All personal court appearances are under “BLOG”
Challenge to UN Global Migration Compact dismissed in Calgary, however
Court rules that it is non intended as legally binding contract
Court Case
A v. Her Majesty, the Queen
Court File No: T-2089-18
Calgary Branch, Federal Court
300-635 8th Ave SW, Calgary
Filed: November 6, 2018
Ruled: February 12, 2019
The Claim was filed in Calgary Federal Court on December 6, 2018. It asked (among other things), for an injunction against signing the UN Global Migration Compact.
The Defense filed a motion to strike, claiming that under Federal Courts Act, it should have been an “Application for Judicial Review”, not a claim. However, that doesn’t seem to be the only problem.
After some back and forth, the Statement of Claim was struck out (without permission to amend), and a $500 cost award was issued against me.
Here are some quotes from the ruling. The most interesting is possibly the one where the Judge confirms that the UN Global Migration Compact is not intended as a legally-binding agreement.
So, who won? The goal of the claim was to prevent Canada from joining the UN Compact, and the Judge says that it has no legal weight anyway.
[2] (Plaintiff) pleads, in the alternative, that if Canada has already signed the UN Compact when the Court rules on her claim, the Court should void the signature and any legal consequences
In this case, the issue of whether it should have been a 1/ Statement of Claim, or 2/ Application for Judicial Review, is sort of mute, since this alternative “does” fall within the scope of a Claim.
Court is also correct that seeking to nullify any legal consequences “is” primary function of this action. However, the Judge will go on to say that the UN Global Migration Compact “doesn’t” carry legal weight.
[8] However, this does not exempt a plaintiff from pleading material facts supporting the claim. Rule 174 states that a Statement of Claim “shall contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the party relies.
Court finds that the facts plead were not specific enough to be suitable for an action.
[15] The Supreme Court has substantive content of each Charter right in the case law, and a Plaintiff who relies on the Charter must plead material facts to satisfy the criteria applicable to the provision in question. Charter cases can not be decided in a factual vacuum.
Interesting to know. General pleading are not enough in this case, and more definitive and substantive arguments must be made.
[26] As it is plain and obvious that (her) claims based on the Charter and other statutory provisions cannot succeed, the thrust of her claim is simply that Canada should be enjoined from joining the UN Compact, a non-legally binding, cooperative framework agreement because she is of the opinion that it attempts to normalise mass migration to any country, and that the public should have been consulted on this agreement.
Again, the Judge re-iterates that it is “non-legally binding”. Having rejected the specific constitutional arguments earlier, apparently the only argument left is that the public should have been consulted.
[27] It is well-established that the conduct of foreign affairs, and international relations, including the decision to conclude or withdraw from a treaty, is part of the Crown’s prerogative powers and falls exclusively under the executive branch of government. In the absence of a Charter challenge, a decision pertaining to such matters is not justifiable.
There “were” several Charter challenges listed, but the Calgary Court found them too broad to be acceptable.
[25] Based on my review of the Statement of Claim, it is plain and obvious that the Contract Claim discloses no cause of action and must be struck out. The Statement of Claim quotes lengthy exerps from the UN Compact, including the following statement at Paragraph 54 of the claim, which indicates the UN Compact is not intended as a legally binding contract:
44(7) “This Global Compact presents a non-legally binding, co-operate framework that builds on the commitments agreed upon by Member States in the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants. It fosters cooperation among all the relevant actors on migration, acknowledging that no one State can address migration alone, and upholds the sovereignty of States and their obligations under international law.”
This is possibly the most interesting part of the entire ruling. The Judge states that the UN Global Migration Compact is not intended as a legally binding contract.
We now have a Federal Court Judge ruling that the UN Compact is “not intended as a legally-binding contract”. This is huge, as this may thwart any attempt by open-borders advocates to use the UN Compact as a “reference point” at a later date.
Even though the Court threw the case out, the reasons given may be what we need to prevent it from becoming “soft law”.
You’re welcome, Canada
$900 — costs of travel, court fees, other fees
$500 — costs award issued by Calgary Court
PRICELESS — protecting Canada’s sovereignty
LEGAL FRAMEWORK SOUGHT CLICK HERE, the mandate for developing a legally binding framework (2004) You suckers thought this was “voluntary”? CLICK HERE, for the “non-legally binding” legal framework.
The United Nations wants to globally regulate forests as well.
What “don’t” they want to regulate?
What areas of nationhood “don’t” they want to control?
International Arrangement on Forests
The International Arrangement on Forests (IAF) has five main components: the UN Forum on Forests (UNFF) and its Member States, the UNFF Secretariat, the Collaborative Partnership on Forests (CPF), the UNFF Global Forest Financing Facilitation Network (GFFFN), and the UNFF Trust Fund.
