Author: Ronnie

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Bill C-27: Digital Charter Implementation Act Returns, With AI Provision

Bill C-27, the Digital Charter Implementation Act (or Dee CIA), has been brought back. In the last session, this was Bill C-11.

Contrary to what many might assume, this is not about gun control. Instead, it concerns digital privacy, and the way and means that personal information will be shared.

In fact, a lot of the Bills in this current session are recycled versions of legislation that died in previously. This is no exception.

One major difference here is something that was created:

The Artificial Intelligence and Data Act

[Section 2: definitions]
artificial intelligence system means a technological system that, autonomously or partly autonomously, processes data related to human activities through the use of a genetic algorithm, a neural network, machine learning or another technique in order to generate content or make decisions, recommendations or predictions.

[Section 3] Interestingly, this Act, and the limitations, do not apply to:
(a) the Minister of National Defence;
(b) the Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service;
(c) the Chief of the Communications Security Establishment; or
(d) any other person who is responsible for a federal or provincial department or agency and who is prescribed by regulation.

The legislation then gets into how the Act would be applied, and what the limitations would be. There’s a provision to prevent “biased outcomes” from being determined by artificial intelligence.

[Section 5(1)]
biased output means content that is generated, or a decision, recommendation or prediction that is made, by an artificial intelligence system and that adversely differentiates, directly or indirectly and without justification, in relation to an individual on one or more of the prohibited grounds of discrimination set out in section 3 of the Canadian Human Rights Act, or on a combination of such prohibited grounds. It does not include content, or a decision, recommendation or prediction, the purpose and effect of which are to prevent disadvantages that are likely to be suffered by, or to eliminate or reduce disadvantages that are suffered by, any group of individuals when those disadvantages would be based on or related to the prohibited grounds.

For reference, the Canadian Human Rights Act lists: “race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, marital status, family status, genetic characteristics, disability and conviction for an offence for which a pardon has been granted or in respect of which a record suspension has been ordered”, as protected grounds

In other words, AI can be used to pander to specific groups of people. However, “noticing” things would presumably violate the law.

[Section 6] lays out a requirement to add safeguards to anonymized data, which actually a really good idea. Guess we’ll have to see what those protections are later.

[Section 11] states that anyone or group that is involved in running a high-impact system must publish information — in plain terms — how the system works, and what safety protocols are in place.

(from the Bill) High-impact system means an artificial intelligence system that meets the criteria for a high-impact system that are established in regulations. However, the regulations haven’t been established yet.

[Sections 13, 14] allows Cabinet Ministers to require the disclosure of certain records, particularly if there is the risk of “biased outcomes” in what the AI is generating.

[Section 26] lists others who may be able to access confidential information, including:
(a) the Privacy Commissioner;
(b) the Canadian Human Rights Commission;
(c) the Commissioner of Competition;
(d) the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission;
(e) any person appointed by the government of a province, or any provincial entity, with powers, duties and functions that are similar to those of the Privacy Commissioner or the Canadian Human Rights Commission;
(f) any other person or entity prescribed by regulation.

[Section 28] gives the Minister the authority to publish information about people or a group (without their consent), if it’s believed that doing so will prevent harm from coming to them. However, it’s not stated what “reasonable grounds” actually means.

[Section 29] gets into Administrative Monetary Penalties, and the stated goal of ensuring compliance with the The Artificial Intelligence and Data Act.

[Section 30] states that it’s an offence to violate Sections 6-12, as well as providing misleading information to the Minister, or anyone acting for the Minister.

[Section 36] is a backdoor provision, which exists in many pieces of legislation. It allows the Governor in Council to make regulations without the need to Parliamentary oversight.

[Sections 38-40] lay out penalties, both monetary and potential prison time, for violations of this Act. Fines can be up to $25,000,000 + 5% of revenues. Prison time can be up to 5 years (if proceeded by indictment), and 2 years less a day (if proceeded summarily).

Aside from the Artificial Intelligence and Data Act being included, this legislation is essentially just Bill C-11 from the last session of Parliament.

Consumer Privacy Protection Act

The Consumer Privacy Protection Act was the bulk of the last version of this Bill, and was in this one as well. While name appears to take privacy seriously, it’s worth noting that that Section 4 states that it doesn’t apply to:

(a) any government institution to which the Privacy Act applies;

(b) any individual in respect of personal information that the individual collects, uses or discloses solely for personal or domestic purposes;

(c) any organization in respect of personal information that the organization collects, uses or discloses solely for journalistic, artistic or literary purposes;

(d) any organization in respect of an individual’s personal information that the organization collects, uses or discloses solely for the purpose of communicating or facilitating communication with the individual in relation to their employment, business or profession; or

(e) any organization that is, under an order made under paragraph 122(2)‍(b), exempt from the application of this Act in respect of the collection, use or disclosure of personal information that occurs within a province in respect of which the order was made.

In other words, personal information can be shared with just about anyone.

