Frank Geels & Disruptive Innovation Framework

(From actual academic writing: Frank W. Geels)

(More academia: Sustainable Consumption Institute, Manchester University)

(Clayton Christiansen and “Disruptive Innovation” video)

(From the Uppity Peasants site)

1. Go Check Out Uppity Peasants Site


This is a fairly new site, however, it has some interesting content on it. Well researched, it will give some alternative views on how we are really being controlled.
Go check out “Uppity Peasants“.

2. Important Links


CLICK HERE, for the Sustainable Consumption Institute & Manchester Institute of Innovation Research, The University of Manchester, Denmark Road Building, M13 9PL, Manchester, United Kingdom.
CLICK HERE, for Clayton Christiansen and “Disruptive Innovation”.
CLICK HERE, for SCI Collective Action & Social Movements.
CLICK HERE, for SCI Social Inequality.
CLICK HERE, for Multi-Level Perspective on Sustainability.
CLICK HERE, for a Wiki explanation of disruptive innovation.
CLICK HERE, for removing the innovator’s dilemma.

CLICK HERE, for the Climate Change Scam Part I.
CLICK HERE, for Part II, the Paris Accord.
CLICK HERE, for Part III, Saskatchewan Appeals Court Reference.
CLICK HERE, for Part IV, Controlled Opposition to Carbon Tax.
CLICK HERE, for Part V, UN New Development Funding.

3. Quotes From The Geels Article

Disruption and low-carbon system transformation: Progress and new challenges in socio-technical transitions research and the Multi-Level Perspective

This will be elaborated on, but is about subverted the status quo, or “disruption”. Worth pointing out, that although these types of articles are published and marketed as “science”, they are anything but.

As this title would suggest, the article is extremely political. The concern is not about science itself, but how to “sell” the science. And the agenda here is searching for political methods of implementing the transition to a Carbon free

ABSTRACT
This paper firstly assesses the usefulness of Christensen’s disruptive innovation framework for low-carbon system change, identifying three conceptual limitations with regard to the unit of analysis (products rather than systems), limited multi-dimensionality, and a simplistic (‘point source’) conception of change. Secondly, it shows that the Multi-Level Perspective (MLP) offers a more comprehensive framework on all three dimensions. Thirdly, it reviews progress in socio-technical transition research and the MLP on these three dimensions and identifies new challenges, including ‘whole system’ reconfiguration, multi-dimensional struggles, bi-directional niche-regime interactions, and an alignment conception of change. To address these challenges, transition research should further deepen and broaden its engagement with the social scienceseconomy.

The usefulness of Christiansen’s disruptive innovation framework? While used in a business sense, it appears to be a way for entrepreneurs to get into a market or business. However, in this context it is used as disrupting an environmental policy.

It is mildly (or downright) creepy that the author, Frank Geels, openly suggests that research should broaden its engagement with social sciences. In plain English, this means merging, where scientific research is viewed through a “social” lens.

Christiansen’s “Disruptive Innovation Framework” is explained in the above video. Also see “disruption in financial services“.

Christensen [4] made important contributions to the long-standing debate in innovation management about new entrants, incumbents and industry structures. He argued that disruptive innovations enable new entrants to ‘attack from below’ and overthrow incumbent firms. Christensen thus has a particular understanding of disruption, focused mainly on the competitive effects of innovations on existing firms and industry structures. His framework was not developed to address systemic effects or broader transformations, so my comments below are not about the intrinsic merits of the framework, but about their usefulness for low-carbon transitions.

Christensen’s disruptive innovation framework offers several useful insights for low-carbon transitions (although similar ideas can also be found elsewhere). First, it suggests that incumbent firms tend to focus their innovation efforts on sustaining technologies (which improve performance along established criteria), while new entrants tend to develop disruptive technologies (which offer different value propositions). Second, it proposes that disruptive technologies emerge in small peripheral niches, where early adopters are attracted by the technology’s new functionalities. Third, incumbent firms may initially overlook or under-estimate disruptive technologies (because of established beliefs) or are not interested in them, because the limited return on-investments associated with small markets do not fit with existing business models. Fourth, price/performance improvements may enable disruptive technologies to enter larger markets, out-compete existing technologies and overthrow incumbent firms

Worth pointing out right away, Geels has no interest in the “intrinsic merits” of the disruptive innovation framework that Christiansen talks about. Rather, he focuses on applying that technique to reducing/eliminating Carbon emissions from society.

Christiansen’s idea could be applied fairly practically to business, where new players want to establish themselves. However, Geels “weaponizes” this idea and wants to apply it with the climate-change agenda.

Geels also makes it obvious that overthrowing incumbents is a priority. Again, Christiansen’s writings were meant with the business approach, and trying to start your own, but Geels “repurposes” it.

While Christensen’s framework focuses on technical and business dimensions, the MLP also accommodates consumption, cultural, and socio-political dimensions. Although co-evolution has always been a core concept in the MLP, this is even more important for low-carbon transitions, which are goal-oriented or ‘purposive’ in the sense of addressing the problem of climate change. This makes them different from historical transitions which were largely ‘emergent’, with entrepreneurs exploiting the commercial opportunities offered by new technology

[27]. Because climate protection is a public good, private actors (e.g. firms, consumers) have limited incentives to address it owing to free rider problems and prisoner’s dilemmas. This means that public policy must play a central role in supporting the emergence and deployment of low-carbon innovations and changing the economic frame conditions (via taxes, subsidies, regulations, standards) that incentivize firms, consumers and other actors. However, substantial policy changes involve political struggles and public debate because: “[w]hatever can be done through the State will depend upon generating widespread political support from citizens within the context of democratic rights and freedoms” ([28]: 91).

Again, Geels hijacking a legitimate business concept, but using it for his enviro agenda.

How to implement this? Taxes, subsidies, regulations, standards for businesses and consumers. Use these to regulate and influence behaviour.

Geels rightly says that widespread political support will be needed. But he frames the climate change scam as a way to protect rights and freedoms. Nice bait-and-switch.

Conceptually, this means that we should analyse socio-technical transitions as multi-dimensional struggles between niche-innovations and existing regimes. These struggles include: economic competition between old and new technologies; business struggles between new entrants and incumbents; political struggles over adjustments in regulations, standards, subsidies and taxes; discursive struggles over problem framings and social acceptance; and struggles between new user practices and mainstream ones.

Despite Geels’ article being published in the Journal, “ENERGY RESEARCH AND SOCIAL SCIENCE”, this anything but scientific. If anything, it seems analogous to the “lawfare” that Islamic groups perpetuate on democratic societies.

While Geels promotes economic competition, this is anything but a fair competition. He also calls for:

  • Political struggles over regulations
  • New standards
  • Subsidies
  • Taxes
  • Discursive struggles over problem framings & social acceptance
  • Struggles between new and mainstream user practices

There is nothing scientific here. This is a call for using “political” manoeuvering for achieving social goals.

The importance of public engagement, social acceptance and political feasibility is often overlooked in technocratic government strategies and model-based scenarios, which focus on techno-economic dimensions to identify least-cost pathways [32]. In the UK, which is characterized by closed policy networks and top-down policy style, this neglect has led to many problems, which are undermining the low carbon transition.

• Onshore wind experienced local protests and permit problems, leading to negative public discourses and a political backlash, culminating in a post-2020 moratorium.

• Shale gas experienced public controversies after it was pushed through without sufficient consultation.

• Energy-saving measures in homes were scrapped in 2015, after the Green Deal flagship policy(introduced in2013) spectacularly failed, because it was overly complicated and poorly designed, leading to limited uptake.

• The 2006 zero-carbon homes target, which stipulated that all new homes should be carbon-neutral by 2016, was scrapped in 2015, because of resistance by major housebuilders and limited consumer interest.

• The smart meter roll-out is experiencing delays, because of controversies over standards, privacy concerns, and distribution of benefits (between energy companies and consumers).

While these points are in fact true, Geels suggests that problems could have been avoided if there was sufficient public consultation. This is wishful thinking.

These points raise many legitimate concerns with the eco-agenda. Yet Geels shrugs them off as the result of not engaging the public enough.

Christensen and other innovation management scholars typically adopt a ‘point source’ approach to disruption, in which innovators pioneer new technologies, conquer the world, and cause social change. Existing contexts are typically seen as ‘barriers’ to be overcome. This ‘bottom-up’ emphasis also permeates the Strategic Niche Management and Technological Innovation System literatures. While this kind of change pattern does sometimes occur, the MLP was specifically developed to also accommodate broader patterns, in which niche-innovations diffuse because they align with ongoing processes at landscape- or regime-levels [9].

The MLP thus draws on history and sociology of technology, where processual, contextual explanations are common. Mokyr [58], for instance, emphasizes that “The new invention has to be born into a socially sympathetic environment” (p. 292) and that “Macro-inventions are seeds sown by individual inventors in a social soil. (.) But the environment into which these seeds are sown is, of course, the main determinant of whether they will sprout” (p. 299). So, if radical innovations face mis-matches with economic, socio-cultural or political contexts, they may remain stuck in peripheral niches, hidden ‘below the surface’.

Since low-carbon transitions are problem-oriented, transition scholars should not only analyse innovation dynamics, but also ‘issue dynamics’ because increasing socio-political concerns about climate change can lead to changes in regime-level institutions and selection environments. Societal problems or ‘issues’ have their own dynamics in terms of problem definition and socio-political mobilization as conceptualized, for instance, in the issue lifecycle literature [59,50]. Low carbon transitions require stronger ‘solution’ and problem dynamics, and their successful alignment, which is not an easy process, as the examples below show.

These passages go into marketing strategies, and ways to “frame an argument”. Notice not once does Geels suggest doing more research, or checking the reliability of existing data. Instead, this is a push for emotional manipulation and shameless advertising.

Invention has to be born into a socially sympathetic environment. Science be damned.

There are also positive developments, however, that provide windows of opportunity. Coal is losing legitimacy in parts of the world, because it is increasingly framed as dirty, unhealthy and old-fashioned, and because oil and gas companies are distancing themselves from coal, leading to cracks in the previously ‘closed front’ of fossil fuel industries. The UK has committed to phasing out coal-fired power plants by 2025 and several other countries (Netherlands, France, Canada, Finland, Austria) also move in this direction, providing space for low-carbon alternatives, including renewables.

