Author: Ronnie

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Kirsten Jenkins: Humanizing Sociotechnical Transitions Through Energy Justice

1. Go Check Out Uppity Peasants Site


This is a fairly new site, however, it has some interesting content on it. Well researched, it will give some alternative views on how we are really being controlled. It you haven’t been there, what are you waiting for?

2. About The Authors


CLICK HERE, for the profile of Kirsten Jenkins. Side note: no shocker she has cited Frank Geels.

CLICK HERE, for Benjamin Sovacool.

He is a Lead Author of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s Sixth Assessment Report (AR6), due to be published in 2022, and an Advisor on Energy to the European Commission’s Directorate General for Research and Innovation in Brussels, Belgium.

He has played a leadership role in winning and managing collaborative research grants worth more than $19.6 million, including those from the U.S. Department of Energy, U.S. National Science Foundation, MacArthur Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation, Energy Technology Development and Demonstration Program of Denmark, the Danish Council for Independent Research, and the European Commission. In the United Kingdom, he has served as a Principal Investigator on projects funded by the Economic and Social Research Council, Natural Environment Research Council, and the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council.

CLICK HERE, for Darren McCauley.

3. The Paper Itself

Humanizing sociotechnical transitions through energy justice: An ethical framework for global transformative change
Kirsten Jenkins, Benjamin K. Sovacool, Darren McCauley

Not even kidding. That is the title of the paper.

ABSTRACT
Poverty, climate change and energy security demand awareness about the interlinkages between energy systems and social justice. Amidst these challenges, energy justice has emerged to conceptualize a world where all individuals, across all areas, have safe, affordable and sustainable energy that is, essentially, socially just. Simultaneously, new social and technological solutions to energy problems continually evolve, and interest in the concept of sociotechnical transitions has grown. However, an element often missing from such transitions frameworks is explicit engagement with energy justice frameworks. Despite the development of an embryonic set of literature around these themes, an obvious research gap has emerged: can energy justice and transitions frameworks be combined? This paper argues that they can. It does so through an exploration of the multi-level perspective on sociotechnical systems and an integration of energy justice at the model’s niche, regime and landscape level. It presents the argument that it is within the overarching process of sociotechnical change that issues of energy justice emerge. Here, inattention to social justice issues can cause injustices, whereas attention to them can provide a means to examine and potential resolve them

This article is the first time I have encountered the term “energy justice”. Rather than simply dealing with a problem in a scientific and factual way, the authors add some social-justice element to it. The abstract doesn’t really explain how this works. Hopefully the body will.

Thus, it calls for greater engagement with the three-tenet energy justice approach (distributional justice, procedural justice and justice as recognition) when planning for more sustainable transitions.

Energy justice apparently consists of:

  • Distributional justice
  • Procedural justice
  • Justice as recognition

Okay, but that doesn’t really explain what it is.

Amidst serious sustainability challenges, transitions frameworks have evolved to either conceptualize or facilitate decarbonised energy systems that provide both security of supply and universal access to energy; a process that it is widely acknowledged will require new ways of producing, living and working with energy (Bridge et al., 2013; Heffron and McCauley, 2018; IEA, 2008; Mernier, 2007). In aiming to implement sociotechnical solutions, governments are increasingly utilising the language of transitions, and the concept has begun to feature in the energy policies of countries including Denmark, Switzerland and the United Kingdom (UK)

Some points that should be addressed:

  • They are quite blunt (and proud it seems) that their language is filtering into government activity.
  • Provide universal supply of energy? Is this meant to be some sort of socialist or communist idea?
  • Has it sunk in that if you remove all Carbon forms of energy that it will reduce supply, and make your universal supply harder to obtain?
  • When you say a “new way of living”, does this mean reducing the standard of living in the West to ensure that everyone has access to the same amount of energy?

Yet despite ongoing debates about ethics or justice across many fields of literature (including extended discussions between antagonist camps that have gone on across the history of political philosophy), one social element missing from transitions frameworks is explicit, practice oriented engagement with the energy justice concept and related approaches to justice concerns. Eames and Hunt (2013) draw attention to the fact that considerations of equity and justice are underrepresented within the sociotechnical transitions literature and the wider energy transitions debate, despite the fact that the concept of sustainable development, the target of many transition plans, is inherently rooted in these core notions (Hopwood et al., 2005). Transitions literatures can also fail to give due consideration to issues of landscape, health and existing property values too (Jefferson, 2017).

More points to be looked at:

  • This seems a shameless attempt to turn what is supposed to be an environmental issue into a “social justice”, and hence blur the lines.
  • “Equity and justice” and terms that need to be rammed into discussions.
  • It appears that including “social justice” would be a way to better market their ideas. They don’t seem to make an actual connection though.
  • If a platform needs to latch on to overused buzzwords to sell itself, then it’s probably not a very good platform.

Failure to adequately engage with questions of justice throughout the transition process is dangerous. It may lead to aggravated poverty, entrenched gender bias and non-participation as outcomes or by-products of ‘blinkered’ decision-making. Indeed, without a focus on justice, transitions may fail to acknowledge the burdens of having too much energy, such as waste, over-consumption and pollution, or from not having enough, where some individuals lack access, are challenged by under-consumption and poverty, and may face health burdens and shortened lives as a consequence of restricted energy choices (Sovacool et al.,2016a). This paper therefore utilizes the energy justice concept as a way of engaging with these ethical dilemmas within pre-existing transitions frameworks.

More nonsense which requires a response:

  • There is an obsession with redefining terms to suit an agenda.
  • This is energy we are talking about, not poverty, gender bias, or non-participation. That’s right, they really played the “gender” card here.
  • Burden of having too much? Can I assume the solution is to force sharing? Or rather, to force “rich” nations to hand over energy supplies?
  • Engaging with these ethical dilemmas? You haven’t demonstrated any sort of cause and effect yet.

The origins of the energy justice literature is largely reported as coming from activist accounts of energy issues using the environmental justice frame – a precursor to the energy justice concept which shares overlapping philosophical groundings

That’s right. A bunch of activists made this up.

Specifically, as environmental justice is commonly defined as the distribution of environmental hazards and access to all natural resources; it includes equal protection from burdens, meaningful involvement in decisions, and fair treatment in access to benefits……….. This approach forms the basis of the energy justice approach and framework. However, mentions of its core notions also appear elsewhere, including in the guise of the “three A’s” of availability, accessibility and affordability

It reads like the sort of nonsense one would get in a gender studies class. Only thing is that “energy” is being substituted for here.

note in this regard, that even ‘a “low-carbon” transition has the potential to distribute its costs and benefits just as unequally [as historical fossil-based transitions] without governance mindful of distributional justice’ or, as an extension, without attention to the issues of justice as recognition and due process–energy justice tenets we explore below. We argue that the energy justice concept provides one way of filling this gap.

Here, we get into some straight up Communism. Is it true that costs and benefits don’t impact everyone equally? Yes. However, there is no practical way to do this. Either you would have to forcefully arrange differences in benefits and costs to “make things right”, or you would have to alter everyone’s standard of living so that they were equal.

Guess the road to Hell could use a re-paving.

Throughout, we present three main claims, each coinciding with a level in the MLP model; the niche, regime, and landscape:

(1) That the energy justice concept can expose exclusionary and/or inclusionary technological and social niches before they develop, leading to potentially new and socially just innovation;

(2) That in addition to using the MLP to describe regimes, the energy justice framework provides a way for these actors to normatively judge them, potentially destabilising existing regimes using moral criteria;

(3) That framing energy justice as a matter of priority at the landscape level could exert pressure on the regime below, leading to the widespread reappraisal of our energy choices, and integration of moral criteria.

(1) Sounds like a way to vilify or outcast technology that is scientifically sound, because it doesn’t meet their criteria.
(2) Appears to be a method of using peer pressure and social pressure as a way of destabilizing systems.
(3) Comes across as more overt propaganda.

This governance focus means that the socio-technical literature increasingly acknowledges the political dynamics related to the process through which innovations scale, diffuse or entrench. We focus here on the most prominent socio-technical transitions framework, the multi-level perspective (MLP). The MLP takes the form of a series of nested levels, the niche, regime, and landscape

Nothing scientific. Purely political manoeuvering.

Analysis through the energy justice lens reveals that although electric vehicles (EVs) do have laudable environmental (and social) attributes, they can be exclusionary in the sense that they can perpetuate already widening gaps between the wealthy and poor, as well as potentially raising new forms and geographies of injustice – distributional and justice as recognition concerns.

I thought the point was protecting the environment. But here, they talk about how electric cars will not impact everyone equally, even if they do have considerable environmental benefits. Again, is this an argument in favour of socialism or communism?

Equal opportunity v.s. equal outcome.

In addition to applications in niches, the energy justice framework can support the current role of the MLP to describe regimes by providing a means for policy actors to normatively judge them—exposing unjust practices and resultantly, increasing regime ‘humanisation’. We illustrate this first through the exploration of nuclear power and hydroelectric power production, regimes in which there is some consensus that technological development and lock-in raises issues of justice, or injustice. We identify that the metrics, frameworks, or checklists presented above – as well as the three-tenet framework of energy justice more generally – provide a means of normatively judging both planned and current energy and future sociotechnical regimes, leading to potential re-evaluation of our energy selection criteria. These approaches also recognise the need to politicise the actualisation of energy justice itself.

Finally some honesty. This is a political agenda.

And working to “humanize” a movement? What happened to simply relying on scientific consensus?

4. Conclusions From The Paper

Energy decisions are all too frequently made in a moral vacuum, culminating in a strong normative case for combining the literature on sociotechnical transitions with concepts arising from energy justice. Moreover, we illustrate that energy justice can play a role at each level of one of the more expansive sociotechnical transitions frameworks, the MLP. Within this latter contribution, (1) the energy justice concept could expose exclusionary niches, (2) provide a means for actors to normatively judge regimes, and (3) through the framing of energy justice at the landscape level foster the reappraisal of our energy choices and integration of moral principles. Across all stages of this argument, we present a case for not only mitigating environmental impacts of energy production via sociotechnical change, but doing so in an ethically defensible, socially just way.

