IBC #4: Response From Finance Department Questions On National Debt

(30% of Canada’s debt held by foreigners)

(Archived debt information is available)

(If data hard to see, written information in Section #4)

(Will Abram explains the issues here)

CLICK HERE, for response from Elections Canada

1. First Email Back

Hello ****,
.
1) Budget documents going back to 1995, they are available here: https://www.budget.gc.ca/pdfarch/index-eng.html
2) The Debt Management Reports and Fiscal Reference Tables may be useful. I am still looking to see if I can find more. You may want to try reaching out to the Bank of Canada for more information.
.
Regards,

2. Second Email Back

Hello again ****,
.
After asking around, here is what I was told regarding your second question:
.
Government of Canada marketable debt, which includes treasury bills and marketable bonds, is distributed cost-effectively through competitive auctions to Government Securities Distributors, a group of banks and investment dealers in the domestic market. These Government Securities Distributors then resell securities bought at auctions to their wholesale and retail clients in the secondary market.
.
Ultimately, the majority of Government of Canada debt is held by Canadian households, institutions and governments. The participation of international investors in Government of Canada securities markets is of benefit to Canadians, as they serve to increase competition, increase the diversity of the Government’s investor base, and ultimately reduce borrowing costs for Canadian taxpayers.
.
For more information, you may also wish to review the Debt Management Report 2017-2018 (e.g., Chart 9) at https://www.fin.gc.ca/pub/dmr-rgd/index-eng.asp.
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Hope this helps.
.
Regards,

3. Information On Debt Summary

This chart, and the information from it is provided by the sources which the Ministry of Finance has provided here.

Chart 1
Snapshot of the Federal Balance Sheet, as at March 31, 2018
Unmatured debt
.
Market debt
$704.3 billion
.
(marketable bonds, treasury bills, retail debt, and foreign currency debt)
Market debt value adjustments and capital lease obligations
$16.9 billion
.
Other liabilities
.
Pensions and other liabilities
$281.4 billion
.
Accounts payable and accrued liabilities
$154.8 billion
.
Total Liabilities $1,157.4 billion
.
Less financial assets
$398.6 billion (cash, reserves, loans)
.
Net debt
$758.8 billion
.
Less non-financial assets
$87.5 billion (capital assets)
.
Federal debt
$671.3 billion (accumulated deficit)

4. Looking At The Debt Tables

Recent report is here. See page 9.

The staff was helpful enough to direct me to this table, and hence, the data within it. Now, let’s see how much interest or “Public Debt Charges” we have been paying off since 1966.

Year Interest ($Mil) Cum. Since 1966
1966-67 1,162 1,162
1967-68 1,286 2,448
1968-69 1,464 3,912
1969-70 1,694 5,606
1970-71 1,887 7,493
1971-72 2,110 9,603
1972-73 2,110 11,703
1973-74 2,565 14,278
1974-75 3,238 17,516
1975-76 3,970 21,486
1976-77 4,708 26,194
1977-78 5,531 31,725
1978-79 7,024 38,749
1979-80 8,494 47,243
1980-81 10,658 57,901
1981-82 15,114 73,015
1982-83 16,903 89,918
1983-84 20,430 110,348
1984-85 20,430 110,348
1985-86 27,657 138,005
1986-87 28,718 166,723
1987-88 31,233 197,956
1988-89 35,532 233,488
1989-90 41,246 274,734
1990-91 45,034 319,768
1991-92 43,861 363,629
1992-93 41,332 404,961
1993-94 40,099 445,060
1994-95 44,185 489,245
1995-96 49,407 538,652
1996-97 47,281 585,933
1997-98 43,120 629,053
1998-99 43,303 672,356
1999-00 43,384 715,740
2000-01 43,384 715,740
2001-02 39,651 755,391
2002-03 37,270 792,661
2003-04 35,769 828,430
2004-05 43,384 871,814
2005-06 33,772 905,586
2006-07 33,945 939,531
2007-08 33,325 972,856
2008-09 28,269 1,001,125
2009-10 26,652 1,027,687
2010-11 28,610 1,056,297
2011-12 29,038 1,085,335
2012-13 25,533 1,110,868
2013-14 24,729 1,135,597
2014-15 24,207 1,159,804
2015-16 21,837 1,181,641
2016-17 21,232 1,202,873
2017-18 21,889 1,224,762

Note: This only applies to interest payments on the NATIONAL debt. The Provinces, particularly Ontario and Quebec, have been piling on their own debt.

To be fair, we can largely exclude the payments before 1974, which is when Trudeau Sr. forced fiat banking on Canada. That would remove $14,278M. leaving Canada with $1,210,484 in interest paid as of 2018. $1.21 trillion, just in interest (or public debt charges).

Although I didn’t get names of specific bond holders, it was not a total loss. Our debt is bought an sold, just like a collections agent would do, and about 30% is sold to foreign buyers.

5. No Political Will To End Debt

Although political parties pay lip service to the idea of balancing a budget, they tap-dance around the idea of paying it off.

Why though? If merely “balancing the budget” means paying interest payments forever, why is that all that is talked about? Why is this open-ended drain on the public purse not discussed?

Anyone who has ever held a credit card knows that it is senseless to let the charges keep accumulating. Eventually, the interest and fees will exceed the cost of the initial charge.

So why DON’T politicians want to get rid of our debt? Are these “interest” payments really a form of money laundering? Are they being told (or paid off) not to get rid of the debt?

6. Reason Behind The Debt: PRIVATE Borrowing

The idea of dumping central (fiat banking) is never brought up. Even so called “deficit hawks” never address the reason of why this exists is the first place. They never talk about the Bank for International Settlements, nor do they discuss the Basel Committee.

In 1974, Pierre Trudeau changed Canada’s monetary system, and did so without a democratic mandate. Since the 1934 Bank of Canada Act, the Federal Government had effectively been borrowing money from itself. This meant that interest payments amounted to the Canadian public being paid. See PART 1 of the series for more information.

However, since 1974, Canada has been borrowing from private lenders. Quite simply, we now have to pay other parties, instead of ourselves.

The reason for doing this has never been made clear. Vague claims have been made about stability of currency and inflation control. But a cause-and-effect has never actually been demonstrated. Nor has any benefit been shown that would counter the endless repayments, and ever growing debt.

And while this article is aimed at the Federal Government, the Provinces do not get a pass. More on them in another article.

7. Who’s Pushing For Continuation Of Scheme?

Remember this quote from the Ministry of Finance. Though specific people, institutions and parties were not named, it is reasonable to assume that this is a profitable business. After all, it is buying and selling — and reselling — national debt on the open market.

Government of Canada marketable debt, which includes treasury bills and marketable bonds, is distributed cost-effectively through competitive auctions to Government Securities Distributors, a group of banks and investment dealers in the domestic market. These Government Securities Distributors then resell securities bought at auctions to their wholesale and retail clients in the secondary market.

Ultimately, the majority of Government of Canada debt is held by Canadian households, institutions and governments. The participation of international investors in Government of Canada securities markets is of benefit to Canadians, as they serve to increase competition, increase the diversity of the Government’s investor base, and ultimately reduce borrowing costs for Canadian taxpayers.

The Ministry has been contacted again asking for specific names. If they won’t release any, then perhaps a freedom of information request will be needed. However, it’s unwise to drop names without any proof.

It’s reasonable to believe that the people profiting the most from this scheme are the ones pushing to keep fiat going. If any specifics are provided, they will be added as an update.

(1) https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/cv.action?pid=1010004801#timeframe
(2) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bank_for_International_Settlements
(3) https://www.bis.org
(4) https://www.bis.org/about/member_cb.htm
(5) https://www.bis.org/bcbs/organ_and_gov.htm
(6) https://www.fin.gc.ca/pub/dmr-rgd/index-eng.asp
(7) https://www.budget.gc.ca/pdfarch/index-eng.html
(8) https://www.fin.gc.ca/pub/frt-trf/index-eng.asp

UN Global Taxation Efforts & Schemes

(Ways to raise money)

(Details of proposed global tax scheme)

These are not the only examples, but should serve as an illustration for the “taxation” efforts the UN is undertaking in order to finance its various agendas. Of course its ultimate goal is world domination. It’s quite the rabbit hole, and this is just surface level.

(Shiva Ayyadurai, Republican and former Senate Candidate explains how the Carbon tax really works.)

1. Paris Accord Is All About Taxation

(This is the Paris Accord, and “Conservative” Garnett Genuis’ dishonest spin in supporting it in Parliament.)

This is not an exaggeration, or hyperbole. The entire point of the agreement is to generate an enormous slush fund. The UN IPCC and select partners can then put that money into the commodities market and make trillions from it.

If you have any doubts about that, read Article 9 from the Paris Agreement. It spells out the “financial flow” in no uncertain terms.

1. Developed country Parties shall provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation in continuation of their existing obligations under the Convention.

2. Other Parties are encouraged to provide or continue to provide such support voluntarily.

3. As part of a global effort, developed country Parties should continue to take the lead in mobilizing climate finance from a wide variety of sources, instruments and channels, noting the significant role of public funds, through a variety of actions, including supporting country-driven strategies, and taking into account the needs and priorities of developing country Parties. Such mobilization of climate finance should represent a progression beyond previous efforts.

4. The provision of scaled-up financial resources should aim to achieve a balance between adaptation and mitigation, taking into account country-driven strategies, and the priorities and needs of developing country Parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change and have significant capacity constraints, such as the least developed countries and small island developing States, considering the need for public and grant-based resources for adaptation.

5. Developed country Parties shall biennially communicate indicative quantitative and qualitative information related to paragraphs 1 and 3 of this Article, as applicable, including, as available, projected levels of public financial resources to be provided to developing country Parties. Other Parties providing resources are encouraged to communicate biennially such information on a voluntary basis.

6. The global stock take referred to in Article 14 shall take into account the relevant information provided by developed country Parties and/or Agreement bodies on efforts related to climate finance.

7. Developed country Parties shall provide transparent and consistent information on support for developing country Parties provided and mobilized through public interventions biennially in accordance with the modalities, procedures and guidelines to be adopted by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement, at its first session, as stipulated in Article 13, paragraph 13. Other Parties are encouraged to do so.

8. The Financial Mechanism of the Convention, including its operating entities, shall serve as the financial mechanism of this Agreement.

9. The institutions serving this Agreement, including the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism of the Convention, shall aim to ensure efficient access to financial resources through simplified approval procedures and enhanced readiness support for developing country Parties, in particular for the least developed countries and small island developing States, in the context of their national climate strategies and plans.