I would actually agree that coal being phased out would benefit society. However, Geels makes it a “marketing” issue rather than a scientific one. Coal is “increasingly framed” as dirty. Notice that the actual science, such as from this site, are very rarely described.

Following chemical reactions takes place in the combustion of coal with the release of heat:
C + O2 = CO2 + 8084 Kcal/ Kg of carbon (33940 KJ/Kg)
S + O2 = SO2 + 2224 Kcal/Kg of sulfur (9141 KJ/Kg)
2 H2 + O2 = 2 H2O + 28922 Kcal/Kg of hydrogen (142670 KJ/Kg)
2C + O2 = 2CO + 2430 Kcal/Kg of carbon (10120 KJ/Kg)

4. Geels’ Conclusions

The paper has also identified several research challenges, where the transitions community could fruitfully do more work. First, we should broaden our analytical attention from singular niche-innovations (which permeate the literature) to ‘whole system’ change. This may involve changes in conceptual imagery (from ‘point source’ disruption to gradual system reconfiguration) and broader research designs, which analyze multiple niche-innovations and their relations to ongoing dynamics in existing systems and regimes. That, in turn, may require more attention for change mechanisms like add-on, hybridisation, modular component substitution, knock-on effects, innovation cascades, multi regime interaction.

Second, we should better understand regime developments. Existing regimes can provide formidable barriers for low-carbon transitions. Incumbent actors can resist, delay or derail low-carbon transitions, but they can also accelerate them if they reorient their strategies and resources towards niche-innovations. The analysis of niche-to-regime dynamics (as in the niche empowerment literature) should thus be complemented with regime-to-niche dynamics, including incumbent resistance or reorientation. Additionally, we need more nuanced conceptualizations and assessments of degrees of lock-in, tensions, cracks, and destabilisation.

Third, we need greater acknowledgement that socio-technical systems are a special unit of analysis, which spans the social sciences and can be studied through different lenses and at different levels. The recent trend towards deepening our understanding of particular dimensions and societal groups is tremendously fruitful, because disciplinary theories offer more specific causal mechanisms. But, as a community, we should complement this with broad analyses of co-evolution, alignment, multi-dimensionality and ‘whole systems’.

This all sounds elegant, but read between the lines. It is about influencing public perception. Whenever academics, lawyers or politicians seem to make things confusing we need to ask: are they trying to obscure their goals?

5. More About Frank W. Geels

Selected publications of Geels
If you would like a broader cross section of Geels’ work, perhaps these publications will be of interest.

  • Geels, F.W., Berkhout, F. and Van Vuuren, D., 2016, Bridging analytical approaches for low-carbon transitions, Nature Climate Change, 6(6), 576-583
  • Geels, F.W., Kern, F., Fuchs, G., Hinderer, N., Kungl, G., Mylan, J., Neukirch, M., Wassermann, S., 2016, The enactment of socio-technical transition pathways: A reformulated typology and a comparative multi-level analysis of the German and UK low-carbon electricity transitions (19902014), Research Policy, 45(4), 896-913
  • Turnheim, B., Berkhout, F., Geels, F.W., Hof, A., McMeekin, A., Nykvist, B., Van Vuuren, D., 2015, Evaluating sustainability transitions pathways: Bridging analytical approaches to address governance challenges, Global Environmental Change, 35, 239–253
  • Penna, C.C.R. and Geels, F.W., 2015, ‘Climate change and the slow reorientation of the American car industry (1979-2011): An application and extension of the Dialectic Issue LifeCycle (DILC) model’, Research Policy, 44(5), 1029-1048
  • Geels, F.W., 2014, ‘Regime resistance against low-carbon energy transitions: Introducing politics and power in the multi-level perspective’, Theory, Culture & Society, 31(5), 21-40
  • Geels, F.W., 2013, ‘The impact of the financial-economic crisis on sustainability transitions: Financial investment, governance and public discourse’, Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions, 6, 67-95
  • Geels, F.W., 2012, ‘A socio-technical analysis of low-carbon transitions: Introducing the multi-level perspective into transport studies’, Journal of Transport Geography, 24, 471-482
  • Geels, F.W., Kemp, R., Dudley, G. and Lyons, G. (eds.), 2012, Automobility in Transition? A Socio Technical Analysis of Sustainable Transport, New York: Routledge
  • Verbong, G.P.J. and Geels, F.W., 2010, ‘Exploring sustainability transitions in the electricity sector with socio-technical pathways’, Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 77(8), 12141221 Verbong, G.P.J. and Geels, F.W., 2007, ‘The ongoing energy transition: Lessons from a sociotechnical, multi-level analysis of the Dutch electricity system (1960-2004)’, Energy Policy, 35(2), 1025-1037
  • Geels, F.W., 2002, ‘Technological transitions as evolutionary reconfiguration processes: A multi-level perspective and a case-study’, Research Policy, 31(8/9), 1257-1274

Frank Geels publicly available CV
Education
• Ph.D., Science, Technology and Innovation Studies, Twente University of Technology (Jan. 1998- July 2002), Netherlands. Supervisors: Arie Rip and Johan Schot. Title PhD thesis: Understanding the Dynamics of Technological Transitions: A co-evolutionary and socio-technical analysis.
• Masters degree in Philosophy of Science, Technology and Society, Twente University of Technology (1991-1996)
• Bachelor degree in Chemical Engineering, Twente University of Technology (1989-1991)

For what it’s worth, his formal education is pretty impressive. Where I lose respect is when he deviates from scientific argument in favour of political discourse. What could be very interesting work is corrupted be having an agenda.

His undergraduate degree is chemical engineering, which again, is very respectable. However, his Masters and PhD show a deviation from science and research.

While there are many other such authors, Frank W. Geels is a good case of what happens when political agendas and manoeuvering creep into science.

A morbidly fascinating topic. Check out some of his other publications.

CCS #14: UN’s New Development Financing (The Bait-and-Switch)

(Ways to raise money)

(Sources of money for health initiatives)

An internationally concerted carbon tax could raise $250 billion per year…

(Page 13)
In this vein, a tax of $25 per ton of CO2 emitted by developed countries is expected to raise $250 billion per year in global tax revenues. Such a tax would be in addition to taxes already imposed at the national level, as many Governments (of developing as well as developed countries) already tax carbon emissions, in some cases explicitly, and in other cases, indirectly through taxes on specific fuels

…and a small currency transaction tax could add an estimated $40 billion…

1. Debunking The Climate Change Scam

CLICK HERE, for #1: major lies that the climate frauds tell.
CLICK HERE, for #2: review of the Paris Accord.
CLICK HERE, for #3: Bill C-97, the GHG Pollution Pricing Act.
CLICK HERE, for #4: in 3-2 decision, Sask. COA allows carbon tax.
CLICK HERE, for #5: controlled opposition to carbon tax.
CLICK HERE, for #6: controlled opposition Cons ==> Supreme Court.
CLICK HERE, for #7: climate bonds pitched as $100T industry.
CLICK HERE, for #8: Joel Wood pitching various pricing options.
CLICK HERE, for #9: Mark Carney and UN climate finance.
CLICK HERE, for #10: Goldman Sachs, Obama, Clinton, Chicago CX.
CLICK HERE, for #11: Coronavirus, Pirbright Inst, Gates, Depopulation.
CLICK HERE, for #12: AOC and the “Green New Deal”.
CLICK HERE, for #13: UN seeks new development financing.

CLICK HERE, for BOLD Like A Leopard Guest Posting.

2. Important Links


UN.new.development.financing.2012.178pages
CLICK HERE, for the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime.
CLICK HERE, for UN Sustainable Development Goals.
CLICK HERE, for Devex article explaining debt-for-development.
CLICK HERE, for World Bank explanation for debt-for-development trade.
CLICK HERE, for debt swaps for sustainable development.
CLICK HERE, for loss of sovereignty article.
CLICK HERE, for an IMF article on debt swaps.

3. This Is The Bait:

(From Page 10)
Two main sources are considered: taxes levied on international transactions and/or taxes that are internationally concerted, such as the air-ticket solidarity levy, financial or currency transaction taxes and carbon taxes; and revenues from global resources, such as SDR allocations and proceeds derived from the extraction of resources from the global commons, through, for example, seabed mining in international waters. Proposals on potential sources of finance for international development cooperation in both categories have been discussed for decades, although most of these, with the exception of the proposal on an airline levy, have not yet been adopted.

So what kind of “revenues” are raised?

  • taxes on international transactions
  • internationally concerted taxes
  • air-ticket solidarity levy
  • financial or currency transaction taxes
  • carbon taxes

This is how bait-and-switch works:
(1) Raise money using cause A.
(2) Actually spend the money on cause B.

4. And Here Is The Switch:

An array of other options with large fundraising potential have been proposed (see figure O.1 and table O.1), but have not been agreed upon internationally thus far. These include taxes on financial and currency transactions and on greenhouse gas emissions, as well as the creation of new international liquidity through issuance of special drawing rights (SDRs) by the International Monetary Fund IMF), to be allocated with a bias favouring developing countries or leveraged as development financing. Though their potential may be high, these proposals are subject to political controversy. For instance, many countries are not willing to support international forms of taxation, as these are said to undermine national sovereignty.

There are also challenges in the use and allocation of funds mobilized internationally. Most existing innovative financing mechanisms earmark resources upfront for specific purposes, as is the case for the global health funds. There are perceived benefits in doing so. Advocates argue that the earmarking helps build political support and attract funds by establishing a clear link between fundraising and popular causes. This may come at a cost, however, since earmarking funds can limit domestic policy space for channelling resources to nationally defined priorities.

This explains why there is the bait-and-switch. Countries are not willing to support international taxation. Therefore it is necessary to raise money under the pretense of “environmentalism”. It also shows that the UN feels little resistance to misleading the public on where money is being used for.

(From Page 10)
Some innovations focus on intermediation mechanisms designed to better match funding and needs by facilitating front-loading of resources (which include several mechanisms channelling resources to global health funds and some debt-for-development swap mechanisms), by mobilizing public means to guarantee or insure natural disaster risks or technology development for public causes, or by securing specific-purpose voluntary contributions from the private sector for official development cooperation. Various mechanisms of these types do exist, but they are not large in size.

