Challenge To Proposed UN Parliament: Calgary

(Topic Previously Covered by Canuck Law)

CLICK HERE, for a very interesting page on free speech in Canada (links included).

Here is a portion of what is going to the Federal Court of Canada:

REMEDY SOUGHT
(a) To issue a permanent, binding injunction against the Federal Government ever participating in such a United Nations Parliament or other ”World Government” scheme on the grounds it violates the laws cited above

(b) To find that any such actions in furtherance of this scheme are unconstitutional.

Alternatively an order that:
(c) To rule that any such measure would require the following forms of consent:
I/ Vote from the Federal House of Commons
II/ Vote from the Senate
III/ Signature of the Prime Minister
IV/ Royal Assent from the Governor General
V/ A nationwide referendum on this issue with 75% majority
VI/ 7 of 10 Provinces (with 50%+ population) affirming

Note, should that alternative be ordered, it is asked that the court also rule for (c), that any Province or Municipality that wishes to opt out may do so.

Written submissions For challenge to UN Parliament

Part I: Jurisdiction
Part II: Issues
Part III: Facts
Part IV: Law
Part V: Authorities
Part VI: Order Sought
Part I: Jurisdiction

Part I: Jurisdiction

  1. Under Section 18 of the Federal Courts Act, and Section 300/301 of Federal Court Rules, the Federal Court of Canada has jurisdiction to hear such an application.

  2. Federal Court also has jurisdiction to issue an injunction under Rule 18(1)(a) and 18(3) of Federal Courts Act ”
    18 (1) Subject to section 28, the Federal Court has exclusive original jurisdiction (a) to issue an injunction, writ of certiorari, writ of prohibition, writ of mandamus or writ of quo warranto, or grant declaratory relief, against any federal board, commission or other tribunal;

  3. Remedies to be obtained on application
    (3) The remedies provided for in subsections (1) and (2) may be obtained only on an application for judicial review made under section 18.1.

  4. Rule 303(2) in Federal Court Rules states that in an application for judicial review (which an extension of time is sought here), where no person can be named, the Attorney General of Canada shall be named as a Respondent. Since there is no ”single person” who is responsible for this mess, the Attorney General of Canada shall be named as a Defendant

Part II: Issues

  1. Seven questions to consider

  2. First: Does the proposed UN Parliamentary Assembly (World Government), violate the 1867-1982 Constitution Act, which requires the Government of Canada to provide, “Peace, Order and Good Government” and makes no provision for abdication of that duty to supra-national bodies?

  3. Second: Does the proposed UN Parliamentary Assembly (World Government) violate the 1982 Constitution Act, which states that it is the supreme law of Canada, and that any laws that any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect.”

  4. Third: Considering that this would add a new layer of Government to Canada, would this violate Sections 91 and 92 of the Consitution, which separate Federal and Provincial Jurisdictions?

  5. Fourth: Does the proposed UN Parliamentary Assembly (World Government), require a constitutional amendment (Part V, Section 38 of the Constitution) that would require consent of:
    (a) The House of Commons
    (b) The Senate
    (c) 7 of 10 Provinces, consisting of 50%+ of the population

  6. Fifth: Does the proposed UN Parliamentary Assembly (World Government) violate Section 3 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which ensure all Canadians the right to participate in their democracy?

  7. Sixth: Given some of the initiatives the UN proposes, such as internet regulation and free speech restrictions, would these violate Canadians’ fundamental freedoms, enshrined in Section 2 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and explicitly affirmed in Section 32?

  8. Seventh: Would the proposed UN Parliamentary Assembly (World Government), violate Part II, Section 35 of the Constitution of Canada, which enshrines Aboriginal Rights?

Part III: Facts

  1. The United Nations (UN) is a globalist body which more and more is taking rights and sovereignty away from individual nation states

  2. Since 2007, there has been an initiative by high ranking politicians and former politicians of ”UN Countries” to form a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly (UNPA). Dozens of current Canadian MPs, including Liberal, NDP, PM Justin Trudeau, and Green Party Leader Elizabeth May have all endorsed such a World Gov’t (Exhibit B)

  3. As shown by screenshots (Exhibit A) from the website, the goal is explicitly to form LEGALLY BINDING decisions. This would in effect reduce nations to mere ”States” or ”Provinces” of the UN.

  4. Other initiatives by the UN include
    A/ Internet governance (digital cooperation)
    B/ Global ban on blasphemy (criticism of Islam)
    C/ Gender language agenda
    D/ Global MIgration Compact (258M economic migrants)
    E/ Paris Accord (carbon taxes)
    F/ UN Global Citizenship Education
    G/ Encouraging repatriation of Islamic terrorists
    H/ Right to abortion (even for children)
    I/ Agenda 21 (June 1992)
    J/ Agenda 2030 (September 2015)
    K/ Urban Development Agenda

  5. This is only a partial list. But if this proposed UN Parliamentary Assembly (World Government) were ever to take place, all of these ”non-legally binding” initiatives will become ”legally-binding”.

  6. Canadians have never been asked to vote on such a matter, either at the Municipal, Provincial or Federal level. The Government of Canada (nor any Gov’t) has no legal or moral mandate to enact such a proposal.

  7. Canadians have never participated in any sort of national referendum to guage interest and approval of such an idea.

  8. Canadians have never had the sort of public debate necessary to give an informed and intelligent response to such a proposed World Government.

Part IV: Relevant Laws

  1. The proposed United Nations Parliamentary Assembly (World Government) should be rejected because it violates a number of Constitutional provisions. Here are some of them:

(a) Section 2 of Charter: Fundamental Freedoms
(b) Section 3 of Charter: Right to participate in democracy
(c) Section 32 of Charter: Applicability
(d) Part II, Section 35 of Constitution, Aboriginal rights
(e) Part V, Section 38 of Constitution, amending Constitution
(f) Part VII, Section 52 of Constitution, primacy of Constitution
(g) Part VI: Section 91 & 92 of Constitution, distribution of powers

FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS (S2)

  1. (a) Fundamental Freedoms
    Marginal note:
    Fundamental freedoms
  2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms:
    (a) freedom of conscience and religion;
    (b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication;
    (c) freedom of peaceful assembly; and
    (d) freedom of association.

DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS (S3)

  1. Democratic Rights
    Marginal note:
    Democratic rights of citizens
  2. Every citizen of Canada has the right to vote in an election of members of the House of Commons or of a legislative assembly and to be qualified for membership therein.

APPLICATION OF THE CHARTER (S32)

  1. Application of Charter
    Marginal note:
    Application of Charter
  2. (1) This Charter applies
    (a) to the Parliament and government of Canada in respect of all matters within the authority of Parliament including all matters relating to the Yukon Territory and Northwest Territories; and
    (b) to the legislature and government of each province in respect of all matters within the authority of the legislature of each province.

ABORIGINAL RIGHTS (S35)

  1. RIGHTS OF THE ABORIGINAL PEOPLES OF CANADA
    Marginal note:
    Recognition of existing aboriginal and treaty rights
  2. (1) The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.
    Definition of “aboriginal peoples of Canada”
    (2) In this Act, “aboriginal peoples of Canada” includes the Indian, Inuit and Métis peoples of Canada.
    Marginal note:
    Land claims agreements
    (3) For greater certainty, in subsection (1) “treaty rights” includes rights that now exist by way of land claims agreements or may be so acquired.

PROCEDURE FOR AMENDING CONSTITUTION (S38)

  1. PROCEDURE FOR AMENDING CONSTITUTION OF CANADA (101)
    Marginal note:
    General procedure for amending Constitution of Canada
  2. (1) An amendment to the Constitution of Canada may be made by proclamation issued by the Governor General under the Great Seal of Canada where so authorized by
    (a) resolutions of the Senate and House of Commons; and
    (b) resolutions of the legislative assemblies of at least two-thirds of the provinces that have, in the aggregate, according to the then latest general census, at least fifty per cent of the population of all the provinces.
    Marginal note:
    Majority of members
    (2) An amendment made under subsection (1) that derogates from the legislative powers, the proprietary rights or any other rights or privileges of the legislature or government of a province shall require a resolution supported by a majority of the members of each of the Senate, the House of Commons and the legislative assemblies required under subsection (1).
    Marginal note:
    Expression of dissent
    (3) An amendment referred to in subsection (2) shall not have effect in a province the legislative assembly of which has expressed its dissent thereto by resolution supported by a majority of its members prior to the issue of the proclamation to which the amendment relates unless that legislative assembly, subsequently, by resolution supported by a majority of its members, revokes its dissent and authorizes the amendment.