These are quotes directly from the Paris Accord. In particular, Article 9 makes it abundantly clear that this is all about “financial flow” and a transfer of wealth from the developed world to the developing world.

Actual environmental changes seem almost to be an afterthought. This is a giant wealth transfer scheme.

2. New Development Finance, Bait-and-Switch

Okay, what are these “revenue sources”?

  • SDR (or special drawing rights), from IMF $150B-$270B
  • Carbon taxes, $240B
  • Leveraging SDR, $90B
  • Financial transaction tax, $10B-70B
  • Billionaire tax, $90B
  • Currency trading tax, $30B
  • EU emissions trading scheme, $5B
  • Air passenger levy, $10B
  • Certified emission reduction tax, $2B
  • Current ODA Flow, $120B

If these numbers are accurate, then the US is viewed as a cash cow somewhere to the tune of $627 billion to $807 billion. Yes, this only refers to revenue potential from the United States. I believe this is annually.

What does the report say about SDAs?

These include taxes on financial and currency transactions and on greenhouse gas emissions, as well as the creation of new international liquidity through issuance of special drawing rights (SDRs) by the International Monetary Fund IMF), to be allocated with a bias favouring developing countries or leveraged as development financing. Though their potential may be high, these proposals are subject to political controversy. For instance, many countries are not willing to support international forms of taxation, as these are said to undermine national sovereignty.

No kidding. There is a lot of political opposition to taxes which are deemed to undermine national sovereignty. Could that be because these taxes AREN’T being used to support the well being of the citizenry? Instead the money is being funnelled out of the country in the name of some global good project.

This is how bait-and-switch works:
(1) Raise money using cause A.
(2) Actually spend the money on cause B.

An array of other options with large fundraising potential have been proposed (see figure O.1 and table O.1), but have not been agreed upon internationally thus far. These include taxes on financial and currency transactions and on greenhouse gas emissions, as well as the creation of new international liquidity through issuance of special drawing rights (SDRs) by the International Monetary Fund IMF), to be allocated with a bias favouring developing countries or leveraged as development financing. Though their potential may be high, these proposals are subject to political controversy. For instance, many countries are not willing to support international forms of taxation, as these are said to undermine national sovereignty.

(Page 86) Debt-conversion mechanisms
Debt conversion entails the cancellation by one or more creditors of part of a country’s debt in order to enable the release of funds which would otherwise have been used for debt-servicing, for use instead in social or environmental projects. Where debt is converted at a discount with respect to its face value, only part of the proceeds fund the projects, the remainder reducing the external debt burden, typically as part of a broader debt restructuring.

Debt to developing nations can be “forgiven”, at least partly, if certain conditions are met. However, the obvious question must be asked:

Can nations be loaned money they could never realistically pay back, in order to ensure their compliance in UN or other global agenda, by agreeing to “forgive” part of it?

(Page 86) Debt conversion first emerged, in the guise of debt-for-nature swaps, during the 1980s debt crisis, following an opinion article by Thomas Lovejoy, then Executive Vice-President of the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), in the New York Times in 1984. Lovejoy argued that a developing country’s external debt could be reduced (also providing tax relief to participating creditor banks) in exchange for the country’s taking measures to address environmental challenges. Estimates based on Sheikh (2010) and Buckley, ed. (2011) suggest that between $1.1 billion and $1.5 billion of debt has been exchanged through debt-for-nature swaps since the mid–1980s, although it is not possible to assess how much of this constitutes IDF, for the reasons discussed in box III.1.

If debt can be forgiven in return for environmental measures, then why not simply fund these environmental measures from the beginning? Is it to pressure or coerce otherwise unwilling nations into agreeing with such measures?

(Page 88)
There have been two basic forms of debt-for-nature exchanges (Buckley and Freeland, 2011). In the first, part of a country’s external debt is purchased by an environmental non-governmental organization and offered to the debtor for cancellation in exchange for a commitment to protect a particular area of land. Such transactions occurred mainly in the late 1980s and 1990s and were generally relatively small-scale. An early example was a 1987 deal under which Conservation International, a Washington, D.C.-based environmental non-governmental organization, bought $650,000 of the commercial bank debt of Bolivia (now Plurinational State of Bolivia) in the secondary market for $100,000, and exchanged this for shares in a company established to preserve 3.7 million acres of forest and grassland surrounding the Beni Biosphere Reserve in the north-east part of the country. In the second form, debt is exchanged for local currency (often at a discount), which is then used by local conservation groups or government agencies to fund projects in the debtor country. Swaps of this kind are generally much larger, and have predominated since the 1990s. The largest such swap came in 1991, when a group of bilateral creditors agreed to channel principal and interest payments of $473 million (in local currency) into Poland’s Ecofund set up to finance projects designed to counter environmental deterioration. The EcoFund financed 1,500 programmes between 1992 and 2007, providing grants for conservation projects relating to cross-border air pollution, climate change, biological diversity and the clean-up of the Baltic Sea (Buckley and Freeland, 2011).

We will “forgive” your debt if:
(1) A portion of your land is off limits; or
(2) Debt converted to currency to fund “projects”

The entire document is 178 pages. While a tedious read, it’s worthwhile.

3. UN Wants $400B In Global Taxation

(UN supports global tax to raise $400B)

New York, 5 July 2012 –The United Nations is proposing an international tax, combined with other innovative financing mechanisms, to raise more than $400 billion annually for development and global challenges such as fighting climate  change. In its annual report on global development, World Economic and Social Survey 2012: In Search of New Development Finance, (WESS 2012) launched today, the UN says, in the midst of difficult financial times, many donor countries have cut back on development assistance. In 2011, for the first time in many years, aid flows declined in real terms

The survey finds that the financial needs of developing countries have long outstripped the willingness and ability of donors to provide aid. And finding the necessary resources to achieve the Millennium Development Goals and meet other global challenges, such as addressing climate change, will be tough, especially for least developed countries. 

The need for additional and more predictable financing has led to a search for new sources not as a substitute for aid, but as a complement to it . A number of innovative initiatives have been launched during the past decade, mainly to fund global health programmes aimed at providing immunizations, AIDS and tuberculosis treatments to millions of people in the  developing  world.  The  UN  survey  finds  that  while  these  initiatives have successfully used new methods to channel development financing to combat diseases, they have hardly yielded any additional funding on top of traditional development assistance. 

This source explains it straight from the horse’s mouth. The UN is not taking in enough money for its various schemes. In fact, real contributions are shrinking. Therefore it is necessary to come up with new and innovative ways to tax developed nations.

Of course one of the most common ways is with the “climate change” scam. But it is hardly the only one. The UN views many forms of wealth simply as money to tap into.

4. UN Eyeing Up African Pensions

(Pensions are also being eyed as a funding source)

(Page 10) III. PENSION FUNDS DIRECT INVESTMENT IN INFRASTRUCTURE
International experience At 36.6 percent of GDP, assets of the pension funds in OECD countries are relatively large. As of end-2013, pension-fund assets were even in excess of 100 percent in countries such as the Netherlands, Iceland, Switzerland, Australia, and the United Kingdom (Figure 1). In absolute terms, pension funds in OECD countries held $10.4 trillion of assets. While large pension funds (LPFs) held about $3.9 trillion of assets, assets in public and private sector and public pension reserves (PPRFs) stood at $6.5 trillion.

(Page 30) C. Policy framework for investment in infrastructure Pension funds—just like other investors, domestic and foreign—need a fair, transparent, clear, and predictable policy framework to invest in infrastructure and other assets. This is important as infrastructure assets have a number of characteristics that increase investors’ perception of risk. First, infrastructure projects typically involve economies of scale and often lead to natural monopolies with high social benefits and, at times, lower private returns. As a result, infrastructure projects may require heavy government involvement. Second, infrastructure projects are often large and long-lived with a significant initial investment but with cash flows that accrue over a long horizon.

In this regard, improving the policy framework for investment can be useful to countries seeking to develop the investor base for infrastructure. For instance, the OECD’s Policy Framework for Investment (PFI) uses self-assessments and/or an external assessment by the OECD to help a country elaborate policies for capacity building and private sector development strategies, and inform the regional dialogue (OECD, 2015b). The PFI’s investment policy refers not only to domestic laws, regulations, and policies relating to investment but also goals and expectations concerning the contribution of investment to sustainable development, such as infrastructure

(Page 31) D. Infrastructure financing instruments available to pension funds Even in well-performing pension systems where the governance, regulation, and supervision of pension funds are conducive to investment in infrastructure and there is a sound policy framework for investment, there is still a need for adequate instruments to channel pension fund assets into the infrastructure sector. Pension funds can use a number of channels to invest in infrastructure. Direct exposure is gained mainly through the unlisted equity instruments (direct investment in projects and infrastructure funds) and project bonds, while indirect exposure is normally associated with listed equity and corporate debt. More specifically, pension funds can rely on a number of options such as

The paper itself is quite long, but here is the gist of it. (See archive). The UN wants to take African pension funds and use them to “invest” it UN type of schemes.

While this seems harmless enough, remember the Paris Accord. The UN thinks nothing of taxing the developed world hundreds of billions of dollars under false pretenses in order to invest in the commodities market. Nor does the UN object to giving “infrastructure loans” to nations that will likely never be able to pay it back.

It should alarm people that an organization with no inherent loyalty to the region would want to use African pension funds to finance its own agenda.

5. UN Environment Programme (UNEP)

(UN Environment Programme)

United Nations Environment Programme – Finance Initiative (UNEP FI) is a partnership between United Nations Environment and the global financial sector created in the wake of the 1992 Earth Summit with a mission to promote sustainable finance. More than 250 financial institutions, including banks, insurers, and investors, work with UN Environment to understand today’s environmental, social and governance challenges, why they matter to finance, and how to actively participate in addressing them.

UNEP FI’s work also includes a strong focus on policy – by facilitating country-level dialogues between finance practitioners, supervisors, regulators and policy-makers, and, at the international level, by promoting financial sector involvement in processes such as the global climate negotiations.

Here are the members of the Global Steering Committee. In short, this is a partnership between the UN and banking sector.

Keep in mind the “New Development Financing” agenda discussed earlier. Money is taken and used to “invest” in 3rd World Development Programs. Countries that are unable to pay back are forced either to give up sovereignty, or comply with other arrangements.

