility for hosting and supporting the world’s refugees by adopting a global compact on refugees in 2018.

4. Contrast NY Declaration, UNGMC

The Global Migration Compact consists of 23 “non-binding” objectives, which align almost perfectly with the original declaration

Point #1

Protect the human rights of all refugees and migrants, regardless of status. This includes the rights of women and girls and promoting their full, equal and meaningful participation in finding solutions.

Gender will be mentioned throughout the document.

Point #2, Objective 15(f)

Ensure that all refugee and migrant children are receiving education within a few months of arrival.
.
(Objective, 15(f)) Provide inclusive and equitable quality education to migrant children and youth, as well as facilitate access to lifelong learning opportunities , including by strengthening the capacities of education systems and by facilitating non-discriminatory access to early childhood development, formal schooling, non-formal education programmes for children for whom the formal system is inaccessible, on-the-job and vocational training, technical education, and language training, as well as by fostering partnerships with all stakeholders that can support this endeavour

Point #3

Prevent and respond to sexual and gender-based violence.

Of course, there is the “elephant in the room”. If sexual and gender based violence is anticipated to be such a big problem, “why” are we letting large numbers of these people into our countries?

Point #4, Objective 8

Support those countries rescuing, receiving and hosting large numbers of refugees and migrants.
.
We commit to cooperate internationally to save lives and prevent migrant deaths and injuries through individual or joint search and rescue operations, standardized collection and exchange of relevant information, assuming collective responsibility to preserve the lives of all migrants, in accordance with international law. We further commit to identify those who have died or gone missing, and to facilitate communication with affected families.

Notice, they blur the line between:
(a) Migrant and refugee, and
(b) Legal and illegal

Point #5, Objective 13

Work towards ending the practice of detaining children for the purposes of determining their migration status.
.
(Objective 13) We commit to ensure that any detention in the context of international migration follows due process, is non-arbitrary, based on law, necessity, proportionality and individual assessments, is carried out by authorized officials, and for the shortest possible period of time, irrespective of whether detention occurs at the moment of entry, in transit, or proceedings of return, and regardless of the type of place where the detention occurs. We further commit to prioritize noncustodial alternatives to detention that are in line with international law, and to take a human rights-based approach to any detention of migrants, using detention as a measure of last resort only.

That’s right. Avoid detention of illegals if at all possible. Release them into the community wherever possible. Just because they are in the country illegally, that doesn’t mean they are breaking the law apparently.

Point #6, Objective 17

Strongly condemn xenophobia against refugees and migrants and support a global campaign to counter it.
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(Objective 17) Promote independent, objective and quality reporting of media outlets, including internet based information, including by sensitizing and educating media professionals on migration-related issues and terminology, investing in ethical reporting standards and advertising, and stopping allocation of public funding or material support to media outlets that systematically promote intolerance, xenophobia, racism and other forms of discrimination towards migrants, in full respect for the freedom of the media

17(c) is the infamous propaganda clause that promotes “sensitizing and educating” media, and shutting down media critical of mass migration.

Point #7, Objective 2

Strengthen the positive contributions made by migrants to economic and social development in their host countries.
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We commit to create conducive political, economic, social and environmental conditions for people to lead peaceful, productive and sustainable lives in their own country and to fulfil their personal aspirations, while ensuring that desperation and deteriorating environments do not compel them to seek a livelihood elsewhere through irregular migration. We further commit to ensure timely and full implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, as well as to build upon and invest in the implementation of other existing frameworks, in order to enhance the overall impact of the Global Compact to facilitate safe, orderly and regular migration.

As convoluted as the wording is, the parties will be shelling out “BOTH” money for host countries, and to enhance mass migration to the West.

Point #8

Improve the delivery of humanitarian and development assistance to those countries most affected, including through innovative multilateral financial solutions, with the goal of closing all funding gaps.
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We commit to promote faster, safer and cheaper remittances by further developing existing conducive policy and regulatory environments that enable competition, regulation and innovation on the remittance market and by providing gender-responsive programmes and instruments that enhance the financial inclusion of migrants and their families. We further commit to optimize the transformative impact of remittances on the well-being of migrant workers and their families, as well as on sustainable development of countries, while respecting that remittances constitute an important source of private capital, and cannot be equated to other international financial flows, such as foreign direct investment, official development assistance, or other public sources of financing for development.

