Category: Canadian Decisions

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CCS #4: Saskatchewan COA, in 3-2 Ruling Allows Carbon Tax

(Court reference regarding Carbon tax in Saskatchewan)

(Saskatchewan Premier Scott Moe)

(Environment Minister Catherine McKenna)

1. Debunking The Climate Change Scam

CLICK HERE, for #1: major lies that the climate frauds tell.
CLICK HERE, for #2: text/review of the Paris Accord.
CLICK HERE, for #3: Bill C-97, GHG Pollution Pricing Act.

2. Important Links

SK COA Ruling On Carbon Tax
http://archive.is/tNe2k
Saskatchewan Court Of Appeal Reference Question
SKCA Attorney General Of Canada
SKCA Attorney General Of Ontario
SKCA Attorney General Of New Brunswick
SKCA Attorney General Of British Columbia
SKCA Canadian Taxpayers Association
SKCA David Suzuki Foundation
SKCA International Emissions Trading Association
SKCA United Conservative Association

CLICK HERE, for the Saskatchewan COA Reference.
CLICK HERE, for Saskatchewan Premier, Scott Moe.
CLICK HERE, for Environment Minister Catherine McKenna.
CLICK HERE, for the Paris Accord itself.

CLICK HERE, for Bjorn Lomborg, Copenhagen Consensus Center. (0.05 degrees)
CLICK HERE, for fact-checking Paris Accord. (0.20 degrees)
CLICK HERE, for limited temperature raises form 2 degrees to 1.5 (0.50).
CLICK HERE, for some skepticism.
CLICK HERE, for the Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report Summary for Policymakers [Climate Change 2014], used by Sask COA.
CLICK HERE, for the UN Conference on Climate Change (2015).

3. Quotes From Majority Ruling

[4] The factual record presented to the Court confirms that climate change caused by anthropogenic greenhouse gas [GHG] emissions is one of the great existential issues of our time. The pressing importance of limiting such emissions is accepted by all of the participants in these proceedings.

Okay, to start this off, Saskatchewan Premier Scott Moe doesn’t actually “challenge” any of the climate change alarmist claims that society depends on it. He doesn’t challenge any of the pseudo-science or the history of failed climate models. His only argument is that a Carbon tax is ineffective.

If you were expecting Premier Moe to examine or look into any of the “scientific” claims, he is not the man to do it.

[5] The Act seeks to ensure there is a minimum national price on GHG emissions in order to encourage their mitigation. Part 1 of the Act imposes a charge on GHG-producing fuels and combustible waste. Part 2 puts in place an output-based performance system for large industrial facilities. Such facilities are obliged to pay compensation if their GHG emissions exceed applicable limits. Significantly, the Act operates as no more than a backstop. It applies only those provinces or areas where the Governor in Council concludes GHG emissions are not priced at an appropriate level.

[6] The sole issue before the Court is whether Parliament has the constitutional authority to enact the Act. The issue is not whether GHG pricing should or should not be adopted or whether the Act is effective or fair. Those are questions to be answered by Parliament and by provincial legislatures, not by courts.

So not only does the Saskatchewan Government accept that climate change is a threat to our existence, it doesn’t even ask the Court to consider if such a measure is fair or effective.

[16] ….(a) “Human influence on the climate system is clear, and recent anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases are the highest in history. Recent climate changes have had widespread impacts on human and natural systems” (at 2).
.
(b) “Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, and since the 1950s, many of the observed changes are unprecedented over decades to millennia. The atmosphere and ocean have warmed, the amounts of snow and ice have diminished, and sea level has risen” (at 2).
.
(c) “Anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions have increased since the pre-industrial era, driven largely by economic and population growth, and are now higher than ever. This has led to atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide that are unprecedented in at least the last 800,000 years. Their effects, together with those of other anthropogenic drivers, have been detected throughout the climate system and are extremely likely to have been the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century” (emphasis in original, at 4).
.
(d) “Changes in many extreme weather and climate events have been observed since about 1950. Some of these changes have been linked to human influences, including a decrease in cold temperature extremes, an increase in warm temperature extremes, an increase in extreme high sea levels and an increase in the number of heavy precipitation events in a number of regions” (at 7).
.
(e) “Continued emission of greenhouse gases will cause further warming and long lasting changes in all components of the climate system, increasing the likelihood of severe, pervasive and irreversible impacts for people and ecosystems. Limiting climate change would require substantial and sustained reductions in greenhouse gas emissions which, together with adaptation, can limit climate change risks” (at 8).
.
(f) “Surface temperature is projected to rise over the 21st century under all assessed emission scenarios. It is very likely that heat waves will occur more often and last longer, and that extreme precipitation events will become more intense and frequent in many regions. The ocean will continue to warm and acidify, and global mean sea level to rise” (emphasis in original, at 10).
.
(g) “Climate change will amplify existing risks and create new risks for natural and human systems. Risks are unevenly distributed and are generally greater for disadvantaged people and communities in countries at all levels of development”
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(h) “Without additional mitigation efforts beyond those in place today, and even with adaptation, warming by the end of the 21st century will lead to high to very high risk of severe, widespread and irreversible impacts globally (high confidence). …” (emphasis in original, at 17).
.
None of these conclusions were challenged or put in issue by the participants in this Reference

Source for claims. Read through it. Despite all of the dire warnings inside, there is little to actually justify any of it.

To repeat: NONE of these “facts” are disputed by the Saskatchewan Government or Premier Moe. The Government doesn’t dispute that the IPCC claims to know what happened 800,000 years ago. It doesn’t challenge any of the predictions (and computer models are just predictions). Instead, the case will boil down to technical arguments as to whether the Feds have the jurisdiction to impose the Carbon tax.

Saskatchewan concedes all of the “factual” arguments around climate change, and instead tries to make narrow legal arguments against it being imposed.

In fact, watching Premier Moe’s speech after the ruling, it is clear he believes that the climate change scam is legitimate. Rather, he argues that the Federally mandated Carbon tax is just an ineffective means of dealing with it.

While on a technical level, Saskatchewan does make interesting arguments about jurisdiction. However, it’s difficult to justify not jumping onboard when you have agreed that climate change threatens humanity

[7] The Constitution Act, 1867 distributes legislative authority between Parliament and the provincial legislatures. Broadly speaking, a statute is valid if its essential character falls within a subject matter allocated to the legislative body that put the statute in place. Neither level of government has exclusive authority over the environment. As a result, Parliament can legislate in relation to issues such as GHGs so long as it stays within the four corners of its prescribed subject matters and the provinces can do the same so long as they stay within their prescribed areas of authority.

[8] The Attorney General of Saskatchewan [Saskatchewan] challenges the Act by submitting it imposes taxes in the constitutional sense of the term. This would normally be legally unobjectionable because Parliament enjoys a broad taxing authority. However, Saskatchewan contends the Act is invalid because the Governor in Council determines the provinces where it operates. This is said to offend the principle of federalism in that the application of the Act depends on whether a province has exercised its own jurisdiction in relation to pricing GHG emissions to a standard considered appropriate by the Governor in Council. Saskatchewan also says the Act runs afoul of s. 53 of the Constitution Act, 1867. Section 53 requires, in effect, that taxes be authorized by legislative bodies themselves, not by executive government or otherwise.

[9] Saskatchewan’s arguments on this front cannot be accepted. The principle of federalism is not a free-standing concept that can override an otherwise validly enacted law. Rather, it is a value to be taken into account when interpreting the Constitution. The s. 53 argument cannot be sustained either because, in constitutional terms, the levies imposed by the Act are regulatory charges, not taxes. In any event, even if they were taxes, the Act does not offend s. 53. Parliament has clearly and expressly authorized the Governor in Council to decide where the Act will apply.

The layman’s explanation is not that the science is sound (it isn’t) nor that such a tax is fair or appropriate. Again, the Court is only considering whether Ottawa stepped over its bounds by encroaching on a Provincial matter. The majority (a 3-2 decision), says no it does not.

[29] The federal government released a document entitled Pan-Canadian Approach to Pricing Carbon Pollution on October 3, 2016. The approach outlined in the document was grounded both on the proposition that economy-wide carbon pricing was the most efficient way to reduce GHG emissions and a recognition that several jurisdictions including British Columbia, Ontario and Québec had already introduced carbon pricing regimes. The approach proposed by the government involved a pan-Canadian “benchmark” for carbon pricing. The benchmark involved a requirement that pricing regimes apply to essentially the same emission sources as British Columbia’s carbon tax. The required stringency of the benchmark, for an explicit price-based system, was that carbon pricing should start at a minimum of $10 per tonne in 2018 and rise by $10 per year to $50 per tonne in 2022. The provinces with cap-and-trade systems would have to ensure that emission reduction targets were in line with Canada’s overall reduction target. As well, the federal government’s approach was stated to involve a “backstop”. This was the idea that the federal government would introduce an explicit price-based carbon pricing system in jurisdictions that did not meet the benchmark.

Again, the Provinces are all on board with the global warming scam, but Ottawa decided to enact a pricing scheme on Provinces that would not enact their own.

And from Saskatchewan’s own submissions:

[33]We wholeheartedly support efforts to reduce greenhouse gases. But those efforts must be effective and they must not disadvantage one region of Canada more than another. A federal carbon tax is ineffective and will impair Saskatchewan’s ability to respond to climate change.

Our opposition to the federal government’s carbon tax should not be seen as reluctance to act. Rather, it is a recognition that we must act, and act decisively, with all our economic strength. For Saskatchewan, mitigation is not enough. Our agriculture and resource-rich province must also focus on climate adaptation and resilience in order to be effective.