Several global funds that act as allocation mechanisms are generally also considered to come under the rubric of innovative development financing. Disbursement mechanisms in the health sector include the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, UNITAID and the GAVI Alliance. These mechanisms collect financing directly from sources or through intermediary financing mechanisms. UNITAID is the only disbursement mechanism that obtains the bulk of its financing from an innovative source, the air-ticket solidarity levy. Other funds rely mainly on traditional sources of financing.

Though the bulk of money raised is collected under the pretense of “environmentalism”, the UN makes it clear that the cash will be spent on a few “other” purposes.

  1. Global Health Funds
  2. Debt-for-Development Swap Mechanisms

5. UN Violates Own Convention


From the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime

Article 4(1)

Article 4. Protection of sovereignty
1. States Parties shall carry out their obligations under this Convention in a manner consistent with the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity of States and that of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other States.
2. Nothing in this Convention entitles a State Party to undertake in the territory of another State the exercise of jurisdiction and performance of functions that are reserved exclusively for the authorities of that other State by its domestic law.

Article 5

Article 5. Criminalization of participation in an organized criminal group
1. Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally:
(a) Either or both of the following as criminal offences distinct from those involving the attempt or completion of the criminal activity:
(i) Agreeing with one or more other persons to commit a serious crime for a purpose relating directly or indirectly to the obtaining of a financial or other material benefit and, where required by domestic law, involving an act undertaken by one of the participants in furtherance of the agreement or involving an organized criminal group;

Consider that the New Development Financing involves obtaining huge sums of money under false pretenses. While the publics are told that much of this revenue will be for environmental causes, it becomes clear from later in the document that it will be spent on other purposes (such as debt-for-development and health care causes).

Taking money for purposes other than what is advertised is fraud.

6. Debt Conversion Mechanisms

(Page 86) Debt-conversion mechanisms
Debt conversion entails the cancellation by one or more creditors of part of a country’s debt in order to enable the release of funds which would otherwise have been used for debt-servicing, for use instead in social or environmental projects. Where debt is converted at a discount with respect to its face value, only part of the proceeds fund the projects, the remainder reducing the external debt burden, typically as part of a broader debt restructuring.

Debt to developing nations can be “forgiven”, at least partly, if certain conditions are met. However, the obvious question must be asked:

Can nations be loaned money they could never realistically pay back, in order to ensure their compliance in UN or other global agenda, by agreeing to “forgive” part of it?

(Page 86) Debt conversion first emerged, in the guise of debt-for-nature swaps, during the 1980s debt crisis, following an opinion article by Thomas Lovejoy, then Executive Vice-President of the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), in the New York Times in 1984. Lovejoy argued that a developing country’s external debt could be reduced (also providing tax relief to participating creditor banks) in exchange for the country’s taking measures to address environmental challenges. Estimates based on Sheikh (2010) and Buckley, ed. (2011) suggest that between $1.1 billion and $1.5 billion of debt has been exchanged through debt-for-nature swaps since the mid–1980s, although it is not possible to assess how much of this constitutes IDF, for the reasons discussed in box III.1.

If debt can be forgiven in return for environmental measures, then why not simply fund these environmental measures from the beginning? Is it to pressure or coerce otherwise unwilling nations into agreeing with such measures?

(Page 88)
There have been two basic forms of debt-for-nature exchanges (Buckley and Freeland, 2011). In the first, part of a country’s external debt is purchased by an environmental non-governmental organization and offered to the debtor for cancellation in exchange for a commitment to protect a particular area of land. Such transactions occurred mainly in the late 1980s and 1990s and were generally relatively small-scale. An early example was a 1987 deal under which Conservation International, a Washington, D.C.-based environmental non-governmental organization, bought $650,000 of the commercial bank debt of Bolivia (now Plurinational State of Bolivia) in the secondary market for $100,000, and exchanged this for shares in a company established to preserve 3.7 million acres of forest and grassland surrounding the Beni Biosphere Reserve in the north-east part of the country.
In the second form, debt is exchanged for local currency (often at a discount), which is then used by local conservation groups or government agencies to fund projects in the debtor country. Swaps of this kind are generally much larger, and have predominated since the 1990s. The largest such swap came in 1991, when a group of bilateral creditors agreed to channel principal and interest payments of $473 million (in local currency) into Poland’s Ecofund set up to finance projects designed to counter environmental deterioration. The EcoFund financed 1,500 programmes between 1992 and 2007, providing grants for conservation projects relating to cross-border air pollution, climate change, biological diversity and the clean-up of the Baltic Sea (Buckley and Freeland, 2011).

We will “forgive” your debt if:
(1) A portion of your land is off limits; or
(2) Debt converted to currency to fund “projects”

Debt For Health

(Page 89)
Since the development of debt swaps in the 1980s, there has been a diversification of their uses to encompass social projects, most recently in the area of health under the Debt2Health initiative, which was launched by the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria in 2007 to harness additional resources for its programmes. Under Debt2Health, a donor country agrees to reduce part of a loan ineligible for debt relief under global initiatives such as the HIPC and Multilateral Debt Reduction Initiatives, in exchange for a commitment by the debtor to invest (in local currency) half of the nominal value of the debt in programmes approved by the Global Fund. The Global Fund is committed to devoting all of the funds thus generated to financing programmes in the country rather than overhead costs (Buckley, 2011c).

Debt For Education

(Page 90)
In addition to the uses described above, debt swaps have also been successfully implemented for education and development.2 Clear delineation among the various types of swaps is often problematic, however, as debt-for-development swaps typically provide funding for environmental, health and/or education projects.
……..
. Although nominally debt-conversion operations, these Contracts stipulate that debtor countries are to continue to service these debts in full, while receiving, however, an equivalent amount of new ODA grants tied to specific programmes when they do so (Agence Française de Développement, n.d.). Thus, resources are not redirected from debt servicing to other uses; rather, potential fiscal savings from debt-service reduction are forgone, the resources instead being directed to specific uses (Buckley, 2011a). These transactions thus cannot be considered to constitute IDF

So in these cases the debt isn’t really forgiven. The indebted nation will still have to make payments, while other money will be coming in for other purposes.

The funding generated by debt swaps is closely tied to their designated end use (although the effectiveness of this depends on monitoring mechanisms). While this effective earmarking of budgetary funds indicates a trade-off with policy space, the debt relief provided by converting debt at a discount (where the debt would otherwise have been serviced) releases resources for use in accordance with national priorities. However, the exclusion of relevant ministries and limited civil society participation in the design and implementation processes may undermine coherence with medium-term national development strategies.

To make absolutely clear, this debt forgiveness isn’t free. There is always some trade off. Here, it seems to be having your nation’s sovereignty eroded in return for being cut a break.

While all of this is couched in very pretty rhetoric, one really has to ask what is really the costs?

7. “Voluntary” Pesticide Use In Crops


Here is one such “pull measure” (page 98)

The World Bank is currently developing agricultural projects based on pull mechanisms through the Agricultural Pull Mechanism (AGPM) initiative, with the objectives of increasing production, reducing losses and enhancing food security for small farmers. There are six pilot programmes currently being developed, which are expected to be launched in June 2012. Their objectives are:
-To develop distribution networks for bio-fortified crop varieties (high pro-vitamin A cassava, maize and sweet potato, and high in iron beans) in Africa
-To promote the development and use of new hybrid rice varieties in South Asia
-To develop improved fertilizers and fertilizer production processes
-To promote adoption of improved post-harvest storage technologies
-To incentivize the use of biocontrol mechanisms against aflatoxin contamination of crops
-To promote development and use of a vaccine against peste des petits ruminants in livestock in Africa

Interesting. How much of this is done in the first world?

8. Now Comes Climate Change

(Page 120)
The unprecedented global improvements in average living standards over the last two centuries have come at the cost of serious degradation of the natural environment. The most serious environmental threat is climate change, brought about by global emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases. In addition to considerable expenditure for adaptation, climate change necessitates a fundamental shift in development strategies towards a much less carbon-intensive model, and a major reduction in reliance on fossil fuels.

While climate change arises overwhelmingly from historical emissions in developed countries, it impacts disproportionately the well-being and livelihoods of people in developing countries. This makes a compelling case for the assumption by richer countries of the costs of mitigation and adaptation

Read the next several pages. While the paper talks at length about how to “raise” money for climate change causes, it is surprisingly vague about how this money will actually be spent. There are some bland references to technology, but no specifics.

The paper cites “Carbon Dioxide and other greenhouse gases” but CO2 is the only one to actually be named.

Furthermore, the UN tries to promote mass migration to the West. However, this would be illogical, since on average, Western nations leave a much bigger “footprint” than others do.

While “financing” climate change efforts features prominently in later sections of the paper, it gives no real information on how the money would be put to use.

9. Is This Predatory?

From the Journal of Politics and Law Article (see here).

Budget constraints are severely undermining the capacity of governments of developing countries to provide their people even the most basic of social services. This lack of finance is in turn caused by several factors including, among others, huge military spending, pervasive corruption and large repayments of debts owed to the developed world. These factors, either singly or in combination, eat up government funds that can otherwise be spent on education, health, housing and other social services. Economists have a better way of describing it – these factors ‘crowd out’ essential public spending designed to benefit the people. (Note 1) As a result, these governments are unable to steer their countries towards the path of economic development and entire peoples are unable to enjoy the most fundamental of economic, social and cultural rights

This is what we are financing.

Our leaders take from us, claiming it is for efforts to “protect the environment”. Money is then spent abroad in the developing world, often awarded in the form of loans. When such nations cannot pay back the money they owe, they become indebted to their creditors. This is usually bodies like the UN or IMF.

Bait: Tax to save environment
Switch: Predatory loans to developing world.

This is the bait-and-switch. It is highly unethical to take advantage of people like this.

CCS #13: UN’s Search For New Development Financing

1. Debunking The Climate Change Scam

CLICK HERE, for #1: major lies that the climate frauds tell.
CLICK HERE, for #2: review of the Paris Accord.
CLICK HERE, for #3: Bill C-97, the GHG Pollution Pricing Act.
CLICK HERE, for #4: in 3-2 decision, Sask. COA allows carbon tax.
CLICK HERE, for #5: controlled opposition to carbon tax.
CLICK HERE, for #6: controlled opposition Cons ==> Supreme Court.
CLICK HERE, for #7: climate bonds pitched as $100T industry.
CLICK HERE, for #8: Joel Wood pitching various pricing options.
CLICK HERE, for #9: Mark Carney and UN climate finance.
CLICK HERE, for #10: Goldman Sachs, Obama, Clinton, Chicago CX.
CLICK HERE, for #11: Coronavirus, Pirbright Inst, Gates, Depopulation.
CLICK HERE, for #12: AOC and the “Green New Deal”.

