ECHR Upholds Islamic Blasphemy Law in Austria

(From the European Court of Human Rights press release)

An Austrian woman had her appeal rejected and will have to pay 480 Euros for truthful comments she made at 2 seminars calling Muhammad a paedophile for marrying a 6 year old girl.

An interesting side note, as exampled in the video, Islam is not a race, and hence criticism of it is not “racism”. That claim is often used to derail legitimate debate.

For some context, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) is a European-based court in France where people can contest judgements if they claim human rights have been violated. This court will consider cases after other legal remedies have been exhausted in the home country.

Conviction for calling Muhammad a paedophile is not in breach of Article 10
In today’s Chamber judgment1
.
in the case of E.S. v. Austria (application no. 38450/12) the European Court of Human Rights held, unanimously, that there had been: no violation of Article 10 (freedom of expression) of the European Convention on Human Rights.
.
The case concerned the applicant’s conviction for disparaging religious doctrines; she had made statements suggesting that Muhammad had had paedophilic tendencies.
.
The Court found in particular that the domestic courts comprehensively assessed the wider context of the applicant’s statements and carefully balanced her right to freedom of expression with the right of others to have their religious feelings protected, and served the legitimate aim of preserving religious peace in Austria. It held that by considering the impugned statements as going beyond the permissible limits of an objective debate, and by classifying them as an abusive attack on the Prophet of Islam which could stir up prejudice and threaten religious peace, the domestic courts put forward relevant and sufficient reasons.

That was the summary of the case, The press release goes on to list the facts:

Principal facts
.
The applicant, E.S., is an Austrian national who was born in 1971 and lives in Vienna (Austria). In October and November 2009, Mrs S. held two seminars entitled “Basic Information on Islam”, in which she discussed the marriage between the Prophet Muhammad and a six-year old girl, Aisha, which allegedly was consummated when she was nine. Inter alia, the applicant stated that Muhammad “liked to do it with children” and “… A 56-year-old and a six-year-old? … What do we call it, if it is not paedophilia?”.
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On 15 February 2011 the Vienna Regional Criminal Court found that these statements implied that Muhammad had had paedophilic tendencies, and convicted Mrs S. for disparaging religious doctrines. She was ordered to pay a fine of 480 euros and the costs of the proceedings. Mrs S. appealed but the Vienna Court of Appeal upheld the decision in December 2011, confirming in essence the lower court’s findings.

The facts were not really in question, just the findings

Decision of the Court
Article 10
.
The Court noted that those who choose to exercise the freedom to manifest their religion under Article 9 of the Convention could not expect to be exempt from criticism. They must tolerate and accept the denial by others of their religious beliefs. Only where expressions under Article 10 went beyond the limits of a critical denial, and certainly where they were likely to incite religious intolerance, might a State legitimately consider them to be incompatible with respect for the freedom of thought, conscience and religion and take proportionate restrictive measures.
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The Court observed also that the subject matter of the instant case was of a particularly sensitive nature, and that the (potential) effects of the impugned statements, to a certain degree, depended on the situation in the respective country where the statements were made, at the time and in the context they were made. Accordingly, it considered that the domestic authorities had a wide margin of appreciation in the instant case, as they were in a better position to evaluate which statements were likely to disturb the religious peace in their country.
.
……….
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The Court found in conclusion that in the instant case the domestic courts carefully balanced the applicant’s right to freedom of expression with the rights of others to have their religious feelings
protected, and to have religious peace preserved in Austrian society.
.
3
The Court held further that even in a lively discussion it was not compatible with Article 10 of the
Convention to pack incriminating statements into the wrapping of an otherwise acceptable expression of opinion and claim that this rendered passable those statements exceeding the permissible limits of freedom of expression.

The ECHR press release pretty much sums it up in 2 statements

(1) Criticising Islam can lead to religious unrest

(2) Protecting religious feelings (of Muslims) trumps free speech

Actually, the ruling and press release could be taken as a good sign that some religions simply do not belong in a Western country. If mere criticism can result in ”religious violence” then it is obviously incompatible.

The ECHR excused the practice, saying that it should be considered that child marriages were historically a reality. But switch that around. That historical reality would be considered paedophilia under today’s laws. So the statement is factually correct.