[Section 8(1)] requires that organizations designate someone to be responsible for the security of this information, and that their contact information be furnished if requested.

[Sections 9-11] outline how a privacy safety management program must be established, and some considerations in setting it up.

[Section 18] lists how and when businesses can collect personal information, or disclose it, and when consent isn’t required to go through with it.

[Section 19] says that no consent or knowledge is required from the individual to share personal information with a service provider in the course of business.

[Sections 20-22] permit research to be done using customer information as data, although it’s expected that it would be anonymized. It’s also okay to do this for prospective business transactions that haven’t yet been approved.

[Sections 23-24] are about disclosure during the course of employment. This has been the norm for a long time, as companies routinely share data for things like payroll.

[Sections 25-28] says information can be shared without knowledge or consent for the purposes of disclosure to a notary, obtaining witness statements, suspected fraud, and debt collection.

[Section 35] allows information to be disclosed without the person’s knowledge or consent if it’s being done for statistical purposes, study or research, if obtaining consent is impractical.

[Section 36] gets into the disclosure of “records of historic or archival importance”, which again, can be done without knowledge or consent.

[Section 38] allows journalists, artists and people performing literary purposes to disclose information without the knowledge or consent of other parties involved.

[Sections 43, 44] mean that Government employees would be able to access personal records without the knowledge or consent of others, if done for the purpose of administering laws.

The Act then goes on at length about procedures that would be in place if these other rules were violated.

Bill C-27 would make various changes to other acts such as: the Canada Evidence Act; the Access to Information Act; the Aeronautics Act, the Competition Act; the Telecommunications Act; and the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act.

While it sounds great to enshrine digital privacy, there are so many exceptions written in that one reasonably has to wonder what protections are really offered.

Of course, there is a bit of a conflict of interest here. Reporters and journalists require access to information in order to do their jobs. While doxing isn’t acceptable, the ability to dig deep is essential in order to properly prepare a broadcast or newspaper.

Bill C-11, (the last version of this), didn’t get far in the last session, and it doesn’t appear to be urgent now. Who knows if this will actually pass?

(1) https://www.parl.ca/legisinfo/en/bill/43-2/c-11
(2) https://www.parl.ca/DocumentViewer/en/43-2/bill/C-11/first-reading
(3) https://www.parl.ca/legisinfo/en/bill/44-1/c-27
(4) https://www.parl.ca/DocumentViewer/en/44-1/bill/C-27/first-reading
(5) https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/h-6/page-1.html

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Four Applications To Federal Travel Mandates All Struck As “Moot”

The other day, the Federal Court released its reasons for dismissing various Applications challenging air and train vaccination mandates. The ruling came from Associate Chief Justice Gagné (2022 FC 1463). The specific challenges were:

  • T-145-22: Nabil Ben Naoum
  • T-247-22: Maxime Bernier
  • T-1991-21: Shaun Rickard, Karl Harrison
  • T-168-22: Brian Peckford, Leesha Nikkanen, Ken Baigent, Drew Belobaba, Natalie Grcic, Aedan MacDonald

All of these challenges were heard together, since they cover essentially the same issues. This isn’t surprising, as it can theoretically free up other courts.

To be clear, the cases weren’t struck or dismissed based on the merits, evidence, or arguments of the case. Instead, they were struck since the orders themselves had expired. The Judge decided it wasn’t worth hearing anyway, to ward off any potential return of these restrictions.

In the ruling, it came down to 2 questions: (a) are the cases moot; and (b) if so, should they be heard anyway?

[14] The Applicants and the Respondent both agree that the applicable test on a motion for mootness is the one articulated by Justice Sopinka in Borowski v Canada (Attorney General), 1989 CanLII 123 (SCC), 1989 1 SCR 342. Unsurprisingly, they take very opposite positions on both of the two key stages as set forth in Borowski. Namely, they disagree on i) whether the issue is moot, and on ii) whether the Court should exercise its discretion to nonetheless hear the case, if it is found moot.

[15] The Respondent’s motion therefore raises the following issues:
(a) Are the issues raised by these Applications for judicial review moot; is there a live controversy?
(b) If the issues are moot, should the Court nevertheless exercise its discretion to hear the merits?

“Mootness” in the legal context means that the underlying issues have already been resolved in some way, or the circumstances have changed in a way that makes it impossible to determine. In this instance, the Federal Government argued that since the travel mandates had expired, there was no remedy to seek.

The Applicants, however, were concerned that these measures — or very similar ones — could be brought back, and it could happen at any time. They wanted this issue dealt with once and for all.

In their eyes, travel mandates were hardly “theoretical”, as they had already happened. Should the Court refuse to intervene, Ottawa would be able to reimpose them at a later date.

[20] The Applicants argue that there remains a live controversy because of statements by the Government of Canada that travel restrictions have only been “suspended”, suggesting that they may be re-implemented at any time if the COVID-19 public health situation worsens. In that sense, the Respondent’s motions would be premature. The Applicants rely on a press release issued by the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, statements made by Ministers at a June 14, 2022 press conference, and in an interview that the Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs gave to the CBC shortly afterwards.