CLICK HERE, for BOLD Like A Leopard Guest Posting.

2. Important Links


CLICK HERE, for the 178 page document.
CLICK HERE, for the Paris Accord.
CLICK HERE, for Agenda 2030, signed Sept 2015 by Harper.
CLICK HERE, for Agenda 21, signed June 1992 by Mulroney.
CLICK HERE, for debt.org, and predatory lending.
CLICK HERE, for Washington State, and predatory lending.
CLICK HERE, for British Columbia Law Institute, predatory lending.

3. FOREWORD BY BAN KI-MOON

Achieving the Millennium Development Goals and addressing global challenges such as climate change require considerable financing. Finding the necessary resources will be challenging, especially for least developed countries. Official development assistance (ODA) is falling well short of what countries need, and commitments to provide more aid remain unfulfilled. In the midst of difficult financial times, many donor countries have cut back on development assistance. In 2011, aid flows declined in real terms for the first time in many years.

The need for additional and more predictable development financing has led to a search for alternative, innovative sources. A number of initiatives have been launched during the past decade, most of which have been used to fund global health programmes that have helped to provide immunizations and AIDS and tuberculosis treatments to millions of people in the developing world.

While these initiatives have successfully used novel methods to channel development financing, they have not yielded much additional funding, thus leaving available finance well short of what is needed. This is one reason why proposals to mobilize resources for development through sources beyond ODA, including innovative finance mechanisms, have generated renewed interest from both Governments and civil society.

This year’s World Economic and Social Survey shows that such proposals could raise hundreds of billions of dollars in additional finance. If they are to become viable, however, strong international agreement is needed, along with adequate governance mechanisms, to manage the allocation of additional resources for development and global public goods.

World Economic and Social Survey 2012 is a valuable resource for implementing the decisions reached at the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20). I commend it to all those seeking a solid financial underpinning for the post2015 development agenda

Okay, to sum this up: the UN needs “lots” of cash for its various agendas. Foreign aid is being cut for the first time in years, and commitments remain unfulfilled.

4. Innovative Sources Of Funding

Okay, what are these “revenue sources”?

  • SDR (or special drawing rights), from IMF $150B-$270B
  • Carbon taxes, $240B
  • Leveraging SDR, $90B
  • Financial transaction tax, $10B-70B
  • Billionaire tax, $90B
  • Currency trading tax, $30B
  • EU emissions trading scheme, $5B
  • Air passenger levy, $10B
  • Certified emission reduction tax, $2B

If these numbers are accurate, then the US is viewed as a cash cow somewhere to the tune of $627 billion to $807 billion. Yes, this only refers to revenue potential from the United States. I believe this is annually.

What does the report say about SDAs?

These include taxes on financial and currency transactions and on greenhouse gas emissions, as well as the creation of new international liquidity through issuance of special drawing rights (SDRs) by the International Monetary Fund IMF), to be allocated with a bias favouring developing countries or leveraged as development financing. Though their potential may be high, these proposals are subject to political controversy. For instance, many countries are not willing to support international forms of taxation, as these are said to undermine national sovereignty.

No kidding. There is a lot of political opposition to taxes which are deemed to undermine national sovereignty. Could that be because these taxes AREN’T being used to support the well being of the citizenry? Instead the money is being funnelled out of the country in the name of some global good project.

The appeal of potential mechanisms for more automatic and assured flows of funds for international cooperation, especially if they can mobilize substantial amounts of resources, has led to multiple proposals on how to establish those mechanisms. While recognizing that these proposals have been long-standing, this Survey argues that certain forms of international taxation and leveraging of international reserve assets have great potential to significantly enhance resources for international development cooperation, warranting greater efforts to overcome the obstacles that have prevented tapping such potential in the past.

Here we get to the heart of the matter. The bulk of these “revenue tools” are listed as being for environmental causes. Yet the UN itself admits that the money will be used for other purposes. This is money laundering and fraud.

In one such proposal, the IMF would issue more international liquidity in the form of special drawing rights. Proposed annual allocations of SDR 150 billion–250 billion would be received mainly by developed countries, as the SDRs are distributed according to country quotas in IMF. However, if instead, two thirds were allocated to developing countries, they would receive $160 billion–$270 billion annually. The “seigniorage” from such issuance, which now accrues to the international reserve currency countries, could be allocated for use in part by the international community in favour of developing countries. Admittedly, changing the SDR allocation formula would constitute a significant political undertaking, as it will require an amendment to the IMF Articles of Agreement. Amending the Articles, like decisions for a general SDR allocation under existing rules, requires an 85 per cent approval of member votes, giving the United States of America an effective veto. Indeed, United States support for regular SDR allocations would imply a measure of global solidarity, as the seigniorage embodied in the new SDRs would be largely at the expense of seigniorage no longer accruing to the United States. Nevertheless, such a change could result in a significant strengthening of the international monetary system, which should be supported by all IMF member countries.

Such regular issuance of SDRs has no direct link to development finance, however. SDRs remain a reserve asset, but their additional availability, arranged through international coordination, could reduce the need for individual developing countries to set aside foreign-exchange earnings in reserve holdings of their own as a form of self insurance against global market shocks.

So if the developed world were to engage in these UN measures, then developing countries wouldn’t need to set aside foreign exchange earnings in reserve. This is because “we” will have done it for them. In short, this is the 1st world economically propping up the 3rd world.

An internationally concerted carbon tax could raise $250 billion per year…

Let’s be clear. The Carbon tax has NOTHING to do with environmentalism, and everything to do with being a fundraising tool for the UN’s agendas.

If global policy could be designed as if for a single economy, then a single global tax could be set (and adjusted over time) to steer overall emissions in the direction of a particular target to be achieved by a particular date. However, the world is made up of many countries which would experience different impacts on overall consumption and production from a single tax. The differential impact of a uniform carbon tax would cause objections to be raised by Governments and could frustrate agreement on the tax, especially since it is unlikely that those making the smallest sacrifices under a uniform tax would fully compensate those making the largest. Indeed, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol3 to the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change mandates only that higher-income countries make specific targeted reductions, as those countries are responsible for most of the man-made concentrations of CO2 in the atmosphere and are best able to bear the economic burden. In this vein, a tax of $25 per ton of CO2 emitted by developed countries is expected to raise $250 billion per year in global tax revenues. Such a tax would be in addition to taxes already imposed at the national level, as many Governments (of developing as well as developed countries) already tax carbon emissions, in some cases explicitly, and in other cases, indirectly through taxes on specific fuels.

We will have a carbon tax on top of:

  • other federal taxes
  • Provincial taxes
  • Municipal taxes
  • Fuel specific taxes

This is all a scam to gouge the public to finance the UN agendas.

Estimates of additional financing needs for climate change mitigation and adaptation in developing countries are great—considerably greater even than those for health. Estimates of additional investment needs in 2030 are in the order of $140 billion–$175 billion per annum (plus additional upfront investments of $265 billion–$565 billion) for mitigation, and a further $30 billion–$100 billion per annum for adaptation. World Economic and Social Survey 2011 (United Nations, 2011a) estimated additional investment needs of developing countries for sustainable development, including for climate change mitigation and adaptation, and for ensuring access to clean energy for all, sustainable food production and forest resource management, at about $1 trillion per year in the coming decades. As recognized, inter alia, by the Copenhagen Accord, from the perspective both of fair burden-sharing in financing global public goods and of the limited economic means of developing countries, a substantial share of the required financing would need to come from international transfers.

Okay, by 2030, various UN agendas will be costing about $1 trillion (with a “T”) annually. And in order to finance this, lots of financing will be required, mainly from the developed world.

Health causes will cost a fraction of what environmental costs are expected to be.

5. Exploitation: Debt for Development

Debt conversion first emerged, in the guise of debt-for-nature swaps, during the 1980s debt crisis, following an opinion article by Thomas Lovejoy, then Executive Vice-President of the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), in the New York Times in 1984. Lovejoy argued that a developing country’s external debt could be reduced (also providing tax relief to participating creditor banks) in exchange for the country’s taking measures to address environmental challenges. Estimates based on Sheikh (2010) and Buckley, ed. (2011) suggest that between $1.1 billion and $1.5 billion of debt has been exchanged through debt-for-nature swaps since the mid–1980s, although it is not possible to assess how much of this constitutes IDF, for the reasons discussed in box III.1.

There have been two basic forms of debt-for-nature exchanges (Buckley and Freeland, 2011). In the first, part of a country’s external debt is purchased by an environmental non-governmental organization and offered to the debtor for cancellation in exchange for a commitment to protect a particular area of land. Such transactions occurred mainly in the late 1980s and 1990s and were generally relatively small-scale. An early example was a 1987 deal under which Conservation International, a Washington, D.C.-based environmental non-governmental organization, bought $650,000 of the commercial bank debt of Bolivia (now Plurinational State of Bolivia) in the secondary market for $100,000, and exchanged this for shares in a company established to preserve 3.7 million acres of forest and grassland surrounding the Beni Biosphere Reserve in the north-east part of the country.

In the second form, debt is exchanged for local currency (often at a discount), which is then used by local conservation groups or government agencies to fund projects in the debtor country. Swaps of this kind are generally much larger, and have predominated since the 1990s. The largest such swap came in 1991, when a group of bilateral creditors agreed to channel principal and interest payments of $473 million (in local currency) into Poland’s Ecofund set up to finance projects designed to counter environmental deterioration. The EcoFund financed 1,500 programmes between 1992 and 2007, providing grants for conservation projects relating to cross-border air pollution, climate change, biological diversity and the clean-up of the Baltic Sea (Buckley and Freeland, 2011).

However, most debt-for-nature swaps have been much smaller, so that the funds generated are generally limited relative to environmental financing needs, providing funding, instead, for individual projects. Critics also argue that monitoring mechanisms are often insufficient to ensure that debtor countries fulfil their environmental obligations, and that swaps may be detrimental to national sovereignty in cases where they result in the transfer of landownership to foreign entities. In view of the latter concern, conservation organizations involved in three-way swaps (involving the debtor Government, the creditor and a third party) often refrain from buying land directly with funds generated by swaps (Sheikh, 2010)

How is this even legal? Developing nations are “loaned” money they cannot possibly pay back. This is done on the backs of taxpayers in the first world.