But before sounding too smug, the Liberal Party of Canada passed a non-binding motion (M-103) which


a) recognize the need to quell the increasing public climate of hate and fear; (b) condemn Islamophobia and all forms of systemic racism and religious discrimination and take note of House of Commons’ petition e-411 and the issues raised by it; and (c) request that the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage undertake a study on how the government could

(i) develop a whole-of-government approach to reducing or eliminating systemic racism and religious discrimination including Islamophobia, in Canada, while ensuring a community-centered focus with a holistic response through evidence-based policy-making,

(ii) collect data to contextualize hate crime reports and to conduct needs assessments for impacted communities, and that the Committee should present its findings and recommendations to the House no later than 240 calendar days from the adoption of this motion, provided that in its report, the Committee should make recommendations that the government may use to better reflect the enshrined rights and freedoms in the Constitution Acts, including the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Notice that Islam is the only religion mentioned in the motion. It should also be noted that the Liberals rejected an alternative motion that would passed the same intent, but with no mention to any specific religion.

No other religious group in the western world acts this way, or has to have certain laws passed to appease it.

Religion and Government should remain 2 separate entities. However, that becomes next to impossible when importing a culture that believes religious law should govern civil law. Another example of multiculturalism not working at all. This nonsense needs to stop.

South Korea, Japan Ban Citizens From Toking in Canada, U.S. Bans Pot Investors

(South Korean and Japanese citizens will not be allowed to smoke marijuana in Canada, even though it is legal here)

Marijuana, or weed, was legalized in Canada, as of October 17, 2018. Far from the most controversial legislation is has passed since getting elected in 2015. While the substance will for now still be regulated, for all practical purposes it is completely legal. A number of developments from this are happening.

First, is that the Canadian government intends to make it easier to apply for a pardon for those with a pot conviction. This similar to prior moves years ago which pardoned gays and lesbians for consensual sexual acts.

Second, it remains to be seen how the economy will be effected by this legislation. There has been widespread speculation that it will boost economic growth. The details are outside the scope of this article, though more information is coming available.

Third, the United States says it intends to ban those who smoke cannabis, or even those who invest in the product, such as stock or bond holders. While the U.S. does have the right to refuse entry to anyone it wishes, this does raise 2 interesting questions: (a) how would Border Control even find out; (b) does it infringe on citizens doing lawful activity abroad? In later versions of the story, the U.S. is said to be backing off on that proposal — at least for now.

Fourth, and probably the most interesting here is that South Korea has formally declared that any of its citizens who smoke weed may be arrested. This applies even in Canada, where the act itself is legal. South Korean citizens are subjected to its laws regardless of where they are in the world. Japan has done the same, warning citizens that they may be subjected to home laws even while abroad.

As an aside, it would be interesting to know how the officials would ever learn about it. However, people today do brag about just about everything online. Also, given the distance, bringing witnesses for a criminal trial may prove difficult.

Furthermore, could a Korean or Japanese national smoke weed, and then claim asylum here, on grounds that they are being persecuted? This sounds absurd, but not outside the realm of possibility.

The Japanese and South Korea model stand in stark contrast to Canadian, American, and other Western nations, who oblige their citizens to follow the laws of wherever they happen to be at that time.

Fifth, and also worth noting, Russia has condemned the move as hypocritical. The Russian government says that legalization flies in the face of several anti-narcotic treaties, and does and end run around those agreements. Canada was a party to the following:

CLICK HERE, for the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.

CLICK HERE, for the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

CLICK HERE, for the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances.

CLICK HERE, for the 1988 Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.

Russia has a valid point. The legalization push by the Trudeau government “will” undoubtedly make anti-drug matters more complicated. After all, how committed can Canada be to fighting the marijuana trade considering the substance is legal here?

The October 17 legalization will bring a number of challenges both here and abroad. Too early to say where things will go, but there will almost certainly be a followup article on at least one of these points.

Canada’s Bill C-75 (Watering Down Penalties for Terrorism, Rioting, Weapons)

(The Canadian Criminal Code, which typically gets amended every year)

Criminal offences in Canada are categorized like this

SUMMARY OFFENCE: more minor, lesser penalties (misdemeanor)
INDICTABLE OFFENCE: more serious, harsher penalties (felony)
HYBRID OFFENCE: Prosecutor has discretion as to proceed “summarily” or “by indictment”

For a good video on this subject, Julie Mora posted a video seen here. It had 2 parts: (a) an expanded gun registry, Bill C-71, and (b) changes to the Canadian Criminal Code, Bill C-75. Julie is a fine blogger, and her videos are well worth a watch by all Canadians. She claims in this video that the bill will “hybridize” many serious charges, meaning that they may now be tried summarily. And she is right. Below are the major points.