PRIMACY OF CONSTITUTION (S52)

  1. Primacy of Constitution of Canada
  2. (1) The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect.
    Marginal note:
    Constitution of Canada
    (2) The Constitution of Canada includes
    (a) the Canada Act 1982, including this Act;
    (b) the Acts and orders referred to in the schedule; and
    (c) any amendment to any Act or order referred to in paragraph (a) or (b).
    Marginal note:
    Amendments to Constitution of Canada
    (3) Amendments to the Constitution of Canada shall be made only in accordance with the authority contained in the Constitution of Canada.

DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS (S91/S92)

  1. VI. DISTRIBUTION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS
    Powers of the Parliament
    Marginal note:
    Legislative Authority of Parliament of Canada
  2. It shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate and House of Commons, to make Laws for the Peace, Order, and good Government of Canada, in relation to all Matters not coming within the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces; and for greater Certainty, but not so as to restrict the Generality of the foregoing Terms of this Section, it is hereby declared that (notwithstanding anything in this Act) the exclusive Legislative Authority of the Parliament of Canada extends to all Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter enumerated; that is to say,
  3. Repealed. (44)
    1A.
    The Public Debt and Property. (45)
  4. The Regulation of Trade and Commerce.
    2A.
    Unemployment insurance. (46)
  5. The raising of Money by any Mode or System of Taxation.
    And any Matter coming within any of the Classes of Subjects enumerated in this Section shall not be deemed to come within the Class of Matters of a local or private Nature comprised in the Enumeration of the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces. (47)
    Exclusive Powers of Provincial Legislatures
    Marginal note:
    Subjects of exclusive Provincial Legislation
  6. In each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in relation to Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter enumerated; that is to say,
  7. Repealed. (48)
  8. Direct Taxation within the Province in order to the raising of a Revenue for Provincial Purposes.
  9. The borrowing of Money on the sole Credit of the Province.
  10. The Establishment and Tenure of Provincial Offices and the Appointment and Payment of Provincial Officers.
  11. The Management and Sale of the Public Lands belonging to the Province and of the Timber and Wood thereon.
  12. The Establishment, Maintenance, and Management of Public and Reformatory Prisons in and for the Province.
  13. The Establishment, Maintenance, and Management of Hospitals, Asylums, Charities, and Eleemosynary Institutions in and for the Province, other than Marine Hospitals.
  14. Municipal Institutions in the Province.
  15. Shop, Saloon, Tavern, Auctioneer, and other Licences in order to the raising of a Revenue for Provincial, Local, or Municipal Purposes.
  16. Local Works and Undertakings other than such as are of the following Classes:
    (a)
    Lines of Steam or other Ships, Railways, Canals, Telegraphs, and other Works and Undertakings connecting the Province with any other or others of the Provinces, or extending beyond the Limits of the Province:
    (b)
    Lines of Steam Ships between the Province and any British or Foreign Country:
    (c)
    Such Works as, although wholly situate within the Province, are before or after their Execution declared by the Parliament of Canada to be for the general Advantage of Canada or for the Advantage of Two or more of the Provinces.
  17. The Incorporation of Companies with Provincial Objects.
  18. The Solemnization of Marriage in the Province.
  19. Property and Civil Rights in the Province.
  20. The Administration of Justice in the Province, including the Constitution, Maintenance, and Organization of Provincial Courts, both of Civil and of Criminal Jurisdiction, and including Procedure in Civil Matters in those Courts.
  21. The Imposition of Punishment by Fine, Penalty, or Imprisonment for enforcing any Law of the Province made in relation to any Matter coming within any of the Classes of Subjects enumerated in this Section.
  22. Generally all Matters of a merely local or private Nature in the Province.

  23. Sections 91 and 92 have no provision for any supra-national body to interfere with this distribution of powers.

  24. Note that ”Parliamentary Perogative” does not apply here, since the proposed Gobal Government is not a treaty BETWEEN governments. Rather, it would dissolve nations in favour of a supra-national body,

Part V: Authorities

Reference re Senate Reform, [2014] 1 SCR 704, 2014 SCC 32 (CanLII) (S38)
CLICK HERE, for full text of decision.

Sibbeston v. Canada (Attorney-General), 1988 CanLII 5673 (NWT CA) (S52)
CLICK HERE, for full text of decision.

Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 SCR 927, 1989 CanLII 87 (SCC) (S2)
CLICK HERE, for the full text of decision.

Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] 1 S.C.R. 912 (S3)
CLICK HERE, for decision, view para 27, 30, 31.

2 cases on Aboriginal duty to consult:
Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] 3 SCR 511, 2004 SCC 73 (CanLII) (S35)
(1) CLICK HERE, for full text of decision.

(2) Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia (Project Assessment Director), [2004] 3 SCR 550, 2004 SCC 74 (CanLII) (S35)
CLICK HERE, for full text of decision.


Reference re Senate Reform, [2014] 1 SCR 704, 2014 SCC 32 (CanLII) (S38)
CLICK HERE, for full text of decision.

(a) The General Amending Procedure
[33] Section 38 of the Constitution Act, 1982 provides:
38. (1) An amendment to the Constitution of Canada may be made by proclamation issued by the Governor General under the Great Seal of Canada where so authorized by

(a) resolutions of the Senate and House of Commons; and

(b) resolutions of the legislative assemblies of at least two-thirds of the provinces that have, in the aggregate, according to the then latest general census, at least fifty per cent of the population of all the provinces.

(2) An amendment made under subsection (1) that derogates from the legislative powers, the proprietary rights or any other rights or privileges of the legislature or government of a province shall require a resolution supported by a majority of the members of each of the Senate, the House of Commons and the legislative assemblies required under subsection (1).

(3) An amendment referred to in subsection (2) shall not have effect in a province the legislative assembly of which has expressed its dissent thereto by resolution supported by a majority of its members prior to the issue of the proclamation to which the amendment relates unless that legislative assembly, subsequently, by resolution supported by a majority of its members, revokes its dissent and authorizes the amendment.

(4) A resolution of dissent made for the purposes of subsection (3) may be revoked at any time before or after the issue of the proclamation to which it relates.

[34] The process set out in s. 38 is the general rule for amendments to the Constitution of Canada. It reflects the principle that substantial provincial consent must be obtained for constitutional change that engages provincial interests. Section 38 codifies what is colloquially referred to as the “7/50” procedure — amendments to the Constitution of Canada must be authorized by resolutions of the Senate, the House of Commons, and legislative assemblies of at least seven provinces whose population represents, in the aggregate, at least half of the current population of all the provinces. Additionally, it grants to the provinces the right to “opt out” of constitutional amendments that derogate from “the legislative powers, the proprietary rights or any other rights or privileges of the legislature or government of a province”.

  1. Sibbeston v. Canada (Attorney-General), 1988 CanLII 5673 (NWT CA) (S52)
    CLICK HERE, for full text of decision.

[6] The respondent’s amended petition cannot be pursued under principles of Canadian constitutional practice that must now be regarded as established. They include the political reality that it is the people of Canada, expressing their political will through the joint constitutional authority of the Parliament of Canada and the elected legislative assemblies of the provinces, who are sovereign in the delineation of federal-provincial power-sharing under the Constitution of Canada. Beyond that no segment of the Constitution of Canada, including the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, is paramount to other segments, or indeed the balance, of the Constitution. The Constitution “as a whole” is Canada’s supreme law.

[7] Section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982, provides:
52(1) The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect.
(2) The Constitution of Canada includes
(a) the Canada Act, 1982, including this Act;
(b) the Acts and orders referred to in the schedule; and
(c) any amendment to any Act or order referred to in paragraph (a) or (b).
(3) Amendments to the Constitution of Canada shall be made only in accordance with the authority contained in the Constitution of Canada.