This reads like a dog-and-pony show. The Saskatchewan Government at every turn admitting that “climate change” is a dire threat to the world. The complaint seems to be wanting to implement its own solution.

Is Scott Moe just going through the motions?

[51] Saskatchewan advances two main lines of argument in seeking to have the Act found unconstitutional. The first is that the principle of federalism prevents Parliament from enacting a statute applicable in only some provinces because of how those provinces have chosen to exercise their legislative authority. Saskatchewan’s second argument is that the Act imposes a tax and, because it allows the Governor in Council to decide where it applies, the Act offends the requirement in s. 53 of the Constitution Act, 1867 that bills imposing taxes must originate in the House of Commons. Saskatchewan goes on to deny that, as contended by Canada, the Act can be sustained under Parliament’s authority under the national concern branch of POGG. It also denies, as suggested by some intervenors, that the Act, or features of it, can be supported under Parliament’s authority in relation to trade and commerce, emergencies, criminal law or treaties.

Argument 1: can’t treat the Provinces differently.
Argument 2: Tax bills must come from House of Commons.

Let’s address those both.

[60] It is useful to begin by underlining that, as Saskatchewan concedes, there is no recognized constitutional requirement that laws enacted by Parliament must apply uniformly from coast to coast to coast. To the contrary, a number of decisions have upheld federal laws with uneven geographic application.

[68] Saskatchewan has referred to no judicial authority which in any way directly supports the idea that the principle of federalism can or should independently render unconstitutional an otherwise valid law. Its argument on this front cannot succeed.

Several cases are then cited, in fact beating down Saskatchewan’s argument #1. That was one of 2 legal arguments, and Saskatchewan goes into Court without a single case to back up its claims. Now to get to argument #2.

[100] Saskatchewan >does not challenge Parliament’s legislative authority to enact the Act under its s. 91(3) taxation power. Indeed, it takes the initiative in arguing that the levies imposed by the Act fall under s. 91(3). Saskatchewan’s real point lays one step down the road from this characterization of the Act. It takes issue with the authority of the Governor in Council to determine the provinces and areas to which the Act will apply. This authority is said to make the Act non-compliant with s. 53.

Saskatchewan admits the Federal Government has the power to impose taxes. Rather it takes issue with the Governor in Council determining where it will apply. But in all fairness, Ottawa “did” give all Provinces the chance to come up with their own taxation policies.

Argument #1: Claiming non-uniform treatment, yet admitting there is no requirement for uniform treatment. Also, not a single case to rely in.

Argument #2: Admitting Ottawa has constitutional power to impose taxes, but arguing over how it should apply.

Some pretty weak arguments.

Now, had Saskatchewan challenged the factual basis for the climate change scam, instead of relying on narrow, legal arguments, this may have ended quite differently.

Saskatchewan did also raise this issue of “Peace, Order and Good Governance”, but that was shot down as well

[210] The advisory opinion offered in response to the question posed by the Lieutenant Governor in Council is as follows: “The Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act is not unconstitutional either in whole or in part”.

4. Quotes From Minority Dissent

[236] GHGs are gases that absorb and re-emit infrared radiation, the most prevalent of which is carbon dioxide [CO2]. GHGs are a significant contributor to climate change. For this reason, the parties and intervenors all agree that the governments of Canada and the Provinces must take steps to mitigate the anthropogenic emission of GHGs. Because none of the Attorneys General dispute the causative effect anthropogenic GHGs have on climate change or the attendant and existential necessity of mitigating anthropogenic GHG emissions, the proof or truth of these facts is not at issue. That is, they are proven and true.

[237] In policy terms, the Act is the product of the federal government’s efforts to meet Canada’s commitments under the Paris Agreement (AG-Can Record, Moffet Affidavit vol 2, Tab I). This is apparent from the terms of the March 3, 2016, Vancouver Declaration on Clean Growth and Climate Change (AG-SK Record, Tab 1 [Vancouver Declaration]), where First Ministers of Canada recognised the necessity of reducing anthropogenic GHG emissions and committed their respective governments to “[i]mplement GHG mitigation policies in support of meeting or exceeding Canada’s 2030 target of a 30% reduction below 2005 levels of emissions, including specific provincial and territorial targets and objectives”.

Even the dissenting Justices acknowledged that Saskatchewan admits the “climate change” issue is real.

[459] The Attorney General of Canada concedes the Act will cause prices of agricultural inputs to rise. Even though farmers are exempt from the fuel charge, the producers, manufacturers and retailers of farm inputs are not. Further, transportation companies that haul grain, livestock and inputs for farmers are not exempt from the fuel levy. In this way, the effect of the Act is to regulate local industries, businesses and consumer activity in a specific way chosen by the federal government, but the practical effect on a Province of the imposition of federal GHG emissions policy under the Act is a profound intrusion into the exclusive spheres of Provincial jurisdiction. As set forth earlier, the Government of Saskatchewan has indicated in the Saskatchewan Strategy that it believes the fuel levy imposed under the Act will actually impair its ability to react to and to address climate change.

[460] The Act is highly intrusive into provincial jurisdiction. Although less direct, it is only slightly less intrusive than the legislation considered in Anti-Inflation, where the federal government had sought to pervasively control wages and prices in the Provinces. Although the Supreme Court sustained that legislation under the emergency branch of POGG, it could not have sustained the legislation under the national concern branch.

[461] The Act is highly intrusive in another way. The benchmark, which determines its application in the Provinces, effectively establishes federal oversight of GHG emissions regulation by the Provinces within their spheres of exclusive jurisdiction. It is regulation of the regulator. To permit Parliament to exercise a law-making power of this nature in respect of GHGs would be to open up the use of POGG to allow regulatory oversight by the federal government over all manner of Provincial matters as it might unilaterally deem to have become matters of national concern.

[462] Of particular concern to us on the question of its impact are the provisions of the Act that make it possible for the executive branch of federal government to substantially alter the original form and effect of the Act. The provisions that permit statutory transmogrification are ss. 26, 166 to 168 and 197(1)(a). Furthermore, the pervasive use of the word prescribed in the Act confers further metamorphic power on the executive branch to alter the appearance, character and functionality of the Act. These provisions have been referred to earlier but are worth reviewing in this context. In that regard, s. 26, dealing with the fuel levy, allows the federal cabinet by prescribing certain things, to change to whom the fuel levy applies, under what conditions it applies, the manner of payment and the time of payment.

Some interesting points:
(a) Act effectively regulates local businesses.
(b) Act is highly intrusive into Provincial matters.
(c) Allows Federal regulation of Provincial matters.
(d) Feds can amend this unilaterally.

[468] In our view, the position taken by the Attorney General of Canada mirrors the scenario described above. The Act has broad effects and the potential to have even broader effect than its current terms, but these facts are ignored in the expediency of characterising the matter, whether in terms of cumulativeness or stringency, narrowly enough to qualify it as a matter of national concern. However, a court cannot ignore the fact that, by its very terms, the Act can be expanded in any way the federal cabinet determines is necessary or expedient.

[476] Before summarising our opinion, we would reiterate two points. First, we agree that all levels of government in Canada must take action to address climate change. The anthropogenic emission of GHGs is an issue of pressing concern to all Canadians and to the world. Second, Parliament has a number of constitutional powers, legislative means and administrative mechanisms at its disposal to achieve its objectives in this regard. This reference arises because Parliament chose not to avail itself of its established constitutional powers or to do so validly. Notwithstanding the existential threat of climate change, federalism in Canada means that all governments of Canada must bring all law-making power to bear on the issue of climate change, but in a way that respects the division of powers under the Constitution Act, 1867

Though some interesting legal arguments were raised, Saskatchewan plays along with the propaganda that climate change is an existential threat to humanity.

IV. OPINION
[477] Section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 states that the Constitution is the supreme law of Canada and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect. We advise the Lieutenant Governor in Council that, for the foregoing reasons, in our opinion:

(a) Part 1 of the Act is invalid, being an unconstitutional delegation of Parliament’s law-making power under s. 91(3) of the Constitution Act, 1867 and being contrary to s. 53 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

(b) The Act cannot be sustained as a valid exercise of Parliament’s other enumerated law-making powers under s. 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867 nor can it be sustained under POGG

So, by a 3-2 margin, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeals rules that the Carbon tax can be legally imposed on Provinces.

5. Actual Climate Change Research

Table 1. Impact of climate policies, optimistic and pessimistic,

for RCP8.5, using MAGICC, summary of finds described through-out the text
Change in temperature

°C year 2100 Pessimistic Optimistic
US INDC 0.008 0.031
US CPP 0.004 0.013
EU INDC 0.017 0.053
EU 2020 0.007 0.026
China INDC 0.014 0.048
RoW INDC 0.009 0.036
Global INDCs 0.048 0.170

See page 9 (Page 117 in index) for above table.
Source is here.

That’s right. Even the most optimistic climate models, would be a reduction of 0.170 degrees Celcius. Most pessimistic case would be 0.048 degrees Celcius. 0.048 to 0.170 degrees over the next century. Rather than getting nitpicky over jurisdiction, perhaps Scott Moe SHOULD have challenged the facts and evidence.

6. Was The Challenge Designed To Fail?

The “Conservative” Government of Scott Moe doesn’t challenge the climate change agenda itself. None of them do. Instead, this is extremely narrow arguments over jurisdiction. And it’s about to get much worse, so stay tuned.