When indebted nations cannot pay the loans back, which is usually the case, debt is “forgiven” or “reduced” in return for local currency and resources, and/or access to the land for other environmental projects. These, of course, are also financed on the backs of First World taxpayers.

Of course, land and other resources could now be effectively controlled by foreign entities, meaning that entire parts of Countries would be owned by foreigners. Not too different from say, Vancouver (which is bought up en masse by China).

6. Exploitation: Debt for Education

In addition to the uses described above, debt swaps have also been successfully implemented for education and development. Clear delineation among the various types of swaps is often problematic, however, as debt-for-development swaps typically provide funding for environmental, health and/or education projects.

Based on Buckley, ed. (2011), the cumulative amount of debt-for-development and debt-for-education swaps appears to be in the order of $3 billion, including 18 debt-for-education swaps in 14 countries since 1998, the proceeds of which were in most cases directed to funding for local schools (Buckley, 2011c). Again, however, the proportion of this total that has provided additional funding—and may therefore be considered to constitute IDF—cannot readily be estimated. In particular, $865 million of the $3 billion total represents Debt Reduction-Development Contracts with the Agence Française de Développement, covering debts arising from past ODA loans from France which would otherwise be eligible for cancellation under multilateral debt reduction programmes such as the HIPC Initiative. Although nominally debt-conversion operations, these Contracts stipulate that debtor countries are to continue to service these debts in full, while receiving, however, an equivalent amount of new ODA grants tied to specific programmes when they do so (Agence Française de Développement, n.d.). Thus, resources are not redirected from debt servicing to other uses; rather, potential fiscal savings from debt-service reduction are forgone, the resources instead being directed to specific uses (Buckley, 2011a). These transactions thus cannot be considered to constitute IDF.

This is concerning for a few reasons.

First, it seems to hold a nation hostage by making demands in order to fund its health care or education.

Second, given the sorts of education the UN engages in, would imposing this on other nations actually work to undermine its culture and identity?

7. Closing thoughts

Given the document is basically a book, this review hardly does it justice.

The UN seeks to raise huge amounts of money through various “innovative” means. Basically, they are some form of tax, or are funds converted from taxes of individual nations. This has the effect of bankrupting the developed world, as their money is being used to finance globalist agendas.

Furthermore, the “lending” to the developing world can be considered predatory. Money is loaned out to nations which have no realistic chance to pay it back. In order to “service” their debts, nations are forced to cede to foreign ownership, or to allow the UN control over how its territory is used.

This is exploitive for everyone involved. And despite the rallying cries, this has little to do with actually combatting climate change.

A shoutout to Nicky @cravecreative, for catching this disaster.

CCS #5: Meet the Controlled “Opposition” To Carbon Tax

(Originally featured in Maclean’s as “The Resistance”)

(Garnett Genuis, CPC MP, justifies Paris Accord)

(“Conservative” AB Premier Jason Kenney endorses Carbon tax)

(“Conservative” AB Prem Jason Kenney supports Bill C-69)

(Ontario Court of Appeals, website, contains many great links and references)

(Maxime Bernier, in 2016, against tax, but for climate change agenda)

1. Debunking The Climate Change Scam

CLICK HERE, for #1: major lies that the climate frauds tell.
CLICK HERE, for #2: review of the Paris Accord.
CLICK HERE, for #3: Bill C-97, the GHG Pollution Pricing Act.
CLICK HERE, for #4: in 3-2 decision, Sask. COA allows carbon tax.

2. Important Links


CLICK HERE, for Reference at Ontario Court of Appeals.
CLICK HERE, for Saskatchewan COA ruling.
CLICK HERE, for Ontario COA Factum (arguments).
CLICK HERE, for BC Factum (Intervenor in Ontario).
CLICK HERE, for NB Factum (Intervenor in Ontario).
CLICK HERE, for Manitoba’s position on “climate change”.
CLICK HERE, for Jason Kenney (AB).
CLICK HERE, for Jason Kenney Supporting Bill C-69.
CLICK HERE, for Jason Kenney Wanting a Provincial Carbon Tax.
CLICK HERE, for Maxime Bernier (PPC).
CLICK HERE, for Bernier again.

CLICK HERE, for factum of Intergenerational Climate Committee.
CLICK HERE, for the Factum of Canadian Taxpayers Federation.
CLICK HERE, for United Conservative Association.

3. Quotes From Sask COA Ruling

[4] The factual record presented to the Court confirms that climate change caused by anthropogenic greenhouse gas [GHG] emissions is one of the great existential issues of our time. The pressing importance of limiting such emissions is accepted by all of the participants in these proceedings.

[5] The Act seeks to ensure there is a minimum national price on GHG emissions in order to encourage their mitigation. Part 1 of the Act imposes a charge on GHG-producing fuels and combustible waste. Part 2 puts in place an output-based performance system for large industrial facilities. Such facilities are obliged to pay compensation if their GHG emissions exceed applicable limits. Significantly, the Act operates as no more than a backstop. It applies only those provinces or areas where the Governor in Council concludes GHG emissions are not priced at an appropriate level.

[6] The sole issue before the Court is whether Parliament has the constitutional authority to enact the Act. The issue is not whether GHG pricing should or should not be adopted or whether the Act is effective or fair. Those are questions to be answered by Parliament and by provincial legislatures, not by courts.

As was mentioned in the last segment, Saskatchewan “admits” that climate change is a real thing, and that emissions must be reduced drastically, in order to save the planet.

In other words, “Conservative” Premier Scott Moe fully endorsed the climate change scam. Rather, his sole argument against was that Ottawa should not intervene, and that Provinces should be left to their own devices. Specifically, Ottawa shouldn’t impose a carbon tax.

Moe is hardly alone in this. Indeed, the other “Resistance Members”

4. Quotes From Ontario Factum

6. Ontario agrees with Canada that climate change is real and that human activities are a major cause. Ontario also acknowledges that climate change is already having a disruptive effect across Canada, and that, left unchecked, its potential impact will be even more severe. Ontario agrees that proactive action to address climate change is required. That is why Ontario has put forward for consultation a made-in-Ontario plan to protect the environment, reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and fight climate change.

11. Ontario released its climate change plan, as part of its overall environment plan, for a 60-day period of public consultation on November 29, 2018. The plan will be finalized following consideration of input from that consultation. Ontario’s plan will tackle climate change in a balanced and responsible way, without placing additional burdens on Ontario families and businesses

12. “[Greenhouse gas] emissions come from virtually all aspects of Ontario’s society and economy.” There are seven primary sectors in Ontario that produce greenhouse gas emissions: transportation; industry; buildings; land use, land use change and forestry; electricity; waste; and agriculture. All but the last (which is an area of concurrent federal/provincial jurisdiction) will be discussed in turn.

13. Canada itself has publicly acknowledged the wide range of activities that can generate greenhouse gas emissions – activities as varied as homes and buildings, transport, industry, forestry, agriculture, waste, and electricity.

(Source is here.) Ontario, like Saskatchewan, does not bother questioning any of the findings. Both “Conservative” governments have no interest in getting to the truth of the scam, nor the many failed model predictions. Again, this only concerns whether Ottawa can mandate Carbon taxes on other provinces.

5.Quotes From New Brunswick Factum

1. The Intervenor, Attorney General of New Brunswick (“New Brunswick”) agrees with the factum of the Attorney General of Ontario (“Ontario”) regarding the nature of this reference and agrees with Ontario’s conclusions in every respect. New Brunswick also agrees with the climate data submitted by the Attorney General of Canada (“Canada”). This reference should not be a forum for those who deny climate change; nor should it be a showcase about the risks posed by greenhouse gas emissions (“GHG emissions”). The supporting data is relevant only to the extent that it is meaningfully connected to the constitutional question at issue.

2. The foundational climate change data provided by Canada, generally intended to portray the anticipated impacts of climate change in Canada, as well as the many references to international accord and commitments, leave an unquestionable impression of Canada’s a deep resolve to see the nation’s environmental footprint diminished. New Brunswick does not take issue with Canada’s commitment or with the importance of the overall subject matter.

3. What New Brunswick disputes is the way in which the federal Parliament has apportioned its resolve to diminish GHG emissions by imposing “backstop legislation”.

New Brunswick very explicitly states that the reference is not for anyone who denies “climate change, or global warming (or whatever it identifies as). Instead, the only issue is whether the tax imposed by the Federal Government is constitutional.

6. Quotes From BC Factum

1. Greenhouse gases might pose the most difficult collective action problem the world has ever faced. The benefits of emissions are local, but the costs are global. When people burn fossil fuels in the production or consumption of goods and services, each jurisdiction – national or subnational – exports its greenhouse gases to every other. And they all import the consequences: for all practical purposes, without regard to the extent of their own part in creating the problem.

2. The prospect of uncontrolled climate change requires that we treat the capacity of the atmosphere to hold greenhouse gases like the scarce, valuable resource it is. If total temperature increases are to be kept to 1.5˚C or 2˚C above pre-industrial averages — or indeed to any target at all — the world must ultimately reduce net emissions to zero. The global stock of greenhouse gases that can permissibly be added in the meantime is finite and must somehow be allocated. Those allocations have an economic value that individuals, industries, sub-national jurisdictions and nation states can be expected to quarrel over.

3. Under Canada’s Constitution, provinces have legislative authority to regulate or price emissions by individuals and businesses within their borders. In 2008, British Columbia enacted one of the first carbon pricing schemes. In the intervening decade, emissions were reduced compared to what they would have been, while the province enjoyed the highest economic growth in the country. But because greenhouse gases do not respect borders — while provincial legislation must — British Columbia’s actions will only counteract the negative effects of climate change on the property and civil rights of its residents if other jurisdictions follow suit

BC actually has a socialist government, which in this case is indistinguishable from self-identified “Conservative” governments.

7. Quotes From Manitoba

The Manitoba government will go to court over Ottawa’s imposition of a carbon tax.

Premier Brian Pallister revealed Wednesday his government will launch a legal challenge against the federal government, which imposed its new levy as promised on Manitoba, along with three other provinces, Monday.

“We’re going to court, sadly, to challenge the Ottawa carbon tax because Ottawa cannot impose a carbon tax on a province that has a credible greenhouse gas-reduction plan of its own, and we do,” he told reporters.