[8] Section 52 espouses the equality of its components including amendments. Charter scrutiny could not have been reserved by its drafters: Reference re an Act to Amend the Education Act (Ontario) (1987), 1987 CanLII 65 (SCC), 40 D.L.R. (4th) 18, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1148, 77 N.R. 241.

[9] The Constitution Act, 1982, also provides:
Application of Charter
32(1) This Charter applies
(a) to the Parliament and government of Canada in respect of all matters within the authority of Parliament including all matters relating to the Yukon Territory and Northwest Territories; and
(b) to the legislature and government of each province in respect of all matters within the authority of the legislature of each province.

  1. Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 SCR 927, 1989 CanLII 87 (SCC) (S2)
    CLICK HERE, for the full text of decision.

C.The Second Step: Was the Purpose or Effect of the Government Action to Restrict Freedom of Expression?

Having found that the plaintiff’s activity does fall within the scope of guaranteed free expression, it must next be determined whether the purpose or effect of the impugned governmental action was to control attempts to convey meaning through that activity. The importance of focussing at this stage on the purpose and effect of the legislation is nowhere more clearly stated than in R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., 1985 CanLII 69 (SCC), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at pp. 331-32 where Dickson J. (as he then was), speaking for the majority, observed:

In my view, both purpose and effect are relevant in determining constitutionality; either an unconstitutional purpose or an unconstitutional effect can invalidate legislation. All legislation is animated by an object the legislature intends to achieve. This object is realized through the impact produced by the operation and application of the legislation. Purpose and effect respectively, in the sense of the legislation’s object and its ultimate impact, are clearly linked, if not indivisible. Intended and actual effects have often been looked to for guidance in assessing the legislation’s object and thus, its validity.

Moreover, consideration of the object of legislation is vital if rights are to be fully protected. The assessment by the courts of legislative purpose focuses scrutiny upon the aims and objectives of the legislature and ensures they are consonant with the guarantees enshrined in the Charter. The declaration that certain objects lie outside the legislature’s power checks governmental action at the first stage of unconstitutional conduct. Further, it will provide more ready and more vigorous protection of constitutional rights by obviating the individual litigant’s need to prove effects violative of Charter rights. It will also allow courts to dispose of cases where the object is clearly improper, without inquiring into the legislation’s actual impact.

Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] 1 S.C.R. 912 (S2)
CLICK HERE, for decision, view para 27.

27 An understanding of s. 3 that emphasizes the right of each citizen to play a meaningful role in the electoral process also is sensitive to the full range of reasons that individual participation in the electoral process is of such importance in a free and democratic society. As Dickson C.J. wrote in R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, at p. 136:

The Court must be guided by the values and principles essential to a free and democratic society which I believe embody, to name but a few, respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, commitment to social justice and equality, accommodation of a wide variety of beliefs, respect for cultural and group identity, and faith in social and political institutions which enhance the participation of individuals and groups in society.

In this passage, Dickson C.J. was addressing s. 1 . Yet since reference to “a free and democratic society” is essential to an enriched understanding of s. 3 , this passage indicates that the best interpretation of s. 3 is one that advances the values and principles that embody a free and democratic state, including respect for a diversity of beliefs and opinions. Defining the purpose of s. 3 with reference to the right of each citizen to meaningful participation in the electoral process, best reflects the capacity of individual participation in the electoral process to enhance the quality of democracy in this country.

30 In the final analysis, I believe that the Court was correct in Haig, supra, to define s. 3 with reference to the right of each citizen to play a meaningful role in the electoral process. Democracy, of course, is a form of government in which sovereign power resides in the people as a whole. In our system of democracy, this means that each citizen must have a genuine opportunity to take part in the governance of the country through participation in the selection of elected representatives. The fundamental purpose of s. 3 , in my view, is to promote and protect the right of each citizen to play a meaningful role in the political life of the country. Absent such a right, ours would not be a true democracy.

31 For this reason, I cannot agree with LeBel J. that it is proper, at this stage of the analysis, to balance the right of each citizen to play a meaningful role in the electoral process against other democratic values, such as the aggregation of political preferences. Legislation that purports to encourage the aggregation of political preferences might advance certain collective interests, but it does not benefit all citizens, namely, those whose interests are not aggregated by the mainstream political parties. As a result, the proportionality analysis endorsed by LeBel J. clearly admits of the possibility that collective or group interests will be balanced against the right of each citizen to play a meaningful role in the electoral process at the infringement stage of the analysis. If the government is to interfere with the right of each citizen to play a meaningful role in the electoral process in order to advance other values, it must justify that infringement under s. 1 .

Also worth noting (need a residency to vote) persons who have recently arrived in a province or territory (Reference Re Yukon Election Residency Requirements (1986), 27 D.L.R. (4th) 146 (Y.T.C.A.); Storey v. Zazelenchuk (1984), 36 Sask.R. 103 (C.A.); Olson v. Ontario (1992), 12 C.R.R. (2d) 120 (Ont.Gen.Div.); Arnold v. Ontario (Attorney General) (1987), 43 D.L.R. 4th 94 (Ont.H.Ct.) — although 6 to 12 month minimum residency requirements were justified under section 1)

Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] 3 SCR 511, 2004 SCC 73 (CanLII) (S35)
CLICK HERE, for full text of decision.

26 Honourable negotiation implies a duty to consult with Aboriginal claimants and conclude an honourable agreement reflecting the claimants’ inherent rights. But proving rights may take time, sometimes a very long time. In the meantime, how are the interests under discussion to be treated? Underlying this question is the need to reconcile prior Aboriginal occupation of the land with the reality of Crown sovereignty. Is the Crown, under the aegis of its asserted sovereignty, entitled to use the resources at issue as it chooses, pending proof and resolution of the Aboriginal claim? Or must it adjust its conduct to reflect the as yet unresolved rights claimed by the Aboriginal claimants?

27 The answer, once again, lies in the honour of the Crown. The Crown, acting honourably, cannot cavalierly run roughshod over Aboriginal interests where claims affecting these interests are being seriously pursued in the process of treaty negotiation and proof. It must respect these potential, but yet unproven, interests. The Crown is not rendered impotent. It may continue to manage the resource in question pending claims resolution. But, depending on the circumstances, discussed more fully below, the honour of the Crown may require it to consult with and reasonably accommodate Aboriginal interests pending resolution of the claim. To unilaterally exploit a claimed resource during the process of proving and resolving the Aboriginal claim to that resource, may be to deprive the Aboriginal claimants of some or all of the benefit of the resource. That is not honourable.

Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia (Project Assessment Director), [2004] 3 SCR 550, 2004 SCC 74 (CanLII)
CLICK HERE, for full text of decision.

23 The Province argues that, before the determination of rights through litigation or conclusion of a treaty, it owes only a common law “duty of fair dealing” to Aboriginal peoples whose claims may be affected by government decisions. It argues that a duty to consult could arise after rights have been determined, through what it terms a “justificatory fiduciary duty”. Alternatively, it submits, a fiduciary duty may arise where the Crown has undertaken to act only in the best interests of an Aboriginal people. The Province submits that it owes the TRTFN no duty outside of these specific situations.

24 The Province’s submissions present an impoverished vision of the honour of the Crown and all that it implies. As discussed in the companion case of Haida, supra, the principle of the honour of the Crown grounds the Crown’s duty to consult and if indicated accommodate Aboriginal peoples, even prior to proof of asserted Aboriginal rights and title. The duty of honour derives from the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty in the face of prior Aboriginal occupation. It has been enshrined in s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, which recognizes and affirms existing Aboriginal rights and titles. Section 35(1) has, as one of its purposes, negotiation of just settlement of Aboriginal claims. In all its dealings with Aboriginal peoples, the Crown must act honourably, in accordance with its historical and future relationship with the Aboriginal peoples in question. The Crown’s honour cannot be interpreted narrowly or technically, but must be given full effect in order to promote the process of reconciliation mandated by s. 35(1).