Some of the key objectives of the IAF include:
1/ Promoting implementation of sustainable forest management (SFM), in particular the implementation of the UN Forest Instrument;
2/ Enhancing the contribution of forests to the post-2015 development agenda;
3/ Enhancing cooperation, coordination, coherence and synergies on forest-related issues;
4/ Fostering international cooperation, public-private partnerships and cross-sectoral cooperation;
5/ Strengthening forest governance frameworks and means of implementation;
6/ Strengthening long-term political commitment towards the achievement of SFM;
7/ Enhancing coherence, cooperation and synergies with other forest-related agreements, processes and initiatives
Note: It is worth pointing out that many of these UN initiatives have very detailed, lofty goals. However, when it comes to “implementation details”, they get very fuzzy.
Does the UN not know how they will implement their agendas? Would they just rather not say? Are they worried about the consequences of posting “written evidence” on their website?
What about the policy document?
Name
The name of the partnership is the Collaborative Partnership on Forest, hereinafter referred to as the CPF or the Partnership.
Mission
The mission of the CPF is to help enhance the contribution of all types of forests and trees outside forests to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and other internationally agreed development goals, promote the sustainable management of all types of forests and to strengthen long-term political commitment to that end.
Functions
The core functions of the CPF are to: support the work of UNFF and its member countries; provide scientific and technical advice to the Forum and governing bodies of other CPF members, at their request; enhance coherence, cooperation as well as policy and programme coordination at all levels, including through joint programming and the submission of coordinated proposals to members’ governing bodies, consistent with their mandates; promote the implementation of the UN Forest Instrument and the United Nations Strategic Plan for Forests as well as the contribution of forests and trees to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and other major forest-related agreements.
Membership
The Collaborative Partnership on Forests currently consists of fourteen international organizations, institutions and secretariats (hereafter referred to as CPF members), that have substantial programmes on forests. Members have considerable capacity to deliver on CPF’s core functions. It is widely recognized that no single body or organization has the capacity or mandate to respond to the multiple demands of forests in a comprehensive manner. Collectively, CPF members, building on their comparative advantages, support the implementation of sustainable forest management worldwide.
The Partnership may periodically review its composition vis a vis its evolving mandate and decide on changes in its membership or establish temporary arrangements for the involvement of third parties to expand its capacities as needed.
Also Worth A Look, The “Major Groups”
The following Major Groups were identified in Agenda 21:
A/ Business and Industry
B/ Children and Youth
C/ Farmers
D/ Indigenous People
E/ Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs)
F/ Local Authorities
G/ Scientific and Technological Community
H/ Women
I/ Workers and Trade Unions
Again, all part of Agenda 21
(a) Business & Industry — this is to be expected, but more information would be nice on their role and expected compensation
(b) Children & Youth — Will there be child labour, or are children expected to specifically benefit?
(c) Farmers — Need more information
(d) Indigenous people — Need more information
(e) NGOs — this is perhaps the most interesting, since NGOs are notorious for flouting national law (think the human smugglers into Europe)
(f) Local authorities — to be expected
(g) Scientific community — the same ones pushing the climate change scam?
(h) Women — So, gender quotas?
(i) Workers & trade unions — Won’t that be a new form of take over?
While this all sounds great, some questions need to be asked:
1/ Will this “forest management” be happening in all countries?
2/ How will the funding be provided? (Specifically, with details)
3/ Who will oversee this?
4/ What if a national government decides participation is against its own interests?
5/ Will blocs of nations be able to “outvote” others?
This has been going on for decades, yet this is the first I am hearing about it?!?!
Purpose
The scale, spread and speed of change brought about by digital technology is unprecedented, and the current means and levels of international cooperation are unequal to the challenge. Digital technologies make a significant contribution to the realisation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and cut uniquely across international boundaries, policy silos and professional domains. Cooperation across domains and across borders is therefore critical to realizing the full social and economic potential of digital technologies, mitigating the risks they pose, and curtailing any unintended consequences.
The High-level Panel on Digital Cooperation was convened by the UN Secretary-General to advance proposals to strengthen cooperation in the digital space among Governments, the private sector, civil society, international organizations, academia, the technical community and other relevant stakeholders.
The Panel is expected to raise awareness about the transformative impact of digital technologies across society and the economy, and contribute to the broader public debate on how to ensure a safe and inclusive digital future for all, taking into account relevant human rights norms.
A number of questions here:
1/ Is this “global cooperation” being used to advance Agenda 2030?
2/ Social potential as in what?
3/ Why strengthen cooperation? Is this a form of policing?
4/ Safe and inclusive digital future? Does this mean that opinions or ideas that don’t make people feel “safe and inclusive” will be banned?
5/ Human rights norms as in what? Censoring of ideas? Something like a global M103 (to ban criticism of Islam)?