This is not trivial at all. Terrorism and rioting offence should be treated seriously. Yet, if this bill were actually to pass, the penalties for serious crimes may be gutted. True, for hybrid offences, Prosecutors could still choose to try the case by indictment. However, most people would agree that the option should not exist

Relevant links are below:
CLICK HERE for the Criminal Code as it currently exists.
CLICK HERE for the Liberal Bill C-75.


ORIGINAL

Marginal note:
Punishment of rioter
65 (1) Every one who takes part in a riot is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.
Marginal note:
Concealment of identity
(2) Every person who commits an offence under subsection (1) while wearing a mask or other disguise to conceal their identity without lawful excuse is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years.

REPLACEMENT

Punishment of rioter
65 (1) Every person who takes part in a riot is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than two years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.
Concealment of identity
(2) Every person who commits an offence under subsection (1) while wearing a mask or other disguise to conceal their identity without lawful excuse is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.


ORIGINAL

Neglect by peace officer
69 A peace officer who receives notice that there is a riot within his jurisdiction and, without reasonable excuse, fails to take all reasonable steps to suppress the riot is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.

REPLACEMENT

Neglect by peace officer
69 A peace officer who receives notice that there is a riot within their jurisdiction and, without reasonable excuse, fails to take all reasonable steps to suppress the riot is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than two years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.


ORIGINAL

Possession without lawful excuse
82 (1) Every person who, without lawful excuse, the proof of which lies on the person, makes or has in the possession or under the care or control of the person any explosive substance is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years.

REPLACEMENT

14 Subsection 82(1) of the Act is replaced by the following:

Possession of explosive
82 (1) Every person who, without lawful excuse, makes or has in their possession or under their care or control any explosive substance is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than five years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.


ORIGINAL

Financing of Terrorism
Marginal note:
Providing or collecting property for certain activities
83.02 Every one who, directly or indirectly, wilfully and without lawful justification or excuse, provides or collects property intending that it be used or knowing that it will be used, in whole or in part, in order to carry out
(a) an act or omission that constitutes an offence referred to in subparagraphs (a)(i) to (ix) of the definition of terrorist activity in subsection 83.01(1), or
(b) any other act or omission intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to a civilian or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, if the purpose of that act or omission, by its nature or context, is to intimidate the public, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or refrain from doing any act,
is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years.

REPLACEMENT

Providing or collecting property for certain activities
83.‍02 Every person is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years or is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction who, directly or indirectly, wilfully and without lawful justification or excuse, provides or collects property intending that it be used or knowing that it will be used, in whole or in part, in order to carry out
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than five years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.


ORIGINAL

Providing, making available, etc., property or services for terrorist purposes
83.03 Every one who, directly or indirectly, collects property, provides or invites a person to provide, or makes available property or financial or other related services
(a) intending that they be used, or knowing that they will be used, in whole or in part, for the purpose of facilitating or carrying out any terrorist activity, or for the purpose of benefiting any person who is facilitating or carrying out such an activity, or
(b) knowing that, in whole or part, they will be used by or will benefit a terrorist group,
is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years.

REPLACEMENT

Providing, making available, etc.‍, property or services for terrorist purposes
83.‍03 Every person is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years or is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction who, directly or indirectly, collects property, provides or invites a person to provide, or makes available property or financial or other related services
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than five years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.


ORIGINAL

Using or possessing property for terrorist purposes
83.04 Every one who
(a) uses property, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, for the purpose of facilitating or carrying out a terrorist activity, or
(b) possesses property intending that it be used or knowing that it will be used, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, for the purpose of facilitating or carrying out a terrorist activity,
is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years.

REPLACEMENT

Using or possessing property for terrorist purposes

83.‍04 Every person is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years or is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction


ORIGINAL

Offences — freezing of property, disclosure or audit
83.12 (1) Every one who contravenes any of sections 83.08, 83.1 and 83.11 is guilty of an offence and liable
(a) on summary conviction, to a fine of not more than $100,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than one year, or to both; or
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years.