Manitoba’s Premier Pallister, who also self-identifies as a “Conservative”, doesn’t challenge the history of valid predictions or climate models. Instead, his position (like the others), is solely that Ottawa doesn’t have the authority to impose a Carbon tax on the Provinces.

8. Quotes From Alberta

The fall federal election will be “an opportunity for Canadians to say that they don’t want busy-body politicians telling them how to live their lives and taking more money out of their pockets,” said Kenney, who was sworn in as Alberta’s premier on Tuesday.

Alberta is not currently subject to the federal carbon tax because it has its own pricing scheme set up by the former NDP government. Kenney has vowed to repeal that legislation and implement his own emissions reduction plan.

Again, no mention about the scam that is climate change. No mention of how wrong all these “experts” have been. Nothing about how Carbon Dioxide is used in photosynthesis.

And Jason (Bilderberg) Kenney will very shortly go about screwing over Alberta, first with a “made in Alberta” Carbon tax, then supporting Bill C-69, despite the damage it will do to Alberta’s economy. See here, and see here.

9. From Canadian Taxpayer Federation

1. The Canadian Taxpayers Federation [the CTF] is a federally incorporated, not-for-profit citizen’s group dedicated to advocating for lower taxes, less waste, and more accountable government. The CTF is participating in this reference based on its concern that the federal carbon tax is unlikely to achieve its stated objective and will, instead, just be a ‘tax’ on the taxpayers of Ontario, despite being imposed on the taxpayers of Ontario in a manner that is contrary to section 53 of the Constitution Act, 1867. Constitution Act, 1867, at s. 53.

2. The CTF intends to use its participation in this reference to advance the following two points. First, the federal carbon tax also meets the legal criteria for being designated as a ‘tax’. Second, the federal carbon tax does not comply with the constitutionally-enshrined principle of “no taxation without representation” and, thus, the federal carbon tax is unconstitutional, at least in its application in Ontario.

For a non-profit worried about wasted taxpayer money, the CTF misses the most important part: the climate change movement is a scam based on junk science. However, no where that (or any similar arguments), be made on its behalf.

10. From United Conservative Association

1. This Reference is a case about the division of powers between the federal and provincial governments and the proper balance of federalism in Canada. The United Conservative Association (“UCA”) agrees with the positions advanced by Ontario and submits that the Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act (the ”GGPPA”) is unconstitutional.

2. By attempting to justify the enactment of the GGPPA using the national concern branch of the peace, order, and good governance (“POGG”) clause, Canada seeks to expand the federal government’s constitutional powers at the expense of the provinces.

3. Put simply, Canada is attempting to claim a new, exclusive power to regulate greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions throughout Canada.

Again, no mention of the junk science behind the climate change scam. The only issue is whether Ottawa has Constitutional power to impose such a tax.

11. The “Populist” Position

A second reason is that provinces are already experimenting with various ways to reduce emissions. Some have a carbon tax, others have a cap-and-trade regime, still, others are focusing on carbon capture or direct regulation. Several also have programs to subsidize electric cars or renewable energy that only seem to waste money and drive up costs to businesses and consumers.

We’ll see over time what model is most effective in reducing emissions and least detrimental to the economy. But there is no reason for Ottawa to impose another layer of government intervention on an already complex and costly series of measures whose effectiveness has yet to be demonstrated.

A third reason is that the transition to other sources of energy is already taking place, as companies respond to consumer demand for more environment-friendly products. The federal government should help it along by reducing taxes, barriers to innovation and competition, and ineffective and costly regulation. This is a real market-based policy that Conservatives should support.

See SOURCE:

“Populist” Maxime Bernier refuses to call out the scam, and instead just calls Carbon pricing ineffective. Granted, this article is from August 2016. However, Bernier will not call a spade a spade. Just like in this 2016 tweet.

But since leaving the Conservative Party, Bernier is now willing to call out climate change propaganda.

Though, to be fair, Bernier is now openly saying that Carbon Dioxide is just plant food.

12. An Outsider’s Take On This


Despite the shoddy pseudo-science behind “climate change” policies, none of the parties either in the Saskatchewan case, nor the upcoming Ontario case question it. Rather, these parties SOLELY object to the Carbon tax on the grounds that Provinces should be able to set their prices.

Controlled opposition, the whole lot.

CCS #4: Saskatchewan COA, in 3-2 Ruling Allows Carbon Tax

(Court reference regarding Carbon tax in Saskatchewan)

(Saskatchewan Premier Scott Moe)

(Environment Minister Catherine McKenna)

1. Debunking The Climate Change Scam

CLICK HERE, for #1: major lies that the climate frauds tell.
CLICK HERE, for #2: text/review of the Paris Accord.
CLICK HERE, for #3: Bill C-97, GHG Pollution Pricing Act.

2. Important Links

SK COA Ruling On Carbon Tax
http://archive.is/tNe2k
Saskatchewan Court Of Appeal Reference Question
SKCA Attorney General Of Canada
SKCA Attorney General Of Ontario
SKCA Attorney General Of New Brunswick
SKCA Attorney General Of British Columbia
SKCA Canadian Taxpayers Association
SKCA David Suzuki Foundation
SKCA International Emissions Trading Association
SKCA United Conservative Association

CLICK HERE, for the Saskatchewan COA Reference.
CLICK HERE, for Saskatchewan Premier, Scott Moe.
CLICK HERE, for Environment Minister Catherine McKenna.
CLICK HERE, for the Paris Accord itself.

CLICK HERE, for Bjorn Lomborg, Copenhagen Consensus Center. (0.05 degrees)
CLICK HERE, for fact-checking Paris Accord. (0.20 degrees)
CLICK HERE, for limited temperature raises form 2 degrees to 1.5 (0.50).
CLICK HERE, for some skepticism.
CLICK HERE, for the Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report Summary for Policymakers [Climate Change 2014], used by Sask COA.
CLICK HERE, for the UN Conference on Climate Change (2015).

3. Quotes From Majority Ruling

[4] The factual record presented to the Court confirms that climate change caused by anthropogenic greenhouse gas [GHG] emissions is one of the great existential issues of our time. The pressing importance of limiting such emissions is accepted by all of the participants in these proceedings.

Okay, to start this off, Saskatchewan Premier Scott Moe doesn’t actually “challenge” any of the climate change alarmist claims that society depends on it. He doesn’t challenge any of the pseudo-science or the history of failed climate models. His only argument is that a Carbon tax is ineffective.

If you were expecting Premier Moe to examine or look into any of the “scientific” claims, he is not the man to do it.

[5] The Act seeks to ensure there is a minimum national price on GHG emissions in order to encourage their mitigation. Part 1 of the Act imposes a charge on GHG-producing fuels and combustible waste. Part 2 puts in place an output-based performance system for large industrial facilities. Such facilities are obliged to pay compensation if their GHG emissions exceed applicable limits. Significantly, the Act operates as no more than a backstop. It applies only those provinces or areas where the Governor in Council concludes GHG emissions are not priced at an appropriate level.

[6] The sole issue before the Court is whether Parliament has the constitutional authority to enact the Act. The issue is not whether GHG pricing should or should not be adopted or whether the Act is effective or fair. Those are questions to be answered by Parliament and by provincial legislatures, not by courts.

So not only does the Saskatchewan Government accept that climate change is a threat to our existence, it doesn’t even ask the Court to consider if such a measure is fair or effective.

[16] ….(a) “Human influence on the climate system is clear, and recent anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases are the highest in history. Recent climate changes have had widespread impacts on human and natural systems” (at 2).
.
(b) “Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, and since the 1950s, many of the observed changes are unprecedented over decades to millennia. The atmosphere and ocean have warmed, the amounts of snow and ice have diminished, and sea level has risen” (at 2).
.
(c) “Anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions have increased since the pre-industrial era, driven largely by economic and population growth, and are now higher than ever. This has led to atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide that are unprecedented in at least the last 800,000 years. Their effects, together with those of other anthropogenic drivers, have been detected throughout the climate system and are extremely likely to have been the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century” (emphasis in original, at 4).
.
(d) “Changes in many extreme weather and climate events have been observed since about 1950. Some of these changes have been linked to human influences, including a decrease in cold temperature extremes, an increase in warm temperature extremes, an increase in extreme high sea levels and an increase in the number of heavy precipitation events in a number of regions” (at 7).
.
(e) “Continued emission of greenhouse gases will cause further warming and long lasting changes in all components of the climate system, increasing the likelihood of severe, pervasive and irreversible impacts for people and ecosystems. Limiting climate change would require substantial and sustained reductions in greenhouse gas emissions which, together with adaptation, can limit climate change risks” (at 8).
.
(f) “Surface temperature is projected to rise over the 21st century under all assessed emission scenarios. It is very likely that heat waves will occur more often and last longer, and that extreme precipitation events will become more intense and frequent in many regions. The ocean will continue to warm and acidify, and global mean sea level to rise” (emphasis in original, at 10).
.
(g) “Climate change will amplify existing risks and create new risks for natural and human systems. Risks are unevenly distributed and are generally greater for disadvantaged people and communities in countries at all levels of development”
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(h) “Without additional mitigation efforts beyond those in place today, and even with adaptation, warming by the end of the 21st century will lead to high to very high risk of severe, widespread and irreversible impacts globally (high confidence). …” (emphasis in original, at 17).
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None of these conclusions were challenged or put in issue by the participants in this Reference

Source for claims. Read through it. Despite all of the dire warnings inside, there is little to actually justify any of it.

To repeat: NONE of these “facts” are disputed by the Saskatchewan Government or Premier Moe. The Government doesn’t dispute that the IPCC claims to know what happened 800,000 years ago. It doesn’t challenge any of the predictions (and computer models are just predictions). Instead, the case will boil down to technical arguments as to whether the Feds have the jurisdiction to impose the Carbon tax.

Saskatchewan concedes all of the “factual” arguments around climate change, and instead tries to make narrow legal arguments against it being imposed.

In fact, watching Premier Moe’s speech after the ruling, it is clear he believes that the climate change scam is legitimate. Rather, he argues that the Federally mandated Carbon tax is just an ineffective means of dealing with it.