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Morgane Oger Further Weaponizes Human Rights Codes, $55K Ruling

(BC “Human Rights” Commission Ruling)

(Morgane Oger Foundation)

(Proposed “Hate Map” Across Canada)

1. Important Links

(1) https://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bchrt/doc/2019/2019bchrt58/2019bchrt58.pdf
(2) ttp://www.bclaws.ca/Recon/document/ID/freeside/00_96210_01
(3) https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/const/page-15.html
(4) https://canucklaw.ca/bill-c-16-adding-gender-identity-to-human-rights-code-and-criminal-code/
(5) https://canucklaw.ca/morgane-oger-foundation-wants-to-be-another-doxxing-site/
(6) https://canucklaw.ca/weaponizing-the-human-rights-codes-and-refugee-boards/

Some Thoughts

Our favourite “serial-victim” Morgane Oger, is in the news again, this time for getting a $55,000 award ($35K for hurt feelings, and $20K in punitive damages). This was William Whatcott for calling Oger “a man”. (Oger is transgender).

A few interesting observations in reading the ruling:

(1) Morgane Oger seems perfectly content silencing William Whatcott’s free speech and right to religious expression in the name of gender identity.

(2) The BC Tribunal deliberately and repeatedly skirted the truthfulness of Whatcott’s claim that Oger is biologically male. Hormones, surgery and legal paperwork don’t change biology.

(3) The BC Tribunal awarded $35,000 in damages without any damages being proven. How exactly does one prove “hurt feelings and dignity”?

3. BC Human Rights Code

Discrimination and intent
2
Discrimination in contravention of this Code does not require an intention to contravene this Code.

Section 2 makes it very clear: absolutely no intent is required on the part of anyone in order to be found to violate someone’s human rights. For a “quasi-judicial” board, this is very disturbing. However, it seems to be the case with all provinces.

Discriminatory publication
7 (1) A person must not publish, issue or display, or cause to be published, issued or displayed, any statement, publication, notice, sign, symbol, emblem or other representation that
(a) indicates discrimination or an intention to discriminate against a person or a group or class of persons, or
(b) is likely to expose a person or a group or class of persons to hatred or contempt because of the race, colour, ancestry, place of origin, religion, marital status, family status, physical or mental disability, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or age of that person or that group or class of persons.
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a private communication, a communication intended to be private or a communication related to an activity otherwise permitted by this Code.

Oger claims that the publications were contrary to Section 7(1)(a) and (b) of the code.

Evidence
27.2 (1) A member or panel may receive and accept on oath, by affidavit or otherwise, evidence and information that the member or panel considers necessary and appropriate, whether or not the evidence or information would be admissible in a court of law.
(2) Nothing is admissible in evidence before a member or panel that is inadmissible in a court because of a privilege under the law of evidence.
(3) Despite section 4, subsection (1) of this section does not override an Act expressly limiting the extent to which or purposes for which evidence may be admitted or used in any proceeding.
(4) A member or panel may direct that all or part of the evidence of a witness be heard in private.

(4) flies in the face of an open inquiry, and doesn’t set any guidelines as to “when” it would be appropriate.
One of the problems Whatcott cited was the Commission refusing to hear all the evidence.

Remedies
37 (1) If the member or panel designated to hear a complaint determines that the complaint is not justified, the member or panel must dismiss the complaint.
(2) If the member or panel determines that the complaint is justified, the member or panel
(a) must order the person that contravened this Code to cease the contravention and to refrain from committing the same or a similar contravention,
(b) may make a declaratory order that the conduct complained of, or similar conduct, is discrimination contrary to this Code,
(c) may order the person that contravened this Code to do one or both of the following:
(i) take steps, specified in the order, to ameliorate the effects of the discriminatory practice;
(ii) adopt and implement an employment equity program or other special program to ameliorate the conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups if the evidence at the hearing indicates the person has engaged in a pattern or practice that contravenes this Code, and
(d) if the person discriminated against is a party to the complaint, or is an identifiable member of a group or class on behalf of which a complaint is filed, may order the person that contravened this Code to do one or more of the following:
(i) make available to the person discriminated against the right, opportunity or privilege that, in the opinion of the member or panel, the person was denied contrary to this Code;
(ii) compensate the person discriminated against for all, or a part the member or panel determines, of any wages or salary lost, or expenses incurred, by the contravention;
(iii) pay to the person discriminated against an amount that the member or panel considers appropriate to compensate that person for injury to dignity, feelings and self respect or to any of them.

In short, the BC Human Rights Code can award money if it rules that your feelings were hurt, or your dignity or self respect was hurt. No need to prove “actual” damages.

4. Section 2(b) Of Charter

Fundamental freedoms
2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms:
(a) freedom of conscience and religion;
(b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication;
(c) freedom of peaceful assembly; and
(d) freedom of association

5. From HRT Ruling

William Whatcott identifies himself as a Christian activist. When he learned of Ms. Oger’s candidacy, he resolved to stop her being elected. He was not a member of her riding, nor did he research her platform or the policies which she sought to advance. The sole basis for his campaign against her was that she is a transgender woman and therefore, in his view, unsuitable to hold public office. 

Very interesting choice of words. Whatcott “identifies” as a Christian activist, yet Oger “actually is” a woman.

Mr. Whatcott was not a resident in Ms. Oger’s riding. She came to his attention after he had decided there were no suitable political options within his own riding. He says that he had decided not to vote in the election at all, but then turned to prayer. He asked God how he could help in the election. He started researching the candidates across the province and, in this way, came across Ms. Oger. He learned that she had been active in lobbying for amendments to the Code to add the grounds of “gender identity and expression”, and in promoting education about sexual orientation and gender identity in schools. Most importantly, however, he was upset that the media and public at large were “pretending” that Ms. Oger was a woman. He fundamentally believes that gender is static and derived from the genitalia that a person has at birth. He believes that Ms. Oger is a man. He sees himself as the small boy in the fairy tale about the Emperor with no clothes the only one brave enough to speak the truth about Ms. Oger’s gender. He decided to focus his energies on her campaign. In doing so, he describes Ms. Oger herself as “incidental” and “small” within his larger fight for social order and freedom. 

The first part gets glossed over. Oger is trying help enact 2 policies that Whatcott is bothered by:
(A) Bill C-16, to add “gender identity” to the Criminal Code and Human Rights Code.
(B) Bringing SOGI (sexual orientation & gender identity) into schools and have it taught to young children.

In all fairness, “both” of the above issues rub a lot of people the wrong way.

[53] To the extent that s. 7 is unique, it is because it expressly and exclusively targets speech. Mr. Whatcott argues that, in doing so, it violates his Charter‐guaranteed rights to freedom of religion and expression ss. 2(a) and (b). In his final reply, he added an argument that it violates his right to life, liberty and security of the person, guaranteed by s. 7 of the Charter.  

[54]This Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to apply the Charter: Administrative Tribunals Act, s . 45; Code, s. 32(i). I cannot find s. 7 of the Code unconstitutional, or that any of Mr. Whatcott’s Charter rights have been violated in the course of Ms. Oger’s human rights  complaint against him.

 

[55]There is no question, however, that this complaint engages Charter protections. In these circumstances, I must interpret and apply the Code in a manner that proportionately balances its purposes with those protections. The framework for this analysis has been set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in three cases: Doré v. Québec (Tribunal des Professions), 2012 SCC 12 [Doré]; Loyola High School v. Quebec (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 12 [Loyola]; and Trinity  Western University v. Law Society of BC, 2018 SCC 32 [TWU]. 

While simultaneously claiming not to be able to apply the Charter, the Tribunal says it will balance the rights of the Charter v.s. the Code.

A. Factual context 
1. Discrimination against transgender people 
. This is a significant time for trans and gender diverse people. Their long fight for equality is bearing some fruit, as society begins to adjust its traditionally static and binary understanding of gender, and its tolerance for people to identify and express their gender authentically. One indicator of this progress is the 2016 amendment to the Code that added the grounds of gender identity and expression. 

[61] However, as this hearing made clear, the journey is far from over. Unlike other groups protected by the Code, transgender people often find their very existence the subject of public debate and condemnation. What flows from this existential denial is, naturally, a view that transpeople are less worthy of dignity, respect, and rights. In the hearing room for this complaint, we were witness to repeated, deliberate, and flagrant attacks on Ms. Oger based on nothing more than a belief that her very existence is an affront. 

(A) The Tribunal actually referred to this section as “factual context”, but then goes on to make a number of straw man arguments.
(B) It is not a fight for equality. That was never the issue.
(C)”Traditionally static and binary understanding of gender”? Actually, there has never been evidence that there are more than 2 genders. Simply passing a law does not erase science. A government could conceivably pass a law saying that dogs are cats, but it would not be based in reality.
(D) Gender identity and expression? Don’t these contradict reality? Merely expressing oneself or identifying oneself a certain way does not make it so.
(E) Questioning the reality of something not based on science is a hate crime now? Got it.