REPLACEMENT

Paragraphs 83.‍12(1)‍(a) and (b) of the Act are replaced by the following:

(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years; or
(b) on summary conviction, to a fine of not more than $100,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than two years less a day, or to both.


ORIGINAL

Participation in activity of terrorist group
83.18 (1) Every one who knowingly participates in or contributes to, directly or indirectly, any activity of a terrorist group for the purpose of enhancing the ability of any terrorist group to facilitate or carry out a terrorist activity is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years.

REPLACEMENT

Participation in activity of terrorist group
83.‍18 (1) Every person who knowingly participates in or contributes to, directly or indirectly, any activity of a terrorist group for the purpose of enhancing the ability of any terrorist group to facilitate or carry out a terrorist activity is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than10 years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.


ORIGINAL

Leaving Canada to participate in activity of terrorist group
83.181 Everyone who leaves or attempts to leave Canada, or goes or attempts to go on board a conveyance with the intent to leave Canada, for the purpose of committing an act or omission outside Canada that, if committed in Canada, would be an offence under subsection 83.18(1) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years

REPLACEMENT

21 Section 83.‍181 of the Act is replaced by the following:

Leaving Canada to participate in activity of terrorist group
83.‍181 Every person who leaves or attempts to leave Canada, or goes or attempts to go on board a conveyance with the intent to leave Canada, for the purpose of committing an act or omission outside Canada that, if committed in Canada, would be an offence under subsection 83.‍18(1) is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.


ORIGINAL

Advocating or promoting commission of terrorism offences
83.221 (1) Every person who, by communicating statements, knowingly advocates or promotes the commission of terrorism offences in general — other than an offence under this section — while knowing that any of those offences will be committed or being reckless as to whether any of those offences may be committed, as a result of such communication, is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than five years.

REPLACEMENT

22 Subsection 83.‍221(1) of the Act is replaced by the following:

Advocating or promoting commission of terrorism offences
83.‍221 (1) Every person who, by communicating statements, knowingly advocates or promotes the commission of terrorism offences in general — other than an offence under this section — while knowing that any of those offences will be committed or being reckless as to whether any of those offences may be committed, as a result of such communication, is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than five years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction


ORIGINAL

Concealing person who carried out terrorist activity
83.23 (1) Everyone who knowingly harbours or conceals any person whom they know to be a person who has carried out a terrorist activity, for the purpose of enabling the person to facilitate or carry out any terrorist activity, is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment
(a) for a term of not more than 14 years, if the person who is harboured or concealed carried out a terrorist activity that is a terrorism offence for which that person is liable to imprisonment for life; and
(b) for a term of not more than 10 years, if the person who is harboured or concealed carried out a terrorist activity that is a terrorism offence for which that person is liable to any other punishment.

REPLACEMENT

Concealing person who carried out terrorist activity
83.‍23 (1) Every person who knowingly harbours or conceals another person whom they know to be a person who has carried out a terrorist activity, for the purpose of enabling that other person to facilitate or carry out any terrorist activity, is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 14 years, if the person who is harboured or concealed carried out a terrorist activity that is a terrorism offence for which that person is liable to imprisonment for life; and
(b) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years or an offence punishable on summary conviction, if the person who is harboured or concealed carried out a terrorist activity that is a terrorism offence for which that person is liable to any other punishment.


ORIGINAL

Concealing person who is likely to carry out terrorist activity
(2) Everyone who knowingly harbours or conceals any person whom they know to be a person who is likely to carry out a terrorist activity, for the purpose of enabling the person to facilitate or carry out any terrorist activity, is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years.

REPLACEMENT

Concealing person who is likely to carry out terrorist activity
(2) Every person who knowingly harbours or conceals another person whom they know to be a person who is likely to carry out a terrorist activity, for the purpose of enabling that other person to facilitate or carry out any terrorist activity, is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction


ORIGINAL

Person to be brought before judge
(3) A peace officer who arrests a person in the execution of the warrant shall, without delay, bring the person, or cause them to be brought, before the judge who issued the warrant or another judge of the same court. The judge in question may, to ensure compliance with the order, order that the person be detained in custody or released on recognizance, with or without sureties.

