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Canada’s Bill C-75 (Watering Down Penalties for Terrorism, Rioting, Weapons)

(The Canadian Criminal Code, which typically gets amended every year)

Criminal offences in Canada are categorized like this

SUMMARY OFFENCE: more minor, lesser penalties (misdemeanor)
INDICTABLE OFFENCE: more serious, harsher penalties (felony)
HYBRID OFFENCE: Prosecutor has discretion as to proceed “summarily” or “by indictment”

For a good video on this subject, Julie Mora posted a video seen here. It had 2 parts: (a) an expanded gun registry, Bill C-71, and (b) changes to the Canadian Criminal Code, Bill C-75. Julie is a fine blogger, and her videos are well worth a watch by all Canadians. She claims in this video that the bill will “hybridize” many serious charges, meaning that they may now be tried summarily. And she is right. Below are the major points.

This is not trivial at all. Terrorism and rioting offence should be treated seriously. Yet, if this bill were actually to pass, the penalties for serious crimes may be gutted. True, for hybrid offences, Prosecutors could still choose to try the case by indictment. However, most people would agree that the option should not exist

Relevant links are below:
CLICK HERE for the Criminal Code as it currently exists.
CLICK HERE for the Liberal Bill C-75.

ORIGINAL

Marginal note:
Punishment of rioter
65 (1) Every one who takes part in a riot is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.
Marginal note:
Concealment of identity
(2) Every person who commits an offence under subsection (1) while wearing a mask or other disguise to conceal their identity without lawful excuse is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years.

REPLACEMENT

Punishment of rioter
65 (1) Every person who takes part in a riot is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than two years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.
Concealment of identity
(2) Every person who commits an offence under subsection (1) while wearing a mask or other disguise to conceal their identity without lawful excuse is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.

ORIGINAL

Neglect by peace officer
69 A peace officer who receives notice that there is a riot within his jurisdiction and, without reasonable excuse, fails to take all reasonable steps to suppress the riot is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.

REPLACEMENT

Neglect by peace officer
69 A peace officer who receives notice that there is a riot within their jurisdiction and, without reasonable excuse, fails to take all reasonable steps to suppress the riot is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than two years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.

ORIGINAL

Possession without lawful excuse
82 (1) Every person who, without lawful excuse, the proof of which lies on the person, makes or has in the possession or under the care or control of the person any explosive substance is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years.

REPLACEMENT

14 Subsection 82(1) of the Act is replaced by the following:

Possession of explosive
82 (1) Every person who, without lawful excuse, makes or has in their possession or under their care or control any explosive substance is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than five years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.

ORIGINAL

Financing of Terrorism
Marginal note:
Providing or collecting property for certain activities
83.02 Every one who, directly or indirectly, wilfully and without lawful justification or excuse, provides or collects property intending that it be used or knowing that it will be used, in whole or in part, in order to carry out
(a) an act or omission that constitutes an offence referred to in subparagraphs (a)(i) to (ix) of the definition of terrorist activity in subsection 83.01(1), or
(b) any other act or omission intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to a civilian or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, if the purpose of that act or omission, by its nature or context, is to intimidate the public, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or refrain from doing any act,
is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years.

REPLACEMENT

Providing or collecting property for certain activities
83.‍02 Every person is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years or is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction who, directly or indirectly, wilfully and without lawful justification or excuse, provides or collects property intending that it be used or knowing that it will be used, in whole or in part, in order to carry out
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than five years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.

ORIGINAL

Providing, making available, etc., property or services for terrorist purposes
83.03 Every one who, directly or indirectly, collects property, provides or invites a person to provide, or makes available property or financial or other related services
(a) intending that they be used, or knowing that they will be used, in whole or in part, for the purpose of facilitating or carrying out any terrorist activity, or for the purpose of benefiting any person who is facilitating or carrying out such an activity, or
(b) knowing that, in whole or part, they will be used by or will benefit a terrorist group,
is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years.