[21] Firstly, the hearing of these Applications for judicial review is set for five days commencing on October 31, 2022. Since the hearing of this Motion, Transport Canada has removed the requirement to wear a mask on planes and trains and repealed the last remaining IO. In my view, the situation is as likely to improve as it is to worsen by the time the hearing of these Applications on their merits is over. The Applicants’ argument is highly speculative and does not support their position that the controversy is still ongoing.

[22] Secondly, a comment made by a Minister to a journalist, taken outside its context, does not amount to a decision by that Minister and it is no more an indication of a live controversy. Even if the Minister called what occurred in June 2022 a suspension, the reality is that all IOs/MO that had contained a vaccination mandate have legally expired and none that contain such a mandate have been reissued since June.

The ruling goes on some more, with the Judge explaining why this wasn’t worth continuing, since the orders had all lapsed.

The case was ultimately thrown out for “mootness”. The Judge declined to hear the merits anyway.

And therein lies another problem with this Court. Is there really justice when a Judge can simply pick and choose which cases they want to hear, and which ones they can decline? What exactly was the remedy that they should have sought? And where?

[48] For the above reasons, these Applications will be struck as moot. The air and rail passenger vaccine mandates were repealed, as have other related public health measures. The Applicants have substantially received the remedies sought and as such, there is no live controversy to adjudicate.

[49] There is no important public interest or inconsistency in the law that would justify allocating significant judicial resources to hear these moot Applications.

[50] Finally, it is not the role of the Court to dictate or prevent future government actions. If the air and rail vaccine mandates are re-introduced in the future, they can be properly challenged and should be weighed against the reality in which they are implemented.

Apparently, the inability of millions of people to fly and exercise their Section 6 Charter rights (mobility) isn’t a concern for the Court. After all, the mandates are gone — for now. If this isn’t worth spending judicial resources on, what exactly is?

Interestingly, the Judge says it’s not the place of the Court to dictate or prevent future government actions, but suggests that the cases can be brought back again if travel mandates are reinstated.

Suppose that does happen — and that the vaccine passport does return — what’s to stop Ottawa from temporarily pulling it (again) to ward off another challenge? Perhaps this is old fashioned, but it would be nice to see the issue resolved once and for all.

The Applicants who initiated these suits are now on the hook for the costs of losing this motion. While their initial filings were compelling, letting the orders expire then doing this was a dirty trick. It’s unclear what cost scale would be used, but the parties could very well settle it on their own.

Had a Prothonotary issued this ruling, it could be reviewed under Rule 51. But this came from a Justice, so the next step would be challenging this at the Federal Court of Appeals. There has been talk of doing this, especially in light of the Associate Chief Justice refusing to hear it altogether. We will have to see if that happens in the next few weeks. There is a 30 day time limit to file notice.

For reference, the standard for review is also available online. It addresses findings of fact, law, and mixed fact and law.

(1) https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fct/doc/2022/2022fc1463/2022fc1463.html
(2) https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fct/doc/2022/2022fc1463/2022fc1463.pdf
(3) https://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fc-cf/decisions/en/522361/1/document.do
(4) https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/regulations/sor-98-106/index.html
(5) https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2002/2002scc33/2002scc33.html

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Nova Scotia FOI: Pfizer Docs; AEFI; Deaths; Weather Modification

In the last piece, it was shown how the Nova Scotia Premier’s Office apparently had no records whatsoever concerning the “document dumping” that Pfizer was forced to undertake. Now, it seems like NS Health has no records to disclose either. One would think that the revelations in that paperwork would be cause for concern.

Nova Scotia doesn’t have statistics available on the compensation of adverse reactions from the vaccine. However, there a small package for the AEFI reported thus far. There’s also an attached link to the Federal program that is being administered through a 3rd party, RCGT Consulting Inc.

As of June 2022, there were:

  • 615 non serious and 315 serious AEFI
  • 57 cases of myocarditis/pericarditis
  • 5 cases of Guillain-Barre Syndrome
  • 2 cases of Vaccine-Induced Immune Thrombotic Thrombocytopenia

Keep in mind, this is just what has been reported. It’s possible that there are far more side effects that have thus far gone under the radar.

As of the time of writing this:

  • 774 claims have been submitted
  • 7 claims have been approved
  • 71 claims were deemed inadmissible for ineligibility and/or missing information
  • 654 claims were deemed admissible
  • 553 claims are in the process of collecting medical records
  • 23 claims are being reviewed

From the FAQ section on their website:

A serious and permanent injury is defined as a severe, life-threatening or life-altering injury that may require in-person hospitalization, or a prolongation of existing hospitalization, and results in persistent or significant disability or incapacity, or where the outcome is a congenital malformation or death

The Vaccine Injury Support Program (VISP) is premised on the notion of no-fault. This means that financial support to eligible claimants is provided regardless of responsibility or possible fault (e.g., of the claimant, manufacturer or health professional administering the vaccine). A no-fault program ensures timely access to financial support.