To repeat, this is not about environmental protection. It is about blending a social justice causes and lingo into an unrelated topic.

Our caveats come as recognition of the intricacies of politics and political processes around energy transitions and energy justice. For as Meadowcroft (2009) highlights, long-term change is likely to be even messier and more contested than the transitions literature discusses. Indeed, there are likely to be political aspects that approaches such as the MLP are ill equipped to negotiate, and trade-offs that a tenet approach to energy justice cannot entirely resolve.

This may be the most honest thing they say. Politically, this is a very tough sell. They also admit that there “energy justice” approach will not answer the hard questions.

Nonetheless, they still cover those facts in academic jargon.

5. My Own Thoughts

The authors keep repeating that they are just “framing the issue”. In reality, they are publishing propaganda.

There is nothing scientific that the paper adds. There is no building on previous work, or fact checking of previous research. It is entirely about manipulating people to their cause by pretending it is a “social justice” issue. This is blatant activism, masquerading as science.

I also noticed a lot of overlap with the Frank W. Geels article. Do they merely cite each other, or do they just republish the same articles over and over again?

This environmental movement seems to have a lot of self-inflicted problems. For example, this obsession with “energy justice” and other non-issues actually stonewalls progress that they could have made.

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Frank Geels & Disruptive Innovation Framework

(From actual academic writing: Frank W. Geels)

(More academia: Sustainable Consumption Institute, Manchester University)

(Clayton Christiansen and “Disruptive Innovation” video)

(From the Uppity Peasants site)

1. Go Check Out Uppity Peasants Site


This is a fairly new site, however, it has some interesting content on it. Well researched, it will give some alternative views on how we are really being controlled.
Go check out “Uppity Peasants“.

2. Important Links


CLICK HERE, for the Sustainable Consumption Institute & Manchester Institute of Innovation Research, The University of Manchester, Denmark Road Building, M13 9PL, Manchester, United Kingdom.
CLICK HERE, for Clayton Christiansen and “Disruptive Innovation”.
CLICK HERE, for SCI Collective Action & Social Movements.
CLICK HERE, for SCI Social Inequality.
CLICK HERE, for Multi-Level Perspective on Sustainability.
CLICK HERE, for a Wiki explanation of disruptive innovation.
CLICK HERE, for removing the innovator’s dilemma.

CLICK HERE, for the Climate Change Scam Part I.
CLICK HERE, for Part II, the Paris Accord.
CLICK HERE, for Part III, Saskatchewan Appeals Court Reference.
CLICK HERE, for Part IV, Controlled Opposition to Carbon Tax.
CLICK HERE, for Part V, UN New Development Funding.

3. Quotes From The Geels Article

Disruption and low-carbon system transformation: Progress and new challenges in socio-technical transitions research and the Multi-Level Perspective

This will be elaborated on, but is about subverted the status quo, or “disruption”. Worth pointing out, that although these types of articles are published and marketed as “science”, they are anything but.

As this title would suggest, the article is extremely political. The concern is not about science itself, but how to “sell” the science. And the agenda here is searching for political methods of implementing the transition to a Carbon free

ABSTRACT
This paper firstly assesses the usefulness of Christensen’s disruptive innovation framework for low-carbon system change, identifying three conceptual limitations with regard to the unit of analysis (products rather than systems), limited multi-dimensionality, and a simplistic (‘point source’) conception of change. Secondly, it shows that the Multi-Level Perspective (MLP) offers a more comprehensive framework on all three dimensions. Thirdly, it reviews progress in socio-technical transition research and the MLP on these three dimensions and identifies new challenges, including ‘whole system’ reconfiguration, multi-dimensional struggles, bi-directional niche-regime interactions, and an alignment conception of change. To address these challenges, transition research should further deepen and broaden its engagement with the social scienceseconomy.

The usefulness of Christiansen’s disruptive innovation framework? While used in a business sense, it appears to be a way for entrepreneurs to get into a market or business. However, in this context it is used as disrupting an environmental policy.

It is mildly (or downright) creepy that the author, Frank Geels, openly suggests that research should broaden its engagement with social sciences. In plain English, this means merging, where scientific research is viewed through a “social” lens.

Christiansen’s “Disruptive Innovation Framework” is explained in the above video. Also see “disruption in financial services“.

Christensen [4] made important contributions to the long-standing debate in innovation management about new entrants, incumbents and industry structures. He argued that disruptive innovations enable new entrants to ‘attack from below’ and overthrow incumbent firms. Christensen thus has a particular understanding of disruption, focused mainly on the competitive effects of innovations on existing firms and industry structures. His framework was not developed to address systemic effects or broader transformations, so my comments below are not about the intrinsic merits of the framework, but about their usefulness for low-carbon transitions.

Christensen’s disruptive innovation framework offers several useful insights for low-carbon transitions (although similar ideas can also be found elsewhere). First, it suggests that incumbent firms tend to focus their innovation efforts on sustaining technologies (which improve performance along established criteria), while new entrants tend to develop disruptive technologies (which offer different value propositions). Second, it proposes that disruptive technologies emerge in small peripheral niches, where early adopters are attracted by the technology’s new functionalities. Third, incumbent firms may initially overlook or under-estimate disruptive technologies (because of established beliefs) or are not interested in them, because the limited return on-investments associated with small markets do not fit with existing business models. Fourth, price/performance improvements may enable disruptive technologies to enter larger markets, out-compete existing technologies and overthrow incumbent firms

Worth pointing out right away, Geels has no interest in the “intrinsic merits” of the disruptive innovation framework that Christiansen talks about. Rather, he focuses on applying that technique to reducing/eliminating Carbon emissions from society.

Christiansen’s idea could be applied fairly practically to business, where new players want to establish themselves. However, Geels “weaponizes” this idea and wants to apply it with the climate-change agenda.

Geels also makes it obvious that overthrowing incumbents is a priority. Again, Christiansen’s writings were meant with the business approach, and trying to start your own, but Geels “repurposes” it.

While Christensen’s framework focuses on technical and business dimensions, the MLP also accommodates consumption, cultural, and socio-political dimensions. Although co-evolution has always been a core concept in the MLP, this is even more important for low-carbon transitions, which are goal-oriented or ‘purposive’ in the sense of addressing the problem of climate change. This makes them different from historical transitions which were largely ‘emergent’, with entrepreneurs exploiting the commercial opportunities offered by new technology

[27]. Because climate protection is a public good, private actors (e.g. firms, consumers) have limited incentives to address it owing to free rider problems and prisoner’s dilemmas. This means that public policy must play a central role in supporting the emergence and deployment of low-carbon innovations and changing the economic frame conditions (via taxes, subsidies, regulations, standards) that incentivize firms, consumers and other actors. However, substantial policy changes involve political struggles and public debate because: “[w]hatever can be done through the State will depend upon generating widespread political support from citizens within the context of democratic rights and freedoms” ([28]: 91).

Again, Geels hijacking a legitimate business concept, but using it for his enviro agenda.

How to implement this? Taxes, subsidies, regulations, standards for businesses and consumers. Use these to regulate and influence behaviour.

Geels rightly says that widespread political support will be needed. But he frames the climate change scam as a way to protect rights and freedoms. Nice bait-and-switch.

Conceptually, this means that we should analyse socio-technical transitions as multi-dimensional struggles between niche-innovations and existing regimes. These struggles include: economic competition between old and new technologies; business struggles between new entrants and incumbents; political struggles over adjustments in regulations, standards, subsidies and taxes; discursive struggles over problem framings and social acceptance; and struggles between new user practices and mainstream ones.

Despite Geels’ article being published in the Journal, “ENERGY RESEARCH AND SOCIAL SCIENCE”, this anything but scientific. If anything, it seems analogous to the “lawfare” that Islamic groups perpetuate on democratic societies.

While Geels promotes economic competition, this is anything but a fair competition. He also calls for:

  • Political struggles over regulations
  • New standards
  • Subsidies
  • Taxes
  • Discursive struggles over problem framings & social acceptance
  • Struggles between new and mainstream user practices

There is nothing scientific here. This is a call for using “political” manoeuvering for achieving social goals.

The importance of public engagement, social acceptance and political feasibility is often overlooked in technocratic government strategies and model-based scenarios, which focus on techno-economic dimensions to identify least-cost pathways [32]. In the UK, which is characterized by closed policy networks and top-down policy style, this neglect has led to many problems, which are undermining the low carbon transition.

• Onshore wind experienced local protests and permit problems, leading to negative public discourses and a political backlash, culminating in a post-2020 moratorium.

• Shale gas experienced public controversies after it was pushed through without sufficient consultation.

• Energy-saving measures in homes were scrapped in 2015, after the Green Deal flagship policy(introduced in2013) spectacularly failed, because it was overly complicated and poorly designed, leading to limited uptake.

• The 2006 zero-carbon homes target, which stipulated that all new homes should be carbon-neutral by 2016, was scrapped in 2015, because of resistance by major housebuilders and limited consumer interest.

• The smart meter roll-out is experiencing delays, because of controversies over standards, privacy concerns, and distribution of benefits (between energy companies and consumers).

While these points are in fact true, Geels suggests that problems could have been avoided if there was sufficient public consultation. This is wishful thinking.

These points raise many legitimate concerns with the eco-agenda. Yet Geels shrugs them off as the result of not engaging the public enough.

Christensen and other innovation management scholars typically adopt a ‘point source’ approach to disruption, in which innovators pioneer new technologies, conquer the world, and cause social change. Existing contexts are typically seen as ‘barriers’ to be overcome. This ‘bottom-up’ emphasis also permeates the Strategic Niche Management and Technological Innovation System literatures. While this kind of change pattern does sometimes occur, the MLP was specifically developed to also accommodate broader patterns, in which niche-innovations diffuse because they align with ongoing processes at landscape- or regime-levels [9].