REPLACEMENT

Providing, making available, etc.‍, property or services for terrorist purposes
83.‍03 Every person is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years or is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction who, directly or indirectly, collects property, provides or invites a person to provide, or makes available property or financial or other related services
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than five years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.

ORIGINAL

Using or possessing property for terrorist purposes
83.04 Every one who
(a) uses property, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, for the purpose of facilitating or carrying out a terrorist activity, or
(b) possesses property intending that it be used or knowing that it will be used, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, for the purpose of facilitating or carrying out a terrorist activity,
is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years.

REPLACEMENT

Using or possessing property for terrorist purposes

83.‍04 Every person is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years or is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction

ORIGINAL

Offences — freezing of property, disclosure or audit
83.12 (1) Every one who contravenes any of sections 83.08, 83.1 and 83.11 is guilty of an offence and liable
(a) on summary conviction, to a fine of not more than $100,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than one year, or to both; or
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years.

REPLACEMENT

Paragraphs 83.‍12(1)‍(a) and (b) of the Act are replaced by the following:

(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years; or
(b) on summary conviction, to a fine of not more than $100,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than two years less a day, or to both.

ORIGINAL

Participation in activity of terrorist group
83.18 (1) Every one who knowingly participates in or contributes to, directly or indirectly, any activity of a terrorist group for the purpose of enhancing the ability of any terrorist group to facilitate or carry out a terrorist activity is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years.

REPLACEMENT

Participation in activity of terrorist group
83.‍18 (1) Every person who knowingly participates in or contributes to, directly or indirectly, any activity of a terrorist group for the purpose of enhancing the ability of any terrorist group to facilitate or carry out a terrorist activity is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than10 years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.

ORIGINAL

Leaving Canada to participate in activity of terrorist group
83.181 Everyone who leaves or attempts to leave Canada, or goes or attempts to go on board a conveyance with the intent to leave Canada, for the purpose of committing an act or omission outside Canada that, if committed in Canada, would be an offence under subsection 83.18(1) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years

REPLACEMENT

21 Section 83.‍181 of the Act is replaced by the following:

Leaving Canada to participate in activity of terrorist group
83.‍181 Every person who leaves or attempts to leave Canada, or goes or attempts to go on board a conveyance with the intent to leave Canada, for the purpose of committing an act or omission outside Canada that, if committed in Canada, would be an offence under subsection 83.‍18(1) is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.

ORIGINAL

Advocating or promoting commission of terrorism offences
83.221 (1) Every person who, by communicating statements, knowingly advocates or promotes the commission of terrorism offences in general — other than an offence under this section — while knowing that any of those offences will be committed or being reckless as to whether any of those offences may be committed, as a result of such communication, is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than five years.

REPLACEMENT

22 Subsection 83.‍221(1) of the Act is replaced by the following:

Advocating or promoting commission of terrorism offences
83.‍221 (1) Every person who, by communicating statements, knowingly advocates or promotes the commission of terrorism offences in general — other than an offence under this section — while knowing that any of those offences will be committed or being reckless as to whether any of those offences may be committed, as a result of such communication, is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than five years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction

ORIGINAL

Concealing person who carried out terrorist activity
83.23 (1) Everyone who knowingly harbours or conceals any person whom they know to be a person who has carried out a terrorist activity, for the purpose of enabling the person to facilitate or carry out any terrorist activity, is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment
(a) for a term of not more than 14 years, if the person who is harboured or concealed carried out a terrorist activity that is a terrorism offence for which that person is liable to imprisonment for life; and
(b) for a term of not more than 10 years, if the person who is harboured or concealed carried out a terrorist activity that is a terrorism offence for which that person is liable to any other punishment.