The amount of financial support an individual will receive will be determined on a case by case basis. Amounts will be based on a pre-determined financial support payment framework. The framework will align with compensation provided under the Québec Vaccine Injury Compensation Program and informed by other public and private sector injury compensation practices.

It’s interesting that all of this is premised as “no-fault” when there was outright coercion to get people to take the shots in the first place. There doesn’t seem to be any posted rates of compensation.

One other point: accepting money from this program almost certainly means waiving any rights to take other actions (such as suing). True, there were indemnification agreements in place, but this would protect everyone from liability, and can’t really be challenged later. Expect non-disclosure agreements to be put in place as condition of getting any funds.

Also released is data on the total numbers of deaths in Nova Scotia, going back to 2017. In fairness, a small increase annually isn’t farfetched, given the growing population. That said, the data shows small decreases from time to time, while 2021/2022 lists increases across the board. Look at it for yourself, and draw your own conclusions.

Remember: WHO defines a “Covid death” as: A probable or confirmed COVID-19 case whose death resulted from a clinically compatible illness, unless there is a clear alternative cause of death identified (e.g., trauma, poisoning, drug overdose). Sounds legitimate, right?

Now, this is unrelated to the above, but worth a browse. Here is the decision letter, and the results, of an FOIA request into weather modification. Remember when all of this was written off as conspiracy theories?

If you haven’t checked out the work of Fluoride Free Peel, go do that. No proper isolation has ever been done, anywhere in the world. Arguing about “mitigation” or protective measures seems pointless if there’s nothing to protect against.

DOCUMENTS/LINKS
(1) 2022-182 no responsive records NSH Pfizer
(2) 2022-181 no responsive records AEFI Statistics
(3) https://novascotia.ca/coronavirus/docs/adverse-events-following-immunization-with-COVID-19-vaccines-2022-06-30.pdf
(4) https://vaccineinjurysupport.ca/en/program-statistics
(5) https://vaccineinjurysupport.ca/en/faq
(6) FOI 2022-01565-SNSIS deaths by month since 2017 Book2 (1)
(7) A-2022-01018 – Response Letter Weather Modification
(8) A-2022-01018 – Release Weather Modification

PREVIOUS FOI RESULTS FROM NOVA SCOTIA
(A) https://canucklaw.ca/nova-scotia-foi-response-tacitly-admits-there-is-no-wave-of-hospitalizations/
(B) https://canucklaw.ca/nova-scotia-foi-result-province-refuses-to-turn-over-data-studies
(C) https://canucklaw.ca/more-foi-requests-from-nova-scotia-trying-to-get-answers-on-this-pandemic/
(D) https://canucklaw.ca/nova-scotia-foi-request-shows-province-reduced-icu-capacity-in-recent-years/
(E) https://canucklaw.ca/nova-scotia-foi-shows-province-has-no-evidence-asymptomatic
(F) https://canucklaw.ca/nova-scotia-foi-province-refuses-to-turn-over-contract/
(G) https://canucklaw.ca/nova-scotia-foi-19-1-million-spent-on/
(H) https://canucklaw.ca/nova-scotia-foi-no-real-increase-in-deaths-due-to-pandemic/
(I) https://canucklaw.ca/nova-scotia-foi-more-deaths-as-vaccination-numbers-climb/
(J) https://canucklaw.ca/nova-scotia-foi-govt-data-on-deaths-by-age-vaxx-status/
(K) https://canucklaw.ca/nova-scotia-foi-another-data-dump-on-cases-vaxx-rates/
(L) https://canucklaw.ca/freedom-of-information-requests-canuck-law/
(M) https://canucklaw.ca/nova-scotia-foi-cant-be-bothered-with-pfizer-docs/

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Bill S-248: Removing Final Consent For Assisted Suicide Requests

Remember how people were warning that assisted suicide (medical assistance in dying or MAiD) wouldn’t be the limited measure that was initially laid out? Those alarmists worried that safeguards and conditions would be rolled back to further expand this “procedure”.

Well, here we go again. Senate Bill S-248 would allow people to enter into contracts that would permit the euthanasia, even if the person isn’t capable of giving that final consent.

Supporters of MAiD had always claimed that the patient would always have the option to change their mind, and to back out. This would allow for contemplation, and for cooler heads to prevail.

From the description of the Bill:

This enactment amends the Criminal Code to
.
(a) permit an individual whose death is not reasonably foreseeable to enter into a written arrangement to receive medical assistance in dying on a specified day if they lose the capacity to consent to receiving medical assistance in dying prior to that day; and
.
(b) permit an individual who has been diagnosed with a serious and incurable illness, disease or disability to make a written declaration to waive the requirement for final consent when receiving medical assistance in dying if they lose the capacity to consent to receive medical assistance in dying, are suffering from symptoms outlined in the written declaration and have met all other relevant safeguards outlined in the Criminal Code.