The MLP thus draws on history and sociology of technology, where processual, contextual explanations are common. Mokyr [58], for instance, emphasizes that “The new invention has to be born into a socially sympathetic environment” (p. 292) and that “Macro-inventions are seeds sown by individual inventors in a social soil. (.) But the environment into which these seeds are sown is, of course, the main determinant of whether they will sprout” (p. 299). So, if radical innovations face mis-matches with economic, socio-cultural or political contexts, they may remain stuck in peripheral niches, hidden ‘below the surface’.

Since low-carbon transitions are problem-oriented, transition scholars should not only analyse innovation dynamics, but also ‘issue dynamics’ because increasing socio-political concerns about climate change can lead to changes in regime-level institutions and selection environments. Societal problems or ‘issues’ have their own dynamics in terms of problem definition and socio-political mobilization as conceptualized, for instance, in the issue lifecycle literature [59,50]. Low carbon transitions require stronger ‘solution’ and problem dynamics, and their successful alignment, which is not an easy process, as the examples below show.

These passages go into marketing strategies, and ways to “frame an argument”. Notice not once does Geels suggest doing more research, or checking the reliability of existing data. Instead, this is a push for emotional manipulation and shameless advertising.

Invention has to be born into a socially sympathetic environment. Science be damned.

There are also positive developments, however, that provide windows of opportunity. Coal is losing legitimacy in parts of the world, because it is increasingly framed as dirty, unhealthy and old-fashioned, and because oil and gas companies are distancing themselves from coal, leading to cracks in the previously ‘closed front’ of fossil fuel industries. The UK has committed to phasing out coal-fired power plants by 2025 and several other countries (Netherlands, France, Canada, Finland, Austria) also move in this direction, providing space for low-carbon alternatives, including renewables.

I would actually agree that coal being phased out would benefit society. However, Geels makes it a “marketing” issue rather than a scientific one. Coal is “increasingly framed” as dirty. Notice that the actual science, such as from this site, are very rarely described.

Following chemical reactions takes place in the combustion of coal with the release of heat:
C + O2 = CO2 + 8084 Kcal/ Kg of carbon (33940 KJ/Kg)
S + O2 = SO2 + 2224 Kcal/Kg of sulfur (9141 KJ/Kg)
2 H2 + O2 = 2 H2O + 28922 Kcal/Kg of hydrogen (142670 KJ/Kg)
2C + O2 = 2CO + 2430 Kcal/Kg of carbon (10120 KJ/Kg)

4. Geels’ Conclusions

The paper has also identified several research challenges, where the transitions community could fruitfully do more work. First, we should broaden our analytical attention from singular niche-innovations (which permeate the literature) to ‘whole system’ change. This may involve changes in conceptual imagery (from ‘point source’ disruption to gradual system reconfiguration) and broader research designs, which analyze multiple niche-innovations and their relations to ongoing dynamics in existing systems and regimes. That, in turn, may require more attention for change mechanisms like add-on, hybridisation, modular component substitution, knock-on effects, innovation cascades, multi regime interaction.

Second, we should better understand regime developments. Existing regimes can provide formidable barriers for low-carbon transitions. Incumbent actors can resist, delay or derail low-carbon transitions, but they can also accelerate them if they reorient their strategies and resources towards niche-innovations. The analysis of niche-to-regime dynamics (as in the niche empowerment literature) should thus be complemented with regime-to-niche dynamics, including incumbent resistance or reorientation. Additionally, we need more nuanced conceptualizations and assessments of degrees of lock-in, tensions, cracks, and destabilisation.

Third, we need greater acknowledgement that socio-technical systems are a special unit of analysis, which spans the social sciences and can be studied through different lenses and at different levels. The recent trend towards deepening our understanding of particular dimensions and societal groups is tremendously fruitful, because disciplinary theories offer more specific causal mechanisms. But, as a community, we should complement this with broad analyses of co-evolution, alignment, multi-dimensionality and ‘whole systems’.

This all sounds elegant, but read between the lines. It is about influencing public perception. Whenever academics, lawyers or politicians seem to make things confusing we need to ask: are they trying to obscure their goals?

5. More About Frank W. Geels

Selected publications of Geels
If you would like a broader cross section of Geels’ work, perhaps these publications will be of interest.

  • Geels, F.W., Berkhout, F. and Van Vuuren, D., 2016, Bridging analytical approaches for low-carbon transitions, Nature Climate Change, 6(6), 576-583
  • Geels, F.W., Kern, F., Fuchs, G., Hinderer, N., Kungl, G., Mylan, J., Neukirch, M., Wassermann, S., 2016, The enactment of socio-technical transition pathways: A reformulated typology and a comparative multi-level analysis of the German and UK low-carbon electricity transitions (19902014), Research Policy, 45(4), 896-913
  • Turnheim, B., Berkhout, F., Geels, F.W., Hof, A., McMeekin, A., Nykvist, B., Van Vuuren, D., 2015, Evaluating sustainability transitions pathways: Bridging analytical approaches to address governance challenges, Global Environmental Change, 35, 239–253
  • Penna, C.C.R. and Geels, F.W., 2015, ‘Climate change and the slow reorientation of the American car industry (1979-2011): An application and extension of the Dialectic Issue LifeCycle (DILC) model’, Research Policy, 44(5), 1029-1048
  • Geels, F.W., 2014, ‘Regime resistance against low-carbon energy transitions: Introducing politics and power in the multi-level perspective’, Theory, Culture & Society, 31(5), 21-40
  • Geels, F.W., 2013, ‘The impact of the financial-economic crisis on sustainability transitions: Financial investment, governance and public discourse’, Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions, 6, 67-95
  • Geels, F.W., 2012, ‘A socio-technical analysis of low-carbon transitions: Introducing the multi-level perspective into transport studies’, Journal of Transport Geography, 24, 471-482
  • Geels, F.W., Kemp, R., Dudley, G. and Lyons, G. (eds.), 2012, Automobility in Transition? A Socio Technical Analysis of Sustainable Transport, New York: Routledge
  • Verbong, G.P.J. and Geels, F.W., 2010, ‘Exploring sustainability transitions in the electricity sector with socio-technical pathways’, Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 77(8), 12141221 Verbong, G.P.J. and Geels, F.W., 2007, ‘The ongoing energy transition: Lessons from a sociotechnical, multi-level analysis of the Dutch electricity system (1960-2004)’, Energy Policy, 35(2), 1025-1037
  • Geels, F.W., 2002, ‘Technological transitions as evolutionary reconfiguration processes: A multi-level perspective and a case-study’, Research Policy, 31(8/9), 1257-1274

Frank Geels publicly available CV
Education
• Ph.D., Science, Technology and Innovation Studies, Twente University of Technology (Jan. 1998- July 2002), Netherlands. Supervisors: Arie Rip and Johan Schot. Title PhD thesis: Understanding the Dynamics of Technological Transitions: A co-evolutionary and socio-technical analysis.
• Masters degree in Philosophy of Science, Technology and Society, Twente University of Technology (1991-1996)
• Bachelor degree in Chemical Engineering, Twente University of Technology (1989-1991)

For what it’s worth, his formal education is pretty impressive. Where I lose respect is when he deviates from scientific argument in favour of political discourse. What could be very interesting work is corrupted be having an agenda.

His undergraduate degree is chemical engineering, which again, is very respectable. However, his Masters and PhD show a deviation from science and research.

While there are many other such authors, Frank W. Geels is a good case of what happens when political agendas and manoeuvering creep into science.

A morbidly fascinating topic. Check out some of his other publications.

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Committee for Monetary and Economic Reform (COMER) Case, Bank Of Canada

An update on this is coming soon.
It’s time to go through this again.

1. From COMER’s 2011 Press Release

The action also constitutionally challenges the government’s fallacious accounting methods in its tabling of the budget by not calculating nor revealing the true and total revenues of the nation before transferring back “tax credits” to corporations and other taxpayers.

The Plaintiffs state that since 1974 there has been a gradual but sure slide into the reality that the Bank of Canada and Canada’s monetary and financial policy are dictated by private foreign banks and financial interests contrary to the Bank of Canada Act.

The Plaintiffs state that the Bank of International Settlements (BIS), the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were all created with the cognizant intent of keeping poorer nations in their place which has now expanded to all nations in that these financial institutions largely succeed in over-riding governments and constitutional orders in countries such as Canada over which they exert financial control.

The Plaintiffs state that the meetings of the BIS and Financial Stability Board (FSB) (successor of FSF), their minutes, their discussions and deliberations are secret and not available nor accountable to Parliament, the executive, nor the Canadian public notwithstanding that the Bank of Canada policies directly emanate from these meetings. These organizations are essentially private, foreign entities controlling Canada’s banking system and socio-economic policies.

The gist of the press release, and of the Claim overall, is that Canada’s banking system has been hijacked and usurped. As such, it is controlled by foreign entities such as the Bank of International Settlements and the International Monetary Fund.

As was outlined in the last article, Canada’s banking “was” effectively turned over. The result is that Canada, instead of loaning money to itself, is now borrowing from private banks. As such, it is being bled dry.

In fact, COMER’s claims can be easily validated by online research. The question for the Court to decide: is this actually legal?

2. Ruling Striking Out Statement of Claim

[5] The core elements of COMER’s Claim can be reduced to three parts:
1. The Bank of Canada (Bank) and Crown refuse to provide interest-free loans for capital expenditures.
2. The Crown uses flawed accounting methods in describing public finances, which provides the rationale for refusing to grant such loans.
3. These and other harms are caused by the Bank being controlled by private foreign interests.