REPLACEMENT

Concealing person who carried out terrorist activity
83.‍23 (1) Every person who knowingly harbours or conceals another person whom they know to be a person who has carried out a terrorist activity, for the purpose of enabling that other person to facilitate or carry out any terrorist activity, is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 14 years, if the person who is harboured or concealed carried out a terrorist activity that is a terrorism offence for which that person is liable to imprisonment for life; and
(b) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years or an offence punishable on summary conviction, if the person who is harboured or concealed carried out a terrorist activity that is a terrorism offence for which that person is liable to any other punishment.

ORIGINAL

Concealing person who is likely to carry out terrorist activity
(2) Everyone who knowingly harbours or conceals any person whom they know to be a person who is likely to carry out a terrorist activity, for the purpose of enabling the person to facilitate or carry out any terrorist activity, is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years.

REPLACEMENT

Concealing person who is likely to carry out terrorist activity
(2) Every person who knowingly harbours or conceals another person whom they know to be a person who is likely to carry out a terrorist activity, for the purpose of enabling that other person to facilitate or carry out any terrorist activity, is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction

ORIGINAL

Person to be brought before judge
(3) A peace officer who arrests a person in the execution of the warrant shall, without delay, bring the person, or cause them to be brought, before the judge who issued the warrant or another judge of the same court. The judge in question may, to ensure compliance with the order, order that the person be detained in custody or released on recognizance, with or without sureties.

REPLACEMENT

25 Subsection 83.‍29(3) of the Act is replaced by the following:

Person to be brought before judge
(3) A peace officer who arrests a person in the execution of a warrant shall, without delay, bring the person, or cause the person to be brought, before the judge who issued the warrant or another judge of the same court. The judge in question may, to ensure compliance with the order, order that the person be detained in custody or make a release order, the form of which may be adapted to suit the circumstances

[Note: the new wording is such that is seems intended to make it easier to release suspected terrorists]

ORIGINAL

Possession of prohibited or restricted firearm with ammunition

Punishment
(2) Every person who commits an offence under subsection (1)
(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of
(i) in the case of a first offence, three years, and
(ii) in the case of a second or subsequent offence, five years; or
(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year.

REPLACEMENT

27 Paragraph 95(2)‍(b) of the Act is replaced by the following:

(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

ORIGINAL

Possession of weapon obtained by commission of offence

96 (1) Subject to subsection (3), every person commits an offence who possesses a firearm, a prohibited weapon, a restricted weapon, a prohibited device or any prohibited ammunition that the person knows was obtained by the commission in Canada of an offence or by an act or omission anywhere that, if it had occurred in Canada, would have constituted an offence.
Marginal note:
Punishment
(2) Every person who commits an offence under subsection (1)
(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of one year; or
(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year.

REPLACEMENT

28 Paragraph 96(2)‍(b) of the Act is replaced by the following:

(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

As absurd as it sounds, here is the “SUMMARY” of Bill C-75.

SUMMARY

This enactment amends the Criminal Code to, among other things,
(a) modernize and clarify interim release provisions to simplify the forms of release that may be imposed on an accused, incorporate a principle of restraint and require that particular attention be given to the circumstances of Aboriginal accused and accused from vulnerable populations when making interim release decisions, and provide more onerous interim release requirements for offences involving violence against an intimate partner;
(b) provide for a judicial referral hearing to deal with administration of justice offences involving a failure to comply with conditions of release or failure to appear as required;
(c) abolish peremptory challenges of jurors, modify the process of challenging a juror for cause so that a judge makes the determination of whether a ground of challenge is true, and allow a judge to direct that a juror stand by for reasons of maintaining public confidence in the administration of justice;
(d) increase the maximum term of imprisonment for repeat offences involving intimate partner violence and provide that abuse of an intimate partner is an aggravating factor on sentencing;
(e) restrict the availability of a preliminary inquiry to offences punishable by imprisonment for life and strengthen the justice’s powers to limit the issues explored and witnesses to be heard at the inquiry;
(f) hybridize most indictable offences punishable by a maximum penalty of 10 years or less, increase the default maximum penalty to two years less a day of imprisonment for summary conviction offences and extend the limitation period for summary conviction offences to 12 months;
(g) remove the requirement for judicial endorsement for the execution of certain out-of-province warrants and authorizations, expand judicial case management powers, allow receiving routine police evidence in writing, consolidate provisions relating to the powers of the Attorney General and allow increased use of technology to facilitate remote attendance by any person in a proceeding;
(h) allow the court to exempt an offender from the requirement to pay a victim surcharge if the offender satisfies the court that the payment would cause the offender undue hardship, provide the court with guidance as to what constitutes undue hardship, provide that a victim surcharge is to be paid for each offence, with an exception for certain administration of justice offences if the total amount of surcharges imposed on an offender for those types of offences would be disproportionate in the circumstances, require courts to provide reasons for granting any exception for certain administration of justice offences or any exemption from the requirement to pay a victim surcharge and clarify that the amendments described in this paragraph apply to any offender who is sentenced after the day on which they come into force, regardless of whether or not the offence was committed before that day; and
(i) remove passages and repeal provisions that have been ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Canada, repeal section 159 of the Act and provide that no person shall be convicted of any historical offence of a sexual nature unless the act that constitutes the offence would constitute an offence under the Criminal Code if it were committed on the day on which the charge was laid.