While on a technical level, Saskatchewan does make interesting arguments about jurisdiction. However, it’s difficult to justify not jumping onboard when you have agreed that climate change threatens humanity

[7] The Constitution Act, 1867 distributes legislative authority between Parliament and the provincial legislatures. Broadly speaking, a statute is valid if its essential character falls within a subject matter allocated to the legislative body that put the statute in place. Neither level of government has exclusive authority over the environment. As a result, Parliament can legislate in relation to issues such as GHGs so long as it stays within the four corners of its prescribed subject matters and the provinces can do the same so long as they stay within their prescribed areas of authority.

[8] The Attorney General of Saskatchewan [Saskatchewan] challenges the Act by submitting it imposes taxes in the constitutional sense of the term. This would normally be legally unobjectionable because Parliament enjoys a broad taxing authority. However, Saskatchewan contends the Act is invalid because the Governor in Council determines the provinces where it operates. This is said to offend the principle of federalism in that the application of the Act depends on whether a province has exercised its own jurisdiction in relation to pricing GHG emissions to a standard considered appropriate by the Governor in Council. Saskatchewan also says the Act runs afoul of s. 53 of the Constitution Act, 1867. Section 53 requires, in effect, that taxes be authorized by legislative bodies themselves, not by executive government or otherwise.

[9] Saskatchewan’s arguments on this front cannot be accepted. The principle of federalism is not a free-standing concept that can override an otherwise validly enacted law. Rather, it is a value to be taken into account when interpreting the Constitution. The s. 53 argument cannot be sustained either because, in constitutional terms, the levies imposed by the Act are regulatory charges, not taxes. In any event, even if they were taxes, the Act does not offend s. 53. Parliament has clearly and expressly authorized the Governor in Council to decide where the Act will apply.

The layman’s explanation is not that the science is sound (it isn’t) nor that such a tax is fair or appropriate. Again, the Court is only considering whether Ottawa stepped over its bounds by encroaching on a Provincial matter. The majority (a 3-2 decision), says no it does not.

[29] The federal government released a document entitled Pan-Canadian Approach to Pricing Carbon Pollution on October 3, 2016. The approach outlined in the document was grounded both on the proposition that economy-wide carbon pricing was the most efficient way to reduce GHG emissions and a recognition that several jurisdictions including British Columbia, Ontario and Québec had already introduced carbon pricing regimes. The approach proposed by the government involved a pan-Canadian “benchmark” for carbon pricing. The benchmark involved a requirement that pricing regimes apply to essentially the same emission sources as British Columbia’s carbon tax. The required stringency of the benchmark, for an explicit price-based system, was that carbon pricing should start at a minimum of $10 per tonne in 2018 and rise by $10 per year to $50 per tonne in 2022. The provinces with cap-and-trade systems would have to ensure that emission reduction targets were in line with Canada’s overall reduction target. As well, the federal government’s approach was stated to involve a “backstop”. This was the idea that the federal government would introduce an explicit price-based carbon pricing system in jurisdictions that did not meet the benchmark.

Again, the Provinces are all on board with the global warming scam, but Ottawa decided to enact a pricing scheme on Provinces that would not enact their own.

And from Saskatchewan’s own submissions:

[33]We wholeheartedly support efforts to reduce greenhouse gases. But those efforts must be effective and they must not disadvantage one region of Canada more than another. A federal carbon tax is ineffective and will impair Saskatchewan’s ability to respond to climate change.

Our opposition to the federal government’s carbon tax should not be seen as reluctance to act. Rather, it is a recognition that we must act, and act decisively, with all our economic strength. For Saskatchewan, mitigation is not enough. Our agriculture and resource-rich province must also focus on climate adaptation and resilience in order to be effective.

This reads like a dog-and-pony show. The Saskatchewan Government at every turn admitting that “climate change” is a dire threat to the world. The complaint seems to be wanting to implement its own solution.

Is Scott Moe just going through the motions?

[51] Saskatchewan advances two main lines of argument in seeking to have the Act found unconstitutional. The first is that the principle of federalism prevents Parliament from enacting a statute applicable in only some provinces because of how those provinces have chosen to exercise their legislative authority. Saskatchewan’s second argument is that the Act imposes a tax and, because it allows the Governor in Council to decide where it applies, the Act offends the requirement in s. 53 of the Constitution Act, 1867 that bills imposing taxes must originate in the House of Commons. Saskatchewan goes on to deny that, as contended by Canada, the Act can be sustained under Parliament’s authority under the national concern branch of POGG. It also denies, as suggested by some intervenors, that the Act, or features of it, can be supported under Parliament’s authority in relation to trade and commerce, emergencies, criminal law or treaties.

Argument 1: can’t treat the Provinces differently.
Argument 2: Tax bills must come from House of Commons.

Let’s address those both.

[60] It is useful to begin by underlining that, as Saskatchewan concedes, there is no recognized constitutional requirement that laws enacted by Parliament must apply uniformly from coast to coast to coast. To the contrary, a number of decisions have upheld federal laws with uneven geographic application.

[68] Saskatchewan has referred to no judicial authority which in any way directly supports the idea that the principle of federalism can or should independently render unconstitutional an otherwise valid law. Its argument on this front cannot succeed.

Several cases are then cited, in fact beating down Saskatchewan’s argument #1. That was one of 2 legal arguments, and Saskatchewan goes into Court without a single case to back up its claims. Now to get to argument #2.

[100] Saskatchewan >does not challenge Parliament’s legislative authority to enact the Act under its s. 91(3) taxation power. Indeed, it takes the initiative in arguing that the levies imposed by the Act fall under s. 91(3). Saskatchewan’s real point lays one step down the road from this characterization of the Act. It takes issue with the authority of the Governor in Council to determine the provinces and areas to which the Act will apply. This authority is said to make the Act non-compliant with s. 53.

Saskatchewan admits the Federal Government has the power to impose taxes. Rather it takes issue with the Governor in Council determining where it will apply. But in all fairness, Ottawa “did” give all Provinces the chance to come up with their own taxation policies.

Argument #1: Claiming non-uniform treatment, yet admitting there is no requirement for uniform treatment. Also, not a single case to rely in.

Argument #2: Admitting Ottawa has constitutional power to impose taxes, but arguing over how it should apply.

Some pretty weak arguments.

Now, had Saskatchewan challenged the factual basis for the climate change scam, instead of relying on narrow, legal arguments, this may have ended quite differently.

Saskatchewan did also raise this issue of “Peace, Order and Good Governance”, but that was shot down as well

[210] The advisory opinion offered in response to the question posed by the Lieutenant Governor in Council is as follows: “The Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act is not unconstitutional either in whole or in part”.

4. Quotes From Minority Dissent

[236] GHGs are gases that absorb and re-emit infrared radiation, the most prevalent of which is carbon dioxide [CO2]. GHGs are a significant contributor to climate change. For this reason, the parties and intervenors all agree that the governments of Canada and the Provinces must take steps to mitigate the anthropogenic emission of GHGs. Because none of the Attorneys General dispute the causative effect anthropogenic GHGs have on climate change or the attendant and existential necessity of mitigating anthropogenic GHG emissions, the proof or truth of these facts is not at issue. That is, they are proven and true.

[237] In policy terms, the Act is the product of the federal government’s efforts to meet Canada’s commitments under the Paris Agreement (AG-Can Record, Moffet Affidavit vol 2, Tab I). This is apparent from the terms of the March 3, 2016, Vancouver Declaration on Clean Growth and Climate Change (AG-SK Record, Tab 1 [Vancouver Declaration]), where First Ministers of Canada recognised the necessity of reducing anthropogenic GHG emissions and committed their respective governments to “[i]mplement GHG mitigation policies in support of meeting or exceeding Canada’s 2030 target of a 30% reduction below 2005 levels of emissions, including specific provincial and territorial targets and objectives”.

Even the dissenting Justices acknowledged that Saskatchewan admits the “climate change” issue is real.

[459] The Attorney General of Canada concedes the Act will cause prices of agricultural inputs to rise. Even though farmers are exempt from the fuel charge, the producers, manufacturers and retailers of farm inputs are not. Further, transportation companies that haul grain, livestock and inputs for farmers are not exempt from the fuel levy. In this way, the effect of the Act is to regulate local industries, businesses and consumer activity in a specific way chosen by the federal government, but the practical effect on a Province of the imposition of federal GHG emissions policy under the Act is a profound intrusion into the exclusive spheres of Provincial jurisdiction. As set forth earlier, the Government of Saskatchewan has indicated in the Saskatchewan Strategy that it believes the fuel levy imposed under the Act will actually impair its ability to react to and to address climate change.

[460] The Act is highly intrusive into provincial jurisdiction. Although less direct, it is only slightly less intrusive than the legislation considered in Anti-Inflation, where the federal government had sought to pervasively control wages and prices in the Provinces. Although the Supreme Court sustained that legislation under the emergency branch of POGG, it could not have sustained the legislation under the national concern branch.

[461] The Act is highly intrusive in another way. The benchmark, which determines its application in the Provinces, effectively establishes federal oversight of GHG emissions regulation by the Provinces within their spheres of exclusive jurisdiction. It is regulation of the regulator. To permit Parliament to exercise a law-making power of this nature in respect of GHGs would be to open up the use of POGG to allow regulatory oversight by the federal government over all manner of Provincial matters as it might unilaterally deem to have become matters of national concern.

[462] Of particular concern to us on the question of its impact are the provisions of the Act that make it possible for the executive branch of federal government to substantially alter the original form and effect of the Act. The provisions that permit statutory transmogrification are ss. 26, 166 to 168 and 197(1)(a). Furthermore, the pervasive use of the word prescribed in the Act confers further metamorphic power on the executive branch to alter the appearance, character and functionality of the Act. These provisions have been referred to earlier but are worth reviewing in this context. In that regard, s. 26, dealing with the fuel levy, allows the federal cabinet by prescribing certain things, to change to whom the fuel levy applies, under what conditions it applies, the manner of payment and the time of payment.

Some interesting points:
(a) Act effectively regulates local businesses.
(b) Act is highly intrusive into Provincial matters.
(c) Allows Federal regulation of Provincial matters.
(d) Feds can amend this unilaterally.

[468] In our view, the position taken by the Attorney General of Canada mirrors the scenario described above. The Act has broad effects and the potential to have even broader effect than its current terms, but these facts are ignored in the expediency of characterising the matter, whether in terms of cumulativeness or stringency, narrowly enough to qualify it as a matter of national concern. However, a court cannot ignore the fact that, by its very terms, the Act can be expanded in any way the federal cabinet determines is necessary or expedient.