[62] And so, despite some gains, transgender people remain among the most marginalized in our society. Their lives are marked by “disadvantage, prejudice, stereotyping, and vulnerability”: F(C) v. Albert (Vital Statistics), 2014 ABQB 237 at para. 58; see also Rainbow  Committee of Terrace v. City of Terrace, 2002 BCHRT 26 at paras. 47-51. They are stereotyped as “diseased, confused, monsters and freaks”: Nixon v. Vancouver Rape Relief Society, 2002. 
BCHRT 1 at paras. 136137, overturned 2005 BCCA 601 (not on this point). Transpeople face barriers to employment and housing, inequitable access to health care and other vital public services, and heightened risks of targeted harassment and violence. The results include social isolation, as well as higher rates of substance use, poor mental health, suicide, and poverty: XY v. Ontario (Government and Consumer Services), 2012 HRTO 726 at paras. 164-166. For transgender children, antitrans bullying leads to higher rates of absenteeism and poorer educational outcomes, which then has ripple effects for their health and future prospects: Christophe Cornu (2016), “Preventing and addressing homophobic and transphobic bullying in  education; A human-rights based approach using the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child”, Journal of LGBT Youth, 13:1‐2, 6‐17 at pp 7‐8. 

(A) How are they marginalized? They have entire government bodies to fight specifically for their rights.
(B) Substance abuse, suicide, and mental health problems? Doesn’t that signify that there might be something seriously wrong with what they are doing?
(C) Children should not be transitioning. Period.

[64] Mr. Whatcott and the JCCF sought to rely on statistics about the poor health and social outcomes for transgender people as proof that – at best – the merits of being transgender was a matter for ongoing study and debate and – at worst –it was a bad lifestyle choice, whichought to be publicly discouraged. I agree with Ms. Oger that this is an illconceived attempt to “take the data about the consequences of being a victim of oppression, or the consequences of being marginalized, and turn that into the root cause of the issue”.  

[65] The poor health, economic, and social outcomes for many transgender people are not a signal of their inherent worth but rather of the significant degree to which they continue to face marginalization, stigma, and discrimination. They illustrate how much work remains to be done to make the Code’s objective of an equal society into a reality. 

(A) The Tribunal specifically states they will not consider statistical data. How very “scientific and reasoned” of them.
(B) Another straw-man argument. No one is saying these people are not worthy, but that there are very serious mental health issues that need to be addressed. Issues the tribunal has no interest in addressing.

[75] There is no dispute that a decision against Mr. Whatcott would limit his Charter right to freedom of religion. Ms. Oger concedes that Mr. Whatcott has a sincerely held religious belief that it is his duty to spread his views about transgender people: Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, 2004 SCC 47 at para. 65. This concession was appropriate. Mr. Whatcott identifies as Christian and describes himself as a “flawed Christian activist”. He says that his theology largely lines up with that of the Lutheran Church. The Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that Evangelical Christians, and I believe it is fair to count Mr. Whatcott as one, “carry their religious beliefs and values beyond their private lives and into their work, education, and politics”: TWU at para. 67. This is certainly true of Mr. Whatcott. For many years, he has manifested his religious beliefs through activism, beginning with antiabortion activism and then, in more recent years, in activism against the LGBTQ community. His beliefs about transgender people namely that they do not exist and are engaged in a falsehood  stem from his interpretation of the Christian Bible. He believes it is God’s will that he spread the Christian gospel and his views about the “morality” of being transgender. 

(A) Now we get to the heart of it. This would actually limit religious freedom.
(B) The Tribunal knows this, and will act against it anyway.

[77] There is similarly no dispute that a decision against Mr. Whatcott would limit his freedom to publicly express his views about transgender people generally, and Ms. Oger specifically. This engages his right to free expression. As I will discuss below, the scope of freedom of expression, and the significance of any possible infringement, varies according to the type of speech and the extent to which it furthers or detracts from the core values underlying the freedom. However, at this threshold stage, it is sufficient that the Flyer was a form of expression and that any decision restricting Mr. Whatcott’s right to distribute it publicly would limit his expressive rights to some extent. 

[78] With respect to Mr. Whatcott’s s. 7 Charter rights, I agree with the Attorney General that it would not be fair to consider that argument, which was raised for the first time in Mr. Whatcott’s final reply, after the hearing of this complaint had concluded. Regardless, the argument has no merit. A decision by this Tribunal would not restrict Mr. Whatcott’s life, liberty, or security of the person. The remedial jurisdiction conferred by s. 37 of the Code is in no way equivalent to penal consequences. It does not threaten Mr. Whatcott’s life or liberty. While I accept that individuals found to violate the Code may encounter, as a consequence, a degree of stigma and social disapproval, such consequences do not rise to a level of “serious  state imposed psychological stress

(A) No threat to his security? Try not paying the fine and see what happens.
(B) You also say the Commission “will” order the so-called bad behaviour to stop. And if it doesn’t, you’ll fine him again.
(C) Who cares if this is the first time the argument has been brought up?

Now a quote from the Supreme Court of Canada:

First and foremost, free expression is essential to the proper functioning of democratic governance. As Rand J. put it, “government by the free public opinion of an open society . . . demands the condition of a virtually unobstructed access to and diffusion of ideas”: Switzman, at p. 306. 
.
  Second, the free exchange of ideas is an “essential precondition of the  search for truth”: R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, at p. 803, per  McLachlin J. This rationale, sometimes known as the “marketplace of ideas”, extends beyond the political domain to any areaof debate where truth is sought through the exchange of information and ideas. Information is disseminated and propositions debated. In the course of debate, misconceptions and errors are exposed. What withstands testing  emerges as truth. 
.
  Third, free expression has intrinsic value as an aspect of self‐realization for both speakers and listeners. As the majority observed in Irwin Toy, at p. 976, “the diversity in forms of individual selffulfillment and human flourishing ought to be cultivated in an essentially tolerant, indeed welcoming, environment not only for the sake of those who convey a meaning, uut also for the sake of those to whom it is conveyed”.  Grant v. Torstar Corp., 2009 SCC 61 at paras. 4750; see also R v. Keegstra,  [1990] 3 SCR 697 [Keegstra], at paras. 87‐89; 

This is quite laughable, as the Tribunal has no interest in the factual basis of Whatcott’s claim (that Oger is male), nor in the statistical research and evidence regarding transgenders in general.

[119] I reject this proposition in the strongest possible terms. The question of whether transgender people exist and are entitled to dignity in this province is as valuable to ongoing public debate as whether one race is superior to another. This does not mean that all expression that criticizes or questions the existence of transgender people violates the Code. Here I distinguish between public debate about, for example, the scope of rights that different groups in society may be afforded, and commentary like that which is in the Flyer, which denies the very existence of transpeople. Understood in its proper context, it is simply not accurate to place this type of expression at the core of s. 2(b) values. 

(A) False equivalence. The reality of transitioning is not the same thing as racial supremacy.
(B) False equivalence. Questioning whether trans-people exist is not the same thing as saying a person should not have dignity.
(C) The flyer is inappropriate, but once again the Tribunal dodges the issue of “truth”.

[125] This argument confuses distinctions with discrimination. Efforts to increase the participation and representation of groups which have historically been excluded from political life serve the goals of achieving substantive equality and enriching Canada’s democracy. But to advocate against including those groups in politics is not the same thing as arguing for their deliberate inclusion. The law has long understood that identical treatment of groups is often the very source of serious inequality: Kapp at para. 27, citing Andrews. Put another way, “different treatment in the service of equity for disadvantaged groups is an expression of [substantive] equality, not an exception to it”: P. W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (5th ed. Supp. 2007), vol. 2, at p. 5553; cited with approval in Kapp at para. 37. It is simply not reasonable to equate efforts to increase the representation of disadvantaged groups in government with those which would seek to continue to exclude them. While I acknowledge that individual voters may choose to discriminate within the privacy of a ballot box, it does not further Canada’s democracy to suggest that a person’s connection with a historically disadvantaged group is a legitimate point on which to openly campaign against them. 

To summarize this word salad: ACTUAL equal treatment of people can be wrong, since it doesn’t take “historical marginalization” into account. Hence the idea of 15(2) of the Charter (affirmative action). This is essentially different rules for different groups in order to “increase representation”.

The decision is long one (100 pages), but this covers the main points. The Tribunal also goes on at length about Whatcott refusing to refer to Oger as “she” despite being repeatedly told not to.

While Whatcott comes off as a bit of a jerk, it is hard to come up with much sympathy for Oger, who is essentially a professional victim. The proposed “hate map” is essentially a doxing tool for opinions that they don’t agree with.

It is also disturbing to see the Tribunal so uninterested in fact or truth. Legitimate concerns about whether a person can transition are deemed hate speech. Further, the tribunal doesn’t care for evidence presented regarding statistics of trans-people. If anything, it is deemed as more of a reason to grant special status.

Whatcott “identifies” as a Christian activist, yet Oger “really is” a woman. The Tribunal is inconsistent in their own standards.

And as seems to be the case in all provinces, the “human rights” code stipulates that no intent is necessary for a finding against a person or group.

Will there be an appeal (in the form of an application for judicial review)? We will find out. But this sets a very bad precedent.

Posted on

Canada’s Criminal Code: Insults As Bad As Advocating Genocide

(MP Iqra Khalid, who opposes free speech)

DEFAMATORY LIBEL laws are still on the books!

1. Important Links

CLICK HERE, for a prior review of Bill C-71 (firearms)
CLICK HERE, for a prior review of Bill C-75 (terrorism)
CLICK HERE, for global efforts to ban criticism of Islam.
CLICK HERE, for “defamatory libel” in the Criminal Code.
CLICK HERE, for previous version.
CLICK HERE, for Canadian Charter of Rights & Freedoms.
CLICK HERE, for R. v. Stevens, 1993 CanLII 14706 (MB PC).
CLICK HERE, for cases linked to R. v. Stevens.
CLICK HERE, for R. v. Lucas, (1998)

2. From The Criminal Code

Defamatory Libel
Definition of newspaper
297 In sections 303, 304 and 308, newspaper means any paper, magazine or periodical containing public news, intelligence or reports of events, or any remarks or observations thereon, printed for sale and published periodically or in parts or numbers, at intervals not exceeding thirty-one days between the publication of any two such papers, parts or numbers, and any paper, magazine or periodical printed in order to be dispersed and made public, weekly or more often, or at intervals not exceeding thirty-one days, that contains advertisements, exclusively or principally.
R.S., c. C-34, s. 261.