The enactment also amends the Youth Criminal Justice Act in order to reduce delays within the youth criminal justice system and enhance the effectiveness of that system with respect to administration of justice offences. For those purposes, the enactment amends that Act to, among other things,
(a) set out principles intended to encourage the use of extrajudicial measures and judicial reviews as alternatives to the laying of charges for administration of justice offences;
(b) set out requirements for imposing conditions on a young person’s release order or as part of a sentence;
(c) limit the circumstances in which a custodial sentence may be imposed for an administration of justice offence;
(d) remove the requirement for the Attorney General to determine whether to seek an adult sentence in certain circumstances; and
(e) remove the power of a youth justice court to make an order to lift the ban on publication in the case of a young person who receives a youth sentence for a violent offence, as well as the requirement to determine whether to make such an order.

Finally, the enactment amends among other Acts An Act to amend the Criminal Code (exploitation and trafficking in persons) so that certain sections of that Act can come into force on different days and also makes consequential amendments to other Acts.
Bill C-75 is too long to possibly cover entirely in one article, though this is the most serious of it.

Having much smaller bills introduced would certainly be preferable. Far too often, governments ram through much unrelated material into a bill, called “omnibus bills”, such that proper debate never actually happens.

A more thorough debate could be had if this were broken up into 6-8 separate bills

And just reiterate, terrorism and other major crimes should always be tried by indictment.

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Motorcycle Helmet Law Exemptions

(A new option for motorcycle riders in Ontario)

In British Columbia, Alberta, Manitoba, and now Ontario, Sikhs are now exempt from wearing helmets while riding motorcycles.

Other areas around the Western World have either implemented such an exemption, or have looked into it.

The Ontario law is to take effect on October 18.

This is being done under the guise of “accommodation” and “human rights”. But it is absurd. Helmets are worn to keep people safe. In the event of an accident, the helmet can prevent the riders head from getting cracked open. A piece of cloth is not a helmet, and does not provide protection. If the rider lands on his head, the road won’t care that the turban is a religious item.

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Using Genealogy and DNA to Catch Golden State Killer

James Joseph DeAngelo, the so-called “Golden State Killer”, has been caught using a very controversial method: genealogical DNA testing. See here, and here. DeAngelo is accused of committing rapes and murders over many years.

The short explanation of the method is this: When a person submits a DNA sample to a genealogical organization (and pays the fee), it is done with the intention of learning more about their biological relatives. Even previously known and distant relatives can be found. 2nd, 3rd, and even 4th cousins can now be identified using this technique.

Quite understandably, people submitting DNA to ancestory organizations do so in order to see who they might be related to. Certainly, no one does so with the intention of providing evidence or at least a lead against other distant relatives. This was never meant to be a police tool.