6/ Seeing how Statistics Canada has no issue with privacy breaches, what kinds of safeguards can we expect here?
Process
The Panel will hold two in-person meetings in September 2018 and January 2019, and will meet virtually as required.
The Panel will also seek to gather the views and proposals of Member States, relevant industries, civil society and academia worldwide through a careful consultation process. It will draw expertise from expert communities across the globe through engagement at existing events, conferences and forums as well as call for contributions from the general public through virtual hubs and online participation platforms. Two regional consultations will be organized in Asia and in Africa.
The Panel will complete its deliberations and submit its final report, including actionable recommendations, within a nine-month period. The report will map trends in digital technologies, identify gaps and opportunities, and outline proposals for strengthening international cooperation in the digital space.
FAQs
Why was the Panel established?
Current means and levels of international cooperation are not commensurate with the scale and rapidity of changes brought about by digital technologies. Digital technologies cut uniquely across international boundaries. Cooperation across sectors and across borders is critical to realizing the full social and economic potential of digital technologies as well as mitigating the risks they could pose.
Why is it called High-level Panel on Digital Cooperation?
The term Digital Cooperation aims to frame discussions on digital issues in a cooperative framework; it also aims to break silos by encouraging thinking and action across domains, and build trust among various stakeholders.
What are the expected outcomes?
The Panel will submit a report that will provide a high-level independent contribution to the broader public debate on digital cooperation frameworks and support Member States in their consultations on these issues.
The report is expected to: 1) raise awareness about the transformative impact of digital technologies across society and the economy, 2) identify policy, research and information gaps as well as ways to improve interdisciplinary action on digital technologies, and 3) present concrete proposals to strengthen cooperation in the digital space in an effective and inclusive manner.
It is expected that the consultation process leading to the report will contribute to stimulating discussion among and between various stakeholder groups on how they can work together to maximize the potential of the digital transformation.
Guess what isn’t mentioned here?
Free speech, privacy.
How is this different from other panels, commissions and international forums on similar topics?
The Secretary-General welcomes the increased focus on the implications of digital technologies for our society and our economy through commissions, conferences and other forums. This signifies that the timing is ripe for the digital policy ecosystem to evolve to the next level of maturity.
The work of all these initiatives can and should be mutually reinforcing. Wherever possible, this Panel will work with other initiatives and seek to identify synergies and complementarities.
Word salad.
How is the Panel supported?
The Panel is supported by a small Secretariat funded by donor resources, and based in New York and Geneva.
How were the Panel members selected?
The Secretary-General invited 20 independent experts with a range of professional and academic backgrounds in fields related to technology and policy. All members serve in their personal capacity, not as representatives of their affiliated institutions.
The Panel’s composition represents a broad mix of disciplines and sectors, geographic, gender and age diversity in an effort to reflect the cross-boundary nature of the digital sphere. Given that young people will be disproportionately affected by the future impact of a digital society, the Panel includes several individuals under the age of 35.
Racial diversity.
Gender diversity.
Age diversity.
No mention of diversity of thought. Perhaps how some person think can be a bad idea.
Contact and More Information
Visit the dedicated website for further information, engagement opportunities and news: www.digitalcooperation.org
For updates about the Panel, follow on Twitter at @UNSGdigicoop or sign up for the mailing list.
To provide suggestions or comments, contact the High Level Panel Secretariat at: digitalcooperation [at] unops.org
Bios
3. Some Thought
To be frank, the idea that the UN is actually getting together for “digital cooperation” is downright scary. Which ones will be “enhanced” by digital cooperation?
UN Global Migration Compact
Paris Accord
Proposed UN Global Government
Agenda 21, Agenda 2030
Global Citizen Education Agenda
New Development Financing
Efforts to ban criticism of Islam
Any of the dozens of other initiatives?
Liberal Candidate for the Burnaby by-election, Richard Lee says that he supports having the UN regulate internet activity. And the UN openly supports “digital cooperation”.
Is this the next frontier?
What exactly will they cooperate on? This is disturbingly vague? Will there be “cooperation” to stifle unpopular opinions? Perhaps to censor ideas and beliefs deemed inappropriate? Will this be a way to monitor and prevent criticism of Islam?
Will this be a means to streamline continued mass migration, or to continue financing UN scams like
There is a Federal by-election scheduled for February 25, 2019.
One of the ridings is Burnaby South, BC
The Liberal candidate, Richard Lee, when asked about internet regulation, openly suggested that the United Nations should regulate internet use. The crowd booed.
A Liberal MP (candidate) openly proposing regulating and controlling internet content
Interestingly, Lee is the second candidate for the Liberals in the byelection. Karen Wang was forced to step down after making a blatantly racial appeal. Wang is of Chinese descent, as is about 1/3 of the riding. She advocated only voting for her, rather than the NDP leader Jagmeet Singh, who is of East Indian descent. See this article.