Marginal note:
Definition
298 (1) A defamatory libel is matter published, without lawful justification or excuse, that is likely to injure the reputation of any person by exposing him to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or that is designed to insult the person of or concerning whom it is published.

Marginal note:
Mode of expression
(2) A defamatory libel may be expressed directly or by insinuation or irony
(a) in words legibly marked on any substance; or
(b) by any object signifying a defamatory libel otherwise than by words.
R.S., c. C-34, s. 262.

Marginal note:
Publishing
299 A person publishes a libel when he
(a) exhibits it in public;
(b) causes it to be read or seen; or
(c) shows or delivers it, or causes it to be shown or delivered, with intent that it should be read or seen by any person other than the person whom it defames.
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 299; 2018, c. 29, s. 31.
Previous Version

Marginal note:
Punishment of libel known to be false
300 Every one who publishes a defamatory libel that he knows is false is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years.
R.S., c. C-34, s. 264.

Marginal note:
Punishment for defamatory libel
301 Every one who publishes a defamatory libel is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.
R.S., c. C-34, s. 265.

Marginal note:
Extortion by libel
302 (1) Every one commits an offence who, with intent
(a) to extort money from any person, or
(b) to induce a person to confer on or procure for another person an appointment or office of profit or trust,
publishes or threatens to publish or offers to abstain from publishing or to prevent the publication of a defamatory libel.

Marginal note:
Idem
(2) Every one commits an offence who, as the result of the refusal of any person to permit money to be extorted or to confer or procure an appointment or office of profit or trust, publishes or threatens to publish a defamatory libel.

Marginal note:
Punishment
(3) Every one who commits an offence under this section is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years.
R.S., c. C-34, s. 266.

Marginal note:
Proprietor of newspaper presumed responsible
303 (1) The proprietor of a newspaper shall be deemed to publish defamatory matter that is inserted and published therein, unless he proves that the defamatory matter was inserted in the newspaper without his knowledge and without negligence on his part.

Marginal note:
General authority to manager when negligence
(2) Where the proprietor of a newspaper gives to a person general authority to manage or conduct the newspaper as editor or otherwise, the insertion by that person of defamatory matter in the newspaper shall, for the purposes of subsection (1), be deemed not to be negligence on the part of the proprietor unless it is proved that
(a) he intended the general authority to include authority to insert defamatory matter in the newspaper; or
(b) he continued to confer general authority after he knew that it had been exercised by the insertion of defamatory matter in the newspaper.

Marginal note:
Selling newspapers
(3) No person shall be deemed to publish a defamatory libel by reason only that he sells a number or part of a newspaper that contains a defamatory libel, unless he knows that the number or part contains defamatory matter or that defamatory matter is habitually contained in the newspaper.

Selling book containing defamatory libel
304 (1) No person shall be deemed to publish a defamatory libel by reason only that he sells a book, magazine, pamphlet or other thing, other than a newspaper that contains defamatory matter, if, at the time of the sale, he does not know that it contains the defamatory matter.

Marginal note:
Sale by servant
(2) Where a servant, in the course of his employment, sells a book, magazine, pamphlet or other thing, other than a newspaper, the employer shall be deemed not to publish any defamatory matter contained therein unless it is proved that the employer authorized the sale knowing that
(a) defamatory matter was contained therein; or
(b) defamatory matter was habitually contained therein, in the case of a periodical.
R.S., c. C-34, s. 268.

Some observations:

  1. Under 301 defamatory libel is punishable by up to 2 years. However, in Section 300 publishing defamatory libel is punishable by up to 5 years. What exactly is the difference?
  2. Bill C-75 (terrorism and other offences) included provisions to make terrorism eligible to be tried summarily (for lesser punishments). However, mean words is automatically indictable. Seriously?
  3. Obvious question: but in a free society, why would civil infractions be criminalized?
  4. Under Section 298(1) and (2), irony and satire seem to be included.
  5. Under Section 303, newspaper editors are “assumed” to be liable. So much for the presumption of innocence in our criminal “justice” system.
  6. However, when publishing a “book” (under Section 304), the publisher is assumed not to be have known.

3. Defenses To Defamatory Libel

Well, there are some defenses, which is good to know. For example, it’s not a crime if bad things are said in the context of divorce proceedings, or parliamentary or judicial proceedings.

Fair report of public meeting
308 No person shall be deemed to publish a defamatory libel by reason only that he publishes in good faith, in a newspaper, a fair report of the proceedings of any public meeting if
(a) the meeting is lawfully convened for a lawful purpose and is open to the public;
(b) the report is fair and accurate;
(c) the publication of the matter complained of is for the public benefit; and
(d) he does not refuse to publish in a conspicuous place in the newspaper a reasonable explanation or contradiction by the person defamed in respect of the defamatory matter.
R.S., c. C-34, s. 272.

Marginal note:
Public benefit
309 No person shall be deemed to publish a defamatory libel by reason only that he publishes defamatory matter that, on reasonable grounds, he believes is true, and that is relevant to any subject of public interest, the public discussion of which is for the public benefit.
R.S., c. C-34, s. 273.

Marginal note:
Fair comment on public person or work of art
310 No person shall be deemed to publish a defamatory libel by reason only that he publishes fair comments
(a) on the public conduct of a person who takes part in public affairs; or
(b) on a published book or other literary production, or on any composition or work of art or performance publicly exhibited, or on any other communication made to the public on any subject, if the comments are confined to criticism thereof.
R.S., c. C-34, s. 274.

Marginal note:
When truth a defence
311 No person shall be deemed to publish a defamatory libel where he proves that the publication of the defamatory matter in the manner in which it was published was for the public benefit at the time when it was published and that the matter itself was true.
R.S., c. C-34, s. 275.

Marginal note:
Publication invited or necessary
312 No person shall be deemed to publish a defamatory libel by reason only that he publishes defamatory matter
(a) on the invitation or challenge of the person in respect of whom it is published, or
(b) that it is necessary to publish in order to refute defamatory matter published in respect of him by another person,
if he believes that the defamatory matter is true and it is relevant to the invitation, challenge or necessary refutation, as the case may be, and does not in any respect exceed what is reasonably sufficient in the circumstances.
R.S., c. C-34, s. 276.

Marginal note:
Answer to inquiries
313 No person shall be deemed to publish a defamatory libel by reason only that he publishes, in answer to inquiries made to him, defamatory matter relating to a subject-matter in respect of which the person by whom or on whose behalf the inquiries are made has an interest in knowing the truth or who, on reasonable grounds, the person who publishes the defamatory matter believes has such an interest, if
(a) the matter is published, in good faith, for the purpose of giving information in answer to the inquiries;
(b) the person who publishes the defamatory matter believes that it is true;
(c) the defamatory matter is relevant to the inquiries; and
(d) the defamatory matter does not in any respect exceed what is reasonably sufficient in the circumstances.

Good to know that truth is a valid defense. Also, “public benefit” considered to be a defense. But don’t we have something called the Charter of Rights and Freedoms? Aren’t there fundamental freedoms guaranteed to us? Let’s take a look.

But first, let’s look at a silly comparison: what are the punishments for advocating genocide?

4. Canadian Criminal Code

Advocating genocide
318 (1) Every one who advocates or promotes genocide is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years.
Marginal note:
Definition of genocide
(2) In this section, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy in whole or in part any identifiable group, namely,
(a) killing members of the group; or
(b) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction.
Marginal note:
Consent
(3) No proceeding for an offence under this section shall be instituted without the consent of the Attorney General

That’s right. Advocating genocide is an indictable offense, punishable by up to 5 years in prison.

Think that through. Insulting people publicly can be treated just as harshly as actually calling for people to be exterminated.

5. Fundamental Freedoms, Canadian Charter

2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms:
(a) freedom of conscience and religion;
(b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication;
(c) freedom of peaceful assembly; and
(d) freedom of association.

On the surface, yes, fee speech, belief, expression and opinion are guaranteed. Yet these “defamatory libel” laws are still on the books. So what happens when they collide?

6. Charter V.S. Criminal Code

From the case: R. v. Stevens (1993),

1. Is s. 300 of the Criminal Code of Canada an infringement of freedom of expression as guaranteed under s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms?
ANSWER: Yes
2. If s. 300 of the Criminal Code is an infringement of the Charter can it be upheld under s. 1 of the Charter as a reasonable limit prescribed by law and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society?
ANSWER: Yes
While I have struck down certain portions of ss. 298 and 299 for failing the proportionality test under s. 1, this result has no impact in the present case in view of the findings of fact previously made by this court.
Accordingly, I find Mr. Stevens guilty of the offence under s. 300
of the Criminal Code as charged.

This Judge rules that yes, it is a violation of the Charter, but a justifiable one under Section 1.

From the case: R. v. Lucas (1998),

[129] In his reasons for sentence ((1995), 1995 CanLII 4081 (SK QB), 132 Sask. R. 71), the trial judge stated “that John David Lucas was the instigator and Johanna Erna Lucas was his follower” (p. 74). This finding raises the possibility that Mrs. Lucas’s knowledge might have derived at least in part from what she was told by Mr. Lucas, and she may therefore have believed that the message was true even though in fact it was not.