(4th Amendment)
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

But here, it gets a bit more complicated. Even if one argues that using DNA set aside for genealogical testing violates that person’s 4th Amendment rights, it is that person’s rights being violated, not the actual target’s rights.

Understandably, many are upset over a clear breach of their agreement.

While DeAngelo certainly deserves to be caught and tried, the method of DNA identification sends chills to many. It will be interesting to see what, if any policies and laws come as a result of this. There will likely be a followup article

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Voting Eligibility (Part 2) — Identification

Kudos to Rants Derek for his suggestion to cover this topic. Derek is a Canadian YouTuber, with his own style of humour in creating videos. Go watch his stuff.

This topic has to do with a fairly straightforward topic: Do you need I.D. to vote? For extra information, here is more information on other countries.

Canadian:
There are “options” when it comes to showing I.D., the information is available here.
(Option 1) Show 3 pieces of I.D.
(Option 2) 2 pieces of “I.D.” as long as something has your address on it. These “forms” include: library card, utility bill, credit card bill, or a variety of other documents.
(Option 3) If you don’t meet the “requirements” of Option 2, you can just swear or affirm an oath, and get someone to vouch for you.
Note: Provinces have their own requirements, this just focuses on Federal elections.

American:
Voting requirements appear to be left to the individual states to decide. Definitely a range:
(Option 1) Strict photo ID – Wisconsin, Kansas, Virginia
(Option 2) Non-Strict Photo ID — Arizona, North Dakota, Ohio
(Option 3) Photo ID Requested — Texas, Louisiana, Arkansas
(Option 4) ID Requested — Washington State, Iowa, Alaska
(option 5) No Documents at all — California, Nevada, Oregon

That is correct, in about 1/3 of states, no ID required at all to vote

British:
Almost unbelievably, there are no mandatory voter ID laws, although there are pilot projects underway to change that.
However, that is currently being challenged.

Australian:
In Australia, you are asked a few questions prior to voting, but ID isn’t required. Voting is mandatory, but ID is not required. Like the UK, efforts are being made to have a nationwide requirement for voting. And like the UK, that also is being challenged.

New Zealander:
Like Australia, voting is mandatory for citizens and permanent residents. However, citizens away for 3+ years, and permanent residents away for 1+ years cannot vote. ID is not necessary, just present you voting card.

Some Thoughts
The above list covered 5 English speaking, Common Law countries. It seems a bit unsettling to see that, aside from some U.S. states, ID is not necessary.

Seems that this type of system is ripe for abuse. If no ID is required, or no photo ID needed, then what is to stop large groups of people from potentially altering elections?

Critics of photo ID requirements claim that it discriminates against poor and marginalized people, and that there is no documented cases of abuse.

However, those arguments do not hold water. (1) If people are to be entrusted with voting on the future of a nation, then are we to expect that legal residents cannot get any ID whatsoever? (2) There may be no documented cases of abuse. Though if voters are undocumented, as lefties like to call them, then how would there be any documentation in the first place?

Clearly, each nation will have their own ways of doing things, but it appears that some safeguard must be put in place to ensure that the integrity of democratic systems is intact.

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Voting Eligibility (Part 1) — Crime & Citizenship


(Image by WordPress)

Who is allowed to vote?

Well, depending on where you go, you will get a very different answer. Do you have to be of good character? Can you currently vote while in prison? Do you even have to be a citizen?

This topic could fill several books, but this is just a starter piece. The article focuses on 2 main areas: criminality and non-citizenship

Canada, Criminality:
The Canada Elections Act of 1985 used to prohibit a person from being able to vote if they are serving a federal sentence (2 years or more). However, that was struck down in 2002. The Crown conceded it violated Section 3 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, that everyone had the right to vote in elections to govern the country. To be fair though, the dissenting Justices thought that the violations were reasonable. As things stand now, even persons in custody are allowed to vote, and jail officials must make accommodation for them to do so.