Open racial identity politics, UN censorship and internet regulation.
AN ACT to amend the public health law, in relation to enacting the
reproductive health act and revising existing provisions of law
regarding abortion; to amend the penal law, the criminal procedure
law, the county law and the judiciary law, in relation to abortion; to
repeal certain provisions of the public health law relating to
abortion; to repeal certain provisions of the education law relating
to the sale of contraceptives; and to repeal certain provisions of the
penal law relating to abortion
26 ARTICLE 25-A
27 REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH ACT
28 Section 2599-aa. Policy and purpose.
29 2599-bb. Abortion.
30 § 2599-aa. Policy and purpose. The legislature finds that comprehen-
31 sive reproductive health care is a fundamental component of every indi-
32 vidual’s health, privacy and equality. Therefore, it is the policy of
33 the state that:
34 1. Every individual has the fundamental right to choose or refuse
35 contraception or sterilization.
36 2. Every individual who becomes pregnant has the fundamental right to
37 choose to carry the pregnancy to term, to give birth to a child, or to
38 have an abortion, pursuant to this article.
39 3. The state shall not discriminate against, deny, or interfere with
40 the exercise of the rights set forth in this section in the regulation
41 or provision of benefits, facilities, services or information.
42 § 2599-bb. Abortion. 1. A health care practitioner licensed, certi-
43 fied, or authorized under title eight of the education law, acting with-
44 in his or her lawful scope of practice, may perform an abortion when,
45 according to the practitioner’s reasonable and good faith professional
46 judgment based on the facts of the patient’s case: the patient is within
47 twenty-four weeks from the commencement of pregnancy, or there is an
48 absence of fetal viability, or the abortion is necessary to protect the
49 patient’s life or health.
50 2. This article shall be construed and applied consistent with and
51 subject to applicable laws and applicable and authorized regulations
52 governing health care procedures.
1 § 5. Sections 125.40, 125.45, 125.50, 125.55 and 125.60 of the penal
2 law are REPEALED, and the article heading of article 125 of the penal
3 law is amended to read as follows:
4 HOMICIDE[, ABORTION] AND RELATED OFFENSES
5 § 6. Section 125.00 of the penal law is amended to read as follows:
6 § 125.00 Homicide defined.
7 Homicide means conduct which causes the death of a person [or an
8 unborn child with which a female has been pregnant for more than twen-
9 ty-four weeks] under circumstances constituting murder, manslaughter in
10 the first degree, manslaughter in the second degree, or criminally
11 negligent homicide[, abortion in the first degree or self-abortion in
12 the first degree].
13 § 7. The section heading, opening paragraph and subdivision 1 of
14 section 125.05 of the penal law are amended to read as follows:
15 Homicide[, abortion] and related offenses; [definitions of terms]
16 definition.
17 The following [definitions are] definition is applicable to this arti-
18 cle:
19 [1.] “Person,” when referring to the victim of a homicide, means a
20 human being who has been born and is alive.
That’s right: it is no longer murder to kill a child right up until the moment of birth
SUMMARY AS INTRODUCED:
.
Abortion; eliminate certain requirements. Eliminates the requirement that an abortion in the second trimester of pregnancy and prior to the third trimester be performed in a hospital. The bill eliminates all the procedures and processes, including the performance of an ultrasound, required to effect a woman’s informed written consent to the performance of an abortion; however, the bill does not change the requirement that a woman’s informed written consent be first obtained. The bill eliminates the requirement that two other physicians certify that a third trimester abortion is necessary to prevent the woman’s death or impairment of her mental or physical health, as well as the need to find that any such impairment to the woman’s health would be substantial and irremediable. The bill also removes language classifying facilities that perform five or more first-trimester abortions per month as hospitals for the purpose of complying with regulations establishing minimum standards for hospitals.
§ 18.2-73. When abortion lawful during second trimester of pregnancy.
Notwithstanding any of the provisions of § 18.2-71 and in addition to the provisions of § 18.2-72, it shall be lawful for any physician licensed by the Board of Medicine to practice medicine and surgery, to terminate or attempt to terminate a human pregnancy or aid or assist in the termination of a human pregnancy by performing an abortion or causing a miscarriage on any woman during the second trimester of pregnancy and prior to the third trimester of pregnancy provided such procedure is performed in a hospital licensed by the State Department of Health or operated by the Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Services.
§ 18.2-74. When abortion or termination of pregnancy lawful after second trimester of pregnancy.