Interesting side note: “financial flow” is what the Paris Accord calls the Carbon tax. But this is another massive wealth transfer scheme.

Point #9, Objective 23

Implement a comprehensive refugee response, based on a new framework that sets out the responsibility of Member States, civil society partners and the UN system, whenever there is a large movement of refugees or a protracted refugee situation.
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Conclude bilateral, regional or multilateral mutually beneficial, tailored and transparent partnerships, in line with international law, that develop targeted solutions to migration policy issues of common interest and address opportunities and challenges of migration in accordance with the Global Compact

Point #10

Find new homes for all refugees identified by UNHCR as needing resettlement; and expand the opportunities for refugees to relocate to other countries through, for example, labour mobility or education schemes.

Even though nations have their own homeless, we are going to provide housing for foreigners. Great.

(Point #11, Objective 11, 23)

Strengthen the global governance of migration by bringing the International Organization for Migration into the UN system.
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(Objective 11) We commit to manage our national borders in a coordinated manner, promoting bilateral and regional cooperation, ensuring security for States, communities and migrants, and facilitating safe and regular cross-border movements of people while preventing irregular migration. We further commit to implement border management policies that respect national sovereignty, the rule of law, obligations under international law, human rights of all migrants, regardless of their migration status, and are non-discriminatory, gender-responsive and child-sensitive.
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(Objective 23) We commit to support each other in the realization of the objectives and commitments laid out in this Global Compact through enhanced international cooperation, a revitalized global partnership, and in the spirit of solidarity, reaffirming the centrality of a comprehensive and integrated approach to facilitate safe, orderly and regular migration, and recognizing that we are all countries of origin, transit and destination. We further commit to take joint action in addressing the challenges faced by each country to implement this Global Compact, underscoring the specific challenges faced in particular by African countries, least developed countries, landlocked developing countries, small island developing States, and middle-income countries. We also commit to promote the mutually reinforcing nature between the Global Compact and existing international legal and policy frameworks, by aligning the implementation of this Global Compact with such frameworks, particularly the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development as well as the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, and their recognition that migration and sustainable development are multidimensional and interdependent.

5. Final Thoughts

  • This scheme was outlined in 2016, a full 2 years before the signing of the “treaty”.
  • The documents routinely blur the line between “refugee” and “migrant”.
  • All this talk of rights for “migrants and refugees”, but no consideration given for the host populations which are forced to deal with them
  • They go on and on about Agenda 2030. Guess this is the next step.
  • Media is to be “sensitized” about migration.
  • Looks like Calgary adventure was well worth it.
Posted on

The Water Action Hub

1. Important Links

CLICK HERE, for the main page.
CLICK HERE, for the Business for Social Responsibility.
CLICK HERE, for Global Water Challenge.
CLICK HERE, for Human Development Report.
CLICK HERE, for International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies Global Water and Sanitation Initiative.
CLICK HERE, for Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
CLICK HERE, for Stockholm International Water Institute.
CLICK HERE, for UN Global Compact.
CLICK HERE, for UN Millennium Development Goals.
CLICK HERE, for UNDP Water Governance Programme.
CLICK HERE, for UNEP Collaborating Center on Water and Environment.
CLICK HERE, for UNEP Freshwater Activities.
CLICK HERE, for UNEP Global Environment Outlook.
CLICK HERE, for UNESCO Institute for Water Education.
CLICK HERE, for UNICEF Water, Environment and Sanitation Program.
CLICK HERE, for WaterAid.
CLICK HERE, for Water Footprint Network.
CLICK HERE, for World Bank Group.
CLICK HERE, for World Business Council for Sustainable Development.
CLICK HERE, for World Economic Forum Water Initiative.
CLICK HERE, for World Health Organization.
CLICK HERE, for WWF International.