American, Criminality
The case of Richardson v. Ramirez (1974), held that the 14th Amendment, Section 2, was not violated in barring felons form voting (called felony disenfranchisement). Since then, the 50 states have written their own laws, and they widely vary widely, from Maine, which allows voting while incarcerated, to voting after release, to Idaho and voting after probation ends, to never voting, to Florida requiring a petition.

Australian, Criminality
Things are a bit different here. For starters, voting is mandatory. There are arguments both for and against it. In the past, anyone serving a sentence of 1 year or more was unable to vote. As it stands now, only those serving a sentence of at least 3 years cannot vote until the sentence is finished.

British, Criminality
The UK is having to revise their policies on letting prisoners and convicts vote, because of the European Court of Human Rights. Originally, they couldn’t, but that is changing. Interestingly, Members of Parliament can keep their seat if they have been sentenced to 1 year or less. So they could hold office, but not vote.

Much Europe has some restriction of voting rights, such as type of offense, and is the sentence fully served.

Laws vary widely around the world. However, the main argument against letting cons, or ex-cons vote is that they have violated the social contract with the people, and hence should not be a part of forming its laws.

Voting by Non-Citizens

While this list is too extensive to go through, many countries do allow permanent residents to vote if they have lived their for a long enough period.

Also many cities, such as San Francisco, Toronto, Hamilton, Calgary, Vancouver, allow voting for permanent residents.

One argument against letting non-citizens vote is that it weakens what it means to be a citizen. What then, distinguishes a citizen from a resident? A second is that the longer time to obtain citizenship is necessary to fully adapt to the new homeland. A third is that it leads to divided loyalty from Members of Parliament/Congress, who will look towards future voters more than current ones. All have some merit.

A push over the years from leftist politicians has been to let “undocumented immigrants” (a.k.a.) “illegal immigrants” vote in elections, as well as to reduce or eliminate voter identification requirements.

Note: Women are now allowed to vote in Western countries as well as many others. New Zealand and Australia led the way.

Author’s Views:
However, things do, or at least should have a limit.

(1) There have been many challenges to Voter ID laws, claiming that it discriminates against people who can’t get identification. The usual claim is wither poverty, or that the community lacks these services. Really, a legal citizen, or at least permanent resident can’t get I.D.?! Of course, if they are “undocumented”, that may be why they can’t get “documents”.

(2)So-called “Sanctuary Cities” are letting illegal immigrants vote which seems bizarre. Why should people in the country illegally be helping to vote in people to draft laws? Seems like a serious conflict of interest here.

It seems that items (1) and (2) are very much linked. Could objecting to voter I.D. requirements be to enable, or help cover up, illegal immigrants voting? Hard to say, there is no “documentation”. Could it be to help “elect” candidates who would push for more immigration and easier citizenship paths?

As for convicts voting, obviously everyone has different ideas. My personal choice would be: (a) not while in jail or parole; and (b) not for serious crimes such as murder/treason/terrorism/drug trafficking/sex offenses.

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The New Lindsay Shepherd: Statistics are now Violence (Infanticide #2)

(University of the Fraser Valley former teaching assistant, Valerie Flokstra)

1. Other Articles on Abortion/Infanticide

(1) https://canucklaw.ca/canadian-universities-fighting-against-free-speech-and-free-association-in-court/

2. Review Of The Subject

The original article, along with partial audio is available here. Posted by Andrew Lawton.

Apparently, discussing abortion critically, is not permitted. Their former teaching student, Valerie Flokstra, seen above, found that out the hard way. Flokstra was called into a meeting with various faculty members, Nancy Norman, and Vandy Britton, to discuss how ideas are “potentially harmful”. University of the Fraser Valley, (British Columbia, Canada), openly promotes social justice in their teaching program. See below. Oddly, no written commitment to free speech, or open inquiry.