25 As discussed in Haida, what the honour of the Crown requires varies with the circumstances. It may require the Crown to consult with and accommodate Aboriginal peoples prior to taking decisions: R. v. Sparrow, 1990 CanLII 104 (SCC), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, at p. 1119; R. v. Nikal, 1996 CanLII 245 (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 1013; R. v. Gladstone, 1996 CanLII 160 (SCC), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723; Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, 1997 CanLII 302 (SCC), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, at para. 168. The obligation to consult does not arise only upon proof of an Aboriginal claim, in order to justify infringement. That understanding of consultation would deny the significance of the historical roots of the honour of the Crown, and deprive it of its role in the reconciliation process. Although determining the required extent of consultation and accommodation before a final settlement is challenging, it is essential to the process mandated by s. 35(1). The duty to consult arises when a Crown actor has knowledge, real or constructive, of the potential existence of Aboriginal rights or title and contemplates conduct that might adversely affect them. This in turn may lead to a duty to change government plans or policy to accommodate Aboriginal concerns. Responsiveness is a key requirement of both consultation and accommodation.

Part VI: Order Sought

  1. (a) To issue a permanent, binding injunction against the Federal Government ever participating in such a United Nations Parliament or other ”World Government” scheme on the grounds it violates the laws cited above

(b) To find that any such actions in furtherance of this scheme are unconstitutional.

Alternatively an order that:

(c) To rule that any such measure would require the following forms of consent:
I/ Vote from the Federal House of Commons
II/ Vote from the Senate
III/ Signature of the Prime Minister
IV/ Royal Assent from the Governor General
V/ A nationwide referendum on this issue with 75% majority
VI/ 7 of 10 Provinces (with 50%+ population) affirming

Note, should that alternative be ordered, it is asked that the court also rule for (c), that any Province or Municipality that wishes to opt out may do so.

Sincerely,

Me

How I.C.B.C. Discriminates Against Drivers Born Out-Of-Province

(I.C.B.C., which holds a monopoly on car insurance in BC)

(1) Some Background Information About the Issue
(2) Written Response From I.C.B.C. Staff
(3) Written Response From I.C.B.C. Lawyer Alandra Harlengton
(4) What The Constitution Says On The Matter
(5) About The Case: Canada Egg Market Agency v. Richardson, (1998) 3 S.C.R.
(6) The Limitations Act
(7) Would This Work In Court?

(1) Some Background Information About the Issue

The Insurance Corporation of British Columbia (I.C.B.C.), is a government crown corporate that holds a legal monopoly on automobile insurance in the province. Although additional coverage is available privately, those wishing to legally drive must buy the $200,000 3rd party liability insurance through I.C.B.C.

Needless to say, since this is a government monopoly, there is no incentive to operate efficiently, or to provide good service. Even so, they routine post huge losses. No worries, just jack up rates on the drivers. It’s a captive market. They can complain, but there is no avenue of recourse.

But this article is about a specific grievance: that I.C.B.C. has different rules for drivers when it comes to calculating the base rate, SEE HERE. In short, new drivers start at a CRS of zero ”0”, and it is adjusted up or down depending on whether you have accidents, or drive claims free.

But here is the difference:

(a) A BC-born driver immediately begins accruing years of ”claims free driving” as soon as he/she gets a license. No experience or skill is required. If you got a license at age 16, but don’t get insured until age 30, you would begin at -14, or the maximum 43% discount.

(b) A driver born in another province who moves to BC is subjected to different rules. Here, you don’t get ”claims free driving” for mere possession of a license. You can get up to 8 years from another jurisdiction, but only for time which you actually held insurance. If you came from Ontario, Alberta, Saskatchewan, etc… you may have had a license since age 16, but will still start at 0 when you finally get insurance.

Note: should you move to BC a a year or more prior to getting insurance, that time will be considered ”claims free driving”.

Since simple possession of a BC license means ”experience” and of ”claims free driving” then actual experience is irrelevant. It is this double standard that is illegal.

(2) Written Responses From I.C.B.C. Staff
From Customer Service Rep Catherine Dixon:

”…Under the CRS system the maximum discount on compulsory basic insurance is 43 per cent, and that discount percentage applies to policies that reflect nine or more claim-free years. If you, as a new resident with a 40 per cent discount, stay claims-free for one more year, you will have the best discount on Basic, which is three percent more than the out of province entry point.

“New residents” are defined as customers whose auto insurance history with insurers is outside British Columbia or when they return to British Columbia after an absence of more than eight years. Since January 1, 2001, new certificates of ICBC insurance issued to new residents are subject to the following:
Each full year of being claim-free represents a five per cent discount on the base premium up to a maximum of 40 per cent.
The maximum discount allowed is level -8 (40 per cent) effective the ICBC history start date.

When a customer has been outside of British Columbia for more than eight years, ICBC follows the Basic Insurance Tariff, which has the force of a Regulation in the province of British Columbia. The Tariff outlines that ICBC will start from the date of the application for insurance and count backwards the number of “full chargeable claim payment free years” to a maximum of 8 years. The Tariff states that a new resident applying for a discount must provide verification letters from each previous insurer documenting a continuous record of the applicant’s coverage history. This history is a maximum of eight years and must immediately precede the date of the application for insurance in British Columbia. The Basic Insurance Tariff can be found on ICBC’s website: http://www.icbc.com/about-icbc/company-info/Documents/bcuc/basic-tariff.pdf#search=Tariff.

Information on moving to British Columbia can be found on the ICBC website, at: http://www.icbc.com/autoplan/moving-insurance/Pages/Default.aspx.

Ms. Dixon confirms in writing that out of province drivers are subjected to different rules.

While she is careful to avoid expressing saying ”double standard”, she goes on at length to explain how I.C.B.C. treats non-BC born drivers differently. She is also careful to avoid answering the question of Sections 6 (Mobility) and 15(1) (Equality) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Those will be addressed later.

CLICK HERE, for Basic Insurance Tariff

(3) Written Response From I.C.B.C. Lawyer Alandra Harlengton
From I.C.B.C. Lawyer Alandra Harlengton

“….The distinct roles of ICBC and the British Columbia Utilities Commission
1.
Section 2 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 231, provides that, if the Insurance Corporation Act authorizes ICBC to operate a plan of universal compulsory vehicle insurance, ICBC must operate the plan of universal compulsory vehicle insurance in accordance with the Insurance (Vehicle) Act and regulations.
2.
The Insurance (Vehicle) Act provides ICBC the authority to establish classes and subclasses of vehicles and drivers of vehicles, and basic premiums that apply to those classes as well as premium discounts and additional premiums based on, among other things, the accident record of the owner or driver: Insurance (Vehicle) Act, ss. 34(1) and 35.

  1. The Utilities Commission Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 473, applies to and in respect of ICBC’s rates for basic insurance as if it were a public utility, except where expressly precluded under the Insurance Corporation Act.

  2. The British Columbia Utilities Commission (the “Commission”) is a statutory body continued under s. 2 of the Utilities Commission Act.

ICBC and the Commission have distinct but interrelated roles. The Commission may determine and set adequate, efficient, just and reasonable standards, practices or procedures to be used by ICBC in providing universal compulsory vehicle insurance and may order ICBC to comply with those standards, practices or procedures: Insurance Corporation Act, s. 45(2).

ICBC must make available universal compulsory vehicle insurance in a manner, and in accordance with practice and procedures, that the Commission considers are in all respects adequate, efficient, just and reasonable: Insurance Corporation Act, s. 45(1).

The Commission may exercise its powers and duties under the Insurance Corporation Act in relation to ICBC’s provision of universal compulsory vehicle insurance, but not in relation to the provision of insurance to any one customer: Insurance Corporation Act, s. 45(5).

The rates to be applied to applications for basic insurance premiums are approved by the Commission pursuant to s. 46.2 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act, ss. 44 and 45 of the Insurance Corporation Act, ss. 58 to 60 of the Utilities Commission Act, and the Special Direction IC2 to the British Columbia Utilities Commission, B.C. Reg. 307/2004, which provides direction to the Commission regarding ICBC.

  1. The Insurance (Vehicle) Act specifically confers jurisdiction on the Commission to approve, require replacement of, or to override and replace, classes and subclasses of vehicles and drivers, basic premiums, additional premiums, and discounts for universal compulsory vehicle insurance: Insurance (Vehicle) Act, s. 46.2.