REPLACEMENT

25 Subsection 83.‍29(3) of the Act is replaced by the following:

Person to be brought before judge
(3) A peace officer who arrests a person in the execution of a warrant shall, without delay, bring the person, or cause the person to be brought, before the judge who issued the warrant or another judge of the same court. The judge in question may, to ensure compliance with the order, order that the person be detained in custody or make a release order, the form of which may be adapted to suit the circumstances

[Note: the new wording is such that is seems intended to make it easier to release suspected terrorists]


ORIGINAL

Possession of prohibited or restricted firearm with ammunition

Punishment
(2) Every person who commits an offence under subsection (1)
(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of
(i) in the case of a first offence, three years, and
(ii) in the case of a second or subsequent offence, five years; or
(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year.

REPLACEMENT

27 Paragraph 95(2)‍(b) of the Act is replaced by the following:

(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.


ORIGINAL

Possession of weapon obtained by commission of offence

96 (1) Subject to subsection (3), every person commits an offence who possesses a firearm, a prohibited weapon, a restricted weapon, a prohibited device or any prohibited ammunition that the person knows was obtained by the commission in Canada of an offence or by an act or omission anywhere that, if it had occurred in Canada, would have constituted an offence.
Marginal note:
Punishment
(2) Every person who commits an offence under subsection (1)
(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of one year; or
(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year.

REPLACEMENT

28 Paragraph 96(2)‍(b) of the Act is replaced by the following:

(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.


As absurd as it sounds, here is the “SUMMARY” of Bill C-75.

SUMMARY

This enactment amends the Criminal Code to, among other things,
(a) modernize and clarify interim release provisions to simplify the forms of release that may be imposed on an accused, incorporate a principle of restraint and require that particular attention be given to the circumstances of Aboriginal accused and accused from vulnerable populations when making interim release decisions, and provide more onerous interim release requirements for offences involving violence against an intimate partner;
(b) provide for a judicial referral hearing to deal with administration of justice offences involving a failure to comply with conditions of release or failure to appear as required;
(c) abolish peremptory challenges of jurors, modify the process of challenging a juror for cause so that a judge makes the determination of whether a ground of challenge is true, and allow a judge to direct that a juror stand by for reasons of maintaining public confidence in the administration of justice;
(d) increase the maximum term of imprisonment for repeat offences involving intimate partner violence and provide that abuse of an intimate partner is an aggravating factor on sentencing;
(e) restrict the availability of a preliminary inquiry to offences punishable by imprisonment for life and strengthen the justice’s powers to limit the issues explored and witnesses to be heard at the inquiry;
(f) hybridize most indictable offences punishable by a maximum penalty of 10 years or less, increase the default maximum penalty to two years less a day of imprisonment for summary conviction offences and extend the limitation period for summary conviction offences to 12 months;
(g) remove the requirement for judicial endorsement for the execution of certain out-of-province warrants and authorizations, expand judicial case management powers, allow receiving routine police evidence in writing, consolidate provisions relating to the powers of the Attorney General and allow increased use of technology to facilitate remote attendance by any person in a proceeding;
(h) allow the court to exempt an offender from the requirement to pay a victim surcharge if the offender satisfies the court that the payment would cause the offender undue hardship, provide the court with guidance as to what constitutes undue hardship, provide that a victim surcharge is to be paid for each offence, with an exception for certain administration of justice offences if the total amount of surcharges imposed on an offender for those types of offences would be disproportionate in the circumstances, require courts to provide reasons for granting any exception for certain administration of justice offences or any exemption from the requirement to pay a victim surcharge and clarify that the amendments described in this paragraph apply to any offender who is sentenced after the day on which they come into force, regardless of whether or not the offence was committed before that day; and
(i) remove passages and repeal provisions that have been ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Canada, repeal section 159 of the Act and provide that no person shall be convicted of any historical offence of a sexual nature unless the act that constitutes the offence would constitute an offence under the Criminal Code if it were committed on the day on which the charge was laid.