Banks are in the business of making money. Alternatively, they are in the business of acquiring assets which can be converted into money, or otherwise make them money. What if this banking alliance has no altruistic roots, and is meant to be predatory?

Uppity Peasants has an interesting take on the UNEP.

Make no mistake, this is exactly what happens to these people, by the way. One cross-country comparison between microloan recipients in Bangladesh and payday loan recipients in Canada found that both ‘products’ tend to attract the same kinds of people to them from very similar backgrounds, for largely the same reasons — i.e., neither group tends to use these loans for re-investment, such as starting a business; rather, they use them to cover day-to-day expenses at exorbitant interest rates, thus entrapping themselves in a cycle of never ending debt (Islam & Simpson, 2018). If you know how bad the consequences of payday lending can be for people in the first world, imagine how bad it is for someone who’s already living in third world-levels of poverty.

Now, part of the reason why the UNEP, of all possible agencies, is so heavily invested (emotionally and literally) into fintech and other start-up technologies is because many of the “incumbent banks” — the top-players of our current system — don’t think that completely up-ending the global financial system to move the focus away from profits and toward complying with heavy-handed, UN-decided environmental regulations is a particularly attractive road to go down. In the next excerpt, the UNEP openly admit that start-ups in this area are better to invest in for the pursuit of ‘change’, specifically because their owners tend to be new to the world of business and, as such, don’t know enough about what they’re doing to avoid being manipulated — and that’s where the UNEP comes in.

Uppity Peasants argues that the UNEP is driven much more on a business model than on any kind altruistic path. Further, the circumstances which the aid recipients require the resources to cover essential expenses means they are unable to invest anything. This is similar to a payday loan type of system.

6. Green Finance For 3rd World $5-7 Trillion

(Green finance for developing countries)

(Page 13)In 2015, governments adopted three major agreements that set out their vision for the coming decades: a new set of 17 sustainable development goals (SDGs), the Paris Agreement on climate change and the ‘financing for development’ package. Finance is central to realizing all three agreements – and these now need to be translated into practical steps suited to each country’s circumstances.

Sustainable Energy for All estimates that annual global investments in energy will need to scale up from roughly US$400 billion at present to US $1-1.25 trillion. Of that, US$40-100 billion annually is needed to achieve universal access to electricity. Overall, US $5-7 trillion a year is needed to implement the SDGs globally. Developing countries are estimated to face an annual investment gap of US$2.5 trillion in areas such as infrastructure, clean energy, water and sanitation, and agriculture.

(Page 14) The challenge for financial systems is twofold: to mobilize finance for specific sustainable development priorities and to mainstream sustainable development factors across financial decision-making.

Capital needs to be mobilized for inclusion of underserved groups (e.g. small and medium enterprises), raising capital for sustainable infrastructure (e.g. energy, housing, transport, urban design) and financing critical areas of innovation (e.g. agriculture, mobility, power).

Sustainability needs to become mainstream for financial institutions. This starts with ensuring market integrity (e.g. tax, corruption, human rights) and extends to integrating environmental and social (E&S) factors into risk management (e.g. climate disruption, water stress). Sustainability also needs to be incorporated into the responsibilities and reporting of market actors to guide their decision-making. Momentum is building to align financial systems with the financing needs of an inclusive, sustainable economy. This is complementary to ‘real economy’ actions such as environmental regulations, reform of perverse subsidies and changes to resource pricing. However, while these are critical, it is increasingly recognized that changes are also needed in the financial system to ensure that it is both more stable and more connected to the real economy.

Some interesting points here:

  • $5 to $7 trillion (yes trillion) needed annually fulfill these goals. The billions stated before was lowballed.
  • The “sustainability” agenda needs mass marketing.
  • Finance needed for:
    1. 17 goals of Agenda 2030
    2. Paris Climate Accord
    3. Finance for development
  • 3 above items to be integral part of national agendas.
  • Most of this has nothing to do with the environment

In fact, it reads like a global version of the US Green New Deal, proposed by Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez. In fact, her Chief of Staff, Saikat Chakrabarti, admitted it was about changing the economy, not the environment.

7. International Chamber Of Commerce

(International Chamber of Commerce)

THE INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ICC is the world’s largest business organization with a network of over 6 million members in more than 130 countries. We work to promote international trade, responsible business conduct and a global approach to regulation through a unique mix of advocacy and standard setting activities—together with market-leading dispute resolution services. Our members include many of the world’s largest companies, SMEs, business associations and local chambers of commerce.
.
We are the world business organization.

That quote came from their policy guide. Pretty straightforward. They want to run business on a global level. Now, let’s get to the meat and potatoes, the tax proposals:

Interplay between tax policy making and economic growth The world’s population is predicted to increase by 2 billion people by 2050, and the population of the world’s least developed countries is projected to double by 2053, in some countries even tripling. By 2025 half of the world’s population will be living in water-stressed areas. Under such circumstances, the need for large-scale investment in economic growth and development becomes evident.

Whilst there is no panacea, it is evident that greater alignment of investment and tax policies would be essential in promoting investment, job creation and economic growth. International commerce remains a powerful mechanism to help lift people out of poverty. Tax is intrinsically linked to development as taxation provides the revenue that states need to mobilize resources and reinforce a country’s infrastructure. Taxation “provides a predictable and stable flow of revenue to finance public spending, and shapes the environment in which investment, employment and trade takes place.”

Further, it is important to have a fair, efficient, and effective revenue collection infrastructure to promote economic and social development. Domestic resource mobilization (DRM) has been proposed as a way to meet the SDGs with the development finance already available. However, DRM can be impeded by unclear and confusing tax systems. It is imperative that companies are able to move products and services into areas where they are most needed without unnecessary administrative impediments.

Having a reliable and consistent taxation policy seems reasonable enough. However, the ICC is not being clear on the reason behind the push. They want better taxation methods in order to INCREASE the amount of revenue available.

Governments often side with these groups, even when it is not in the best interests of the citizens themselves. “Investment” dollars are then shovelled into infrastructure projects.

Tax the people, so that the money can be “properly” spent, as the UN and their partners see fit.

8. Addis Ababa Action Agenda

(Addis Ababa Action Agenda)

(Page 10) DOMESTIC PUBLIC RESOURCE
For all countries, public policies and the mobilization and effective use of domestic resources, underscored by the principle of national ownership, are central to our common pursuit of sustainable development, including achieving the sustainable development goals. Building on the considerable achievements in many countries since Monterrey, we remain committed to further strengthening the mobilization and effective use of domestic resources

(Page 10) 22. We recognize that significant additional domestic public resources, supplemented by international assistance as appropriate, will be critical to realizing sustainable development and achieving the sustainable development goals. We commit to enhancing revenue administration through modernized, progressive tax systems, improved tax policy and more efficient tax collection. We will work to improve the fairness, transparency, efficiency and effectiveness of our tax systems, including by broadening the tax base and continuing efforts to integrate the informal sector into the formal economy in line with country circumstances.

23. We will redouble efforts to substantially reduce illicit financial flows by 2030, with a view to eventually eliminating them, including by combating tax evasion and corruption through strengthened national regulation and increased international cooperation. We will also reduce opportunities for tax avoidance, and consider inserting anti-abuse clauses in all tax treaties. We will enhance disclosure practices and transparency in both source and destination countries, including by seeking to ensure transparency in all financial transactions between Governments and companies to relevant tax authorities. We will make sure that all companies, including multinationals, pay taxes to the Governments of countries where economic activity occurs and value is created, in accordance with national and international laws and policies

(Page 13) 27. We commit to scaling up international tax cooperation. We encourage countries, in accordance with their national capacities and circumstances, to work together to strengthen transparency and adopt appropriate policies, including multinational enterprises reporting country-by-country to tax authorities where they operate; access to beneficial ownership information for competent authorities; and progressively advancing towards automatic exchange of tax information among tax authorities as appropriate, with assistance to developing countries, especially the least developed, as needed. Tax incentives can be an appropriate policy tool. However, to end harmful tax practices, countries can engage in voluntary discussions on tax incentives in regional and international forums.

(Page 45) 98. We affirm the importance of debt restructurings being timely, orderly, effective, fair and negotiated in good faith. We believe that a workout from a sovereign debt crisis should aim to restore public debt sustainability, while preserving access to financing resources under favourable conditions. We further acknowledge that successful debt restructurings enhance the ability of countries to achieve sustainable development and the sustainable development goals. We continue to be concerned with non-cooperative creditors who have demonstrated their ability to disrupt timely completion of the debt restructurings.

In no way does this cover the entire document. However, there are 3 themes which get repeated over and over again.

  1. Efficient tax collection
  2. Global tax regulations and data sharing
  3. “Sustainable” debt and borrowing

There is very little in this document, about actually improving lives, improving infrastructure, or improving the environment. Instead, it is all about implementing a global taxation system, while eliminating “off the books”, or illicit cash.

9. Global Tax Avoidance Measures

(Global tax avoidance measures)

Exchange of information for tax purposes
Exchange of information has long been included as a feature of tax treaty models. By agreeing to exchange information with respect to taxpayers, countries can become more aware of the global activities taxpayers are engaging in and impose tax that should be due.

The upcoming 2017 revision of the United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing countries is expected to bring a new revised version of the exchange of information provision, following the approval of the new United Nations Code of Conduct. The Committee agreed in 2016 to a proposal for a United Nations Code of Conduct on Cooperation in Combating International Tax Evasion. This Code supports the automatic exchange of information for tax purposes as the way forward for countries generally, but recognizes that it is vital for developing countries to exchange information, even if they are not ready for automatic exchange. The Code of Conduct has been approved by the Committee of Experts in 2016, and set automatic exchange of information as the new universal standard after ECOSOC adopted the Code of Conduct in a Resolution in 2017, during the ECOSOC Special Meeting on International Cooperation on Tax Matters. .Furthermore, the OECD model convention and commentaries is expected to broaden the scope of the exchange of information article to allow triangular, or multi-party exchange of information requests.

While this certainly sounds like some well meaning way to prevent money laundering and tax fraud, there is another angle to look at.

Having a global (or at least more centralized) database of people and their taxable income will allow for more efficient and effective tax collection. This is especially true whenever a new “development project” needs funding.

Furthermore, if there is such a global system, it will be easier to determine who isn’t paying “their fair share” when it comes to contributions. Those national governments can then act accordingly. Also, who doesn’t view this as becoming a global version of Revenue Canada, or the American IRS?

10. From Billions To Trillions (SF 2.0)

(Why stop at just billions?)

Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) will require an enormous increase in external financing flows to developing countries. Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) have gradually started to shift their business model towards de-risking services to crowd in long-term, low-risk private capital. However, the targeted scaling up of private investment from billions to trillions to realise the SDGs contains massive risks for stability. And good macro-policies are needed, in turn, to address such underlying risks. Countries that need the greatest amount of development finance are often those that have domestic financial resource constraints and underdeveloped markets. Financing their growth and investment opportunities makes the management of exchange rate risks, which are inherent in development finance, a critical challenge.

Merely supplying development finance is not enough. It needs to be done in socially and economically sustainable ways, where risks are allocated to those who can best manage and sustain them. Efficient use of limited public resources, through improved policies and regulatory processes, is required to achieve the SDGs and related efforts. Governments around the world must work together to offer feasible business opportunities to the private sector that are in line with domestic and international development objectives. Only with such coordinated action will we succeed in moving from billions to trillions to realise sustainable progress for all.

This article should serve as a warning to anyone who thinks that this global development system is going to be steady. Wrong. Once considered “fully operational”, the next step is to upscale it, and make it far bigger.

It is not governments who will be paying for these globalist schemes. It is the working class tax-payers who will see more and more of their wealth transferred to these projects.

Of course, once your money leaves Canadian soil, there is little to no accountability or control over what happens to it. But that it routinely downplayed.

11. What To Make From All This?

To state the obvious: these agendas and agreements are bringing nations towards a global taxation model. Countries (presumably under UN control) will be expected to share data on tax paying citizens and other people earning money. While this is touted as an anti-tax avoidance measure, the real goal is making sure the global order accounts for all money and where it goes.

Going towards a “cashless society” also helps in that regard. Hence the push for more and more electronic options, while making cash payments more difficult.

Beyond enforcement, knowing which nations have money and how much will make it easier to determine who shall pay how much as their “fair share” of future projects. We won’t have nations in the traditional sense, just shareholders.

International agreements like the Paris Accord have nothing to do with the environment. That is just the sales pitch. Instead, it an excuse to funnel huge sums of money to the UN to finance their business model. It is taking advantage of an altruistic goal.

This is about having a globalist, centralized economy and taxation. The environmental and humanitarian claims are just talking points.

(1) https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wess/wess_current/2012wess.pdf
(2) 2012.new.development.finance
(3) https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wess/wess_current/2012wesspr_en.pdf
(4) 2012, Call To Raise $400 Billion
(5) https://www.fsmgov.org/paris.pdf
(6) https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/2051AAAA_Outcome.pdf
(7) Addis Ababa Action Agenda
(8) https://iccwbo.org/publication/tax-united-nations-sustainable-development-goals/
(9) https://iccwbo.org/content/uploads/sites/3/2018/02/icc-position-paper-on-tax-and-the-un-sdgs.pdf
(10) http://unepinquiry.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Green_Finance_for_Developing_Countries.pdf
(11) Green_Finance_for_Developing_Countries
(12) https://developmentfinance.un.org/international-efforts-combat-tax-avoidance-and-evasion
(13) https://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/pubs/2017pensionfunds.pdf
(14) https://www.un.org/pga/72/wp-content/uploads/sites/51/2018/05/Financing-for-SDGs-29-May.pdf
(15) Financing-for-SDGs-29-May
(16) https://mnetax.com/un-releases-updated-model-tax-treaty-adding-new-technical-service-fees-article-27765
(17) “https://oecd-development-matters.org/2018/07/31/development-finance-2-0-from-billions-to-trillions/
(18) https://developmentfinance.un.org/sites/developmentfinance.un.org/files/FSDR2019_ChptII.pdf
(19) Financing for Sustainable Development 2019
(20) https://www.unepfi.org/about/
(21) https://www.uncdf.org/
(22) https://oim.unjspf.org/
(23) https://www.unfcu.org/home/
(24) https://uppitypeasants.home.blog/2019/08/10/fintech-for-sustainable-development-assessing-the-implications/
(25) https://canucklaw.ca/guest-post-sunrise-movement-and-the-green-new-deal/

The Trans-Pacific Partnership, Bill C-79

(Government link for TPP, now referred to as CPTPP)

(Canada’s Bill C-79, October 2018)

1. Offshoring, Globalization, Free Trade

The other posts on outsourcing/offshoring are available here. It focuses on the hidden costs and trade offs society as a whole has to make. Contrary to what many politicians and figures in the media claim, there are always costs to these kinds of agreement. These include: (a) job losses; (b) wages being driven down; (c) undercutting of local companies; (d) legal action by foreign entities; (e) industries being outsourced; and (f) losses to communities when major employers leave. Don’t believe the lies that these agreements are overwhelmingly beneficial to all.

2. Important Links

(1) ttps://www.parl.ca/LegisInfo/BillDetails.aspx?Language=E&billId=9970461&View=5
(2) https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/cptpp-ptpgp/index.aspx?lang=eng
(3) https://www.epi.org/publication/the-china-toll-deepens-growth-in-the-bilateral-trade-deficit-between-2001-and-2017-cost-3-4-million-u-s-jobs-with-losses-in-every-state-and-congressional-district/
(4) https://www.epi.org/publication/webfeatures_snapshots_archive_12102003/
(5) https://www.epi.org/blog/naftas-impact-workers/
(6) https://www.epi.org/publication/webfeatures_snapshots_archive_11052003/

Note: After the US withdrew from the agreement, it was renamed the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).

3. Trading Partner Brunei, Stoning Gays

On a side note, Brunei, a small nation governed by Islamic law, announced it would stone gays to death in accordance with religious law. It seems extremely hypocritical for the virtue-signaling Prime Minister Trudeau to have such a trading partner. However, under public pressure, Brunei has apparently backed down from the measure.

4. Portions Of Bill C-79

Causes of action under sections 9 to 13
.
8 (1) No person has any cause of action and no proceedings of any kind are to be taken, without the consent of the Attorney General of Canada, to enforce or determine any right or obligation that is claimed or arises solely under or by virtue of sections 9 to 13 or an order made under those sections.

Causes of action under Agreement
.
(2) No person has any cause of action and no proceedings of any kind are to be taken, without the consent of the Attorney General of Canada, to enforce or determine any right or obligation that is claimed or arises solely under or by virtue of the Agreement.
.
Exception
.
(3) Subsection (2) does not apply with respect to causes of action arising out of, and proceedings taken under, Section B of Chapter 9 or Article 11.‍22 of the TPP.

Right away is a red flag. If you are a private party, there may be instances where litigation is required to protect your interests (from unfair trade practices perhaps). However, the wording makes it clear that legal action is not possible here unless the Attorney General signs off on it.

As for the exceptions, Chapter 9, Section B refers to disputes among investors, and encourages the parties to resolve the problems themselves. Article 11.22 outlines dispute mechanisms for financial services.

Payment of expenditures
.
12 The Government of Canada is to pay its appropriate share of the aggregate of
(a) any expenditures incurred by or on behalf of the Commission,
(b) the general expenses incurred by the committees, working groups and other bodies established under the Agreement and the remuneration and expenses payable to representatives on the Commission and those committees and to members of those working groups and other bodies, and
(c) the expenses incurred by panels and arbitration tribunals established under the Agreement and the remuneration and expenses payable to the panellists on those panels, to arbitrators and to any experts retained by those panels or arbitration tribunals.

Not only will Canada be forced to pay its “share” for Commission expenses, but will in effect pay to set up an alternative quasi-judicial system. Not only will Canada have to pay for that, but legal and expert expenses, and any judgements awarded against.

Orders — Article 28.‍20 of TPP
.
13 (1) The Governor in Council may, for the purpose of suspending benefits in accordance with Article 28.‍20 of the TPP, by order, do any of the following:
(a) suspend rights or privileges granted by Canada to another party to the Agreement or to goods, service suppliers, investors or investments of investors of that party under the Agreement or any federal law;
(b) modify or suspend the application of any federal law, with respect to a party to the Agreement other than Canada or to goods, service suppliers, investors or investments of investors of that party;
(c) extend the application of any federal law to a party to the Agreement other than Canada or to goods, service suppliers, investors or investments of investors of that party; or
(d) take any other measure that the Governor in Council considers necessary.

The Governor in Council can apparently:

  • Suspend rights or privileges
  • modify or suspend application of Federal law
  • extend Federal law to others not previously included
  • Do anything else deemed necessary

Without clarification or at least guidance of the topic, this is extremely vague. Worse, is the Governor in Council can make these changes without requiring consent of the public.

Most of the rest of the Bill goes into detail about how tariffs on many different items will be reduced to zero.

However, like with most free trade agreements, Bill C-79 does not address an important topic: protection of jobs for people at home. That will be addressed later.

5. Sections Of CPTPP Text

While the agreement is very long, let’s look mainly at Article 9, as it has some of the more unsettling information in it. To be blunt, it removes nations’ abilities to protect their people from foreign competition. The downside to free trade.

Article 9.4: National Treatment
1. Each Party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no less favourable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments in its territory.
2. Each Party shall accord to covered investments treatment no less favourable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to investments in its territory of its own investors with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments.
3. For greater certainty, the treatment to be accorded by a Party under paragraphs 1 and 2 means, with respect to a regional level of government, treatment no less favourable than the most favourable treatment accorded, in like circumstances, by that regional level of government to investors, and to investments of investors, of the Party of which it forms a part.

This is basically the same language used in NAFTA, where no preference could be given to host countries. In short, it doesn’t matter if another party can outbid and outcompete you. Terms just as favourable must be given.

Article 9.5: Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment
1. Each Party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no less favourable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to investors of any other Party or of any non-Party with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments in its territory.
2. Each Party shall accord to covered investments treatment no less favourable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to investments in its territory of investors of any other Party or of any non-Party with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments.
3. For greater certainty, the treatment referred to in this Article does not encompass international dispute resolution procedures or mechanisms, such as those included in Section B (Investor-State Dispute Settlement).

This is much the same idea. If you treat a non-party (someone outside the agreement) a certain way, then a party within the agreement must get at least the same, if not better, treatment.