  2. The Special Direction IC2 to the British Columbia Utilities Commission, as amended, provides that, subject to certain exceptions, the Commission may not determine rates based on age, gender, or marital status (s. 3(1)(i)). Under the Insurance Corporation Act and Utilities Commission Act, an insured’s driving history is not a protected ground.

As part of its mandate, the Commission is empowered to inquire into, hear and determine any application by or on behalf of any interested party or on its own motion regarding whether ICBC is administering the universal compulsory vehicle insurance in a manner that is adequate, efficient, just and reasonable. Upon doing so, the Commission may make an order granting the whole or part of the relief applied for or may grant further or other relief, as the Commission considers advisable: Insurance Corporation Act, s. 45(2); see also, Utilities Commission Act, ss. 2.1, 58, 72, 99 to 105.

The rates for basic insurance premiums contained in the Basic Insurance Tariff
and applied to the plaintiff were approved by the Commission, after ICBC received a direction from the Province of British Columbia to prepare and implement a basic insurance rate design plan that required ICBC to, among other things, retain the CRS until at least the 2011 rate year.

13
ICBC cannot charge a rate for universal compulsory vehicle insurance other than the rates approved by the Commission. The Utilities Commission Act stipulates that rates approved by the Commission are the only lawful enforceable, and collectable rates of ICBC for universal compulsory insurance, and no other rate may be collected, charged, or enforced: Utilities Commission Act, s. 61(3)…”

It is interesting that Ms. Harlengton goes on to ”deny” that there is any double standard of how non-BC born drivers are treated. She very explicitly denies this.

She then spends a lot of time ”justifiying” why this double standard exists, citing the: 1/ Basic Insurance Tariff; 2/ Insurance Corporation Act; and 3/ Utilities Commission Act.

Here’s the thing: when you start explaining why a double standard exists, you are no longer denying the double standard. Rather you are justifying it.

Logically, once you start justifying an action, you are in fact admitting that action.

As an example: Suppose a robber breaks into my home, and I shoot him to protect my family. I then call the police. I am not denying that I did the shooting, but rather, am justifying or explaining why it happened.

Justifying involves admitting the underlying facts.

And again, if all one needs for claims-free driving is a BC driver’s license, then actual experience is not needed. So a license from any province should be suitable.

(4) What The Constitution Says On The Matter

Enforcement of guaranteed rights and freedoms

24. (1) Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been infringed or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances.

So, if you believe that other constitutional rights are being violated, under Section 24, you may seek a remedy in the courts. In this case, BC Supreme Court is the place

Note #1: Even though the Civil Resolution Tribunal covers very small amounts, they will not get involved in any case that involves a government body.

Note #2: Although Small Claims Court would be suitable for small amounts, they will not get involved in cases that involve questions of law.


Mobility of citizens
6. (1) Every citizen of Canada has the right to enter, remain in and leave Canada.

Marginal note:Rights to move and gain livelihood
(2) Every citizen of Canada and every person who has the status of a permanent resident of Canada has the right

(a) to move to and take up residence in any province; and

(b) to pursue the gaining of a livelihood in any province.

Marginal note:Limitation
(3) The rights specified in subsection (2) are subject to

(a) any laws or practices of general application in force in a province other than those that discriminate among persons primarily on the basis of province of present or previous residence; and

(b) any laws providing for reasonable residency requirements as a qualification for the receipt of publicly provided social services

Note, there is a specific case Canada Egg Market Agency v. Richardson, (1998) 3 S.C.R., that addresses this issue, but in an unrelated case. That will be covered in the next part.

I.C.B.C also violates Section 15(1), Equality.

Equality Rights

Marginal note:Equality before and under law and equal protection and benefit of law
15. (1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.

Before anyone gets fussy, the wording means this list is not exclusive, and may include other grounds.

Furthermore, the Canadian Constitution is supreme over these provincial acts I.C.B.C. relies on. Here are 2 more sections, 32 and 52:


Application of Charter
32. (1) This Charter applies

(a) to the Parliament and government of Canada in respect of all matters within the authority of Parliament including all matters relating to the Yukon Territory and Northwest Territories; and

(b) to the legislature and government of each province in respect of all matters within the authority of the legislature of each province.

*******************************

Primacy of Constitution of Canada
52. (1) The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect.

Marginal note:Constitution of Canada
(2) The Constitution of Canada includes

(a) the Canada Act 1982, including this Act;

(b) the Acts and orders referred to in the schedule; and

(c) any amendment to any Act or order referred to in paragraph (a) or (b).

Marginal note:Amendments to Constitution of Canada
(3) Amendments to the Constitution of Canada shall be made only in accordance with the authority contained in the Constitution of Canada.

(6) About The Case: Canada Egg Market Agency v. Richardson, (1998) 3 S.C.R.
CLICK HERE,

for the case of: Canada Egg Market Agency v. Richardson, (1998)

49 Section 6 of the Charter states:

                                                     Mobility Rights
  1. (1) Every citizen of Canada has the right to enter, remain in and leave Canada.

(2) Every citizen of Canada and every person who has the status of a permanent resident of Canada has the right

(a) to move to and take up residence in any province; and

(b) to pursue the gaining of a livelihood in any province.

(3) The rights specified in subsection (2) are subject to

(a) any laws or practices of general application in force in a province other than those that discriminate among persons primarily on the basis of province of present or previous residence; an

(b) any laws providing for reasonable residency requirements as a qualification for the receipt of publicly provided social services.

(4) Subsections (2) and (3) do not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object the amelioration in a province of conditions of individuals in that province who are socially or economically disadvantaged if the rate of employment in that province is below the rate of employment in Canada.

The scope given to these words has significant implications for the exercise of the federal and provincial powers enumerated in ss. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867, respectively. This context makes it necessary to consider carefully the purpose and role of the mobility section, and of the Charter itself in our constitutional order. The necessity of returning to first principles is heightened by the scarcity of both jurisprudence and academic commentary on s. 6.

(a) The Nature of the Right

50 The specific sections of the Charter raised in this case are s. 6(2)(b) and s. 6(3)(a). A preliminary problem is whether the two paragraphs should be read together as establishing a single right which is internally qualified, or whether, alternatively, the first paragraph establishes a self-contained right which is externally qualified by the second paragraph. Section 6(2)(b) guarantees the right to “pursue the gaining of a livelihood in any province”. Section 6(3)(a) then dramatically narrows the ambit of that right, making it subject to laws of general application in the province, except those which discriminate against individuals “primarily on the basis of province of present or previous residence”. In our view, it is impossible to ascertain the purpose of the extremely broad statement in s. 6(2)(b) without importing the limitation contained in s. 6(3)(a).

51 In Malartic Hygrade Gold Mines Ltd. v. The Queen in Right of Quebec (1982), 1982 CanLII 2870 (QC CS), 142 D.L.R. (3d) 512 (Que. Sup. Ct.), the relationship between the two paragraphs is explained according to the following dialectic, at p. 521:

[TRANSLATION]

(a) The principle: The right to pursue the gaining of a livelihood in any province;

(b) The exception: This right is subject to any laws or practices of a general application in force in that province;

(c) The exception to the exception: Except if these laws discriminate among persons primarily on the basis of the province of residence.

On close examination, it will be observed that (b) almost entirely undermines the guarantee set out in (a); meaning, scope and purpose can only be attributed to (a) by reading it in conjunction with (c). The correctness of this general approach was recognized in both of the major Supreme Court decisions on s. 6, Law Society of Upper Canada v. Skapinker, 1984 CanLII 3 (SCC), [1984] 1 S.C.R. 357, and Black v. Law Society of Alberta, 1989 CanLII 132 (SCC), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 591.

Although the circumstances of the case are quite different than I.C.B.C. and auto insurance, the principle outlined here still applies.

(a) The principle: The right to pursue the gaining of a livelihood in any province;

(b) The exception: This right is subject to any laws or practices of a general application in force in that province;

(c) The exception to the exception: Except if these laws discriminate among persons primarily on the basis of the province of residence.

Here, the principle would be the right of any Canadian citizen to move to any province, including that of British Columbia.

The exception would be that all those wishing to drive must go through I.C.B.C., regardless of what their previous insurance rules were.

The exception to the exception is that drivers new to BC would not be subjected to the ”moving to BC” guidelines that I.C.B.C. lays out, since they financially punish drivers for the crime of not being born in BC.