Of course, the usual questions will come up. Did the person fully understand and support this decision? Was their undue influence? Did they ever change their mind? How do we determine whether or not they are capable of giving that final go-ahead?

There is still a provision that the person can speak or gesture to indicate that they no longer wish to go through with this. However, if they are incapacitated, that obviously won’t help.

This Bill was brought by Pamela Wallin. A decade ago, she became infamous for playing fast and loose with her expenses and got suspended, along with Mike Duffy and Patrick Brazeau.

In her capacity as a Senator, Wallin has had some interesting visitors recently.

Wallin brought this Bill on June 2, 2022. The day before, the Alzheimer Society of Canada had paid a visit. Among the topics listed in their lobbying profiled was: “Parliamentary review of medical assistance in dying with respect to advance requests”. In other words, go ahead, even if final consent can’t be obtained.

Field Trip Psychedelics Inc. has also been in touch with Wallin. This was concering the: “regulation of psilocybin-assisted psychotherapy that would give Canadians access to medical, non-recreational, psilocybin therapy.”

The Canadian Palliative Hospice Care Assocation also has contacted Wallin. Although their profile does mention end of life care, it doesn’t specify assisted suicide.

In any event, these are probably just coincidences, right?

Shouldn’t be any surprise that Wallin brought this Bill. But seriously, how far back do we keep pushing the line, or is there a limit?

(1) https://www.parl.ca/legisinfo/en/bill/44-1/s-248
(2) https://www.parl.ca/DocumentViewer/en/44-1/bill/S-248/first-reading
(3) https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/senate-moving-to-suspend-pamela-wallin-mike-duffy-1.2101305
(4) https://lobbycanada.gc.ca/app/secure/ocl/lrs/do/cmmLgPblcVw?comlogId=533156
(5) https://lobbycanada.gc.ca/app/secure/ocl/lrs/do/vwRg?cno=367664&regId=905218&blnk=1
(6) https://lobbycanada.gc.ca/app/secure/ocl/lrs/do/cmmLgPblcVw?comlogId=533156
(7) https://lobbycanada.gc.ca/app/secure/ocl/lrs/do/vwRg?cno=14475&regId=923718&blnk=1
(8) https://lobbycanada.gc.ca/app/secure/ocl/lrs/do/cmmLgPblcVw?comlogId=523500
(9) https://lobbycanada.gc.ca/app/secure/ocl/lrs/do/vwRg?cno=15059&regId=917004&blnk=1

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Bill C-5: Eliminating Mandatory Sentences For Serious Gun Crimes

Canada’s Bill C-5 is a piece of legislation has been rightfully criticized as gutting the strength of crimes involving firearms. While this is true, it’s quite shocking to see the actual details.

Comparing the current version of the Criminal Code versus the changes being pushed, it’s unsettling. Punishments for some of the most serious offences are being gutted.

Here’s a look at some of the changes that would be made.

Using firearm in commission of offence
.
85 (1) Every person commits an offence who uses a firearm, whether or not the person causes or means to cause bodily harm to any person as a result of using the firearm,
.
(a) while committing an indictable offence, other than an offence under section 220 (criminal negligence causing death), 236 (manslaughter), 239 (attempted murder), 244 (discharging firearm with intent), 244.2 (discharging firearm — recklessness), 272 (sexual assault with a weapon) or 273 (aggravated sexual assault), subsection 279(1) (kidnapping) or section 279.1 (hostage taking), 344 (robbery) or 346 (extortion);
.
(b) while attempting to commit an indictable offence; or
(c) during flight after committing or attempting to commit an indictable offence.
.
Marginal note: Using imitation firearm in commission of offence
.
(2) Every person commits an offence who uses an imitation firearm
(a) while committing an indictable offence,
(b) while attempting to commit an indictable offence, or
(c) during flight after committing or attempting to commit an indictable offence,
.
whether or not the person causes or means to cause bodily harm to any person as a result of using the imitation firearm.
.
Marginal note: Punishment
.
(3) Every person who commits an offence under subsection (1) or (2) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable
.
(a) in the case of a first offence, except as provided in paragraph (b), to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of one year; and
.
(b) in the case of a second or subsequent offence, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of three years.

Under the current version of the Criminal Code, a person faced a minimum of a year in prison (for a first offence), and 3 years (for subsequent offences). While this is still pretty lenient, there were at least minimums. This applies to:

  • s.220 (criminal negligence causing death)
  • s.236 (manslaughter)
  • s.239 (attempted murder)
  • s.244 (discharging firearm with intent)
  • s.244.2 (discharging firearm — recklessness)
  • s.272 (sexual assault with a weapon)
  • s.273 (aggravated sexual assault),
  • s.279(1) (kidnapping)
  • s.279.1 (hostage taking)
  • s.344 (robbery)
  • s.346 (extortion)

However, s.85(3) would be rewritten to remove the minimum terms, and simply replace them with 14 year maximums. Not only are the minimums removed, but another part of the Bill changes the rules surrounding conditional sentencing (house arrest) for serious crimes.