[130] In the absence of findings of fact by the trial judge related to subjective knowledge, there is insufficient evidence before this Court to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mrs. Lucas knew that the messages on the placard she carried were false. Accordingly, her conviction must be set aside.

[131] Ordinarily, a new trial would be ordered. However, in light of the Crown’s statement that in the circumstances the Crown would not proceed with a new trial, I would direct an acquittal of Mrs. Lucas.

An acquittal here, but only because the person didn’t know the statements weren’t true.

7. Do We Really Have Free Speech?

To a point, yes. However, a free speech absolutist would argue that no, that isn’t free speech.

However, in the world of everyone criticizing everyone, this type of law seems to easy to be abused. One person’s satire and trolling is another person’s hate and defamatory libel.

There are several other cases to go through. But the point here remains:

DEFAMATORY LIBEL laws are still on the books!

There are plenty of “civil” cases for defamation even in recent years. However, “criminal” cases for defamation seem to be a thing of the past. Probably since there are far more important things for police and prosecutors to busy themselves with.

Still, good to know this….

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TSCE #7: Abuse of S3CA & Coming To Canada Under False Pretenses

CLICK HERE, for previous article on the Canada/US Safe 3rd Country Agreement (signed in 2002)

1. Interesting Cases

(1) CLICK HERE, for a marriage of convenience.
Liang v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, 2014 CanLII 90636 (CA IRB)

(2) CLICK HERE, for committing identity fraud in order to gain entry to Canada.
Shaikh v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2018 CanLII 89040 (CA IRB)

(3) CLICK HERE, for an actual terrorist wanting to stay in Canada.
Singh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1997 CanLII 5893 (FC)

(4) CLICK HERE, for a failed US asylum seeker, relying on falsified psychological documents.
X (Re), 2016 CanLII 152912 (CA IRB)

(5) CLICK HERE, for a failed US asylum seeker changing his story this time.
X (Re), 2013 CanLII 99499 (CA IRB)

(6) CLICK HERE, for an Indian man claiming to be from Tibet to gain asylum (Mariam Monself, take note).
X (Re), 2014 CanLII 100882 (CA IRB)

(7) CLICK HERE, for a “refugee” who lived illegally in the US for 14 years, then trying to claim asylum in Canada
X (Re), 2015 CanLII 44019 (CA IRB)

(8) CLICK HERE, for a wanted fugitive from China trying to get asylum in Canada.
X (Re), 2015 CanLII 107837 (CA IRB)

These 8 cases are just a small sample of the tidal wave of fraudulent “refugee” claims that have been made over the last several years. Although many get rejected, many still get through. This happens even when adjudicators admit that applicants have been deceptive.

2. UN Promotes Abuse Of S3CA

CLICK HERE, for the UN link.

Exceptions to the Safe Third Country Agreement with Canada

The U.S. and Canada have an agreement preventing people who first enter one country from applying for asylum or refugee status in the other. This means that if you entered the U.S. first and then try to apply for asylum in Canada, you may not be able to. However, there are exceptions to the agreement that may allow you to apply for asylum in Canada, even if you came to the U.S. first. For one thing, this agreement only applies to you if you are planning on arriving at entry ports on the U.S.-Canada land border. It does not apply if you plan on arriving in Canada at air or marine ports.

The following questions will determine whether you meet any of the exceptions that will allow you to apply for asylum in Canada at a U.S.-Canada land border even if you arrived in the U.S. first.

EXCEPTION # 1 Land Border Entry Ports Only

Are you going to arrive in Canada from a land border?

NO ==> You qualify under this exception!

YES ==> You do not qualify under this exception. Check to see if you qualify under any other exception.

EXCEPTION # 2 Family Connections in Canada

Do you have any of the following family members in Canada?

  • A spouse
  • A common-law partner (a common law partner is person of the same or opposite sex with whom you are cohabiting in a conjugal relationship and have cohabited for at least a year.)
  • A legal guardian
  • A child
  • A father or mother
  • A brother or sister
  • A grandfather or grandmother
  • A grandchild
  • An uncle or aunt
  • A nephew or niece

NO ==> You do not qualify under this exception. Check to see if you qualify under any other exception.

YES ==> Is your family member any of the following?

  • A Canadian citizen
  • A permanent resident
  • A protected person (i.e. determined to be a refugee or a person in need of protection)
  • Accepted in principle on humanitarian and compassionate grounds (removal order stayed under Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations 233)
  • 18 years of age or over and is a refugee claimant (and the claim has not been rejected, withdrawn, found abandoned or ineligible)
  • 18 years of age or over and is in Canada on a work permit or study permit (but check the exceptions)

    • YES ==> You qualify under this exception!
    NO ==> You do not qualify under this exception. Check to see if you qualify under any other exception.

    EXCEPTION # 3 Unaccompanied Minor
    Are you under 18?
    NO ==> You do not qualify under the unaccompanied minor exception. Check to see if you qualify under any other exception.
    YES ==> Were you accompanied here by your father, mother, or legal guardian? Are you married? Is your father, mother, or legal guardian in Canada or the United States?

    If NO to all these questions ==> You qualify under this exception!
    If YES to any of these questions ==> You do not qualify under this exception. Check to see if you qualify under any other exception.

    EXCEPTION # 4 Countries to which Canada Does Not Remove

    Are you a national of any of the following countries?

    • Afghanistan
    • Burundi
    • Democratic Republic of Congo
    • Haiti
    • Iraq
    • Liberia
    • Rwanda
    • Zimbabwe

    NO ==> You do not qualify under this exception. Check to see if you qualify under any other exception.

    YES ==> Have you been convicted of any crimes?

    NO ==> You qualify under this exception!

    YES ==> You may not qualify under this exception. Canada does not admit people who have been convicted of certain crimes. Whether you qualify under this exception depends on the type of crime(s) you were convicted of.

    EXCEPTION # 5 Death Penalty

    Have you been charged or convicted of an offence punishable with the death penalty in the country?

    YES ==> You MAY qualify under this exception. Canada does not admit people who have been convicted of certain crimes. Whether you qualify under this exception depends on the type of crime(s) you were convicted of.

    NO ==> You do not qualify under this exception. Check to see if you qualify under any other exception.

    EXCEPTION # 6 Valid Visa Exception

    Do you have a valid visa to enter Canada, other than a transit visa?

    YES ==> You qualify under this exception!

    NO ==> You do not qualify under this exception. Check to see if you qualify under any other exception.

    EXCEPTION # 7 Visa Required in U.S. But Not in Canada

    Are you a national of any of the following countries?

    • Antigua and Barbuda
    • Barbados
    • Botswana
    • Cyprus
    • Greece
    • Malta
    • Mexico
    • Namibia
    • Papua New Guinea
    • Republic of (South) Korea
    • St. Kitts and Nevis
    • St. Lucia
    • St. Vincent
    • Solomon Islands
    • Swaziland
    • Western Samoa

    NO ==> You do not qualify under this exception. Check to see if you qualify under any other exception.

    YES ==> You qualify under this exception!

    From Canadian Website

    CLICK HERE, for Canadian Government website.

    Where the Agreement is in effect
    The Safe Third Country Agreement applies only to refugee claimants who are seeking entry to Canada from the U.S.:
    at Canada-U.S. land border crossings
    by train or
    at airports, only if the person seeking refugee protection in Canada has been refused refugee status in the U.S. and is in transit through Canada after being deported from the U.S.

    Exceptions to the Agreement
    Exceptions to the Agreement consider the importance of family unity, the best interests of children and the public interest.
    There are four types of exceptions:

    1. Family member exceptions
    2. Unaccompanied minors exception
    3. Document holder exceptions
    4. Public interest exceptions

    Even if they qualify for one of these exceptions, refugee claimants must still meet all other eligibility criteria of Canada’s immigration legislation. For example, if a person seeking refugee protection has been found inadmissible in Canada on the grounds of security, for violating human or international rights, or for serious criminality, that person will not be eligible to make a refugee claim.

    Family member exceptions
    Refugee claimants may qualify under this category of exceptions if they have a family member who:

    • is a Canadian citizen
    • is a permanent resident of Canada
    • is a protected person under Canadian immigration legislation
    • has made a claim for refugee status in Canada that has been accepted by the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB)
    • has had his or her removal order stayed on humanitarian and compassionate grounds
    • holds a valid Canadian work permit
    • holds a valid Canadian study permit, or
    • is over 18 years old and has a claim for refugee protection that has been referred to the IRB for determination. (This claim must not have been withdrawn by the family member, declared abandoned or rejected by the IRB or found ineligible for referral to the IRB.)

    Unaccompanied minors exception
    Refugee claimants may qualify under this category of exceptions if they are minors (under the age of 18) who:
    are not accompanied by their mother, father or legal guardian
    have neither a spouse nor a common-law partner, and
    do not have a mother, a father or a legal guardian in Canada or the United States.

    Document holder exceptions
    Refugee claimants may qualify under this category of exceptions if they:
    hold a valid Canadian visa (other than a transit visa)
    hold a valid work permit
    hold a valid study permit
    hold a travel document (for permanent residents or refugees) or other valid admission document issued by Canada, or
    are not required (exempt) to get a temporary resident visa to enter Canada but require a U.S.–issued visa to enter the U.S.