Notwithstanding any of the provisions of § 18.2-71 and in addition to the provisions of §§ 18.2-72 and 18.2-73, it shall be lawful for any physician licensed by the Board of Medicine to practice medicine and surgery to terminate or attempt to terminate a human pregnancy or aid or assist in the termination of a human pregnancy by performing an abortion or causing a miscarriage on any woman in a stage of pregnancy subsequent to the second trimester, provided that the following conditions are met:
The following are actually REMOVED under this bill:
(a) 1. Said operation is performed in a hospital licensed by the Virginia State Department of Health or operated by the Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Services.
(b) 2. The physician and two consulting physicians certify certifies and so enter enters in the hospital record of the woman, that in their the physician’s medical opinion, based upon their the physician’s best clinical judgment, the continuation of the pregnancy is likely to result in the death of the woman or substantially and irremediably impair the mental or physical health of the woman.
(c) 3. Measures for life support for the product of such abortion or miscarriage must shall be available and utilized if there is any clearly visible evidence of viability.
§ 18.2-76. Informed written consent required.
.
A. Before performing any abortion or inducing any miscarriage or terminating a pregnancy as provided in § 18.2-72, 18.2-73, or 18.2-74, the physician shall obtain the informed written consent of the pregnant woman. However, if the woman has been adjudicated incapacitated by any court of competent jurisdiction or if the physician knows or has good reason to believe that such woman is incapacitated as adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction, then only after permission is given in writing by a parent, guardian, committee, or other person standing in loco parentis to the woman, may the physician perform the abortion or otherwise terminate the pregnancy.
B. At least 24 hours before the performance of an abortion, a qualified medical professional trained in sonography and working under the supervision of a physician licensed in the Commonwealth shall perform fetal transabdominal ultrasound imaging on the patient undergoing the abortion for the purpose of determining gestational age. If the pregnant woman lives at least 100 miles from the facility where the abortion is to be performed, the fetal ultrasound imaging shall be performed at least two hours before the abortion. The ultrasound image shall contain the dimensions of the fetus and accurately portray the presence of external members and internal organs of the fetus, if present or viewable. Determination of gestational age shall be based upon measurement of the fetus in a manner consistent with standard medical practice in the community for determining gestational age. When only the gestational sac is visible during ultrasound imaging, gestational age may be based upon measurement of the gestational sac. If gestational age cannot be determined by a transabdominal ultrasound, then the patient undergoing the abortion shall be verbally offered other ultrasound imaging to determine gestational age, which she may refuse. A print of the ultrasound image shall be made to document the measurements that have been taken to determine the gestational age of the fetus.
The provisions of this subsection shall not apply if the woman seeking an abortion is the victim of rape or incest, if the incident was reported to law-enforcement authorities. Nothing herein shall preclude the physician from using any ultrasound imaging that he considers to be medically appropriate pursuant to the standard medical practice in the community.
C. The qualified medical professional performing fetal ultrasound imaging pursuant to subsection B shall verbally offer the woman an opportunity to view the ultrasound image, receive a printed copy of the ultrasound image and hear the fetal heart tones pursuant to standard medical practice in the community, and shall obtain from the woman written certification that this opportunity was offered and whether or not it was accepted and, if applicable, verification that the pregnant woman lives at least 100 miles from the facility where the abortion is to be performed. A printed copy of the ultrasound image shall be maintained in the woman’s medical record at the facility where the abortion is to be performed for the longer of (i) seven years or (ii) the extent required by applicable federal or state law.
D. For purposes of this section:
“Informed written consent” means the knowing and voluntary written consent to abortion by a pregnant woman of any age, without undue inducement or any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, or other form of constraint or coercion by the physician who is to perform the abortion or his agent. The basic information to effect such consent, as required by this subsection, shall be provided by telephone or in person to the woman at least 24 hours before the abortion by the physician who is to perform the abortion, by a referring physician, or by a licensed professional or practical nurse working under the direct supervision of either the physician who is to perform the abortion or the referring physician; however, the information in subdivision 5 may be provided instead by a licensed health-care professional working under the direct supervision of either the physician who is to perform the abortion or the referring physician. This basic information shall include:
1. A full, reasonable and comprehensible medical explanation of the nature, benefits, and risks of and alternatives to the proposed procedures or protocols to be followed in her particular case;
2. An instruction that the woman may withdraw her consent at any time prior to the performance of the procedure;
3. An offer for the woman to speak with the physician who is to perform the abortion so that he may answer any questions that the woman may have and provide further information concerning the procedures and protocols;
4. A statement of the probable gestational age of the fetus at the time the abortion is to be performed and that fetal ultrasound imaging shall be performed prior to the abortion to confirm the gestational age; and
5. An offer to review the printed materials described in subsection F. If the woman chooses to review such materials, they shall be provided to her in a respectful and understandable manner, without prejudice and intended to give the woman the opportunity to make an informed choice and shall be provided to her at least 24 hours before the abortion or mailed to her at least 72 hours before the abortion by first-class mail or, if the woman requests, by certified mail, restricted delivery. This offer for the woman to review the material shall advise her of the following:
(i) the Department of Health publishes printed materials that describe the unborn child and list agencies that offer alternatives to abortion;
(ii) medical assistance benefits may be available for prenatal care, childbirth and neonatal care, and that more detailed information on the availability of such assistance is contained in the printed materials published by the Department;
(iii) the father of the unborn child is liable to assist in the support of her child, even in instances where he has offered to pay for the abortion, that assistance in the collection of such support is available, and that more detailed information on the availability of such assistance is contained in the printed materials published by the Department;
(iv) she has the right to review the materials printed by the Department and that copies will be provided to her free of charge if she chooses to review them; and
(v) a statewide list of public and private agencies and services that provide ultrasound imaging and auscultation of fetal heart tone services free of charge. Where the woman has advised that the pregnancy is the result of a rape, the information in clause (iii) may be omitted.