[476] Before summarising our opinion, we would reiterate two points. First, we agree that all levels of government in Canada must take action to address climate change. The anthropogenic emission of GHGs is an issue of pressing concern to all Canadians and to the world. Second, Parliament has a number of constitutional powers, legislative means and administrative mechanisms at its disposal to achieve its objectives in this regard. This reference arises because Parliament chose not to avail itself of its established constitutional powers or to do so validly. Notwithstanding the existential threat of climate change, federalism in Canada means that all governments of Canada must bring all law-making power to bear on the issue of climate change, but in a way that respects the division of powers under the Constitution Act, 1867

Though some interesting legal arguments were raised, Saskatchewan plays along with the propaganda that climate change is an existential threat to humanity.

IV. OPINION
[477] Section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 states that the Constitution is the supreme law of Canada and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect. We advise the Lieutenant Governor in Council that, for the foregoing reasons, in our opinion:

(a) Part 1 of the Act is invalid, being an unconstitutional delegation of Parliament’s law-making power under s. 91(3) of the Constitution Act, 1867 and being contrary to s. 53 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

(b) The Act cannot be sustained as a valid exercise of Parliament’s other enumerated law-making powers under s. 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867 nor can it be sustained under POGG

So, by a 3-2 margin, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeals rules that the Carbon tax can be legally imposed on Provinces.

5. Actual Climate Change Research

Table 1. Impact of climate policies, optimistic and pessimistic,

for RCP8.5, using MAGICC, summary of finds described through-out the text
Change in temperature

°C year 2100 Pessimistic Optimistic
US INDC 0.008 0.031
US CPP 0.004 0.013
EU INDC 0.017 0.053
EU 2020 0.007 0.026
China INDC 0.014 0.048
RoW INDC 0.009 0.036
Global INDCs 0.048 0.170

See page 9 (Page 117 in index) for above table.
Source is here.

That’s right. Even the most optimistic climate models, would be a reduction of 0.170 degrees Celcius. Most pessimistic case would be 0.048 degrees Celcius. 0.048 to 0.170 degrees over the next century. Rather than getting nitpicky over jurisdiction, perhaps Scott Moe SHOULD have challenged the facts and evidence.

6. Was The Challenge Designed To Fail?

The “Conservative” Government of Scott Moe doesn’t challenge the climate change agenda itself. None of them do. Instead, this is extremely narrow arguments over jurisdiction. And it’s about to get much worse, so stay tuned.

CCS #3: Canada’s Bill C-97, Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act

(Garnett Genuis defends the Paris Accord)

(A nice critique of Paris Accord)

1. Debunking The Climate Change Scam

(a) https://canucklaw.ca/ccs-1-overview-major-lies-of-the-climate-change-scam
(b) https://canucklaw.ca/ccs-2-the-paris-accord-a-giant-wealth-transfer-scheme/

2. Important Links


(1) http://www.parl.ca/DocumentViewer/en/42-1/bill/C-97/first-reading#enH5814
(2) https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/G-11.55/
(3) https://www.fsmgov.org/paris.pdf

3. Quotes From Bill C-97

DIVISION 4 
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Payments
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Climate Action Support
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Payment in Relation to Infrastructure
.
Maximum payment of $2,200,000,000
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130 Despite section 161 of the Keeping Canada’s Economy and Jobs Growing Act, as amended by section 233 of the Economic Action Plan 2013 Act, No. 1, there may be paid out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund, on the requisition of the Minister of Infrastructure and Communities or the Minister of State (Indigenous Services), in accordance with terms and conditions approved by the Treasury Board, in addition to the sum referred to in that section 161, a sum not exceeding $2,200,000,000 to provinces, territories, municipalities, municipal associations, provincial, territorial and municipal entities and First Nations for the purpose of municipal, regional and First Nations infrastructure.
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Federation of Canadian Municipalities
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Maximum payment of $950,000,000
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131 (1) There may be paid out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund, on the requisition of the Minister of Natural Resources, in accordance with the terms and conditions provided for in the agreement referred to in subsection (2), a sum not exceeding $950,000,000 to the Federation of Canadian Municipalities for the purpose of providing funding to the Green Municipal Fund.
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Maximum payment of $60,000,000
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(3) There may be paid out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund, on the requisition of the Minister of Infrastructure and Communities, in accordance with the terms and conditions provided for in the agreement referred to in subsection (4), a sum not exceeding $60,000,000 to the Federation of Canadian Municipalities for the purpose of providing funding to the Asset Management Fund.
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Shock Trauma Air Rescue Service
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Maximum payment of $65,000,000
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132 (1) There may be paid out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund, on the requisition of the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, in accordance with the terms and conditions provided for in the agreement referred to in subsection (2), a sum not exceeding $65,000,000 to the Shock Trauma Air Rescue Service for the acquisition of new emergency ambulance helicopters.

Okay, let’s tally this up

Area Of Spending Amount
Infrastructure $2,200,000,000
Municipalities $950,000,000
Green Municipal Fund $60,000,000
Air Rescue Service $65,000,000
Total Spending $3,275,000,000

This “price on pollution” will result in $3.275B being spent, and this is just for now. There is nothing to indicate that spending won’t go up.

Bill C-97 references the “Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act” (a.k.a. Carbon tax act). Here it is, and it is well worth a read. The more interesting sections are in Division 6, which have to do with enforcement.

Chilling, considering this is bogus pseudo-science.

Probably the most irritating part of Bill C-97 is that it is an omnibus bill. This means that it is a mismatch of many unrelated areas of law, being rammed through Parliament.

When in opposition, Liberals claimed to be against omnibus bills. Different story when they are in power.

4. What Is This?

DIVISION 8, SUBDIVISION B 
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R.‍S.‍, c. E-4
Electricity and Gas Inspection Act
162 The Electricity and Gas Inspection Act is amended by adding the following after section 28:
Ministerial Regulations
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28.‍1 (1) Despite anything in the Weights and Measures Act, the Minister may make regulations prescribing units of measurement for electricity and gas sales in addition to the units specified in section 3.
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Expiry
(2) A regulation made under subsection (1) ceases to have effect on the earliest of
(a) the day on which a regulation made under paragraph 28(1)‍(b) that has the same effect as the regulation comes into force,
(b) the third anniversary of the day on which the regulation made under subsection (1) comes into force, or
(c) the day on which it is repealed.

Is this to mean the government will be controlling how energy will be sold and in what amounts?

5. Greenhouse Gases Pollution Pricing Act

DIVISION 6
.
Administration and Enforcement
SUBDIVISION A
Payments
Marginal note:
Person resident in Canada
84 For the purposes of this Division, a person is deemed to be resident in Canada at any time
(a) in the case of a corporation, if the corporation is incorporated or continued in Canada and not continued elsewhere;
(b) in the case of a partnership, a joint venture, an unincorporated society, a club, an association or an organization, or a branch thereof, if the member or participant, or a majority of the members or participants, having management and control thereof is or are resident in Canada at that time;
(c) in the case of a labour union, if it is carrying on activities as such in Canada and has a local union or branch in Canada at that time; or
(d) in the case of an individual, if the individual is deemed under any of paragraphs 250(1)(b) to (f) of the Income Tax Act to be resident in Canada at that time.

Is there anyone who “doesn’t” make the list? Individuals, partnerships, labour unions and corporations are all included in this law.

Large payments
86 Every person that is required under this Part to pay an amount to the Receiver General must, if the amount is $50,000 or more, make the payment to the account of the Receiver General at
(a) a bank;
(b) a credit union;
(c) a corporation authorized under the laws of Canada or a province to carry on the business of offering its services as a trustee to the public; or
(d) a corporation that is authorized under the laws of Canada or a province to accept deposits from the public and that carries on the business of lending money on the security of real property or immovables or investing in indebtedness on the security of mortgages on real property or hypothecs on immovables.

Wow. So the government seems to “expect” that people will be writing very large cheques to cover these carbon costs. In fact, if your bill is over $50,000 … as if this is to be normal. Guess the fears of companies being put out of business is legitimate.

Also, here are portions of the “penalties” provisions.

6. Punishment & Enforcement

Punishment
(2) Every person that commits an offence under subsection (1) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction and, in addition to any penalty otherwise provided, is liable to
(a) a fine of not less than 50%, and not more than 200%, of the amount payable that was sought to be evaded, or of the rebate or other payment sought, or, if the amount that was sought to be evaded cannot be ascertained, a fine of not less than $2,000 and not more than $40,000;
(b) imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years; or
(c) both a fine referred to in paragraph (a) and imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.
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Marginal note:
Prosecution on indictment
(3) Every person that is charged with an offence described in subsection (1) may, at the election of the Attorney General of Canada, be prosecuted on indictment and, if convicted, is, in addition to any penalty otherwise provided, liable to
(a) a fine of not less than 100%, and not more than 200%, of the amount payable that was sought to be evaded, or of the rebate or other payment sought, or, if the amount that was sought to be evaded cannot be ascertained, a fine of not less than $5,000 and not more than $100,000;
(b) imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years; or
(c) both a fine referred to in paragraph (a) and imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years.
Marginal note:
Penalty on conviction
(4) A person that is convicted of an offence under this section is not liable to pay a penalty imposed under this Part for the same evasion or attempt unless a notice of assessment for that penalty was issued before the information or complaint giving rise to the conviction was laid or made.
.
Marginal note:
Stay of appeal
(5) If, in any appeal under this Part, substantially the same facts are at issue as those that are at issue in a prosecution under this section, the Minister may file a stay of proceedings with the Tax Court of Canada and, upon that filing, the proceedings before the Tax Court of Canada are stayed pending a final determination of the outcome of the prosecution.
.
Marginal note:
Offence — confidential information
134 (1) A person is guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding $5,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months, or to both, if that person
(a) contravenes subsection 107(2); or
(b) knowingly contravenes an order made under subsection 107(12).
.
Marginal note:
Offence — confidential information
(2) Every person to whom confidential information has been provided for a particular purpose under subsection 107(6) and that for any other purpose knowingly uses, provides to any person, allows the provision to any person of, or allows any person access to, that information is guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding $5,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months, or to both.

Yes, you can get up to 5 years in prison for not playing ball with the Carbon tax collectors. Considering that Bill C-75 (among other things) made terrorism offences hybrid offences (prosecutors can charge summarily), Carbon taxes are an odd thing to focus on.