The Pronothary summarizing the main issues the Plaintiffs raise

Discussion
[41] Against these competing positions, it must be remembered that the test for striking an action is a high one. The action must be bereft of any chance of success and as noted above just because it is a novel cause of action it does not automatically fail.[26]

[42] The Supreme Court of Canada has recently summarized the principles to be applied on a motion to strike. In R. v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd.,[27] the Chief Justice, writing for the Court made the following observations regarding a motion to strike:

17. The parties agree on the test applicable on a motion to strike for not disclosing a reasonable cause of action under r. 19(24)(a) of the B.C. Supreme Court Rules. This Court has reiterated the test on many occasions. A claim will only be struck if it is plain and obvious, assuming the facts pleaded to be true, that the pleading discloses no reasonable cause of action: Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse, 2003 SCC 69 (CanLII), [2003] 3 S.C.R. 263, at para. 15; Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc., 1990 CanLII 90 (SCC), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 959, at p. 980. Another way of putting the test is that the claim has no reasonable prospect of [page 67] success. Where a reasonable prospect of success exists, the matter should be allowed to proceed to trial: see, generally, Syl Apps Secure Treatment Centre v. B.D., 2007 SCC 38 (CanLII), [2007] 3 S.C.R. 83; Odhavji Estate; Hunt; Attorney General of Canada v. Inuit Tapirisat of Canada, 1980 CanLII 21 (SCC), [1980] 2 S.C.R. 735.

. . .

21. Valuable as it is, the motion to strike is a tool that must be used with care. The law is not static and unchanging. Actions that yesterday were deemed hopeless may tomorrow succeed. Before Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562 (H.L.) introduced a general duty of care to one’s neighbour premised [page68] on foreseeability, few would have predicted that, absent a contractual relationship, a bottling company could be held liable for physical injury and emotional trauma resulting from a snail in a bottle of ginger beer. Before Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners, Ltd., [1963] 2 All E.R. 575 (H.L.), a tort action for negligent misstatement would have been regarded as incapable of success. The history of our law reveals that often new developments in the law first surface on motions to strike or similar preliminary motions, like the one at issue in Donoghue v. Stevenson. Therefore, on a motion to strike, it is not determinative that the law has not yet recognized the particular claim. The court must rather ask whether, assuming the facts pleaded are true, there is a reasonable prospect that the claim will succeed. The approach must be generous and err on the side of permitting a novel but arguable claim to proceed to trial.

What we can gain from this is that striking out a Statement of Claim is something that must be done cautiously, and only when it is plain and obvious that there is no chance to succeed.

Some of what may be “struck out” now, may in fact later be the basis for new laws, so the Courts should exercise caution and not jump to conclusions.

[30] The Crown further contends that COMER’s claim is outside this Court’s jurisdiction as it fails to meet the three-part test set out in ITO-International Terminal Operators Ltd v. Miida Electronics Inc.[21] In ITO, the Supreme Court considered the jurisdiction of the Federal Court in the context of an admiralty action. The Supreme Court determined that jurisdiction in the Federal Court depends on three factors:
1. There must be a statutory grant of jurisdiction by the Federal Parliament.
2. There must be an existing of body of federal law which is essential to the disposition of the case and which nourishes the statutory grant of jurisdiction.
3. The law on which the case is based must be a “law of Canada” as the phrase is used in s. 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867 [page 766]

[57] The jurisdictional issue raised by the Crown engages the three part test set out in ITO as discussed above. The Crown argues that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain tort claims against Federal authorities.

[58] However, pursuant to sections 2, 17 and 18 of the Federal Courts Act, the wording is sufficiently wide to capture these types of claims against federal actors and Crown servants. It is therefore not plain and obvious that this Court is without jurisdiction to entertain claims seeking declaratory relief as here.

One of the major contentions is that the Government alleged that the Federal Court had no jurisdiction to even hear the case. The Pronothary took a different view. However, there were other problems which ended with this.

[71] There is ample authority in this Court and in the jurisprudence generally that where a claim has some kernel of a legitimate claim it should not be tossed aside but permitted to be amended to determine if the clam in law can be cured.[45]

[72] Given that the Claim, in my view, is not justiciable, leave to amend will not cure the defects. Leave to amend is therefore not granted.

The case was thrown out on a motion to strike. However, that will not be the end of it. The Plaintiffs would appeal to a Justice of the Federal Court.

3. COMER Appeals Dismissal


(See here.)

The striking out (without permission to amend) was appealed to a Justice of the Federal Court. This was a partial victory, as the dismissal “was” upheld, but it allowed the Plaintiff’s to file an amended Claim. This would be another “chance” to get it right.

4. COMER Tries To File Again


(See here.)
After the Justice of the Federal Court upheld the dismissal (but giving leave to amend the Statement of Claim), COMER appealed to the Federal Court of Appeal, and the Government cross-appealed.

In short, the Plaintiffs were trying to get the dismissal overturned entirely, while the Government tried to remove the clause to allow COMER to file an amended Statement of Claim.

The Federal Appeals Court panel (3 Justices) threw out both the appeal and cross-appeal.

5. COMER’s Amended Statement Thrown Out


(See here.)

[66] In terms of the general principles that ought to be applied on a motion to strike, the Plaintiffs assert that the facts pleaded by the Plaintiffs must be taken as proven: Canada (Attorney General) v Inuit Tapirasat of Canada, 1980 CanLII 21 (SCC), [1980] 2 SCR 735; Nelles v Ontario (1989), DLR (4th) 609 (SCC) [Nelles]; Operation Dismantle, above; Hunt v Carey Canada Inc 1990 CanLII 90 (SCC), [1990] 2 SCR 959 [Hunt]; Dumont v Canada (Attorney General), 1990 CanLII 131 (SCC), [1990] 1 SCR 279 [Dumont]; Nash v Ontario (1995), 1995 CanLII 2934 (ON CA), 27 OR (3d) 1 (Ont CA) [Nash]; Canada v Arsenault, 2009 FCA 242 (CanLII) [Arsenault].

[67] The Plaintiffs echo the test referenced by the Defendants, asserting that a claim can be struck only in plain and obvious cases where the pleading is bad beyond argument: Nelles, above, at para 3. The Court has provided further guidance in Dumont, above, that an outcome should be “plain and obvious” or “beyond doubt” before striking can be invoked (at para 2). Striking cannot be justified by a claim that raises an “arguable, difficult or important point of law”: Hunt, above, at para 55.

[68] The novelty of the Amended Claim is not reason in and of itself to strike it: Nash, above, at para 11; Hanson v Bank of Nova Scotia (1994), 1994 CanLII 573 (ON CA), 19 OR (3d) 142 (CA); Adams-Smith v Christian Horizons (1997), 3 OR (3d) 640 (Ont Gen Div). Additionally, matters that are not fully settled by the jurisprudence should not be disposed of on a motion to strike: RD Belanger & Associates Ltd v Stadium Corp of Ontario Ltd (1991), 1991 CanLII 2731 (ON CA), 5 OR (3d) 778 (CA). In order for the Defendants to succeed, the Plaintiffs state that a case from the same jurisdiction that squarely deals with, and rejects, the very same issue must be presented: Dalex Co v Schwartz Levitsky Feldman (1994), 19 OR (3d) 215 (CA). The Court should be generous when interpreting the drafting of the pleadings, and allow for amendments prior to striking: Grant v Cormier – Grant et al (2001), 2001 CanLII 3041 (ON CA), 56 OR (3d) 215 (CA).

[69] The Plaintiffs also remind the Court that the line between fact and evidence is not always clear (Liebmann v Canada, 1993 CanLII 3006 (FC), [1994] 2 FC 3 at para 20) and that the Amended Claim must be taken as pleaded by the Plaintiffs, not as reconfigured by the Defendants: Arsenault, above, at para 10.

Plaintiffs arguing that the Defendant has not actually met the burden to strike out a Statement of Claim. However, the Justice decides differently.

[137] In the present case, the Plaintiffs have not, in their Amended Claim, pleaded facts to demonstrate a “real” issue concerning the relative interests of each party, and the nexus of that real issue to the Plaintiffs and their claim for relief. Although as I pointed out in my Order of April 24, 2014, the Plaintiffs do distinguish between legal issues and policy issues, the legal issues remain theoretical with no real nexus to some interest of the Plaintiffs, other than an interest in having the Court endorse their opinion on the Bank Act issues raised.

[138] The Plaintiffs have not addressed the jurisdictional problems I referred to in paras 85 to 91 of my Order of April 24, 2014 and/or what might generally be referred to as the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain, or its willingness to grant, free-standing requests for declaration.

The Justice Rules that the original problems are left unfixed. As such, the case is thrown out. This time, there is no leave to amend, so if this is to continue, it must go back to the Federal Court of Appeals.

6. Return to Federal Court of Appeals


(See here.)

[9] The essence of the Federal Court judge’s reasoning for striking the amended statement of claim is summed up at paragraph 144 of his reasons: It seems to me, then, that the latest Amended Claim discloses no reasonable cause of action and has no prospect of success at trial. It also seems to me that the Plaintiffs are still asking the Court for an advisory opinion in the form of declarations that their view of the way the Bank Act and the Constitution should be read is correct. It also seems to me that they have failed to show a statutory grant of jurisdiction by Parliament that this Court can entertain and rule on their claim as presently constituted, or that they have any specific rights under the legislation which they invoke, or a legal framework for any such rights. As the Supreme Court of Canada pointed out in Operation Dismantle, above, the preventive function of a declaratory judgment must be more than hypothetical and requires “a cognizable threat to a legal interest before the Court will entertain the use of its process as a preventative measure” (para 33). The Court is not here to declare the law generally or to give an advisory opinion. The Court is here to decide and declare contested legal rights.

[10] The appellants assert that the opinion so expressed is wrong in law. In support of this proposition, they essentially reiterate the arguments which they urged upon the Federal Court judge and ask that we come to a different conclusion. Counsel for the appellants focused his argument during the hearing on the issue of standing and the right to seek declarations of constitutionality. It remains however that, as the Federal Court judge found, the right to a remedy is conditional on the existence of a justiciable issue.

The Federal Appeals Court believes that COMER is still asking for an advisory opinion. Furthermore, the FCA still believes that no justiciable issue has been raised.

7. Supreme Court of Canada Declines To Hear Case


(See here.)

The Supreme Court refuses to hear the case, which means it is legally over. It would have been nice to have some actual reasons included. However, due to the volume of cases it receives, rejected applications generally don’t receive them.