It’s worth pointing out that there doesn’t seem to be much of a distinction between a crime committed using a real firearm v.s. one where a replica is used. Makes sense, as it wouldn’t really matter to the victims, if they believed it to be real.

Reasonable people can disagree on how widespread minimum sentencing should be. That said, there are offences where it needs to exist, just to have some sense of law and order.

Possession of firearm knowing its possession is unauthorized
.
92 (1) Subject to subsection (4), every person commits an offence who possesses a prohibited firearm, a restricted firearm or a non-restricted firearm knowing that the person is not the holder of
.
(a) a licence under which the person may possess it; and
(b) in the case of a prohibited firearm or a restricted firearm, a registration certificate for it.
.
Marginal note: Possession of prohibited weapon, device or ammunition knowing its possession is unauthorized
.
(2) Subject to subsection (4), every person commits an offence who possesses a prohibited weapon, a restricted weapon, a prohibited device, other than a replica firearm, or any prohibited ammunition knowing that the person is not the holder of a licence under which the person may possess it.
.
Marginal note: Punishment
.
(3) Every person who commits an offence under subsection (1) or (2) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable
(a) in the case of a first offence, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years;
(b) in the case of a second offence, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of one year; and
(c) in the case of a third or subsequent offence, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of two years less a day.

For possession of a firearm (where it’s known to be illegal, second and subsequent convictions currently carry mandatory jail sentences. This Bill would change that to simply a maximum punishment of 10 years. It would be entirely up to the Judge to impose the sentence.

Possession of prohibited or restricted firearm with ammunition
.
95 (1) Subject to subsection (3), every person commits an offence who, in any place, possesses a loaded prohibited firearm or restricted firearm, or an unloaded prohibited firearm or restricted firearm together with readily accessible ammunition that is capable of being discharged in the firearm, without being the holder of
.
(a) an authorization or a licence under which the person may possess the firearm in that place; and
(b) the registration certificate for the firearm.
.
Marginal note: Punishment
.
(2) Every person who commits an offence under subsection (1)
.
(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of
(i) in the case of a first offence, three years, and
(ii) in the case of a second or subsequent offence, five years; or
.
(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

In fairness, this change is one that actually makes sense. There is no crime or issue other than simple possession and storage. Here the minimum sentence (if by way of indictment) would be 1, 3, or 5 years, depending on previous convictions. In theory, a person could be locked up for handing the guns of a friend or family member.

Granted, there was the exception built in for being directly supervised by someone with lawful possession. That said, the current form seemed to open to interpretation.

s.96(2)‍(a) of the Criminal Code carries a 1 year minimum for people who obtain firearms if they knew that it was done illegally. That minimum would be removed under Bill C-5. Of course, there’s an exception that allows the person to turn it in without consequences.

s.99(3) covers weapons trafficking, and lists a 1 year minimum jail term for people convicted of this offense. Consistent with other changes, that mandatory provision would be removed. Instead, there would simply be a 10 year maximum sentence.

s.100(3) gets into possession for the purposes of trafficking. Similarly, the 1 year mandatory minimum sentence would be struck from the Criminal Code.

s.103(2.1) removes the 1 year minimum sentence for importing or exporting firearms, if it’s known they are unauthorized. However, this change will only apply to guns that are neither restricted nor prohibited.

Discharging firearm with intent
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244 (1) Every person commits an offence who discharges a firearm at a person with intent to wound, maim or disfigure, to endanger the life of or to prevent the arrest or detention of any person — whether or not that person is the one at whom the firearm is discharged.
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Marginal note: Punishment
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(2) Every person who commits an offence under subsection (1) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable
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(a) if a restricted firearm or prohibited firearm is used in the commission of the offence or if the offence is committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with, a criminal organization, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of
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(i) in the case of a first offence, five years, and
(ii) in the case of a second or subsequent offence, seven years; and
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(b) in any other case, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of four years.

Currently, if it’s not a prohibited or restricted firearm, and not done in association with a criminal organization, there is a 4 year minimum. That would disappear under this Bill.

Side note: if a gun is discharged in a way that’s designed to wound, maim or disfigure, to endanger the life of a person, that sounds pretty close to attempted murder.

Discharging firearm — recklessness
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244.2 (1) Every person commits an offence
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(a) who intentionally discharges a firearm into or at a place, knowing that or being reckless as to whether another person is present in the place; or
(b) who intentionally discharges a firearm while being reckless as to the life or safety of another person.
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Definition of place
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(2) For the purpose of paragraph (1)(a), place means any building or structure — or part of one — or any motor vehicle, vessel, aircraft, railway vehicle, container or trailer.
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Marginal note: Punishment
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(3) Every person who commits an offence under subsection (1) is guilty of an indictable offence and
(a) if a restricted firearm or prohibited firearm is used in the commission of the offence or if the offence is committed for the benefit of, at the direction of or in association with a criminal organization, is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 14 years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of
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(i) five years, in the case of a first offence, and
(ii) seven years, in the case of a second or subsequent offence; and
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(b) in any other case, is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 14 years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of four years.