3. What Is This Exactly?
These are just so wrong.
Even those who are “pro-choice” should be shocked at the idea of killing an infant that within minutes or hours would have been born. Of course, even “clumps of cells” aborted don’t always die. See here.
Apparently it’s no longer an issue of “when” children can be aborted. Guess the new slippery slope is how long after birth can we kill them.
A minute?
An hour?
A day?
A week?
A month?
Just call it a 4th trimester abortion.
Remember kids: it’s not murder as long as your mother is complicit in it.
CLICK HERE, for the German version of the book. Google translate or some similar service should be helpful to you non-speakers.
This is not my usual format, but this may be necessary for a glimpse into the mind of someone who can support a “world” parliament.
OUTLINE OF THE BOOK
Detailed Contents
Introduction ……………………………………………………………………. 1
PART I The idea of a world parliament: its history and pioneers
6
1. From the Stoics to Kant: cosmopolitanism, natural law, and the idea of a contract
8 Cosmopolitanism in ancient Greece
8—Cosmopolitan roots in India and China
9— Vitoria’s ‘republic of the whole world’
10—Conceptions of peace under ‘the sovereign power of the state’
12—The idea of the social contract in Hobbes and Locke
13—The social contract and Wolff’s ‘Völkerstaat’ 16—Kant’s cosmopolitan project
17 2. The 18th century: enlightenment, revolutions, and parliamentarism …..
20 The American federal state and representative democracy
20—The historical roots of parliamentarism
22—Cosmopolitanism in the French Revolution
24—Cloots’ ‘republic of humanity’
25—The end of cosmopolitanism
26 3. From Vienna to The Hague: the dynamics of integration and the inter-parliamentary movement
27 Sartorius’ ‘peoples’ republic’
27—Pecqueur’s concept of worldwide integration
28— Pecqueur’s world federation and world parliament
29—Tennyson’s ‘Parliament of Man’
31—The long struggle to extend the right to vote
32—The birth of the inter-parliamentary movement
33—The establishment of the IPU
34—The Hague Peace Conferences as a catalyst
35—Internationalism in the USA
36—An initiative at the IPU
37— Arguments emerging out of the German peace movement
39 4. World War and the League of Nations
42 The programme of the ‘Round Table’ group
42—The theory of sociocultural evolution and a world federation
43—A world parliament on the Versailles agenda
44—The ‘German Plan’ for the constitution of the League
46—Disappointment over the League of Nations
46 5. The Second World War and the atomic bomb: World Federalism in the early days of the UN
50 Federalism under pressure from fascism
50—The growth of world federalism
51— Planning the post-war order
53—Fundamental criticism of the UN, and the shock of Detailed Contents ix the atom bomb
54—Prominent support for a federal world order
55—Reves’ critique of democracy, the nation state and sovereignty
56—Albert Einstein and Albert Camus as advocates
57—The position of the Catholic Church
58—The British initiative of Nov. 1945
59—The issue of a Charter review conference
60—The foundation of the Council of Europe
62—Sohn’s proposal for a parliamentary assembly at the UN
62—Models for a world constitution
63—The Clark and Sohn model
64—CURE’s deliberations and conclusions
65—Parliamentary cooperation for a world federation
66 6. Bloc confrontation and the rise of the NGOs
68 World federalism caught between the fronts in the Cold War
68—The federalist movement and the founding of NATO
68—The declining popularity of world federalism and a world parliament
69—The World Order Models Project
71—The growing importance of NGOs
71—The idea of a ‘second chamber’
73—The issue of weighted voting in the UN General Assembly
74—Bertrand’s report
75— Perestroika and Gorbachev’s initiative
76 7. The end of the Cold War: the democratization wave, and the revitalization of the debate
79 The democratization wave
79—The revitalization of the debate
80—A UN parliamentary assembly as a strategic concept
81—Support for a world parliament and a UNPA
82— The report by the Commission on Global Governance
85—The report by the World Commission on Culture and Development
87 8. Democracy in the era of globalization
88 Globalization and the nation state
88—The theory of ‘cosmopolitan democracy’
90— The Falk and Strauss essays
93—A community of the democracies?