The case is widely being compared to Lindsay Shepherd, who in November of 2017, was summoned to such a meeting at Wilfrid Laurier university (WLU), for showing a TVO clip of Jordan Peterson debating gender pronouns related to transgender persons. The inquisitors were: Nathan Rambukkana, Hernert Pimlott, and Adria Joel. See below.

In fact, Valerie Flokstra cites Lindsay Shepherd in her decision to record this meeting with the faculty. Seeing how badly Shepherd was treated forced Flokstra to take defensive measures.

Another key difference is that Shepherd released the recording of her meeting immediately to the media. She found there to be various forms of retaliation and hostility to her at Wilfred Laurier University. Flokstra, on the other hand, waited until she graduated to avoid such retaliation.

Some have observed, it seems moronic that these professors wouldn’t have any reservation about holding such a meeting, and playing these games. In the Shepherd case, Professors Rambukkana and Pimlott effectively had their academic careers and reputations destroyed. Given the international coverage Shepherd got, it seems highly implausible that the UFV wouldn’t all know about it.

In the Flokstra matter, she had claimed that premature births were contributing to autism diagnoses. She questioned that women who have abortions but have children later in life more often have premature births. Statistics were cited, see here. And this led to a reasonable suggestion that abortions will lead to higher autism risks later.

If A = B, and B = C, then does A = C? Makes sense.

If prior abortion ==> higher risk of premature births later, and
If premature births ==> higher risk of autism, then

Does prior abortion ==> higher risk of autism? Seems like a reasonable conclusion. At least is cannot be dismissed out of hand.

However, Professors Norman and Britton would have none of that. They questioned Flokstra for bringing it up, and attributed a variety of negative motivations for doing so, such as pressing her own religious beliefs.

Norman and Britton engaged in Orwellian double speak. Instead of the “critical thinking” that many champion, Flokstra was told she needed to engage in “critical mindfulness“.

Flokstra was told that if she had strong opinions, she was free to write them down and hold onto them, but always to consider any potential harm that may come to students rather than saying them.

Norman and Britton also tried to explain that Flokstra shouldn’t be “shutting down students” by bringing up certain opinions. However they were dismissive when repeatedly told that “they were the ones currently shutting her down. The mental gymnastics of the pair….

Norman and Britton tried to explain that they weren’t trying to “shut down” Flokstra, but rather that they just didn’t want her to speak about various topics. Telling someone politely to shut up is apparently not shutting them down.

Norman and Britton were also dismissive of Flokstra’s assertion that these were university students in her class, not high school students, and that a higher degree of discussion should be expected of them.

Normal and Britton explained that they were (not) shutting her down, not because of the actual harm that was coming from having topics such as abortion discussed. Rather, she was (not) being shut down because of potential harm that could come from discussing these topics.

In both the Flokstra and Shepherd cases, absurd comparisons were made. Shepherd was told that showing a video uncritically of Jordan Peterson was like neutrally playing a speech by Adolf Hitler. Flokstra was told that sharing certain views in a way was like a KKK (Ku Klux Klan) group on campus. Rather than make factual, logical arguments why certain topics are “off-limits”, ridiculous rhetoric is used.

Only a partial audio (8 minutes out of almost an hour long meeting) is available for article. The summary of the meeting is that the 2 professors spent the entire time trying to shut Valerie Flokstra down, but then using double talk and word games to deny that is what they were actually doing.

Benjamin Boyce, a YouTuber in Washington State, released this fine review of the fiasco. The College Fix also did a great piece, and more are coming out.

A thought on universities: If people are going to be shut down in this manner (or any manner), a little honesty would be nice. Drop the word games (a la Shepherd and Flokstra), and just be upfront that this is what you are doing. If schools are places that do not support free speech and open inquiry, then just say so. Start calling yourselves “INDOCTRINATION CENTERS” instead of “HIGHER LEARNING CENTERS“. Ideas cannot be analyzed properly if the cannot be discussed openly.

But of course, if such honesty were used, admissions would pretty much stop altogether.

Funny, this problem is non-existent in trade schools. But then, they actually provide skills.