A bit misleading is the use of the term investment. Most people think of stocks and bonds as investments. While true, this agreement considers basically anything to be an investment. Here is a quote from the definitions section of Article 9.

investment means every asset that an investor owns or controls, directly or indirectly, that has the characteristics of an investment, including such characteristics as the commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption of risk. Forms that an investment may take include:
(a) an enterprise;
(b) shares, stock and other forms of equity participation in an enterprise;
(c) bonds, debentures, other debt instruments and loans;
(d) futures, options and other derivatives;
(e) turnkey, construction, management, production, concession, revenue-sharing and other similar contracts;
(f) intellectual property rights;
(g) licences, authorisations, permits and similar rights conferred pursuant to the Party’s law; and
(h) other tangible or intangible, movable or immovable property, and related property rights, such as leases, mortgages, liens and pledges,

Beyond the traditional sense of investments there is more. Any business itself, business contracts, property, or tangible or intangible items are also considered investments.

And what about countries wanting to nationalise (take public ownership), of their “investments”? Remember, under the definition provided, an investment is pretty much anything.

Article 9.8: Expropriation and Compensation
1. No Party shall expropriate or nationalise a covered investment either directly or indirectly through measures equivalent to expropriation or nationalisation (expropriation), except:
(a) for a public purpose
(b) in a non-discriminatory manner;
(c) on payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation in accordance with paragraphs 2, 3 and 4; and
(d) in accordance with due process of law.
2. Compensation shall:
(a) be paid without delay;
(b) be equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriated investment immediately before the expropriation took place (the date of expropriation);
(c) not reflect any change in value occurring because the intended expropriation had become known earlier; and
(d) be fully realisable and freely transferable.
3. If the fair market value is denominated in a freely usable currency, the compensation paid shall be no less than the fair market value on the date of expropriation, plus interest at a commercially reasonable rate for that currency, accrued from the date of expropriation until the date of payment.
4. If the fair market value is denominated in a currency that is not freely usable, the compensation paid, converted into the currency of payment at the market rate of exchange prevailing on the date of payment, shall be no less than:
(a) the fair market value on the date of expropriation, converted into a freely usable currency at the market rate of exchange prevailing on that date; plus
(b) interest, at a commercially reasonable rate for that freely usable currency, accrued from the date of expropriation until the date of payment.

This actually does make some sense, as it provides some protections to companies and insures that their property won’t just be converted into the government’s.

However, the wording is such that any legitimate measures a nation might make to go about its business might be construed as “expropriating” or as “nationalising”. The language seems worded poorly on purpose.

And it doesn’t mention that nations have legitimate interests in protecting the jobs of its people, and the local economy. Governments are supposed to protect their people first and foremost.

Article 9.9: Transfers
1. Each Party shall permit all transfers relating to a covered investment to be made freely and without delay into and out of its territory. Such transfers include:
(a) contributions to capital;
(b) profits, dividends, interest, capital gains, royalty payments, management fees, technical assistance fees and other fees;
(c) proceeds from the sale of all or any part of the covered investment or from
the partial or complete liquidation of the covered investment
;
(d) payments made under a contract, including a loan agreement;
(e) payments made pursuant to Article 9.7 (Treatment in Case of Armed Conflict or Civil Strife) and Article 9.8 (Expropriation and Compensation); and
(f) payments arising out of a dispute.

Pull the covered investments freely and without delay? Again, almost anything is an investment under this agreement. This actually has the potential to do serious harm. Businesses wishing to leave could pull all of their “investments” and drain the country of its wealth quite quickly.

Article 9.11: Senior Management and Boards of Directors
1. No Party shall require that an enterprise of that Party that is a covered investment appoint to a senior management position a natural person of any particular nationality.
2. A Party may require that a majority of the board of directors, or any committee thereof, of an enterprise of that Party that is a covered investment, be of a particular nationality or resident in the territory of the Party, provided that the requirement does not materially impair the ability of the investor to exercise control over its investment.

This ignores a basic reality. People are loyal first and foremost to their homes and their tribes. Do people want a bunch of foreigners, with in-group preference for their homelands to be controlling so much? Probably not, but free trade deals do not deal with nations, but “economic zones”.

Inserting a condition that it not “materially impair” is vague and open to interpretation. As such, it seems almost worthless.

Article 9 is the most troubling in the agreement. But it is worth addressing one point in Article 28, which covers dispute resolution.

Article 28.4: Choice of Forum
1. If a dispute regarding any matter arises under this Agreement and under another international trade agreement to which the disputing Parties are party, including the WTO Agreement, the complaining Party may select the forum in which to settle the dispute.
2. Once a complaining Party has requested the establishment of, or referred a matter to, a panel or other tribunal under an agreement referred to in paragraph 1, the forum selected shall be used to the exclusion of other fora.

An interesting detail, parties filing complaints can shop around. There is no fixed place to do so. While this sounds fine on the surface, such could be open to gaming the system.

6. Potential For Huge Job Losses

Companies close down and new ones start up. That is normal in a capitalist society. However, free trade deals in general pose a complication. When it becomes more advantageous (ie “cheaper”) to produce a good in another country, there is always a risk. What will stop a company from closing down, laying off all its staff, and relocating in the foreign nation? Legally, nothing, at least in many cases.

The previous pieces on NAFTA addressed some on the downsides to free trade deals. The CPTPP would likely cause the same sorts of issues.

Let’s use the United States as an example. It lost 3.4 million jobs to China between 2001 and 2017 due to “liberalized trade”. Further, another 879,000 jobs have been lost as a direct result of NAFTA.

Beyond the direct job losses, trade deals have the effect of driving down wages. This is especially true for manufacturing jobs, which are traditionally well paid. The reason is leverage. If a company can threaten to relocate in order to pay its (new) workers much less, then current employees can be forced to accept significantly less compensation. One reason tariffs are applied to goods is to counter the vast discrepancies that can exist between nations.

In very lopsided trading arrangements, the benefits are not equal. Again, referring to the US, trade deficits can balloon very quickly. While some surplus or deficit is inevitable, the trading relations cannot continue unless the parties benefit fairly equally. Large trade deficits drain wealth from a nation. This is money being taken out of the country and not being spent on people here.

The CPTPP addresses NONE of these issues. Is this a form of protectionism? Yes, and there’s nothing wrong with that.

7. Conclusions Regarding C-79 & CPTPP

NAFTA was tricky enough, even with just 3 nations, all on one continent. CPTPP has more, and it covers a much larger geographic area. The wealth discrepancies are even larger.

While this is touted as an economy growth tool, the CPTPP doesn’t indicate at all how the citizens will benefit. Under the “National Treatment” provisions, foreigners must be given the same considerations as locals. If it becomes more economical to lay off people and move assets, then it’s done. There can be no protection for locals, which is what a government should be doing.

Free trade agreements tend to create a “race to the bottom”. If it becomes more profitable to ship work and jobs to another country, it is done. Locals will have to accept far less in order to compete, driving down their standards of living.

Communities benefit when there is work and wealth. Exporting it for overall economic growth is cold, and reduces people to mere cogs in a machine.

Difficult to see how average people will benefit from CPTPP.

Pensions #2: Social Security Unable To Fully Pay Obligations By 2034

(Social Security Administration)

(2019 Annual Report to Congress)

(Signatories to the 2019 report)

1. Pensions, Benefits, Worker Entitlements

The public is often unaware of what is happening with their pensions and other social benefits. Often, changes are made with little to no input from the people who are directly impacted by it. Where exactly are the pension funds being held, and is it secure? Unfortunate, but we need to constantly be on top of these things.

2. Important Links

On the American situation:
CLICK HERE, for the 2019 Annual Report to Congress.

CLICK HERE, for an interesting powerpoint on liability calculation.
CLICK HERE, for a 2018 paper: UNFUNDED OBLIGATION AND TRANSITION COSTS FOR THE OASDI PROGRAM
CLICK HERE, for the Brookings Institute & privatization.

3. Side Note On Signatories

Although unrelated to the long term problems with the Social Security program, it is worth pointing out — as a side note — some scandals with 2 people involved. Steve Mnuchin, is long suspected or corruption, and Alex Acosta was the Prosecutor who previously let Jeffrey Epstein off on child sex charges.

4. Open-Group v.s. Closed Group Valuation


From this presentation. The author makes the assumption that “open-group valuation” should be used for public pensions such as Social Security, while private pensions should rely on “closed-group valuation” methods of accounting.

The difference is this:
Open-group valuation principles mean that a pension is solvent and in good shape as long as it’s current assets and payouts are able to keep up with the demands of retirees at the moment. It doesn’t require that the pension plan be fully funded. The reasoning is there is a “social contract”, and that the Government can raise more money (tax more) to cover the shortfalls.

Closed-group valuation principles require that “all” liabilities be taken into account. The is a far more accurate method, as payments from all workers are considered, if those who won’t retire for decades. The rationale is that private companies could go bankrupt at any time, and need to take the actual amounts into account.

For obvious reasons, the closed-group valuation method is a far more accurate approach in calculating the health of pension plans. It forces “all” assets and liabilities to be disclosed.

To be fair, it is a valid point that private pension funds cannot exactly just “take more money” to cover their shortfalls. Still, the open-group approach is very misleading.

5. The Approach Explained in 2018 Paper

1. Introduction In calculating the unfunded obligation of the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance (OASDI) program, we include the entire cost of paying scheduled benefits in full and on time, even after trust fund reserves are depleted. However, when the trust fund reserves are depleted, current law limits expenditures to the amount of continuing income received by the fund. Thus, the measures of unfunded obligation represent the shortfall of financial resources scheduled under current law to cover the cost associated with timely payment of scheduled benefits for the period.

The unfunded obligation for any program must be defined on the basis of the intended funding method for the program. Because the OASDI program is financed on essentially a current-cost or pay-as-you-go basis, the open group unfunded obligation measure is appropriate. Programs that are intended to be essentially fully advance-funded require the use of other measures, reflecting a closed group perspective, to assess their unfunded obligation (or liability). However, these closed group measures are more accurately described as theoretical measures of “transition cost” for the OASDI program. Estimates of the unfunded obligation vary depending on the valuation period and the assumptions used. Transition cost measures also vary depending on which plan participants are included.

(See this source.) This paper explains that the open-group valuation method is appropriate because people will always be paying into it. While this is a valid point, it doesn’t take away from the growing amount of unfunded liabilities.

In fact, it helps to conceal just how much the program owes and still is obligated to pay out. The only way this works is with an infinitely growing population, and ever growing contributions.

Basically, a giant Ponzi scheme, where participation is mandatory, under threat of arrest and detention.