94— Höffe’s federal world republic
95—The call for a WTO parliament and the role of the IPU
97—Other initiatives towards a world parliament and a UNPA
98 9. The ‘War on Terror’, the role of the IPU, and the Campaign for a UN Parliamentary Assembly
102 The ban on landmines, the International Criminal Court and the World Social Forum
102—New contributions on the idea of a global parliament
103—The Lucknow conferences
104—9/11 and global democracy
105—The report by the German Bundestag‘s Enquete Commission
106—The report by the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization
107—The Ubuntu Forum campaign
108—The Cardoso panel report
108—Growing support for a UNPA
111—The international campaign for a UNPA
114—Calls for a UNPA since 2007
117—The third World Conference of Speakers of Parliament
120—The European Parliament Resolution of 2011
121—The de Zayas recommendations
123—Later developments
124—The report by the Albright-Gambari Commission
126—The election of Trump and ongoing efforts 127
x A WORLD PARLIAMENT PART II Governance and democracy in the 21st century
129
10. The Anthropocene, planetary boundaries, and the tragedy of the commons
132 The era of humankind
132—Earth system boundaries
133—The problem of voluntarism
135—The ‘tragedy of the commons’
137—The management of global common goods
139—The problem of the generations
140—Global majority decision-making
141— The tragedy of international law
143 11. Overshoot, the ‘Great Transformation’, and a global eco-social market economy
144 Overshoot and ecological footprint
144—The end of the Utopia of growth
145—The challenge of global eco-social development
146—‘Political barriers’ as the main obstacle to transformation
147—The process of state formation and the rise of the market economy
148—The ‘double movement’ between market fundamentalism and state interventionism
149—A global eco-social market economy
150 12. Turbo-capitalism, the financial crisis, and countering global deregulation
153 The relevance of the ‘double movement’ and the emancipation question
153—The financial crisis and the continuing systemic risk
154—State intervention to stabilize the financial system
156—The financial system as a ‘priority global public good’
157—The anarchic system of international law
158—Liberalism, Laissez-faire and the question of a world state
159—The global race to deregulate
160—The key role of tax havens and anonymous shell companies
161—The hidden trillions
164—Global state formation as the goal of the counter-movement
165 13. A world currency, global taxation, and fiscal federalism
167 A world currency and a world central bank
167—The impact of national monetary policy and currency wars
168—Recent proposals for a world reserve currency
169—The fiscal race to the bottom
170—Uniform taxation of multinational corporations
172— Rejection by the OECD
173—Global fiscal federalism and the restitution of fiscal sovereignty
174—Ideas for global taxes
175—The management, supervision and expenditure of global tax revenues
176 14. World domestic policy, trans-sovereign problems, and complex interdependence
179 ‘Trans-sovereign problems’
179—The concept of interdependence
180—Transgovernmental networks and the merging of domestic and foreign policy
181—The evolutionary phases of the international order
183—Sovereignty and the era of ‘implosion’
184 Detailed Contents xi 15. The fragility of world civilization, existential risks, and human evolution
187 The potential for worldwide collapse
187—The Genome as part of the heritage of humankind
188—Reprogenetics
189—Transhumanism and artificial intelligence
190— Autonomous weapons systems
191—Bioterrorism, nanobots and new pathogens
193— The need for regulation under global law
194 16. The threat of nuclear weapons, disarmament, and collective security …
196 Nulcear war as ‘the end of all things’
196—The danger of nuclear war
197—The risk of nuclear accidents
198—The unfulfilled commitment to general and complete disarmament
200—The architecture of nuclear disarmament
202—The link between nuclear and conventional disarmament
204—The McCloy-Zorin Accords
206—The unrealized peace concept of the UN Charter, and UN armed forces
207—The four pillars of a world peace order
209—The role of a World Parliament
210 17. Fighting terrorism, ‘blowback’, and data protection
212 The ‘war on terror’ as an end in itself
212—The covert warfare of the USA
212—The consequences of US foreign policy and the ‘war against terror’
213—Human rights violations and the USA’s drone warfare
215—The roots of transnational terrorism and the relevance of a World Parliament
216—The global surveillance system and universal disenfranchisement
219—Global data protection legislation
221 18. A world law enforcement system, criminal prosecution, and the post-American era
223 The need for world police law and a supranational police authority
223—The failure of classical sanctions
224—A supranational police to support the ICC
225—Extending the prosecuting powers of the ICC
227—Strengthening international criminal prosecution and a World Parliament
229—Interpol and accountability
231—A World Parliament as an element of world police law
232—The role and significance of the USA
235 19. Global food security and the political economy of hunger
238 The extent of worldwide hunger and the right to adequate nutrition
238—Population growth and food production
240—The fragility of global food supply