Despite repeated rejection by the Courts, the questions about the changes in banking policy were never really addressed. Does giving control of our central bank to foreign powers break the law?

This is supposedly a “political” issue, but no politicians are willing to talk about it.

As of now, Canada is still borrowing money from private banks, as opposed to ourselves. We are racking up huge levels of debt that we shouldn’t be.

(1) http://www.comer.org ARCHIVE
(2) http://www.comer.org/content/SupremeCourtDecision_4May17.htm
(3) http://www.comer.org/content/COMER_CourtCasePressRelease.pdf
(4) http://comer.org/content/COMER_CourtProceedings5Dec2012.pdf
(5) https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fct/doc/2013/2013fc855/2013fc855.html
(6) http://comer.org/content/COMER_Appeal24April2014.pdf
(7) http://comer.org/content/COMER_FederalCourtDecisionApr2014.pdf
(8) https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fca/doc/2015/2015fca20/2015fca20.html
(9) https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fca/doc/2016/2016fca312/2016fca312.html

Posted on

Restoring The 1934 Bank Of Canada Act

(Bank for International Settlements, or BIS)

(Basel Committee)

(Great video by Stephan Smith)

(Jack Layton and Elizabeth May know full well about the international banking cartel. However they act as controlled opposition and remain silent)

(Great video by NoLongerATheory on 1974 sellout by Trudeau Sr.)

The Bank of Canada Act was passed in 1934. It allowed the Canadian Government to borrow from its own central bank, in a sense, to “borrow from itself”. However, things drastically changed in 1974. Pierre Trudeau changed it so that Canada would now be borrowing from “private banks”, and racking up debt and interest charges in the meantime.

From the Global Research article:

Between 1939 and 1974, the government actually did borrow from its own central bank. That made its debt effectively interest-free, since the government owned the bank and got the benefit of the interest. According to figures supplied by Jack Biddell, a former government accountant, the federal debt remained very low, relatively flat, and quite sustainable during those years. (See his chart below.) The government successfully funded major public projects simply on the credit of the nation, including the production of aircraft during and after World War II, education benefits for returning soldiers, family allowances, old age pensions, the Trans-Canada Highway, the St. Lawrence Seaway project, and universal health care for all Canadians.

This is the main takeaway here: Borrowing from your own central bank effectively makes the loans interest free, since you are borrowing from yourself as opposing to borrowing from someone else.

From the Canadian Dimension article:

The critical point is that between 1939 and 1974 the federal government borrowed extensively from its own central bank. That made its debt effectively interest-free, since the government owned the bank and got the benefit of any interest. As such Canada emerged from World War II and from all the extensive infrastructure and other expenditures with very little debt. But following 1974 came a dramatic change.

Reiterating the point, that Canada was borrowing from itself until 1974.

1. Pierre Trudeau’s Dual Loyalty

In 1974 the Bank for International Settlements (the bank of central bankers) formed the Basel Committee to ostensibly establish global monetary and financial stability. Canada, i.e., the Pierre Trudeau Liberals, joined in the deliberations. The Basel Committee’s solution to the “stagflation” problem of that time was to encourage governments to borrow from private banks, that charged interest, and end the practice of borrowing interest-free from their own publicly owned banks. Their argument was that publicly owned banks inflate the money supply and prices, whereas chartered banks supposedly only recycle pre-existing money. What they purposefully suppressed was that private banks create the money they lend just as public banks do. And as banking specialist Ellen Brown states: “The difference is simply that a publicly-owned bank returns the interest to the government and the community, while a privately-owned bank siphons the interest into its capital account, to be reinvested at further interest, progressively drawing money out of the productive economy.” The effect of such a change would remove a powerful economic tool from the hands of democratic governments and give such control to a cabal of foreign bankers. This was one of Milton Friedman’s radical free-market ideas.

At that time it seems that Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau came under the influence of neoliberalism, promulgated by Frederich Hayek and Milton Friedman. Then, while attending the Basil Committee sessions, he probably came under further influence of fellow Bilderberg attendees and as a result he accepted the partisan flawed logic from the world’s top banks. Apparently on the basis of this, he decided that Canada should dramatically reduce borrowing interest-free money from Canada’s own bank and instead borrow the bulk of its money from chartered banks and pay interest on the loans. It appears that this decision was made without informing Canada’s parliament. This was such a fundamental change of policy that it should not only have been debated in parliament, this should have been put to a national referendum. Strangely, even when this became known, this was apparently never questioned by the opposition parties, especially the NDP, and never revealed in the media. Strange indeed.

John Ryan, writing for Canadian Dimension points out the obvious flaw in the logic of private bank loans. Yes, they create money as well, but their obligations are to shareholders.

Why is it that Canada’s mainstream media has never brought any of these matters to the public’s attention? After the Supreme Court declined to deal with this case, citing specious reasoning that this was more of political issue than a judicial one, the media boycotted the story and therefore hardly anyone in Canada knows of this case. Canada’s top constitutional lawyer Rocco Galati who handled this lawsuit has always gotten major media attention, except for this case, which he considers to have been his most important lawsuit. Prior to this, Galati had been best known for stopping the Supreme Court appointment of Judge Marc Nadon, whose nomination had been put forward by Stephen Harper. Although Galati is unable to identify his sources, he states that he was informed that the government instructed the mainstream media to give this case, and prior lawsuits on this matter, limited coverage. And they complied. The story trickled out through alternative news sources.

In the course of five court hearings dealing with this case, Rocco Galati, as the lead lawyer, maintained that since Canada joined the Bank of International Settlements all their ensuing meetings have been kept secret. Their minutes, discussions and deliberations are secret and not available nor accountable to Canada’s Parliament, notwithstanding that the Bank of Canada policies emanate directly from these meetings. As Galati has stated: “These organizations are essentially private, foreign entities controlling Canada’s banking system and socio-economic policies.” As such, private foreign banks and financial interests, contrary to the Bank of Canada Act, dictate the Bank of Canada and Canada’s monetary and financial policy.

Galati is of course correct, and the COMER case is the subject of the next article. The Governments of both Stephan Harper and Justin Trudeau fought tooth and nail to keep the banking cartel in place in Canada.

One would THINK that the NDP would be all over the case, but surprisingly not. Guess standing up for the little guy has its limits.

As a result of being part of the banking cartel, our “debt” keeps increasing. Truth be told, it will never be paid off, since it is designed not to be.

2. How Much Debt?


Dollars (millions)
Net federal government financial debt
1930 $2,178
1931 $2,262
1932 $2,376
1933 $2,596
1934 $2,730
1935 $2,846
1936 $3,006
1937 $3,084
1938 $3,102
1939 $3,153
1940 $3,271
1941 $3,649
1942 $4,045
1943 $6,183
1944 $8,740
1945 $11,298
1946 $13,421
1947 $13,048
1948 $12,372
1949 $11,776
1950 $11,626
1951 $11,427
1952 $11,163
1953 $11,151
1954 $11,092
1955 $11,229
1956 $11,241
1957 $10,967
1958 $11,015
1959 $11,627
1960 $12,047
1961 $12,394
1962 $13,378
1963 $14,079
1964 $15,262
1965 $15,748
1966 $15,381
1967 $15,866
1968 $16,713
1969 $17,396
1970 $18,095
1971 $18,581
1972 $19,328
1973 $20,123
1974 $21,580
1975 $24,769
1976 $28,573
1977 $32,629
1978 $45,846
1979 $59,040
1980 $72,555
1981 $86,280
1982 $99,600
1983 $128,302
1984 $164,532
1985 $209,891
1986 $245,151
1987 $276,735
1988 $305,438
1989 $333,519
1990 $362,920
1991 $395,075
1992 $428,682
1993 $471,061
1994 $513,219
1995 $550,685
1996 $578,718
1997 $588,402
1998 $581,581
1999 $574,468
2000 $561,733
2001 $545,300
2002 $534,690
2003 $526,492
2004 $523,648
2005 $523,344
2006 $514,099
2007 $508,122
2008 $490,412

See the source.

In 1930, Canada’s national debt was about $2 billion. In $1974, it was about $20 billion. A decade after changes to the Act, the debt was about $160, or 8 times higher.

Worth noting, that Brian Mulroney, who was PM from 1984 until 1993 added over $300 billion to the national debt.

3. Fighting Back: Committee on Monetary & Economic Reform

Supreme Court of Canada Dismisses Constitutional Bank of Canada Case, Claiming It Is a Political Matter

We believe that the case has ample legal merit, and should have proceeded to trial. It is not uncommon for the Supreme Court to refuse leave on a given issue multiple times, finally to grant leave, hear the appeal and the case then succeeds. The Supreme Court controls its own agenda, both in its timing and on the merits of issues it will or will not hear. (Annually, fewer than 8–10% of all cases filed are granted permission and heard at the Supreme Court of Canada.)

It should be noted that throughout this arduous and expensive legal process, the substance of this lawsuit initiated in the public interest has not been addressed. The matters raised by the lawsuit are summarized in the original news release (pdf) issued on December 19, 2011.)

See the source

A 5 1/2 year legal fight to restore the original central banking. Even more frustrating is that the Courts have never really addressed the issues which led to the challenge in the first place.

The Supreme Court says it is a “political matter”, but no politicians in Canada have the willpower to address it, never mind fix it. Even “socialist” and “populist” politicians seem unwilling to take it on.

4. Who Are These People?

About BIS – overview

Our mission is to serve central banks in their pursuit of monetary and financial stability, to foster international cooperation in those areas and to act as a bank for central banks.

Established in 1930, the BIS is owned by 60 central banks, representing countries from around the world that together account for about 95% of world GDP. Its head office is in Basel, Switzerland and it has two representative offices: in Hong Kong SAR and in Mexico City.