Once more, since simply having a BC driver’s license counts as ”claims free driving”, then actual experience becomes irrelevant.

(6) The Limitations Act

What about illegal overpayments from a long time ago?

Division 1 — Establishment of Basic Limitation Period

Basic limitation period
6 (1) Subject to this Act, a court proceeding in respect of a claim must not be commenced more than 2 years after the day on which the claim is discovered.

(2) The 2 year limitation period established under subsection (1) of this section does not apply to a court proceeding referred to in section 7.

Admittedly, this is trickier. However, there are other things to consider (Note: a Court may not agree)

General discovery rules
8 Except for those special situations referred to in sections 9 to 11, a claim is discovered by a person on the first day on which the person knew or reasonably ought to have known all of the following:

(a) that injury, loss or damage had occurred;

(b) that the injury, loss or damage was caused by or contributed to by an act or omission;

(c) that the act or omission was that of the person against whom the claim is or may be made;

(d) that, having regard to the nature of the injury, loss or damage, a court proceeding would be an appropriate means to seek to remedy the injury, loss or damage.

Limitation periods extended if liability acknowledged
24 (1) If, before the expiry of either of the limitation periods that, under this Act, apply to a claim, a person acknowledges liability in respect of the claim,

(a) the claim must not be considered to have been discovered on any day earlier than the day on which the acknowledgement is made, and

(b) the act or omission on which the claim is based is deemed to have taken place on the day on which the acknowledgement is made.

(2) An acknowledgement of liability in respect of a claim for interest is also an acknowledgement of liability in respect of a claim for

(a) the outstanding principal, if any, and

(b) interest falling due after the acknowledgement is made.

Other possible arguments would involve that I.C.B.C. commits fraud (section 380 of criminal code) with their policies, or that it is a corrupt enterprise.

Note: These arguments, even if they fail, does not mean the claim would not be valid, just that a person couldn’t go further back to make a claim for over payment.

(7) Would This Work In Court?
Difficult to say, as Judges don’t always behave in consistent or logical ways. However, consider this:

THE FACTS are on the side of the non-BC born driver. I.C.B.C. admits they have different sets of rules. They justify them at great length, but then deny there is actually a double standard.

THE LAWS are on the side of the non-BC born driver. Sections 6 (mobility) and 15 (equality) are spelled out quite clearly in the Charter. Sections 32 (applicability) and 52 (supremacy) show that the constitution is supreme to other laws. Other laws that conflict have no effect and are unenforceable. To be fair, the Limitations Act may make older overpayments hard to collect on.

I.C.B.C. is proposing changing this rule anyway. SEE HERE. Among the new proposals would change the rules so that all you need is a driver’s license, regardless of province.Pretty hard to argue their current policies are justified.

Very interesting to see how this will play out in such a case.

Representing Yourself in Court (Review)

(How to Win Your Own Case, by Devlin Farmer)

This is basically an instructional book written in 2015 for those wishing to represent themselves in court.

Unlike An Advocacy Primer, covered in September, the Farmer book contains much more basic information, and is much more simplified. It assumes that the readers have little to no knowledge about how the court proceedings work, and is a lot more reader friendly.

An interesting Supreme Court ruling, Pintea v. Johns, came out in 2017. It codified the obligations of Justices, Judges, Masters, and Deputy Judges to ensure that self-represented litigants are getting fair treatment in court. In fairness to the author, it was 2 years after the book was published.

A Brief Outline of The Book
Part 1: Alternatives to court
Part 2: Learning the law
Part 3: Filing
Part 4: Lawyers
Part 5: Discovery
Part 6: Motions and temporary orders
Part 7: Pre-trial prep
Part 8: Trial proceedings
Part 9: Witnesses
Part 10: Exhibits
Part 11: Closing arguments
Part 12: Intro to appeals

By no means does the book actually prepare someone for the court. However, by explaining what is happening and why, the self-rep is able to prepare him/herself and more thoroughly understand the process.

The book is written a very basic level, yet contains a wealth of information necessary for a potential self-represented litigant to face the court. It also avoid legalese and jargon. As such, it is very readable to anyone with adult reading skills.

This book stays away from specific forms and names, which in this case is a blessing. Better to understand the process more than to be bogged down with memorization.

The book is published by “Self-Counsel Press”, which releases many self-help and how-to books on a range of topics. Overall, they are very readable. They are not tedious or intimidating at all. This publisher releases some very good content.

If you are facing (or initiating) a court case, this book will do well to helping the average reader understand what is happening. At a minimum, if you do choose to get legal counsel at some point, reading this book beforehand will enable you to make better choices. Also, you are less likely to be gouged for fees.

Overall, this is a highly recommended read for anyone with any interest in court procedures.

Progress In Legal Challenge To UN Global Migration Compact

(Liberal business sense, much like Liberal immigration policy)

(Calgary, on a beautiful, but chilly Friday evening)

***********************************************************************
The full text for UN Global Migration Compact is RIGHT HERE.

Please sign this: PETITION E-1906 CLICK HERE

UN GMC Challenged In Calgary Fed Court, 300-635 8th Ave SW.
Case File: T-2089-18. Filed December 6, 2018.
CLICK HERE for more information.
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Update To Original Story
It appears that the wrong paper work has been filled out to initiate the proceedings in Calgary. It should have been written up as an ”application for judicial review”, as opposed to starting a claim. More to be posted as it develops.

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Section 18 of Federal Courts Act

Jurisdiction of Federal Court (continued)
Marginal note:
Extraordinary remedies, federal tribunals
18 (1) Subject to section 28, the Federal Court has exclusive original jurisdiction
(a) to issue an injunction, writ of certiorari, writ of prohibition, writ of mandamus or writ of quo warranto, or grant declaratory relief, against any federal board, commission or other tribunal; and
(b) to hear and determine any application or other proceeding for relief in the nature of relief contemplated by paragraph (a), including any proceeding brought against the Attorney General of Canada, to obtain relief against a federal board, commission or other tribunal.
Marginal note:

Extraordinary remedies, members of Canadian Forces
(2) The Federal Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and determine every application for a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, writ of certiorari, writ of prohibition or writ of mandamus in relation to any member of the Canadian Forces serving outside Canada.
Marginal note:

Remedies to be obtained on application
(3) The remedies provided for in subsections (1) and (2) may be obtained only on an application for judicial review made under section 18.1.
R.S., 1985, c. F-7, s. 18; 1990, c. 8, s. 4; 2002, c. 8, s. 26.
Previous Version
Marginal note:

Application for judicial review
18.1 (1) An application for judicial review may be made by the Attorney General of Canada or by anyone directly affected by the matter in respect of which relief is sought.
Marginal note:

Time limitation
(2) An application for judicial review in respect of a decision or an order of a federal board, commission or other tribunal shall be made within 30 days after the time the decision or order was first communicated by the federal board, commission or other tribunal to the office of the Deputy Attorney General of Canada or to the party directly affected by it, or within any further time that a judge of the Federal Court may fix or allow before or after the end of those 30 days.
Marginal note:

Powers of Federal Court
(3) On an application for judicial review, the Federal Court may
(a) order a federal board, commission or other tribunal to do any act or thing it has unlawfully failed or refused to do or has unreasonably delayed in doing; or
(b) declare invalid or unlawful, or quash, set aside or set aside and refer back for determination in accordance with such directions as it considers to be appropriate, prohibit or restrain, a decision, order, act or proceeding of a federal board, commission or other tribunal.
Marginal note:

Grounds of review
(4) The Federal Court may grant relief under subsection (3) if it is satisfied that the federal board, commission or other tribunal
(a) acted without jurisdiction, acted beyond its jurisdiction or refused to exercise its jurisdiction;
(b) failed to observe a principle of natural justice, procedural fairness or other procedure that it was required by law to observe;
(c) erred in law in making a decision or an order, whether or not the error appears on the face of the record;
(d) based its decision or order on an erroneous finding of fact that it made in a perverse or capricious manner or without regard for the material before it;
(e) acted, or failed to act, by reason of fraud or perjured evidence; or
(f) acted in any other way that was contrary to law.
Marginal note:

Defect in form or technical irregularity
(5) If the sole ground for relief established on an application for judicial review is a defect in form or a technical irregularity, the Federal Court may
(a) refuse the relief if it finds that no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has occurred; and
(b) in the case of a defect in form or a technical irregularity in a decision or an order, make an order validating the decision or order, to have effect from any time and on any terms that it considers appropriate.