6. Quotes From 2019 Report

In 2018 At the end of 2018, the OASDI program was providing benefit payments1 to about 63 million people: 47 million retired workers and dependents of retired workers, 6 million survivors of deceased workers, and 10 million disabled workers and dependents of disabled workers. During the year, an estimated 176 million people had earnings covered by Social Security and paid payroll taxes on those earnings. The total cost of the program in 2018 was $1,000 billion. Total income was $1,003 billion, which consisted of $920 billion in non-interest income and $83 billion in interest earnings. Asset reserves held in special issue U.S. Treasury securities grew from $2,892 billion at the beginning of the year to $2,895 billion at the end of the year.

Short-Range Results Under the Trustees’ intermediate assumptions, Social Security’s total cost is projected to be less than its total income in 2019 and higher than its total income in 2020 and all later years. Social Security’s cost has exceeded its non-interest income since 2010. For 2019, program cost is projected to be less than total income by about $1 billion and exceed non-interest income by about $81 billion.

This information is from the overview (Page 2). it states that on paper, the revenue generated (both from employee deductions and from interest/dividends generated was slightly higher than the payments it distributed.

On paper, this seems fine. However, getting to the “long-range results” it tells a different story. However, it still relies on the “open-group valuation” method.

The projected OASDI annual cost rate increases from 13.91 percent of taxable payroll for 2019 to 16.62 percent for 2040 and to 17.47 percent for 2093, a level that is 4.11 percent of taxable payroll more than the projected income rate (the ratio of non-interest income to taxable payroll) for 2093. For last year’s report, the Trustees estimated the OASDI cost for 2093 at 17.72 percent, or 4.36 percent of payroll more than the annual income rate for that year. Expressed in relation to the projected gross domestic product (GDP), OASDI cost generally rises from 4.9 percent of GDP for 2019 to about 5.9 percent by 2039, then declines to 5.8percent by 2052, and then generally increases to 6.0 percent by 2093.

For the 75-year projection period, the actuarial deficit is 2.78 percent of taxable payroll, decreased from 2.84percent of taxable payroll in last year’s report. The closely-related open-group unfunded obligation for OASDI over the 75-year period is 2.61 percent of taxable payroll, decreased from 2.68 percent of payroll in last year’s report. The open-group unfunded obligation for OASDI over the 75-year period is $13.9 trillion in present value and is $0.7 trillion more than the measured level of $13.2 trillion a year ago. If the assumptions, methods, starting values, and the law had all remained unchanged, the actuarial deficit would have increased to 2.90 percent of taxable payroll, and the unfunded obligation would have risen to about 2.74 percent of taxable payroll and $13.7 trillion in present value due to the change in the valuation date.

(Those quotes from page 4) Using the “open-group” method, the unfunded liabilities over 75 years is $13.9 trillion, or adding the equivalent of $185 billion/year. The authors also state a few blunt facts in the conclusion

Conclusion Under the intermediate assumptions, the projected hypothetical combined OASI and DI Trust Fund asset reserves become depleted and unable to pay scheduled benefits in full on a timely basis in 2035. At the time of depletion of these combined reserves, continuing income to the combined trust funds would be sufficient to pay 80 percent of scheduled benefits. The OASI Trust Fund reserves are projected to become depleted in 2034, at which time OASI income would be sufficient to pay 77 percent of OASI scheduled benefits. DI Trust Fund asset reserves are projected to become depleted in 2052, at which time continuing income to the DI Trust Fund would be sufficient to pay 91 percent of DI scheduled benefits.

Lawmakers have a broad continuum of policy options that would close or reduce Social Security’s long-term financing shortfall. Cost estimates for many such policy options are available at www.ssa.gov/OACT/solvency/provisions/

A few points to take away here
(A) Old Age Survivors Insurance (OASI) will become depleted in 2034, and only able to pay 77% of its obligations.
(B) Disability Insurance (DI) will be depleted in 2052, and only able to pay 91% of obligations by then.
(C) Raising deductions taken from employees is necessary.

But this is using open-group valuation methods of accounting. So how much

7. Getting An Answer On Unfunded Liabilities

It has been difficult getting an accurate answer on the true size of the Social Security deficit. Estimates range from $10 trillion to over $100 trillion.

The government cited $13.7 trillion in liabilities using the less accurate “open-group” valuation. Still, that is an awful lot of money, even if it is the full amount.

8. Why Not Reform Or Privatize?

The Brookings Institute explains in this article why efforts to privatize or reform Social Security have so far gone no where. Media scare is not the only reason for this.

Any transition to a private system must overcome a major financial hurdle, however. Social Security has accumulated trillions of dollars in liabilities to workers who are already retired or who will retire soon. To make room for a new private system, policymakers must find funds to pay for these liabilities while still leaving young workers enough money to deposit in new private accounts. This requires scaling back past liabilities – by cutting benefits – or increasing contributions from current workers. Most large-scale privatization plans also involve major new federal borrowing. Consequently, if a balanced budget amendment becomes part of the constitution, it would torpedo any attempt to replace most of Social Security with a private retirement system.

Privatizing Social Security can boost workers’ rate of return by allowing retirement contributions to be invested in private assets, such as stocks, which yield a better return than the present pay-as-you-go retirement system. Returns can be boosted still further if the government borrows on a massive scale to pay for past Social Security liabilities, allowing workers to invest a larger percentage of their pay in high-yielding assets. Exactly the same rate of return can be obtained, however, if the current public system is changed to allow Social Security reserves to be invested in private assets.

The article is blunt about the situation.

The system DEPENDS ON a constant inflow of new money from younger workers in order to stay solvent. If current workers were to start pulling their money from Social Security (and saving or investing elsewhere), the program would be immediately strapped for cash. This means benefits cuts to those receiving it, and higher premiums for those paying into it.

Of course, as workers who remain have to pay higher premiums, they, quite reasonably, will look for other options. This could easily create a snowball effect where more and more people pull their contributions. This will cause the collapse of Social Security.

So it’s not really the “privatization” boogeyman here. It is that the system needs an ever growing pool of new money to pay off retirees.

Yes, it’s a government run Ponzi scheme.

9. Government Pensions Are Ponzi Schemes

As was demonstrated in previous articles, the Canadian Pension Plan has almost a trillion dollars in unfunded liabilities. While claiming to have almost $400 billion in assets, the truth is that the full size of liabilities put it well in the hole.

The U.S. Social Security system faces the same issues, although the scope is worse. Even the open-group accounting method lists $13 trillion in liabilities.

There are efforts to “reform” which include: (a) raising premiums; (b) cutting benefits; and (c) raising the age of retirement. However, this may just be like shuffling the deck chairs on the Titanic. Futile. As long as a fund depends on paying off retirees with the contributions of workers, it is set up for failure.

Letting workers invest in private funds will hasten the demise, as it would deplete the funds needed to pay off existing retirees.

One has to shake their head. Bernie Madoff ran a Ponzi scheme and was sent to prison. As would any private citizen. But when the government does it, it’s called a social safety net.

Same conclusion as before: Americans are pretty screwed.

Pensions #1(C): Canada Pension Plan, Where Is The Money Going?

1. More On Pension Plans/Funding

CLICK HERE, for #1: CPPIB invests $2B in Mumbai, India.
CLICK HERE, for #2: CPP underfunded, money leaving Canada.

2. Important Links

CLICK HERE, for CPPIB Investing $2B In Mumbai, India.
CLICK HERE, for earlier piece on Canada Pension Plan.
CLICK HERE, for 2000 audit. $443B shortfall (Page 113)
CLICK HERE, for 2006 audit. $620B shortfall (Page 73). $67.9B added as of 2009.
CLICK HERE, for 2012 audit. $830B shortfall (Page 48)
CLICK HERE, for 2015 audit. $884B shortfall (Page 48)
CLICK HERE, for the 2019 CPPIB Annual Report.”

CLICK HERE, for getting your statement of earnings.
CLICK HERE, for CPP benefits for 2019 year.
CLICK HERE, for a generic investment calculator.

CLICK HERE, for a 2017 UN report on leveraging African pension funds for financing infrastructure development.
CLICK HERE, for 2019 report on development financing.
CLICK HERE, for closing infrastructure funding gap.

3. Obtain Your Statement Of Contributions

Any Service Canada should be able to help you apply for a copy of your statement of contributions. One tip is to do it after a tax assessment to get the most up to date information. You will need your social insurance number.

Also, you can request your statement by mail.
Contributor Client Services
Canada Pension Plan
Service Canada
PO Box 818 Station Main
Winnipeg MB R3C 2N4

Once you have received it, you will get a lot of new information you didn’t have before. Yes, I have mine from 2018, and am ordering a 2019 statement.

4. Information From Statement Of Contributions

A quote from the 2018 statement:

You and your employer each paid 4.95% of your earnings between the minimum of $3,500 and the maximum of $55,900 for 2018. These are called “pensionable earnings. Self employed individuals paid contributions of 9.9% on these amounts.
The maximum retirement pension at age 65 this year is $1,134.17 per month.

A few things to point out here:

You and your employer “both” paid 4.95% of your earnings between the minimum and maximum amounts. So if you made $25,000 then $21,500 of it would be taxable. Both you and your employer would have contributed $1,064.25 towards it. Combined is $2128.50.

Suppose you made over $55,900. Then $52,400 of it would have been taxable, and both you and the employer would have paid $2,593.80 into it. Combined is $5187.60.

Let address the elephant in the room. How much: (a) will CPP actually pay out for you; and (b) what would you make if you invested the CPP contributions yourself?

5. How Much Will CPP Pay Out For You?

Assuming retirement at age 65, and average life expectancy is 82. That gives 17 years, (204 months) of receiving pension contributions.

For the 2019 year, the maximum is listed as $1,154.58, and the average is $679.16. None of this covers Old Age Security (OAS) or Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS). Those are separate and fall outside of CPP.

The average earner:
($679.16/month)X(17 year)X(12 month/year) = $138,540

The top earner:
($1,154.58/month)X(17 year)X(12 month/year) = $235,534

For simplicity, inflation is ignored, as is indexing of contributions.

6. Invest Your Own CPP Contributions

Yes, contributions and interest rates vary, but for simplicity, let’s keep them consistent.

For the top earner, let’s do this scenario:
(a) Worked for 40 years
(b) Contributed full amounts
(c) Invested at 8% annually.

Yes, the interest is absurd, but CPPIB claims that is what it is getting. In fact, CPPIB states that it gets 6.6-18% interest on its fun each year.

Over $1.3 million. That is what you would have after 40 years, making full contributions, assuming those contributions (both yours and the employer’s) were fully invested. A far cry from the $235,000 that you would make from 17 years of CPP payouts. Over a million more in fact.