    Public interest exceptions
    Refugee claimants may qualify under this category of exceptions if:
    they have been charged with or convicted of an offence that could subject them to the death penalty in the U.S. or in a third country. However, a refugee claimant is ineligible if he or she has been found inadmissible in Canada on the grounds of security, for violating human or international rights, or for serious criminality, or if the Minister finds the person to be a danger to the public.

    Making a refugee claim under the Safe Third Country Agreement
    For detailed information on making a refugee claim for protection in Canada at the Canada–U.S. border, please refer to the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA).

    There are so many exemptions in this agreement that it’s difficult to find someone who “doesn’t” qualify on one or more grounds.

    4. Canada Admits U.S. A Safe Country

    Factor 3: Human rights record of the United States
    The United States meets a high standard with respect to the protection of human rights. It is an open democracy with independent courts, separation of powers and constitutional guarantees of essential human rights and fundamental freedoms.

    Factor 4: Whether the United States is party to an agreement with Canada for the purpose of sharing responsibility with respect to claims for refugee protection

    The Safe Third Country Agreement between Canada and the United States was signed on December 5, 2002, came into force on December 29, 2004, and remains in force.

    The US is a safe country. That “should” end the discussion on fake refugees coming here.

    After all, simply being in the country illegally isn’t a defense.

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    Mandatory Minimum Sentences: Good, Bad, Or It Depends?

    Suggested Offences With Mandatory Minimums
    CC 46-48 (Treason)
    CC 83.01-83.3 (Terrorism)
    CC 151-154 (child Sex Offences)
    CC 229-239 (Murder, 1st degree)

    The case AGAINST Mandatory Minimums
    -Judges are better able to look at a case and decide what is fair
    -Judges are better able to decide what would be best for the public
    -Judges are not subject to the whims of the population, given their jobs are secure
    -In the event of very poor rulings, they can be appealed
    -Mandatory minimums are very costly to the public
    -Mandatory minimums result in “social costs” to the public
    -There is no general deterrence
    -Politicians in general cannot be trusted to pass good laws
    -Politicians take so much power anyway, a separate judiciary is necessary
    -Government should stay out of people’s lives as much as possible
    -Given fraud and corruption within gov’t it is hypocritical for them to be passing such laws
    -Judges are best able to “make that exception” when needed
    -Mandatory minimums make it hard, if not impossible to make punishment fit the crime. It always must.

    Articles Cited:
    Research At A Glance
    Mandator Minimum Penalties
    Mandatory Minimums Unfair and Expensive
    PBS Special on Mandatory Minimums

    The Case IN FAVOUR OF Mandatory Minimums
    -Politicians can (theoretically) be thrown out, judges cannot
    -Although far from perfect, public input can help draft laws
    -While judges are well intended, different perspectives can lead to widely differing sentences on cases of similar facts
    -Consistency is necessary in applying sentencing principles
    -If bad rulings occur and are not struck down, they can create ”precedent” for future bad rulings. Having set standards eliminates that possibility
    -If not mandatory minimums, then guidelines (as is also the case in US/UK)
    -Some offences are so bad they “require” prison time (as mentioned, it covered offences like murder, terrorism, child sex offences)
    -Of course, this is not to imply that all, or even most offences should carry mandatory minimums
    -The crimes being proposed for mandatory minimums are committed so rarely, that there would be ”no dragnet” of people.
    -For certain offences, the well being of society needs to trump individual rights
    -The Principles of Sentencing (see below) to see a need to balance both individual rights and society’s (the group’s rights)
    -Items (a), (b), (c) put societal interest first, while (d), (e), (f) put individual interest first

    What Does The Law Say?

    Note: the information here is not necessary to prove that mandatory minimums are necessary, but rather to explain when the rationale behind sentencing.

    Also the Bill C-42 was introduced to remove so-called ”conditional sentencing” for certain offences. The rationale being, if house arrest is inadequate, the probation would be even more so. In effect, it would ”create” mandatory jail sentences (though the length not specified).

    Purpose and Principles of Sentencing
    Marginal note:
    Purpose
    718 The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives:

    (a) to denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community that is caused by unlawful conduct;

    (b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences;

    (c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary;

    (d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders;

    (e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and

    (f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims or to the community.

    Objectives — offences against children
    718.01 When a court imposes a sentence for an offence that involved the abuse of a person under the age of eighteen years, it shall give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence of such conduct.

    Objectives — offence against peace officer or other justice system participant
    718.02 When a court imposes a sentence for an offence under subsection 270(1), section 270.01 or 270.02 or paragraph 423.1(1)(b), the court shall give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence of the conduct that forms the basis of the offence.

    Objectives — offence against certain animals
    718.03 When a court imposes a sentence for an offence under subsection 445.01(1), the court shall give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence of the conduct that forms the basis of the offence.

    Fundamental principle
    718.1 A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.

    Restrictions on Conditional Sentencting, Bill C-42

    R v. Proulx (2003) for conditional sentencing

    “The requirement in s. 742.1 (b) that the judge be satisfied that the safety of the community would not be endangered by the offender serving his or her sentence in the community is a condition precedent to the imposition of a conditional sentence, and not the primary consideration in determining whether a conditional sentence is appropriate. In making this determination, the judge should consider the risk posed by the specific offender, not the broader risk of whether the imposition of a conditional sentence would endanger the safety of the community by providing insufficient general deterrence or undermining general respect for the law. Two factors should be taken into account: (1) the risk of the offender re-offending; and (2) the gravity of the damage that could ensue in the event of re-offence. A consideration of the risk posed by the offender should include the risk of any criminal activity, and not be limited solely to the risk of physical or psychological harm to individuals.

    Once the prerequisites of s. 742.1 are satisfied, the judge should give serious consideration to the possibility of a conditional sentence in all cases by examining whether a conditional sentence is consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing set out in ss. 718 to 718.2. This follows from Parliament’s clear message to the judiciary to reduce the use of incarceration as a sanction.

    A conditional sentence can provide significant denunciation and deterrence. As a general matter, the more serious the offence, the longer and more onerous the conditional sentence should be. There may be some circumstances, however, where the need for denunciation or deterrence is so pressing that incarceration will be the only suitable way in which to express society’s condemnation of the offender’s conduct or to deter similar conduct in the future.

    Generally, a conditional sentence will be better than incarceration at achieving the restorative objectives of rehabilitation, reparations to the victim and the community, and promotion of a sense of responsibility in the offender and acknowledgment of the harm done to the victim and the community.

    Where a combination of both punitive and restorative objectives may be achieved, a conditional sentence will likely be more appropriate than incarceration. Where objectives such as denunciation and deterrence are particularly pressing, incarceration will generally be the preferable sanction. This may be so notwithstanding the fact that restorative goals might be achieved. However, a conditional sentence may provide sufficient denunciation and deterrence, even in cases in which restorative objectives are of lesser importance, depending on the nature of the conditions imposed, the duration of the sentence, and the circumstances of both the offender and the community in which the conditional sentence is to be served. A conditional sentence may be imposed even where there are aggravating circumstances, although the need for denunciation and deterrence will increase in these circumstances.

    No party is under a burden of proof to establish that a conditional sentence is either appropriate or inappropriate in the circumstances. The judge should consider all relevant evidence, no matter by whom it is adduced. However, it would be in the offender’s best interests to establish elements militating in favour of a conditional sentence.

    Sentencing judges have a wide discretion in the choice of the appropriate sentence. They are entitled to considerable deference from appellate courts. Absent an error in principle, failure to consider a relevant factor, or an overemphasis of the appropriate factors, a court of appeal should only intervene to vary a sentence imposed at trial if the sentence is demonstrably unfit.”

    R v Proulx makes a pretty compelling case in favour of “conditional sentencing” a.k.a. “house arrest”. This case is recognized and relied on when handing down sentences. Many defense lawyers argue that conditional sentencing would better serve everyone (in most cases) than physical prison.

    The restrictions that came from Bill C-42, however, means that certain offences are no longer eligible for conditional sentencing. This means that Judges will have to choose jail sentences, since probation would be considered unfit.

    Overall, a very interesting topic to cover.

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    Senator Mike Duffy Can’t Sue Senate Over Suspension

    (“P.E.I” Senator Mike Duffy, textbook case of “pig at the trough”)

    (Pamela Wallin, Patrick Brazeau, Mike Duffy, all temporarily suspended from the Canadian Senate)

    An Ontario Judge has ruled that Mike Duffy cannot sue the Senate for a decision that caused him to be suspended without pay for almost 2 years.

    CLICK HERE, for the actual ruling from Justice Sally Gomery. (Quotes in bold/italics. Commentary in regular font).

    CLICK HERE, for the original verdict, acquitting Duffy.

    [1] Senator Michael Duffy is suing the Senate of Canada for over $7 million in damages.

    [2] On November 5, 2013, the Senate voted to suspend Senator Duffy based on a report from its standing committee on Internal Economy, Budgets and Administration (the “CIBA”). This CIBA report concluded that he had violated rules on living and travel expenses. Senator Duffy was later criminally charged with breach of trust, fraud and accepting a bribe. On April 21, 2016, after a trial that lasted more than a year, he was acquitted of all charges. Justice Vaillancourt, the judge who heard the criminal trial, concluded that the Prime Minister’s Office (“PMO”) directed one or more senators to interfere with an audit of Senator Duffy’s expenses. 2018 ONSC 7523 (CanLII) He also concluded that, in making living expense claims, Senator Duffy “committed no prohibited act, violated no Senate rules”, and neither engaged in criminal fraud nor intended to do so.