242—Dependence on oil and phosphates
244—Hunger as a problem of political economy
244— The relevance of democracy and the international
245—Agricultural subsidies, the WTO and food security
247—Commodity markets and financial speculation
248— Food security as a global public good and the failure of the G20
249—The FAO, a World Food Board and global food reserves
250—Free trade, food security and a world peace order
252—Democratising global food policy and a World Parliament 253
xii A WORLD PARLIAMENT 20. Global water policy ………………………………………………………
256 The state of drinking water supply
256—Water security as a global concern
257—The democratic deficit in water governance and a World Parliament
259 21. The elimination of poverty, and basic social security for all
262 Poverty as a key issue
262—Extreme poverty and the right to an adequate standard of living
262—The need for a new approach to international development
265— Economic growth is not enough
266—Social security as the foundation of a planetary social contract
267—A global basic income
268—Universal access to the global commons
270—The dream of a life free from economic compulsion
270 22. Global class formation, the ‘super class’, and global inequality …………
272 The emergence of global class conflicts and the role of the middle class
272—The global precariat
274—The concept of the Multitude
275—The super rich and global power structures
277—The transnational capitalist class
279—A transnational state apparatus 280—The interconnections between transnational corporations
281—The need for a global antitrust authority
282—Global inequality and instability
284— Inequality as the cause of the financial crisis
285—The growth of capital investments and a global tax on capital
286—The need for global public policy instruments and a World Parliament
287—A new global class compromise
289 23. The debate on world government, the age of entropy, and federalism .
290 The global elite and the question of a world government
290—The spectre of a global Leviathan
292—Hierarchical order and complexity
294—Different types of hierarchies
294—The principle of subsidiarity
295—The fragmentation of global governance and international law
296—Coherent world law and a World Parliament
298— The bewildering world order and the ‘age of entropy’
298—The entropic decline of world civilization?
300—World federalism as a means of reducing complexity
301—A world state as a taboo topic
302—The teetering paradigm of intergovernmentalism
303— The standard reactionary arguments
305 24. The third democratic transformation and the global democratic deficit
307 The waves of democratization
307—Economic development and democracy
309—The post-industrial transformation in values
310—Democracy as a universal value
312— The right to democracy
313—The undermining of democracy by intergovernmentalism
315—The influence of transnational corporations
317—The example of the Codex Commission
317—Fragmentation as a problem of democracy
319—The dilemma of scale
320—The concept of a chain of legitimation
320—Output legitimation
321— Accountability to the world’s citizens
323—Equality and representation in international law and world law
324—The third democratic transformation
326— International parliamentary institutions
328 Detailed Contents xiii 25. The development of a planetary consciousness, and a new global enlightenment
330 War and socio-political evolution
331—The decline of violence
333—The development of reason, empathy, and morality
333—The origin of morality in group selection
336— In-group morality and humanity’s crisis of adolescence
337—Sociogenesis and psychogenesis
340—The widening circle of empathy
340—The transition to an integral consciousness
343—Group narcissm and the Promethean gap
345—The problem of cultural lag
347—Global identity and the Other
349—The ‘Overview Effect’ and a planetary worldview
351—Identity, demos, and state formation
353—The progressive attitude of the world population
357—Global history and world citizenship education
359—‘Big History’ as a modern creation story
360—The continuation of the project of modernity
362—The new global Enlightenment 365
PART III Shaping the future: the design and realization of world democracy ….
367 26. Building a world parliament .
369 The example of the European Parliament
369—The proposal for a UNPA
370—The extension of powers and responsibilities
371—Growing democratic challenges
374— The allocation of seats
376 27. Creating world law
379 International law and world law compared
379—A bicameral world legislature
381— A world constitutional court
382 28. The necessary conditions for the transformation
384 The structural conditions for institutional change
384—A cosmopolitan move- ment
386—The role of NGOs
388—A UNPA as a catalyst for change
389—Four factors
391—The stealthy revolution
391—The revolution from below
392—The revolution from above
393—The trigger
394—Anticipating and averting the horror
395— Climate-induced events
396—A democratic China
397—In the beginning 399
Index …………………………………………………………………………. 401
World currency? World bank? World parliament? World courts?
Global identity? New global enlightenment? Global antitrust authority? Global public policy instruments?
Social security as a right?
Supra-national police force?
298— The bewildering world order and the ‘age of entropy’
298—The entropic decline of world civilization?
Entropy? Isn’t that what Trudeau referred diversity as?