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Text Of Original Article
A formal legal challenge (via Statement of Claim), has been initiated against Canada’s participation in the UN Global Migration Compact. Here is where things currently stand.

(1) Statement of Claim: Filed and already served
(2) Motion Record: Finished and being served
(3) Notice of Constitutional Questions: Finished and being served

For more information, see the sections below.

(1) Statement of Claim

This was filed on Thursday, December 6. Cheeky piece done here, but nearly all of the details still apply.

(a) Relief sought: permanent injunction UN Global Migration Compact

(b) Parties: Plaintiff (you) v. Defendant (Her Majesty, the Queen)

(c) Facts alleged: Trudeau going to sign the deal, and promote globalism. Note, you can cite specifics of the UN Global Compact here, or later.

(d) Law being relied on
-Section 2(b) of Charter: Free speech
-Section 3 of Charter: Right to participate in democracy
-Section 7 of Charter: Security of the person
-Section 15 of the Charter: Equality
-Section 24 of the Charter: Remedies available in Court
-Section 32 of the Charter: Applicability of the Charter
-Section 38 of the Constitution: How to amend the Constitution
-Section 52 of the Constitution: Supremacy of the Constitution
-Sections 91 & 92 of the Constitution: Federal v. Provincial domain
-Criminal Code 380: Fraud
-Essentials of a valid contract lacking
-Doctrine of unconscionability

One correction from the last article: if you are ”only” filing against Her Majesty, the Queen, use form 48, instead of 171A. $2 filing fee instead of $150.

(2) Motion Record Compiled

This was prepared and filled out Friday, December 7, with the Court Clerk stamping the necessary forms. Service going out soon. Motion record contains:

-Notice of motion (Form 359)
-Affidavit (Form 80)
-Evidence:
(Exhibit A) Email from Liberal M.P. Stephen Fuhr
Click here for more detail
(Exhibit B) Maclean’s article from Immigration Minister Hussen
Click here, for the article
(Exhibit C) UN Global Migration Compact
Click here, for the 23 objectives.
-Written submissions (a.k.a. Arguments)

The Motion Record is to attempt a temporary injunction against the ”non-binding” UN Global Migration Compact. Given I was only visiting Calgary, a hearing by teleconference is preferable.

(3) Notice of Constitutional Questions

This is being served on all Provincial Attorney Generals/Deputy Attorney Generals. (Form 69)

See above section: 2(b); 3; 7; 15; 24; 32; 38; 52; 91/92 all being subjected to challenge.

Note: Each AG has the opportunity to: (a) support; (b) oppose; (c) be neutral

(4) Where Things Stand Now

Other than finishing with the mailings, there isn’t much to do at this point.

Currently waiting on responses from the Feds and the Provinces.

The story will be updated as progress is made

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Update To Original Story
It appears that the wrong paper work has been filled out to initiate the proceedings in Calgary. It should have been written up as an ”application for judicial review”, as opposed to starting a claim. More to be posted as it develops.

***********************************************************************

Kevin O’Leary Sues Elections Canada Over Fundraising Limits

(Kevin O’Leary, former candidate for CPC, to replace Stephen Harper)

***********************************************************************
The full text for UN Global Migration Compact is RIGHT HERE.

Please sign this: PETITION E-1906 CLICK HERE
***********************************************************************

CBC published an article announcing that former Conservative Party leadership candidate, Kevin O’Leary, is suing Elections Canada over ruling relating to how he can pay back campaign debt. During the election campaign, O’Leary accumulated about $2,000,000 in debt. Approximately $400,000 is still outstanding.

Kevin-O-Leary

A quote from the article states that:

In his claim, O’Leary said that it is proving too difficult to raise the necessary funds in the three-year timeframe set by Elections Canada laws because people are understandably “uninterested” in contributing to a failed campaign that is long over.

He has a good point. No one would be interested in contributing to a political campaign that has long since ended. So it does posse serious challenges for him to do so.

Further, the article raises an interesting question:

“If you’re out of the race, and you’re not a politician any more and you owe money to a fellow citizen, where is it right that the law protects you from ever paying it back? That’s un-Canadian. That’s unconstitutional. That’s simply wrong,”

Again, this is valid. O’Leary’s brief political career is finished. He claims to never wish to run for office again, so what is the issue with him simply paying the debts and moving on with his life? O’Leary states that he has the funds available to do so, but is prohibited from doing so under the Canada Elections Act.

The claim filed is available here, and let’s go through some of the better arguments.

Regarding the applicable laws, the claim states:

1. A declaration that subsections 367(1)(d), (6) and (7), 478.756), and 500(1) of the Canada Elections Act, SC. 2000, c. 9 (the ?Act?) (collectively referred to herein as the impugned provisions) infringe on and deny the rights and freedoms guaranteed by sections 3 and 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the Charter)

and are not saved by section 1 thereof;

2. A declaration that, insofar as the impugned provisions infringe on and deny the rights and freedoms guaranteed by sections 3 and/or 7 of the Charter and cannot be justified under section 1 of the Charter, those provisions are invalid and of no force and effect, to

the extent of the inconsistency;
3. In addition, or in the alternative:

a. A declaration that the impugned provisions violate the constitutional principle of the rule of law, which requires that laws be written and interpreted according to an intelligible legal standard that gives individuals fair notice of the conduct that will

attract imprisonment by the state;

b. A declaration that, insofar as the impugned provisions fail to meet the constitutional standard of legislative precision required by the rule of law, these provisions are invalid and of no force and effect or, in the alternative, must be read down so as to

satisfy this standard;

Okay, let’s dissect this word salad. O’Leary claims that portions of the Canada Elections Act, violate several provisions of the Canadian Charter. The “reasonable limitation is the Charter (section 1) would not apply and justify the C.E.A. Further, he implies that the C.E.A. is written in a too confusing standard to be followed.

Here is the Canada Elections Act.

Contribution limits
367 (1) Subject to subsection 373(4), no individual shall make contributions that exceed

(a) $1,500 in total in any calendar year to a particular registered party;
(b) $1,500 in total in any calendar year to the registered associations, nomination contestants and candidates of a particular registered party;
(c) $1,500 in total to a candidate for a particular election who is not the candidate of a registered party; and
(d) $1,500 in total in any calendar year to the leadership contestants in a particular leadership contest.

Contributions — candidates and leadership contestants
(6) Subject to subsection (7), no candidate in a particular election and no leadership contestant in a particular leadership contest shall make a contribution out of their own funds to their own campaign.
Marginal note:

Exception — certain contributions to own campaign
(7) The following contributions are permitted:
(a) contributions that do not exceed $5,000 in total by a candidate for a particular election out of their own funds to their own campaign; and
(b) contributions that do not exceed $25,000 in total by a leadership contestant in a particular leadership contest out of their own funds to their own campaign.

Okay, 367(1)(d) has to do with individuals making contributions being limited to $1,500 per year to any leadership contestant. Sections (6) and (7) have to do with overall individual limits. It is definitely reasonable that there should be contribution limits, in order to avoid having candidates “BOUGHT AND PAID FOR”. However, should that apply to former candidates who have since moved on.

3 potential counter arguments against O’Leary though:
(a) What if a person “hasn’t” moved on, and intends to use this relief for future campaigns?
(b) Would removing this cap be an end-run around spending limits?
(c) Would this restriction be necessary to ensure “smaller candidates” get a fair shot?

There is no 478.756 in the Canada Elections Act. It appears to be a type in the claim. However, this is the provision that I believe O’Leary was referring to. That is 478.75.

Payment within three years
478.75 (1) If a claim for a leadership campaign expense is evidenced by an invoice or other document that has been sent under section 478.74, or if a claim for repayment of a loan is made to the leadership contestant under section 373, the claim shall be paid within three years after the day on which the leadership contest ends.