We pursue our mission by:

  • fostering discussion and facilitating collaboration among central banks
  • supporting dialogue with other authorities that are responsible for promoting financial stability
  • carrying out research and policy analysis on issues of relevance for monetary and financial stability
  • acting as a prime counterparty for central banks in their financial transactions
  • serving as an agent or trustee in connection with international financial operations

As part of our work in the area of monetary and financial stability, we regularly publish related analyses and international banking and financial statistics that underpin policymaking, academic research and public debate.

With regard to our banking activities, our customers are central banks and international organisations. We do not accept deposits from, or provide financial services to, private individuals or corporate entities.

Supposedly, the Bank for International Settlements is “owned” by 60 central banks. It then facilitates discussions between those 60 banks. In short, it is a global collusion to fix monetary policies.

Interesting that the “central banks” are supposed to be owned by their respective nations, yet, BIS recommends borrowing from “private” bankers. Almost as if it wasn’t acting in the nations’ self interests.

5. Not in Canada’s Interests


This should be obvious, but borrowing from private banks is not in Canada’s best interests, nor any nations. This is bankrupting our nation, to enrich global bankers.

Restore the 1934 Bank of Canada Act, and let us take back control over our own finances.

Curious, even when national and provincial debts are in the news so much, no one asks the obvious question. Why are we jacking up our debt by borrowing from private banks?

(1) https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/cv.action?pid=1010004801#timeframe
(2) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bank_for_International_Settlements
(3) https://www.bis.org
(4) https://www.bis.org/about/member_cb.htm
(5) https://www.bis.org/bcbs/organ_and_gov.htm
(6) https://canadiandimension.com/articles/view/the-bank-of-canada-should-be-reinstated-to-its-original-mandated-purposes
(7) https://www.globalresearch.ca/oh-canada-imposing-austerity-on-the-world-s-most-resource-rich-country/30074
(8) http://www.comer.org/content/SupremeCourtDecision_4May17.htm
(9) http://www.comer.org/content/AmendedClaimStatement26Mar2015.pdf
(10) https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/B-2/

Posted on

CCS #14: UN’s New Development Financing (The Bait-and-Switch)

(Ways to raise money)

(Sources of money for health initiatives)

An internationally concerted carbon tax could raise $250 billion per year…

(Page 13)
In this vein, a tax of $25 per ton of CO2 emitted by developed countries is expected to raise $250 billion per year in global tax revenues. Such a tax would be in addition to taxes already imposed at the national level, as many Governments (of developing as well as developed countries) already tax carbon emissions, in some cases explicitly, and in other cases, indirectly through taxes on specific fuels

…and a small currency transaction tax could add an estimated $40 billion…

1. Debunking The Climate Change Scam

CLICK HERE, for #1: major lies that the climate frauds tell.
CLICK HERE, for #2: review of the Paris Accord.
CLICK HERE, for #3: Bill C-97, the GHG Pollution Pricing Act.
CLICK HERE, for #4: in 3-2 decision, Sask. COA allows carbon tax.
CLICK HERE, for #5: controlled opposition to carbon tax.
CLICK HERE, for #6: controlled opposition Cons ==> Supreme Court.
CLICK HERE, for #7: climate bonds pitched as $100T industry.
CLICK HERE, for #8: Joel Wood pitching various pricing options.
CLICK HERE, for #9: Mark Carney and UN climate finance.
CLICK HERE, for #10: Goldman Sachs, Obama, Clinton, Chicago CX.
CLICK HERE, for #11: Coronavirus, Pirbright Inst, Gates, Depopulation.
CLICK HERE, for #12: AOC and the “Green New Deal”.
CLICK HERE, for #13: UN seeks new development financing.

CLICK HERE, for BOLD Like A Leopard Guest Posting.

2. Important Links


UN.new.development.financing.2012.178pages
CLICK HERE, for the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime.
CLICK HERE, for UN Sustainable Development Goals.
CLICK HERE, for Devex article explaining debt-for-development.
CLICK HERE, for World Bank explanation for debt-for-development trade.
CLICK HERE, for debt swaps for sustainable development.
CLICK HERE, for loss of sovereignty article.
CLICK HERE, for an IMF article on debt swaps.

3. This Is The Bait:

(From Page 10)
Two main sources are considered: taxes levied on international transactions and/or taxes that are internationally concerted, such as the air-ticket solidarity levy, financial or currency transaction taxes and carbon taxes; and revenues from global resources, such as SDR allocations and proceeds derived from the extraction of resources from the global commons, through, for example, seabed mining in international waters. Proposals on potential sources of finance for international development cooperation in both categories have been discussed for decades, although most of these, with the exception of the proposal on an airline levy, have not yet been adopted.

So what kind of “revenues” are raised?

  • taxes on international transactions
  • internationally concerted taxes
  • air-ticket solidarity levy
  • financial or currency transaction taxes
  • carbon taxes

This is how bait-and-switch works:
(1) Raise money using cause A.
(2) Actually spend the money on cause B.

4. And Here Is The Switch:

An array of other options with large fundraising potential have been proposed (see figure O.1 and table O.1), but have not been agreed upon internationally thus far. These include taxes on financial and currency transactions and on greenhouse gas emissions, as well as the creation of new international liquidity through issuance of special drawing rights (SDRs) by the International Monetary Fund IMF), to be allocated with a bias favouring developing countries or leveraged as development financing. Though their potential may be high, these proposals are subject to political controversy. For instance, many countries are not willing to support international forms of taxation, as these are said to undermine national sovereignty.

There are also challenges in the use and allocation of funds mobilized internationally. Most existing innovative financing mechanisms earmark resources upfront for specific purposes, as is the case for the global health funds. There are perceived benefits in doing so. Advocates argue that the earmarking helps build political support and attract funds by establishing a clear link between fundraising and popular causes. This may come at a cost, however, since earmarking funds can limit domestic policy space for channelling resources to nationally defined priorities.

This explains why there is the bait-and-switch. Countries are not willing to support international taxation. Therefore it is necessary to raise money under the pretense of “environmentalism”. It also shows that the UN feels little resistance to misleading the public on where money is being used for.

(From Page 10)
Some innovations focus on intermediation mechanisms designed to better match funding and needs by facilitating front-loading of resources (which include several mechanisms channelling resources to global health funds and some debt-for-development swap mechanisms), by mobilizing public means to guarantee or insure natural disaster risks or technology development for public causes, or by securing specific-purpose voluntary contributions from the private sector for official development cooperation. Various mechanisms of these types do exist, but they are not large in size.

Several global funds that act as allocation mechanisms are generally also considered to come under the rubric of innovative development financing. Disbursement mechanisms in the health sector include the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, UNITAID and the GAVI Alliance. These mechanisms collect financing directly from sources or through intermediary financing mechanisms. UNITAID is the only disbursement mechanism that obtains the bulk of its financing from an innovative source, the air-ticket solidarity levy. Other funds rely mainly on traditional sources of financing.

Though the bulk of money raised is collected under the pretense of “environmentalism”, the UN makes it clear that the cash will be spent on a few “other” purposes.

  1. Global Health Funds
  2. Debt-for-Development Swap Mechanisms

5. UN Violates Own Convention


From the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime

Article 4(1)

Article 4. Protection of sovereignty
1. States Parties shall carry out their obligations under this Convention in a manner consistent with the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity of States and that of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other States.
2. Nothing in this Convention entitles a State Party to undertake in the territory of another State the exercise of jurisdiction and performance of functions that are reserved exclusively for the authorities of that other State by its domestic law.

Article 5

Article 5. Criminalization of participation in an organized criminal group
1. Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally:
(a) Either or both of the following as criminal offences distinct from those involving the attempt or completion of the criminal activity:
(i) Agreeing with one or more other persons to commit a serious crime for a purpose relating directly or indirectly to the obtaining of a financial or other material benefit and, where required by domestic law, involving an act undertaken by one of the participants in furtherance of the agreement or involving an organized criminal group;

Consider that the New Development Financing involves obtaining huge sums of money under false pretenses. While the publics are told that much of this revenue will be for environmental causes, it becomes clear from later in the document that it will be spent on other purposes (such as debt-for-development and health care causes).

Taking money for purposes other than what is advertised is fraud.

6. Debt Conversion Mechanisms

(Page 86) Debt-conversion mechanisms
Debt conversion entails the cancellation by one or more creditors of part of a country’s debt in order to enable the release of funds which would otherwise have been used for debt-servicing, for use instead in social or environmental projects. Where debt is converted at a discount with respect to its face value, only part of the proceeds fund the projects, the remainder reducing the external debt burden, typically as part of a broader debt restructuring.

Debt to developing nations can be “forgiven”, at least partly, if certain conditions are met. However, the obvious question must be asked:

Can nations be loaned money they could never realistically pay back, in order to ensure their compliance in UN or other global agenda, by agreeing to “forgive” part of it?

(Page 86) Debt conversion first emerged, in the guise of debt-for-nature swaps, during the 1980s debt crisis, following an opinion article by Thomas Lovejoy, then Executive Vice-President of the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), in the New York Times in 1984. Lovejoy argued that a developing country’s external debt could be reduced (also providing tax relief to participating creditor banks) in exchange for the country’s taking measures to address environmental challenges. Estimates based on Sheikh (2010) and Buckley, ed. (2011) suggest that between $1.1 billion and $1.5 billion of debt has been exchanged through debt-for-nature swaps since the mid–1980s, although it is not possible to assess how much of this constitutes IDF, for the reasons discussed in box III.1.

If debt can be forgiven in return for environmental measures, then why not simply fund these environmental measures from the beginning? Is it to pressure or coerce otherwise unwilling nations into agreeing with such measures?