    [3] In his lawsuit, Senator Duffy claims that the CIBA report and the Senate’s decision to suspend him were politically motivated, unconstitutional, procedurally unfair and contrary to his rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms1. Given the judge’s findings when he was acquitted of criminal charges, Senator Duffy argues that actions by various senators and the Senate as a whole were clearly wrong and unlawfully deprived him of salary, allowances and pension contributions. He also says that, since he was acquitted and the suspension was lifted, the Senate has once again unfairly denied him reimbursement for further legitimate expenses. He seeks compensation for the amounts he says he is entitled to as well as compensatory and punitive damages.

    [4] This matter is before me now because the Senate says that Senator Duffy’s action should be dismissed. The Senate contends that the lawsuit cannot proceed because the actions that Senator Duffy seeks to challenge fall squarely within the scope of parliamentary privilege. Determining the questions that arise in Senator Duffy’s lawsuit would accordingly require a court to do exactly what parliamentary privilege is designed to prevent.

    An interesting approach. While Duffy was ultimately acquitted on the criminal charges, the Trial Judge didn’t exactly exonerate him completely. More on that later. And this deflection and projection does not change the fact that there was considerable grounds for the suspension. This reads like an attempt to cash in.

    [7] For the purpose of a motion like this one, I must assume that all of the factual allegations in Senator Duffy’s statement of claim are true. He makes many allegations about the improper motivations of various senators and the denial of any due process. But the core allegation, what he says entitles him to damages, is that the decisions by the CIBA and the Senate to suspend him and to deny his claims for compensation were unlawful and unfair. I must determine whether these decisions are protected by parliamentary privilege and therefore shielded from any review by this court.

    This is an important distinction to make here: the Judge is saying that it must be “assumed” for the purposes of the motion that the factual allegations are true. This is not to claim that they actually are.

    [8] I conclude that they are. The Senate enjoys certain categories of privilege by virtue of the Constitution Act, 1867. 6 Four types of privilege prevent a court from reviewing the actions by the Senate at issue in this case.

    [9] First, parliamentary privilege extends to decisions by the Senate to discipline its own members. The privilege clearly applies to decisions about whether a senator should be suspended or expelled. In some cases, a court may review disciplinary decisions with respect to employees of a legislative body, if the management of such employees does not fall within the scope of what is necessary to protect the independent functioning of that body. There is however no question that the privilege prevents judicial review of discipline or suspension of a member of the legislature itself.

    [10] Second, parliamentary privilege applies to the Senate’s management of its internal affairs, including the allocation and use of parliamentary resources. This privilege extends to decisions on the approval of expenses claimed by senators. I find that the privilege applies to decisions by an internal committee of senators, such as the CIBA, with respect to the allocation or withholding of parliamentary resources to a senator.

    [11] Third, Parliament has exclusive control over, and privilege with respect to, its own debates and proceedings.

    [12] Finally, parliamentary privilege protects freedom of speech in the Senate. Allegations in a statement of claim about what was said in parliament must be struck, because statements in parliament cannot be reviewed by a court. Neither a senator nor a third party can be compelled to testify in court about anything they said or did in the course of Senate proceedings. Transcripts of proceedings, and reports produced by or commissioned for the Senate, can likewise not be produced in court proceedings. The Senate’s failure to object to disclosure of some evidence that might have been subject to privilege during Senator Duffy’s criminal trial does not mean that it has relinquished its right to invoke privilege in this case.

    The Judge is setting out the reasons here: The Senate is allowed under the law to discipline its own members. The ruling will go on to cite many examples and circumstances, but this will suffice for now.

    [13] Senator Duffy contends that the application of parliamentary privilege in this case leaves him without any meaningful remedy. He says that he cannot hope to get justice from the very body that has treated him so badly in the past, and that the courts should not allow Charter violations to go unchecked, particularly in circumstances where those violations arise from interference by one branch of government (the PMO) with another (the Senate).

    [14] I am however obliged to respect constitutional imperatives. Allowing a court to revisit the Senate’s decisions at issue here would interfere with the Senate’s ability to function as an independent legislative body, equal to other branches of government. These decisions, as well as the Senate record relevant to them, are protected by parliamentary privilege and are accordingly immune from judicial review or reconsideration. Since the actions at issue fall within those actions protected by parliamentary privilege, I cannot give any consideration to whether they were wrong or unfair or even contrary to Senator Duffy’s Charter rights. All of these are determinations that the Senate, and the Senate alone, can make. The Senate’s motion to dismiss Senator Duffy’s action against it is therefore granted.

    Interesting, that Duffy has been in the Senate since 2009, but seems to know so little about how it works.

    From the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, 21 and 25.11:


    21.01 (1) A party may move before a judge,
    (a) for the determination, before trial, of a question of law raised by a pleading in an action where the determination of the question may dispose of all or part of the action, substantially shorten the trial or result in a substantial saving of costs; or
    (b) to strike out a pleading on the ground that it discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence,
    and the judge may make an order or grant judgment accordingly. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 21.01 (1).

    STRIKING OUT A PLEADING OR OTHER DOCUMENT
    25.11 The court may strike out or expunge all or part of a pleading or other document, with or without leave to amend, on the ground that the pleading or other document,
    (a) may prejudice or delay the fair trial of the action;
    (b) is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious; or
    (c) is an abuse of the process of the court. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 25.11.

    The Senate invokes 2 sections of the Ontario rules, claiming that since Parliamentary privilege applies that the Senate should not be a defendant in the case.

    [25] Over time, the concept of parliamentary privilege was expanded to protect not only speech and procedures, but any action within parliament over which it must necessarily have exclusive control, as an independent and coequal branch of government. Parliamentary privilege is accordingly:
    the necessary immunity that the law provides for Members of Parliament … in order for these legislators to do their legislative work. It is also the necessary immunity that the law provides for anyone while taking part in a proceeding in Parliament … Finally, it is the authority and power of each House of Parliament … to enforce that immunity.

    Section 18 of the 1867 Constitution Act states:


    Privileges, etc., of Houses
    18. The privileges, immunities, and powers to be held, enjoyed, and exercised by the Senate and by the House of Commons, and by the members thereof respectively, shall be such as are from time to time defined by Act of the Parliament of Canada, but so that any Act of the Parliament of Canada defining such privileges, immunities, and powers shall not confer any privileges, immunities, or powers exceeding those at the passing of such Act held, enjoyed, and exercised by the Commons House of Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and by the members thereof

    In one context, it is nice that the Court here does apply and uphold some separation between branches of government.

    However, from a taxpayer who likes accountability from public officials, there is another viewpoint. Many would like to see the truth of the matter fleshed out, something that hasn’t really happened. However, this seems to be a case of “procedure over facts”.

    It will be interesting to see what happens with the RCMP, as they will be all too happy to throw Duffy under the bus to show they acted properly.

    Backstory Events Leading Up to Lawsuit Against RCMP and Senate
    In November 2013, Conservative Senators: 1/ Patrick Brazeau; 2/ Pamela Wallin’ and 3/ Mike Duffy were all suspended from the Canadian Senate for 2 years without pay, over illegal spending.

    Mike Duffy faced 31 criminal charges, including: 15 counts of fraud, 15 counts of breach of trust, and 1 count of bribery, (for allegedly receiving $90,000 gift to pay back expenses).

    Brazeau and Liberal Senator Mac Harb were charged with breach of trust and fraud, (sections 122 and 380 of the criminal code)


    Bribery of judicial officers, etc.
    119 (1) Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years who
    (a) being the holder of a judicial office, or being a member of Parliament or of the legislature of a province, directly or indirectly, corruptly accepts, obtains, agrees to accept or attempts to obtain, for themselves or another person, any money, valuable consideration, office, place or employment in respect of anything done or omitted or to be done or omitted by them in their official capacity, or
    (b) directly or indirectly, corruptly gives or offers to a person mentioned in paragraph (a), or to anyone for the benefit of that person, any money, valuable consideration, office, place or employment in respect of anything done or omitted or to be done or omitted by that person in their official capacity.

    Breach of trust by public officer
    122 Every official who, in connection with the duties of his office, commits fraud or a breach of trust is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, whether or not the fraud or breach of trust would be an offence if it were committed in relation to a private person.
    R.S., c. C-34, s. 111.

    Fraud
    380 (1) Every one who, by deceit, falsehood or other fraudulent means, whether or not it is a false pretence within the meaning of this Act, defrauds the public or any person, whether ascertained or not, of any property, money or valuable security or any service,
    (a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to a term of imprisonment not exceeding fourteen years, where the subject-matter of the offence is a testamentary instrument or the value of the subject-matter of the offence exceeds five thousand dollars; or
    (b) is guilty
    (i) of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, or
    (ii) of an offence punishable on summary conviction,
    where the value of the subject-matter of the offence does not exceed five thousand dollars.

    Pamela Wallin was never actually charged, but forced to pay back for her actions, despite over $100,000 in illegal expenses. In a bizarre twist, it cost $127,000 to audit Wallin’s spending.

    Duffy was acquitted in a very bizarre ruling in 2016. More on that later.

    This most likely influenced the decision to drop the charges against Harb in May 2016, and later Brazeau in July 2016.

    Although Duffy was eventually acquitted of criminal wrongdoing, him returning to the Senate has left a bad taste in many people’s mouths.

    Nonsensical Acquittal by Vaillancourt At Trial

    CLICK HERE, for the text of the ruling.

    That is actually its own article, CLICK HERE. It is too long to do properly here.