The enactment also amends the Youth Criminal Justice Act in order to reduce delays within the youth criminal justice system and enhance the effectiveness of that system with respect to administration of justice offences. For those purposes, the enactment amends that Act to, among other things,
(a) set out principles intended to encourage the use of extrajudicial measures and judicial reviews as alternatives to the laying of charges for administration of justice offences;
(b) set out requirements for imposing conditions on a young person’s release order or as part of a sentence;
(c) limit the circumstances in which a custodial sentence may be imposed for an administration of justice offence;
(d) remove the requirement for the Attorney General to determine whether to seek an adult sentence in certain circumstances; and
(e) remove the power of a youth justice court to make an order to lift the ban on publication in the case of a young person who receives a youth sentence for a violent offence, as well as the requirement to determine whether to make such an order.

Finally, the enactment amends among other Acts An Act to amend the Criminal Code (exploitation and trafficking in persons) so that certain sections of that Act can come into force on different days and also makes consequential amendments to other Acts.
Bill C-75 is too long to possibly cover entirely in one article, though this is the most serious of it.


Having much smaller bills introduced would certainly be preferable. Far too often, governments ram through much unrelated material into a bill, called “omnibus bills”, such that proper debate never actually happens.

A more thorough debate could be had if this were broken up into 6-8 separate bills

And just reiterate, terrorism and other major crimes should always be tried by indictment.

Child Killer Gets Transfer to “Healing Lodge” Because of her Race

(Interrogation of McClintic)

(Interrogation of Rafferty)

(News on McClintic’s Transfer To Healing Lodge)

As cited in a previous article, see here, all defendants/prisoners are not equal in the eyes of the law. This is a racially discriminating practice that Canada has been involved in doing since the late 1990s.

Here is section 718.2(e) of the Canadian Criminal Code:

all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders.

Yes, one racial group is allowed to get what amounts to a race based discount. The 1999 Gladue ruling essentially paved the way for this to be normalized across Canada, while the Ipeelee decision expanded the scope to include long term offenders.

Here are the links to the Court decisions of Gladue (1997, 1999) and Ipeelee (2012).

R. v. Gladue, 1997 CanLII 3015 (BC CA)
R. v. Gladue, [1999] 1 SCR 688, 1999 CanLII 679 (SCC)
R. v. Ipeelee, [2012] 1 SCR 433, 2012 SCC 13 (CanLII)

While Indigenous people getting a race-based discount is nothing new in Canada, the transfer of child killer Terry McClintic to a “healing lodge” has the Canadian public flared up.

In 2009, 8 year old Tori Stafford was murdered by Terri McClintic, who was an accomplice to Michael Rafferty. In 2010, both McClintic and Rafferty received life sentences, with a 25 year custodial minimum. In 2014, McClintic was transferred to a medium security prison. Now, in 2018, McClintic is being sent to this “healing lodge”.

Not only is McClintic a child killer, but she viciously assaulted another inmate in 2012, and bragged that she only regretted not causing worse injury. Definitely a candidate for transfer from maximum to medium security prison.

Unfortunately, the federal parties are playing politics with it, while avoiding the real issue. The Liberals, now in government, blame the Conservatives for the 2014 transfer to medium security prison (when Stephen Harper was PM). The Conservatives blame the Liberals for not stopping this transfer. Both blame the other, while saying that they were not able to do anything — that Corrections Canada makes the decisions.

But the real issue that both Liberals and Conservatives dodge is that the entire law giving special treatment to Aboriginal/Indigenous/First Nations peoples. No group should receive “any” special treatment. Raced-based discounts are immoral.

What “should” be done is have the Gladue/Ipeelee rulings overturned. Yes, the Supreme Court of Canada endorsed this nonsense, but it can be stopped permanently using Section 33, the Notwithstanding Clause of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Application of Charter
32. (1) This Charter applies
(a) to the Parliament and government of Canada in respect of all matters within the authority of Parliament including all matters relating to the Yukon Territory and Northwest Territories; and
(b) to the legislature and government of each province in respect of all matters within the authority of the legislature of each province.
Marginal note:
Exception
(2) Notwithstanding subsection (1), section 15 shall not have effect until three years after this section comes into force.
Marginal note:
Exception where express declaration
33. (1) Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act of Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of this Charter.

Rafferty/McClintic have frequently been compared to Paul Bernardo/Karla Homolka, another male/female child killing couple. Karla Homolka’s mere 12 year sentence outraged Canadians, as does the McClintic transfer now.

Rather than bickering about whose government dropped the ball, this soft bigotry of low expectations needs to end. Legislate this nonsense out of Canadian law.