Recklessly discharging a firearm (that’s not restricted or prohibited) currently carries a 4 year minimum jail sentence. That would be eliminated under this Bill, at least in its current form.

A pattern in this legislation is that removing minimum sentences only seems to apply to non-restricted or prohibited firearms. They really seem intent on pushing that.

Robbery
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344 (1) Every person who commits robbery is guilty of an indictable offence and liable
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(a) if a restricted firearm or prohibited firearm is used in the commission of the offence or if any firearm is used in the commission of the offence and the offence is committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with, a criminal organization, to imprisonment for life and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of
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(i) in the case of a first offence, five years, and
(ii) in the case of a second or subsequent offence, seven years;
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(a.1) in any other case where a firearm is used in the commission of the offence, to imprisonment for life and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of four years; and
(b) in any other case, to imprisonment for life.

Robbery with a firearm (that’s not restricted or prohibited) currently carries a 4 year minimum jail sentence. That would be removed under this Bill, leaving open the possibility of a convict receiving a conditional sentence.

Extortion
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s.346.(1.1) Every person who commits extortion is guilty of an indictable offence and liable
(a) if a restricted firearm or prohibited firearm is used in the commission of the offence or if any firearm is used in the commission of the offence and the offence is committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with, a criminal organization, to imprisonment for life and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of
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(a.1) in any other case where a firearm is used [non restricted or prohibited] in the commission of the offence, to imprisonment for life and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of four years; and

Bill C-5 would remove a provision that imposes a mandatory 4 year prison term for extortion using a non-restricted firearm by repealing s.346(1.1)(a.1). However, there is a separate section dealing with restricted and prohibited firearms, that appears to be left intact.

The criminal would still be exposed to a potential life sentence, but the minimum term would be eliminated.

Imposing of conditional sentence
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742.1 If a person is convicted of an offence and the court imposes a sentence of imprisonment of less than two years, the court may, for the purpose of supervising the offender’s behaviour in the community, order that the offender serve the sentence in the community, subject to the conditions imposed under section 742.3, if
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(c) the offence is not an offence, prosecuted by way of indictment, for which the maximum term of imprisonment is 14 years or life;

Offenses which were ineligible for house arrest (conditional sentencing) include:

  • s.268 aggravated assault
  • s.272.(1)(a) sexual assault with a weapon
  • s.272.(1)(b) sexual assault with threats to cause bodily harm
  • s.272.(1)(c) sexual assault causing bodily harm
  • s.272.(1)(c.1) sexual assault involving choking, suffocation or strangulation
  • s.273 aggravated sexual assault

Now, should this Bill pass in its current form, people convicted of the above would once again be eligible for house arrest as an alternative to prison. Instead, 3 specific offences will be listed.

  • s.239 (attempted murder)
  • s.269.1 (torture)
  • s.318 (advocating genocide)

Strange that a “feminist” administration claims to care so much about women, while trying pass legislation to make it easier for violent and sexual predators to avoid prison time.

In fairness, just because conditional sentencing is back on the table, it doesn’t mean that convicts would be getting it in large numbers. It just means that the option has been restored.

It’s also illogical that this Government would be putting the screws to legal gun owners, while watering down the criminal punishments for offences involving guns. Then again, perhaps causing chaos or instability is what’s really at play here.

Consider the earlier coverage of Bill C-75, which was introduced in Trudeau’s first term. This monster included: (a) reduced penalties for terrorism offences; (b) reduced penalties for child sex offences; (c) influence from groups pushing alternative lifestyles; and (d) decriminalizing misinformation.

It’s quite amazing what can be inserted into legislation, and the effects it will have. However, far too few people actually read into these things.

(1) https://www.parl.ca/legisinfo/en/bill/44-1/c-5
(2) https://www.parl.ca/DocumentViewer/en/44-1/bill/C-5/third-reading
(3) https://www.laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-46/index.html
(4) https://www.laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/f-11.6/FullText.html#h-224023

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Private Member’s Bill C-261: Red Flag Laws In Canada For Hate Speech?

Bill C-261 is a piece of legislation that will allow individual members of the public to get Court orders against other people. This can be done if they have “reasonable grounds for fearing” that someone is, or will engage in hate speech, promote hate or violence, or commit an offence that is motivated by hate.

Hate motivated crimes are already illegal, and subject to serious consequences. That being said, this Bill would permit people to seek Court orders based on what someone might do. There’s no requirement that an offense have already been committed.

And what is “hate propaganda” for these purposes? It’s unclear. Would saying that men are men and that women are women qualify?

To address the obvious: yes, this is a Private Member’s Bill. They rarely become law.