Once more this seems to make a good point. The C.E.A requires repayment within 3 years. However, if former candidates must: (I) pay in 3 years or less; (II) are not actually able to raise more donations because they are not running; and (III) have strict limits as to how much of their personal wealth they can use, then there seem to be few, if any options.

Now, for section 500 of the C.E.A.:

Marginal note:
Punishment — strict liability offences
500 (1) Every person who is guilty of an offence under any of subsections 484(1), 486(1), 489(1), 491(1), 492(1), 495(1), 495.1(1), 495.2(1), 496(1), 497(1), 497.1(1), 497.2(1), 497.3(1), 497.4(1), 497.5(1) and 499(1) is liable on summary conviction to a fine of not more than $2,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than three months, or to both.

I’m not going to quote the entirety of Section 500. The point is that O’Leary is correct, the C.E.A. does in fact threaten jail time as a punishment for failing to comply.

One the surface, Kevin O’Leary’s claim seems to be valid, given the strict rules the C.E.A. sets out. But let’s now check out the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms which the lawsuit references as relief.

Democratic rights of citizens
3. Every citizen of Canada has the right to vote in an election of members of the House of Commons or of a legislative assembly and to be qualified for membership therein.

Life, liberty and security of person
7. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.

Rights and freedoms in Canada
1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.

O’Leary makes the argument that fairly large campaigns are necessary to be elected as part of a legislative assembly. Without debating the merits of “big money”, it is a fact. Campaigns and elections are expensive to run.

Section 7 has to do with punishments, which Section 500 of the C.E.A. establishes can be up to 90 days in prison for violating provisions of the act.

Section 1 is often invoked as a “reasonable justification” for restricting Charter rights. Obviously, in order to restrict, there must be some societal overall good. While Elections Canada will obviously argue differently, O’Leary is attempting to preempt the defence by stating there is none.

Thoughts And Conclusions
Obviously, this is only beginning. The claim has been filed, but no response or defence has yet been made.

On the surface, the claim makes valid points. O’Leary, like all Canadian citizens, is allowed to run for any legislative assembly or body he wishes to. Today’s reality is that campaigns are long, expensive, and a financial drain to run. However, candidates may find themselves hamstrung by campaign finance rules, which seem overly complex and tedious.

As stated earlier, I see a few possible defences for Elections Canada
(a) What if a person “hasn’t” moved on, and intends to use this relief for future campaigns?
(b) Would removing this cap be an end-run around spending limits?
(c) Would this restriction be necessary to ensure “smaller candidates” get a fair shot?

Politicians (and aspiring politicians) across the country will likely be tracking this case, as it will have real impact on future elections and party leadership races.

As a side note: CBC published the article a month after the case was filed. Not that it is relevant to the case, but did they not know about it until then?

Supreme Court Will Hear Woman Arrested for Not Holding Handrail

(Bela Kosoian, taking legal action to S.C.C.)

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The full text for UN Global Migration Compact is RIGHT HERE.

Please sign this: PETITION E-1906 CLICK HERE
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The Supreme Court of Canada has agreed to hear Bela Kosoian, a woman detained in Laval, Quebec, for refusing to hold a hand rail.

(1) Backstory of the Case
This is a a bizarre story, starting in 2009, of a woman in a Laval, QC, subway station, refused instructions from transit officers to hold a handrail while on an escalator.

When transit officers attempted to write her a ticket for the refusal to obey, she refused to identify herself. Identity is rather important in enforcing tickets. This led to her being detained for about a half hour, after which point she did reveal her name.

Kosoian was issued 2 tickets from that incident, one for $100, and one for $320. She contested both, and they were eventually thrown out.

Since then, she has taken legal action against the city, the STM, and a staff member. After a series of legal twists, it will now be heard by the Supreme Court of Canada.

(2) Quebec Court of Justice — Trial Court
Kosoian took legal action against: (a) the City of Laval; (b) Fabio Camacho — one of the officers; and (c) the Transportation Company of Montreal — aka the STM. She sought $24,000 for moral damages, pain, suffering, inconvenience and exemplary damages, and another $45,000 for moral and punitive damages for the fault committed by its agent.

Kosoian submitted a VERY LENGTHY list and description of physical and psychological trauma suffered as a resukt of being detained for about half an hour. On the surface, it seems like malingering.

Section 49 of the Canadian Charter was invoked, which states:

CHAPTER V
SPECIAL AND INTERPRETATIVE PROVISIONS

49. Any unlawful interference with any right or freedom recognized by this Charter entitles the victim to obtain the cessation of such interference and compensation for the moral or material prejudice resulting therefrom.
In case of unlawful and intentional interference, the tribunal may, in addition, condemn the person guilty of it to punitive damages.

For it’s part, the STM Referenced By-Law R-036

” BY-LAW R-036

“REGULATIONS RESPECTING THE SAFETY AND BEHAVIOR STANDARDS OF PERSONS IN ROAD EQUIPMENT AND BUILDINGS OPERATED BY OR FOR THE MONTREAL TRANSPORTATION CORPORATION”

[…]

SECTION III – GENERAL PROVISIONS

3. Subject to the law and regulations, any person has the right to use the public transportation system of the Company in comfort and safety.

Subsection I – Citizenship

4. In or on a building or rolling stock, no person shall

(a) impede or hinder the free movement of persons, including standing still, lurking, strolling, laying down or carrying a bag, container or other object;

(b) endanger the safety of persons or rolling stock, in particular by depositing or carrying a bag, container or other object;

[…]

e) to disobey a directive or pictogram posted by the Society;

[…]

h) to delay or interfere with the work of a servant of the Corporation; “

But according to the STM staff, it is not the potential safety infraction that led to Bela Kosoian being arrested. Rather, it was her refusal to identity herself when being written a ticket.

In August 2015, a Quebec Court rejected the claim. It stated that the officers acted reasonably, and that the situation was largely self-inflicted

(3) Motion for Leave, Quebec Court of Appeal
Kosoian sought leave to go to the Quebec Court of Appeal.

On December 2015, in an extremely brief ruling, the Quebec Court of Appeal allowed the appeal to proceed, dismissing a motion from the Respondents.

(4) Appeal, Quebec Court of Appeal
In a 2-1 split decision, Kosoian lost her appeal at the Quebec Court of Appeals. 2 Justices ruled that the STM and its staff had acted reasonably. In dissent, the other Justice says he would have set aside the Trial ruling, and ordered $15,000 in damages.

[ 1 ] The appellant appeals against a judgment rendered on August 11, 2015, by the Court of Quebec, District of Laval (the Honorable Denis Le Reste), dismissing the appellant’s motion to institute damages for damages .
[ 2 ] For the reasons of Dutil and Vauclair JJ., THE COURT :
[ 3 ] REJECTS the appeal with court costs.
[ 4 ] For other reasons, Schrager JA would have allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment at trial, granted the motion to institute proceedings, ordered the respondents, jointly and severally, to pay the appellant the sum of 15,000 $ with interest and the additional indemnity since the summons at first instance, as well as legal costs at first instance and on appeal, and stated that between the respondents, the Montreal Transit Corporation will have to assume the entire conviction.

(5) Supreme Court of Canada
This leads things to where they are today. Once again, the Supreme Court granting leave to appeal just now.

The motion for an extension of time and the application for leave to appeal is granted. The application for leave to appeal to the judgment of theCourt of Appeal of Quebec (Montreal), Number 500-09-025644-154, 2017 QCCA 1919 (CanLII) , date December 5, 2017, is awarded with costs in the case. The schedule for serving and filing materials will be set by the Registrar .

An interesting split so far in the courts. In Kosoian’s favour:
-Supreme Court of Canada, leave to appeal
-Quebec Court of appeal, dissenting opinion
-Quebec Court of Appeal, motion for leave

And against Kosoian:
-Quebec Court of Appeal, majority opinion
-Quebec Trial Court
-Laval ruling which dismissed the original tickets.

Personally, I see blame on both sides here. While ticketing her for refusing to hold a handrail does seem excessive, the escalation of the problems resulted from Kosoian herself. She did refuse to identify herself when being ticketed, which for the STM was a legitimate demand. Also, her claims of emotional and psychological damages seem grossly exaggerated, and manipulated to seek a huge damages amount.

The Supreme Court Appeal Panel will now decide the case.