(Page 88)
There have been two basic forms of debt-for-nature exchanges (Buckley and Freeland, 2011). In the first, part of a country’s external debt is purchased by an environmental non-governmental organization and offered to the debtor for cancellation in exchange for a commitment to protect a particular area of land. Such transactions occurred mainly in the late 1980s and 1990s and were generally relatively small-scale. An early example was a 1987 deal under which Conservation International, a Washington, D.C.-based environmental non-governmental organization, bought $650,000 of the commercial bank debt of Bolivia (now Plurinational State of Bolivia) in the secondary market for $100,000, and exchanged this for shares in a company established to preserve 3.7 million acres of forest and grassland surrounding the Beni Biosphere Reserve in the north-east part of the country.
In the second form, debt is exchanged for local currency (often at a discount), which is then used by local conservation groups or government agencies to fund projects in the debtor country. Swaps of this kind are generally much larger, and have predominated since the 1990s. The largest such swap came in 1991, when a group of bilateral creditors agreed to channel principal and interest payments of $473 million (in local currency) into Poland’s Ecofund set up to finance projects designed to counter environmental deterioration. The EcoFund financed 1,500 programmes between 1992 and 2007, providing grants for conservation projects relating to cross-border air pollution, climate change, biological diversity and the clean-up of the Baltic Sea (Buckley and Freeland, 2011).

We will “forgive” your debt if:
(1) A portion of your land is off limits; or
(2) Debt converted to currency to fund “projects”

Debt For Health

(Page 89)
Since the development of debt swaps in the 1980s, there has been a diversification of their uses to encompass social projects, most recently in the area of health under the Debt2Health initiative, which was launched by the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria in 2007 to harness additional resources for its programmes. Under Debt2Health, a donor country agrees to reduce part of a loan ineligible for debt relief under global initiatives such as the HIPC and Multilateral Debt Reduction Initiatives, in exchange for a commitment by the debtor to invest (in local currency) half of the nominal value of the debt in programmes approved by the Global Fund. The Global Fund is committed to devoting all of the funds thus generated to financing programmes in the country rather than overhead costs (Buckley, 2011c).

Debt For Education

(Page 90)
In addition to the uses described above, debt swaps have also been successfully implemented for education and development.2 Clear delineation among the various types of swaps is often problematic, however, as debt-for-development swaps typically provide funding for environmental, health and/or education projects.
……..
. Although nominally debt-conversion operations, these Contracts stipulate that debtor countries are to continue to service these debts in full, while receiving, however, an equivalent amount of new ODA grants tied to specific programmes when they do so (Agence Française de Développement, n.d.). Thus, resources are not redirected from debt servicing to other uses; rather, potential fiscal savings from debt-service reduction are forgone, the resources instead being directed to specific uses (Buckley, 2011a). These transactions thus cannot be considered to constitute IDF

So in these cases the debt isn’t really forgiven. The indebted nation will still have to make payments, while other money will be coming in for other purposes.

The funding generated by debt swaps is closely tied to their designated end use (although the effectiveness of this depends on monitoring mechanisms). While this effective earmarking of budgetary funds indicates a trade-off with policy space, the debt relief provided by converting debt at a discount (where the debt would otherwise have been serviced) releases resources for use in accordance with national priorities. However, the exclusion of relevant ministries and limited civil society participation in the design and implementation processes may undermine coherence with medium-term national development strategies.

To make absolutely clear, this debt forgiveness isn’t free. There is always some trade off. Here, it seems to be having your nation’s sovereignty eroded in return for being cut a break.

While all of this is couched in very pretty rhetoric, one really has to ask what is really the costs?

7. “Voluntary” Pesticide Use In Crops


Here is one such “pull measure” (page 98)

The World Bank is currently developing agricultural projects based on pull mechanisms through the Agricultural Pull Mechanism (AGPM) initiative, with the objectives of increasing production, reducing losses and enhancing food security for small farmers. There are six pilot programmes currently being developed, which are expected to be launched in June 2012. Their objectives are:
-To develop distribution networks for bio-fortified crop varieties (high pro-vitamin A cassava, maize and sweet potato, and high in iron beans) in Africa
-To promote the development and use of new hybrid rice varieties in South Asia
-To develop improved fertilizers and fertilizer production processes
-To promote adoption of improved post-harvest storage technologies
-To incentivize the use of biocontrol mechanisms against aflatoxin contamination of crops
-To promote development and use of a vaccine against peste des petits ruminants in livestock in Africa

Interesting. How much of this is done in the first world?

8. Now Comes Climate Change

(Page 120)
The unprecedented global improvements in average living standards over the last two centuries have come at the cost of serious degradation of the natural environment. The most serious environmental threat is climate change, brought about by global emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases. In addition to considerable expenditure for adaptation, climate change necessitates a fundamental shift in development strategies towards a much less carbon-intensive model, and a major reduction in reliance on fossil fuels.

While climate change arises overwhelmingly from historical emissions in developed countries, it impacts disproportionately the well-being and livelihoods of people in developing countries. This makes a compelling case for the assumption by richer countries of the costs of mitigation and adaptation

Read the next several pages. While the paper talks at length about how to “raise” money for climate change causes, it is surprisingly vague about how this money will actually be spent. There are some bland references to technology, but no specifics.

The paper cites “Carbon Dioxide and other greenhouse gases” but CO2 is the only one to actually be named.

Furthermore, the UN tries to promote mass migration to the West. However, this would be illogical, since on average, Western nations leave a much bigger “footprint” than others do.

While “financing” climate change efforts features prominently in later sections of the paper, it gives no real information on how the money would be put to use.

9. Is This Predatory?

From the Journal of Politics and Law Article (see here).

Budget constraints are severely undermining the capacity of governments of developing countries to provide their people even the most basic of social services. This lack of finance is in turn caused by several factors including, among others, huge military spending, pervasive corruption and large repayments of debts owed to the developed world. These factors, either singly or in combination, eat up government funds that can otherwise be spent on education, health, housing and other social services. Economists have a better way of describing it – these factors ‘crowd out’ essential public spending designed to benefit the people. (Note 1) As a result, these governments are unable to steer their countries towards the path of economic development and entire peoples are unable to enjoy the most fundamental of economic, social and cultural rights“

This is what we are financing.

Our leaders take from us, claiming it is for efforts to “protect the environment”. Money is then spent abroad in the developing world, often awarded in the form of loans. When such nations cannot pay back the money they owe, they become indebted to their creditors. This is usually bodies like the UN or IMF.

Bait: Tax to save environment
Switch: Predatory loans to developing world.

This is the bait-and-switch. It is highly unethical to take advantage of people like this.

Posted on

CCS #13: UN’s Search For New Development Financing

1. Debunking The Climate Change Scam

CLICK HERE, for #1: major lies that the climate frauds tell.
CLICK HERE, for #2: review of the Paris Accord.
CLICK HERE, for #3: Bill C-97, the GHG Pollution Pricing Act.
CLICK HERE, for #4: in 3-2 decision, Sask. COA allows carbon tax.
CLICK HERE, for #5: controlled opposition to carbon tax.
CLICK HERE, for #6: controlled opposition Cons ==> Supreme Court.
CLICK HERE, for #7: climate bonds pitched as $100T industry.
CLICK HERE, for #8: Joel Wood pitching various pricing options.
CLICK HERE, for #9: Mark Carney and UN climate finance.
CLICK HERE, for #10: Goldman Sachs, Obama, Clinton, Chicago CX.
CLICK HERE, for #11: Coronavirus, Pirbright Inst, Gates, Depopulation.
CLICK HERE, for #12: AOC and the “Green New Deal”.

CLICK HERE, for BOLD Like A Leopard Guest Posting.

2. Important Links


CLICK HERE, for the 178 page document.
CLICK HERE, for the Paris Accord.
CLICK HERE, for Agenda 2030, signed Sept 2015 by Harper.
CLICK HERE, for Agenda 21, signed June 1992 by Mulroney.
CLICK HERE, for debt.org, and predatory lending.
CLICK HERE, for Washington State, and predatory lending.
CLICK HERE, for British Columbia Law Institute, predatory lending.

3. FOREWORD BY BAN KI-MOON

Achieving the Millennium Development Goals and addressing global challenges such as climate change require considerable financing. Finding the necessary resources will be challenging, especially for least developed countries. Official development assistance (ODA) is falling well short of what countries need, and commitments to provide more aid remain unfulfilled. In the midst of difficult financial times, many donor countries have cut back on development assistance. In 2011, aid flows declined in real terms for the first time in many years.

The need for additional and more predictable development financing has led to a search for alternative, innovative sources. A number of initiatives have been launched during the past decade, most of which have been used to fund global health programmes that have helped to provide immunizations and AIDS and tuberculosis treatments to millions of people in the developing world.

While these initiatives have successfully used novel methods to channel development financing, they have not yielded much additional funding, thus leaving available finance well short of what is needed. This is one reason why proposals to mobilize resources for development through sources beyond ODA, including innovative finance mechanisms, have generated renewed interest from both Governments and civil society.

This year’s World Economic and Social Survey shows that such proposals could raise hundreds of billions of dollars in additional finance. If they are to become viable, however, strong international agreement is needed, along with adequate governance mechanisms, to manage the allocation of additional resources for development and global public goods.

World Economic and Social Survey 2012 is a valuable resource for implementing the decisions reached at the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20). I commend it to all those seeking a solid financial underpinning for the post2015 development agenda

Okay, to sum this up: the UN needs “lots” of cash for its various agendas. Foreign aid is being cut for the first time in years, and commitments remain unfulfilled.

4. Innovative Sources Of Funding

Okay, what are these “revenue sources”?

  • SDR (or special drawing rights), from IMF $150B-$270B
  • Carbon taxes, $240B
  • Leveraging SDR, $90B
  • Financial transaction tax, $10B-70B
  • Billionaire tax, $90B
  • Currency trading tax, $30B
  • EU emissions trading scheme, $5B
  • Air passenger levy, $10B
  • Certified emission reduction tax, $2B

If these numbers are accurate, then the US is viewed as a cash cow somewhere to the tune of $627 billion to $807 billion. Yes, this only refers to revenue potential from the United States. I believe this is annually.

What does the report say about SDAs?

These include taxes on financial and currency transactions and on greenhouse gas emissions, as well as the creation of new international liquidity through issuance of special drawing rights (SDRs) by the International Monetary Fund IMF), to be allocated with a bias favouring developing countries or leveraged as development financing. Though their potential may be high, these proposals are subject to political controversy. For instance, many countries are not willing to support international forms of taxation, as these are said to undermine national sovereignty.