However, it’s worth covering as it gives an insight into the kinds of activities our elected officials are talking about. Moreover, the content of a Private Bill may one day be slipped into a larger Bill, receiving little to no scrutiny.

Appearances
(2) The provincial court judge who receives an information under subsection (1) may cause the parties to appear before a provincial court judge.

Adjudication
(3) If the provincial court judge before whom the parties appear is satisfied by the evidence adduced that the informant has reasonable grounds for the fear, the judge may order that the defendant enter into a recognizance to keep the peace and be of good behaviour for a period of not more than 12 months.

Duration extended
(4) However, if the provincial court judge is also satisfied that the defendant was convicted previously of any offence referred to in subsection (1), the judge may order that the defendant enter into the recognizance for a period of not more than two years.

Refusal to enter into recognizance
(5) The provincial court judge may commit the defendant to prison for a term of not more than 12 months if the defendant fails or refuses to enter into the recognizance.

Here’s where the enforcement comes in. If the person refuses to enter into the recognizance (court order) that person can be incarcerated for a year.

It’s unclear what threshold would be required for the Judge to conclude that someone has a reasonable fear. This comes across as being entirely subjective.

Conditions in recognizance
Start of inserted block
(6) The provincial court judge may add any reasonable conditions to the recognizance that the judge considers desirable to secure the good conduct of the defendant, including conditions that
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(a) require the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device, if the Attorney General makes that request;
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(b) require the defendant to return to and remain at their place of residence at specified times;
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(c) require the defendant to abstain from the consumption of drugs, except in accordance with a medical prescription, of alcohol or of any other intoxicating substance;
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(d) require the defendant to provide, for the purpose of analysis, a sample of a bodily substance prescribed by regulation on the demand of a peace officer, a probation officer or someone designated under paragraph 810.‍3(2)‍(a) to make a demand, at the place and time and on the day specified by the person making the demand, if that person has reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant has breached a condition of the recognizance that requires them to abstain from the consumption of drugs, alcohol or any other intoxicating substance;
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(e) require the defendant to provide, for the purpose of analysis, a sample of a bodily substance prescribed by regulation at regular intervals that are specified, in a notice in Form 51 served on the defendant, by a probation officer or a person designated under paragraph 810.‍3(2)‍(b) to specify them, if a condition of the recognizance requires the defendant to abstain from the consumption of drugs, alcohol or any other intoxicating substance; or
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(f) prohibit the defendant from communicating, directly or indirectly, with any person identified in the recognizance, or refrain from going to any place specified in the recognizance, except in accordance with the conditions specified in the recognizance that the judge considers necessary.

Without having been charged or convicted of any offence, a Judge has the power to impose:
(a) electronic monitoring
(b) house arrest or a curfew
(c) an alcohol prohibition
(d) demands to provide samples for testing
(e) no contact orders, or orders to stay away from places

And it doesn’t stop there.

Conditions — firearms
(7) The provincial court judge shall consider whether it is desirable, in the interests of the defendant’s safety or that of any other person, to prohibit the defendant from possessing any firearm, cross-bow, prohibited weapon, restricted weapon, prohibited device, ammunition, prohibited ammunition or explosive substance, or all of those things. If the judge decides that it is desirable to do so, the judge shall add that condition to the recognizance and specify the period during which it applies.

Surrender, etc.
(8) If the provincial court judge adds a condition described in subsection (7) to a recognizance, the judge shall specify in the recognizance how the things referred to in that subsection that are in the defendant’s possession shall be surrendered, disposed of, detained, stored or dealt with and how the authorizations, licences and registration certificates that are held by the defendant shall be surrendered.

Reasons
(9) If the provincial court judge does not add a condition described in subsection (7) to a recognizance, the judge shall include in the record a statement of the reasons for not adding it.

A Judge can also order that a person be prohibited from possessing any weapons, and be ordered to surrender any that they do have. Again, a person doesn’t have to be criminally charged for any of this to take place.

Interestingly, the Judge would be required to provide an explanation if there is no provision to prohibit that person from owning or using firearms or other weapons.

The language here is quite similar to Bill C-21, which would allow private citizens to have guns removed if a Judge viewed someone as a threat. There was a lot wrong with that Bill, but C-261 would water down the requirement so that the target didn’t even have to be a threat.

There is the safeguard that the Attorney General has to approve such an application. But that raises the question of to what degree this process will be open to political interference. Worse, the vague wording on what qualifies leaves a lot open to interpretation.

While this particular piece may not go anywhere, it’s entirely possible that the content will be stuffed into another Bill at some point in the future. Vigilance is needed.

(1) https://www.parl.ca/DocumentViewer/en/44-1/bill/C-261/first-reading
(2) https://www.parl.ca/DocumentViewer/en/44-1/bill/C-21/first-reading
(3) https://canucklaw.ca/bill-c-21-reintroduced-legislation-to-whittle-away-gun-rights/