Update on the Story: On October 3, the Liberals, NDP and Green Party voted against a Conservative motion that would have kept Terri-Lynn McClintic in prison. See this link.

Further Update on the Story
On November 8, the Liberals have announced they will make new rules to send McClintic back. However, it doesn’t address underlying racist nature of the law — different sentencing rules based on skin colour, or even on ”how someone identifies”.

Supreme Court of Canada Affirms Protections for Self Represented People

April 23, 2017 — The Supreme Court of Canada has affirmed the protection for self represented persons and accused people

Based on the 2006 Statement of principles from the Canadian Judicial Council, the SCC has enshrined these principles into law. See here, here, here, and here.

STATEMENT:
Judges, the courts and other participants in the justice system have a responsibility to promote
access to the justice system for all persons on an equal basis, regardless of representation.

PRINCIPLES:
1. Judges and court administrators should do whatever is possible to provide a fair and impartial process and prevent an unfair disadvantage to self-represented persons.

  1. Self-represented persons should not be denied relief on the basis of a minor or easily rectified deficiency in their case.

  2. Where appropriate, a judge should consider engaging in such case management activities as are required to protect the rights and interests of self-represented persons. Such case management should begin as early in the court process as possible.

  3. When one or both parties are proceeding without representation, non-prejudicial and engaged case and courtroom management may be needed to protect the litigants’ equal right to be heard. Depending on the circumstances and nature of the case, the presiding judge may:

(a) explain the process;
(b) inquire whether both parties understand the process and the procedure;
(c) make referrals to agencies able to assist the litigant in the preparation of the case;
(d) provide information about the law and evidentiary requirements;
(e) modify the traditional order of taking evidence; and
(f) question witnesses.

This is great news, as Justices/Judges/Masters/JP are now obligated to go the extra mile in assuring fair process for those accused and self representing.

Self representing is an intimidating process, but levelling the field should go a long way to ensure better access to justice.  It should not be only for those who can spend lots of money on a lawyer, or who are able to spend huge amounts of time learning the law.

Race Based Discounts In Criminal Courts

Here is some information on how “Gladue Rights” work in Canada.
Equality under the law should mean that all people are treated equally.

However, that is not the case in Canada, with regards to sentencing in criminal justice.  To be specific, one group: Aboriginal, aka First Nations, aka Native have a section of the law specifically to give them a ”race-based discount”.

Here is section 718.2(e) of the Canadian Criminal Code:

all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders.

Yes, one racial group is allowed to get what amounts to a race based discount.  The 1999 Gladue ruling essentially paved the way for this to be normalized across Canada, while the Ipeelee decision expanded the scope to include long term offenders.

There have been complaints of recent in the media that despite these legal changes, the proportion and rates of Aboriginals in prison continues to rise.  (See questions below)

Here are the links to the Court decisions of Gladue (1997, 1999) and Ipeelee (2012).

R. v. Gladue, 1997 CanLII 3015 (BC CA)
R. v. Gladue, [1999] 1 SCR 688, 1999 CanLII 679 (SCC)
R. v. Ipeelee, [2012] 1 SCR 433, 2012 SCC 13 (CanLII)

People should be treated equally under the law, and that no one group should receive any lesser or harsher punishment because of race, gender, religion, etc…

Defenders of the law claim that this is necessary because of ”overrepresentation” in Canadian prisons.  However, a number of serious questions don’t get asked:

(1) What are the actual crime rates by race?  Is it one group being unfairly targeted, or is it one group simply committing more crime, and they are actually being treated fairly under the law?  There is a huge difference.

(2) Yes there was historical discrimination, but why should people who were born after this, and not subjected to it, be benefiting from it?

(3) If there is ”systemic discrimination” against Aborginals, then how does handing down lighter sentences actually address this?  Doesn’t it avoid the underlying issue?

(4) If reserves in particular are so bad (they are often referred to as 3rd world conditions), wouldn’t the humane thing be to shut them down entirely?

(5) Should the Canadian government be allowing a policy that aims to create ”equality of outcome” in the prisons?  Should jails look like a random sample of society, rather than a reflection of who is actually committing crimes?

(6) If ”Gladue Rights” lead to lower sentences, couldn’t smart criminals game the system by committing ”more” crime, but still getting lower sentences?

Sadly, there seems to be little interest in the media, courts or politics for addressing these questions.