No kidding. There is a lot of political opposition to taxes which are deemed to undermine national sovereignty. Could that be because these taxes AREN’T being used to support the well being of the citizenry? Instead the money is being funnelled out of the country in the name of some global good project.

The appeal of potential mechanisms for more automatic and assured flows of funds for international cooperation, especially if they can mobilize substantial amounts of resources, has led to multiple proposals on how to establish those mechanisms. While recognizing that these proposals have been long-standing, this Survey argues that certain forms of international taxation and leveraging of international reserve assets have great potential to significantly enhance resources for international development cooperation, warranting greater efforts to overcome the obstacles that have prevented tapping such potential in the past.

Here we get to the heart of the matter. The bulk of these “revenue tools” are listed as being for environmental causes. Yet the UN itself admits that the money will be used for other purposes. This is money laundering and fraud.

In one such proposal, the IMF would issue more international liquidity in the form of special drawing rights. Proposed annual allocations of SDR 150 billion–250 billion would be received mainly by developed countries, as the SDRs are distributed according to country quotas in IMF. However, if instead, two thirds were allocated to developing countries, they would receive $160 billion–$270 billion annually. The “seigniorage” from such issuance, which now accrues to the international reserve currency countries, could be allocated for use in part by the international community in favour of developing countries. Admittedly, changing the SDR allocation formula would constitute a significant political undertaking, as it will require an amendment to the IMF Articles of Agreement. Amending the Articles, like decisions for a general SDR allocation under existing rules, requires an 85 per cent approval of member votes, giving the United States of America an effective veto. Indeed, United States support for regular SDR allocations would imply a measure of global solidarity, as the seigniorage embodied in the new SDRs would be largely at the expense of seigniorage no longer accruing to the United States. Nevertheless, such a change could result in a significant strengthening of the international monetary system, which should be supported by all IMF member countries.

Such regular issuance of SDRs has no direct link to development finance, however. SDRs remain a reserve asset, but their additional availability, arranged through international coordination, could reduce the need for individual developing countries to set aside foreign-exchange earnings in reserve holdings of their own as a form of self insurance against global market shocks.

So if the developed world were to engage in these UN measures, then developing countries wouldn’t need to set aside foreign exchange earnings in reserve. This is because “we” will have done it for them. In short, this is the 1st world economically propping up the 3rd world.

An internationally concerted carbon tax could raise $250 billion per year…

Let’s be clear. The Carbon tax has NOTHING to do with environmentalism, and everything to do with being a fundraising tool for the UN’s agendas.

If global policy could be designed as if for a single economy, then a single global tax could be set (and adjusted over time) to steer overall emissions in the direction of a particular target to be achieved by a particular date. However, the world is made up of many countries which would experience different impacts on overall consumption and production from a single tax. The differential impact of a uniform carbon tax would cause objections to be raised by Governments and could frustrate agreement on the tax, especially since it is unlikely that those making the smallest sacrifices under a uniform tax would fully compensate those making the largest. Indeed, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol3 to the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change mandates only that higher-income countries make specific targeted reductions, as those countries are responsible for most of the man-made concentrations of CO2 in the atmosphere and are best able to bear the economic burden. In this vein, a tax of $25 per ton of CO2 emitted by developed countries is expected to raise $250 billion per year in global tax revenues. Such a tax would be in addition to taxes already imposed at the national level, as many Governments (of developing as well as developed countries) already tax carbon emissions, in some cases explicitly, and in other cases, indirectly through taxes on specific fuels.

We will have a carbon tax on top of:

  • other federal taxes
  • Provincial taxes
  • Municipal taxes
  • Fuel specific taxes

This is all a scam to gouge the public to finance the UN agendas.

Estimates of additional financing needs for climate change mitigation and adaptation in developing countries are great—considerably greater even than those for health. Estimates of additional investment needs in 2030 are in the order of $140 billion–$175 billion per annum (plus additional upfront investments of $265 billion–$565 billion) for mitigation, and a further $30 billion–$100 billion per annum for adaptation. World Economic and Social Survey 2011 (United Nations, 2011a) estimated additional investment needs of developing countries for sustainable development, including for climate change mitigation and adaptation, and for ensuring access to clean energy for all, sustainable food production and forest resource management, at about $1 trillion per year in the coming decades. As recognized, inter alia, by the Copenhagen Accord, from the perspective both of fair burden-sharing in financing global public goods and of the limited economic means of developing countries, a substantial share of the required financing would need to come from international transfers.

Okay, by 2030, various UN agendas will be costing about $1 trillion (with a “T”) annually. And in order to finance this, lots of financing will be required, mainly from the developed world.

Health causes will cost a fraction of what environmental costs are expected to be.

5. Exploitation: Debt for Development

Debt conversion first emerged, in the guise of debt-for-nature swaps, during the 1980s debt crisis, following an opinion article by Thomas Lovejoy, then Executive Vice-President of the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), in the New York Times in 1984. Lovejoy argued that a developing country’s external debt could be reduced (also providing tax relief to participating creditor banks) in exchange for the country’s taking measures to address environmental challenges. Estimates based on Sheikh (2010) and Buckley, ed. (2011) suggest that between $1.1 billion and $1.5 billion of debt has been exchanged through debt-for-nature swaps since the mid–1980s, although it is not possible to assess how much of this constitutes IDF, for the reasons discussed in box III.1.

There have been two basic forms of debt-for-nature exchanges (Buckley and Freeland, 2011). In the first, part of a country’s external debt is purchased by an environmental non-governmental organization and offered to the debtor for cancellation in exchange for a commitment to protect a particular area of land. Such transactions occurred mainly in the late 1980s and 1990s and were generally relatively small-scale. An early example was a 1987 deal under which Conservation International, a Washington, D.C.-based environmental non-governmental organization, bought $650,000 of the commercial bank debt of Bolivia (now Plurinational State of Bolivia) in the secondary market for $100,000, and exchanged this for shares in a company established to preserve 3.7 million acres of forest and grassland surrounding the Beni Biosphere Reserve in the north-east part of the country.

In the second form, debt is exchanged for local currency (often at a discount), which is then used by local conservation groups or government agencies to fund projects in the debtor country. Swaps of this kind are generally much larger, and have predominated since the 1990s. The largest such swap came in 1991, when a group of bilateral creditors agreed to channel principal and interest payments of $473 million (in local currency) into Poland’s Ecofund set up to finance projects designed to counter environmental deterioration. The EcoFund financed 1,500 programmes between 1992 and 2007, providing grants for conservation projects relating to cross-border air pollution, climate change, biological diversity and the clean-up of the Baltic Sea (Buckley and Freeland, 2011).

However, most debt-for-nature swaps have been much smaller, so that the funds generated are generally limited relative to environmental financing needs, providing funding, instead, for individual projects. Critics also argue that monitoring mechanisms are often insufficient to ensure that debtor countries fulfil their environmental obligations, and that swaps may be detrimental to national sovereignty in cases where they result in the transfer of landownership to foreign entities. In view of the latter concern, conservation organizations involved in three-way swaps (involving the debtor Government, the creditor and a third party) often refrain from buying land directly with funds generated by swaps (Sheikh, 2010)

How is this even legal? Developing nations are “loaned” money they cannot possibly pay back. This is done on the backs of taxpayers in the first world.

When indebted nations cannot pay the loans back, which is usually the case, debt is “forgiven” or “reduced” in return for local currency and resources, and/or access to the land for other environmental projects. These, of course, are also financed on the backs of First World taxpayers.

Of course, land and other resources could now be effectively controlled by foreign entities, meaning that entire parts of Countries would be owned by foreigners. Not too different from say, Vancouver (which is bought up en masse by China).

6. Exploitation: Debt for Education

In addition to the uses described above, debt swaps have also been successfully implemented for education and development. Clear delineation among the various types of swaps is often problematic, however, as debt-for-development swaps typically provide funding for environmental, health and/or education projects.

Based on Buckley, ed. (2011), the cumulative amount of debt-for-development and debt-for-education swaps appears to be in the order of $3 billion, including 18 debt-for-education swaps in 14 countries since 1998, the proceeds of which were in most cases directed to funding for local schools (Buckley, 2011c). Again, however, the proportion of this total that has provided additional funding—and may therefore be considered to constitute IDF—cannot readily be estimated. In particular, $865 million of the $3 billion total represents Debt Reduction-Development Contracts with the Agence Française de Développement, covering debts arising from past ODA loans from France which would otherwise be eligible for cancellation under multilateral debt reduction programmes such as the HIPC Initiative. Although nominally debt-conversion operations, these Contracts stipulate that debtor countries are to continue to service these debts in full, while receiving, however, an equivalent amount of new ODA grants tied to specific programmes when they do so (Agence Française de Développement, n.d.). Thus, resources are not redirected from debt servicing to other uses; rather, potential fiscal savings from debt-service reduction are forgone, the resources instead being directed to specific uses (Buckley, 2011a). These transactions thus cannot be considered to constitute IDF.

This is concerning for a few reasons.

First, it seems to hold a nation hostage by making demands in order to fund its health care or education.

Second, given the sorts of education the UN engages in, would imposing this on other nations actually work to undermine its culture and identity?

7. Closing thoughts

Given the document is basically a book, this review hardly does it justice.

The UN seeks to raise huge amounts of money through various “innovative” means. Basically, they are some form of tax, or are funds converted from taxes of individual nations. This has the effect of bankrupting the developed world, as their money is being used to finance globalist agendas.

Furthermore, the “lending” to the developing world can be considered predatory. Money is loaned out to nations which have no realistic chance to pay it back. In order to “service” their debts, nations are forced to cede to foreign ownership, or to allow the UN control over how its territory is used.

This is exploitive for everyone involved. And despite the rallying cries, this has little to do with actually combatting climate change.

A shoutout to Nicky @cravecreative, for catching this disaster.