2. Preamble Of The Group

We also recognize the following:
● Water stress is expected to worsen in many parts of the world as a result of factors including urbanization and population growth, increasing food production, changing consumption patterns, industrialization, water pollution, and climate change.
● The main user of fresh water is agriculture. Though much less is used in manufacturing and services, these sectors can still contribute positively.
● Scarcity and related problems pose material risks but can also, when well managed, create opportunities for improvement and innovation.
● Unsafe drinking water and lack of appropriate sanitation profoundly affect the health and well-being of billions of people, including those who are our customers and employees. In this regard, we note the 2010 resolutions by the UN Human Rights Council and the UN General Assembly recognizing the human right to safe drinking water and sanitation.
● Companies can have a direct impact on water management in their own business, as well as an indirect impact by encouraging and facilitating actions by those in their supply chains to improve water management.
● In order to operate in a sustainable manner, and contribute to the vision of the UN Global Compact and the realization of the Millennium Development Goals, companies have a responsibility to make water-resources management a priority.
● Individual and collective efforts – involving partnership with the public sector and civil society and through the supply chain – will be required to adequately address this crisis.

Some thoughts on the preamble:

  1. Changing consumption patterns is a threat to water supply, but the UN promotes mass migration to the West, which leads to people with previously LOW consumption levels now adopting HIGH consumption levels.
  2. Most water use due to agriculture, but that isn’t where the focus seems to be.
  3. UN recognizes water and sanitation as human rights, though interestingly the Human Rights Council is stacked with members who don’t believe in human rights.
  4. Companies have an obligation to make this agenda a priority.
  5. Collective efforts will be required. Can I assume that force and law will be needed in order to accomplish this?

3. Mandate Of The Group

The Mandate is governed by the Steering Committee, which oversees the initiative’s strategic, administrative, and financial arrangements. The CEO Water Mandate Steering Committee is composed of:
(1) Ten corporate representatives from diverse geographies who serve staggered two-year terms. Corporate representatives will be drawn from Action Platform participants only.
(2) One representative of the UN Global Compact Office
(3) Special Advisors representing different stakeholder interests and spheres
(4) Patron sponsors of the Action Platform – Water Security through Stewardship

The Secretariat makes decisions based on a consensus model. When consensus cannot be reached, a simple majority vote decides matters.

So the mandate seems to be fluid, to put it mildly. This “Steering Committee” will decide what the mandate will be, and consisted of these people.
Endorsing Company Members

  1. Troy Jones, Teck Resources
  2. Mark Weick, The Dow Chemical Company
  3. Carlo Galli, Nestlé
  4. Andre Fourie, ABInbev
  5. Naty Barak, Netafim
  6. Inge Huijbrechts, Radisson Hotel Group
  7. Feroz Koor, Woolworth Holdings
  8. Adriana Lagrotta Leles, SANASA
  9. Erika Korosi, BHP
  10. Michael Alexander, Diageo

Some observations on this list:

  • Teck Resources is a mining conglomerate, and Dow Chemical is (no shocker), a chemical company. Strange choices to have on your committee.
  • Interesting to note: The Radisson Hotel in Toronto has been converted into a migrant camp. Of course this could be a total coincidence.
  • Woolsworth Holdings is a retail giant based in South Africa.
  • SANASA is a banking institution.

While individual organizational efforts will be critical in helping to address the water challenge, collective efforts – across sectors and societal spheres – will also be required. Such multi-stakeholder collaboration can draw on significant expertise, capacities and resources. Utilizing frameworks such as the UN Global Compact, companies can participate in collective efforts to address water sustainability.

4. Collective Action

Therefore, we pledge to undertake the following actions, where appropriate, over time:

  • Build closer ties with civil society organizations, especially at the regional and local levels.
  • Work with national, regional and local governments and public authorities to address water sustainability issues and policies, as well as with relevant international institutions – e.g., the UNEP Global Programme of Action.
  • Encourage development and use of new technologies, including efficient irrigation methods, new plant varieties, drought resistance, water efficiency and salt tolerance.
  • Be actively involved in the UN Global Compact’s Country Networks.
  • Support the work of existing water initiatives involving the private sector – e.g., the Global Water Challenge; UNICEF’s Water, Environment and Sanitation Program; IFRC Water and Sanitation Program; the World Economic Forum Water Initiative – and collaborate with other relevant UN bodies and intergovernmental organizations – e.g., the World Health Organization, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and the World Bank Group

The collective action that they speak of, is collaborating with the United Nations, and approved partners. This is globalist control over water resources.

Of course, while this wording sounds all lovely and flowery, it is not yet clear what sort of force will be used (if any) to ensure these goals are met.

Globalist regulation of water resources and determination over how it is used, and in what amounts. What could possibly go wrong?