Even just a 3% return — which is very doable — would net you $390,000 over those 4 years. Almost double what CPP would be paying out.

For an average earner, let’s try different numbers:
(a) Worked for 30 years
(b) Earned ~$30,000 annually contributed $2,970
(c) Invested at 6% annually.

$235,000 the person would have earned. This is about $100,000 more than simply taking the average payouts from Canada Pension Plan.

Why the different numbers? Perhaps the person took several years off for childcare. Perhaps there were years with low earnings. And 6% is a more realistic return, although good luck getting that from a bank. To repeat, CPPIB claims 6-18% returns (after costs) annually.

To be fair, people who go decades without working are unlikely to ever be able to save and invest the equivalent of what CPP is paying out.

For example, my own statement of contributions estimates if I were magically 65 today. With only a decade of work, I would be getting $317/month. Over the next 17 years that would pay out about $65,000, far more than I would have put in.

But long term and steadily employed workers get screwed.

7. Performance CPPIB Claims In Investments

This was addressed in the previous piece. In the CPPIB Annual Reports, the Board claims to have staggering growth year after year. Of the years listed, the interest ranges from 6% to 18%.

Year Value of Fund Inv Income Rate of Return
2010 $127.6B $22.1B 14.9%
2011 $148.2B $20.6B 11.9%
2012 $161.6B $9.9B 6.6%
2013 $183.3B $16.7B 10.1%
2014 $219.1B $30.1B 16.5%
2015 $264.6B $40.6B 18.3%
2016 $278.9B $9.1 6.8%
2017 $316.7B $33.5B 11.8%
2018 $356.B $36.7B 11.6%
2019 $392B $32B 8.9%

Also, as outlined in the last article, the accounting method used also changes how your pension plan comes across. You can select your data, and paint a rosy picture. Or you can take ALL assets and liabilities into account.

When the Canada Pension Plan was properly audited in 2016, it was found to have $884.2 billion in unfunded liabilities. The 2019 Annual report lists $392 billion as the value of the fund. However, with over a trillion dollars in liabilities, that illusion came crashing down.

$239 billion in growth over the last decade, an 11% annual increase. But in spite of that, CPP is not paying out retirees anywhere near what they have put in.

Why? Where is the money going?

8. CPP Unfunded Liabilities Swept Under Rug

Here are quotes from some of the actuarial reports. Interesting how they go out of their way to gloss over the truth about the CPP. In 2 of the reports, the total unfunded liabilities are reduced to a mere footnote.

Page 113 in 2000 audit. Actuarial liability 486,682M Actuarial value of assets 43,715 or 9%, Unfunded liability 442,967M or 91% of total. That’s right, ten times as many liabilities as assets.


Page 73 in 2006 audit report. $619.9B in unfunded liabilities. Updated in 2009 to reflect another $67.9B on the interest (just the interest) of those unfunded liabilities.


Footnote from 2012 audit. When the “closed-group approach” is used to audit the program, the assets are $175.1 billion, actuarial liability of the Plan is equal to $1,004.9 billion, and the assets shortfall is equal to $829.8 billion

Footnote from 2015 audit. Using “closed-group approach” to audit, the actuarial liability of the Plan is equal to $1,169.5 billion, the assets are $285.4 billion, and the assets shortfall is equal to $884.2 billion

Despite the glowing reviews our politicians give, the Canada Pension Plan is not doing well. In fact, it has close to a trillion dollars in unfunded liabilities. This is not sustainable in the slightest.

Younger workers will be paying into a system they have no realistic hope of ever collecting on. Not a good social safety net.

By now you are probably wondering these things:
The CPP, for most people, will never actually pay out anywhere near the amount that the person contributes over their lifetime. This is on top of the nearly 1 trillion shortfall that the plan has. So if the plan won’t pay out fully, and yet is so broke, where is the money going?

Who is running the show?

9. Open-Group v.s. Closed-Group Valuation

The difference is this:
Open-group valuation principles mean that a pension is solvent and in good shape as long as it’s current assets and payouts are able to keep up with the demands of retirees at the moment. It doesn’t require that the pension plan be fully funded. The reasoning is there is a “social contract”, and that the Government can raise more money (tax more) to cover the shortfalls.

Closed-group valuation principles require that “all” liabilities be taken into account. The is a far more accurate method, as payments from all workers are considered, if those who won’t retire for decades. The rationale is that private companies could go bankrupt at any time, and need to take the actual amounts into account.

10. CPPIB Board Members Well Connected

Heather Munroe-Blum

  • Principal and Vice Chancellor (President), McGill University
  • Current Director of the Royal Bank of Canada
  • Hydro One (Ontario)
  • Trilateral Commission

Ashleigh Everett

  • Former Director of The Bank of Nova Scotia
  • Premier’s Enterprise Team for the Province of Manitoba

William ‘Mark’ Evans

  • Former member of the Management Committee at Goldman Sachs
  • Co-founded TrustBridge Partners in China (2006)
  • Kindred Capital in Europe (2016)

Mary Phibbs

  • Standard Chartered Bank plc
  • ANZ Banking Group
  • National Australia Bank
  • Commonwealth Bank of Australia
  • Allied Irish Banks plc
  • Morgan Stanley Bank International Ltd
  • The Charity Bank Ltd

Tahira Hassan
Kathleen Taylor

  • Chair of the Board of the Royal Bank of Canada
  • Director of Air Canada since May 2016
  • Chair since April 2019 of Altas Partners

Karen Sheriff

  • United Airlines
  • Director of WestJet Airlines

Jo Mark Zurel

Not proof of any wrongdoing, but the board is certainly connected to other institutions.

11. CPPIB Holdings (Foreign & Domestic)

Here are CPPIB’s Canadian holdings.
Here are CPPIB’s foreign holdings.

$44M in from Power Corporation (Desmarais)
$17M in Hydro One Ltd (Heather Munroe-Blum is former board member)
$555M in RBC (Heather Munroe-Blum is board member)
$292M in Scotia Bank (Sylvia Chrominska is former chair)

In fairness, there are hundreds of companies CPPIB invests in. But always keeping an eye out for potential conflicts of interest.

But having all of these assets (both within Canada and abroad), doesn’t really explain the trillion dollar shortfall. There has to be something else that the CPPIB is wasting Canadian pensioners’ retirement savings on.

12. Pensions Sent For UN Development Projects?

Yes, this sounds absurd, but consider this report from the UN about using pensions to leverage development projects. True, this report refers to African pension funds. But it is entirely possible that Canada could get involved (or already be involved) in some similar scheme.

III. PENSION FUNDS DIRECT INVESTMENT IN INFRASTRUCTURE
International experience At 36.6 percent of GDP, assets of the pension funds in OECD countries are relatively large. As of end-2013, pension-fund assets were even in excess of 100 percent in countries such as the Netherlands, Iceland, Switzerland, Australia, and the United Kingdom (Figure 1). In absolute terms, pension funds in OECD countries held $10.4 trillion of assets.25 While large pension funds (LPFs) held about $3.9 trillion of assets, assets in public and private sector and public pension reserves (PPRFs) stood at $6.5 trillion.

Individual pension funds can be relatively large in some countries such as the Netherlands (ABP at $445.3 billion and PFZW at $189.0 billion) and the U.S. (CalPERS at $238.5 billion, CalSTRS at $166.3 billion, and the New York City Combined Retirement System at $150.9 billion). Similarly, PPRFs are relatively large in the U.S. (United States Social Security Trust Fund at $2.8 trillion) and Japan (Government Pension Investment Fund at $1.2 trillion). Among emerging markets, South Africa (Government Employees Pension Fund (GEPF) at $133.4 billion) and Brazil (Previ at $72 billion) have the largest funds in Africa and Latin America, respectively.

Pension funds can dedicate a share of their assets specifically to infrastructure. Such direct investment in infrastructure is implemented through equity investment in unlisted infrastructure projects (through direct investment in the project or through a private equity fund). Such investment can also take the form of debt investment in project and infrastructure bonds or asset-backed security. In contrast, pension funds can allocate a share of their funds indirectly to infrastructure through investment in market-traded equity and bonds. Listed equity investment can take the form of shares issued by corporations and infrastructure project funds while debt investment is often in the form of corporate market-traded bonds.

As is plain from the text, (Page 10), the UN views pensions as a potential investment vehicle for their agendas. And is clear from the pages in the reports, the UN has been sizing up pension funds from all over the world.

This is more than just an academic exercise

IV. OBSTACLES TO PENSION FUNDS INVESTMENT IN INFRASTRUCTURE
The extent to which pension funds can invest in infrastructure depends on the availability of assets in the pension system. Asset availability, in turn, is driven by a number of factors including the pension system’s environment, design, and performance. Even in a well-performing pension system with ample assets available for investments, the governance, regulation, and supervision of pension funds can restrict those funds’ ability to actually invest in infrastructure. If such constraints are lifted, then pension funds need to consider the risks of infrastructure projects and demand a fair, transparent, clear, and predictable policy framework to invest in infrastructure assets. Once this hurdle is overcome, pension funds will need adequate financial and capital market instruments to implement their investment decisions.

Simple enough (page 13). Lift the regulations, and the pension money will be free to flow to UN development projects. And after all, who knows better about spending other people’s money?

The endless foreign aid gestures that our government engages in: is that really our pension money being sent abroad?

We can see from Table 2 (Page 16) that the UN has been sizing up:

  1. Canada Pension Plan ($173B in assets)
  2. Ontario Municipal Employees ($62B in assets)
  3. Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan ($128B in assets)
  4. Quebec Pension Plan ($39B in assets)

The recent OECD policy guidance for investment in clean energy, which is based on the PFI illustrates how policymakers can identify ways to mobilize private investment in infrastructure (OECD, 2015c). The policy guidance focuses on electricity generation from renewable energy sources and improved energy efficiency in the electricity sector, and provides a list of issues and questions on five areas of the PFI (investment policy, investment promotion and facilitation, competition policy, financial market policy, and public governance).

(Page 31) Clearly the UN is pushing its enviro agenda and suggesting that public pensions be used to finance at least part of it.

13. So Why Is CPP So Underfunded?

A number of factors most likely.

(A) Most pension plans are ponzi-style. In order to stay funded, it requires an ever growing number of contributors in order to pay off older contributors. Rather than having members who can sustain themselves, this is dependent on infinite growth.

(B) Although a person contributing to a pension in their career would “theoretically” be self-sufficient, it is clear the interest and gains are not what CPPIB pretends. If the fund was growing at 10%+ year over year, it would be different. We are not getting the full story.

(C) Public sector pensions are not sustainable either. So, very likely that some CPP money is being diverted to help cover the shortfalls.

(D) Due to political pressure, the powers that be find it more convenient to downplay the serious shortfalls rather than meaningfully address it. No political will to ask the hard questions.

(E) There has to be money going to outside projects, such as the UN plot to use pensions to fund their development agenda. The UN is a money pit, and the waste is probably enormous.

To repeat from the last post:
We are screwed.

SNC-Lavalin: Lobbying The Entire Legislature For Deferred Prosecution

1. Important Links

Previous Coverage:
CLICK HERE, for deferred prosecution agreement, Bill C-74.
CLICK HERE, for SNC Lavalin’s political connections.
CLICK HERE, for David Lametti, the AG who freed SNC-Lavalin, in return for a $200M kickback to McGill University.

CLICK HERE, for the Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying in Canada.

2. SNC-Lavalin Lobbied David Lametti Personally

CLICK HERE, for the report associated with the meeting between David Lametti and SNC Lavalin.That’s right. On May 30, 2017, almost 2 years before becoming Attorney General of Canada, David Lametti met with SNC-Lavalin over exactly this issue. The company was looking to have the laws changed regarding so-called “white collar crime”.

3. SNC-Lavalin Lobbied Gerald Butts

CLICK HERE, for the report. On February 23, 2017, Trudeau’s Chief of Staff, Gerald Butts, met with SNC-Lavalin to discuss the possibility of a deferred prosecution agreement, which would have allowed SNC to keep getting Canadian Government contracts.

4. SNC-Lavalin Lobbied Finance Minister Bill Morneau

CLICK HERE, for the report. On October 16, 2018, SNC-Lavalin lobbied the sitting Finance Minister, Bill Morneau. One of the topics discussed was the creation of alternatives for white collar crime, or the DPA.

5. Privy Council Clerk Michael Wernick Lobbied

CLICK HERE, for the report. Lavalin actually lobbied the Clerk of the Privy Council, Michael Wernick, in the hopes of getting the DPA.

Also worth noting is that there is a HUGE conflict of interest here. Kevin Lynch, Chairman of SNC-Lavalin, among other roles, was Clerk of the Privy Council. He clearly still has access to the Council. (Taken from his BMO profile.)

6. SNC-Lavalin Lobbied Group Of MPs

CLICK HERE, for the report of the meeting. As before, one common item keeps coming up: changes to policies regarding white collar crime (a.k.a. the deferred prosecution agreement).

One thing that needs to be mentioned: Peter Van Loan is a CONSERVATIVE Member of Parliament. So much for this being a Liberal-only problem.

7. CONSERVATIVE Senator Larry Smith Lobbied

CLICK HERE, for the report. Lavalin has actually taken to lobbying at least one Conservative Senator.

8. List Of Public Figures Lobbied (DPA)

(Source is here.)
Dean Allison, Member of Parliament | House of Commons
Omar Alghabra, Parliamentary Secretary | Global Affairs Canada (GAC)
Navdeep Bains, Minister | Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada (ISED)
Simon Beauchemin, Advisor | Prime Minister’s Office (PMO)
Stefanie Beck, Assistant Deputy Minister | Global Affairs Canada (GAC)
Karl Belanger, Chief of Staff | Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC)
Mathieu Belanger, Director of Policy | Infrastructure Canada (INFC)
Susan Bincoletto, Assistant Deputy Minister and Chief Trade Commissioner | Global Affairs Canada (GAC)
Michael Binder, President and Chief Executive Officer | Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC)
Richard Botham, Assistant Deputy Minister | Finance Canada (FIN)
Mathieu Bouchard, Senior Advisor | Prime Minister’s Office (PMO)
Scott Brison, Member of Parliament | House of Commons
Gianluca Cairo, Chief of Staff | Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada (ISED)
Rebecca Caldwell, Chief of Staff | Status of Women Canada (SWC)
Zoe Caron, Chief of Staff | Natural Resources Canada (NRCan)
Celina Cesar-Chavannes, Member of Parliament | House of Commons
Francois-Philippe Champagne, Minister of Infrastructure and Communities | Infrastructure Canada (INFC)
Jim Carr, Minister | Global Affairs Canada (GAC)
Ben Chin, Chief of Staff | Finance Canada (FIN)
Brian Clow, Director | Prime Minister’s Office (PMO)
Martin Crevier, Legislative Assistant to Peter Schiefke | House of Commons
Roger Cuzner, Member of Parliament | House of Commons
Kathleen Davis, Special Assistant | Prime Minister’s Office (PMO)
Bernie Derible, Senior Policy Advisor | Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC)
Rebecca Dixon, Advisor | Senate of Canada
Percy Downe, Senator | Senate of Canada
Scott Driscoll, Vice President and Chief Compliance and Ethics | Export Development Canada (EDC)
Pierre-Luc Dusseault, Member of Parliament | House of Commons
Mark Eyking, Member of Parliament | House of Commons
Greg Fergus, Member of Parliament | House of Commons
Marc Fortin, Assistant Deputy Minister | Infrastructure Canada (INFC)
Kelly Gillis, Deputy Minister | Infrastructure Canada (INFC)
Mark Glauser, Director General | Global Affairs Canada (GAC)
Pamela Goldsmith-Jones, Member of Parliament | House of Commons
Paul Halucha, Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet | Privy Council Office (PCO)
Tasha Hanes, Chief of Staff | Finance Canada (FIN)
Jamie Innes, Director of Parliamentary Affairs | Global Affairs Canada (GAC)
Diamond Isinger, Special Assistant | Prime Minister’s Office (PMO)
Phil Jennings, Associate Deputy Minister | Natural Resources Canada (NRCan)
Stephen Kelly, Chief of Staff | Senate of Canada
Jay Khosla, Assistant Deputy Minister | Natural Resources Canada (NRCan)
Jean-Frederique Lafaille, Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet | Privy Council Office (PCO)
Paul Lefebvre, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Natural Resources | Natural Resources Canada (NRCan)
Andrew Leslie, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs | Global Affairs Canada (GAC)
Gavin Liddy, Associate Deputy Minister | Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC)
Stephen Lucas, Deputy Minister | Environment and Climate Change Canada (ECCC)
Steve MacKinnon, Member of Parliament | House of Commons
David Maloney, Member of Parliament | House of Commons
Elder Marques, Senior Advisor | Prime Minister’s Office (PMO)
Brian Masse, Member of Parliament | House of Commons
Remi Masse, Member of Parliament | House of Commons
John McCallum, Ambassador of Canada to the People’s Republic of China | Global Affairs Canada (GAC)
David McGovern, Associate Deputy Minister | Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada (ISED)
Duane McMullen, Director General | Global Affairs Canada (GAC)
Michael McNair, Executive Director | Prime Minister’s Office (PMO)
David McNaughton, Ambassador of Canada to the United States | Global Affairs Canada (GAC)
Marc Miller, Member of Parliament | House of Commons
Grant Mitchell, Senator | Senate of Canada
Martin Moen, Director General | Global Affairs Canada (GAC)
Renze Nauta, Director of Policy and Planning | House of Commons
Kyle Nicholson, Special Assistant, Policy | Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC)
Julian Ovens, Chief of Staff | Global Affairs Canada (GAC)
Tracey Ramsey, Member of Parliament | House of Commons
Phil Rheault, Senior Policy Advisor | Global Affairs Canada (GAC)
Paul Rochon, Deputy Minister | Finance Canada (FIN)
Kim Rudd, Member of Parliament | House of Commons
Tim Sargent, Deputy Minister | Global Affairs Canada (GAC)
Dev Saxena, Policy Advisor | Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada (ISED)
Sandra Schwartz, Senior Policy Advisor | House of Commons
Andrew Scheer, Leader of the Official Opposition | House of Commons
Richard Sexton, President and CEO | Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL)
Judy Sgro, Member of Parliament | House of Commons
Miguel Simard, General Counsel | Export Development Canada (EDC)
Jagmeet Singh, Leader of the New Democratic Party of Canada | House of Commons
Rick Stewart, Assistant Deputy Minister | Finance Canada (FIN)
Catrina Tapley, Secretary to the Cabinet (Operations) | Privy Council Office (PCO)
Owen Teo, Director of Policy | Global Affairs Canada (GAC)
Justin To, Director of Policy and Policy Advisor | Prime Minister’s Office (PMO)
Chrystine Tremblay, Deputy Minister | Natural Resources Canada (NRCan)
Shawn Tupper, Associate Deputy Minister | Natural Resources Canada (NRCan)
David Usher, Ambassador of Canada to Argentina | Global Affairs Canada (GAC)
Michael Wernick, Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to the Cabinet | Privy Council Office (PCO)
Steve Verheul, Assistant Deputy Minister | Global Affairs Canada (GAC)
Howard Wetston, Senator | Senate of Canada
Yuen Pau Woo, Senator | Senate of Canada
Ava Yaskiel, Associate Deputy Minister | Finance Canada (FIN)
Martin Zablocki, President and CEO | Canadian Commercial Corporation (CCC)

I might have missed a few, but this is still pretty extensive.

To reiterate, all of these meetings took place during the period when SNC-Lavalin was lobbying for a DPA.

8. Opposition Leader Andrew Scheer Lobbied

CLICK HERE, for report. On May 29, 2018, Andrew Scheer, Opposition Leader, and supposedly a “Conservative” was also lobbied by SNC-Lavalin. This could explain why he is so open to giving Lavalin the deferred prosecution, in spite of the corruption. He’s controlled as well.

9. NDP Leader Jagmeet Singh Lobbied By SNC

CLICK HERE, for the report. Jagmeet Singh, yes the NDP leader, was “also” lobbied by SNC-Lavalin. One of the topics was “changes related to white collar crime”. Of course, this is a euphemism for the DPA (deferred prosecution agreement). Is the entire legislature in on this? Might be, from the number of Senators and MPs involved.

10. Lobbyists Bruce Hartley & William Pristanski

Also worth noting, SNC-Lavalin has two professional shills (I mean lobbyists), Bruce Hartley and William Pristanski. Both are lobbying specifically in relation to obtaining a DPA for SNC-Lavalin.

11. Is This Why Opposition So Tepid?

It seems that all parties are in on it.

Is all the bickering in the House of Commons just for show? Does SNC-Lavalin have the entire legislature in their pockets?